when necessary. end quote. can the iaea really have access to all military sites suspected of housing nuclear activity and does the agency need preapproval from iran to access these sites? and the whole point of sanctions, mr. secretary, was not to bring iran to the negotiation table and dismantling the iran nuclear infrastructure used to be the administration's goal. the administration repeatedly told us it would focus sanctions only on the nuclear portfolio yet in the deal we have 60 pages of individuals, companies, vessels that will be de-listed, specifically mentioned, many of the sanctions are not nuclear-related. the administration has always stated that all provisions within this agreement has to be

agreement upon by all parties, which includes allow the e.u. to lift sanctions on the cuds force, including the leader sola manny. what do you say to the families of americans that were killed or wounded as a result of his actions in iraq and please explain to them why as part of the nuclear negotiations the u.s. agreed that the irgc kurds force that are responsibility for countless deaths around the globe are getting their designations lifted and will be getting billions of dollars to support their acts of terror throughout europe and i'm glad it is only $50 billion, i feel better already. secretary kerry, you will be in cuba soon. i remain extremely worried about allowing cuba to open an embassy here in d.c., giving the regime a license to spy against our nation.

will u.s. law enforcement vet every cuba so-called diplomat that wants to come to washington and will we reject any cuban official that wants to be posted in d.c. if we have relations related to their espionage apparatus. and when posted the iranian deal, the president said, quote, we'll continue our unprecedented efforts for israel's security. will you guarantee the u.s. will veto any measure at the u.n. security council on palestinian statehood except by bit lateral statehood between the israelis and statehood and nothing else. >> so madam chair let me come back to you on the record on a bunch of those because again they are more than i can answer in the time that we have and i

appreciate your effort to get a lot of questions an we'll answer them all. let me clarify a couple of important things i want ernie and jack to get on two things, one on the money and one on the highly enriched uranium. there is a confusion between the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program, versus the nuclear program. it was never the goal of this administration -- and by the way not even the bush administration, the bush administration in 2008 -- >> mr. secretary, with all due respect -- perhaps if you could answer about the solly manny lifting of sanctions which we agreed to. >> i want to be clear we achieved what we set out to do which is dismantling their capacity to make a nuclear weapon. with regard to their military sites, that is part of the inspection of an undeclared suspicious facility and if it is we will have access. >> we will have access to military sites. >> and if they don't proside it this they will be in military breach and the results will snap

back. >> and we'll consult with iran before -- >> well there is a procedure in place but is it t doesn't rely on iran or russia saying yes. >> so iran is wrong when they say we won't have access to military sites? >> no what they said -- they are taking care of their domestic constituency in a way they need to. they understand what they need to -- what they say is not as important as what they do. >> thank you. my time is up. >> i'm going to remind the members they have five minutes. so ask the question and -- >> could i -- >> and we're going to have the response for the record and we're going now to mr. brad sherman of california. >> we've got to remember that this is not a binding deal. this is not a treaty. this is not binding on iran.

this is not binding on the united states. it is not even an executive legislative agreement and these gentlemen here aren't even asking for congress to approve the deal, i think they would appreciate it if we didn't pass a formal resolution of disapproval. it might be as most morally binding on this administration. so what may be important for us to look to see whether it is a good deal in the next couple of years, because i think the administration is planning to follow it, unless we prohibit that. and also try to see whether we'll have congress's and administrations in the future that will take the actions in the future necessitated by our national interest. the irc may not publicly support this deal because that is what they can do or maybe they generally oppose it. but i want to focus, mr. secretary, about dealing with iran non-nuclear behavior. and you say we'll be in a stronger position to deal with that and we have to deal with

it. they are holding four american hostages. assad is killing 5,000 people a month, at least, and the blood is on the hands of men in tehran. and they are supporting hamas and hezbollah and the houthi and those are just the organizations that begin with the letter "h." you can't persuade them to change by charm. you bring a considerable amount of that. you need to threaten them with new sanctions unless they change their behavior. and we've seen sanctions cause raub to change their behavior even on things important to iran. now i'm not asking you whether you think new sanctions are a good idea or bad idea, whether europe will follow or won't follow.

i'm only going to focus on what is legal under this agreement. you were asked about this in the senate and you said we will not vile the agreement if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles or on non-nuclear reasons. but you also noted there is this comment in provision in paragraph 26 that commits the united states to refrain from reintroducing or reimposing the sanctions imposed in an ex two which are the very bex sanctions we've got but we could come up with new ones if you tell us the old ones are forbidden. so you were also asked if we reimpose sanctions on the central bank of iran to deter terrorism, would that violate the agreement and you said no. but i would like you to clarify. is congress and the united states free under this agreement

to adopt new sanctions legislation that will remain in force as long as iran holds our hostages and supports assad? >> we are free to adopt additional sanctions as long as they are not a phony excuse for just taking the whole pot of the past ones and putting them back. we can put them in place -- >> secretary kerry, it is my time and i've got a whole number of questions. now, we have a number of entities listed on the -- for the nuclear activities that deserve to be listed for their terrorist activities but you haven't had time to put them on that second list. will you be putting entities on the -- on the list of sanctions for their taste activity -- for their nuclear activity on the terrorist list if you deserve it and can you get that job done before this agreement becomes effective.

