from the voices of the manhattan project, created by the atomic heritage foundation and the los the war came along , i was drafted -- i was asked to join. attendantas a second -- second lieutenant. the draft occurred, and we hadn't processed all the people from several states through fort dix. got them their uniforms and sent them off to training camps. it wasn't long before i got transferred to washington. up -- i was employed by the same people who eventually had charge of building all the

camps of building all the cancer hospital and airfields in the united states and the pentagon. i became one of the five to the bossofficers of the pentagon job. he supervised 40 or 50 architects, and a great big team of general contractors. our job was trying to stay on top of all that. when the contract was finished, the general picked me up and i went to the manhattan district, it was a very quiet, very secretive project. secretive, it so was five or 10 years after the war that i began telling people what i really should have told them at the outset.

after the war, i went into the construction business on my own. i worked at that for 50 years. built about 800 buildings. if one of them was leaning, we would go profit up. trying and keep it from collapsing. we quit that just recently, i do for the general contracting work. at the time we had 250 people on the payroll. most of the time it was more like 70 or 80. we built churches and hospitals, whatever came along. schools, lots of schools.

i still have a lot of friends that i hear from occasionally. now i am retired, and moved into a retirement center where they provide me with everything i need. i work about a 12 or 15 hour week. time, i am the playing tennis if i can. here i am today, working with you people here, you are running the world why am there doing nothing. that's a brief history. >> that's great. i love the way you have begun this. a. us inyou kind of tell those words -- [indiscernible] your piece, you describe it of love and war. war doesn'tlove and mix, i can tell you that from experience. at the very beginning of the war, i got engaged.

girl, suffered greatly, because i went into the manhattan district, i couldn't tell her what i was doing or where i was, i traveled everywhere. finally that broke up. was -- anotheri six or eight years before i got married. was for many people, a very stressful point. many of the men overseas state oversees five years without seeing their wife for their children. forgotten. -- theyer intended didn't anticipate, i should say, there would be such a division in their lives.

but we got through it. managed. the general brought me in to try and calm down the scientists who he had working on this project to develop the bomb. the scientists couldn't concentrate on their work. they were scared the germans , andyears ahead of us would bomb us almost immediately. them, was to work with and try and bring them information that would calm them down, get them back in their laboratories. meant i had to work with the scientists, and take them with me occasionally overseas. this meant that i do struggle

the immense power that the army had, and the money they had, to get this project done. my scientists who were not related to them at all and didn't see the need to have the army doing anything. they thought they could do it all by themselves. there was tremendous friction. between the two elements. but despite of that, the job got done, mainly because general at the top, worked so well with oppenheimer. it was a tough job for him to do. i went overseas the first time to meet with the british, who had all the intelligence.

on what was going on in the german side, if there was anything, they knew about it. , had noome in america good intelligence services. british as ae major source. eventually, i went around to armyto all the british headquarters, navy headquarters to let them know what i wanted to know without telling them what we are doing. eventually, some reports would drift back to me that they had received, but for the most part, they were interested in these great major buildup of armaments in the military troops and supplies. they didn't have much time for intelligence. we did pick up some very interesting information from them.

and we victim information from dupont, and a lot of larger corporatens who had intelligence services, they kept in touch with around the world. that eventually drew -- you project, the whole manhattan project was built on fear. fear that the enemy had the bomb, would have it before we could develop it. and this, they knew could be the case. because they were refugees from germany, or large number of them. studied under the germans before the war broke

out. knew 40 as a result, i different german scientists that could be involved in the project. that could develop obama. during the rest of the whole time i was there, we were constantly looking for those names to appear in publication, whatever reports we could find. doing,new what they were we could better sss to whether they were on track for developing a bomb. there is serious business. eventually, as the war progressed, the general decided the mission, following the

armies in europe. it would be a scientific mission, commission composed of scientists, we kept saying all of the various scientific tracks. and buried into it would be two or three atomic scientists. this mission would be there to by the generals as they went forward, who were constantly receiving threatening reports of devastating weapons, which might be thrown against them. the mission was put together in g2, the army intelligence department. the name was a mystery name it. for the whole war.

