competition by the uris -- and these cards could be fed into this machine under the correct. -- tray. wherever there was a whole a circuit would be completed. there were pools of mercury underneath each of these ho les. wherever there was a hole who would touch the mercury and move one position. at the end of the day to tabulate the responses you would read the dials. he was a german-american engineer who became quite wealthy based on the convention and the invention -- on the

invention and the invention was the origin of international business machines. ibm's business was based on the punch cards. the way you got information into and out of an electronic computer in the 50's and 60's up to the 80's was like using these mechanical cardboard cards and feeding thousands and thousands of them into the computer at once to run a program or do something. >> each week, american history tv sits in on a lecture with one of the country's college professors. you can watch every evening at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern. next, air force professor mark wells talks about the role of bombers and fighting planes on the allied strategy in world war ii. he also describes the

progression of technology in the. -- poeriod. he argues that air power brought about the end of the war. this class is 55 minutes. mark wells: let's get started. >> room has been shut. mark wells: every seat, thanks. -- have a seat, thanks. today's lesson use the combined bomber offensive. i only have about 15 minutes to talk to you about something that is very important -- 50 minutes to talk to you about something that is very important. i am going to talk about any number of things and to follow you will have to take good notes. some of these are very busy so i

want you to take the most important features. we are going to discuss the bomber barons, a little bit about the war from 1939 to 1945. the american contribution. remember, we came into the war from the british point of view relatively late. and then we will summarize with the overall impact of the combined bomber offensive. remember, we totally combined because it was a mutual effort on the part of great britain -- call it combined because it was a mutual effort on the part of great britain and the united states. here is the takeaway. the combined bombing offensive was vital by significantly reducing german industrial production trauma by destroying the luftwaffe -- production trauma by destroying the

luftwaffe, and by diverting tremendous enemy resources. and i would add by paving the way for the events of the allied armies. now that we have read the book rhetoric and reality," you can draw a comparison -- "rhetoric and reality," you could draw a comparison between my thesis and what you read. we will start with the bomber barons. the review. somebody want to summarize? the difference between their views? or encapsulat -- in a few sentences -- encapsulate it in a few sentences? >> he was talking about bombing and destroying the will of the people by attacking them and making them afraid. trenchard was about bombing the

supply lines. and mitchell was a combination of both. mark wells: moral attacks and terror bombings -- morale of jackson terror bombings and destroying the capacity to wage war. does anybody remember the british raf leaders? who took the doctrine of the prewar years and made it a reality for the british. everybody knows who winston churchill is. he comes into power after the fall of france and he is the stall british leader -- stalwart british leader. lord beaverbrook is in charge of

british industrial aircraft production. ira is a giant in the united states air force history. you might be less familiar with posum. he was an instructor and his job was to write out the plan that we will use that takes the doctrine they studied for a couple of decades and makes it a planning reality. i will show you the details of that momentarily.and everybody should be familiar with president roosevelt and george marshall who was the principal military advisor. these are the folks that make the air campaign a reality. two doctrines, two strategies. the british video, as rachel --

view as rachel said, is that the principal target should be the morale. to disrupt the industry. some of the people in the air force and sir arthur in particular believes that air power can do it alone. strategic air power and long-range bombing as a award-winning capability -- has a war winning capability. by attacking the enemy more rale will suffer. the american view is a classical american view on work, emphasis on technology. once again we have talked about what goes on at the tactical

school. the industrial state is like an organism and when certain parts of the infrastructure a re attacked, the warmaking capability would be destroyed. america comes up with technology to implement that vision in the 1920's and 1930's. large, four engine bombers. fast, well armed, capable of carrying large bomb loads. and, at least in the american view, self defending with enough defensive firepower to make sure they make it to the target whatever the enemy defenses. we talked a little bit about the norton bomb site. this apparatus, top-secret intel 1945, -- on top 45, was designed