>> we have terrorism sanctions in place right now. >> but we have a list of entities. >> we have free to add. and we have added. by the way -- >> and we are free to a add those -- >> we added some 60 entities during the course of the negotiations. >> let me get to one other question. you strongly do not want us to override a presidential veto but if we do that triggers certain american laws. i would like to give you an opportunity -- you don't want us to do it, you think it is terrible policy, you think the rest of the world would be against us. but let's say congress doesn't take your advice and we override a veto and the law that is triggered then imposes certain sanctions. will you follow the law even though you think it violates this agreement clearly and even if you think it is absolutely terrible policy?

>> i can't begin to answer that without consulting with the president and determining what the circumstances are? >> so you are not committed to following the law. >> i said i'm not going to deal with a hypothetical. i would like to the secretary of treasury to respond to the sanctions. >> we're out of time. i would like to go to the gentleman from new jersey. put it in the record. >> there are a lot of responses to the questions being asked and if we had a minute or two to actually respond, it might be helpful to those who want to understand the agreement. >> mr. smith. >> there is collaboration with north korea and including articles written by dallas frons back in 2003 make is clear north korea is collaborating with iran. what happens under the agreement if north korea conveyed nuclear weapons to iran and other capabilities they have at their disposal. this incentivized saudi arabia and others like egypt to acquire a bomb and that becomes the middle east becomes more of a

powder keg. [ inaudible ], when are they going to be free, if you could speak to that, mr. secretary. and in your opening, even if they break out, they have to still design the bomb. that is the problem with the agreement. it kicks the issue of the past military dimensions down the road. iran has been stone calling the iaea for years. inspectors have long been denied access to the sites and where it is believed they tested detonators for nuclear warheads. they have been refused access for years. in 2013 there is bull bosing of -- bulldozing of buildings and removal of roads. they failed to provide inspectors full access and disclosure. and yesterday, mr. secretary, at the tip report release, you

spoke eloquently about -- and boldly about the combatting modern day slavery and i commend you about ending sex slavery and i believe it missed the mark and a number of countries got absolutely unmerited upgrades, including malaysia and cuba and uzbekistan. i went back and read the reports from last year and the year record, in china there were 35 convictions of trafficking and that is a watch list country. cuba, 13 convictions for sex trafficking and nonfor labor trafficking. they say there is no labor trafficking which is nuts. a year ago there were ten convictions. so we are talking about minimal. thailand by contrast had 151 convictions and they are still tier 3 and malaysia had three convictions for sex and labor

trafficking a decrease from nine last year. the narratives miss it by a mile. >> well, i'd be happy to sit down and talk that through. since time so so precious i want to stay on iran and i want my colleague to address a couple of key issues. >> mr. chairman, if i could just respond to a couple of the issues that have been raised. congressman angle asked about the money. >> if gentlemen would yield. this is my time. >> mr. smith, let's -- we'll get answers here to everything. let's let the witness -- >> on the question of the flow of money to iran, there have been a range of estimates as to how much money iran has locked up. let's remember why it is locked up. it is locked up because our international partners locked it up and talk iran's money and not let them get it. at the highest number we see,

there is $115 billion that is available. in reality $58 billion to $59 billion is unavailable. and some is roughed up in china and the balance is nonperforming loans. i'm not going to a $56 billion is not a lot of money but it is not $150 billion and cannot all be used because they need to keep some foreign reserves to run the economy. if you look at the reserves for the use of the money we see $500 billion for competing demands for the $50 billion. so if any kind of allocation for the resource and you look at what they've done under sanctions and they've managed with sanctions in place to put several million dollars per year toward malign purposes. rewon't we kaernt say there will be any more money going to malign purposes. but the order is way smaller and in mal line with the kind of spending they've been doing any way and you compare to it with a nuclear weapon and the bigger threat is iran with a nuclear weapon with the same kinds of objectives. and the questions about the irgc

