it is running into repeated issues and problems and does not seem to have adjusted very well to correct for those things. and as it stands now, the knt party, the leading party on the blue side, has a candidate who is polling between 15% and 20%. how did they end up in that situation? i think there are a number of steps in that process. one is the natural person to be the candidate for the kmt, the party chairman, has chosen not to run. instead he set up a process, a sort of primary process within the party, which would be based upon conducting a public opinion poll to see who should be the party's candidate.

none of the main figures in the party chose to stand for election and perhaps for wise reasons. the one candidate that emerged at the end was a relatively less well-known personality in taiwan, who has recently been the deputy seek of the legislative u-on. before the public opinion poll to determine whether if she would qualify to be the party candidate was held, the party did not arrange any time when she would present her platform to the public. and so when the voters that were polled, not the voters, the people who were polled reacted to her, what were they reacting to? they were reacting to her

personal story which is quite compelling and interesting, and they were reacting to personality as an outspoken and atypical kmt politician. when the poll was conducted, she surprised many people, including myself, and got a 46% support rate, which was well beyond the threshold that the party had set for a potential candidate. shortly afterward, however, her poll numbers began to collapse. why? because the more the public learned about her policy, the less attractive she appeared. she laid out, as has been said, the core of her platform was on cross strait relations, and she said she wanted to move beyond ma's one country interpretation to reach an agreement with

beijing on one china common understanding, and she said she wanted to open political talks with the eventual goal of having a peace agreement. not a new idea, but one that ma had handled very carefully. she was putting it back on the agenda. i think the more people learned about that aspect of her policy the more rapidly her numbers slipped. and as they slipped, the kmt party was moving towards its congress in july and voices began to appear that maybe the party ought to rethink who its candidate was and find a more attractive candidate. well, none was available because once again eric chu, i think, reiterated that he was not going

to run and he managed to pull the congress together to the extent that they unanimously adopted her as a candidate. her campaign has not gone well. just two weeks ago she announced she was going to have a pause in that campaign. it took everyone by surprise. she was going to meditate about the future, decide how to proceed. three days later she came back and she essentially said i'm on the right path. i'm going to continue the campaign the way it was, and i'll do my best on behalf of the party. her poll numbers have remained in the 15% to 20% range. this led to another figure entering the race, james sung. many of you will remember he was

a kmt, very successful kmt politics, who in the year 2000 ran as an independent, almost won. afterwards formed a new party. and has participated in the 2004 and 2012 elections without being on a winning ticket. he has always considered himself fully qualified to be president. and i think he saw this, and i respect james sung. and i'm not criticizing him on this. i'm just saying that he is a man who has great experience and he's understood himself that way. and so at 73 he probably concluded that this was his last chance. so because young's numbers were so low and the kmt party was not well organized, let's put it

that way, he jumped into the race, and it's now a three-way race. and in this three-way race, the outcome is not what you would expect that taiwan's poll numbers have been largely a combination of james sung and chu. the outcome of that race, i think, is quite predictable. since richard told me not to talk too much about policies, i will dropout of my talk, the part i was going say about that and shift to the legislative area on the election. in some ways that's the more interesting and the more consequential point. can the dpp win a clear majority in the ly either alone or with the support of a live parties and i don't know what the

outcome is going be. there are many who predict the goal of a dpp victory is within grasp. here again, i think you see a difference in the way the two parties are running their ly campaigns. the dpp seems to be well organized, is methodically going through the process of identifying good candidates and constituencies where it can win. it is leaving a little bit of space for others in areas where it might not win on its own but where it could support other parties with the hope that they would win. these parties, the ones that they have been working most closely with are the tsu and the new phenomenon, new power party formed by activists who are involved in the sunflower movement and earlier student activities.

so they're doing well. the fallout from the presidential campaign has had a very negative effect on the kmt's campaign for the ly. as soon as madam hung's platform became better known, candidates who might have run for election on the kmt ticket had decided in some instances not to run because she's at the head of the central ticket. others have left the party to join the pfp and several have amalgamated into a new party which is based around the candidate in shinzu who had the largest electoral support in the

last ly elections. so the kmt side is, again, badly divided and its prospects, i think, are poor and really do open the possibility that the dpp with allies could win a majority. the ly election is also interesting because, as i said, you have new parties participating that have not participated before. the kmt side of the spectrum is not a new phenomenon, but i think certainly the new power party and the coalition that's emerged between the green party and the social democratic party are interesting phenomena of

people trying to take advantage of the environment created by sunflower student movement, the demand for more openness, the success of chu running as an independent in taipei with dpp support of opening up the possibility that these smaller parties could succeed. listening to people in taiwan who know these issues better than i do, it seems that there is a possibility that the new power party may pass 5% threshold in the party list part of the ly election, and gain some seats in that way and conceivably even win in one or another constituency with dpp

support. so this is, i think, a very interesting new phenomenon. do i have time to say a few words about -- about the prc, because that is really interesting? at the beginning of the campaign, maybe eight, nine months ago speaking with taiwan experts from china, you would sometimes hear that oh, national level elections in taiwan are different than local elections and therefore there is a possibility that the kmt might do well in the elections in january of 2016. i do not hear that kind of analysis any longer. it leads me to believe that thoughtful people in beijing understand that they are going to be confronted with a dpp government and possibly a dpp controlled legislature. what has beijing been saying during the campaign? i think it's a mixture of what i would call hard messages and soft messages and that's a

phenomena we've seen before in the way beijing has dealt with taiwan at a time when it's not clear what is the best policy on the way forward. some of the hard messages, i think, were the comments that had been referred to by xi jinping in march and may of this year, and the fact that they have conducted some military exercises that have been interpreted as aimed at sending a message related to the election and the softer message is, in part, also xi jinping because his comments have been, i would say, not always clear just what he was saying. there have been times when he talked about the importance of unswervingly maintaining continuity in the peaceful development of cross strait

relations, which has a certain soft message in it, and that's the way he spoke to liang jong when she was in -- he was in beijing recently. and i think the way they have dealt with taipei mayor shows a certain flexibility on issues which would not apply directly to the dpp because the dpp is different than an independent mayoral candidate with no background, no history of relations like the dpp has, but it showed in my mind as was said a certain a flexibility on beijing's side. so, i am left a little uncertain. i think on the longer term, when taiwan won and not in a mode of trying to influence things but of having to deal with a new situation, beijing will be

confronted with many difficult choices. one of them basically is are they going to stick with the peaceful development policy, or shift to a much more military focused coercive policy? i don't know the answer to that question. in part because i don't know that i fully understand a man who is going to make the decisions on that which is xi jinping. but my personal bet is that they will move to find a way to try to keep the peaceful development policy going but with many adjustments to that policy. why do i think it will be a difficult set of decisions for them? it's because i see them on the horns of a dilemma. on the one hand, they will want

to show that elected a government that does not accept the '92 consensus or the idea that taiwan and the mainland are both part of one china, which is xi jinping's core requirement, has to have some costs. they will have to deal with that government differently than they dealt with cho. to the extent that they do things that are seen as punishing to taiwan, they undermine their long-term goal of having a successful peaceful development policy leading in the direction of some form of the integration in the future. so i think they face great difficulties and i will leave it at that. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, dave. now we have tim rich. >> good morning. i would like to structure my