for precision. -- until 1945, was designed for precision. the american view was that it could be conducted during daylight. the british had that view early on but the experience in the war convinced them to change the view ever so slightly. we want to talk about the raf war first. remember, they had gone to war in 1939. and found themselves almost immediately on the defensive. particularly after the fall of france 1940, and the subsequent battle of britain, the british were beleaguered in the theater. setbacks in the balkans and setbacks in north africa or command, these young man -- left

bomber command, these young men the only instrument. they tried to do that but they discovered they had inadequate technology and german defenses were every bit as capable as british defenses had been during the battle of britain. and as a result of losses, just in the first year, year and a half, the british decided they would have to switch tonight area bombardment -- two night area bombardment. what are the problems associated with that? >> the problems with bombing at night, the british had not developed pathfinders so overall the lack of navigation by instruments was a huge deal especially at night. they had trouble even finding the targets.

second, the germans developed night fighter defense forces. they would come in behind the bombers and take them out before the bombers could even see them. also i would imagine that mom damage was tough at night deciding it -- bomb damage. that at night, deciding if you even hit the target. mark wells: we have difficulty in reliability target, and intelligence. all of those sorts of things. the last bullet, the butts report the british find out after doing a study that less than one bomb in three, only a third of the bombs were landing within five miles of the target. the version that rachel was talking about humming factories and workers and industrial areas to reduce morale quickly went

out the window. what they discovered was that if they were going to have any impact at all the would have to have large target areas which for them and big cities. in 1942 they get a new start in a sense. sir arthur harris takes over bomber command. he has a long history with the raf. he was born in south africa and as we have discussed before he does not particularly like the nazi germans. and he is perfectly prepared to attack cities in great numbers. about the time that he arrives a couple of things are happening technologically. the british aircraft industry is building larger bombers. they started the war with two engine bombers and by the spring of 1942, four engine bombers like the halifax and the short

sterling and the lancaster are coming online. british scientists, to overcome the navigation problem, finding the target at night, develop a couple of electronic navigation aids. what is called -- one is called obo and one is called g. they are ways to find german targets at some distance from britain using electronic grid and that kind of technology. not terribly accurate but much better than what they had been using. and i think nick mentioned the word pathfinders. what that means is that they take the cream of the crop, the best navigators doing everything from dead reckoning to shooting the stars with a sexton to this technology to find a target. to find a city.

and then these pathfinder airplanes would find it and dropped the equivalent of star shells and subsequently incendiary's on the city to set a small fire that subsequent bombers could attack. there is much talk in the modern aircraft about still an electronic countermeasures -- stealth and electronic countermeasures. but that war really starts as early as 1942. i want you to picture in your mind's eye british bombers taking off one after another in the early evening towards the pitchdark of the night. only a few minutes apart, as many as 600 or 700 and in one

case over cologne in the spring of 40 to 1000 bombers will stop -- bombers. . the fires go off and the subsequent bombers fly over the city and drop bombs on the fire. and in the meantime, the germans are using radar technology, fighters, to try to stop this. watch this video clip here. >> of the bombing would crush german industrial capacity. >> at this time we were getting better aircraft, the lancaster was coming out in great numbers. we were losing the less efficient sterling and halifax. we were getting better radar devices. and we had extremely good navigators, selected navigators.

this was the essence of the whole thing. these navigators were able to get much closer to the aiming point than previously. and then we laid great lanes of flares, hundreds of flares. even if we missed the point we would identify some very positive feature on the ground like a lake or a bend in the river. from there we could go to the target and put flares down, different colored flares. lit on we got target indicators and these -- later on we got target indicators and these were incandescent grapes falling from wherever we want them to detonate from. >> at the end of july 1943, they deployed the technology with devastating effect on hamburg. mark wells: the hamburg raid is

one of the most infamous in history. as a result of summer conditions at the site and a tactical failure on the part of the german air defense, the city exploded into a firestorm and the more than 30,000 35,000 civilian casualties resulted on the german side. it certainly can't be german's attention. the armaments minister -- caught the german's attention. the armaments minister has said prior to the war that if they have done that five or six times they would not be sure about the morality to continue -- morale to continue. the lancaster is at the top, the sterling and the halifax. these three aircraft are the principal for engine heavy bombers that carried out the british bomber air war.

