we are perfectly comfortable with individuals choosing both pathways, choosing a criminal justice pathway and this pathway. but our goal is to make sure we can remediate our own environment if needed through understanding what the risks are. and to making sure that we are lowering barriers to individuals reporting right now. because that is our biggest concern. we know that the incidents established by polls and studies is nowhere near the number of reports, and we'd like to close that gap. and we don't believe that approach would do so. >> thank you for your testimony. >> thank you. the gentleman's time has expired. ms. bonamici you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. thank you for having me join your sub committee today. this is a topic that has been of import in my state of oregon as

well as across the country. we've had a lot of conversations about it. in fact this last wokeeek i had great scruggs hosted by oregon state university with our title nine coordinators. there are a lot of common themes that we heard today, not only emphasizing the importance of the issue, but the regulatory overlap and sometimes conflict. i think you'll find a lot of support among this committee for clarifying that. but also the resources needed to address these issues, and i'm glad we've had a lot of conversations this morning about prevention and the importance of educating students about healthy relationships. concebsent and what that means,d healthy sexual encounters. there were conversations with the teach safe relationships act. i do invite the other committee

members and other colleagues to take a look at that and join on. and for preventing, that's the best approach. so we know we can take stronger steps, not only in prevention. we want to make sure that survivors of sexual assault have access to resources, services and privacy on and off campus, and i want to emphasize that we really need to have policies that encourage, not discourage, survivors from reporting and seeking counseling and assistance. dr. rue, you discussed the important role of confidential advisers, and that's something that we're seeing in more institutions. now earlier this year i wrote a letter to the department of education about an apparent loophole in ferpa. in some circumstances, attorneys for an institution can access students' counseling records without a court order. the department of education's recent draft guidance to address this issue is encouraging, and i look forward to working with the

administration and advocates and colleagues to close that loophole and provide survivors with a support and assurance of privacy. we want them to be safe, and we want them to feel safe. and if they have a sense that their records are not going to be kept confidential that may discourage them from seeking the support that they need. so my home state is working on this issue. earlier kate brown signed legislation making clear that conversations are confidential. and students are required to be given written notification about their rights, campus services and state resources. and i want to give a shout out to a survivor several years ago who is a nurse and advocate. so these policies are important for students not only in oregon but across the country, and i'm really glad we're having these

conversations today. i want to ask you, ms. maatz, we know that more institutions are starting to educate students about their rights under title ix oregon state is going to be opening a center, they're going to have a full-time advocate there. so what can we do to expand services like that so more students know their rights, and what's the best way to let survivors know what resources are available to them on and off campus and also let all students know that, not just survivors. they need to though what's there, the best way to do that. >> well, title ix absolutely requires schools to put together a policy and have grievance procedures and to publish it in an ongoing way, to publish it to students, faculty and staff. and technology can be our friend there in terms of making sure that it is distributed frequently. it should also be used in

on-campus prevention programs and so forth. i'd also like to get back to the climate surveys. one of the things that is overlooked is it does give an opportunity for students to talk about their experiences. and in a climate -- >> and in reclaiming my time, i wanted to get to that issue. so in the few remaining seconds, could you talk about because there's such a diversity among colleges and universities in size and resources, we want meaningful responses. do you have any suggestions about how we can accomplish that in a nationwide climate survey so we get equity in response and distry bags and participation? >> we need to make sure that there are certain questions that all climate surveys ask. that's very important. the act would do surveys and we need to have that generalized ability across the country. at the same time, each campus can personalize that particular climate survey to make sure they're asking questions key for their community. key for their constituents. and what's good about that is that it not only provides information to the school about what they should be doing, what they're doing that students

don't like, what they're doing that could be better, but it lets the students know that the university is paying attention, that there are these programs, that there are these rights, that there are these protections. and that, in and of itself, is a huge education program as well as a data finding program that helps to make things better. >> my time is expired. i yield back. >> i understand that congresswoman speier would like to speak. >> i would ask that she be allowed and permitted to join the committee members for today and participate in this important hearing. >> without objection, congresswoman speier is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you very much for allowing me to participate today. i apologize for not being here for the entire hearing. i had a funeral to attend. but i want to applaud the committee for recognizing the gravity of this issue and the