and sewell money, and he is not de-listed. there are a few entities whose identity has changed over time. privately we're happy to go through the individual cases but we have kept in place our sanctions regime on terrorism. >> thank you mr. secretary. now we have three questioned asked by the gentleman from new jersey, if we could just have a succinct answer to those. >> on the -- congressman the greatest incentive for an arms race in the region egypt or saudi arabia or one of the other countries to try to get a bomb would be if this agreement is rejected. and the reason will be is iran will go back to enriching and we'll not have inspection and not have insight and they'll say, oh, my god, now they're going for a bomb, now we have a reason to have to get one. they have in fact told us, these

countries, that they are not going to chase a bomb providing the implementation of this agreement continues and providing that we are working with them on the other pushback issues for the region. with respect to the issue of par chin, yes, there will be access as appropriate under agreement between the iaea and iran and that is a agreement which is normally entered into confidentially between those countries. >> again, that is the problem. >> americans held captive in north korea against the bomb conveys a bomb, what happens there? >> may i comment? i believe i heard you say, congressman, that iran set off a nuclear explosive at parchin and that is correct. >> i didn't say that. i didn't say that at all. >> those weren't his remarks. >> at least get it -- >> but there will be appropriate access. >> but again on americans held captive -- north korea conveys bombs, what happens under the

agreement? >> my last conversation with foreign ministers zarif and the brother of the president was regarding the four people being held, the four american citizens. and we have followed up on that conversation since then and we are in direct conversation. that is all i'm going to say here today. i hope they will be returned to be with their families. >> north korea and the bomb? they convey bombs, what happens under the agreement if anything? >> if north korea what? >> if north korea were provide weapons, nuclear weapons to iran, what happened? >> they can't do that. both rarn and north korea would be in violation of the -- >> well that would be -- -- >> and iran would be in violation of this agreement. >> the gentleman from new jersey. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here. you know there are deep divisions in iran, evidenced by the comments made by the

hardliners and the prime minister and the foreign ministers an the supreme leader. are the divisions likely to surface during the implementation of the agreement and what are the consequences of the implement because i keep reading they are constantly going back and forth and i'm concerned that we have a agreement and the hardliners -- >> so congress, that is a very good question and appropriate understanding of the dynamic here. we saw the exact same divisions of things that were being said regarding the interim agreement, if you recall. and what we've learned is it is not as important as what they say, it is important what they do. and make sure that their actions are held accountable. every aspect of the interim agreement has been lived up to, notwithstanding denials that came out publicly from certain politicians or certain leaders.

we've seen the same thing here. we heard that x or y or z was a red line that wouldn't be able to do it, et cetera, but the agreement is the agreement. that is why we've been so clear, mr. chairman. nothing in this agreement is based on trust. nothing is based on an expectation of some change of behavior. this agreement is 100 and whatever -- 109 pages, because it is specific with the an exes in declaring of what is expected of whom and when and that precision gives us confidence we can hold them accountable. >> thank you. and secretary, you said there are only $56 billion for them to really -- >> that is accessible. >> but really they do not need a lot of money for some of the groups to start up again. i mean, they don't need billions. they can absorb billions some of the groups. so there is a lot of money to

stir a lot of problems, even with the sanctions in place, they are finding the relatively small sums of money to do terrible acts of regional destabilization and they are doing that now with sanctions in place and i don't think you're going to see the shape of that support change. though there will be some resources available on the margin and along the signs of what they are already doing which puts the burden on us and our allies in the region to shut down the flow of money and material to malign forces. frankly one of the issues we discussed with our gulf allies when we met with them at camp david was how to work effectively together to shut down the flows of money, things happening today with the sanctions in place. so i think the problem exists today, with or without an agreement. and the challenge on this money that is iran's money locked up

overseas it is not in the united states. the money is in china, in india, in other places. if the p5+1 agreement is rejected by the united states, we can't rely on the other countries keeping the money locked up so you could end up iran getting access to that money without the benefit of an agreement which would be a bad out come. so i think we have to keep it in perspective. it is a serious issue. we have made the commitment to continue designating like we did last week additional hezbollah actors. we will continue to do that. we have sanctions and secondary sanctions in place. we'll double and redouble our efforts. we need our allies to be part of it. but that is not a reason not to have an agreement to make sure iran doesn't get a nuclear weapon. >> also congressman, i would underscore, if you look at their activities, they have not -- they are not capital intensive. what they've done with the houthi and what they've done over the years, i think our objective here was to make sure they can't have a nuclear weapon and secondly to work with our allies and friends in the region in order to do a greater job, a