talk today around -- into two broad sections. one, placing the 2016 presidential election into more of a comparative framework, and the second part focusing on the legislative end, which has received considerably less attention but will likely be much more competitive. i'm a comparativist at heart. most of my discussion is on taiwan, japan more broadly. one thing that sets this presidential election apart in taiwan is the likelihood they will elect the first female president. this is not unusual in asia. in fact if you look over the period from 1945 to 2014 there have been 11 female presidents or prime ministers elected in asia. the side note here is all 11 were either the children of a former leader, the wife, the

widow, et cetera of a former leader, former president, former prime minister or a member of a democracy movement. hung would be the first without this familial ties. to put in contrast, the other female presidents and prime ministers since 1945, only three of them outside of asia had these familial ties. some examples for example in asia, park geun-hye. she's also unmarried and when she ran for the national assembly, which was a major issue. she said she was married. she was married to her country. that sort of died off later. another point much comparison with taiwan is there's arguably greater opportunities for women in lower level elections and thus for legislative elections and thus presidential elections than in other countries in the region. part of this is party quotas, part of this is ease of access at lower levels.

frankly in terms of legislatures only scandinavian countries on average have more women in the legislatures among democracies, stable democracies, the philippines is the only country within east asia, southeast asia that has a similar percentage of women in the legislature as compared to taiwan. another area that i like to go is to compare the 2016 election here with some initially superficial similarities to the 2000 election. some of these are patently obvious, so bear with me. three candidates including james sung again, pushing the election towards the dpp. i think we could agree the kmt did not run their strongest candidate. arguably to avoid the sacrificial lam this year.

arguably, others could be put in the same place. there was real potential for them to finish third. here's where the comparison with 2000 should end. the pan blue split handed the election to the dpp whereas they led in every other poll in the election in 2016. less of a focus on cross strait relations since 2000 if anything its an undue influence in the 2016 election. i don't expect recent attention to the '92 consensus to change that election focus in the long term. another point that i think has been largely overlooked is james sung's motivations are different between 2000 and 2016. i would argue his rationale for

entering '16 is similar to entering '12 and that's to bolster his party. however he's a more viable candidate than in 2012. a reminder he only received 2.77% of the vote in 2012. other sort of clear differences between 2000, 2016, the dpp candidate is not painted as the one that's extreme but hung is playing this role largely because of her positions on cross strait relations. she's not appealing to the sort of blue base but the deep blue. the growth in taiwanese identification even if just looking since president cho took office, 20% growth of those who consider themselves taiwanese as opposed to chinese or both. and which tends to be overlooked still early enough although highly unlikely for a pan blue

coordination over the presidential candidate. it's still theoretically possible that one of the candidates will drop out, although that's highly unlikely. my expectations for the presidential election are no different than almost anyone else's. i see the '91 elections have energized the dpp. anti-sentiment may not necessarily translate into pro-dpp sentiment. however, short of a scandal or an outside short-term event seems poised to win. a sort of follow-up to this is that the third person coming in, a catalyst for internal reforms especially in terms of recruitment, something i brought up before today is not the question of why didn't eric cho run but why are there not other eric chos ready to one.

now shifting to the legislative election. here's where more attention needs to be placed. where sung favored to win the election, the balance in the legislation is less certain. i expect this to be a much more competitive race than 2008, t f 2012. but i do not expect it to necessarily end in a dpp majority. in both cases in 2008 and 2012 the pan blue coalition obtained super majorities. 75% of the seats in 2008, 69% of the seats in 2012. the dpp currently have 40 seats in a 113 seat legislature. they need 17 seats for a majority on their own. i would argue that the structure of the legislative u.n., especially after having the seats, having the seats in half starting in 2008, have created structural conditions that make it difficult for a dpp majority.

you have apportionment of district boundaries that benefit the blue camp more than the green camp since each traditional county or municipality gets one seat. that means places get one seat. another place could be underrepresented. even assuming a national shift that means in terms of proportional representational seats, the dpp could at best pick up two or three seats there. the shift they would need would be in competitive districts elections. a shift of 2% or 3% would bring them closer to the number of seats that they need. but this also assumes that smaller progressive parties like the npp and the tsu don't gain ground. it means coordinating with them in some of these districts. they may benefit for that matter

if the pfp runs a larger slate of district candidates than they have announced so far. and what i see are a handful of key select districts that make it more probable that the dpp will come close to that majority on their own, that would be several districts and a few others that traditionally lean light blue, but i think 17 is really pushing it, frankly. my current prediction, and i hate making election predictions because my track record is not good -- i was very happy as a graduate student to predict the 2004 presidential election. but that was a coin flip. i'm sticking to it. it was planned. my current prediction is there will be a slight, slight pan blue majority in the legislature. what i mean by that by a one or two seat majority not the 75% seat, 69% seats. this largely, of course, depends

on the level of both blue and green coordination of the four party list seats but most importantly district seats. let's take one step back here. let's assume i'm wrong. as my wife says i'm often wrong. what would a unified government look like if the dpp wins the presidential election and the legislative u.n.? this would be the first time that the dpp has ever been close to a majority in the legislative u.n. i don't see that this would galvanize the party to push towards a more independence oriented sentiment. i think as many have already stated, the expectation would be a maintenance of the status quo although the particulars of this may be defined slightly different. i do think, however, it's a chance for the dpp to move the party and show what it can do, for example, on social issues,

on social welfare, on social inequali inequality, and on areas of this nature. one other point and this is not a salient point in the current election but the dpp does have an official stance supporting the legalization of same-sex marriage. the rest are ambiguous at best on this issue. supporters are more supportive of same-sex marriage than dpp supporters. marginally. marginally. why? i don't really have an answer for that right now. what i expect if the dpp do win in both areas you'll see these subtle shifts for future debates on issue of social policy not so much of issues on cross strait issues and i'll wrap up there. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, tim. and thanks to both of you for paying so much attention to the

race. yun-han? >> okay. good morning. thank you you-all for coming to this conference. it's difficult to prepare my remarks, knowing in advance i'll be the third speaker of this panel. but i just tried to focus on a few points and try not to repeat what dave and tim has already said. i think it's probably useful to offer you kind of a historical perspective. remember that this is not the first time taiwan entered the presidential race, neither is james sung. if you look back, you know, what happened four years ago, at that

time -- this is the poll figure that you can collect, you know, during july and august, roughly in the same state that are current in comparing years right now. and at that point you can tell that actually james sung, he posed a formidable challenge in this three-way race. i'm sorry, i pushed the wrong button. this is the one. 2011. okay. this is during the july and august of four years ago, and james sung is at one point get as much as 18% support in the

three-way race in july, and i list all the -- what i consider established polling agencies. there are some little known group that might pop up oftentimes for the purpose of disinformation. not offering much credible sources. and then the taiwan -- actually in the running, just slightly behind ma for support in june and july for quite sometime. and in the end, obviously, i think tim mentioned, you know, earlier that sung won only 2.7. a three-way race will eventually end up as a two-way race.

