first hot warhe in the cold war, in which the united states really did go to war with communist enemies. in this case, north korea and the volunteer army in china. and because it really does impact our world today. korea is one of our most important allies, trading partners, and so our involvement in korea was a very important moment. important fory its role in activism and in getting many of the younger people in the united states involved in politics, involved in protest. and it demonstrates that the united states government is very

much influenced by his constituents and responses to it. but we are going to focus on the environment of both these places. and we are going to start here with korea. that means land of the koreanscalm -- what believe is the phrase that best captures the essence of the peninsula. the war we are going to talk about is the fighting between 1950-9053. for the allied troops, the war went on much longer than that. 1945 or 1947, when were capitalism arguments. the war is ongoing. it is only governed by an armistice, not the street.

it reflected military u.n. involvement in actual combat tuition. so the map there of the korean peninsula, tigers are very important to the people and their culture, history, tradition. for centuries, koreans had seen their peninsula in the shape of a tiger. that is why i have that map up there, other than a boring political map. here is the more boring political map of the peninsula. i have these appear to show you what the climate is like in korea. warn, we are taking the from an environmental perspective. it is important for us to know what are the types of weather patterns and temperatures and the kinds of conditions that u.s. forces faced when they get over to korea? is theleft there, there average low temperatures in the heart of winter. they range from at the very tip their, let me see if i can get

degrees on -4 average in that part of north korea. and down here, in the southern areas, it is more about 36. hovering right around freezing on average from december through february. the summer temperatures there are much warmer. it is a climate where you have very cold, very dry in the winter and very hot and subject to monsoons in the summer. ranging from about 64 degrees in the northern parts of korea, all the way to the 80's down here in the southern part. keep in mind, these are averages. averages, and so you can have temperature ranges in the peninsula and along the peninsula anywhere from double digits below zero fahrenheit to triple digits above fahrenheit in the summer. the peninsula itself is about

84,000 square miles total, about the same area as utah. and it is 600 miles in length, and at its narrowest, right line is, it is 120 miles in width. it extends out into the marine and estuary regions outside, the water regions there. mz is about 150 miles total. 70% is mountainous, it is very rugged terrain. we are getting on to talking about military experiences here. so all of this is just leading up to give you a sense of what kind of terrain and climate that u.s. soldiers and marines faced when they were on the ground. peninsula is mountainous, about 20% is suitable for agriculture -- most of that is in the south. the mountain today is heavily

forested, mixed growth forests. they had been previous to the war, as well. but as i will show you in the pictures, the war devastated the forest. it undermined the stability of the mountainside and graded long-lasting environmental implications for the peninsula and the people who lived there. is -- here's aon picture of some of the mountains that are there. it's location is at the crossroads of asia. it has three very powerful nations surrounding it, china, russia, japan. all of which had designs on the korean peninsula. koreanmany points in history, it has been the object of conquest. as early as the 16th century 1597.en 1592, 509-

when the japanese attempt to conquer the peninsula. 1904, russia and japan fought over control for the resources. that ended with japan getting control over korea, and anntually in 1911, making it official colony. it has a long history of complex on its territory. and the conflict we will talk u.n. war1950-1953, the in korea. the next several slides, i does want to demonstrate most of the military activity on the peninsula in part to show how it ranges all the way across. on war officially begins june 25, 1950 -- when north korean forces move across the dm z. it was a temporary demarcation line at that point, between the northern government and the southern government in the hopes

that at some point soon, the korean people would be able to elect a single government. pasty case, the army moves the demarcation line and captures seoul. and moves into south korean territory. within a few weeks, the north koreans had moved all the way down to what is called the perimeter. they had all but eliminated the south korean army and its ability to retaliate against them. and this is what brings the united nations into the war. september 15, we have operation that you might be for know you're with. this is macarthur's brilliant plan, that rather than pushing entirely by land, but to do it by a marine landing just near seoul. movement topincer

capture troops in south korea, and force a compromise or a surrender. they are successful in that. and by october of that year, you have you forces, south korean forces, and other u.n. troops moving up towards the border with china. and push up the river the north korean forces all the way to their very northern border. this is moving back and forth across the peninsula in a very rapid pace. lots of devastation in the wake, they have lots of artillery, tanks, aerial bombardments -- in fact, i will read a description of an aerial bombardment later on in the lecture. but it is again important to know that this war was not stationary in its first year. it went back and forth, back and forth. devastation was widespread

across the peninsula. 1951, january, you and forces are forced to retreat. that is because chinese forces are now involved in the war. this is not according to china and official chinese government force. this is the people's volunteer army. many millions of chinese troops who are there to support their communist comrades in north isea, that is how is it described. to enter into the fight. so again, the north koreans and the commonest troops moved back beyond -- and the communist troops moved back and conquer seoul again. 1951, we start, to see the beginning of stalemate. this happens to be along the ise line where the dmz