and for 10 years after the war. nobody can figure out where the name came from. eventually, i had to tell them that the kernel and i worked student, and the name was a greek word for groves, a grove of trees. had known that, i would have been put up to the firing squad. he didn't want any secret like that to get known. it was an interesting little got the how this kernel project properly named after all. missionthe scientific was very effective. as the army moved forward, it interviewed german scientists, all kinds of scientists, french, belgian, whatever. as tok up information

what the germans were doing. one of the most important reports was called the strasburg report. groveseally told general and president roosevelt that the -- that they didn't have a project. they were focusing on rockets. of course, i must say, we focused our attention on chiefberg, who was the scientific -- atomic scientist in germany. we knew that wherever he would be, that's what the project would be.

later on, when the bomb was ready, general groves sent me out to pick it up in arizona. new mexico, rather. los alamos. and i traveled with the bomb, byket all the way -- took it air to california in and indianapolis. we flew to indianapolis. i waited there until the bomb was dropped. that, i went into japan on a special mission that general groves set out to look at all the universities come all the colleges, factories to see if we can determine what the capacity of the japanese were, whether they had something going or not. , got out, started my

construction business. and that's basically my war story. i think the bomb was -- it's a miracle the bomb was developed. it's wonderful that we were able to use it to end the war. if the bomb and not been dropped, and the war had of people thousands would've died on both sides, particularly if we'd invaded japan. like, we may be talking about one million people in such a terrible invasion process. the biggest miracle is, after the war, after 60 years of

having not had another atomic bomb incident, it's been lucky. we should direct our attention anyvery effort to prevents possible occurrence, such as a war which might use nuclear weapons. japan was divided and the three parts. , and was a medical mission a military mission that went directly to hiroshima. tother similar group went nagasaki. what's the other city? nagasaki, yeah. the third was the one i had which went to the university, and all the factories in japan and korea.

trace of nuclear action. the people in these missions was really composed of those already at tinian. team of technical people, medical people there. and interpreters. people,m had medical had interpreters and scientists. me, philipison with morrison recently died, he was a professor of physics at cornell, think. many died.

this is where they covered all the fronts, those reports are available. they completely tell the story these --as found when when the americans first arrived. at hiroshima and nagasaki, and when i found in the british university towns. , weof the things we forget are apt to forget is the tremendous an important role that the emperor of japan paid -- played in ending the war. he was perhaps the biggest hero in the war, when you think about it. army, heposed by his got out in front of them, got on the radio and called the war off. wasn't that easy.

the people where i went and did not complain about the war being over. i can remember that. complaintst express about the use of the atomic moment. -- the atomic bomb. the general impression i got was that they needed to get reorganized and back on their feet. i think that sums it up, really. experience, i didn't any great hatred for americans. as we proceeded with the -- into the peacetime.

well, that's about all i can say on that. have you been in contact with the japanese on and off over the last 60 years? impression that those feelings of changed, i'm presuming you have had some contact with the japanese, or have some impressions, no? i have not had any. and it would travel that direction. thatnever traveled in direction. i got as far as alaska. >> how many weeks after the bombing did you have that mission? wasfurman: the first bomb

august 6, second mom about six or eight days later. formed early in september. we got back to the states late in november. then i got out about the first of january. >> you were in japan about two months. mission,ore about your you are looking to see whether the japanese have been developing atomic bombs. mr. furman: in order to determine whether there was a project or not, we went to the universities, because we knew was a project,e the scientists had to come from the universities. it would be a scientific project. physicist would be involved. eight the names of

japanese scientists who had studied in japan, studied in germany, and were capable of running -- possibly capable of running a project if japan had one. then we went to the big inquireions, just to about their facilities. and we their research ,epartments, quizzed people went out into the field, look at properties. korea. had a project,y we knew it would have to be a tremendous project like oak

ridge. if somebody showed us a 40,000 foot warehouse and that was their project, we feel pretty safe. because oak ridge was one million feet. our project, half the size of the state of rhode island. knew, nobody could do it any quick already faster, that was one of our fears, maybe somebody would figure out a way to produce an atomic bomb in a different way than we were doing it. so that's about what we did. we also, particularly in korea, where they had mineral resources, we checked out all

mines to see if there was an interest in mining uranium or thorium. radium. that's where it all has to start. report, fromour this we can make our report back , that there was no serious project. i think that report has stood up under questioning over the years. every once in a while, some he wants to write an article saying secret plan was producing atomic bombs. this we could easily check out. force them to remove the report. to -- oneto go back

of the things that stand nor says is that you were the first atomic intelligence unit. the -- isat they call that what they called it? what would you call it? groves facedeneral this problem with his scientists. they have this tremendous fear of the germans having the bomb. well ahead of us. since most of his team of scientists have studied under the germans, and the germans were still there. reportsidn't have any -- denying they weren't busy and active.

