of single-party rule, which is the justice and development party. one exception between 1991 and 2015 is that for the first time ever, a political party rooted in the kurdish political movement passes the 10% flesh hold, which is the people's democracy party or hdp. so in a lot of ways, 1991 and 2015 are quite alike as well in domestic political setting as well. what about the conflict? in 1990s, the conflict was mostly about rural conflict, clashes around rugged terrain, mountain areas, outposts and mountain holds have substantial strategic influence. whereas in 2015, this clash is turning gradually more urban. you have different splinter organizations, armed groups that have popped up in urban areas in

the predominantly kurdish areas that have diverted this rural mountainous combat into the urban setting. which means that now we have a setting in which there's more civilian involvement and also more potential civilian casualties as well. what about the pkk? in 1990s, pkk was pretty much a monolithic top-down entity with very compact decision making. turkey's argument and position throughout the 1990s was very clear. get rid of pkk's leadership and the organization is going to collapse. in 2015, we have a much different pkk which has decided to engage in splintering strategy, especially valid after

the arrests and capture of its founding leader in 1999. the 2015 pkk is much more different than the 1990s pkk in the sense that decision making is more localized, clashes and command is also more localized, even though the central executive body is quite influential as well. main difference is the emergence of localized leadership that younger cohort used to be the bridge between the pkk and the local populous. but that local intermediary groups have also taken up arms and became armed groups themselves. so in the 1990s to basically defeat the pkk you had to get rid of the leadership. right now to settle the security question and the chaotic situation, you have to deal with the issue locally and on a

case-by-case approach. what about the turkish military? it used to have a defactor control over politics and executives in the 1990s. it was primary actor and primary decision maker on a very large component of policy options on the kurdish question. in 2015, you don't have that kind of an influential military. it went through a difficult process of court cases, arrest of leadership, institutional mistrust persists along with mixed views on the ability of the political leadership to resolve the crisis. there's also not monolithic leadership in the military. what about social perception? in the 1990s, turkish society was fiercely nationalistic, near complete support for the military's handling of the

conflict and belief that only full defeat of the pkk will resolve kurdish question. even though a lot of people had access to conventional media. what happens in predominantly kurdish areas and operational areas would rarely be communicated through mainstream media. that's why people have imperfect information on what's going on there. in 2015, there's still a very nationalistic society. but this doesn't translate right now into a near complete support for military solution. part of this emerges from the fact that part of that electorate thinks that the peace process, even though it was imperfect, succeeded in creating an extended period of cease-fire and relative stability.

so once people saw that it can actually happened, it divided social perception away from unilateral resolution of the questions through military means. to the contrary, public opinion is divided along partisan lines. on the one hand, where people who are closer to the governments argue that this new phase of the clashes is 100% doing the pkk and their decision to go to war with turkish states. whereas those who do not identify themselves with the government calculation or political measurements that are in place in a way that, you know, the state and the government have decided to go into war. and that's, you know, partisan

ship divides how society thinks about the kurdish question, as well. on the one hand, you have people who argue that the peace process was doomed from the beginning. and the peace process should be shelved completely and only a military solution should be pursued. the other part of the society argues that the peace process, although it was imperfect, was still going relatively well. and the government is choosing to stay a step away from a political solution. so this is basically painting a picture on how 1991 and 2015 are similar and also dissimilar. so after painting this picture i'm going to give the floor to other speakers and complete this in the q&a session. thank you. >> great. thank you so much, hamid.

amberin. >> hello, everybody. it's wonderful to be here today. happy roshhoshanna. to everybody who is celebrating it. i want to start with 2012, which i think was a turning point in many respects. when the kurds in northern syria, i'm talking about kurds who are very closely linked or support the pkk took control over several areas along the border is and is have steadily be expanding control ever since and when the turkish response to that was. unless we understand that dynamic, we cannot really properly assess what's happening today between turkey and the kurds. in my view, what happened then was a great opportunity for turkey to advance the peace process.