today. this is an active part of the war. where you have troops from both sides going back and forth across the line, fighting over hills, outposts, engaging in mountain warfare. it is incredibly difficult and tragic for many of the men involved in the fighting. this is where a lot of them lost their lives here. again, i show the slides this to show how much of the peninsula was affected by the war. and how much of its climate and geography u.s. ground forces encounter. because we are really focused on the u.s. experience here. i'm not going to go into talking about the 70 nations that fought in the war, we're going to focus on the american troops. so as we talked about in this class before, we talked about the principles of war. and one of them is that more on paper, such as these maps and

drawings and strategies by the main decision-makers, is not the same kind of war on the ground. weather and terrain are key elements in any military decision. military historians have not adequately addressed how these things affect the individual, how they affect the landscape of places where the war is fought. they have certainly done a good job of explaining the importance of weather and terrain to warmaking decisions. but we need to look at the environmental perspective to understand ramifications that the conflicts take and have. so many of the soldiers and marines that end up in korea, especially in the first part of the war, they are veterans of world war ii. air combat experienced soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors. they understood what the battle was.

and what was expected of them. but when they could not anticipate was what they would face on the ground in korea. most of these men had not heard of it, they did not know where it was. they were not aware of the long-standing political animosity between korea, japan, russia -- all of this is a new experience for them. certainly the terrain and weather was very different from what they had experienced. for example, master sergeant james hart, who was in the second battalion of the fifth at team wrote that they went into combat. at the time, i thought i was in good physical condition. but i found out differently. korea is just one hill and mountain after the other. and since we also carried about 80 pounds of equipment, soldiering in korea was pretty exhausting. this is from someone who served in world war ii and was used to battle and the rigors of being a soldier.

snyder, who was in the seventh infantry "in midn, noted that were 1951, two men seriously injured during the firefight with enemy troops. i was involved in the firefight. but harold and i were assigned to accompany the soldiers as armed escorts against enemy guerrillas in the area." snyder had to take over when the koreans became too exhausted to carry the wounded men. and he says that the terrain was very rough, and i found the job utterly exhausting. one more here. matheson saidd l. that one thing never changed in korea -- the hills. they all look the same. there was always one more we had to take. this again is especially true

when the war becomes a stalemate. and they are fighting over little bits of territory, sometimes just 100 yards apart. enormous trenches, they're going back and forth -- capturing a hill, retaking the hill. it is his constant climbing and going down the hills, fighting over the mountain tops. and it became incredibly exhausting. is thenumber two, this picture of the mountainous terrain in korea. here is a statement of the kinds of weather that the u.s. soldiers and marines experienced there. whether of course was very important to the experience of the soldiers. in winter, especially early in the war when the troops were not well-supplied, they had to use supplies left over from world war ii. intended for climates and places not like korea. so they had boots that were not

appropriate for climbing mountains. or for withstanding deep, deep freezing cold. they also had overcoats and the uniforms were not well suited for cold climate, either. so one soldier -- sorry a marine actually -- private first class entered korea in march, 1952. in the time of the stalemate. and he said like everyone else who served in korea, i have a lasting memory of a cold. thermalheavy parkas, mickey mouse boots. but he said i could not get warm during the winter months. at the same time, i found the summer heat oppressive. mostly because of the high humidity. in addition to being under fire, in addition to the rigors and problems of combat, they had to deal with these climate issues in korea, as well.

during on to say that the night, the chinese repeatedly blew their bugles -- he is talking about a wintertime conflict. even when they had no intention of attacking our line, it was one of their gimmicks to make us jumpy. at christmas time of 1952, they even played christmas carols over the loudspeakers to make us homesick, i presume. we heard silent night and all of the other well-known carols drifting out over no man's land freezing our butts off thousands of miles from home. so unfortunately for them, the carols did not make them feel like they were in a nice, philly place. it made them feel more homesick. it made the climate and the conditions of war that much worse. so one of the most famous battles of the korean conflict, especially for u.s. marines, is the reservoir. it, chosin.abels

this engagement occurs between november and december of 1950. it is an extremely cold winter that year. and there is just this very serious engagement here between u.s. troops, u.s. marines and the chinese people volunteer forces. tens of thousands of them engaged against thousands of marines. in theng to corporal seventh marine division who served there at the reservoir, he said that with fighting all around us we remained 70% under watch. at 1:00 that night, we were ordered to move back about 200 yards. this time, we set up 3.5" rockets in the road. we try to dig in again, but the ground was so hard, we had little success. there were firefights everywhere, so they put us on