okay. whether this scenario will repeat itself, well obviously hard to say. this time, you know, the pan blue voter will feel very confused unlike last time. ma was clearly winnable, electable candidate. in the end the pan blue voter simply abandoned sung and switched to ma to avoid an easy victory for taiwan. tai's is much stronger candidate than last time. ma is a stronger candidate. tai's support hovers around, can be as high as 46% ever recorded. sometimes can be as low as 34. so undecided voter -- also

fluctuate from one point to another. what she suggests actually a sizable portion of our electorate. their move is quite volatile. it manifests through this fluctuation. and that makes the pan blue voter even more confused, especially when they try to pick which one is more winnable between sung and ying-wen. at one point, in a three-way race get as much as almost 30%, but sometimes it's light like 12% or 13%. so this is what has happened july and august.

or if ma eventually the pan blue voter can identify a clear cut runoff. that will shape the scenario and dynamic of this election in a very significant way. i think a very important point is that tai is a much more stronger candidate than she was in 2011, and the reason, you know, is that the widespread disenchantment with the kmt and the ma administration, which alleviates some anxiety among the middle-class voter and some states, and kmt suffered from internal feud in setting an agenda in cyberspace and the

media world. and tai should be reckoned with. i believe her campaign is best financed, best organized since 1996 in which they won the election by a very convincing landslide. and this is not well-known here. actually tsai in the last four years as a fourth time candidate for the 2016 has actually built up a very robust and elaborate gra grassroots support organization in a way not before for the dpp. last time she was quite frustra frustrated, but she had to rely on the faction. not the local faction but within the dpp there's the new faction. everyone has their faction.

so they have to -- she could really have, you know, a firm grip on the grassroots organization work, but this time she learn her lesson. she established more than 800 friend of local chapters throughout taiwan and also there are more than 1,000 groups, you know, to own the line, the social media. so that's why i know she searched on the very top in the early stage of the campaign. so this is the most interesting question whether this will be going to be replay of 2012 or 2000. obviously i agree with tim it's very likely to be a replay of 2000 rather than a replay of 2012. so under that scenario the pan blue voter will be torn between hung and sung and could not make up their mind towards the very

end. under that scene, dpp will benefit notoriously from tai's election. and that deals kmt with a humiliating loss. but another probability scenario in which hung and sung emerge in the next two or three months as the more clear cut runoff and that might trigger a massive scale of voting pong -- among the pan blue voter. so in that case both the credential in the presidential races will become more competitive as a result. in that scenario, you know, probably would not in any way

undermine the prospect of tai winning the election in my mind. now, obviously we should pay more attention to ly. and this is one scenario based on the taiwan future of change. this is a website. and this is -- you know, the first pie chart is the current distribution. so dpd 40. and people's third party, two seats. tsu three. there's one little known party

set up just recently by a former kmt ly member. that was very interesting acronym, kmt and then some independent. and according to the taiwan future of change, it will become mental image of current seat distribution. so it is likely that the dpp can get as many as 63. that also means a clear majority in ly. and the kmt might end up with only 43, a very substantial setback. the third party may get as many as five. the tsu might disappear. the only new party that might get a very small foothold could

the new power, but according to a lot of poll figures, including the taiwan future of change, it's very unlikely that the new power will get -- will be able to get -- to walk across the 5% threshold for the party list. so this is one scenario. another scenario which suggests that, you know, that -- sorry, let me see. scenario one. under this scenario, i will argue that tai will become the most powerful president. okay. the reason this action will also trigger a generation shift in dpp leadership is that

leadership will be completed. that means that -- the existing infection will become weakened. the position will be much better. tai, her position will be much better. under that scenario, i predict the executive branch will regain the control over the legislative agenda, which is not the case for most of time under ma's presidency. another significant change that might happen to ly is the system and scheme centered around the speaker, mainly speaker one, will be curtailed if not dissolved. so this is a very specific development in terms of politics.

actually since they won, ma has to live with a co-president, who is speaker one and who is not a friend of the president. so under this scenario the ascendance of the legislative power, which has taken place under speaker one, will be arrested, if not reversed. however, i wouldn't rule out this scenario completely under which the dpp couldn't win the majority outright. and actually, the first party might turn out to be the critical swing in there. why? the kmt might do slightly better than the first scenario. if that's the case, i will predict that tai will be pressured into forming a

coalition government most likely sign up people's first party. under this narrative, this party will become a critical voting block that can make or break the dpp's control and make or break the legislative agenda. and they could retain the cohesion and avoid breaking up. also under this scenario, the ly might become very mercurial. it is hard to say, even the pfp in the beginning -- it was hard to say whether the dpp will last. can they survive a litmus test over policy? it's very difficult to predict. and under this scenario i think the dpp government will be haunted by its mirror image in

the sense the kmt will revenge with some disruptions with the legislature. something we are all familiar with over the last eight years. and then let me use some political science benchmarks to evaluate the importance of this coming election, whether this is 2016 election will become a critical election for taiwan's electoral politics. usually you can apply these four criteria, okay. and i would say the election is important election for lot of reasons. although it probably -- the first criteria is, you know, whether this election would trigger a major party realignment and reconfiguration in the party system. i will actually say unlikely that taiwan will remain

two-party system plus, you know, one, you know, a minor party. and its questionable whether tsai can survive. and the new power despite the media attention probably, you know, will get a very, very small portion of seats. you know, they're not significant a significant third party. so that is probably a first criteria there, but it will not apply here. however, it will introduce a restructuring of the relationship, as i just mentioned, which is very important to the day-to-day operation of our government system. and also i think it will accelerate generational parties. because it will be last battle, obviously. and to what extent this will

re-election define the party's parameter of competition or even change the underlined image? to some extent. but i still think the identity irks will stay as a dominant cleavage for sometime to come. although distribution issue, how they got the wide income gaps, things like that. that will get attention among the young voter. my last point is about, okay, what kind of challenge awaits our next president? i have to say, i wouldn't envy the job of our next president. a whole list of full array of daunting challenge await our next president. economic challenge. you know? the slide, visible slide in our international competitiveness. whether we can sustain the growth momentum. it's going to be a huge challenge.

and we are facing an unfavorable demographic trend, just like japan. asia in very low reproduction rate. and the next president will have to face a huge tradeoff between growth in the environment, whether the government can guarantee a reliable supply of water and power. with the nuclear power plant, moth balled. probably not going to run in the future. and we have the huge mismatch in the labor market. we have too many college graduate without marketable skill. and also we are facing brain drain. a lot of people with skill and transportable assets. they actually might be attractive in hong kong, singapore and shanghai. not to mention the widening income gap which, you know, make

a lot of younger generation frustrated and feel deprive and the challenge of government itself is quite i would say, quite serious. the government as a whole have to deal with the deteriorating fiscal health. and also taiwan have the, you know, the phenomenon what i would call the hypocrisy if i call fukuyama's new term. we have witnessed the proliferation of the many single issue groups. strong minded and botched a bit with any chance for compromise. for example the semiconductor. they want to make it the latest expansion in the park. the whole project was held up

for many years because of one group in the region want to protect the old trees. okay? and on that issue alone, okay, the whole important multi-billion project has been held up. and finally, obviously, we have to handle an external challenge. in taiwan we have to navigate very carefully when this competition between quite and china, you know, heat up. and we have to worry about our status in the regional process ge integration, whether we can get membership in tpp. and there's the modulation issue. especially for dpp's president, it might be very pressing and a challenge. the next dpp president might

face this dilemma. accepting one china and enduring the backlash from the green camp or facing diplomatic setbecome and major rupture in economic exchange. so my prediction is that it will be very brief. i stop right here. thank you for your attention. [ applause ] >> thanks to each of you for outstanding presentations. you have covered a lot of ground and have covered all the right issues and even some i didn't think about. we have a half hour. i'm sure you have lots of questions. i have lots of questions but i'm not going to take up your time. because we want to hear from you. the ground rules are, once i recognize you, wait for a mike, identify yourself, designate to whom you want to pose the question and keep your question brief.

