potential for hokkaido. they couldn't do much more than put 113th brigade or small element in there before the 25th and it -- had they done it several days in between each division. so was not really feasible as you have been saying. >> there was senior command -- [ inaudible ] >> there was all kinds of people who were advising against this on the military side, you have people like, you know, zukov, you have on the political side, you have molotov saying, hey, this not what we agreed to and we'll get skinned. yeah. there is -- then you have truman, there were so many people on both sides of the pacific who were against this, that it is amazing when i come across these broad things that people say, who obviously have

not read dave's books, and there are these -- and also not aparentally looked at things like terrain maps, ideas that the soviet armored divisions will be sweeping down honshu and there is, like, there is the nonsense that people just kind of throw out there, absolutely amazing, and you've been, i'm sure, reading this stuff for year years. >> take you first. >> i imagine the dearth of naval resources for the invasion, proposed invasion, hokkaido and the losses, was there other support available from as far south as -- >> no. no. the soviets were -- they were making the best use of what they had, which was almost nothing. they were -- they were getting -- they were using it as effectively as they could. but they just didn't have it.

just -- again, when i say they were going to be using trawlers as amphibious vehicles, not just something i'm kidding, he's shaking his head yes right now. and i think you had -- i think frank at the truman library, just a few weeks ago, he had this -- i can't remember what it was, i was trying to hard to not bust up laughing. and interrupt things. >> the soviets would conduct an effective invasion of japan. if soldiers could march across the bottom of the sea of japan, breathing through reads, hauling heavy ropes, artillery and tanks, that is their capability. >> so i guess what i'm trying to say and i -- what a couple of other gentlemen here whose books some people apparently don't bother to read is that it ain't happening. it is just tossed out as a matter of something that, like, well, obviously this could have been done. yes, sir.

>> so what? when we invade kyushu in november 45 and go to the can'to plane of march of 46, what are the soviets doing by that time?? >> well, the societies at that time are consolidating. they've got a lot of consolidating to do. they're pushing -- it's almost like fingers on a hand. they've got a lot of forces that they are having to move forward and they're already running into and, of course, dave can go into details on this. they're having all kinds of issues getting stuff moved forward. they're consolidating. manchuria is a huge play. maybe some japanese are going to start having second thoughts. the soviets, quite frankly, are have you, very busy guys. they are not sitting on their butts, let's put it that way.

yes, sir? >> question. let's say that stalin had just said, full speed ahead, we're going to get with this plan as bad as it is and they went forward. first off, how do you think that would have affected a u.s. plans, etcetera with? would the u.s. have decided, well, they're our allies, we're going to send in the u.s. fleet to support them? what would we have done? >> we would not have -- that would have been such a bizarre decision on stalin's part that i can't imagine that he would. john kuehn who is coming down, he made a fun nny quip about th one time which would be something like mcarthur would probably say to the japanese who we were in contact with, sink them. it was something along the -- what was it that you said? it was something along that. i remember it if you don't.

yes. >> honestly, can i make a minor correction? >> sure. >> you talked about japanese marines. >> yeah. i -- i tried to catch myself. yes. go on. >> well, they were various japanese ground troops. there was a variety of missions unlike our marines, they were neither organized nor equipped as our marines. they were special naval landing forces and a variety of base forces to hold bases and they were part of the navy, not like the marines. >> right. >> yeah. the thing that i would draw -- what i would draw people's attention to in that regard, they're the units that were in manila were very much along the lines of what you're talking about. and they inflicted enormous damage. and then, k, people are familiar with taraowa, as well.

so, yeah, but it's a different strength temperature from the marines. but for, like, the average joe, marines is a -- rather than explaining the whole naval connection and all the idiosyncrasies, but yeah, i thought about that even as i was saying it. i know, i know, you would be seeing some necks turning red. >> one more question. >> yes, yes. >> if there is one, one more question. >> i think they're done with me. american history tv in prime time continues thursday night with manhattan project voices, an oral history of the u.s. effort to build the first atomic bomb. at 8:00 p.m. eastern, an interview with atomic heritage foundation director cynthia kelly. then benjamin burteson recalls

the atmosphere of secrecy around the project and his own work in creating the ig anything switches. american history tv each night this week on c-span3. a signature feature of booktv is our all-day comage of book fairs and vest falls avoss the country. beginning this weekend, we're live from the 15th annual book festival from our neigh's capital. we're in new york for the brooklyn book festival. in early october, the southern festival of books in nashville. the weekend after that, we are live for the austin texas book festival and near the end of the month, we'll be covering two book festivals on the same weekend. it's the wisconsin book festival in madison and back on the east coast, the boston book festival.

we'll be in portland, oregon, for word stock. at the end of november, we're live for the 18th year in a row from florida for the miami book fair international. that's a few of the book fairs and festivals this fall on c-span2's book tv. now a look at allied military strategy in the pacific and world war ii. the vice president of the institute for the study of strategy in politics, james perry, took part in a symposium marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war. this is an hour. >> let me begin by introducing dr. james perry. he was one of our imminent strategists. he is codirector of the institute. will present our opening discourse, setting the stage for the remarks that most of us will be making for the rest of the day. jim, it's yours.

>> i realize this morning that i probably made too many slides. i'll get through as many as i can. what i want to discuss today is the end game that almost was. because as we will see at the -- by the end of today, there was a different august 1945 by roosevelt and truman. i am going to describe the end result roosevelt wanted to achieve and leave it at that. and at the end of the day, we will discuss what truman wanted to receive. the balance between the european and the pacific theaters and opportunity costs at commitments

on one theater imposed on the other. planning from '42 to '45, thinking about the bombing, blockade and invasion as the war developed. and i will conclude with the option which will will tie in with some of the other presentations we will have later. geography. in the pacific, it's tough. the pacific theater, the fighting area is about a third of the earth's surface. the best facilities are at the edges of it. honolulu, japan, manila, new zealand. there were no docks capable of i handling the liberty shift. anything you want you have to bring with you or build it. as the front moves forward, what you built already becomes useless. very often it was more useful to just bring more stuff than to

try to move it around within the theater. they were focused on germany. china, inaccessible from the united states. because you have to have a long way drive across the road, fly over the hump. british very far away. lacking resources and focused on germany. what was a basic factor from our perspective is that it is a lot easier to get stuff to europe than it is is to get stuff to the southwest pacific. you can see the vessel turnaround time is two or three in the south pacific. 60 days for europe. the western pacific is not very

far away. it is is very big. i thought i would contrast the western european with the pacific. normandy to berlin does not look all that impressive in the pacific. moreover, in late 1945, most of our army is obviously in germany. as a result, amphibious invasions were typically much further in distance in the pacific compared to the atlantic theater. most are under 500 miles. where the pacific theater were 1500 miles or even a lot more. 1500 miles and the importance of okinawa is clear. that is probably the shortest

invasion they did in the pacific theater. this is something that maybe looks familiar to students at the current situation in the western pacific, which is the requirement to bring sea based air power up against the continental based air power with lots of planes and lots of bases. those circles there, 800 miles. that is the same distance roughly as london to berlin. they go up against lots of bases in japan. nice bases in the soviet union but inaccessible. the central action would have been we can bring many against a few land bases with just a few planes on them. if you're going to invade japan, you bring your sea power against lots of land-based air p