importance of putting a spotlight on the issue and coming up with some solutions to dealing with it. i understand you've taken up a complete review of the panelists with us today, many of whom are experts, that this is indeed a very serious problem. regardless of how you crunch the numbers, the incidence is widespread on college campuses, and we need to take steps to address it. let me say at the outset that i have worked on this issue now for over two years. i've worked very closely with my colleague on the other side of the aisle, pat, and we have introduced the halt act. but in doing all of this, we've spent time with the office of civil rights, and i want to commend them. the ocr within the department of education in the last couple years has done an outstanding job of creating greater accountability, frankly, because we have seen, for a very long period of time, that the title

ix coordinators on most college campuses weren't even available to people. they were often times buried in websites. that all is changing now. due in large part to dear colleagues' letters that have been sent out by ocr and others. it's personal to me, because i have a daughter who's in college. and every college that we visited before she chose the college that she is now at, the first question that was asked by every parent, the first question when we were at orientations was, what was the safety of that college for their child. and this is a bipartisanish urks madam chair. i can't tell you the number of republican fathers and republican mothers who have said to me, i am really upset that this issue hasn't been dealt with appropriately. and frankly, sometimes it's not until you're six degrees of

separation that you appreciate how close it can come to you. so climate surveys, which we have used very effectively in dealing with sexual assault in the military and has been used in the military for a long period of time, is something that we want to see incorporated by universities. it is a picture that helps them appreciate how significant the issue is. the halt act will also provide for a number of other elements. you know, one of the things that title ix does, it's a heavy hammer. if you aren't providing the kind of non-discrimination in ed characteristic you can lose all your federal funding, which means you lose all the grant money, the option for student loans, and so it is a heavy hammer, but it is, i think, important, to create a system that provides some fiscal

penalties short of that heavy hammer, and the halt act would do that. it would also increase the violations, the penalties for violations to the clary act from $35,000 to $100,000 and create a private right of action under cleary whose institutions fail to inform them of safety risks and their rights. it provide the more money for investigators in the office of civil rights by about $5 million. and as an effort to decrease the backlog that exists right now with the title ix complaints that have been filed. now i spoke to a number of young women who had been assaulted at the university of california. i won't name the campus, so they won't be drawn that closely under the microscope. but in talking to these young women -- and there's nothing like hearing the stories of these youngsters to appreciate how insidious this can be. -- and in any of those cases, the victims were never even

interviewed. that's maybe shocking to some of you. but that was commonplace. and how can you properly evaluate a case unless you interview both the perpetrator or alleged perpetrator and the victim as well. the question as to whether or not colleges should be engaged in this at all, i know ms. scaduto, you had referenced that a few minutes ago is probably a legitimate question. you all have codes of conduct, though. and under that code of conduct, if you violate that code of conduct you take actions to remove those individuals from the campus. so you certainly have the wherewithal. you certainly use that code of conduct in dismissing or suspending students who don't comply with the rules of the university, and i would suggest by being engaged in something that is clearly a crime, which ra is, that that meets the

standard of suspending or terminating a student. but i also appreciate that you, you know, have to weigh various interests. i do think that the office of civil rights needs more resources. i think that we should create a proactive responsibility that institutions plaster the notices of how you can seek title ix coordinators in the bathrooms of every sorority and fraternity. and i thank you for my time to participate. >> thank you very much. i want to thank our witnesses again for taking time to be here today. i would like to recognize the ranking member for any closing comments. >> madam chair, before i give my closing statement, i ask

ask unanimous consent that the following five documents be submitted into the hearing record. number one, the u.s. department of education's 2014 guidance on title ix and sexual violence. number two, u.s. department of education's list of higher education institutions with open title ix sexual investigations as of october 2nd, 2015. and the table chart title ix cleary act, f-e-r-p-a. and lastly, number five, the letter from feminist majority foundation. i ask unanimous consent that that be done. >> without objection. >> thank you. in my closing statement, i'd like to thank all of our witnesses for spending their time with us at this important