so, until i came on board, there wasn't any effort -- there hadn't been any effort to try than they knewre at that time. find out more about what's going on in germany. wasral groves's intention to find out as quickly as downble, in order to calm his scientific teams, to keep them on the job, not be scared all the time. so there was a group of scientists that i met with, major people that were involved in europe inect,

new york lawrence out in california, oppenheimer, they that i couldames work with. in this team of scientists suggested that we, for one thing, that we would go try to get scientific publications out of germany. and let them look at them. because of the scientists we knew, going back to the 40's, we knew the 40 german scientists that were nuclear scientists that would be involved in a publishing they were , this would give us some idea of what they were thinking about. mainly,gh switzerland,

we obtained it scientific reports, and i pass along to this committee, they read them and made their comments, pass them out among the other scientists. all in an effort to try and calm down the scientists that were there. also, if we found some thing important, they would be gratifying, but we never did. we never found out anything. stuff.negative that these 40ans scientists that we knew were not in any big nuclear bomb project. then, the other wing of the groves effort to obtain information, as they move forward, he got reports back of interviews with the german

scientists as the armies went through eastern france over into scientists were picked up and talked to, and ,hese reports went to groves and we got it out all the scientists on the project. project scientists some relief to know that there probably wasn't a project going on. know, we didn't know that the british had broken the code, and that the british of course weren't willing to tell us they had broken the code. for fear that this would leak out back to the germans. so the british themselves were kind of quiet, they passed on

information carefully to us to nothing could be --d back to the fact that we that they had picked it up off of the code breach. and so right to the end of the war, there was a gap there that we never knew about. had, of course, their own opinions, well declared to us in the very beginning, that their information was that the germans had no project. no back to it at all. and they were, of course, completely -- the british were completely absorbed in their efforts just to stay alive. , but their bombings troops in the field and when the war.

so that is about the atmosphere we had to work with. >> with their british they went into france with you? was an american force with the british scientists? did you work with the british as he were going into france and germany? mr. furman: yes. the answer is yes, the british went with us. on our scientific efforts, the scientific project. there were some people in the we wouldccasionally consult with them when we found that information. they always were very helpful. remember, theo

country was being devastated by this war, they were doing all they could just to stay alive. recall it was december 1944 that someone left a project because he had learned it but b re was obama -- no omb. british said the they had efforts -- evidence there was no german effort? mr. furman: it doesn't ring a bell. >> it continued far beyond that. april 45, may, just as d-day was approaching. one of the sort of exciting

parts of dan morris's book is his descriptions, of some of the situations you were involved in, personally come on your mission. some ducking bullets. never in greatas peril. we stayed back of the lines 50 miles. one of the interesting things sent me general groves a cable saying sir charles hambrick, head of the bank of england was coming over to the mission for a visit. he also was a big wheel and the british government, ran two or three railroads, big cheese. take care of him.

appeared, and i found out immediately that he liked to get around the battlefields, i the armies were up north, and crossed over into germany at. think the armies were up north and hadn't crossed over into germany yet. he was a world war i hero, soldier. so we took him out to visit some of the old world war i battlefields, which were still visible. strasburg on ao friday morning, he went down to the rhine river and put his feet in. us that he would even try because the germans were on the other side of the river,

maybe they can see through that followed, i don't know. we didn't want this guy hurt. touring, five days of he said to me, i want to throw a big dinner for my appreciation of all the done. i said fine, so we went to a nn, the french didn't have much food, so we gave the french inn our rations, they .ooked up something i remove or they went down into one of their sellers and came up through the floor with the choice bottle of wine, and said this is going to be a big celebration. we had a great time, great meal. over, the bills came in and they gave it to him said furman, i don't

have any money. we pay this -- will you pay this? here's the head of the bank of england, and i had to pay for it. the next day, or the day after, we took him back to the airport. it was spring time, i still remember him getting on the plane with five or six daffodils in his hand. a great guy. incident that we all remembered. >> no doubt. that's great. let's see. actually, you personally were discovering the scientists.

i know john am still writes in his memoirs coming upon auto within?re you -- with him? mr. furman: yes, i was there. >> can you start again? mr. furman: we're not talking about the armies having moved to go towe were able german --f a printable german scientist. kernel -- was head of the military side of the mission. smith interviewed him, i was there too.

