vanderbilt. second is richard siccardo. he serve as google's information security. before working at google, mr. salgado worked at yahoo, and prior to that served ago special counsel. campaign 2016.

taking you on the road to the white house. >> at the oversight role of congress and u.s. intelligence and national security manners -- matters. david sanger of the new york times moderates this discussion. and welcomemorning to day two. we continue our examination of

the state of u.s. intelligence thosehe perspective of who provide oversight from congress. congress plays a critical role in ensuring the health and operation of intelligence. the house are meant select community -- committee on intelligence [indiscernible] we are pleased to have congressman devin nunes and the ranking minority member congressman adam schiff with us this morning. they represent the great state and have long and distinguished records of performing rigorous oversight of intelligence in the interest of accountability and transparency. our distinguished panelists are joined by david sanger, chief washington correspondent for the new york times. we are thrilled to have you with us today is well. >> thank you and thank you for coming at this early hour of the

morning. i am looking forward to what will be a conversation of under one hour because both of our panelists have to get to what i hope will be a pretty interesting open hearing on cyber. leadinghave many of the intelligence agency heads and i think including the director of who was intelligence here yesterday. i think you both. as you heard in the introduction we're fortunate to have devin nunes and adam schiff with this. that is the role. i want to get to the question of the quality of the intelligence you are getting now with what will be at the end of the week, 14 years since

9/11. great time of upheaval in the way we organize the intelligence community and the way we assess information. let me start with this. when you look around the world and you see the assessments that come into you, we are in an odd moment. post-post-cold war moment. where the assessment of the threat differs considerably. if you look at the national threat assessment you get each february, it has said cyber for the past two years as the biggest threat. if you look at what the pentagon would tell you they would say a resurgent russia under vladimir putin. if you look under -- at the assessments that come from

others who are more focused on the middle east they would tell you the rise of isis. is perhaps the vigorous challenge we face now although not necessarily one that can reach the united states. i would like to ask each of you to tell us which of those you believe but more importantly, tell us what the fact we are getting -- why we are getting such a different assessment, what we should draw from that about the current state of how we assess intelligence threats. >> thank you and i appreciate the opportunity to be here with my colleague am a adam schiff. party to start out to be -- bipartisan. it is behind closed doors so we do not have a lot of the political banter you will see in public hearings that you see on the other committees. the politics we try to check at

the door. this is one of the most important roles that we both play in this town and for the united states of america to look over 17 agencies, that is very difficult. we looked at this before we both came on, we wanted to build what didn what our predecessors and we divided the committee into new subcommittees and tried to spread out the 17 different areas where we have jurisdiction to get our members more engaged. we had very active members on , forsa cyber committee example, and we have a defense in overhead architecture, emerging threats, and cia. we try to divvy it up i the workload. and then we will have -- we will big, important, maybe the first meeting of the week

usually. then we try to let the other committee chairman do the rest because there is too much to cover. that is how we break it down and how we view our role in oversight area -- oversight. i do not think you can rank -- getting to the second question. i look at these and kind of equal buckets that are always changing and that are working together and i see those buckets as you have the whole overarching cyber-problem. you have the russia problem. you have the china problem. and then you have what i call the jihad triangle which is isis, al qaeda, and iran. overarching with that is the cyber problem. so at times when you look at who are the ad cyber actors, they happen to be russia, china, iran, even some of the isil folks.

and then you have the nuclear threat with north korea. i do not think -- if you live at sony it is cyber threat. >> when people ask how is the intelligence community i think too many people expect the intelligence community to be fortunetellers and they think they will predict the future. as we know that is hard to do. you just hope to have really educated folks, educated members , we can provide good education to our military, to the military planners, to our policymakers both at the executive and legislative level. and through that we know that change is always going to happen. new bad things are always going to emerge and you hope that you have some education level amongst all the people i just named.