hearing this morning. a combination of publicity and heightened scrutiny is leading colleges across the entire nation to place more emphasis than ever on preventing and responding to sexual assault on their campuses. sometimes victims of these horrendous crimes do not know who or where to turn, because they believe no one will understand them, or they believe that reporting a crime could bring them much more harm. this is why it's imperative that institutions of higher education, which deal directly with our students have the resources to provide the victims of sexual assault and the accused with help and comfort so that they and those affected by that crime will fully recover and not miss out on their educational opportunity. and with that, i yield back.

>> thank you mr. hinojosa. i want to thank all our witnesses, everyone who came here today. i especially want to thank our staff for the excellent work ton on p -- done on putting this hearing together. and in the interest of time, i did not acknowledge that dr. rue is from wake forest, which is in my district, and i'm very grateful to her and for that wonderful, wonderful institution that is there. i want to say that i deplore violence of any kind. i don't even watch any kind of movies with violence in them, because i cannot abide violence. and this is a very important issue. it's important to all of us. again, i have a grandson who went off to college this fall for the first time. so those of us in particular, again, who have children at

colleges and universities, but every american, everybody on a college campus deserves to have a safe environment to learn. we want that for all of our students. and so i, i believe that today's hearing has brought forth some important information that will inform us as we go forward in the reauthorization of the higher education act, and appreciate, again, the witnesses, my colleagues who came and asked very thoughtful questions. and everyone who's here to learn more about this issue. there being no further business, the sub committee stands adjourned. >> thank you. on the next washington journal, grover norquist on the

tax plans put forth by the republican candidates. and lucy melcher discusses households that have trouble getting access to food. after that, political reporter rachel bade looks at the hillary clinton e-mail probe. plus we'll take your e-mails, phone calls and tweets. washington journal, live on c-span. ahead of pope francis's upcoming visit to the united states, the cato institute holds a hearing. see that live on c-span. also, tuesday, remarks from john mchugh on the future of the army after serving as that military branch's secretary for the last six years.

he'll discuss budge tary issues. see that on c-span 2. both chambers of congress are in session this week. the senate returns tuesday to take another procedural vote on the iran nuclear agreement. they will gather at 1:00 eastern. that vote comes up at 6:00 eastern. and later this week, a measure that would ban abortions after 20 weeks. you can see live coverage of the senate on c-span 2. the u.s. house returns for debate on several bills, including one that would direct the tsa to enhance security at airports. they discuss legislation that would ban all federal funding for planned parenthood unless that group agrees to stop funding or performing abortions.

the house is live on c-span. all persons having business before the honorable, the supreme court of the united states are admonished to draw near and give their attention. >> number 759, ernest miranda, the petitioner, versus arizona. >> roe versus wade. >> marbury and madison is the most famous case. >> they existed as enslaved people here on land where slavery wasn't legally recognized. >> putting the brown decision into effect would take presidential orders, and the presence of federal troops and marshals and the courage of children. >> we wanted to pick cases that changed the direction of the court in society and that also

changed society. >> so, she told them that they'd have to have a search warrant. and, mrs. mapp demanded to see the paper and to read it and see what it was, which they refused to do, so she grabbed it out of his hand to look at it, and thereafter, the police officer handcuffed her. >> i can't imagine a better way to bring the constitution to life than by telling the human stories behind great supreme court cases. >> fred komatsu opposed the forced interment of japanese americans during world war ii. after being convicted of failing to report, he took his case all the way to the supreme court. >> quite often in many of our most famous decisions are ones that the court took that were

quite unpopular. >> if you had to pick one freedom that was the most essential to the functioning of a democracy, it has to be freedom of speech. >> let's go through a few cases that illustrate very dramatically and visually what it means to live in a society of 310 million different people who have helped stick together because they believe in a rule of law. >> landmark cases, an exploration of 12 historic supreme court decisions and the human stories behind them. a new series on c-span, produced in cooperation with the national constitution center, debuting monday, october 5th at 9:00. last week, british foreign secretary phillip hammond answered questions on uk foreign