if you look close you will notice that the typical bomb load for the aircraft is much higher than in the middle of the slide, the b-17, which is the american. the difference, of course is in the defensive armament the number of machine guns designed to protect. the british flu was an air crew of only six or seven -- flew with an air crew of only six or seven while the americans had as many as 10, many of them donors. the british have a smaller air force and were concerned about manpower. many of them were flying with a pilot and copilot. which is terribly problematic if they fle pilot is injured. british casualties were horrific.

about 56,000 british airmen were killed. categories approached 50%. it was very much a war of attrition between 1943 and 1945. every night, every day harris would a circle with a china marker a german cities he intended to destroy. and every night the british bombers would head off to do that. with the results that if we set the moral issues aside for a moment -- we will talk about that at the end of the class maybe -- the military results were mixed. largely because of weather continuing problems with accuracy, german air defense targeting, and intelligence. but by 1942, there is a rescuer.

right? in sight. this graphic shows billy mitchell and the man on the left as you look at it, that would be your right the author. the air war plan developed one. he treated this almost as a mathematical calculation. how many bombers would it take to defeat germany? how many targets, how long. there is almost a quality to this calculation, in line with the american way of war, the scientific engineering project. as i recall he calculated about 5000 bombers would be necessary.

it turned out he miscalculated. and he made some assumptions about the nature of the german industry the nature of the highly industrialized police state like nazi germany willingness to resist, our ability to get there and bombed the correct target. -- bomb the correct target. he also made assumptions about how these bombers, how effective it would be fighting their way through german defenses. he underestimated loss rate and to some extent even the existence and vulnerability of the correct german target array. those of you who have taken military thought class will understand that this is a problem of friction.

this is a chart that we have used before but it shows his notion of a highly industrialized nazi state, the war machine. the ability to wage war is total. it is around his industrial web that there are targets that if a combination of two or more or three or more will be taken out and the web would collapse, that was the notion. early in 1942, we put this into practice. and early on, his notions appear to work. i will show you the aircraft here momentarily but american aircrews flying b-17s and to be 24 hours are able to hit targets -- and be 24's are able to hit targets. these are targets on the periphery of france.

losses are low accuracy is hard we get pretty comfortable. it looks like the prewar assumptions are going to pay off. but we get a rude awakening end of that relates to attacking targets deeper in germany. we are not going to win the war not going to have this vision of collapsing the nazi industrial web, without going to targets deeper in germany. and when they tried that, they find all kinds of things -- try that, they find all kinds of problems. first off, even finding the correct targets is difficult. the germans are not forthcoming with where all of the aircraft factories are or the engine factories.

orbotech factories -- or the tank factories. what we discover in the course of this and most certainly subsequently is that german industry is already dies f -- dispersed to a significant degree and during the war disperses even more. as with all warfare of the enemy has things to say about it -- warfare of the enemy has things to say about it. the german air force is strong. benjamin's have learned the value of strong air defense. they both -- -- the germans have learned the value of strong air defense. they built a line even more robust than what the british have built. they are very capable of flying good air defense. the ma110, they are heavily armed and can fly at night or

use standoff weapons to attack american bombers. and of course the bomber is not as invulnerable as those doctrinaire's at the spectacles cool have thought it would be. -- tactical school have thought it would be. we will get back to that momentarily. from the first world war ii today, you have to consider -- war to today, you have to consider weather. the weather often features some days were the grounds of security more than 50% of the time. remember that this is daylight bombing and not for the most part aided by radar. it does come in at the end of the war but it is rudimentary. this is the big question.