what turkey needed to do at that point i think was to extend the hand of help though these kurds to do what they finally did with the iraqi kurds, which is to develop economic and political relations with them. but instead of viewing this as an opportunity, turkey chose to view this as a threat. and the reason is quite simple. as i said, because the kurds happen to be closely affiliated with the pkk, they see this as a national security threat and decided what they needed to do was to keep these kurds under check. and this is what underpins turkey's kurdish opening back in 2012. yes, the political ambitions clearly were a part of that equation. but above and beyond all else, i think it was the fact that turkey perceived this as huge national security threat and decided what they needed to do

was to co--op and keep the kurds of syria under check. so that was what they were talking about. and as we saw, subsequently, that didn't pan out. rather than being able to keep them under check somehow encouraged them or at least that is what was conveyed and what we saw was a steady progression of the kurds in northern syria. and so when that plan failed, what turkey chose to do was then to get the support of other armed groups inside syria to fight the ypg. and we first saw that very clearly in the summer of 2013 when there was this battle of control where the kurds would call it and it was very clear

that certain factions of the free syrian army and others were being supported by turkey. and that -- sorry. and that of course we saw also that that didn't work out tearally well because the curds ended up taking control of that town as well. so that policy was, obviously, not working. but turkey persists in it. and we saw that in kobani most recently. that was a turning point and a shock for turkey when the americans airdropped weapons and other supplies to the ypg. that is what propelled turkey, in fact, to open the corridor to kobani. and, of course, once that was sort of digested in ankara, they decided what they needed to do

then was open it. they needed to somehow get americans on their side because they became very, very nervous about this deepening cooperation between the united states and the ypg. so what we now have is this sort of understanding that the ypg won't go and to that extent, you could say that turkey's policy of opening injalik as a way of kurdish expansion has been somewhat successful, but for how long? many kurds in turkey believe that part of the quid pro quo of opening it is that turkey would get to attack its own kurds, that is the pkk. so of course the idea that you can have good kurds and bad kurds, which has always been the

case, unfortunately. on the one hand, the ypg are good kurds and the pkk are bad kurds and that the americans can maintain this fiction i think is very unrealistic. because in fact, we all know the truth that however much pkk may be on the united states list of terror organizations that it has to be maintained. in fact, the pkk and the ypg are one and the same. and this contradiction is going to catch up with this government sooner or later. because while you, you call the ypg your allies and you continue to condemn the pkk and say that turkey is justified in its actions against the pkk, what you also have to realize is that there are many families inside

syria, inside turkey, who may have sons fighting both in the pkk and the ypg alike. when i was in northern syria and i went to the homes of people, ordinary people, what i saw on the walls were pictures of their children who died fighting for the pkk but also fighting for the ypg against isis. so i think what we have before us is another opportunity. the fact of american engagement with the ypg can be turned into an opportunity. the united states can use its leverage with the kurds now to somehow revive this peace process that is now completely shelved. it needs to get turkey and the kurds back to the negotiating table. because unless it does so, this is going to be very destabling for turkey and the region.

you cannot have this situation where you have turkey fighting the kurds. and not just the pkk. if you have been following what's been happening inside turkey it's not just the pkk or the youth wing who are being targeted but ordinary civilians as well. this will have repercussions, is having repercussions among kurds across the region. what needs to be done is somehow for the americans to use this leverage, as i said, to get the sides back at the table. because if you don't, i think the cooperation, the alliance between the united states and the ypg will not be sustainable either. you cannot have a situation where the americans are seen to be approving turkey's actions and continuing this alliance. because at the end of the day,

the pkk itself will start saying, you know, okay, if you want to go and get rod car and you need the ypg support, they are going to say if you continue to back turkey and its actions against us, well, we're not really sure we can do that. so i think there is a great opportunity here for the united states. i think it has leverage over turkey too. if it didn't, turkey, for instance, would not have opened the corridor to kobani. and we have to assume reason will prevail in ankara as well. that's a hard assumption to make these days, unfortunately. and what happens after the elections will be key. indeed, whether we will have elections at all. if we do have elections and they are held free and fairly, the question becomes what kind of