hundred percent watch. somehow, we managed to avoid conflict with the enemy, we sure as hell did not avoid the cold. the thermometer had dropped 30 degrees below zero, a strong wind blowing. they're in the valley area here, surrounded by mountains. and they are faced by tens of thousands of hostile troops. he recalled as they moved through the area, on their retreat in december, we moved down the hill slowly. slipping and sliding, then we would just walk -- sometimes in snow that came up to our knees. those in the front of the column got the honor of breaking the path for the rest of us. he concluded his memoir with saying that no one had to tell us all serious the situation was. one place that had three dead chinese soldiers, all frozen to death at their post. we again have a situation

terrible in the best of times, when you had enemy troops engaging with you attempting to take over the territories they you control. but you have the added problems of environmental obstacles come of a, the snow, the wind. especially in 1950, when the marines did not have proper winter clothing. the marines withdrew from the coast area, those who came out words were known as the chosin e few. which is a nice little play on their motto of the few, the proud. according to alan, the foremost historian of the korean war, the reservoir campaign was a geographic victory for the chinese. nevertheless, the campaign group, which did not return to the front until march 1951. and that battle convinced the

united nations command that allied ground troops could do eat chinese troops the matter how numerous. this is important moment for history, and the korean war itself. here are the examples of despite the u.n. forces, they could in fact -- if not be victorious, at least hold at bay numbers of the enemy that are hundreds of times their own. he continues, the chinese remain vague on their losses in the battle. but according to their records and estimates, they put the knife army group casualties in the range of 40,000 to 80,000. wounded plus the deaths and incapacities from the cold. and here is the important point for us.

338 to the cold -- almost twice the number of casualties due to climate rather than combat. some losses and metadata 6000 americans and koreans. korea's climate and terrain, as much an enemy an obstacle as the forces -- the human forces. so i do not want to talk about in theure is an agent war. certainly, humans act as agents in the war, as well. and at times, here in the i will show you, they are enemies attacking you as well as the landscape itself. and to the landscape becomes part of the strategy, part of the operational tactics they have to obliterate the cover from behind which their enemies can hide and launch attacks.

entityorea as a physical poses challenges and was as much andnemy as the north korean chinese forces, along with fellow u.n. troops, u.s. forces left a lasting mark on the landscape. and here is how they do this. they have these modern technologies, right? they have chemical agents, tanks, artillery, airplanes with massive capacities for carpet bombing. that is what happens in korea. war, theapons of hills, mountains, forests, other medications that led to erosion. damaged the river and ecosystem and the flooding and instruction of the agricultural lands. which remember, is only about 20% of the peninsula, itself. so huge amounts of food have to

come from very small amounts of land. and so any kind of destruction, temporary or permanent, is going to have an impact on the ability of civilians to maintain any kind of stable lifestyle during the conflict, or after it. as well as getting food for the truth. not all came from rations, it came from the land, as well. so the next several slides provide some illustrations of this. this picture here is of a white phosphorus attack, a chemical agent that when it comes into contact with the air, it becomes fire. it basically catches on fire. and anything it touches also becomes engulfed in flames, that includes vegetation, and of course human beings. and certainly there were many chinese and north korean's who were afflicted by white phosphorus in these kinds of attacks. delylm was also used wi

to clear forest areas, vegetation, foliage, so the enemy cannot hide. they had less cover. bombing, this was probably the most widespread agent of destruction in the korean war. ais image here is post-bombing reconnaissance picture. and here -- sorry, wrong button. here, you see a mountain ridge, that white area there. these are streams or estuaries, not estuaries, but streams are flooded areas along the rivers. oes thatrice padd have been flooded. marks the white pock have been dropped from the

plane. that isad destruction, one very small area, you can see the amount of damage. and when the mountains are pretty high, they have these pop marks that take away the soil and the trees, and when they are up against the rivers, they become saturated with the runoff from the mountains. and this creates serious problems for agriculture, forgetting clean water, and of course for the fish and other animals that live in the streets. ams. this is just one picture of the mountains, the artillery ordinances use in the war. i don't know if you can see them. but right there, r three u.s. are three u.s. soldiers. you get a sense of the scale of the massive amounts. all of that artillery and

ordinance harmed the landscape. here you can see the trees utterly shattered from both artillery and aerial bombing. i will read a fairly extensive quote here. by an airman who actually witnessed one of the nighttime bombings of the green landscape. captain johnom thornton, a u.s. army helicopter pilot, who on april 19, 1951 witness a nighttime attack. he was a prisoner war. cue, they, as if on nearby hills were brilliantly illuminated by flares from the night bombing. the cast spooky shadows and dancing forms across the rugged terrain. then, like mythical griffins, flying above the flares, hidden men and fire machines and

