berculosis. caroline harrison, this sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's original series. first ladies, examining the public and private lives of the women who filled the position of first lady and their influence on the presidency. from martha washington to michelle obama. on american history tv on c-span3. >> each week american history tv sits in on a lecture with one of the nation's college professors. you can watch at 8:00 anded a midnight. next u.s. air force academy professor mark wells talks about the roll of bombers and allied planes during world war ii. he also describes the progression in air technology. colonel wells argues that they cut off german transportation

and helped bring about the end of the war. his class is about 55 minutes. >> have a seat, thanks. all right. folks, today's lesson is a combined bomber offensive. i've only got about 50 minutes to talk to you about something that's very important. not just in terms of military history and air power history in terms of history of our air force. we're going to talk about any number of things. i'm going to get through it. you're going to have follow along and take notes. some of these overheads are busy. so you're going to take down the most important features. we're going to talk about the bomber barons.

a little bit about bomber command air war from 1935 to 19 45. remember we came into the war from the british point of view relatively late. and then we'll summarize what the overall impact of the combined bomber offensive. we call it combined because this is a mutual effort on the part of great britain and the united states. here's the takeaway. here's the thesis for today. the combined bomber american daylight precision bombing and british night area bombing was vital to allied victory by significantly reducing german industrial production i would add the victorian army. now that we've read professor

david bittles book rhetoric in reality you can kind of draw the comparison between my thesis and potentially what you read there. let's stewart the bomber barons. this should be review for you, right? trencharde duhaet and mitchell. somebody want to summarize the difference between their views encabs lated -- encapsulated in a few sentences? >> in short you had duhet was talking about basically terror bombings and destroying the love the people by attacking them making them afraid. trencha rferings d was -- trenchard was destroying their means. mitchell was a little bit of a

combination of both. mark: ok. so morale attacks. terror bombing and mitchell and subsequently to do industrial bombing, destroy the network ability to wage war. anyone remember who sir charles portal and sir author harris were? british r.e.f. leaders who took the doctrine of the prewar years and made it a reality for the british. everybody knows who sir winston churchhill is. comes into power shortly after the fall of france and is the stall wark political leader. we'll talk about him a little bit more in his views of bombing and lord beaverbrook is in charge of british aircraft production, industrial production.

you may be left familiar with pansle. he's been an instructor at the air corps tactical school. and his job is to actually write out the plan that we will use that is take the doctrine that they've studied for a couple of decades and make it a plans reality. these are the folks that make this air campaign a reality. two dock trins, two strategies. the british view as rachel said is that bombing should as its principle target enforce enemy morale, to disrupt their company

and they see this bombing campaign is sort of integral to the rest of the british armed forces. but some of the folks in the royal air force and sir author who takes command in february of 1942 believes that air power can do it alone. air power is -- strategic air power and long range bombing has a war winning capability. once again by attacking workforce by attacking factories, the enemy morale will suffer and they'll give up. the american view is much more scientific. classically sort of american view of war. emphasis on technology. once again by way of review. we've talked about what goes on at the air corps tactical school. there are senses that the enemy status is like an organism. once certain parts of that infrastructure or industry

attack the war-making capability of that enemy would be destroyed. america comes up with technology to implement that vision in the 1920's and 1930's. large, four-engine capable bombers, fast, well armed capable of carrying large bomb loads and in at least the american view self-defending with another defensive fire power to make sure they make it to target whatever the enemy defense. is and we've talked a little bit about the norton bomb site. this apparatus developed in the 1930's incidentally top secret until 1955 was designed to permit bombing with high altitude with accuracy and precision. the american view is that these bombing raids could be conducted

with accuracy during the day lying. the british had that view but as you can see their experience in the war from 1939 to 1944 convinced them to change it, alter their view ever so slightly. i want to talk about the r.a.f. war first. remember they had gone to war in 1939. and found themselves immediately on the defensively particularly after the fall of france in 1940 in the subsequent battle of britain. the british were beleaguered in the theater. set back in the balkans. left bomber command these young men who are going to fly these british bombers as the only real instrument to carry the war to germany. early on they tried to do that. but they discovered they had inadequate technology that

german defenses were every bit as cameable as british defenses had been during the battle of britain. and a result of losses just in the first year, year and a half, the british decided they were going to try to switch tonight area bombardment. what are some of the problems associated with that? nick? nick: the amount of problems about bombing at night. the brits had developed path finders yet. so overall the lack of navigation by instruments was a huge deal especially at night. they had trouble even finding these large cities that they needed to bomb. second, the german developed quite comprehensive night find irdefense force. they would put radar on the front and take them out at night

before the bombers could even see them. and i imagine bomb damage assessment was pretty tough to at night deciding on whether to hit your target. mark: excellent. excellent. i think you're exactly right of we have limitations, navigation difficulty with reliability, intelligence all those sorts of things. the british find out after doing sort of an options research, a study of the whole issue that less than one bomb in three only 1/3 of the bombs were landing within five miles of the target. so the vision that rachel was talking about factories to reduce morale quickly went out the window. and what they discovered was if they were going to have any impact at all they were going to have large target areas which for them meant big cities.