why did these guys not figure out that they needed some kind of fighter escort? the truth of the matter is that even at the tactical school as we discussed there are people who talked about long-range fighter escort and the need for fighter escort. the issue was really one of technology. in the 1920's and 1930's, bombers were bigger and faster and have far that are high-altitude performance than fighter planes. the only way -- have it far better -- had far better high-altitude performance than fighter planes. it was not until late that fighter technology with the development of powerful in-line engines started to catch up. then there was the problem of limited range because a 1000 horsepower in-line engine would drink gas quickly. there was discussion of drop

tanks, even in the late 1930's and 1940's. the problem with a drop tank was the danger of carrying 250 gallons or 300 gallon drop tanks, there was a certain safety factor. reliability, leaks. then they thought if we carry drop tanks that reduces the maneuverability of fighters and if we are trying to penetrate air defense will the germans would do was use fighters to meet as early on which would then force our drop tanks are in fighters to do what? -- tank carrying fighters to do what? drop tanks. and they would get no advantage. it was not as if they ignored it and they certainly have a sense that the bombers would be challenged. they thought that the bombers under those circumstances would

be able to penetrate the layer of air defense and getting. -- get in. they made the assumption that the germans in this case would not construct air defense in depth. you understand the difference between perimeter or crossed the fence and defense in depth -- crest defense -- crust defense and defense in depth? they tried to convince roosevelt and churchill to make the americans shift from daytime bombing to nighttime bombing joined the british campaign. -- join the british campaign. a major conference in casablanca two major decisions made. one decision has a direct impact on the history of the united states air force. ira, a texan insurer drove the

eighth bomber command, -- in charge of the eighth bomber command, convinces churchill it is important to bomb the germans around the clock. give them no respite. and he agrees. anybody know what the second thing to come out of the casablanca conference was that is important? >> the decision to execute operation overlord? mark wells: overlord but also the demand of unconditional surrender on the part of the germans. unconditional surrender on the part of the germans. so the americans are ready to go deep into germany with long-range strategic daylight bombardment against targets in the industrial west. one of those targets as ball bearings. -- is ball bearings. your knockout ball bearings and the german industrial -- you

knock out ball bearings and the german industrial machine collapses. >> they could not tell the plan was going wrong. weather upset the plans. the result, the luftwaffe refueled and rearm, was waiting for the -- rearmed, was waiting for them. >> we did not expect an attack that far without fighter escort. we were astonished. >> victor, victor. ♪

>> this has been the result of very good conditions. and the fact that we could bring about all of our fighters in operation to intercept the bomber stream. this altogether has favored our result. >> 21 flying fortresses were lost before the first bomb fell. [explosion] >> the first coming in -- mark wells: on two raids in the summer and fall of 1943 the americans lose 60 bombers each,

representing almost 20% of the attack force. on the second rai almostd -- raid, almost 200 suffer damage. the standout. -- they stand down. we do not go back to germany for months. i thought it would show you what a b-17 looks like. anybody ever roll around in one -- crawled around in one? magnificent airplanes. although the people who flew the b-24 liberator are just as proud. this is the one that games the fame and fortune. 10 man crew. top speed of about 255 260.

carried about a 4000 pound bomb load and range of 2000 miles. various attempts were made to make the aircraft more self defending, flying in close combat boxes, large numbers interlocking fields of fire with machine guns to ward off human fighters but as we have seen -- german fighters, but as we have seen, not terribly effective. so what changes? or what has caused these problems, let's start with that. i think we have mentioned some of these already. weather, mechanical failure, the luftwaffe, air faced with casualties you get tired and after taking a break -- have to take a break. send for a couple of weeks away

from almost certain death with 50% casualties. we were never as accurate as we wanted in the airplanes were never as reliable as we wanted and sometimes misfortune, chance, and bad luck. one of the takeaways for the class, is this a case of technological fanaticism? is is trying to show a scientific approach to war but could not be carried out -- is this trying to show a scientific approach to war that could not be carried out? but something will change. and here is one of the major changes. an airplane that have gone from 90 days from drawing board to production initially not that capable. -- had gone from 90 days from