much better job, of pushing back against those activities. and i'm going at the end of the week, i'm meeting with the gulf states, we're laying out with them the specific steps with respect to that pushback and what we'll be engaged in in order to increase the security and push back against the activities you're talking about. but it is impossible to put them all in one pot at one time. first, one step and now we have the opportunity to push for the changes we want. >> thank you. >> thank you. we go to mr. daniel roar backer of california. >> thank you very much mr. chairman and again thank you. and ranking member engel for providing such leadership on this issue. we've had many hearings about it and mr. secretary let me note that while you're receiving

quite a grueling today, let us know that we appreciate the hard work that you and others of the administration are making. we know that you sincerely are looking to make this a more peaceful world. but some of us realize that in the past, we've seen people who are very sincere in seeking peace, creating -- unfortunately setting things off in a direction that led to war and re appreciation and didn't create a more peaceful world. one of the efforts i noted when i was part of this is how ronltd reagan succeeded in ending the cold war and during that time period we reached weapons agreements with the soviet union. but let me note, while we were making those agreements with the soviet union to put a lid on nuclear weapons and in europe, et cetera, we ratcheted up our support for the democratic elements struggling against soviet domination in various parts of world, whether in the

soviet union or nigeria or afghanistan, we were actually increasing our efforts to support those people. we also denied them hard currency much less had any agreement that would have bolstered the soviet economy. and because we had that approach, the soviet union fell apart and in the long run that is what made a more peaceful world, the elimination of that regime and i'm afraid without -- without fighting by the way. i'm afraid the treaty you are talking about today and promoting will do the opposite of what we saw succeeded and that is it will actually empower rather than making a more peaceful regime and make peace more likely. em pooring them in the long run will create more chaos and

likely of war because they are the supporting of terrorism and hatred toward the west that we've seen coming from their regime. now what i would like to ask you is we all know in this body, we've been aware for example of the repression and the brutal treatment of people within iran and like the mek that are suffering and you've noted this in the past yourself, the brutality that these people who oppose the regime have had to face. was there any -- did you confer in any way with the people -- the democratic elements in iran or these other people who are struggling for a free iran and how this agreement will effect their long-term goal for democratic iran and thus a more peaceful world? >> well as you know this was a

nuclear negotiation, but i have on many occasions met with and had discussions with folks representing different interests and and aspirations in iran. what i would say to you, congressman, and you have to make a hard judgment here about where iran is. president ruhani and the foreign minister are both individuals who have expressed a very different point of view from the past leadership -- >> but limited a amount of time. so your answer is no that you did not confer -- >> no, that's not what i said. >> but you're conferring with their oppressors, instead. >> i didn't say that. i don't think i said that at all, congressman. >> mr. secretary during the reagan years, we talked about only 55 billion, okay.

part of the effort that worked under reagan was supporting the democratic element and undermining the economy of the soviet union. in the long run, what will bring peace to this part of the world is not for us to have short terms arms deals with the regimes and the other people who hate the west and are supporting terrorism. it's to try and support those elements in the societies that want peace with the west and are preparing some sort of holy war against us. this -- i'm sorry mr. secretary. i appreciate your sincerity and what you guys are trying to do but i believe this treaty will empower the mullahs and make conflict more likely. >> i thank the chairman and i find my friend from california, i find his words ironic. ronald reagan was nothing if not pragmatist and was quite capable

compartmentalizing relationships for the sake of a greater good. and his relations with the soviet union with the quintessence of that kind of pragmatism. something is overriding, nuclear capability in the region. shall we deal with it or not? samuel taylor describes fix as the willing suspension of disbelief. i must say, i find a lot of fiction involved a willing suspension of disbelief in some of the criticism of the agreement. it's not perfect. it will hurt israel. it will give them a nuclear capability some day. it doesn't do enough. it doesn't deal with ancillary and horrendous behavior. but who said it would? and here is the bottom line.

valid though many of those criticisms may be. imperfections we can find by the score. what's your program? and you know what i've heard in a series of hearings here? let's just go back to the p5 plus one and iran and say we just couldn't sell it, let's start over. that was one of the most monumentally naive statements i've ever heard and it came from a former member of congress who knows better. it's not true. it won't happen. at least let's stick to the facts. but no the willing suspension of this belief is at work. it's alive and well here. including the issue of the existential threat to israel. walking away from this agreement agreement, you need the take responsibility for the questionses to israel. whether you're meeting netanyahu or iran.