developments, including combat being isis, the syrian refugee crisis and the iran nuclear program. held in london, this is just over two hours. >> welcome to this session for foreign affairs. my thanks to foreign sent and to sir simon and sir simon for going to join us this afternoon. we will get straight into questions. the issues, i have some sense as to what we will cover. but inevitably, isis, daesh, so isil, whatever it is to be called heads the agenda. so i thought we would start off there and with syria. so to say then, in july, you indicated that our policy in attacking isil in iraq but not

syria was incoherent and the defense secretary has been extremely robust on this point in the last couple of days. but, isn't that british military incoherence trivial, and in terms of the mission, irrelevant when set within the wholly incoherent policy towards syria? as we now see it, far beyond iraq. and the point, if i recall in july that i was making is that there is a military incoherence

to carrying out a campaign of airstrikes against an enemy on the ground in iraq whose supply lines originate in the neighboring country, but being unable to attack those supply lines and control centers in the neighboring country, so there may well be political arguments, and, indeed there are political arguments, and these were rehearsed in parliament on the 29th of august 2013. but, from a military point of view, it is incoherence. it is a single theater of conflict. and the supply lines run from raqqah in syria, into iraq, where they sustain the isil daesh forces that are attacking iraqi forces. >> but what about the juxtaposition of the military incoherence? or the requirement for military

coherence by the supporting functions, being able to operate both over iraq and syria, which is a perfectly proper military and ter she airy argument. isn't that the whole position towards both syria and isil? >> well, i think the international community's response to isil is coherence. crisis in syria of which isil it's limited in the sense that we have taken a decision that it would not be appropriate to put coalition ground forces into iraq. that the coalition's activity is limited to the air power, training, mentoring, to the

iraqi forces and the kurdish peshmerga forces. that means that the objectives will take longer to achieve than they might have done if western forces had been injected into iraq, but the judgment is that the ensuing result will be more sustainable, if it is delivered by iraqi forces acting on the ground and in iraq. so i think that is perfectly coherent. and there will be many people, and i understand entirely their frustration, who are reluctant to contemplate what, i think, general allen from the beginning was indicating, that it could take, it could be taking years, not months, to resolve the isil problem in iraq. and frustrated because of the immense barbarity of the isil occupation of parts of iraq, but

i think it is coherent. it is a different challenge and it is made complex by the fact that the two most important external players in iraq, the three most important external players, russia, iran, and turkey, all have very different agendas. and in the case of turkey an agenda which is clearly evolving even as we discuss this this afternoon. >> but i think you describe the international view towards isil is limited. >> it is limited in the fact that we have made a decision for better or worse that we are not going to put wherein ground forces into iraq. >> but can isil be defeated without resolution of the syrian civil war? >> i think my view on that is,

yes is, it could. if we were able to attack isil across its theater of operation from northern syria through eastern syria into iraq. it is is possible to defeat isil in that theater as a separate issue from the broader syrian civil war. >> can you paint that scenario, though, if the syrian civil war still continued, how that could happen? >> i mean, obviously, we've already talked about the possibility of coalition airstrikes of the uk perhaps, in the future deciding to join in coalition airstrikes in syria. we will only defeat isil in iraq when there is a ground force that is able to pursue them and inflict serious damage on them.