government will we have? clearly a coalition between the ak and the mhp will be very, very unhelpful. so we'll have to hope, first of all, we do have these elections, they will be fair and free, that the hdp will be able to participate, the people in the southeast will be able to go to the ballot box and what comes out of it will hopefully be a coalition. obviously the ak will continue to be the top party and it will somehow make a deal. they will cut losses and make a deal with the chp or maybe even the htp, though that's harder to imagine. >> thank you. >> thank you so much. henri? >> thank you. i will start in 2015. we saw 1991, 2012. i'm going to talk about the elections and the current crisis. in fact, actually build on both

what was talked about. clearly things appear to be spinning out of control in turkey as you look at events in recent times. not just the violence we've seen between the pkk and the government. we have seen quite significant pkk attacks that have create significant casualties among the security forces. but it is also the fact that the government is not responding. especially a government that is technically an election government. it is not necessarily a party government. it is supposed to be somewhat independent. in fact, two members of it. but you have seen this government is taking various strict actions. we saw the stuff that's going on in gisa. the whole town has been under curfew for eight days. they lifted the curfew and then reinstated it.

you had today the announcement that they whole a great number of television stations that broadcast in kurdish which was one of the great aspects of the forms introduced after the peace process started. that people could actually have television and radio stations and publish and broadcasting kurdish. those have not been closed today by the order of the supreme broadcasting authority. you have newspapers that are being blocked from access. you can't reach certain newspapers online any more because they have been blocked, again, without any kind of order by judge or by court. so you have, essentially, an escalating situation in turkey that is becoming more and more one between, i wouldn't say between turks and kurds, although, of course, it is

significantly between turks and kurds and really a government or a president and significant segment of the population. that's what it boils down to. at the root of this is essentially the failed election results. on june 7th, the akp for the first time since 2002 lost its majority. it lost its majority for essentially, i would believe, two reasons. one is because it was very clear that the resident wanted to from a constitutional parliamentary system to a presidential system. maybe ala french system. there was a great deal of resistance. this was not a kurdish/turkish issue. but it became a way for people to express their opposition to mr. erdogan. to make sure the kurdish body would cross the 10% threshold.

two things we saw happening in these elections. one is that a significant number of what people call white turks. live in instoneble but who wanted to make sure that he doesn't get his majority. for the kurdish party. the other reason is most of the conservative kurds who traditionally always voted for the akp, this time defected. and i think they have seemed to have defected for good. when you look at the kurdish historically, most of the kurds have always -- the declining percentage i would say voted for akp or predecessors, if you think about the other islamist parties that existed in the 1990s. but there was a break.

this 2015 elections was a case where we saw these conservative kurds change sides. what's interesting of course is these kurds are very closely aligned with mr. buzani in the krg. despite his efforts to get the kurds to vote for erdogan, they didn't. why didn't they do? i would say there's a one word answer for that and that is kobani. in kobani, when the turkish government made it clear they would love to see kobani fall to the hands of i.s. and be saved, that was a psychological break for the kurds and turkey and erdogan. in a way i think that is the breaking point when it comes to kurds and erdogan. look, every reason why the kurds should be thankful to erdogan. erdogan has done more in pushing the ideas that kurds and turks can live in one country, and a peace process.

he talked to the pkk. even if he did not mean to, even if his heart was not in it, as we think. as i think people now think is the case. the fact of the matter is that the major threshold was crossed. that threshold was talking to the pkk. talking to theomy. that is a point you can't go back from. in that sense, it's a very important threshold. conservative kurds who don't necessarily like the pkk would have voted for mr. erdogan and his party. he came on television with great glee made it clear he wanted kobani to fall. and the fact that the united states had shifted sides and helped the syrian kurds gave the kurds a great deal of self-confidence. but once election results became

obvious and mr. erdogan, technically he's a constitutional president. he is not supposed to take part in elections, he did it. he basically took the turkish constitution and participated. which is all the more reason why this election result was devastating to him. because despite his personal involvement, he was campaigning for the akp saying he wanted 400 seats. he still lost. so this defeat is more his defeat than the akp defeat. people can say it was overshadowed by mr. erdogan. so almost immediately he started to maneuver in such a way there would be another election. if you can't win this time, maybe he hoped he would win a second time. he maneuvered the process in a