drawing board to production, initially not that capable with an american engine in it. a european officer suggested it be replaced with a merlin engine, the engine from the spitfire. the american industry had licensed production rights and basically in the spring of 1944 the newly re-p 51 mustang -- re-engined p 51 mustang arrived in europe with a range of 2000 miles extending into germany. this is the typical mission for a bomb group. during that. -- that p[eriod.

you can see the complexity. they would not fly the whole route that they would in relay to provide cover for the bombers. on the advice of leadership in the fighter command, these aircraft were for you from close escort -- freed from close escort and freed for hunting of german fighters. on top of that on the way back they could fly at low altitude and attacked ground targets. and once again, in a sense, the eighth air force had lost the air battle by the fall of 43. by the spring of 44, and certainly by the summer of 1944, because of the introduction of long-range p 51's and improved technology for p 47's with drop

tanks and 48's, we want what we had lost -- won what we have lost. it is a new ballgame. in the meantime general aker had been replaced by jimmy doolittle. aker ever built the eighth air command and subsequently the eighth air force. he let it through the most difficult time. and on -- led it through the most difficult time. on the verge of this change he was promoted and sent to the mediterranean. they were directly in contact with the german army and the italian campaign. jimmy doolittle, the same jimmy doolittle of the doolittle raid and 16 airplanes, is now in

command of the world's largest air force. p 50 ones. -- d50p51's. we were narrowing the targets. after casablanca there was a sense of targeting the german air force. targeting the german air force. there were some targets as well but principally the german air force, meaning factories. even then, even with the p 51 and long-range escort, the results were mixed in terms of the ability to hit the target and the germans were dispersing targets. but one of the impacts was, you see it in this bullet, air attrition. the germans are compelled now to fight increasing numbers of

allied aircraft, the british at night and americans during the day, with fighters. and the germans are going to lose the ball of attrition. -- the battle of attrition. what i call the death of the german air force. let's look at the details of air operations i said early in the spring we were going after the german air force by factories. what is coming up in the summer of 1944? overlord. the main effort to come to grips with the germans on the land, satisfying of the pleas from russia. a clean -- a clear sense of where the war would end.

this was the main event. as a result of that, i mentioned we were having success in the war of attrition over the air but now the allies take a step back and there is a bit of an argument. general eisenhower supported members of the british staff wanting to shift the targets of the strategic bombers, raf and a air force, -- 8th air force, to targets closer in support of overlord, to targets in france. transportation targets to isolate the normandy battlefield. airmen resist. and marshall harris goes no. does not want to do that. he has been circling german cities and with increasing numbers setting fires and burning german cities, what a night. he wants to continue -- one a

night. he wants to continue. it air force leaders are saying the same thing. general eisenhower says, thank you for sharing that with me. we need to go. we shift back to transportation targets and more operational targets in france to prepare d-day. we also begin to hit oil production targets. we had tried oil as early as 42 when you think of the raid which ended in near disaster. there have been some attempts at oil with mixed results. but increasingly it becomes apparent that oil targets are going to pay off. we know the result of the campaign to isolate the normandy battlefield is very successful. german transportation, frames,

the bridges in france are destroyed, the battle is isolated. allied forces landed successfully in normandy. it is fair to say, surprising even ourselves. and the germans are incapable of reacting as quickly and effectively. they are paralyzed, in a sense. they also have fuel problems. moving on the battlefield is difficult for them because of allied tactical air. shortly after the landings, after the breakout which occurs in the summer of 1944, my follow 44 present -- by a fall of 44 eisenhower releases the bombers to return to the campaign against germany. 44 into 45. listen to me carefully, in the last seven months of the war, in the last seven months of the war, bomber command and the 8th