and it is possible to envisage a situation where that dispute and destruction will go into syria. i'm not saying it's the ideal situation or the most likely situation. but i don't think it is a necessary condition of destroying isil in syria, the civil war in syria. >> yesterday we took evidence from some of the country's most distinction wish the academics and journalists who have followed this crisis. their conclusion was that isil won't be defeated until turkey, iran, saudi arabia share in power and its defeat. it enables those states to focus on other national priorities. so isn't the coalition's, more particularly the united states and the united kingdom perhaps,

and canada, the western powers, isn't our policy, and our action, having the unintended consequence of relieving those key powers of the need to cooperate in order to prioritize and enable isil's defeat? >> well, i think i've already made reference to the fact that the complexity in syria is the three external powers most directly involved and most influential have complex agendas, and they, in some cases, internally conflicting agendas, and that is what mayke the problem in syria so difficult to tackle. i agree with you that having turkey, iran and russia pursuing separate agendas and in the case of turkey, a shifting agenda, makes it very difficult to move

towards the point where we have a clear response, a clear, agreed approach to moving forward in resolving the crisis in syria. >> but in syria, we are salient, and the fact that it's likely to continue is the evidence we've received yesterday. and part of that is because iran and russia are unwilling to countenance the forced removal of assad. so isn't british and american policy actually contributing to that stalemate, and the uncomfortable -- >> how is that contributing? >> because our position as expressed by the prime minister indeed this afternoon from the questions is to equate assad and isil and the removal of assad is the start point of the united

kingdom's position. that the rather uncomfortable truth is that while iran and russia therefore are not prepared to contemplate the forced removal is that we bear a share of the responsibility for that stalemate, and therefore, the continuing blood should, the current migrant crisis, and the inability for the international coalition to actually put together a strategy to defeat isil in both syria and iraq. >> i think the responsibility for the bloodshed lies squarely with those who are perpetrating it, and we need to be clear about that. it's isil in the areas that they control, and it's the assad regime in the areas that they control and that they are bombing from the air indiscriminately. but you've put your finger on, of course, what is precisely the problem. that our analysis of the problem is that assad is a recruiting

sergeant for isil. and any suggestion that western powers were prepared to work with assad in the defeat of isil would redouble that recruiting sergeant effect. and at the same time, two of the most influential parts in this equation, iran and russia, are apparently not prepared to contemplate the removal of assad from power at this stage. our diplomatsy is focussed on persuading russia and iran that their interests can be protected. that their future can best be assured by allowing a transition which didn't seek to dismantle the entire regime, but which did remove assad, and the group around him, who are manifestly

responsible for the bloodshed and the atrocities that have been committed. >> but the problem with that analysis is nicely shared by the expert commentators who gave us evidence yesterday, one said quote you, professor when the point was put to him by mike gates of assad's behavior and whether it's possible to cooperate in that sense with him in any way. he said this. don't confuse pragmatism with in any way cone don'ting the methods of the assad regime. the whole disappoint to put the syrian population first. we all know the statistics you quote, and i agree with you, that the man has more blood on his hands than should ever make us shake his hand, but, yet, because he is backed by some of the two strongest powers in this conflict, russia and iran, the demands that he must go are not

realist particular. so the question is, do you intend to stand on this. >> any sense that the west was prepared to work with assad against isil would redouble the recruiting sergeant effect. we also have legal restraints around supporting or working with a regime which is committing crimes on this scale or indeed on any scale. and we're very acutely conscious of our legal obligations. it's not, you know, even if it was convenient to us. and i don't think it is, but even if it was convenient to us, we don't have the option of just working with assad. we would be abetting with the commission of an international crime. >> that's not what i would be

inviting the british government to do. what i think the issue is, is that the start points of the, as far as i understand it, the western position, american, french, and our own position is that assad must go. and by starting in that place, it means that negotiations cannot happen, effectively a geneva three process is blocked. because the critical partners in this, the critical players in this, in the end, the regional powers, turkey, syria, iran, russia standing behind iran, will not then enable a process to happen. and therefore, the, that's not inviting the united kingdom government to cooperate with assad. inviting the united kingdom with western allies to stop the process, stop stopping the process from starting by, by

dropping our in principle objection to assad and go to language that it's not possible to envisage a role of assad in the future, which strikes me as more a sensible language that it would enable a geneva three process to start rather than the position we put ourselves in. >> and i think, i don't think there's a difference between myself and mrs. margrini. the question isn't, i think the question is about timing. we are prepared to be pragmatic about the process of transition. and in our discussion with russians and now with iranians, i've made that clear. we are not saying, you know, on day one, assad and all of his cronies have to go on day one. if there was a process which was agreed, including with the

russians and the iranians, which took a period of months, and there was a transition out during that period of months, we could certainly discuss that. what i am not prepared to discuss is what i understand to be the russian and iranian position that we need to move to elections in syria, and it will be for the syrian people to decide in those elections whether assad should remain as their president. that is not an acceptable position. the international community cannot, in my view, facilitate and oversee a set of elections in which somebody guilty of crimes of the scale that assad has committed is able to run for office. that has to be clear. he cannot be part of syria's future. and i think that was the point mrs. margarini was making.