1942, they get a new start in a sense. sir author harris takeovers the command of bomber command. he has a long history with r.e.f. he was born in south africa. as we discussed before he doesn't particularly like the nazi germans and he's perfectly prepared to attack cities in great numbers. about the time he arrives a couple of things have happened technologically. the british aircraft industry is building larger bombers. they started the war with two-engine bombers, and certainly by the spring of 1942, the halifax, short sterling and the lancaster are coming online. british scientists also to overcome this navigation problem, the problem of finding a target at night develop a

couple of electronic navigation aids, i won't go into detail. one is called o.b.o. and one is called g. these are electronic means for the british bomber crews to find german targets at some distance from britain using electronic grid and that kind of technology. not terribly accurate but much better than what they had been using. and i think nick mentioned the word "path finders." what that really means is they take the cream of the crop, the very best navigator who are def recking, to shooting the stars to this to find the target to find the city. these path finder airplanes would drop the equivalent of star shells and incendiaries on

the city to set a small fire that subsequent british bombers could attack. there's much talk in the modern air force about stealth and electronic countermeasures right? we measure in some sense the eff cassy of our modern air force by our domination of the electromagnetic environment. but that war really starts as early as 1942. i want you to picture in your mind, british bombers taking off one after another in the early evening towards the pitch dark of the night only a few minutes apart as many as 600 or 700 over colon, 1,000 bombers and a bomber stream led by path finders, right? the fires go off and the subsequent bomber flies over the

city and drops their bombs on the fire. that's kind of -- and in the meantime the germans are using radar technology and fighters to try to stop this. watch -- watch this video clip here. >> the bombing would crush german industrial capacity. at this time we were getting better. lancaster was coming out in great numbers. we were losing the lesser efficient sterling and halifax. we were getting better radar devices. and we had extremely good navigators selected navigators and this was the essence of the whole thing. and these navigators were able to get much closer to a naming point than we had previously.

then we laid great lanes of flares hundreds of flares. even if we missed the aiming flares we would name a great feature on the ground like a lake or a bend in the river and from there we could creep on to the target and put flares down and different colored flares and later on we got target indicators and these you would just imagine a great bunch of incandescent grapes falling from 2,000, 4,000 whatever we wanted them to -- to detonate from. >> at the end of july, 1943, they deployed improving technology with devastating effect on hemberg. >> the hemberg raid is one of the the most infamous as a result of the summer conditions, the size of the raid and sort of

a tactical failure on the part of the german air defense. the city exploded into a firestorm in more than 30,000 35,000 civilian casualties resulted on the german side. it certainly caught the german's attention. their armment minister albert spear said subsequent to the war if the british had done that five or six more times he wasn't sure about german civilian morale and their willingness to continue. that may have been an overstatement. let me show you about british bombing technology. the lancaster at the top, the sterling and the halifax these three aircrafts were the principle four-engine heavy bombers that carried the british bombers command air war. if you look real close you'll noit that the typical bomb load for these aircrafts are much higher than the b-17 which is is

american. the difference, of course is in the the defensive armment in the numbers of machine guns designed to protect the b-17. british typically flew with an air crew of only six or seven where the americans had as many as 10. many of them gunners to defend the bomber. the british had a smaller air force and they were terribly concerned about man power. so at one point some of these british bombers were flying with a pilot and no co-pilot which is problematic if the pilot is wounded in action. many of them trained their flight engineers to be able to fly straight and level. british casualties during this campaign were horrific. about 56,000 airmen were killed, killed wounded or missing in bomber commands. casualties approached 50%. so it was very much a war of

attrition certainly between 1943 and 1945. every night, every day harris would circle with a china marker a german city that he intended to destroy. and every night the british bombers would head off to do that with results that if we set -- the moral issues aside for a moment, we'll talk about that at the end of the class maybe the military results were mixed. largely because of weather, continuing problems with accuracy. german air defense. targeting and intelligence. but by 1942 there's a rescuer right? insight. this graphic sort of shows --