way that that is exactly what happened. there will be a new election november 1st. in between we have now suddenly an increase in the violence between the state and the pkk. now that to me is quite puzzling in the sense that look from a pkk perspective. there was absolutely no reason to escalate the process. here you have hdp into parliament. it has 80 seats in parliament. it has as many as the nationalist party that came in third. the nationalist lost to one member of parliament because they kicked him out. so hdp has more seats than the parliament. technically you would think any peace process, and if it's going

to have real legs to it, needs to be -- handle through parliament, through democrat elected members of parliament. so why start the violence? the only thing one can assume is there is a way which he has in mind, that's the hdb. this is a hypothesis. i haven't asked the pkk leadership and called them up on the phone and said is that what you're trying to do? but the point i'm trying to make is that given the logical situation in a way there are two culprits here. both erdogan and pkk essentially benefit from this violence in the sense that if it undermines the hdp, and it is is between a rock and a hard place as they say in the states, it is room to maneuver has been severely

diminished by events, by -- now, by the way, doesn't necessarily mean the hdp has lost support. all polls indicate, to the extent that turkish polls are accurate. and i think they are this time. the same organizations predicted the previous election results, essentially predicting the same results. there will be marginal changes in the election results. therefore it is quite possible that come november 1st, that the same result will emerge from the elections. that's one hypothesis. now, if the violence increases, if we saw yesterday, if this kind of violence calls for martial law, curfews, essentially the breakdown of law and order in the southeast where

hdp wins with overwhelming majority. the town, for example, the town was just moved by the minister of the interior. she won her seat by 83% vote. this is not significant and i would suspect given the way the state has been behaving, a number of votes are going to increase. so the only way you can push hdp under the 10% threshold is if you make it impossible. in that case the election becomes legitimate. an enormous scandal he cannot win. if he losesers in november, a clean november 1st election.

it will be two major defeats for him. he can create a coalition. and we mentioned hdp is is one possibility. possibly the best way for him to both maintain control and go after the pkk. but if it goes -- if hdp is kept below the 10% threshold, then we have an arguments that you have in urban areas organized but not centralized kurdish youth groups that are going to take matters. that is a very, very dangerous proposition for erdogan. turkey is going to be amazingly unstable with all the dire consequences quee think of for turkish stability, turkish economy, turkish investment, tourism. you name it.

erdogan is a real gamble. for someone who doesn't believe in gambling, he is taking a huge gamble here and i don't understand why. as i said, the pkk is also the unknown and unclear actor here. this, of course, couldn't have come at a worse time as angela merkel said, for the united states. clearly the pressure on the united states is increasing from the turkish side. this week was a major nato conference in which the turkish chief of staff came out strongly and said we are fighting three terrorist organizations at the same time. isis, the pkk, and the ypg. the ypg is the same organization that the united states is giving arms to. we are the ypg's air force and gun forces. we are working with the only

group in syria we can work to essentially push back, push back the isis. this plan being described is actually becoming more and is going to get more severe and create serious dilemmas for the united states. let me stop here. >> great. thank you so much. i'm going to open this up for questions quite briefly. but first let me pose a question of my own. i'm going to start with henri but if hamid and amberin want to weigh in, that would be wonderful. we're in washington, d.c. speaking to an american audience. the united states has dealt with less than democratic turkish governments before. it dealt with turkey dealing with the kurdish question. these aren't new problems. why does it matter for u.s. interests to resolve this

upheaval in turkey right now? >> the united states has been a steadfast ally when it comes to pkk of turkey. we have never veered from calling the pkk a terrorist organization. always supported the turks in their fight against the pkk. what is different this time is essentially isis. here we have different perceptions of isis if you want. for the united states, isis is the most important threat. it is more important than assad, as we know. it is more important than anything else. isis has to be pushed back, defeated, eliminated. and for that, that's number one priority. for the turkish government, the priorities are much more different. in fact, isis priority number three. priority number one are the kurds and assad. and i'm not sure which one comes first. one can make an argument for which is more important.