>> yesterday from julian barnes, as a guarantor of the regime, assad is the glue holding it together. >> that's a line straight from the russian/iranian playbook. assad is the glue holding syria together. that is the that is the iranian national security adviser's line to me word for word. it is sergey lavrov's line word for word. >> does it mean that it's automatically wrong? >> no, but our analysis is that this is one-sided story. of course assad plays a role in the regime's structure. >> but if it's shared by the people who gave us evidence yesterday. and i would invite you to look at the evidence we took yesterday. >> the committee will take evidence from experts, and it should, of course, do so. but now you're asking me for my opinion and british government's

position, and i'm giving you our political judgment that we cannot work with assad in anything other than the very short term of a transition. now we've indicated to the russians and the iranians that if there is a sensible plan for transition that involves assad remaining in some way involved in the process for a period of time we will look at that, and we will discuss it. we are not saying he must go on day one categorically. of course we'll be pragmatic in a discussion with them. but what we will not concede is that he should be allowed to be a contender for a future major role in the new syria. >> if we could just turn to the practicality of the policy there, is it correct that the number of free syrian army and loosely defined western-aligned potential competents in this civil war, that ourselves and

the united states, and others who are trained and employed is frighteningly small. we were given a number yesterday that we've completed the training and put into employment some 54 people, some of whom are already dead. >> no, i don't think that number is correct. it is a small number. but my recollection of the number, my recollection is that it's in the thousands. >> i went over this in july. you were, i think left with the impression that training a moderate syrian opposition appeared to be a core part of our strategy in syria. do you now accept that this doesn't actually appear to constitute a credible and adequate policy for the scale of the challenges in this area? >> i think it's a long-term policy, and it's taken us longer to get off the ground than we would have liked to do. but it is now under way.

it is, it requires the cooperation of turkey to be successful, i think. and, as i said earlier, turkish policy on syria is evolving. we've seen, over the last few months, turkey being much more engaged in the syrian problem, but in a way which is very particularly pursuing its own agendas. >> talking, if we can return to the international coalition, can you tell us what's now actually happening to make the coalition more effective? >> the international coalition. >> is it 62 nations? how many nations? >> to counter isil coalition? >> yes. >> well, the process is the same as it was. there are a number of working groups dealing with different aspebs. for example, countering the isil

daesh propaganda machine, which is beginning to work. that's co-led by the uk, the u.s. and the uae. there's another group working on isil finances, cutting off financial flows, and there's a group working on cutting off flows of foreign fighters. these are three strands of work. there's the military operation, which you're aware of, coordinated by general allen. and all of that is continuing. >> but it's a long haul. i mean, this is not going to happen overnight. we've always been clear about that. >> looking at the competing parties inside syria, with the success of al nusra, really be any more desirable than the success of isil?

>> let me, let me answer the question a different way. we would not regard success by al nusra as a satisfactory or acceptable outcome. if i was put on the spot to rank the horror of living under isil control or al nusra control, i'd have to think quite hard about that, but both would be unacceptable to us, and we've made that clear to any of our partners in the coalition who've ever been inclined to tnk otherwise. >> so what's your view, then, of the support given by saudi arabia and alp fattah? >> it includes saudi arabia, but others as well. the situation on the ground is not as we would like it to be. it is complex.