these are very smart people. you don't have to give a paragraph for them to understand the question. just one sentence will do. so who has the first question? yes, mike. >> we have had some speculation about how the prc might react to the results. is there any way of divining how the prc reacts just to the fact of this process? that you have the most vibrant democracy in asia, a lot of changes in power, tourists, business people travel from the mainland to taiwan. there's at least some media seepage into the country. how do they react to this democratic process going on so close to them? >> anyone want to speak to that? go ahead. >> i think it's frightening to them.

when their citizens travel for tourism, one of the things you frequently things you hear is they want to stay home to watch all the talk shows, political debate shows. there are six or seven channels that are running these almost continuously. and this is something that they are very interested in. i think they have also been shocked by the potency of the sunflower student movement. and a similarity to that. it bears to the umbrella movement in hong kong. and that these are things that for a government that is paranoid about its maintenance of political control in its own society, i think these are very disturbing phenomena. >> anything in addition?

>> well, i think for both the policymaker in beijing, and also, for the general public, this is a very predictable election. so i don't see the outcome to come as a surprise to any audience in mainland china because this popular opinion poll has, you know, primed, you know, the potential audience for a long, long time. but obviously, people like xi jinping and his senior staff, once they get elected, they will go back to the drawing board on how they will continue this peace and development strategy, or they will revisit the assumption of their past policy.

i think this is obviously what creates a hard choice for the beijing leaders. >> a couple of additional points. first of all, i think it's actually good that this election will not have -- not be a surprise in its results. if there is a surprise, it sort of tends to create more of a reaction. i would also say that i think fundamentally china's leaders and the ccp worry in a system like this, a relatively new democracy, it is very easy for demogogic politicians cannot reflect the will of the people or what they think it will be and makes it unpredictable and difficult to manage. next question?

yes, right there. yes? >> i started to -- expected outcome is recuring within the structure, affecting the international relations or it is more characterized as -- with political type revolution, someone pointed out already that we have new generation of -- or maybe geographical changes. do you characterize this coming election outcome, characterize it more by recuring political outcome or having -- coming together? >> do you want to take that?

>> yeah. i think i already mentioned in my remark there that this election will obviously trigger a generational shift. that will clearly be the case with dpp or for the green camp as a whole. and also, a lot of people in their 30s or even late 20s, they have been very active in social movement and also grassroots organization. they will steadily climb up the ladder and become an important forces in shaping the electoral politics. it depends on how his party and his own turn out. ing? he might be around for quite a while, if his party turns out to

be a critical voting bloc, then you know. on the other hand, if in the end, a lot of the voters abandoned him in the very end and his party actually couldn't really play a very significant role in any case, then it is questionable whether the pfp will survive. you know? without him. kmt is more, you know, obviously, less predictable a track. and it will have to lick its wound, you know, to go through a lot of soul searching. and one of the, you know, so-called established leader

might have to come out to put the pieces back as one, again. then they will have to elect a new chairman as he is not going to serve again or take responsibility for the defeat. this guy could be jason, but if hong did in the end impressively in terms of approval rate, support, electoral support, then she also may be a contender in the next leadership. but i would also pay more attention to people, like the son of jiang jiang. you know? that the kmt obviously right now they don't have many, many ri

rising star at the age of 40 or 30. you know? so they will have a difficult task how to rejuvenate the party leadership, and also, mobilize enough young bloc to sustain the vitality. but that's something we won't know until the aftermath of the election. yeah. >> any supplements or different views? >> can i get back to you on that? i would say that if the pfp doesn't win three or four seats, that's probably the end in terms of the pfp. i think three or four is sort of the threshold. and how the pfp does in the legislative end to a certain extent determines how much soul searching they need to do, like how much have they lost? how many have defected. if it's minor defections then you can tell yourselves that

we'll do better next time. if it is major defection, you have to start thinking about rebuilding. in a very different way. i think other smaller parties that this is going to be a challenge, as well. the tsu was surprised that they -- how well they did in 2012 in terms of pr seats. i'm not sure especially with recent trends, whether or not they can expect that again. so this may be a challenge for the tsu to survive, as well. >> dave? >> on that latter point, it is expected that the tsu with thai, at least in terms of her policy and not status quo and not talking about moving in the direction of a new nation, constitutional reform and so forth, i have a strong sense that there is a part of the green base that wants a more assertive policy.

than she's articulating now. down in the south you have a taiwan dependence party and you have a sort of coalition of people associated with one country on each side alliance. this tells me that there is a segment of the taiwan electorate that wants a more assertive policy towards an independent status for taiwan. than thai is articulating. and i will be interested to see if the tsu can plug into that like they seem to do in the last election when she wasn't emphasizing ethnic issues and taiwan identity the way dpp did before. and i respect her for not emphasizing on those, but it moves -- cleared up a little space, it moves a little space for the deep green party and maybe they will feel that.

>> i think we'll see split ticket voting. you go for the district but your heart is still with the dpp on that party list. it's a matter of how many split like that. >> dave, i would hypothesize this deep green effect would be more likely if the mainland took the kinds of steps it was saying in talking about before that create a sort of downward spiral in cross-trade relations. >> that probably won't happen. >> allen romberg has been waiting patiently. >> thank you. one question that the other microphone be looked at to see if it will look. >> i'm sorry? >> the other microphone didn't work very well the last time so request you look at it. i have one very small factual question and then a larger one. the small factual is there was an issue about whether the university exams would conflict with the january 16 election and i don't know how that's turned

out. so just somebody have an answer? the larger question is that there's a lot of discussion that the day of blue versus green is over. and you've talked about this a little bit. but i wonder if you could talk more directly about that. it seems to me if the issue is cross straight that even if you don't -- if taiwan's not going to push for independence, that issue doesn't necessarily go away. so i would appreciate some thoughts on the future of blue/green versus some other division. >> so who wants to do the university exam question? the university professor? >> yes. july -- january 16, okay, is, you know, exam week, you know, for a lot of those in college and there might be some, unl,

call, you know, among the college student who are anxious to go back home to negotiate with the school or the teacher, whether they can move up. okay in the exam, you know, one week. but i don't think that will affect much. you know? in the end. you know? either turnout. maybe a little bit. maybe just a little bit. you know? and so it -- it's not trivial issue but on the other hand not, you know, that important either. so regarding whether we're going to see the end of the blue and green divide, probably not. under two assumptions, okay? number one there's the issue entangled with the issue of

dominant. okay? that's okay. secondly, that she and her party will never come to agreement. you know? on the one china principle. okay? okay? if that remains the case then i think there will be continue to have this green and blue competition. >> okay. anybody else on the blue/green? >> go ahead. >> you're a political scientist more than i am. >> i would generally concur with the continuation of the blue, sort of the blue/green divide. maybe, maybe under a couple situations sort of lower level elections means less over time where cross-elections aren't as -- at the forefront. but i don't see it dissipating by much. >> harry harding.