what am i willing to do on behalf of that vote with regard to our allies and our country? mr. secretary, i think it's an extraordinary job you've done. and i'd like to give you the opportunity to talk about two problems and you, too, mr. secretary. if we walk away from this agreement, what if your analysis, is likely to happen and, likely is that 24-day problem? all of us have reason to be concerned about that. that is not quite the robust inspection we had formed for. >> it's not speculation. it is clear if congress regrets this, iran goes back to its enrichment, the ayatollah will not come back to the table.

anybody who makes that judgment has not talked to the intel community. there is no way, given his feelings about the west and his mistrust of us and his reluctant to even have engaged in this discussion that he's suddenly going to re-enter new discussions. moreover, the folks rerelied on to provide a united front here, france, germany, britain, china russia, go off and we will have set ourselves back, folks. i don't know how i go out to ott country if that happens and say, hey, you ought to negotiate with us or you ought to talk to us about any issue, whatever it is with the reliance that we can actually deliver. because they will sit there and say, well you have 535 secretaries of state in the i'd and we don't know who we're negotiating with and whatever deal we makes always risks being overturned. that is not the traditional relationship that has existed between the secretary and the congress. and finally iran will say we're

free. we can go about back to our program. and what i said earlier about bringing year 15 to today year 20, whatever it is, they will take their 19,000 centrifuges, they have the ability to enrich and they will feel we backed off. ernie, would you adjust these? >> yeah. for my five months at the negotiating table, i doubt our p5 plus one partners would be any more interested in going back to the table than iran. on the 24 days again, let me emphasize that all the regular access for declared sites is constant. the 24 days is a new tool in the sense that there's never been any limit at all. and so the key is in getting now of a process where we find confident in being able to detect any use of materials over that period and in the classified environment we can provided any more evidence than

i've discussed today. >>. >> thank you, mr. secretary. steve schapp of ohio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here, mr. secretary. this administration, the president specifically called isis famously the jv team. that clearly wasn't true. this administration cited yemen as the model approach to u.s. countertimp. and that was shortly before yemen's near total collapse in the chaos. so that wasn't true, either. president obama declared al qaeda to be decimated, on the run, broken apart, on their heels, very weak and those are all quotes, by the way. now, that may be wishful thinking, but it certainly wasn't true and isn't true. why should the american people trust the administration now on this deal? >> we're not asking them to trust. we're asking them to read the deal and look at the components. as i've said many times nothing in this deal is built on trust.

nothing. the it is on very specific steps that have to be taken. for instance iran gets zero relief from the sanctions until iran has implement eded one year breakout time by taking out the centrifuges, undoing their electrical, undoing the piping. they have to do all of that. >> as you know, i've got limited time so i'm going to move on to my next question. but when you say that doesn't depend on trust that is just a strange credibility, i think, to say there isn't trust on both sides involved in this. there has to be or there's no deal. >> not -- >> let me ask you this. relative to anywhere anytime inspections, you said, and i quote, this is a term that honestly i've never heard that we were negotiating. now, in fact, in april of this year, deputy secretary adviser ben rhodes said that the

international atomic energy agency would have immediate access, immediate access to any site that the agency wanted to inspect. now, immediate access sure sounds like anytime to me. also in april the energy secretary, the gentleman sitting next to you there, he had and i quote, we expect to have anywhere, anytime access to places that are suspected of out of bounds activities, unquote. there is that anywhere anytime once again. so again why should the american people trust what they're boeing told by this administration about this deal? >> may i say my quotes haven't been anytime anywhere in the sense of a well defined process of a well defined time scale and that's what we have. >> okay. >> let me go further than that. i've been negotiating -- >> that really clears things up mr. secretary. so thank you. go ahead, mr. secretary. >> well, we never had a

discussion in the context of these negotiations that talked about anywhere, anytime. nowhere on the planet earth does any country anywhere under the mpt have anything called anywhere anytime. what we have is called managed access and it's a process by which we can end. now, within 24 days -- >> let me ask -- and we know that's longer. that's mod. >> 24 days is adds an outside period of time during chmt and for 24 years or longer, 2400 years, they would not be able to ride the remnants of nuclear activity, official material and ernie will tell you that. >> mr. secretary, as you know i've got five minutes and several more questions. >> i am not -- >> if this is such a good deal why is israel so opposed to it? >> first of all, i not when you say israel there are people in

israel who support it. >> right. and the prime minister, just like president obama is the representative of our country on that -- >> and you'll agree that president obama always talks for everybody in the country, right? >> he's speaking for us in this agreement and he seems bound and determined to go forward with this thing, whether the elected representatives of the american people -- the majority of us, at least, are for it or not. >> let me speak to your question because it's a serious question and it's important. as i said earlier every israeli has concerns, have fears. there are concerns about the region they live in, about the nature of the the rhetoric that's used, death to america death to israel, everybody is concerned. which is why this is not based on some element of a dream they're going to change or some element of trust. but i will tell you there are people in israel who -- >> you're going to make a couple of people. the prime minister is against it and i'm almost out of time. this is one of the main reasons