rockets. tumbling napalm canisters fell from the planes like loose parts. splattering across the ground, they lit up the hills with an even greater intensity. the attacking fighters were met by tracer rounds sparking sideways from an aircraft that groped like targets and i. as the dying flares diminished on the parachutes and flickered out, the beleaguered mountains retreated momentarily into the safety of darkness. their existence revealed only by the open wounds burning on their slopes." yes, michael? michael: were they able to recycle the shells? or was it just waste at this point that they had left over? lisa: good question. they were not just waste. they would be recycled into an variety of different uses. it depended on who actually got control of them. how they were used, but the u.s.

army would actually just recycle them. yes. michaela. michaela: how are the white phosphorus attacks carried out? lisa: it was put into canister -- honestlye shot i do not know if it was from handheld guns or tank artillery. i would have to check on that. anyways on their shot into canisters and when the land, they would break open. the white phosphorus would come essentially explode. >> i read a small article, that it also caused blindness. the after effect from the phosphorus after it burns -- lisa: so the question is does white phosphorus cause blindness by iy explosion,

flare, or reaction? i actually do not know. my guess it would be the flash, or more likely from the burning actually. that the eyes were burned or affected by the heat that it generated. brittany? : a lot of these were using vietnam. so why is it that all of this environmental stuff happened in vietnam and not korea? lisa: a great question. if you do not mind, i will answer it in a few slides. maybe two or slides in. it would be a perfect segue. ask a little bit later. these were also used in world war ii. the first time these kinds of chemical agents were used in

war, but we will talk about why vietnam becomes such a flashpoint for protests against them. ok, to the couple more pictures to give you the sense of the landscape damage. to korea by these just three years -- right? well, three years on the calendar. of fighting. month here's a picture of old baldy. on the main line of resistance, where the line exist. it earns his name from lieutenant belton woods, because of the heavy fighting, all of vegetation was destroyed. it had been covered in forest and scrub. now it looks like this. class3, private first james davis said that most of the fighting took place on hillsts -- ugly, treeless

located well in front of the mainline. lote the communists lost a of men trying to defend them, we lost a lot of men. this was a kind of territory they were fighting in. and here is a picture of the mainline a resistance, the mlr. is a8th parallel, this picture of colombian troops. cutcan see their trenches along, and this was where the men would take cover as shells and artillery would be coming in. now, this looks fairly dry now. but remember, korea has monsoonal season. in the spring and summer it rains buckets. so these would be filled with rain and mud, it is very slippery. there on very steep slopes.

that is a big danger for men who are positioned on the mainline of existence. about the cavities of war. then we will get to brittany's question. most of you have probably heard about 54,000 four korea. but about 10 years ago, the e out andcam said 54,000 is the total number of all servicemen worldwide. just like if you're in the service during a conflict, you become a veteran of the war whether or not you ask a served in the war. that is where those numbers come from. it is looking at the war and the serviceman who were wounded or killed during the war in service to the united states. to the actual casualties --yes,

rob? rob: i'm question on the trenches. when you said they filled up, that means mosquitoes. use for that?in ddt was still abatementwhiskey no lice.tement and much of korea at this time was very agricultural. it would be little hamlets, houses do not have running water. the do not have the infrastructure to support any kind of hygiene. they would go into rivers and streams and lakes. things like that, but only when they found them. ddt would've been one of the major tools to fight the infestations they would have faced.

that, and smoke. using fires as a way to get mosquitoes away from you. that was one of their tools and strategies. deaths,es, u.s. 92,000 wounded. 128,650.f they sound like a very specific and accurate numbers. but of course, there is always a bit of uncertainty when it comes to the actual numbers of dead and wounded because we can keep good records. that is just the united states. were 217,000there casualties proximally. and at least a million civilian casualties, missing and wounded. about 600,000

civilians according to their record. and the chinese suffered in the korean war. of course, while this is definitely a human tragedy, war always is, there are other casualties as well. as i try to demonstrate in the last several slides. the landscape was a casualty. if suffered tremendously during the war. lakes, streams, all sorts of natural landscapes were affected by the combat. infrastructure, what there was, was utterly decimated. that means sewers, no running water. all of these things are going to contribute to post-war disease, malnutrition, the agricultural lands were also affected. so, now i am going to turn to