>> thanks very much. i am harry harding. of the university of virginia and hong kong university of science and technology. i want to ask about something that has not yet been raised and to see whether perhaps it's not as important. when he was first nominated, one of my most pro-kmt friends on taiwan said she not only has a great personality and unusual background, but she's a woman. and what she's going to do to put it away is to nominate a taiwanese man as her running mate to put it away from her. but that obviously hasn't happened. to the best of my knowledge in neither candidate has chosen a running mate. in many systems, including our own, where presidents and vice presidents are directly elected, that is seen as an important choice, both for indicating the judgment of the presidential nominee and to build a broader base of support. what is going on here? >> anyone?

do you want to -- >> i don't have a good answer for that. i really don't. i mean, part of it i guess is trying to see where you're going to need support geographically a little bit. like this area, maybe if we put someone on the ticket that will bump up the vote a little bit. i really don't have an answer. >> i will pass. >> it's remarkable that nothing has been done by the candidates. >> if i understand correctly, independent candidates have to announce their vp candidate, like now, when they register. whereas the registered parties don't have to. >> when they collect the signatures. but no. if -- this race remain a three-way race, and jimsom and

they are still running neck and neck in terms of parkwotential support, then the choice of vp wouldn't affect too much as far as the dynamic as far as how they are concerned. but it could add something. her dream running mate is eric hu. although, you know, i will also say it's low probability event but it has been seriously discussed. you know? this is the only way that they can make up for the party after refusing to run, you know, himself.

and under that scenario, she might really help boost, you know, him to a substantial degree and that may salvage his own party. from the debacle which is also very important for the party to remain a formidable political force. however, whether that's going to happen, i don't know. >> harry, one aspect of this is an at least an american presidential campaigns, presidential candidates are focusing not just on how your vice presidential candidate can help you gresk cli and politically, but also, whether he or she can help you govern and you see joe biden and george herbert walker bush and al gore, they all played a role in governance and arguably added to

the capacities of their administrations. okay. >> thank you very much. i am with the agency from hong kong. my question is for the professor. you mentioned that dpp is doing well in the collection. but as an american expert, what are the reasons behind the facts that kmp is doing poor? and if kmp fails this time, do you still believe there's still opportunity for kmp to come back as china kmp? considering the identity and political momentum changing in taiwan. and the second question is also for professor chu. thank you. >> well, when things go well,

many people claim responsibility. when things go poorly, this morning it was said that they bear a certain amount of responsibility for the poor state of the kmt campaign. i would argue that eric shu does share a good portion of that because of his decision not to run and seemingly not willing to try and adjust strategy partway through the campaign when it's quite clear it's not going well. as party leader, he is ultimately responsible for the way the campaign goes for the presidency and legislature. take place. this's the role of political parties to win elections. he's the head of the party and he has to bear a certain responsibility for that. that's in terms of personalities.

i think. the mao fk or tactor reflects everything from his polling on people's attitudes, they are fighting an uphill battle at a time when opinion has shifted quite dramatically within the society i think. will the kmt come back? yes. it's well established party. in 2000, his death was predicted and it was recovered and i'm quite so it will do so again. >> you want to speak to the nature of -- chinese or taiwan. >> well -- >> no. yun-han wants to. >> no. that's the party name.

>> obviously, this warrants the one possibility that speaker wong will enter race, you know, for the party chairmanship. the possibility should not be ruled out. okay? but he will not go uncontested, you know, and might not easily, you know, win the race. but if he win the chairman of the kmt then, yes, the nature and orientation of the kmt will change significantly. and also, might trigger a split, you know, in the kmt. so -- but i would also take that a low possibility to narrow. but i just want to -- yeah. >> david keegan?

>> dave keegan, bart institute. this is a question for anyone who wants to answer it. in some past presidential elections, the business community on the mainland has been an issue both as a voting bloc and in terms of their concerns about how the election would affect them. and i wonder if we know anything about how the taiwan business community on the mainland sees the upcoming election and its consequences. thank you. >> thanks, good question. views? >> i haven't seen anything, in particular, that sort of gave any new insight. and i think if this were a closer presidential election, then it would matter. >> in the previous election, a large number of taiwanese and business men and their independents, they did manage to come back to vote. you know? in spite of the very substantial

cost in terms of money and travel time. but this time i think they will be just as confused as other voters. they might not bother coming back. but, obviously, i would say to know that they are not necessarily a unisonic group. they will support the green in the community. but i would say the majority will feel quite nervous and anxious about what happened in the aftermath. obviously, if xi jinping raises the bar too high for taiwan to overcome, then obviously, this

group, taiwanese business men, will have to bear the burden of burden in cross relations, yeah. >> dave? >> in the last campaign, several prominent taiwan businessmen with interests chimed in at the last moment to endorse the importance of the '92 consensus. i doubt that that will happen this time in part because it's not a close race. >> tom has been waiting patiently and that's probably the last question. >> thank you. i am with the foreign policy discussion group. to what extent have the prolonged political demonstration this is hong kong had an influence on the electorate in taiwan? >> i will answer that because this is a topic i've been working on, in part. the answer is very little. if you're talking about the public as a whole.

the attitude seems to be, taiwan is taiwan. hong kong is hong kong. and so, what happens there doesn't affect us. where it's had a lot more impact is in, let's call it the political class. and among politicians, among the media that is -- that has a role-playing on political issues, so during the protests last fall, the green media sort of hammered away on hong kong. i suspect because it was a useful cudgal in sort of beating up myngul. okay. we have a question in the back. >> i am from the institute of

taiwan and american study. my question is xi jinping going to be in d.c. this month and the speculation is when he come to the white house he might raise the issue about a taiwan and speculation about him talking about another communicate regard taiwan so i like to have a comment about that. how's the possibility about that one. okay? thank you. >> zero? no. i really think that the state of u.s./china relations do not argue or create a good foundation. for a fourth communique. i think taiwan will be raised because chi naez leaders always raise it but i just think this is not in the cards. thank you very much for your great questions. and please join me in thanking our panelists. [ applause ]

the center for strategic and international studies also heard from shelley rigger an ease asian politics professor. she spoke about taiwan's relationship with taiwan and efforts to remain independent. this is 35 minutes. >> thank you so much, rich ar. obviously there's nothing like a book plug like that to make your day. it's real pleasure to be here and to listen to this absolutely fantasticup of speakers already in the morning and really looking forward to the afternoon. i have taken already 11 pages of notes. so that's pretty good. earlier today my brother-in-law

said to me, you know, i'm not really much of a glass half full kind of guy. in fact, i'm usually pretty suspicious about what's in the glass. but those are of you who know me i'm glass half full kind of person. i generally have an out mystic -- if there's a way to take an optimistic view, i find it. this is kind of a half empty kind of a talk today and i don't really mean it -- i guess i no ed to start by saying i'm not sure i really mean what i'm going to say but i want to ask the question especially to this room full of people with great expertise in taiwan politics, u.s.-taiwan relation, u.s.-taiwan prc relations. for a long time, the mainstream analysis of cross straight relations has been that the status quo is pretty stable.