air force, dropped 60% of all of the bombs that they dropped on germany in the second world war. and that we focus on to targets -- two targets, oil and transportation. what is the effect? of the germans had been using not just natural oil but have developed synthetic oil techniques with chemicals. when i say oil we were also hitting chemicals indictments -- synthetic plants that produce other things like nitrogen which is a component in munitions. it even affects agriculture. all of the things associated with petrochemical industry under attack and you can begin to see the results. by mid-44, early into 45, german

industry, and moreover the german war machine, begins to collapse. not because they are not producing lots of stuff but because they cannot marry these component parts. in the first two or three years of the war we have been bombing factories and they have been dispersing factories. but now with oil and transportation under attack the difficulties are going to get much, much worse. one of the things i think is worth thinking about is the impact on german aviation. if you take out and reduce oil

production by 90%, the ability of the german air force to train its aviators declined substantially. think about also, there was complete, the senior german general complained that they could not frame tank drivers because -- train tank drivers because they were running out of oil. if you recall, the germans were highly capable in defending themselves. the counterattack in the ardennes. the germans figured out they had less than a week of fuel supplies and in some cases carried rubber hoses to siphon fuel and gas out of allied vehicles. this was an army that early in the war had won victories based on mobility. and it was losing by 44-45 because it was incapable of

moving any longer. it was incapable, when you think also to the battle of the bulge of effectively attacking in daylight. one of the reasons the battle of the bulge happened is because it was in the middle of bad weather. that was deliberate, to avoid allied air attack. one of the net results of the allied campaign that have so reduced the german air force by attrition. and an inability to fly due to aviation fuel which left allies with default with air superiority. take a look. the attack on oil -- remember we said, we essentially eliminated it by august of 44, this is the

plant in romania. attack synthetic plants. in some cases dr. 5% or 6%. -- down to 5% or 6%. and the attack on railways and waterways. the allies rule of the sky -- ruled the sky. so let's talk about impact. this was not an easy battle. what have we said in previous classes? the bomber barons, the airpower advocates of the 20's and 30's

going back to haig, suggested that airpower could win a war by itself. that it would be cheap and decisive and quick. this war demonstrated it was anything but. air war of attrition. casualties were high. a total of 56,000 in bomber command killed, wounded, or missing. 10,000 aircraft lost. 19,000 americans dead. 6200 aircraft. the germans lost at least as many or more. this is not a quick, this is not a bloodless this is not the kind of war that those advocates anticipated. a total of 1.6 million tons of

bombs were dropped on germany. remember, 60% of it in the last seven months. what did they do? when i say the effect of aircraft production was mixed we did reduce aircraft production but the germans were still capable by dispersing industry to make lots and lots and lots of airplanes. that is why if you look at postwar bomb damage surveys and photographs you see german airplanes parked all over germany under the trees and on roads and stuff but many of them are not complete in terms of parts. they could not have engines. they could not get the airplanes together in final assembly because of attacks on transportation and they could not fly effectively. german pilots by the end of the war are going into battle with as few as 50 flight hours. as few as 50 flight hours as pilots. that was not because the germans did not know that training was

important, but they did not have the gasoline to train. oil production by two thirds. wrestling down to 5%. the germans -- gasoline down to 5%. the germans swept from the skies. what was the german -- or that your pardon, what was strategic bombing's -- i bake your pardon, what was strategic bombing's contribution? i believe that asking the question was it decisive is the wrong question to ask. i am that parsing my words. -- not parsing my words. it was a prerequisite for normandy. it was vital to victory. and sure enough, it was a war of attrition, no question. what did it do?

it did not eliminate german production. but it certainly reduced their production capability substantially. it eliminated some of that potential. it clearly destroyed the left wall for. -- luftwaffe. american and british airplanes will disguise -- rule bust guys -- the skies. think about the resources that had to be devoted to air defense. some people estimate more than 600,000 german soldiers, flak batteries, and all of the rest to provide a roof over hitler's germany.