as a representative of the american people i'm so concerned. israel could be directorly affected, but with these icbms and the technology that could be coming -- >> excuse me. excuse me. we've got to go to mr. ted deutch of florida. >> thank you mr. chairman. and thank you to the witnesses for being here. mr. secretary, thank you, as well, on behalf of my constituents' family, robert levinson for continuing to raise his plight and that of the three other americans that are held. i agree with you that it's time for them to come home. i want to talk specifically about pmd. if we don't address that, it's impossible for us to believe that the iaea will have what it needs going forward. under the terms of the agreement, the neek activity seth forth refer to the road

map. the iaea are on road maps except they leave out the most important point which is the one that the iaea has to have final resolution of pmd. so i have two questions. first, will the iaea have access? the second question is, am i right -- because i don't see any other way to read the agreement that satisfaction of pmd will not be a pre-rick sit to iran getting sanctions. >> it is. it is a prerequisite. if they haven't conemployed with the iea and lived up to the dates laid out in the program, august and october they will not get relief. >> mr. secretary i acknowledge that. but by october 15th they have to have activities that they need to set out what they're going to do but it's december 15th by which the director general and the board of governors will assess whether or

not they've complied. and that is not a condition under the deal. >> actually, it is. they will be in material breach if they't do that. more over -- >> i would point out it's specifically omitted in the list of pacht and present concerns. it's not a requirement. >> well, the outcome. if you're talking about the october, it's not dpent dependent on the outcome because we have no way of knowing which way -- >> but that's the issue, mr. secretary. >> no it's whether they comply or not. we've already drawn our conclusion about 2003. we know they are engaged in trying to make -- >> that's my point. this is important. so you're saying even if -- if they comply with the iaea and the iaea ultimately conclude that here not satisfied either because they don't have access because they didn't get access to the site -- >> then they're not in compliance.

that would away breach. we would not do sanctions relief. they know that. >> then i would respectfully suggest that it's not at all clear in the agreement. we can talk about that. i'd like to just move on to the issue of specifically the sanctions. this has been brought up by a number of my colleagues. the an ex, too, that lifts lots and lots of individuals and entities that are getting sanctions relief under this deal, many of them are involved in not just proliferation activities, but they're also involved in terrorism, corporate terrorism involving human rights pieces. they went on this list because it was easier to get our european allies to go along with the proliferation sanctions. secretary lew, i appreciate that we're going to continue to sanction hezbollah. but what i really want to know is will we be able to and are we going through the process now of scouring this list not just for individuals but for banks and state-owned companies to re

impose sanction fess they're the subject of terrorism? >> there are institutions that were designated for their acts of terrorism that have not been relieved relieved. >> mr. secretary, i understand that. i have a very specific question. will we be able to, under this agreement, to reimpose sanctions on all these individuals and entities if we find they should be because of the terrorism? >> mr. congressman, we have retailed all of our rights to designate firms and -- >> including everyone listed in -- >> including entities on the list. what we cannot do, we cannot just put in place the nuclear sanctions and -- >> i understand. >> we have given up no action to target individuals or -- >> including -- i hope we're going through the list right now. i have a few second left. i would just ask for some

acknowledgement that when we say that iran is engaged in all these terrible consists now and it doesn't cost much money i would suggest it's been reported that $200 million a year is the amount they use to fund hezbollah. so if only $1 million of the 56 were to go to hezbollah, if we were to double the amount of support for five years at which time the arms embargo comes off and they're considerably more dangerous, we have to at least acknowledge that -- >> mr. congressman, there are plenty of opportunities to -- >> there is a u.n. resolution preventing them from taking weapons to hezbollah. there's a resolution preventing them from sending weapons to iraq and -- >> i'm concerned about weapons -- >> but at this time, we have to go to joe wilson of south carolina. >> thank you. >> thank you for hosting this panel. i appreciate the panel being here today. i share the concerns of an op-ed

where 16 reasons are presented that the nuke deal is a catastrophe to the western world. i will present these as questions for you to answer during the coming months. >> we need this as a important. one, was the iranian regime required to expose the previous dimensions of its nuclear program in order to ensure relevant inspections of all facilities? no. two, has the iranian regime been required to halt all uranium enrichment, including thousands of centrifuges spinning? no. has the regime been required to shut down and dismantle the iraq heavy water reacts and plutonium production plant? no. four, has the iranian regime