congressman schiff: we have strongly left coast domination of intelligence oversight with myself, senator new year's, senator feinstein. the chair was mentioning our committee tends to be nonpartisan. that does not mean we don't have our differences. we do that it is a very collegial environment. we try to basically cordon off the areas where we know we are going to be in disagreement and we agree to disagree without it becoming personal. then we focus on the bread-and-butter of our job which there are no party line differences. it is a wonderful retreat from the rest of the congressional committees. i would say a couple of things ic.t the state of the a time ofne through

tremendous growth and capabilities where technology -- ithnological advances made possible to gather information. as a result we are seeing a couple of phenomena. one is that our public policy do not always keep paces with the changes in technology and changes in capability. perhaps we did not ask as much about things we could do, whether we should do, what the implications of disclosure might mean. that environment has very much changed. there are new analyses where almost the expectation is turned on its head. this willation now is be disclosed, leaked, whatever. oft requires a new analysis what will the implications of that be, what are the cost benefits of any kind of intelligence gathering, so the public policy debate is struggling to keep up with the

technological advances. we have been trying to deal with the challenge of the assimilation of great amounts of data which is a different kind thehallenge than perhaps in days gone by when the challenge was getting information, not so much assimilation of information. functionalht is very and contrast too much of the congress. nonetheless, we are at a tremendous mismatch vis-a-vis the intelligence agencies. we cannot take our work home area and we are reliant to a large degree on the agencies telling us if there are problems . within those constraints i think that the oversight mechanism is working and working reasonably well. in terms of the threats we face i find it interesting when team -- people talk about the -- about cyber. it is floating out there not connected to any particular

actor. it is relevant in the context of who is using the cyber weapon against us. russia isirman said, the most sophisticated actor. china may be the most lithic actor. -- prolific actor. we have concerns about iran, north korea, and the increasing democratization of the cyber threat as other countries make use of it. it is a very asymmetric battlefield where a lot of the advantages are to those on offense and that provides great challenge for the intelligence community and all of our agencies. actors ornation state non-nationstate actors on what poses the greatest threat, i view that through the prism of what poses the threat of changing the way we live. , theen i look at isis threat from isis compared to the threat from al qaeda, i have been more worried about al qaeda

because of their capacity to launch major attacks against this country. to bring down our aircraft or an attempt to do a spectacular attack. that could have a transform an event negative impact on the country in a way that the one isil model attacks will not be transformative. i have tended to worry more about al qaeda. that is changing as al qaeda, the core leadership becomes increasingly decimated and isil is increasingly on the rise. that for me is changing. we may be getting to the point where isil has eclipsed al qaeda in my perspective as the predominate terrorist threat. russia presents a very real threat also. potentially transform at its impact in our country. should they miscalculate should lead to warfare on the

continent. you have the same risk although to a lesser degree by china with its aggressive action in the south china sea. those are two of the main nationstate actors we worry about. and then finally, iran, we will be training a lot of our on iran's compliance with the nuclear agreement. that will be the next type rarity. host tom and i want to leave on the two things you raised. move on to iran and some of the cyber issues. , wementioned at the outset work from an old assumption in the intelligence community that most of what you dealt with if not forn secret periodire 25 or 30 year

that you would see at the bottom of a classification stamp but most of that. the dni got around to declassifying presidential daily briefs lyndon johnson received early in the vietnam war. that is the old model. the cia went through a procedure, annual review of the white house that basically said, is this operation, is the data we are getting out of this operation, this effort worth what we're getting if it got disclosed tomorrow morning on "the new york of times" or "the washington post"? the nsa never went through that process until post-snowden time. tell us, go one more beat about how that is changing. what you are saying happen in the culture.

is there now an underlying assumption that even the deepest secrets may only have a shelf life of a couple of years. how does of -- that affect one's thinking on how to measure risk? >> the has been an overreliance on technology. we have to continue to improve how we use technology and data. you can also over-rely on it. there's nothing better than good old-fashioned human intelligence gathering. it is going to be more difficult to gather human intelligence times it isa lot of human intelligence that enables better technologies, new technologies or even discovery of what adversaries are doing.