it can be sustained for a long time. but there's no immediate reason for anybody to be panicking. but that there are circumstances under which this equilibrium could be disrupted and i guess the question i want to ask today is am i crazy or do we see those circumstances beginning to come together now in a way that we may actually have to start thinking about the possibility of a disruption of this stable equilibrium in the taiwan strait. i have three things i want to do very quickly today. one is to spell out those circumstances under which the status quo could be threatened. the second is to point out some evidence that those circumstances may be beginning to manifest themselves. and then third, to mention, of course this is where i refill

the glass, at least halfway up, so that i can still be my optimistic self, i want to talk about some of the forces and factors that mitigate against a crisis even in the face of some forces and factors that maybe moving us in that direction. so most observers over the past few years have agreed that there's no immediate threat to the status quo and what i mean by the status quo is taiwan's de facto independence. there's little urgency for dujuri independence in taiwan and there's little urgency in the prc so we take from that the idea to keep on kicking the can a while longer. why is there so little urgency for change on either side? well, taiwan has kept in check by an awareness of the dangers of defining or challenging the prc, as well as by the economic

value, the economic necessity of peaceful and cooperative cross strait relations. most taiwanese people see little practical value in changing the status quo toward legal independence. so, taiwan's policy has been to cut rate is good relations with the prc, but avoid being drawn into political talks that could erode the island's freedom of action. that's what's keeping taiwan in check. what is keeping the prc in check are at least three things, i'm sure many of you could think of many more. first, the prc recognizes that acting to change the status quo, even in a non-coercive way,

would definitely be difficult, definitely be costly and definitely be risky. so it's safer and easier to kick the can. second, beijing believes that time is on its side. its relative power is growing, as is taiwan's economic dependence on the prc. and then third, china's internal challenges are very significant and we have heard a little bit about that already today, but they're manageable as long as the leadership keeps giving them sufficient attention. so having serious but manageable internal problems keeps beijing preoccupied and risk averse. so the prc's policy is to insist very strongly that taiwan make no moves toward legal independence but to remain pretty tolerant in practice of

the status quo as long as taiwan is not lunging toward a change in the status quo. at the same time the prc is working to promote the entanglement of the two sides and occasionally to leverage that for political gain. so, in short, both sides are good reasons not to push too hard for a change to the status quo so the situation is stable. but there are at least two developments that we routinely mention in conversations about what could upset this equilibrium, what could change this well-established pattern that supports the warm peace or the lukewarm peace, at worst? and one is that the prc's calculus could change so that it begins to believe time is not on its side, that if the prc really begins to sense that waiting

puts it in a weaker position than not waiting, than acting more quickly, then a change in strategy could result. and then the second thing we often talk about as a possible precipitator of a pronounced change in prc policy is that the prc could develop internal or external problems so severe that the leadership sees the need for some kind of diversion or demonstration of its nationalist commitments to distract the prc public and refocus chinese people's attention on the ccp as the defender of chinese nationalism. and the question that i have for you is, are we seeing these developments today? is there evidence that time is

no longer on beijing's side and that the constellation of problems troubling the prc is ripening toward a place where beijing may see the need for some kind of change in its taiwan policy? mostly i want to talk about the evidence that time is not on or may not any longer be on beijing's side but i will say a little bit about the prc even though i don't actually have those qualifications. so -- but the evidence that time is not on beijing's side is a taiwan story so i do have those qualifications or anyway richard believes i do. so when's the evidence that time may not be on beijing's side or that beijing may begin to perceive that to be the case? you know, the argument for the prc to remain patient is that

the mainland is becoming increasingly powerful economically, politically and militarily, especially relative to taiwan. so if present trends continue, it becomes increasingly not decreasingly difficult to imagine how taiwan could resist in the long term the prc's determination to achieve some kind of outcome favorable to its preferences, which is like a really longwinded way of saying something like unification. and i -- i'm going to skip over a description of those favorable trends but just to say that while the prc's political, economic and military might all are increasing, they are increasing at different speeds and it's not really clear how we would know when the mainland's power had reached the point where the tide had decisively

turned in its favor so that for the chinese leadership, trying to know when to change policy toward taiwan is more art than science. so the biggest problem that they face in trying to understand when the trends -- whether the trends are favorable or unfavorable and whether it's safe to continue waiting for these military, economic and political forces to ripen up into a moment where the prc can act on its preferences, the biggest challenge to making that call is taiwanese public opinion because if what you're trying to do is engineer peaceful unification and i think that is ultimately in the long run what the prc would like to do, engineer peaceful unification, you have to be able to sell

peaceful unification. you have to sell unification in taiwan. if it's going to be peaceful, you have to be able to make the case for it in taiwan. and i think it just looks like that is getting harder and harder and harder, not easier, easier, easier. positions notwithstanding, unification has no support at all in taiwan right now. and the other indicators that the prc looks at for measures of how it's doing in terms of the sales job also all look very negative. one of those indicators is support for independence versus unification. on the independence unification debate in taiwan, there's good news and bad news. the good news is that while support for unification is off the charts, that is off the bottom of the charts, support

for independence is also low and consistently low. we don't see a trend of rising support for independence. it's been in the, you know, 20% range for 20 years and it just kind of stagnates there. but the bad news is if you dig a little deeper, support for independence starts to look less weak and support for unification starts to look even weaker than the surface-level trends would suggest. so, for example, the taiwan national security survey, which i have -- i guess they did it again in 2014, but i don't think they have released the data yet, so i'm looking at 2011 data, asking people, if you could have independence and there would be no war, right, if you could have independence and it would cost taiwan nothing, would you support independence? and around 80% of people say,

yes, absolutely. if we could have independence for free, we would take it. but it does have a military cost, which i think we all agree it would right now, the support for independence drops to somewhere around 30% to 35%. meanwhile, if you could have unification and it was -- would cost you nothing because the conditions, the economic, political and social conditions in the mainland would have converged with taiwan, only like a quarter to a third, so somewhere in the high 20s to low 30s, percentage wise, would favor unification under the best possible scenario. and at least half of taiwanese oppose unification under any circumstances. so even best-case scenario, we

don't want it. another piece of negative evidence from the prc's point of view is that the trend in support for unification under ideal circumstances is particularly negative. until 2005, more than half of taiwanese said we could accept unification if it meant that the stuff wouldn't change. now, we are down to below 30% and opposition, active opposition to unification under the best possible scenario was up to around 60%. so, basically, support for unification under any circumstances has reached a low point while support for independence under the best case scenario is extremely high. so, that's not a good trend for the prc.