dock turn grandfather billy mitchell and the man on the right as you look at it, i guess -- no, that would be your right is possum hansel. haywood hansel. the author of this "awpd 1." and he had treated this almost as a mathematical calculation. how many bombers would it take to defeat germany? how many targets? how long? there's almost as many in quality this calculation. it's very much in line with the american way of war. the scientific engineering project. as i recall he calculated about 5,000 bombers would be necessary. it turns out he miss calculated. and he made some assumptions about the nature of the j german

industry, the nature of highly industrialized police state like nazi germany. our ability to get there and bomb the correct targets. he also made assumptions about how these bombers, how effective they would be fighting their way through german defenses. he underestimated law straits and to some extent even the existence and vulnerability of the correct german target array. those of you who have taken military thought class will understand that this is a problem of cause and friction. this is the chart that we've used before but it shows his notion of a highly industrialized nazi state, their

ability to wage war and in notion around this web or targets that if a combination of one or more, two or more three or more had been taken out then the web itself would be taken out. that was the notion. so early in 1942, we put this into practice. and early on, his notions appear to work. i'll show you the aircraft here momentarily. but american air crews flying b-17 and b-24 were willing to hit targets in ruin and st. nazir. these are targets on the periphery of france. losses are low. accuracy is high. we get pretty comfortable.

it looks like those prewar assumptions, bombing accuracy and all the rest are going to pay off. well, we get a rude awakening. and that relates to attacking targets deeper in germany. not going to win the war. not going to have this vision of strategic bombardment and collapsing the nazi industrial web without going to targets deeper into germany. and when they try that, they find all sorts of problems. first of all, even finding the correct targets is difficult. the germans aren't forth coming with factories are, where their engine factories or their tank factories and what we discover during the course of this and most certainly subsequently is

that german industry is already dispersed to a significant degree and during the war disperses even more. as with all warfare the enemy has something to say about it. german air defenses are strong. for their failures in the battle of britain, the germans have learned the value of strong air defense. they built a radar line -- an air defense network every bit as robust in many ways even more robust than the british had built. and tetch aircraft that was left capably defensively are very cable of flying good air defense. the m.e.-110. the j.o.e.-88 are heavily armed. and they can fly at night or use standoff weapons to attack american bombers. and of course, the bomber isn't as invulnerable as those

doctrineer rass at the tackity school had thought it would be. we'll get back to that momentarily. any time you talk to air operations or the history of air campaigns from the first world war to today, you have to consider the environment weather an impact -- and whether the impacted weather. the weather over central germany and central europe even in high summer very often features some days that the ground is on cure more than 50% of the time. remember this is daylight bombing and not for the most part aided by radar bombing does come in towards the end of the war but it's very rudimentary. this is the big question -- why did these guys not figure out that they needed some sort of fighter escort? the truth of the matter even at the air corps tactical school as we talked there are people who

talked about long range fighter escort and the need for fighter escort. the issue is really one of technology. in the 1920's and 1930's bombers were bigger and faster and had far better high altitude performance than did fighter plane. the only way a fighter plan can catch up is to be as big as heavy, as -- with more engines. and that reduced ilts maneuverbility and capability. and it wasn't until late that fighter technology was developing more powerful inline that started to cauch. then there was the problem of still of limited range. 1,000 horsepower could drink gas very quickly. there were discussions of drop tanks even in the late 1930's and early 1940's. the problem with the drop tank was the danger of carrying 250

gallon drop tanks on the bottom of the airplane. there's a certain safety factor. reality, leaks. then they found well, if we carry drop tanks that reduces the maneuverbility of fighters and if we were trying to penetrate an air defense what the germans dwowl is use their fighters to meet us early on which then would force our drop tank carrying fighters to do what? drop their tanks and they get no sfrang that -- any of that. so it wasn't as if they ignored this. and they certainly had a sense that bombers were going to be challenged. they thought that the bombers under those circumstances would be able to penetrate that sort of crust layer of defense and be relatively be unimposed. they made the assumptions that the germans in this case

wouldn't construct an air defense in depth. you understand the difference between primster and crust defense vs. crust and depth. they had questions about the americans bombing during daylight and try to convince roosevelt and churchhill to make the americans shift from nighttime bombing to daytime bombing. in 1943, two great decisions made. one of these decisions you could argue has the direct impact on the history of the united states air force connected to the bomber offensive. ira a taciturn texan who had been in charge of the early command in france convinces churchhill that it's important to bomb the germans around the

clock, give them no respite. and he agrees. anybody know what is the second thing to come out of the casa blanca conference that's important? >> the decision to execute operation overlord. mark: overlord but also to demand unconditional surrounder on the part of the germans. -- surrender on the part of the germans. so the americans are ready to go deep into germany with long range strategic daylight. against target and in industrial web, one of those targets is ball bearings. you knockout ball bearings the germans collapse. the german war machine collapses.