>> i think the allegations regarding angela's cell phone and i can only say allegations were a real tipping point in compelling policymakers ic to thinkof the long and hard about the risks of disclosure, the risks of relationship with allies, the ,isks to sources of information most acutely human sources of information from disclosure. to think in new and different terms about the cost benefit analysis, because i think one of the dynamics that has changed is the conversations that traditionally have taken thee between the media and

intelligence community when the media has a story and they go to the icn say, we are going to run with the story and there is a discussion about, what impact with that have and the newspaper's willingness to self censor and not publish out of the public interest. i think that dynamic has changed. you may be in a better position to speak on this. my perception is that post-snowden there is such a rush to publish. if we do not run with this some other paper will. we will get scooped. it is a very different dynamic now. from the press perspective that may mean that -- described to of thenfidence and trust government. but the bottom line i think for the intelligence community is a much greater expectation that things are going to be published. the celebrity for lack of a better word that has

been attributed to snowden encourages other people to make disclosures. this is a great challenge. we can have an intelligence community where people can unilaterally make the decision even when something is lawful that they disagree with the policy and they will make it public. tremendous challenge. i think it does affect what the ic does. it does affect our expectations about how long things will remain confidential. constraints, some which may be useful and others which may be harmful in terms of national security. those communications inteln "the times" and have not changed all that much. there is a very good time at --

dynamic back-and-forth. while the times or the poster the wall street journal may call and have a serious conversation with the cia or others about whether publication would result in methods being revealed and so forth, wikileaks will not have that phone call or a blogger. we probably would not get the phone call returned. the game is being played at a far more complex level i think than it was in the old days. but you raised at the end the concern that some in the intel community about -- have whether they do this in and out of channel. one of the questions we have gotten up here goes direct to that. to ask you both to comment on the news reports that appeared monday thats" on intelligence assessments of isis at varioustered

points. this was mostly in the dia. to downplay their strength. when i read that story the other day i was thinking to myself, this is the same debate that played out during the pentagon papers in 1969. where history of the vietnam war suggested that the government had overestimated our success against the viet cong. except we were seeing played out in real time with the isis struggle. when you read something like that and maybe you have had some discussions with the intel community on that. tell us a little bit about that dynamic. are concerned about the politicization of intelligence and it has long been a political football that there is always of theions politicization of intelligence. i have never viewed al qaeda as

on the run. it makes for good political rhetoric. gives the market people who do not want to be fighting wars, wemakes them feel good but still have enemies out there and enemies are growing. by the storyprised or -- i was surprised that it sounds like now there are whistleblowers that are coming forward. >> there is an ig investigation. >> that will be of interest to both of us to figure out what that is all about. to have an open avenue for whistleblowers to come forward. it has not been easy in the past for whistleblowers. some of thease whistleblowers came to my colleagues at "the times." could they have come to the committee?

>> absolutely. we have a process in place for whistleblowers to come forward. anyone in the intelligence committee has the right to come actively -- sometimes it is not even whistleblowers that adam and i, we meet with people when we travel or even here in washington. our doors are always open to people within the ic to come with complaints. >> thanks for the refresher on the pentagon papers case. i took a class but it was at 8 a.m. and i slept most of it. >> we started at 8:15 a.m. and we gave them 15 minutes of caffeine knowing that you guys would be out here. >> excellent. i think the chairman's point is exactly right. make itevery effort to possible for whistleblowers not only to can indicate with us but

to -- communicate with us but to have avenues to raise concern so they do not feel they need to leak information to be heard. that onnot to say policy differences that we will agree with someone who disagrees with the policy of the intelligence community, but we do need to make sure that there is an avenue available for overnt, for any concern wrongdoing or failure to adhere to the guidelines or politicization of intelligence. all of us have in mind concerns expressed over intelligence on iraq and none of us want to see anything like that happening with respect to iso-or any other challenge we face. there have been cultural changes that have encouraged dissenting opinions that develop alternative analyses that question assumptions that seems

to be part of the ethic of the intelligence community in a way more than the past. this is obviously not a perfect science. the analysts can reach for different conclusions and we want that to be reflected in the work product we get. impressions can be different. i mentioned this to highlight within the last 24, 48 hours something that i think is telling in terms of the perspective we bring reading the same intelligence. just this week all of the republican members on our committee have come out against the iran agreement and in part on the basis of their reading of intelligence. although democratic members have come out in support. similarly on the basis of our reading of intelligence. we are reaching contrary intelligence reading the same