vietnam. so we can talk about a contrasting experience for u.s. serviceman. they certainly are is a different geography and climate. but here is where we have an as to thethe question actual strategy of attacking the landscape, especially through the use of chemical agents. so while most of these instances in korea were tactical uses of chemical agents to enhance the u.s. force ability to identify and view their enemy, it was not a strategy. it was not a large-scale strategy. it is in vietnam where we see the strategy of using chemical defoliants come into place. that difference of scale and the use of this particular chemical, agent orange and the

other rainbow agents, really generates an outcry among scientists and civilians back in the united states. aat is where we have difference. yes, victor? victor:: weapons and warfare -- lisa: 1925 is the geneva convention. vicotrtor: how are they used justifiably by the u.n.> ? lisa: the question is, how does the united states get around the gym ane geneva convention? we do not sign it until 1975. we were not under the restrictions, even though it was actually u.s. citizens and congressman who wanted to put the geneva protocol into place. in response to the problems of world war i and the use of mustard gas and other chemical

weapons. during that war, that is the other key element of this. weapons versus agents -- you notice i have been very careful chemical agents, not weapons. weapons are nerve gas, mustard gas used against human personnel. chemical agents are used against non-human aspects in the strategy. and so it is against nature documents, that is how we get around using those kinds of things. but during vietnam, it was not an issue because we were not a signatory to the protocol of the geneva mentioned. how does using the agents make a winning strategy when there is not like a clear definition of gaining territory or fighting for territory won or lost? behind the use of

defoliants in vietnam is that that jungle right there is an easy place for the enemy to hide. right? so if you can get rid of the jungle, the enemy has to come out and face you on the battlefield. not necessarily gaining control over territory, but it is denying cover to your enemy troops. yeah, and i will talk a bit about that in just a moment, as well. you are always anticipating me. that is good. and i will talk about the geneva convention, too. you guys have great questions. this is a map era vietnam. it is this long, thin sort of s-shaped nation here. often described as a descending dragon. here that isy called the sending dragon bay. - descending dragon

bay. dropping all these gems, pearls in the bay. that is why you get these lovely cropping's in the water. but the nation itself, you can see it. ?ight was to mark th i think it is a lovely idea to think of it as a dragon. what i want to focus on here is less on the soldier experience and more on the shift in strategy by the u.s. to see the environment itself as the enemy, not just as an obstacle, but as the enemy. and as cover for the enemy. i do want to show a picture here of u.s. soldiers here and north soldiers here in a very similar landscape. these are pictures from the ho chi minh trail.

u.s. soldiers are trying to destroy the ho chi minh trail and flush out the north vietnamese. enemies there, these are north vietnamese troops who are using the trail as their supply line. and, you know, it is the same conditions. clearly, they do not have the same experiences in them. the north vietnamese are very clearly familiar with the terrain, the jungles, how to deal with the weather and the water in the region. and the u.s. soldiers simply are not. they do not get the kind of training. and most of them are not there long enough to get experience with it. year course had one of duty. the ho chi minh trail was a series of trails that was used by the north vietnamese and the viet cong as a way of supplying

their allies in the south. considered tolly be this amazing feat of engineering, because it is carved out of a serious jungle terrain. and as i say the greatest feat of military engineering of the 20th century, this was not done with mechanized vehicle. this was done a lot of it with cut down and created by hand. so the ho chi minh trail becomes a priority for u.s. forces. what they wanted to do was make it unusable. so they attempted to destroy the trail by a variety of means. first, was to create storm clouds through silver iodine. try to watch out the road, because also goes through rugged terrain. they thought they could wash out the area, the viet cong could not get their supplies down the ho chi minh trail to the south. that did not work very well.

as you might imagine. they also tried to use what was called a chemical soak. they would get big huge burlap bags of the agent and drop it along the trail, wait for natural rain to come and create this mess that they hoped would wash out the trail. the viet cong and the north vietnamese were pretty hip to the fact that was going on, and it was good about the chem ical agent. it was not an issue. these kinds of things could not in order to get rid of the trail. so what do they turn to? they turn to bombs there and agent orange and a lot of other places in vietnam. here is one report, an official report, on the operation that

would come to be known as operation ranch hand. "south vietnam is covered with dense forest. hasization of concealment afforded great energy. from the outset therefore has been difficulty of locating the enemy, without information about the disposition, allied forces cannot support firepower. is for way by which allied forces obtain facilities and the sites of infiltration route. " back to the point i made earlier, this is the use of agent orange and other to fully defoiliants to get them out of the mangroves and engage in

military combat. ok, agent orange was that the only way that the u.s. forces helped denude the landscape. it is estimated that about 60% of the forests were destroyed or seriously damaged by the war. and this is an example here, you can see the crater here -- those are bomb craters, artillery craters. according to geographers, although bombardments were heavily you lies in the war, aerial bombardment inflicted damage to the forest on a scale never before congress. much of the damage inflicted on the forests, through the highly explosive shrapnel, was the same as seen in previous wars. bombs destroy vegetations outright. it left it in pregnan with mpregnated with shrapnel.