>> they could not tell that time was going wrong. british weather helped to offset the americans. unexpected low clouds delayed the takeover. result it refueled and rearmed was waiting for them. >> well, we didn't expect an attack coming that far into the country. and without fighter escort and we were very astonished. >> victor. victor. ♪

>> it has been the result of very good conditions in fear of the german fighters and the fact that we could bring about about all our fighters in operation to intercept the bomber stream. this all together has favored our -- shots. >> 21 flying fortresses were lost before the first bomb fell. -- were shot before the first bomb fell. >> the first evasion coming in -- >> over shwanford in 1943, the americans lose 60 bombers each representing almost 20% of the attack force. on the second raid almost 200 of the 300 airplanes would go in

and have some kind of battle damage. call it black thursday. american daylight bombing unescorted fails. and they are forced to stand down. we don't go back to germany for almost five months. thought i'd show you what a b-looks like. -- b-17 looks like? magnificent airplane. the people who flew b-24's liberator are just as proud of their airplane as the folks who flew this airplane. this is the one that gained all the fame and fortune. 10-man crew. top speed of about 255 260. carried about a 4,000 bomb load. ranged effectively about 2,000

miles. early attempts were made to make these aircraft more self-defending flying in combat boxes. large numbers setting up interlocking fuels of fire of those machine guns to try to ward off german fighters but as we've seen not terribly effective. so what -- what changes? or what has caused these problems is the better? let's start with that? i think we've mentioned some of these already. weather, mechanical failure. air crews faced with these casualties. get tired. have to take a break. sent for a couple of weeks away from what is in their view almost certain death with 50% casualties. we were never as accurate as we want. the airplanes were never as

reliable as we wanted. and sometimes in a misfortune chance and bad luck. one of the takeaway for today's class is this the case of technological fanaticism. is this trying to show a scientific approach to war that couldn't be carried out? but something will change. and here's some of the major changes. the airplane that went from drawing board to production initially not that capable with an american engine in it. an officer in europe made the suggestion that the engine in the airplane a p-51 mustang be

replaced by a merlin engine which is the same engine in the american one. basically in the spring of 1944, the newly reengined p-51 mustang arrives in europe with ranges now as far as 850 miles which extends it deep into germany. 850 miles out. 850 miles back. this is the typical mission for a bomb group. during that period, you can see the complexity of their operations. these p-51 escorts wouldn't necessarily fly the whole route of it. it would fly in relay to provide cover for the bombers.

and on the advice of leadership and fighter command these aircraft were free from close escort and free to do hunting of german fighters. and on top of that on the way back instead of flying directly back, they could go at low altitude and attack ground targets. once again in a sense the u.s. eight air force had lost their battle by the fall of 1943. by the spring of 1944 and certainly by the summer of 1944 because of the introduction of long range p-51's and improved technology for p-47's with drop tanks and p-38's we won what we had lost.

it's a new ballgame. in the meantime general acker had been replaced by jimmy dolittle. it wasn't fair for acker. he had let it through its most difficult time and on the verge of this new -- this change, he was promoted in a sense and sense of the mediterranean now the allies directly in contact with the german army and subsequently the italian campaign. jimmy dolittle had a command of 16 airplanes now is command of the world's largest air force in a sense. p-51's and as a result of some of the difficulties with target

selection we were gradually narrowing the targets. after casa blanca there was a sense of targeting the german air force. targeting the german air force. there were some sub targets as well. princeably that meant the german factories, engine factories. even then, even with the p-51 and long range escort, that targeting array the results were mixed in terms of the ability to hit the target. and the germans were dispersing targets. but one of the impact was and you see it on this bullet air attrition over the reich. the germans are compelled now to fight increasing numbers of allied aircraft, british at night. american during the day with fighters and the germans are going to lose this battle of attrition.