and sometimes compromises have to be made on the ground, tactical compromises, and the history of warfare is that you have to make tactical compromises, but we would not regard a strategic alliance with al nusra as being an acceptable way for that at all. >> the complexity of this situation in syria, obviously to everyone, isn't this an area where british diplomatic capability, our capacity to coordinate with our limited firepower that can't make a difference in isolation, our soft power is where the nation's main effort, to bring others together, to use a coherent strategy here, that's where our main effort ought to be focussed, isn't? >> i don't agree with your first part. in iraq, we've conducted more airstrikes apart from any other coalition partner apart from the

united states. our surveillance assets in syria are making a very major contribution. again, i would hazard, second only to that of the united states. so we are playing a significant role in the military and intelligence battle as well. in terms of working on financial flows, we have an expertise in interdikting financial flows which is second to none. we have an important role to play there. and we play through our intelligence and security agents as an important role in cutting off the flow of foreign fighters, and actually, to cover the water front, we play a significant role in the counter propaganda war, where we, again, like to think that we have some experience and capable to

deploy. >> on monday, the prime minister's justification for the british strikes was legally very narrowly drawn. parliamentary authority to act in syria would likely change the situation of action under international law. what are the legal constraints in syria if we don't have the permission of the existing government to operate there, and if there's no immediate threat to the united kingdom presented by the prime minister on monday? >> the coalition forces that are operating in syria are doing so on the basis of the collective defense of iraq. and the challenge that the iraqi government is facing from isil and its base in syria. >> so there would be no justification for operations

against the government of syria. presumably that's why they're not happening. >> not on that legal basis. different countries, of course, have a different approach to their analysis of legal basis for action. and famously, the united states has its own legal approach to justifying action. >> i'm sure you're thinking about when you're going to come to seek authority to operate in syria. perhaps you might be able to tell us when you are expecting to ask parliament for that authority. but why should parliament authorize a widening of british involvement in this conflict when the overall strategy has yet to be worked out? >> i don't think the overall strategy is yet to be worked out. again, we go back to the last questioning at the beginning. we would see authority to attack isil targets more widely in

syria as being a part of the campaign against isil, which, at the moment, is confined to iraq. we would see it as being driven by a military logic, which says you look at the enemy holisticly, we look at the supply lines, the support base, you look at the command-and-control notes. and those are the things you want to attack. and at the moment, we're able to attack some of them. those in iraq. but not all of them. because we don't have authority to attack those in syria, and i think the logic of extending our mandate to cover isil targets in syria would be very clearly a logic in support of the mandate we have in iraq for the collective defense of that country. >> i'm through. >> can i ask you for an assessment of how successful the

current policy of attacking isil in iraq is, particularly, when mosul still seems to be under isil control? and we were given the impression some months ago, the liberation of mosul was fairly imminent. it doesn't look like that. >> well, the, on the question of mosul, general allen, who i have a lot of time for, has always been very cautious about the timing of the retaking of mosul. there have been people in the iraq ei government who have bee shall we say more bullish. and of course it's also true that the iraqis have had their attention deflected by challenges in anbar province. but general allen always said it would be next year that mosul could sensibly be targeted for

retaking. i want to ask simon gast to say something about general allen's view. but to answer your first general question, how successfully do i assess the intervention in iraq has been. it stopped isil's advance dead. if we go back to 15 months, 16 months, we were looking at an apparently unstoppable surge across iraq. downhe river valleys, towards baghdad. with baghdad appearing to be under imminent threat of falling to isis. coalition air power stopped that advance dead. it forced isil to change its tactics from acting like a conventional army to a guerrilla force, operating in small cells, moving by night, making them far less effective and making them

less able to control the territory that they've taken in a conventional manner. and it has allowed a breathing space for the iraqi forces to be regrouped, retrained and rebuilt. that process hasn't gone as quickly as any of us would have liked. in the meantime, the use of coalition air power is holidaying isil in check. but we've always been i have up front about the fact that coalition air power will not roll isil back. it will merely hold them in check. it's got to be iraqi boots on the ground that do the hard slog of rolling them back and clearing and holding iraqi territory. simon? >> very briefly, i wanted to update, i have talked to our american partners. in terms of the military situation, the air war is a success. if you look at tikrit now, a city where isil murdered about 1,000 people and huge numbers of people were driven out of the