u.s. air force bombers in the war practiced carpet bombing. would fly-52 bombers over and lay over a blanket of bombs into an area thought be occupied by enemy forces. the b-52 bombers left wide swaths of craters. here are some of them. typically they consisted of 3-12 aircraft, is caring 108 500-pound bombs. bombsurated an area with approximately half a kilometer wide and 1000 meters wide. conservative estimates place the number of craters left behind from the missions at about 26 million. those are the craters.

by comparison with the previous wars of the 20th century, during world war ii, a total of 2 million or drop in all theaters of the war. in korea, the total munitions were one million ctons. u.s.en 1965-1971, the ofpped over 14 million tons munitions. this was one of the effects of that. to operationon ranch hand. this is a video that i'm going to show you here. servicemen using agent orange. and i have to get it at the right point. otherwise, the first part might make you motion sick. and i also have to press play. sorry.

[industrial noise] lisa: there you can see the

effects of agent orange. yes, michael? michael: how quickly did it take affect? when they shot it out there, it did not look like it was instantly killing stuff. lisa: how it works is it leaf,ially gets into the onto the leaves of the mangroves . of the grasses around there, and root system and kills it from within. it is not an instant effect. but it is a long-lessing kind of

effect. it kills a plant from within. yes, scott? scott: i noticed you show the killing, but yet, firemen were right, they were having problems with being shot at by viet cong moving along at different rates of speed. goal is -- wouldn't the use of fire or napalm be more effective? lisa: i will show you pictures later. but it was a fairly safe one. ve enemiest have inne firing on them. many were charged with deploying agent orange in this manner were of course shot at because the enemies were along the

riverbank. michaela: you can see getting in the water, how it affect the animals? and they were being shot at, house affecting humans might have landed on? lisa: you noticed they had no protective covering. the soldiers sprang the agent orange and a protective covering. so agent orange is a topical tocsin. xin. if you're exposed to it, you're going to have long-term health effects. it would not be an immediate reaction, however. most of the men who were spraying the agent orange did not know they were getting themselves into serious health trouble thereon. in terms of getting in the water, that is excellent point. agent orange is not water soluble. it only degrades by sunlight. basically, the only thing is

sunlight. so when he gets in the water, it stays in the water and you can ingest it -- animals can ingest it and get into the food system. and there are numerous studies that indicate that the systems of agent orange and hotspots all nam or where it was stored for future deployment have resulted in serious genetic the peopleefects for who were exposed to it for longer time. internalther kinds of diseases are connected to it, as well. and of course, the civilians. and the enemy troops that were awful- it is a terrible, toxin. that is a great herbicide, but it is persistent. human long-lasting o

effects. begins inranch hand earnest in 1963. that is when it is ramped up. initially, it was an attempt to create vegetation-free buffer zones around military bases. use, andnsive kind of a long routes, but it soon developed into a battlefield tactic. aimed at guerrilla fighters come as we have been talking about. throughout the the emmys countryside. ietnemese countryside. i will turn to joseph again. he is written extensively on this. the vietnam differed from previous wars because the destruction of key components of the country's key environment

became a deliberate military strategy. in world war i and ii, the damage inflicted was incidental. and that the damage was a side effect of the intention to eliminate enemy forces. in vietnam, a major portion of the u.s. war effort was the elimination of forests. deforestation of the dance, tropical was cover for any troops. antiquated landing strips for aircraft to establish landing zones are troops to point helicopter. so does that answer your question question mark good. n? good. here is another way it was deployed. spraying. and more than tripled, jumping 1965 to,000 acres in

840,000 and doubled again to 1.7 million acres in 1967. after spring 1.3 million acres in 1968, ranch hand began to taper off. and it ceased in december of 1970. so as i mentioned, agent orange is not water soluble. it degrades in sunlight, a clings to soil particles, so even if it was contained in one place during the war, if it was left there as much of it was in the years just after the fighting, it would get into the soil and spread to the rain. you have a larger infected area. contamination in the soil of industrialized nations, this is just to give you a comparison, is less than 12 parts per trillion. in vietnam, researchers found

perls of two 365,000 parts trillion. 262,000 parts per trillion on former storage areas as well. hundreds of thousands of times larger than what you normally find in an industrialized nation. the epa and a variety of international groups are tempting to clean up hot spots. and they have been doing that since 2003. but obviously, this is an enormous problem and will likely not be solved anytime soon. so to your question, scott, defoliantpictures of areas. when you think about the kinds of vegetation it was sprayed on, if it is a dense and scrubby vegetation, you will still have the branches and may be that can

be used as cover. foliage is palm trees. so if you eliminate that, this comes to your question about how effective it was. against snipers the ide. the idea that it would reduce the vulnerability of ambush, and also intend to force them into open battle, was of course wrong. it did not happen. many of the men who were employed in this operation were shut down or shot at in more heavily forest areas. the idea of course was to destroy the environment, bring the enemy out into the open, fight the war the way it is meant to be far. not behind the cover of the jungle, but out on the battlefield. this was not a useful tactic however in the end.