what i call the death of the german air force. let's look at some of the details of their operations. i said early in the spring we were going after the german air force by factories. what's coming up in the summer of 1944? overlor. our main effort to come to grips with the germans on the land, satisfying the police from russia a clear sense of the way this war would end is by invasion and by driving into nazi germany. this was the main event. as a result of that we were -- i mentioned we were having some success in the war of attrition over the air, but now the allies

take a step back and there's a bit of an argument. general eisenhower supported some by members of the british staff, want to shift the targets of these strategic bombers both bomber campaign the r.e.f. to target closer in support of overlor. to targets in france the transportation targets to isolate the normandie battlefield. airmen resist. marshall harris goes nuts. doesn't want to do that. thinks it will take away. he's been circling german cities with increasing number cities one a night. he wants to continue. they want to do the same thing. they're thinking they want to make an impact. general eisenhower said thanks for share hag we me.

we need to go. so we shift targets again. back to transportation targets and a lot more operational targets in france to prep d-day. we also begin to hit some oil production targets. now, we had tried oil as early as 1942 when you think of the poesti raid which ended in near-disaster, there had been some attempts at oil with mixed results. but increasingly it becomes apparent that oil targets are going to pay off. we know the result of the -- the campaign to isolate the normandie battlefield. it's very successful. jer man transportation attempts train the bridges in france are destroyed. the battlefield is isolated. american and allied forces land quite successfully in normandie. it's fair to say even surprising

ourses. but the germans are incablet of reacting as quickly or as effectively. they're paralyzed in a sense. they also have fuel problems. moving on the battlefield is difficult for them because of allied tack any cal error. shortly after the landings, after the breakout which occurs in the summer of 1944, by fall of 1944 eisenhower releases the bombers to return to a campaign against germany. september, october of 1944 and sboop 1945. listen to me carefully. in the last seven months of the war, bomber command and dropped 60% of all the bombs they dropped in germany in the second world war. and now we focus on two targets.

oil and transportation. what's the effect? the germans had been using not just natural oil from the polesti places and other places but had developing synthetic oils. the synthetic plant that produces nitrogen which is a environment component against musicians. it even affectsing aing a culture, right? they come into attack. by early into 1945, german industry and more warrior the

war machine begins to collapse. not because they're not producing lots of stuff but because they can't marry these component parts. right in the first two years, three years of the war, we had been bombing factorying. they had been dissushing factorying. with oil and transportation under attack their difficulties are going to get much, much worse. one of the things i think is worth thinking about is its impact on german aviation. if you take out and reduce oil production by 90%, the ability at the german air force to train the aviators to climb

substantially. there was a complaint -- the senior german general, yodel complained they couldn't train paint drivers because they were running out of oil. if you were a call -- the germans still highly capable in trying to deend this themselves. the counter-attack in. they figured they had less than a week to carry out a fuel attack. and in even some cases even carried houses to get the fuel out of allied vehicle. >> early in the war it was based on mobility. and it was losing by 1944, 1945 because incable of moving any longer. it was incableable and also to the battle of the bum g

effectively attacking in daylight. one of the reasons why the battle of the bowl was on the 16th of december 1944 was because it was in the middle of bad weather. one of the net results of this ally campaign that has so reduced the german air force by attrition and its inability to fly due to its innovation of fuel. take a look. the attack on oil, remember we said we've gone back to plowesi by august of 1944. this was the plan in romain y. 90% of and in some cases down to 5, 6 part.

drs.%. and the attack on railways and waterways. the allies rule the sky. so. let's talk about impact. this was not an easy battle. what have we said in -- what have we said in previous you glasses. the air power advocates of the 1930's 1940, suggested that the pau how we are could win a game by itself. that was it's going be quick decisive and quick this war

demonstrated it was anything but. it was an air war of attrition. 42 british airmen dead. a total i said of 556 thouks. but the borme 10,000 aircraft loss. 26 thousands total cap casualties. 6200 air crafment the germans lost as many or more. this is not a question this is not a blood list. this is not the kind of war that thosed a vowcates antied. a total of 1.6 million 10s of bombs were dropped. what did they do? when i say the effect on

aircraft production mix. but the germans still capable of and make lots and lots and lots of airplanes. if you look at post war bomb damage surveys and photographers. you see german air force under need trees and stuff. but many of them aren't completed in terms of parts. they could not go get get these airplanes together and they couldn't fly very effectively. german pilots. are going into battle with as few as 50 flight how we ares as pilots. they didn't have the gasoline to train. aviation gasoline i set down to two%. and if the german sweat from the

sky. so what were the ally -- what were the german -- i beg your pardon what was strategic bombing contribution. this is where we come with grips with rhetoric and reality. a great title. i believe that ask the question "wasn't decisive" is the wrong dwow ask. i'm not parsing my words. it was a rereck zit for normandie. it was vital to victory. and sure informs it was a war of attrition. no questions. what did it do? it didn't eliminate german production.