that at leastlear he was not involved in any atomic project. this occurred several times with other scientists as we came upon them. people, or other people in the mission would interview them, then we will write up the reports and send them back to the states. time, general groves sent a message that i was to go to the rhine river as soon as the troops got past over the bridge. and scoop up some water and send it back so they could test it. you -- thebeing that

was ansts knew if there atomic plant anywhere on the river, that it could be detected in the water. unless they took extreme don't theo not radioactive substances back into the river. so we did that. project, went north, went out on the bridge and got the water and brought it back to paris. up, for a five bottles of it and send it to chicago. -- sealed theput case, would put in two or three bottles of french wine. with a note.

i wrote on it, ok, test this too. meaning, have a good french wine. well, it wasn't long before we got back a message that the water tested negative, but the wind was positive, send more wine. we didn't know how to take that, whether it was a joke. saying isessage back not a joke, the wine is radioactive, send us more wine. we went back and trace this wine back to a winery, we find out that the wine, the soil there had the wine was grown nuclear deposits of uranium or something in there. it was soaked up into the moisture the got into the wine.

we went got several cases of wine, sent several cases back to the states, kept to a three cases for ourselves to enjoy. of the wine end incident. but the wine was radioactive. i bet that today, if you went into and very carefully tested wines that are on the market today, he would find some that had some radioactivity. not enough to be harmful. and -- as our armies move forward into germany, and it seems that the war would quickly and there. groves attention for target for concentrated, he

concentrated his attention on targets in japan. on a list of stinson and roosevelt, truman. several of the targets were dismissed, like kyoto. there was a great problem trying to find targets because it bomb so many cities. we wanted a city that had not been bombed yet, if we could. gradually they got to cities decided upon, i can remember. -- i can't remember. till august 6 to

get the plane up in the air and over to japan. there was any real effort made to bomb in europe. concentrationthis on targets in japan. all in an effort to end the war. >> so what do you think of truman's decision to decide to drop the bomb? mr. furman: i would say almost , on they in the project military side, wanted to see a drop. the scientists -- i don't know. but anyway, history has really

bomb us that dropping the was the best thing to do to end the war. it ended almost immediately. much pretty solid information on which to base a decision. if you would end the war immediately, it would be worth it to drop the bomb. there was no talk about using the bomb anyway, just because we had developed it. there was no talk like that. as i recall. if we could have ended the war without dropping the bomb, that would be fine. that was never an option. >> might be helpful if you can also add, maybe this is

something we can get some other sources, but just how many, the japanese -- the perception of the japanese as being unwilling to surrender. having had all the battles over deathlands that ended in to the end, the same kind of severe bombing, 550,000 people died. our air raids, or conventional bombing raids for march. could you say something that showed that the japanese were -- didn't seem to have -- be wavering in their commitment to fighting to the end? mr. furman: from where we sat, the japanese were determined to fight to the very end. they were under the military.

they were, the whole country was being directed by the military. military would not give up. that's why it's important to important the decision to get on the radio and stop the war, how important that was, because he had to override the military to do it. this is all been written up in great detail, i'm sure you can read about it. this is very important that we -- hber that your heat joe irohito's decision was primed to ending the war. >> furman: you mentioned -- in mentioned earlier the soviets, the role they played

entering the war. did you want to add anything about that? mr. furman: i didn't understand it. >> you mentioned earlier the japan was worried about russia, about the soviet union entering the war. and if they had to face the through -- into the varioust they may lose possessions, including the homeland. i don't know. discussed: it's often as what would've happened if the war had been continued. if the russians were allowed to come into the war against japan. that, mostly be americans. indidn't want to endless war

the pacific. we wanted over. all we can say is that, by ending the war, the russians didn't have that choice. could, butl they they didn't actually enter the fight. and get more territory. >> can you remember, in your discussions, i get the sense that no one expected this to be -- that the war was going to end after two bombs and a third one on the way. correct?now if that is or what you might have on people's expectations? mr. furman: it is often

discussed as how many bombs could be dropped on japan. we had two bombs. was perhaps three weeks off. and then there were bombs after that. we were lucky. that,er had to go beyond beyond the two that were drawn up. it's just a piece of luck that would get in the war when we did. >> it was indeed. let me see. remember being on killian island? what it was like when the enola tinian? returned to

and the feeling of the people, when did you learn that the bomb had been successful? mr. furman: the enola gay took off from tinian. it was the first bomb. and returned. they went into a debriefing session, which many people attended. and we were all quite pleased, that point, that so far, so good. bomb to end the war. there was no -- we didn't have any, i don't think there was any real expectation that the second