it was not successful. one of the one of the major targets of agent orange were mangroves. before 1943, there were 250,000 hectares, mainly on the coastal areas of the river delta. mangroveshectares of were seriously devastated by toxic chemicals of the u.s. military forces during the time of the war. the tremendous consequences of the destruction of mangrove forests have been encountered with difficulties in rehabilitation, biodiversity loss, and it also continues to affect the life and health of communities in the region. some scientific studies done recently. about 26,000 villages were affected by operation ranch hand and the use of agent orange. 6% werehis villages -- 3

sprayed two times, about 3000 were sprayed more than 10 times with agent orange. campaignhe defoliation focused on the destruction of mainland coast and mangroves in the southern part of vietnam. two, most affected mangrove forest areas where the sac forest outside of saigon and along the cape. a wide swath of destruction with agent orange. here is a picture of an area targeted by agent orange for -- before and after. it not only destroys the trees, it also can lead to the calcification of the soil, depending on what type it is, for lateralization of the soil, meaning it dries out and becomes infertile. it's a long-term impact for many of the areas that were affected

by agent orange. victor, your question about protocol. that was developed in 1925. it was signed by all european powers, but the u.s. did not sign, in part because of the powerful lobbying effort by the u.s. armed forces, which did not want to lose a potential weapon or a means of defense. and by the chemical industry. you had two major lobbying groups working against the u.s. signing and ratification of the geneva protocol. the u.s. failed to ratify it, even though it was one of its original proponents. in 1966, the u.s. claimed that it did not use chemical weapons in vietnam. it instead used "chemical agents" and not against personnel. they are not weapons if they are not anti-personnel.

the u.s. has used chemical agents, including napalm and white phosphorus in world war ii. and if vietnam, to clear out enemy bunkers. but again, using herbicides to clear out bunkers as a patient measures. always careful to call with a chemical agent. in response to the u.s. actions in vietnam, and its refusal to sign the geneva protocols, the u.n. refined its definition in 1967. includeld find it to any chemical agent used during warfare that may be toxic to man, animals, or plants. this is where we get the idea of ecocide. inventing ecocide. the u.n. is certainly debated the perimeters of the geneva protocol. scientists in the u.s. and elsewhere began radicalizing

themselves and organizing themselves and other sympathetic people to their view of the use of chemical agents in war as eco cide. the destruction, the murder of ecosystems. which they, rightly claim, have a larger human impacts. a plantholston, who was biologist at yelp, points to the term. -- arthur galston. the means byy which a community can support itself from the natural world, then you are essentially killing them and are complicit in their death. galston, another scientist rallied environmentalists and students alike to protest the war, not only on humanitarian grounds, but that environmental destruction was problematic ecologically and from a humanistic point of view. he argued that science had been

co-opted by the government and the dod for too long and that it was time for science to work for good, not to create things like agent orange, but to create things that would better humanity. the american association for the advancement of science sent a team in august, 1970 two vietnam to study the ecological of population ranch had. -- of operation ranch hand. this is after years of trying to get there. they had two major findings -- that herbicidal spraying had utterly destroyed half of the vietnam's mangrove forests and had done irreparable harm to its tropical forests, which i result of the spring, were being -- which as a result of the spraying, were being invaded by bamboos. kills created soil erosion and nutrient dumping. the cost of operation ranch hand

with a failure. it was not just against for ests and trees, but also rice paddies. date targeted cultural -- they targeted cultural regions to donate them -- to deny them supplies. it is a failure because military cleaners were unable to distinguish conclusively between areas under civilian control and areas under guerrilla control. in essence, they were killing their own allies in order to hopefully undermine support for their enemy. the result was a growing distrust of the use of such compounds and increasing call for their immolation from the -- of their elimination from the u.s. arsenal. the u.s. senate finally rather not -- finally ratifies the with theotocols,