but it certainly reduced their production capability subsequently. it eliminated some of that potential. it clearly destroyed it. american and british aircraft ruled the skies certainly by the fall of late fall of 1944 and into late 1945. think about the german resources that had to be contributed to the british. some people estimate more than 600,000 german soldiers and all the rest to provide a roof over hitler's german nose were soldiers -- those flack 883w5ries could have been on the earn and western graunt. by 1944 and 592

three defensive players. to frequent air of the right. those -- fighter aircraft not available on either the eastern or the western front and that production diverted the fighters not made for bombers. clearly i said by 42, i mean -- twenal 42 and d-day invasion. the only way we were going to attack germany. the only way that would reliable. a bunch of 19 2rks1-year-olds. eliminated nazi have haven. i mentioned -- we just destroyed transportation and the question of morale, jeremy was i significant in a police state apt do hey in a sor of agony

>> no, it wasn't not. -- was not. >> so the question is, have i made the case for the important of the combined bomberer fences in -- bomber fences. i believe on balance that the resureses is a signed the sacrifice of plare. and the ultimate impact it had on pat subsidy germany who make this combean. and absolute vital fart of ally victories. and when you think about where we are here in the united states in the united states air force? we stan on the should we are of gee guys sbfment bomb the campaigned. you could make a.

any questions. ? i convinced you. good. >> question. >> with talked about cull my napetting particulars. there a similar thing for airplane campaign and you could call lathe night in the air. is there a culminating point in this campaign? >> i think we're talking about culminated points. i it's the ability to supply force. i think you're tied to the range for long distance escorts. sbrp because if you ex-tend too far you're vull mercial and these other advised flighters that are coming online. >> maybe -- maybe there's

pivotal stand down or strake-off and then with the sblex of truly effective long range, that may have been the cull -- turning opponent isn't in the company. that air enough? that's all i've got. mark dismissed. see you next time. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> considered underrated by many first lady historians. choirnl was interested in women's issues and help raids funds for john hopkins university. on and she was the first -- the daughters of the american revolution until she find in the white house out against. this sunday night on c-span's original se rose. examining the republic and private lives of the woim who is their first lady. and there's no. michelle obama, sunday's at 8:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span 3. >> each week american history tv's real america bring us archival films that helps tell

the story of the 20th century. erer i have today ordered. and earn other force which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 almost immediately. additional forces will be needed later. and they will be sent as requested. this will make it necessary to increase or active fighting forces by raising if monthly -- from 17,000 to 35,000 for a month. for thank you for voluntary enlistment. >> talked about a timetable in connection with vietnam. we have sed to me that the united states will not grow

tired. donald jumpson went over to vietnam and later called on you. he told white house reporters that he could imagine a war going on over there going on for six, six, or seven years. are you thought of that sbibblet sir? and do you think the american penal ought to think of that possibility? >> yes, i think the people ought to understand that there's no quick solution to if problem that we fates would not like to prof size. vrp i did not know that we had and accurate table. and we won. i don't think anyone really knew whether there will be four in or six or siv to join the success in world war 2sh. i do think our%s and.

any questions? do i believe that america will stand united behind her man that are there. and i pail as long as i'm president to see if our forces are strongest now. to protect our national interests and our right hand protecting that with u.s. military. and our police cal negotiations are constantly attempting to find soom accident words for the bomber. he said if anyone asks us to make a quake and try to reason that matter out. they will find us a the attempted place at the opponented time until well need challenge.

>> no. twice was enough. he's always to the right and almost always in the wrong. anything complicated. >> the film mackers talk about their documentary dt death buckley" pom ticks god and sex. >> today i believe someone is saying, the numbers of are dwindling talking about hot topic. hot salacious topic number two. i don't think that was the norm in active. morgan said these guys didn't them them.

>> you mentioned the moderator who is a distinguished newsman who i think was really kind of embarrassed like this. he was moderating but he disappears for five or more minute us at the time. you. >> i think everybody at abc stood back and let the fire burn. announcer: next, catherine mcneur talks about her book taming manhattan: environmental battles in the antebellum city. she focuses on two industries, hog and swill milk. run primarily by immigrants, these industries faced pressure as well to do new yorkers posted for health and sanitation regulation. this event was cohosted by the museum of the city of new