those were soldiers, that was equipment, those batteries could have been on the eastern or western front. think about the german air force itself which 544 or 45 is devoting 60% or 80% of production to fighters to protect the air over the reich. those fighter aircraft not available over the eastern or western front. not available for bombers. clearly by 42 -- i mean between 42, the d-day invasion, the only way we were going to attack germany, the only way that we could bring more to nazi germany, was on the backs of your airmen. -- young airmen. eliminating notnazis. i mentioned over and over again we destroyed transportation and

oil. and the question of morale. was it sufficient in a police state to make them throw up their hands? no, it was not. so the question is, have i made the case for the importance of the combined bomber offensive in the second world war? i believe on balance that the resources assigned to the combined bomber offensive and the sacrifice of brave aircrews and the ultimate impact that it had on nazi germany make the campaign if not decisive, an absolutely vital part of allied victory. when you think about where we are today in the united states air force, we stand on the shoulders of giants with these

guys. without the combined bomber offensive, you could make the case that we would not have an independent united states air force today. any questions? i convinced you? good. >> i have a question. we talked about culminating points with the ground campaign. is there a similar thing with the air campaign? mark wells: can somebody answer that based on what i have said? was there a culminating point in this campaign? nick? nick: i think it might be related to logistics and the ability to supply, tied to the range of the long-distance escorts. because if you extend beyond the p-51 too far you are vulnerable

to the advanced german fighters that are coming online. mark wells: i infer from that response maybe this pivotal point where we had to stand down her back off subsequent -- or back off subsequent to the second and the introduction of the long-range fighter escort, that might have been the turning point in the campaign. fair enough? that is all i got. dismissed. see you next time. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> join us each a saturday evening at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern for classroom lectures on different topics and eras of american history. lectures in history are also available as podcasts.

visit our website at c-span.org/history/podcasts or download them from itunes. >> 70 years ago the first atomic bomb was tested near los alamos new mexico. a few weeks later nuclear bombs were dropped on hiroshima and nagasaki, japan. here is part of a 1965 u.s. army film describing the nuclear capability in the 1960's. >> an american desert. this was an early test before our country along with other nations agreed to cease testing of nuclear weapons. for today or nuclear power is such that in the words of our president, the combined destructive power of every battle fought by man is like a firecracker against the sun.

[explosion] ♪ [explosion] [wind howling] >> this is the awesome power and the power we have today is greater than any adversary or combination of adversaries. the fact that we have it is the greatest deterrent to nuclear war. helping to protect us against nuclear attack are radar installations, networks of sensitive nerve ends. a nerve center of our defense alert system is this underground headquarters of the strategic air command. no surprise ballistic attack will catch us unprepared.

in underground silos and enough power would survive to ensure the destruction of any aggressor nation. [explosion] mark wells: -- >> this is the terrible power that stands ever ready. this is the awesome power always under control as it is here, where a polaris missile is being lowered into a submarine. the united states is able to launch ballistic missiles in a matter of seconds from beneath the sea. our nuclear weapons can be delivered by air against any enemy, to any part of the earth. the weapons of this air arm on a

can deliver today are capable -- armada can deliver today are capable of even more destructive force then this pacific island test -- pacific ocean test. this is part of a military strength of the united states. the greatest of any nation in the history of the world. this is the power of retaliation that has made, and it keeps full-scale nuclear war the least probable of any kind of conflict. >> considered "underrated" my many historians, caroline harrison was an accomplished artist to china painting and carried that interest through the white house, establishing the china collection. she was interested in women's issues and help to raise funds for john hopkins university on

the condition that they admit women. she was the first daughter general of the daughters of the american revolution until she died in the white house of tuberculosis. caroline harrison in the series "first ladies," examining the public and private lives of the women who fill the role of first lady from martha washington to michelle obama.