bomb alone would do it. need, we all didn't know how long we would be in tinian, or in japan. plans were being -- movedeen developed, which to tremendous numbers of troops into japan. almost immediately. so the end of the war was greatly appreciated. i really don't know whether i would be here if you hadn't and then. >> were you scheduled to go to japan then? mr. furman: we were all scheduled to go wherever we had to go. everywhere i go, where there is

a war veteran, i find a war veteran with orders, and let which woulds pocket take him on the invasion of japan. everywhere i go. it was no dream, we were going right on in. >> those people, knowing you were involved in the project, went to those people say -- what do those people say? do you find people thanking you for your part in the atomic bomb project? mr. furman: they may not think me, but they were glad the war was over. no war really ever ended like

that. the atomic bomb, is such a devastating bomb. i want you to read, someday, the report that the bombing analysts wrote after visiting targets in japan that have been bombed. that was his job. he went after each bombing project,he went to the went to the bombing project and assess the damage. 30%, 50%, whatever percentage of the cities. planee learned that one over hiroshima had completely devastated the city, it wasn't there anymore, he practically went into shock. in other words, the bombing

missions don't do that. they destroy, but not completely. they very bad, and we lose a lot of planes doing it, but the which ismb has a force almost impossible for us to appreciate. looking into the future, we got to remember that. we have had enough atomic bombs, we hope we don't have to use anymore on anybody anywhere. one of the things i was asked to from loske the bomb alamos to tinian. i went out and received the bomb.

i remember the authorities at los alamos wanted a receipt, that i had received it. so he signed a receipt for an atomic bomb. frame.s kind of nice to then they decided it was too secret for me to keep the receipt, and they actually developed a receipt for the receipt that they had just -- that i had just given them. bomb in a took the convoy down the mountain. i was in this energy -- the center jeep with the bomb, and there were a couple of jeeps ahead of me. and the couple behind. we were on our way to albuquerque, the air force base there.

we would pick up a couple of planes, three planes. the trip was pretty much without incident, except we had a flat this very secret project stood by the side of the road while some g.i. fixed the tire. it makes you think of the g.i., the picture of the g.i. with a minesweeper, walking ahead down theroad, you could see ,hole behind him was 75 trucks following this one man with a minesweeper. same thing. anyway. albuquerque, we had a delay,

because the planes were ready. plane with thea bomb, there was a plane headed me, and one behind me. my orders were to make sure that i went with the bomb, wherever it went, i was to go. we all have parachutes. and we flew without incident over to san francisco. over, andned the bomb took the bomb aboard the indianapolis. which then sailed the pacific, thedelivered the bomb to air force over there. that thenite group fluid into japan.

all i carried was half the bomb. because i have a whole bomb, the thing would blow up at any time. under certain circumstances. so the other half was flown over. kind of think the navy wanted to .e part of this project half of it when a navy ship. of course, the indianapolis is a story all by itself. tinian, a few days later, the indianapolis was sunk in the chinese see somewhere.

>> is an incredible story. you must've been glad you are no longer on it. my god. well, did you get to know the captain? mr. furman: oh, yeah. talk abouta lot morris or moberg. do know him? mr. furman: yes. player of a baseball some note in the major-league's.

and he was recruited by the oss, and became an agent for them. he went abroad during world war ii. we sisi him occasionally. we ran into him occasionally, he might be in the same spot, same places we were. he was, i was not part of this deal, but apparently, gross heisenbergsee if could be eliminated.

where --other story moberg was involved in tracking down heisenberg in switzerland. but really, that is the and the story. it's probably a good idea that such a thing was not carried out , because it would have caused germans toaused the see the immediate importance of an atomic bomb and our involvement in the manufacturer of -- in the manufacture of an atomic bomb would be more apparent to them. they might have changed their targets. but you did not overlap? mr. furman: no, no.

i read he spoke seven languages or something. since you were in europe, did you know or did you learn french and german? mr. furman: i got to speak .rench german -- no. i was very poor anyway and french. got meds that i knew into trouble because as soon as you started to speak french, they would not speak english anymore. french andstudied tried to get so i could talk to french people, but it would have been better if i hadn't. because you really have to be .wfully good

you probably have to live there for a while. did you take french? cindy: yes. i agree completely. [laughter] to live there to really become fluent. i completely sympathize. let's see. oh, i know. i wanted to have you tell us the story that you told before, but it's going to be better -- about mrs. o'leary, having to find a some of the generals could ask questions of. mr. furman: yeah. general groves had in executive secretary. her name was jean o'leary.