i suspect the kurds are far more important. they do not want to see the syrian kurds. it's something. there's another aspect which we haven't talked about yet. that's the relationship between the united states, turkey, and the kurdistan region in iraq. and in there you find that turkey and the krg are much more in line with each other. the turks support the krg, baghdad, oil exports. even despite america's displeasure. but the krg is also important to the united states. so the destabilization of the region is not good for the united states. moreover, fighting isis requires the kurds and the pkk are part of the pkk. complete attention. complete focus. and this is undermining that. >> interesting.

amberin, hamid, do you want to weigh in? >> i think that okay the pkk is labeled a terrorist organization. but that doesn't alter the fact that it is probably the most influential kurdish movement globally. so you have to deal with that. not only are they influential in turkey, they are influential in iran. they are influential obviously in syria. and they do have influence in iraqi kurdistan. which he is acutely aware of. for him, too, it's a very difficult balancing act on the one hand to maintain the strategic relationship with turkey which is key to his agenda, which is independence. and underpinned obviously by being able to sell his oil. and you can't do that without turkey's help. but on the other hand, the fact

that ordinary kurds are feeling angry about what turkey is doing to the pkk, the kurds and what isis is doing on the other. and the fact that the pkk seems to be the most effective fighting force against isis. so bearing all of that in mind, i think it's time to deal with the pkk. and i think, as i said in my little talk, that this is a great opportunity. and i think the fact of the pkk now having this experience of running an area inside syria is having a profound effect on them. it's civilianizing them, if you will. they're having to actually run towns and deal with the issues of ordinary people. you might argue they already have that experience in turkey whether hdp is running municipalities. that is a different set of people doing it.

it's the pkk itself directly who is. so this is an opportunity. this will provide incentives for them to move away from violent politics. but for that to happen, you need to have some kind of accommodation between them and turkey. and i think this could be a win-win. you could also factor in the iraqi kurds. because they need to find a way of cohabiting with them as well. and that seems to be getting rather difficult. and this is where the americans who now have this leverage because they are the primary protectors of the kurdish people at this point to be able to somehow bring all these sides together. i know it's a lot to ask for. but at least one should try. >> i have an international realist perspective on that question. when we think of political ambitions, we look at eastern europe. basically that's nato, cold war,

iron curtain divide in eastern europe. whether it's expanding or retracting into the russian side. role of ukraine or like air defense radares in poland. we think in terms of that. but take that geographic cons h consishness and move it slightly south and you have another in the middle east, which it sees as kind of this underbelly in terms of the western expansionism. so essentially russian perception of its defense of its own territory also has a middle eastern dimension. best empexemplified security issue for russia. now, in that context, russia's iran and turkey policies are quite similar to each other. russia wants iran and turkey,

not cautic in the sense that they are falling apart but not strong that they become impediments to russia is's reassertion of its own strategic interlap. in that case, russia and to a certain extent iran have usually supported little bit controllable amounts of instability in turkey's eastern region. when you, for example, interview retired, not active because they won't tell you. retired military people, really senior people especially those who were in the field in the 1990s, they would complain a lot about iran and how they interacted with the pkk through the 1990s. the same is true for russia. so in that case pkk and the kurdish question, if it's unresolved, it destabilizes turkey. a destabilized turkey is not

good as a u.s. ally in terms of what the united states is trying to do. rather than resolving the kurdish question or not, i think it's about rivalry for turkey's stability versus instability. that's why the united states has an interest in stabilizing turkey in that regard. >> great. thank you so much. so i'm going to open this up to questions. i would ask that you identify yourself and any organization you're affiliated with. and i will insist there are questions involved. please no speech. yes, sir.ñba÷ >> i have a question for amberin. can you explain why some of the kurdish cities have disappeared from turkey and all of them have been like, you know, taken away

in favor of democrat? thank you. >> i'm not sure i completely agree with your premise that they have somehow been removed. i mean, just recently laila zhanna came out and said she was willing to go on a hunger strike if need be for this violence to end. i'm not sure i completely understand your question. he's of a younger generation and a talented politician. anyone familiar with the workings of the movement broadly speaking knows that in fact, individuals don't matter so much in the end. and this is a collective movement. and on the one hand, you have the people in europe, the hdp, important in terms of raising