provision of that the u.s. could use herbicides rugby perimeters of its bases for defensive purposes. -- herbicides around the perimeters of its basis. all the remaining agent orange stock was destroyed. it was collected from all the bases in vietnam, all of its storage centers around the world in military bases, and taken out into the middle of the south pacific. this is a picture of one of the ships used in operation, which was intended to incinerate all of agent orange. these operations were overseen by epa agents. it was not just the u.s. military in charge of this, epa had to oversee this. they had to do it in the pacific because they needed high enough fires, hot enough fires to incinerate the agent down to a

nontoxic component. that is, again, a picture of operation pacer. this has probably been pretty depressing in terms of the long-lasting humanitarian legacy of operation ranch hand. there is a little bit of hope in terms of the vietnamese responses to what has become the problem that they inherited. in 1978, ho chi minh city created a forestry enterprise. a state-run enterprise hoping to rehabilitate their mangrove forests. it also established farms on degraded forest plants to ease or been pressures. ease urbanely -- to ueas pressures. unfortunately, illegal logging cleared most of the forest around ho chi minh city. two immediate that problem, the

state returns the land to the city and the city established a forest and in management board which gave forced allotments to the poor, to local families in order to manage them. these efforts have actually been fairly successful. in 2000, unesco recognized the mangrove forest as a man and biosphere reserve. it has recovered to a significant extent. local families now have solar electricity, adequate and clean water, and sustainable timber. they also have thriving ecotourism industry. not to paint the war -- isn't this great that all this came at about? a green lining or silver lining perhaps, but at least there is a local sustainable community that has been able to prosper on land once destroyed by agent orange.

another point to this is that while the use of chemicals was a terrible thing, the radicalization of scientists and students, as well as others against their use raised awareness about the serious problem associated with chemical agents and other chemical agents'effects on humans and nonhuman nature. both contributing -- thus contributing to the growth of the modern environmental movement. the other changes we have seen since vietnam had been in part due because of the tragedy of agent orange. i will leave you with a few parting thoughts. we do need to take a close look at nature within the context of war. it does provide new insight into the ways that human conflict both hinge upon and material effects -- materially affect landscapes and environments.

i think i demonstrated in part today that's nature is as much of a constant enemy or obstacle to those who are fighting as il lustrated by the voices of the korean and vietnam war. absolutely, war is a human tragedy. we cannot deny that. it can also be catastrophic for nonhuman nature. you can also get people thinking about the problem that humans create for themselves and for the environment and might actually generate positive change in the long run. are there any final questions or comments? yes? student: what you said about battling nature. you said it's a constant battle. the point is, what i see is nature, and man comes in, and says, ok, this is in my way, i

had to get this out of the way using any means possible. aen saying, once again as wants to fall back on nature to reclaim itself, to correct the problem that they caused. we see this in other wars too. it is a constant battle, it is forever going on. prof. brady: it is. i think that is an excellent point. it reminds us that while humans for millennia have tried to conquer and control nature, it has a certain resilience, even in the face of things like the onslaught of operation ranch hand, even with white phosphorus and napalm and bombs and artillery. nature can be resilient. and it has a power of its own. that is the focus of environmental history, right? that is the purpose of our studying it, that's nature has an effect on our human history. okay. well that is the end of class today. i will see you next week. thank you all very much. if you have other questions,

feel free to come up and talk to me. >> woo. >> join us each saturday evening at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern for classroom letters across the country -- classroom lecture across the country on different era of history. they are available as podcasts as well/. visit our website on ry/podcasts orto download them from itunes. >> this labor day weekend, three days of looks at american history. a full day of special programs on c-span. here are a few of the features for labor day monday to getting it 10:00 a.m. eastern. a temple event in seattle discusses the pros and cons of the data and civil liberties. later at 6:30, a debate on how to reduce poverty between president obama and the president of the american enterprise institute, arthur

brooks. and a clock, mark cuban -- at formerark cuban and president george w. bush and bill clinton. sunday, in-depth with lynne cheney, who will take your phone calls, e-mails, and tweets. ards" at 9:00, on "afterw a talk on how families in appalachia and the mississippi delta are surviving on no income. beginning at 11:45 a.m. eastern, authors like erik loomis, and culture and others share their thoughts on medical issues. on c-span3, sunday afternoon at 4:00 on "reel america" -- crowded out, and educational association film about a crowded schools following the post world war ii baby-boom. an interview with building your

full in the past -- billionaire philanthropist david rubenstein. get our full schedule at c-span.org. in august, 9045, 70 years ago -- 1945, 70 years ago, american forces dropped two bombs in japan. heatley talks w about living in oak ridge, tennessee, a program creating enrichment towards building an atomic bomb. it discusses race relations and the need for secrecy. this oral history from the voices of the manhattan project, created by the los alamos historical society. seth: i was at purdue university. i got married in my junior