intelligence. the director spoke yesterday and it was interesting. john negroponte speaking earlier before the panel today about the impressions of what he had to say. i read them in the paper today because it was not present yesterday and i have one interpretation of what he said in terms of our capability of catching iran if they were to cheat. people who heard him may have at completely different impression of whether it was likely or not likely we would catch them. this is not a perfect science. we do want to hear those range of opinions within the ic and what level of confidence they hold. i have a lot of confidence we do get that range of opinion. >> you provided the perfect segue into that topic. i was out in vienna for the and of the iran talks and we spent a with secretary

moneys, the energy secretary who you have heard a lot from and engineeringnuclear department at m.i.t. for many years and has come to you folks with a fair bit of credibility as a result of that. his public assessment on this is if the iranians are engaged in activity involving nuclear materials, our chances of catching them are extraordinarily high because the technology of finding even trace , it is is now so good hard to hide that. hand, they arer going back and doing what the iaea is supposed to be sorting out with them, weapons design, triggers, the kind of work they may have done and so forth, that is much harder to suss out because it does not leave a radioactive trace. you have to get to the human

to get into the university labs that are being used for these purposes. as you look at these intelligence assessments and i said -- let me start with you. give us your assessment about what kind of thing we would likely to be good at catching. what kind of thing you are worried about and how you balance those two as you came to your determination to vote against this deal. >> what you have to do is back up a little ways and you have to start with should we ever -- have ever been at the negotiating table to start if part of eating at the negotiating table meant the iranians would keep any of their nuclear weapons at all or any of their nuclear capabilities at all. my answer would be no. if the iranians wanted to come to the table and they agreed to

immediate inspections always and completely getting rid of all the clear capabilities, then i would have went to the table to negotiate. without that i want to see more sanctions. i realize that to your point on technologies are always changing and perhaps the technologies are better than they once were 10 years ago in north korea when we thought they would not have a nuclear weapon and then they did develop a nuclear weapon. it has been more than 10 years now. the fact of the matter is technology changes for the bad guys, too. we do not know what technologies they are developing to hide their development of nuclear capabilities. i would argue that -- >> you think the original sin here was abandoning the bush administration rule which even -- that administration not one centrifuge could stand. >> that would be my position.

most of the republicans who are against this proposal, that would be their position. >> i would go further to say that we really see this as a gamble. if you look at what president obama, if i understand his lot that areare a off having these folks at the table, having some inspections and perhaps over time as discussing and being at the table with these -- with the mullahs will lead to some downfall of the regime. >> the administration response has been yes. in a perfect world we would love to see not a single centrifuge spin. we do not live in a perfect world and we are much better to get 15 years with a small number

spinning and have the bush administration not stuck to the position that the chairman just laid out. you might have had a deal in 2005, 2006 to have a few hundred spinning and we would the in better shape. you're looking at the same assembly of risk, the same intel picture. where do you come out on that? >> i start out from a different perspective as you point out, in the early bush ministration they had 167 centrifuges. had we gotten a deal than that required them to diminish that number by two thirds, they would he down to about 50 centrifuges. instant of 5000 under the steel. nonetheless, my hope -- hopes at iran wereing is if allowed to have an enrichment capability, it would have been a choking -- a token one. the fact that they have

capability after 15 years is a bitter pill for me to swallow. but that begins to look good when you compare it to the alternative. the alternative is we go back to where theyre before had thousands of kilos of enriched uranium. they had close to 20,000 centrifuges. where there are no limits to whether they could bring a new generation of centrifuges and reach the capability much sooner than 15 years. that that analysis is a great -- is exactly right. -- you are iran, it will be difficult to create a path to enrichment. givens nearly impossible

the vigorous inspection regime, given our intel capabilities. i do not think they can develop an alternative pathway of enrichment. we have to be on guard for a couple things. that they seek to get the material from outside the country. >> mostly north korea. >> or elsewhere. that is a difficult propition for iran but not his called as creating a covert pathway of enrichment. unless they make the decision they will break out. where they are likely to test us and are likely to cheat is in the non-radioactive weapons development. an computer modeling of what explosion with the client and the development of the warhead itself. they may do this in ways that

they believe they can argue is not prohibited i the agreement. of ambiguity.age they may do this in sites we would be less likely to be watching. whether it is universities rather than military sites. they will test and push their two timelines. there is the timeline for enrichment and time to develop the mechanism of the bomb. the enrichment timeline will go down to a matter of weeks so us ino not need to cheat terms of the enrichment to reduce that timeline. where they may try to cheat and we will have to train all our inources in detection is that weaponization work that may be hidden in that 24 hour time. that challenge. and so even under perfect