money, et cetera. organizing and public relations. and then, of course, you have abdallah. the most important question today is why he has been silenced. >> yes, sir? >> washington correspondent. i have two questions. ambrerin and henri. two-fold question. the first one, as you all know, a lot of turkish and western experts before the elections, they encouraged people to vote for hdp believing that that will produce a more democratic turkey. i want to know what went wrong. why didn't you see a more democratic turkey. they fail to become more democratic. there's more instability. my second question, in the possibility of snap elections,

why am i wrong to believe that the turkish voters have only two bad choices. either vote for erdogan, make him an absolute leader or vote the same way they did and produce the outcome we have. thank you. >> in response to your first question, why do we have this unstable situation. it's very clear. i think that june 7th was a wonderful day for all of us in turkey. it was great that for the first time we had this kurdish political party overcoming this terribly undemocratic, terribly unfair threshold making it into the parliament. yes, principally with the votes of kurds, but also with the votes of people like my mom who is a hard-score secularist lady who voted for the hdp. i expected her to say because i hate erdogan so much.

we must make sure he doesn't get his majority. this lady whose name i won't reveal. she'll be upset. was saying, no, we can't keep the kurds out. we can't keep the kurds out of parliament. this is bad for our country. people understood two years after no conflict, peace is a great thing. mothers weren't having to find people in the army to make sure their sons wouldn't be assigned to some place in the southeast where they might die. people for the first time were tasting the fruits of peace. and they wanted that to move forward. wanted that to move forward. it was a great opportunity. and if this government was sincere about solving the kurdish problem, they would have embraced this. they would have embraced this, because there was obviously, now, the public consensus for moving forward. this was an endorsement of the peace process, but no, mr.

erdogan and his friends openly said the fact of, you know, democracy working was a bad thing for democracy. now i would, i'm not sure i really understand that beyond, you know, what we've all come to realize, that mr. erdogan wants absolute power, and he was denied it. perhaps you want to answer the second question, ari? people did not encourage, outsiders did not encourage people to vote. outsiders have very little influence on how people vote in turkey, so, lao being, it was a very interesting election campaign. it was probably one of the more interesting election campaign i have seen in turkey, even though the majority of the press was quite hostile to hdp, because erdogan now controls a

significant amount of the press in turkey. but the answer is, i think, erdogan cares more about him becoming president with all the requisite powers of the presidential system. and everything else comes second. and look, erdogan to a large extent is in a cocoon now. he is a great poll significance, you never underestimate him. however, i'm not sure people are capable of telling him ma's going on in the country anymore. in the sense that i think he only wants to listen to people who agree with him. and you almost see it by the way he has actually maneuvered again who has selected for the ruling consul of the akp. it wasn't all their choices. it was mostly his choices. they're all people related to

him, people who are loyal to him, people who will do exactly what he wants them to do. so you have essentially a system which is being created around him that essentially is a vacuum chamber, you know, he only hears his own voice. in terms of the choices, look, as i said, this is a gamble that is quite problematic in the sense of either you're going to get the same results or you're going to get chaos. i'm sorry. you're going to get, i think you're going to get the same results which means mainly chaos or you're going to get -- both of where i bad for turkey. but who decides whether turkey goes to elections? it's not outsiders. it's the turkish government. >> but it need not be chaos. if you have a hung parl lachl, you have a coalition government. as in many democratic countries. >> sure. >> it's mr. erdogan's perception

that it's chaos. >> but, look, chp, clearly erdogan does not want to see a chp/akp coe liegs, because he's afraid that all the corruption charges are going to come up and be investigated, and that's obviously not good for him or his family. >> back there? >> my name is emory. i'm wondering why erdogan is so silent given the fact that next week there is something coming and he will be able to access his family with it. do we expect erdogan to speak? and if so, what will he say?