on the economic front, the strategy of waiting for economic integration to create support for political integration, i would argue, is also losing momentum. even four years ago, during the 2012 presidential election, the candidates needed to persuade voters that they could keep the economic ties not only continuing at sort of the same pace but accelerating in order to make a persuasive case and i think the -- a big part of the reason that thailand was not elected in 2012 was she did not make the case to the voters that she could keep the economic momentum rolling past 2012. this time around, after four years of disappointing economic performance and rising skepticism about the distributional implications of economic -- cross strait

economic engagement, voters' requirements have changed. they may not have reversed completely, but they may actually have reversed completely, to the point were in this election, you don't have to be able to persuade anybody that you can make more economic integration happen. what you need to persuade people is that you can protect taiwan against the risks associated with the ever-accelerating dependence of taiwan on the prc economy. and, in fact, many voters, maybe not a majority, but a significant chunk of voters, i would argue, are looking for a candidate who will talk about how to reduce taiwan's dependence on the mainland, not deepen the interaction. another big problem for china is

the cantonese shocking weakness at the moment, both in terms of party identification, which is below party identification with the dpp for the first time since the early 2000s and in terms of the party's internal politics. and i just have to guess at the taiwan affairs office in beijing may sit around and ask each other, how in the world did this happen? [ laughter ] so, one final indicator to look at is taiwan people's self-identification as taiwanese, chinese or both and here the trend is clearly very negative for beijing, as well. since 2007, the percentage claiming taiwanese identity has increased from the low 40% to around 60%. and that is a huge trend. it maybe leveling off, but it's still extremely -- you know, just a very sharp increase in a very short time. the presidential and legislative elections will be an imperfect manifestation of how these

trends translate into politics. but as imperfect as they are, they are still what we have to go on, so the prc will be looking at them very closely. that's the evidence that time may not any longer be on beijing's side. and that beijing may have to change that calculus to think about how do we respond now to a negative trend rather than try to shape a positive trend? on the second point, there are many people in this room who understand china's problems much better than i do, but i would just say it seems clear the prc is facing economic and political headwinds that could eventually sharpen into a situation where there is need for xi jinping to do something, to consolidate his support and to show his people that even if he can't control the economy, even if he can't control the prc's image in the

region and lots of other -- even if he can't control corruption in the communist party, he can control something and if that something that he can control turns out to be taiwan, you know, that's not good. so, here, the perpetual optimist is delivering some more sobering news, but i think there are still a number of forces that are actually pulling in a more positive direction and are acting as kind of traction on the status quo. one, the dpp is probably going to win the election, at least the presidential and make major inroads in the legislative, but it is a less odious dpp in 2016 from the prc's point of view than it was in 2012 and if they allow themselves to take this in and to hear the message that taiwan is sending, i think they

will be -- they can be less nervous about the implications of a dpp victory. you know, taiwan is not bien and not worse than bien, from the prc's point of view and telling themselves that she is really doesn't serve the prc's interest because it's not accurate among other things. and there are ways to spin this election result that will make it seem like less of a disaster for china. they can point to the chaos in the kmt and say people didn't vote for the dpp, they voted against the chaos in the kmt vote. she's doing him a favor by getting in and splitting the vote with a blue vote so it looks less like a big surge of support for the dpp and more like, you know, a repeat of 2000. you know, i don't necessarily agree with this. i'm just giving the prc some talking points to talk themselves out of needing to overreact to this election result.

second, i think china's problems are actually still manageable with focused attention and as long as they don't get distracted by side issues like taiwan, you know, they will be fine. third, the military risk is still very high and so adventurism is still risky, and therefore, the deterrence of more precipitous action or a powerful change in the prc's policy -- i think the deterrence to that are still very noticeable and powerful. fourth, china can't afford to worsen relations with its neighbors so it has to pay attention to taiwan in the context of a deteriorating regional scene. and finally, and here i am on shaky ground as a taiwan specialist commenting on ccp internal politics but seems to me strong action or risk taking

could activate or intensify rather than alleviate splits in the prc leadership and that knowledge of that possibility may be a deterrent as well to taking stronger action on the taiwan issue. xi jinping would need to build a consensus for action on that front and given the risks involved that could be very difficult. and here, i will just end by giving two possibilities. one from this morning from tom juwan. one says a taiwan-related crisis would reflect poorly on xi jinping a jinping. another source says xi jinping would be more damaged if he were seen to be looking the other way and tolerating taiwan going in that direction. honestly, both of those logics makes sense to me. so, i would be interested to

hear which you think is more persuasive and also, whether you have other things that i can teed my glass of positive trends to help me, you know, have a glass that's even more than half full so that i don't have to worry about the glass being like more than half empty. thank you. [ applause ] >> so my answer to your two choices is only xi knows for sure. we have ten minutes until we have to break. shelley's going to take her own questions. do you want to do it here or -- >> yep. >> okay. thanks a lot. >> yes? >> my name is hero matsumura, japan. although the kmt is in disarray and weakened, the party had a privileged position in

societal, political, economic life there. the party has a huge -- its own asset, maybe leeching to the 100 billion, which originated from -- major portion originated from japanese asset. based on this wealth and asset, its controls, social keystones 0 cornerstone and the control of the media. right? so, do you think dpp's approach focusing on grassroots movement and sns is sort of inevitable choice and how do you see the competition between the kmt position and dpp's new approach, particularly after the election?

maybe cannot change the public opinion but it can based on this wealth and the position can resurrect dpp pollties and encourage public support. >> well, what we see with the kmt that money isn't everything, you know? you can have a lot of money. you can have a lot of positions in government. you can have a lot of resources and you can still blow it completely. so -- [ laughter ] but i have to be careful because i was one of the people back in 2000 and 2001 who predicted the demise of the knt. i probably at one of your events, i used a very ungenerous analogy, which i will not repeat here, but so, you know, i think it's right that the knt will pull itself back together, but i

also think that taiwan politics has fundamentally changed. and something that was discussed in the previous panel is the blue-green divide disappearing. yes and no i mean, i think the blue-green divide, those two vessels will remain because i think they are meaningful in the context of taiwan's electorate, but i don't necessarily think that the content is unchanging. i think this election is much more about economic issues than past elections have been and it is absolutely true that it -- that taiwan's conversation about economics invariably invokes cross strait relations, but if you think about julian hahn's

last slide, almost everything on that slide, except for the part about cross strait, you know, like the external problems that taiwan has, but the political problems and the economic problems that taiwan has that he identified, the usa has exactly that same litany of problems. the economic problem that taiwan is facing is not only a cross strait problem. it is a globalization problem. and the distributional problems that taiwan is facing are not about cross strait relations. they are about globalization and they are about technology and they are about why my students in the united states are just as desperate thinking about their future prospects as my colleagues from taiwan's students are thinking about their futures. so, i think what the blue-green baskets need to do is they need to go aqua and teal in order to

accommodate a broader range of issues but within that basic context, i think the new issues can be encompassed. i think. knt will be back in some form but organizationally, they have to process this trauma fully in order to, you know, come to dom surging back the way they did after 2001. anybody else? yes. >> thank you, eric gomez from the cato institute. i was wondering if you could comment, i know the election is more about economic issues but is there any significant split within the parties over how they think taiwan should be handling defense-related things if, indeed, the glass is half-empty or less than half-empty?

and also, do you perceive any difference in political will power from self-defense from the knt or the dpp? is any one more committed or less committed? >> both party leaders have consistently promised, right to increase taiwan's defense spending to 3% of gdp and to be more active in self-defense. and i think this is the sort of thing that we could talk about for the rest of the afternoon there is more going on than probably most of us are aware of, but i will say that the track record of the knt in the last eight years has been disappointing to many in the u.s. in terms of not making it to that 3% and not really giving good answers to the question, you know, why not and when will you turn things around?