agreement we have the challenge of making sure they did not get material from elsewhere and they were not doing militarization work. we have much better capabilities than we have had in the past. not omnipotent in our ability and therefore there is risk. like many things these agreements are a balancing of risk it is a risk we can mitigate that we cannot make it go away. that: there is a theory the supreme leader in iran is going to have to buy off the i/o gt for the fact that if this agreement goes through it seems likely they will have 15 tough years on the nuclear program. whether they cheat or do not, their activity will be restrictive. they are brought down to 300 kilograms and they will take

some of that money and effort and put it into support of terrorism. they may take a chunk of it and put it into cyber. on the theory that the supreme leader [indiscernible] someve already seen skills. there were the attacks of the banks, somewhat crude denial of service attacks. what do you think the chances are that we are going to see iran move from an incipient nuclear power to an incipient cyber power and -- as a result -- as a result? few nunes: there are very

making decisions within that regime. i think you bring up a good point about where they are going to spend this money. they are the largest funder of terrorism locally. when i talk about i think it is always important to understand and i try to define it as this jihad triangle because you have al qaeda, isis and people think they are always fighting because they are different religions. we know for fact that at times the iranians have harbored al qaeda and sheltered al qaeda. there is talk now in the last few days in some of the press report to see that al qaeda is talking about and need to work with isis. i do not believe in long term. , when theyhadists

say they are going to dull the west i think we should believe them. rep. schiff: they are already menace andnger and a increasingly sophisticated. you have this tension in iran between the ayatollah d the as recently as yesterday were talking about there is not going to be any combination -- accommodation with the great satan. at the same time you hear ronnie saying we are open to working with the rest of the world on syria, on combating isil. so there is a tension within iranian society. i think the ayatollah will try to mediate that tension because at the end of the day, there is and one prime directive

that is the perpetuation of the rule by the ayatollah and the mullahs. they must view this as an agreement as a way to let off some of the steam of that younger demographic in iran that is plugged into the rest of the do not likeose who what they have. i would not be surprised to see initially after the agreement the mullahs and the irgc flex their muscles to show this is not a sweeping change and the revolution is not over. and we going to have to push back hard. what i have been advocating for some weeks now is we need to figure out how we can strengthen the constraints on iran and the agreement and mitigate the risks and the agreement. think that means forming a much more effective alliance with the gulf states.

iran spends $15 billion on its defense. they do not spend it as cost-effectively or in ways that are effective in pushing back against hezbollah, hamas, and the sheer proxy forces. we have to work with them much more effectively. could discuss thethreshold where intelligence community would share intelligence information with the community on cyber , but this not only requires declassification, it requires huge speed at doing this. you have to do this at networks be. not at declassification speedway to is causing a lot of heartache

ache in the intelligence community as you can imagine. you have to assume that as soon as you spread this information a lot of itndustry will appear in public. maybe in industry publications but it will make its way out faster -- as it began to spread out in 2010 and let us to understand the american and israeli operations. tell us what that threshold could be. rep. nunes: the first thing the committee started with is not making it worse. seen how hard it is just to get even with all the cyberattacks, daily growing cyber threats, you mentioned sony pictures earlier, we had

two major health-care companies in the last six months get compromised, you had opm get compromised. you would think there would be the political will to get something done. we have moved this legislation quickly. in the senate it is still hung up. it is largely over privacy concerns, i guess for good reasons. at some point there will be a weping point where i think have already reached that point. rep. schiff it affected 22 million americans including everybody with a security clearance which means most of

the people in your audience here today. why wasn't opm that tipping point? are trying toes: we get to that first step of allowing company to talk, company to company to talk. sanger: frequently when i see intelligence community warnings on an intel threat and i go out and talk to the people in the industry who look at this , you are calling me now on this, it is september, we were dealing with this in may. where have you been, where has the intelligence community been? i think that is right. by the time there is public dissemination of information it