been required to shut down and dismantle the underground uranium enrichment facility it is building? no. has the iranian regime been required to halt its ongoing missile development? no. six, has the iranian regime been required to halt research and development of the faster century funls which will enable the bomb to break out far more rapidly than is currently the case? no. seven. lass the iranian regime -- no. eight, has the international community established procedures setting out how it will respond to different classes of iranian violation to ensure that the international community can act with sufficient speed and efficiency so to thwart a breakout of the bomb? no. eight, has the iranian regime

been required to halt its arming and training of the army in south lebanon? no. has the iranian government been required to -- members of trial for the alleged involvement in the bombing of the hezbollah suicide bomber of the amia jewish community center in argentina in 1994 resulting in the deaths of 85 people? no. 12 ras the iran leadership stopped its relentless calls nor the annihilation of israel? no. 13, has the iranian regime halted execution currently

running at an average of three a day, the highest rate in 20 years? no. 14 does the nuclear deal shatter the painstakingly negotiations that forced iran to the negotiating table? yes. 15, will the deal usher in a new era of global commercial interaction with iran reviving the iranian economy in releasing financial resources that iran will use to bolster its military force necessary terrorist network.? yes. 16 i'm going to be submitting these for the record and i look forward to receiving them during the next month. in the meantime the american people need to know that there is bipartisan opposition to this deal. i want grateful two weeks ago we had senator joe lieberman here who addressed my concern and that is that the secretary of state designated iran a -- of

state and i asked hererman has there been a change in course? his quote is this iranian government the islamic republic of iran has the blood of a lot of americans on its hands. and i would go on. incidentally hundreds of american soldiers were killed in iraq by shia militias. so your question is a good one. has the government changed? there is no evidence of change. mr. secretary, has there been evidence of change? yes in that the president of iran sent his foreign minister to negotiate an agreement to which i would pose you a lot of questions that i can give you the answer to that are yes to. does iran have to give up two-thirds of its centrifuges for years? yes.

does iran have to annihilate -- >> and mr. secretary those are words -- if the gentleman will suspend, your time has expired. i've suggested to the members, ask the questions and leave time for response. we're going to brian higgins of new york. mr. higgins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the snapback provisions in this agreement are real and powerful. and i think are born out of a deep distrust of iran. the snapback provisions, as i understand them allows for nicks of the six powers to the deal to flag what it considers a voilsz. that concern would be submitted to dispute resolution panel. if those concerns remain unresolved, the sanctions would resume or snap back after 30 days, preventing a resumption of sankss would require a vote from the security council from which the united states and its allies would have veto power.

it's unprecedented and i think very, very powerful and speaks volumes to this deal. under this deal, uranium would be cut by 98 prers. the level of enrichment for what remains is a long way from the 90% enrichment that would need to occur to achieve a weapons facility material. centrifuges would be reduced from 19,000 to a little over 6,100 for ten years. there would be no enrichment and only centrifuges permitted for use would be older, first generation centrifuges. plutonium would be reconstituted so it cannot make weapons grade materials. the materials that do exist there today would be september out of the country entirely. number four iran may try to build a nuclear weapon in secret. mr. secretary of energy i would

ask you thorough bust monitoring and verifications and inspections, the deal would allow inspectors act tess to inspect any suspicioussides. i reader critics of this plan saying because that's like a 24-hour period it's like a police officer calling a drug dealer to say we're going to raid your apartment in 24 days so they can clear all the evidence. would you speak to this within the context of physics and talk about the half life of both uranium and blew tonus. plutonium. >> i'll start with the last question, if i may. technically on the half life of the dominant uranium isotope is roughly the age of the earth which is why it still exists in the earth and that of the uranium 235 which is the isotope

you would want to enrich is somewhat shorter and is, therefore, more rain in nature. the analog to putting it drugs down the toilet is not very a applicable to the use of nuclear materials. as i've said in both unclassified and classified regimes, we have extraordinary sensitive ways of finding minuscule amounts that are left over from using nuclear materials, whether it's enrichment or whether it's in an explosive environment to understand the nuclear weapons behavior. so on that we're very, very clearly. in addition we have other constraints on them some of them forever in terms of our parts of weaponzation like neutron storeses where we also would have some interesting signatures should there be suspicious activity. >> secretary lew, you had dealt

with the issue of the projected amount of money that would be available to iran once the sanctions are lifted. iran's currency of loss -- my understanding is most of that money is iranian money in foreign accounts, froeszen in foreign accounts. in that iran's currency has lost about half its value over the past three years. was that factored into the your estimate about the amount of money that would be available to iran? >> congressman, i was addressing the specific issue of their reserves that are tied up overseas because of sanctions. we have done enormous damage to their economy. it will take them years to get back to where they will have been if saengsz were not put in place, even if they got that money back. so they are not looking into at growing out into a period of graeth growth. i think the challenge here we have a pretty good understanding of what the pressures are in