so i think the dpp is trying to use that as -- and not just trying to use that politically, i don't mean that -- i don't think it's cynical. i think the dpp is actually committed to doing better on the defense front. something i learned today that i had to think about a lot because i had not really thought about the '92 consensus as a larger package, as an edifice of ideas and practices. but i think if the administration has the goal of assembling a kind of coherent set of strategies that support a particular vision and version of cross strait relations, then we have to think about defense policies maybe in that package.

the fact that the dpp is not interested in building that same edifice might give the dpp more flexibility to be a little bit more active on the defense front. alan? >> thanks, alan roberts. it may be a question that goes also to the previous panelist but you talk about the election being primarily about economic issues and we saw data which showed that comp tense that they can manage the economy or social issues better than either of her opponents is pretty obvious. my question is there evidence as to whether that reflects great

confidence in her or lack of confidence in the others compared to her? >> well, one of the things that i really loved on that slide that is way towering over the other two in terms of per formance and experience. even though people don't like him on the other measures, they recognize that he has this experience. what that tells me is that is a real poll that people are answering seriously. they are thinking about, they can disaggregate these people into their components so one of their components is performs an experience. performance and experience. another component is policy preferences what they stand for, what they are likely to do and another component is kind of personality and capacity to govern and to function well in interactions with others. and i think, you know, some does great on -- he has a lot of experience and i think it's worth mentioning that song is i

think -- i think this one is going to be more like 2000 than 2012 because song is campaigning at the grassroots. he is -- he is drawing back into those networks that he cultivated when he was the taiwan provincial governor and he is being a retail politician again. so, he's, people can recognize that about him. but i think they also recognize that his capacity to interact successfully with other political leaders is limited and his policy agenda is not well understood. hong does poorly across the board. she has no experience, people don't like her and she stands for the wrong things. taiwan has moderate experience. she is mostly standing for the right things, mostly. i mean, she's been really careful in how she talks. and she is perceived as being able to get along with people

and do things better that the other two. so, i think it -- it is in that sense sort of, you know, she has -- she averages well. the other song has peaks and valleys. hong has mostly valleys. i think it's in that sense that thai really dominates. i don't know if that was the answer to your question but it was something that i wanted to say. [ laughter ] it looks like we are out of time. >> yes. my obligation to the organizers was to get us off the stage at 1:30 and i'm going to fulfill that obligation. but this -- we will put a big demand on you because whatever you have to do in the break, you have five minutes to do it. and then be back here. but before you leave, please join me in thanking shellie for a great keynote address.

on the next "washington journal" we take a look at the pope's visit to the u.s. with congressman brendan boyle of pennsylvania. and later with paul valley author of "pope francis." "washington journal" is live every morning on c-span. you can join the conversation with your phone calls and comments on facebook and twitter. the pope's visit to the u.s. c-span has live coverage from washington, d.c. the first stop on the pope's tour. tuesday afternoon beginning at 3:45 on c-span. we're live with the president and mrs. obama to greet the pontiff on his arrival at joint base andrews. wednesday morning on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org. as the obamas officially welcome him to the white house. later that afternoon starting at 4:00, the mass and canonization

at the shrine of the immaculate conception. c-span's coverage begins on capitol hill as pope francis makes history becoming the first pontiff to address a joint meeting of congress. friday morning at 10:00, live coverage from new york as the pope speaks to the united nations general assembly on c-span 3, c-span radio and c-span.org. later at 11:30 the pontiff will hold a service at the memorial follow coverage live on tv or online at c-span.org. turkey is holding its general election on november 1st. next a discussion on the country's political landscape with two journalists and a university professor from istanbul. they talk about the influence of the kurds and kurdish affiliate set by the incumbent president and the future of u.s. turkey

relations from the wilson center, this is an hour and a half. good afternoon, everyone. thank you so much for joining us. i'm just waiting for our friends in the back to take their seats, and then we will be ready to start. my name is david kenner. i'm the middle east editor at "foreign policy magazine." we're all very happy to have you here at this panel at the woodrow wilson center's middle east program on the road to elections, turkey and the kurds. we have here an assistant professor of international relations and author of "turkey

kurdish question." and esteemed turkey journalist who covers turkey for the "economist." and dr. henry who is the director of the middle east program at the woodrow wilson center. we have a great discussion for you here today. thank you so much for coming. i think we will kick it off. >> thank you so much. i'm really happy to be here. i would like to start this talk with really an interesting anecdote i heard from bernard lewis. at the beginning of world war ii, turkish ambassador to uk was summoned to the foreign secretary's office. and they were basically trying to inquire whether turkey was

going to join the allied side or remain non-attached. so practically they say that, we have a big instability in our east. we have this eastern problem. at the time they didn't use the term kurdish problem. it was an eastern problem. we're worried the eastern problem will destabilize in case we enter into war on either side. so lord halifax says i have known about this eastern problem for a long while. so, why can't turkey just resolve this issue just like we resolved the scottish question? why can't you resolve this issue the scottish way? he takes a pause and he says, sir, kurds aren't scottish. while everybody is, like, yeah,

right, and then he says, kurds aren't irish. so that's the point where everybody kind of freezes. so he goes back. in any case, i think turkey's kurdish policy or overall turkey's approach towards the kurds has since then has been what bernard lewis has told me about increasing the number of scottish kurds and decreasing the number of irish kurds. practically, has turkey been successful, unsuccessful? that's quite up for grabs. basically, what i'm going to talk about is, in my recently published book, i basically spent a lot of time analyzing the 1990s, the most violent phase of the kurdish insurgence in turkey. basically, i want to talk about

how right now compared to the 1990s, more specifically, what's the difference between 2015 and 1991? when the insurgency started. a lot of analyses point to the start of gulf war in 1990 as the source of why things have assumed such a chaotic and violent character in the 1990s. gulf war, turkey opens up an air base to foreign -- western jets. saddam hussein decides to punish turkey and instead of launching a chemical attack, he attacks the northern kurds as a result of which you have a large population shift together with a refugee crisis. which ends up benefiting, arguably, the pkk but overall it intensified the security question. 2015, we also have an extra

territorial crisis, which is the syrian civil war as well as the emergence of isis in iraq and syria. again, a large population shift emerging from -- especially syria into turkey. new refugee crisis that's worsening the crisis conditions in turkey. so as a result, we pretty much look like, in terms of structural settings, 2015 and 1991 are quite alike. politics, what about politics? in 1990s, basically 1991, there was a general election that produced a coalition government, first time after a very long period of single-party rule. mother land party. 2015, again, an election of june 7, which produces a coalition government after a long period of single-party rule, which is

the justice and development party. one exception between 1991 and 2015 is that for the first time ever, a political party rooted in the kurdish political movement passes the 10% flesh hold, which is the people's democracy party or hdp. so in a lot of ways, 1991 and 2015 are quite alike as well in domestic political setting as well. what about the conflict? in 1990s, the conflict was mostly about rural conflict, clashes around rugged terrain, mountain areas, outposts and mountain holds have substantial strategic influence. whereas in 2015, this clash is turning gradually more urban. you have different splinter organizations, armed groups that have popped up in urban s