was on cnn for weeks ago. and we are very slow to move. in terms of sharing information on cyber threats, that can happen in classified channels. if we happen very quickly have the mechanism established which we're trying to do to this legislation. there are going to be times when we learn about the source of an attack in such a sensitive way where we are not going to want to share the information. we want to share it in ways that don't tip off the generator of the attack that we are aware of where it came from or the nature of the code. merge two topics here is

going to be an issue very much ash respect to our iran work well. the iaea will discover what it discovers. we may discover a lot more through our intelligence capabilities than they do with their eyes on the ground but we will have a dilemma which we can always -- we can easily anticipate where we will catch iran cheating but we will have caught them cheating using a very sensitive capability or human or whatever. we will have to decide, are we willing to burn this source to make the public case that iran is cheating? this will be a difficult constraint and a difficult debate. mr. sanger: we have had this before. the laptop that contained the data that led to the iaea's 12 questions to iran. we were able to track back where

it came from. that was a year or so delay. is one of thehis challenges that we are going to face because particularly if it is not graphic, over cheating, advantagens will take of any ambiguity in the case and when you see how russia has dissembled, about what is going on in ukraine or its activity in the whole russian position on who was using chemical weapons, obviously, some of the p-5 plus one are going to be strongly predisposed to adopting and accepting whatever the iranian position may be. that is going to be a considerable challenge. does the committee have concerns with the proliferation of drones as both

tools and threats to the ic? you spent a lot of time on the question of do you want to use this as a tool to create more terrorists and eliminate and so forth but this question is asking you to go beyond that and to think about the threat that drones may pose to the intelligence community and to the country as a whole. rep. nunes: it is an issue that is being looked at by the entire congress. even in my hometown, once in a while you see a drone. one of these three by three drones flying around create this is an ongoing problem. there will have to be regulation brought in to how you deal with drones as it relates to the intelligence community. i have always cautioned people that using drones for counterintelligence and counter

terrorism, i should say counterterrorism measures is ast a tactic but it is not strategy that ultimately leads to success. there has to be many more tactics with a good strategy en route to ultimately defeat this kind of jihad problem that we are facing. rep. schiff: in california we see quite vividly the pros and cons of expanding drone use with all of our wildfires we're responderrgency aircraft have to be grounded. aircraft cannot operate in the same space. it could literally bring the aircraft down if it was sucked into the engine. we have problems with drones interfering with firefighting efforts. in terms of the intel world, one

thing we have to be mindful of is we may have been the leaders in this technology but we are not the only ones utilizing it poses not only challenges to our intelligence community but it also tells us that we have to be very aware of the fact that whatever rules we establish with our own use of tones, we have to be able hold up to the rest of the world in terms of their use of drones. and you can easily see how this technology might be terribly misused by other nationstates. in terms of surveillance but perhaps even more pointedly in terms of a platform for lethal fire.

mr. sanger: what is the doingigence community together this intel? what we had to do was rely on partner agencies to do this and so you always run into the potential problem. the bigger challenge is digital. it is hard to -- back in the old movies, someone can show on a mask and sneak into a country, maybe they speak a foreign language. nowadays between your cell phone device that anybody can track with enough money and enough technology, with -- whether you are on facebook or twitter, everyone has visual dust. -- digital dust. just the whole kind of big picture problem, how do you even

identify and meet and develop new human intelligence sources is becoming more and more difficult. i think you hit it where we are going to have to will things -- these relationships with allies and partners to try to leverage contacts within countries and people who have access into very difficult places like the middle east. a number ofwe have questions about the organization of the intel community and in some cases, we have a number of questions about the disorganization of the intel community. one of the more interesting ones makes a point. not included in the formal ic. they are part of homeland security, right? this enhances fragmented oversight and it enhances

budgeting fragmentation and makes more difficult executive branch management. moving thoseport entities into the icy given jurisdiction to your own community and developing a panel who authorizes oversight on all intel budgeting. this would require for you to get out into an arm wrestling match with fellow chair men who are overseeing other parts of the intelligence community and probably do not want to give up that privilege. rep. nunes: it is one we have taken on an, with some solutions. under homelandre security and we are involved -- what we focus on is anything that is outside of the united states.