she stopped outside his office and received his calls, took all of his dictation, made all of his arrangements. she was a terrific person. very, very able. but in those days, not like recognized.n't and some of these generals would not talk to a woman. they would demand to talk to somebody else. fromcall would come in general clay for general groves. i don't know if clay was the one or not, but anyway -- she would turn the phone over to me, and i

would make notes and give her the notes and she would tell me what to say to clay, see? there was this problem, and it was something that we would gradually overcome over the years. it was more prevalent then. were headsy people of organizations. not too many women ran companies. it's common. friend and aat good organizer. the general depended on her completely. when gross told you about the plan to build the bomb, did you they knew more about how it

worked than you, but did you defend this idea? were you surprised? mr. furman: from the education i have had, i knew it would work. but what scared everybody was there might be several other .ays it could work, too making all of the assumptions to the problem possible. in other words, if one side said to me, i really do not know if some guy could develop us in his kitchen -- this in his kitchen. it could not happen. but we were in the frontier of scientific knowledge working our way forward. werehat explains why there

150 thousand at los alamos. we needed all of these people working, focused on a solution. it is still true today. we can't handle this stuff with just to your -- just two or three people in a laboratory. if you work on atomic bomb, you've got to have a whole cadre of well-trained people. you can't make a mistake. cindy: do you think -- there were bets taken at trinity whether the "gadget" was going to work or not work. at that time there were many who felt it was not going to work. but this was a certain, a very uncertain, high-stakes gamble that groves had undertaken.

all of those he tried to recruit or did recruit were skeptical that he could do this, certainly within the time were to be used in the war. do you want to talk about that? mr. furman: well, trinity was the test project in the desert there at all medardo -- almagordo, where we tested the second bomb. don't forget, i was already on another bomb. the first bomb was to highly concentrated enriched uranium balls which were fired together wasthe critical mass exceeded and the bomb went off. the other bomb was a plutonium bomb. the bomb, when i saw it, it was a great big ball about the size

of a basketball, maybe larger, explosives. rtx and they fired the explosives, which compressed the plutonium center. and the bomb went off. two different techniques. so, maybe the first was going to work anyway. they should never build another one like it. the second one was the wave of the future. they are all plutonium bombs now. that asust offhand say the project developed, they plutonium. to make they already were the first bomb. so they used it. the second bomb with which i am

-- with plutonium was easier to make an cheaper. let's just offhand. -- that is just offhand. one of the themes of our exhibit will be the amazing alignment between the government, the military, and academia. especially in that groves' connections in the experience of building all of the camps and facilities for the army and the pentagon. he had no leading companies that he then turned to for the he couldand if he had, had confidence in dupont, for example. the university connection.

oppenheimer was known at a lot of universities. s was, too. i don't know. can you talk about how a andition was put together bend back to some of groves' work in building facilities and so forth? groves was a mover, a big action man. well organized and he was able terms, largearge projects. that you and i, we are just not able to do. he was able -- because of his experience building all of the camps and so forth, he got even better than ever at managing

tremendous projects. the manhattan project was a tremendous projects. cities. three or four researched and six or seven universities. and he had to keep his finger on all of that. he had this ability, which not everybody has of being an ultra .anager he got to know everybody. but knowing is not the principal thing. the principal thing is his ability to act in a very decisive way on very, very large projects. it's hard to find a man like that. he's in extraordinary manager.

as a man to work for, he was demanding, but most people say he was quite kind to them. he didn't -- he expected results, but the relationships we all had with him were good. he didn't like to waste time. he was quite sympathetic if you got into a spot. but mainly, he was a pusher. he large that from somerville, i guess. bossal somerville was his prior to the manhattan project. somerville moved on to be head of supply for the army. tremendouswas a mover and shaker, to be able to envision a way of supplying 11 million people in the field.