city. you can see it now returning to something approaching normality. commercial activity is returning. ramadi, there's still an operation toramadi, and that is making progress, but slowly. they have ieds, booby traps. you can do it very quickly or do it in a more steady way. in the north, of course, there's plen plenty of fighting which is the extent of the conflict line. there is clearly a plan to retake mosul, but it does require a lot of shaping operations. we have to make sure that the iraq eye security forces are in a condition where they will be able to have success there. and the training which is going

on there of those forces is now leading to trained units appearing on the battlefield. so without wishing to overstate the amount of success in iraq, it's certainly not an entirely negative picture in terms of retapging territory from isil. >> can you give us some idea of how much of mosul is free of isil and how much still it remains in the hands of isil? >> my understanding is the city itself is still under isil control. some of the surrounding areas, particularly to the north, will be under peshmerga control. the city is, nobody's claiming otherwise that mosul is still under isil control. >> and is the peshmerga force still a substantial number of the iraqi army? >> well, the peshmerga isn't part of the iraqi army. it operates as a separate force.

and the kurdish authorities have made clear that while the peshmerga will act in the area adjacent to mosul, it is not likely to take part in an assault on mosul itself. that will have to be carried out by iraq ei forces. >> yesterday there was some discussion about the future for syria, and there was some suggestions about no-fly zones. and then the point was made that there should be a cease-fire agreed by all sides before no-fly zones are put in place. how do you see that? >> yeah, it would be great. yeah, a cease-fire would be fantastic. we'd go with that. >> who's working on that? what are the diplomatic efforts? >> stephen, the u.s. special envoys have been working on the idea of a cease-fire.

these things are easy to sit in a room and talk about. they're a bit more difficult to of do on the ground. the chairman referred to one such alliance earlier on. frankly, it can involve some very strange bedfellows coming together, tactical alliances around particular towns or cities that are being defended or assaulted. it is a very fluid and complex situation, and i'm afraid the prospect of achieving a cease-fire i regard as being probably further away than the prospect of getting russia around turkey and the western powers to agree on a way forward. >> how do you think that turkey's attack now on the kurdish groups in syria and also the iraqi kurds who, for

instance, liberated kobani. is the turkish attitude helpful? and how do you see that? >> i think the most, the kurdish attacks you're talking about have been in iraq, not in sear yeah, but clearly this is an additional and very significant complication to the situation. the military people have always thought that the involvement of turkey would be key to resolving the situation in northern syria, and the fact that turkey has an agenda which is different, frankly, from the agenda of any of the other players, because it's focussed on their own tensions with the kurds as much as it is focussed on tension with isil and the syrian regime, is a complicating factor. and it's just one more

complicating factor. each one of the players, the significant players here has a different set of agendas, and we're only going to move forward when we can find common threads that all of the players can sign up to, and we can act together accordingly. >> may i just ask you about a statement that was made in the house. that there would be independent monitoring of drone strikes. or that there is end peindepend monitoring. you suggested there might be legal people who are doing it. who is going to be doing that? >> who made the statement you're referring to? >> came from your side of the house. >> i mean, the situation is that b we have a very robust process for authorization of any such action as the prime minister made clear on monday.

and then there is a whole set of rules of engagement once it moves to the military phase, a whole set of rules of engagement have to be complied with. and there is a rigorous process for monitoring that and for assessing outcomes. that's, that's how it works in the ministry of defense. >> who's monitoring it? >> i'm not sure who said it first of all. i'm not sure what was meant by independent monitoring. i'm not sure. >> i was trying to find out who said it. >> yes, thank you. with regard, i'm very pleased to hear you say that you would not deal with president assad, contradicting some evidence that we had yesterday from some experts.

very disappointing to see the austrian foreign minister on the trip to tehran saying the exact opposite, and saying that we do need to engage with assad. my question is two fold. how united is the european union on this issue of whether or not we should deal with assad?