iran right now. we can't know with certainty what decisions they'll make. we know, for example, just to get their oil fields up and running properly would require an investment of $100 billion to $200 billion. so i can't tell you how much of the $50 billion they'll ae ply to their oil feeds but you have to assume one of the things they're going to want to do is get their economy moving. so that money will particularly be used for all the of purposes. i wish i could say zero would go to causes of maligned purposes. >> mike carl of texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary kerry if countries that know iran the best fear this agreement the most. and the reasons are for the following reasons. it laxes the necessary verification measures to ensure iran does not cheat. lists restriction owes iran's intercontinental ballistic missiles which the ayatollah

himself said they will mass produce, the terror arm will be relieved in the european sanctions. this deal could also in my judgment, park spark a nuclear arms deal in the middle east. what concerns me the most is this deal frees up hundreds of billions of dollars. susan rice the president's national security adviser said quote, we should expect some portion of that money will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we've seen in the region. and now you're asking this congress to endorse an agreement that it's submitted will pret spread terror in the region. chairman royce and i sent a

letter to you, sir and the president of the united states asking you to first submit this deal for consideration by the american people through their representatives first before this deal was submitted to the united nations. but instead one went around the congress and the american people submitted it to the united nations and china, russia and venezuela got a chance to vote on there and approve this agreement before we've had a chance to deliberate. my question is this. with the congress overrides the president's veto what effect does that have on this deal? >> let me come back to your earlier comments. >> this is a very important point. will be u.n. and eu sanctions be lifted and that will relief iran of these burdz or would -- if we override the president's veto would it collapse the entire international deal?

>> the sanctions rely on the international community's participation to be able to enforce them. our sanctions alone did not do the job alone. it wasn't until we went out and worked with other countries diligently, china for instance in order to persuade them not to buy x amount of oil. countries in the middle east would not be trading underneath the table or otherwise. there are a lot of different things necessary to make these sanctions work. if the united states unilateral unilaterally through congressional decisions pulls away from this deal, they're not going to continue to apply those sanctions. they have no reason to. they're gone. they've already said they're gone. and with respect to saudi arabia there was an ap article the other day when ash carter visited saudi arabia saudi arabia's foreign minister said iran's nuclear deal appears to have the abilities needed to obtain a nuclear weapon.

>> i've heard otherwise, but that's very important for us -- >> that's a very public comment. >> for us and the congress to understand that if we override the president's veto, it will stop the entire agreement. i think that's important for us members of congress to know. >> members -- >> one more question. it's been debated by secretary lew and yourself that you did not approve the delisting of the kud source commander, the iranian chair arm from the european sanctions list. i'm looking at the agreement right here. they're taken off the list of the european list, which is an agreement that was approved by you, it could force you to -- they killed americans in iraq and afghanistan. what do i tell my gold star mothers back home whose children were killed by these iranian forces and tell them that this agreement will take them off the list? >> tell them that the united states of america will continue to keep the sanctions on them, specifically. he remains designated by our country and we will not ever

lift them and that the united states will be pushing back on them. but look here is what -- >> my final question the secret deal between the iea and iran -- >> there's no skrooep secret deal. >> are you going to present that to the congress? >> there is no secret deal. there is an agreement, which is the normal process of the iea, where they negotiate a confidential agreement between them and the country that exists. we have briefed on it -- >> are you going to present that to the congress? >> we don't have it. >> have you seen it? >> we have been briefed on it. i have not personally seen it. can i just say something? we hear these complaints. we hear this agreement doesn't do this, doesn't do this, doesn't top their terror. what this agreement is supposed to do is stop them from having a nuclear weapon. now, i want to hear somebody tell me how they're going to do that without this agreement. >> mr. secretary --

>> i'd like to know how you're going to -- >> the gentleman's time is expired. >> the ability to go enrich again? what's the next step for the united states? nobody is answering that question. >> mr. kady. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank our witnesses for being here and their hard work. three threats i'm going to throw out there. one of them there have been reports in the media service that among our european partners in there, there was reluctant. those reports centered on france in particular. i'm curious what issues that you can detail that they might have had qualms about, issues that were addressed and i want you to comment on those reports. number two, if you could generally comment about the cooperative actions of north korea and iran and how this might be impacted. impacted. number three we have had witnesses before on this issue, and they