overseas. and -- tions contracts there were two great engineer leaders there. we were very thankful to have. that what is think it about general groves' backgrounds that might have created such a person? was it something to do -- did he have, i don't know -- too much confidence in himself? how did you come to understand who he was and how he became who he was? do you have insight into that? mr. furman: it's a good question. can answer,roves his son. -- his training

was standard. good training. he went to the academy of course. and the academy schools did to manage well, be good managers, but he was an extraordinary one. ee.dy: let's s norris in his book

talks about groves groves is creating an intelligence revolution. what he did to create the security unit and intelligence unit and overseas intelligence and you have counterintelligence. he really had all of that. but, and then the secrecy -- the secrecy, he was hugely powerful and knowledge is power and he was the only one who could do this, and even in his book, he talks about how he was to visit churchill and england and he had to decline because he realized down -- there is too much information. it was all in his head. think if general

groves had a mishap or his plane was shot down, what would happen to the project? mr. furman: your question is a good one, but most of us realized we had a job to do. things were moving very rapidly. luxury ofhave the trying to think of what if groves died or something. is such aork itself tremendous threatening threat to guess, wet we were, i could find another leader if we had to. but don't forget. .his was wartime tremendous dangers existed everywhere. one of the scientists

had a father, a nuclear scientist on the project, his father was on the italian front. an officer. and his father wrote back, he said there is some pretty horrible stuff i am going through here. his son wrote back, just hang in there, because i can't tell you what i'm doing, but it's going to end the war. the father wrote back, is there tomorrowe it will be or the next day? i do not think i can last much longer. as a matter of fact, he died. it was a terrible struggle. war is so foreign. i don't know. . didn't have to suffer

i was not one of the people who had to go through fighting the way forward, you know. that's all very helpful. -- forasy for people people to forget that all of this happened in the middle of a war. [indiscernible] there was a war going on. i also had to pick up a report. my intelligence sources sent me a report that an old lady in ,rance saw a train load go by

--rels of chemicals marked how was it marked? "uranium oxide." they were going past her. and she got this intelligence out and it reached america. my god. got it. so, uranium oxide is uranium. that is what it is. at one of the first products out of the mine. you can take it to the factory in make this oxide. and it came out of france, and belgians hadme the the refineries for it. if uranium was being mind in the belgian congo -- was being mined

in the belgian congo, and i took it to groves and said, i'm onto something. he said, go up to see the head -- which was a big mining company. see what he says. i went to see him and he said, no, this does not mean anything. nothing at all. were, and elephant that door through before i could believe this had any value. so, i went back, and in talking with groves, i decided i would go to europe and organize assert -- a search. so, i went over to france, and at that time, eisenhower was --n on the ranch coast french coast. the big movement had not yet started up to the north.

i'm wrong about that. as movement had gone as far the dutch border. but he was still at his headquarters, he and general smith. on the french coast. pash went with me. into c general smith , the executive officer. while were there, of course, eisenhower comes by. he gave us the clearance to go up there and look for the stuff. pash and a up there,

couple other loads of jeeps, and that was the only time i was right up on the firing line. there in the warehouse, we found of -- threese full ,oints -- three parts uranium eight parts oxygen. we arranged -- the british were with us. we took some british with us. with the british, we arranged for about 20 airplanes and a convoy of trucks, and we took the stuff out of the factory, out of the warehouse. the germans were right there. i mean, they fired at us -- twice maybe. and the story is i was still in

my washington uniform. everybody else was in combat uniform, and the story was the germans saw me there and they realized if the americans are moving their headquarters that close, they better move back, so the next day they moved back 20 miles. that's just the story. but they did move back. we transported that stuff by air , where it was kept in safety and i guess they used it. , i realized that the train was going in two directions. it was picking up the stuff, but it was taking it down into france. we went down there and found it, a big supply of uranium, same

stuff in a warehouse near marseille. navy, went over to the loaded all of this uranium on a ship, and the ship joined a .onvoy before it left, i had a radio i had confiscated somewhere and i put the radio in with everything i mention this because the stuff got to america and was put in storage, but whoever handled it delivered my radio to my parents. i don't know quite how. now i knew that they had got it. , that's the sort of thing you had to do. gotst mention when groves

me started, almost the same week, he got a letter for me, introducing me to whom it may concern from general strong. general strong was g2 of the army. bigshot. this is major furman. he's on an extremely important mission. if you can help them, please help them or drop dead, nine whoever area -- signed whoever. i carried that throughout the war. that was how i got those damn -- they even put the stuff on a ship for me. any time i wanted to travel, i did not have travel orders. i just went to air transport command and they gave me a ticket, wherever it was, and i used it everywhere, to get into corporate offices.

and it helped a lot. god is a lot of information. -- got us a lot of information. cindy: how old were you? mr. furman: this is about when i was 28 maybe. i was born in 1914. 1943. i was 28. that 28, ofmportant course -- at 28, of course. [laughter] cindy: do you think that -- mr. furman: most of us were young. with, young,orked young. they were all young people. cindy: that's true. i think the average age at los alamos was 25?