sometimes there are gray areas because you have terrorists who come in our -- or you have a tax. -- attacks. but we have done to deal with these jurisdictional fights, we essentially eliminated them on the house side create if you look at the areas that we cover, we cover the intelligence , the defense appropriations committee, and the armed services committee. for the first time now we have had the chairman of armed services community -- committee and the -- read in. they are not voting members. with the defense appropriations chairman and the defense appropriations ranking member. that is how we are dealing with getting past these jurisdictional fights that are very unhealthy, don't leave -- lead to good oversight of what

dogoing on out in the ic and not allow us to get anything done if we are fighting amongst ourselves in congress. mr. sanger: we are down to five minutes. let me throw to you the next one and give it an additional twist. preciousstries are equity that needs to be protected. wouldn't it be wise to develop a mechanism comprised of industry partners and ic members that would effectively create a fusion of effort that would eliminate this information sharing problem? we just wrote about two major american companies, microsoft and apple that are basically at war with the u.s. government on the question of encryption because they know that if they cannot protect and encrypt their

users' data, they are not going to be able to sell a broad. ats has caused great angst the justice department and great angst among the intel chiefs. address bothou to sides of the question, is there a way to do a fusion of the ic somehe industry, and for of our most entrepreneurial companies, the intels, microsofts, apple. when it be in their interest to stay as far away from that fusion with the icq entity as they possibly could, most of which are in your state? rep. schiff: i would want to talk with what they mean by a fusion. areas where we need to work much more closely hand-in-hand and i

think it is shrewd of our defense secretary to establish a presence in the silicon valley combine forces and bring our heads together to solve some of these challenges. i was just in the silicon valley i.t. week meeting with people from facebook and google and twitter to deal with a couple of twin challenges, the one that you mentioned which is the end-to-end encryption of medications as well as the encryption of devices. but as well the extensive use that isil has now made of social media for the purposes of recruiting and disseminating information and helping generate attacks within the united states. to talk about how are we going to deal with these encryption issues, is there an answer? at

this point i think there is no consensus at all. not even the beginning of a resolves about how to the so-called going dark problem. i do think certainly on the one hand there is a need for us when we can obtain legal process and make the requisite showing to and on theto devices other hand it seems to me very compelling that even if we succeeded in encouraging american companies to build in a decryption capability and it was done in a secure fashion with multiple keys, etc., it does not answer the question of the fact that there will be other providers providing the encrypted applications. non-american providers. and so you could have users migrate to that to do their nefarious work but you also have the competitive challenge if

they are viewed as a facilitator or armor of the nsa. that argument seems equally unassailable to me. o unassailable arguments. i am not sure where this leads but it will be a tremendous challenge going forward. we do not want to chase this business out of the united states. we need it economically but there are national security advantages to having this -- these companies in the united states. -- we are atve to the nascent stage of looking at this broad issue and i can begin to tell you how it will be resolved except to say i think it is extraordinarily unlikely that the congress will try to provide some kind of legislative mandate. that does not seen\m political -- seem politically feasible even if it were desirable. one of the things i found fascinating to conclude on this discussions in the

silicon valley. they framed it with some ic is coming the to us and saying, you are brilliant, you figure it out. why don't they give us a proposal and lettuce weigh in on it? that is an unusual argument to me -- for me to hear as the legislature -- legislator. we often hear the opposite, let us come up with the answers. here the attitude is quite a bit different. mr. sanger: they do not want to hear the answer. are -- therethere is an economic alignment of their philosophy and their here.ss they do not want to be in the position of coming up with a solution because this is not in their economic interest to do so. is a phenomenal challenge and it makes the

metadata debate we had look trivial by comparison. to give youi want the last word on this and i know you have to make it up to the hearing. when the nsa oversight committee reported to the president 18 months ago, it's answer to the issue that ranking member schiff said, just described was the u.s. intelligence community should support industry in strengthening encryption. there were people who came out of the intel community on senior levels. rep. schiff: i have not read the report. dealing with this issue, especially when you

look at the fbi trying to track criminals all over, it is really a challenge. it is very complicated on, how do you come up with a solution? asking thectually government to provide a solution, that is the first i heard that. it is something we have to grapple with. i think it will be very complex for congress to come up with a solution. host: i think all of you for your questions. hearingorward to your on cyber issues later on this morning and i appreciate your views.

connecticut. then a hearing on food safety. representative