mr. furman: yeah. i have a portfolio of pictures, all labeled with all of the people, names and everything, accumulated. a picture of the plane, picture of the various generals who came over, the enola gay when i came back. someday i will show them to you. here is what we can do. we will come out and see you and bring our scanners and scan them all in and record your notes about them. mr. furman: the beauty of the pictures is they are all labeled with names and the dust of the people in the pictures. i'm not in it. i worked with an army photo

group, and they gave me a complete set. they gave me two complete sets. cindy: when you look back over your long life and all you have accomplished, how do you feel about your years working on the manhattan project? mr. furman: well, it was an unusual experience. 50course, when you spend years in the building business, that's also an unusual experience. you wonder why you survived that, too. but i made a lot of lifelong friends. certainly was in the center of

things. the center of the war. that is why, i guess, everybody is so interested. i worked on the central project. there is nothing like it. i ended up the war with 30 shirts. i used to keep shirts -- italy, england, as well is over here -- as over here. so i felt like i could carry an extra bottle of booze if i had to. you could get a jeep for a week. years took me about five or six years to wear out all of the shirts.

cindy: you had all of the shirts that you carried around? mr. furman: uniform shirts. different address ones issued when you were in it -- you had to have different was issued when you were in italy? mr. furman: you had to have shirts they are so you did not have to carry them the next time you come back. that means five trips to europe. the first trip, of course, was intorome fell and we went italy to talk to the italian scientists. that is when i'm that moberg for the first time -- i met moberg for the first time.

there were four other trips to england or france. cindy: what did you think of the italian effort? we learned they were excluded by the germans from many of the important stuff. the two german and two italian rick and dr. dr. in maldives. they were not in on anything. we came away with the feeling that the project could be there. they were not including the italians in the project of their was one. -- if there was one. but that was 1944, i guess.

it was a separate mission, organized -- i had a hand in organizing. they appointed him to take up the science side. bush was the head of ord. he managed and placed all of the scientists during the war. .hat was not all he did smith was there and he had to

have a way of getting around. military said he would go , a veryonel pash energetic guy. they had four or five scientists scientists came and went. we just open the door and scientific people wanted to come over and sit with us, sit with our mission, fine. the thing was, they were constantly interviewing people covering all of these scientific disciplines. rocketry, munitions, whatever. and buried in this mission, we had three atomic scientists. i can think of two of them.

there was one and the scientist -- idupont was another and will think of it in a minute. it doesn't matter. anyway. this is the way we hid our interest in another mission. we didn't want this mission to be known as the atomic energy interested commission, so we set a disciplined mission and buried our people in it. i went over there and spend some time with them. set up an officer in england who worked with the british intelligence continuously.

-- he did not come over until the war was almost over. and spent most of -- all of his time on security matters here in the state. to sum it all up, the dropping that started bomb the atomic age, we are in the atomic age now 50, 60 years. it is still the biggest thing we have to manage, and we hope that we can have leaders in this country who will help in a worldwide project to help us all benefits andh the values ofdestructive

being in these atomic times. cindy: i assume that you were not so much involved with the early curled -- cold war efforts that.ash and all you went off to the private sector. is that right? mr. furman: yes. i had a choice at the end of the war, either to go back and get my doctorate in physics and stay work, or to start my own construction company. decided i knew best what to do in a construction company.

that is what i did. it became part of the post warning clear effort. but you know, it's funny. i remember -- i knew so many people in the manhattan project that i was building for a doctor in a medical building or something, and he said to me, to close thise meeting, because i'm meeting some very important nuclear scientist, and of course he meant by that i was not up to that, up to their level. so, i excused myself and on the way out, i met the scientists.

they were people i knew. we had a nice talk. my client was not quite sure what to do with me after that. there was a time, you know, after the war when they would come by to see me at my house in georgetown. i had a chance to visit with them. .ut that same tapered off -- but that soon tapered off. >> with less coverage of the house on c-span and the senate on c-span2, on c-span3, we complement that coverage by showing you the most relevant hearings and public affairs events. and on the weekend, c-span3 is home to american history tv including six unique programs. the civil war. american artifacts, touring

museums and historic sites to discover what artifacts reveal about america fell past. history bookshelf with the best-known history writers. the presidency. lectures and history with college professors delving into america fell past. at reel america, looking films. watches on hd. like us on facebook. follow us on twitter. american history tv was at the society for historians of american foreign relations annual meeting in arlington, virginia. we spoke with professors, authors, and graduate students about their research. soeve: keisha blain