>> well, there are specific like erdogan specialists who are kind of, who can douecipher what he wants to say by reading between the lines instead of reading the actual text. i'm not one of them. so take what i'm saying with a pinch of salt. basically, in all processes there's always this tennis match between agency and structure, basically influence of the individuals versus influence of the processes that are already ongoing. when peace process goes well, it tends to strengthen the agency, you know, people who have, who get more influence as things go good. but when things go more

conflictual, the conflict assumes a life on its own, and starts to get separated from the individuals that are running the conflict, because conflicts by definition are very unpredictable. when you start a war, you think that it's going to end whenever you want, but it never ends whenever those people start the war want it to end > in that sense. so erdogan, i think, is hibernating, because he is walking on a tightrope, between one, pkk leadership that's increasingly seeing him yes, important, yes, inflew edges, but nevertheless being in captivity. there are things that are said in captivity. erdogan knows this. so i think he's keeping silent,

because he knows that if he asks pkk to drop arms, pkk probably won't do it. if he tells pkk to take up arms and fight, then he's going to lose the connection request the government and turkish state and all the favors that come with it. so essentially, it's one of those periods where erdogan is withdrawing himself from the game and, you know, waiting for the structure, the process, to complete itself, to reassert at a later time. >> let me ask one thing. he may be silent because the government won't let him talk. i mean, that, to me, is, first of all, none of the hdp members who used to go and visit him have been able to visit him. the only people who talk to him are from the security establishment. so it's not as though people from the security establishment are going to come out and say oh, this is what mr. erdogan

said yesterday to us. clearly, that's not going to have much credibility. so i think it's the government policy to keep him quiet. maybe he wants to be quiet. it's possible. but we don't know if this is him or if it's the government that's keeping him quiet. so, from that perspective, you know -- [ inaudible question ] >> i'm sorry. in the next week, the family members are going to be able to visit and talk with him. what do you expect to say, because -- >> are you sure they're going to go? for sure? >> i mean, in turkish practice, if it is, if he's not allowed to access his family member, that means a bigger crisis, because it's the biram, and all citizens in prison, all people have access to their family members on those special days. that's why i'm assuming, if they don't allow the family members to talk with him, then it means

that certainly a different dynamic's going on. >> you've answered the point. i'm not sure, i don't know if the family members are necessarily the right medium, if you want, for him to talk through. this is not the hdp who are much more seasoned politicians. so you may not still hear anything from him, because that's not who should be carrying the message? look, i'm speculating. i don't know. >> yes, sir, in the back. >> hi, i have a quick question on pk k's objective, actually. can you please elaborate a little bit more on pkk? for example, on what they are trying to do. that they are both targeting and it looks like you do not agree. why, what is trying to do? i mean, pkk, what they are

trying to do? and also is there any tactical changes in the attacks of pkk? for example, they are targeting more the police officers. this is my observation. i'm not an expert on pkk, but there is a tactical change? or a structural change? because of the youth movement that the doctor mentioned? so the objective of pkk and the tactics of pkk. >> yquestion is addressed to me i presume. obviously, i'm not a pkk spokesperson. i can only speculate. but from what i observed, i think when one needs to realize that this is very closely linked to what's happening inside syria. and let's not forget that this escalation happened after the

attack in suruch. i would beg whoever maybes the claim that the government was involved to provide that evidence. in the minds of many kurds and clearly the pkk leadership as well, this was somehow connected to the state and it was a way of sending a very strong message about what was happening inside syria and that it was in fact targeting what the pk k's achieving in syria, its alliance with the united states and the fact of, you know, turkey opening injured there after and probably persuaded them that that indeed was what this was all about. and i think the pkk is on the one hand saying to the turkish government, if you continue to try to undermine us, this is what we'll do. and on the other hand, it's also saying that if you continue to

undermine the kurdish movement inside turkey, if you continue to try to marginalize the hdp -- that's sort of where we disagree -- i'm going to make turkey ungovernable for you. this is sort of a way of saying, if you're going to play hardball with me, i'm going to play hardball with you. and very few of us actually predicted this, because we all seemed to believe that when the pkk was bogged down in this fight against the islamic state it could hardly afford to open up a second front against turkey, but in a very eironic twist in a certain sense, it's america that enabled it to do so, because america rode to the rescue with its air support, which, of course, took a lot of pressure on the pkk on the ground and making it easier for them to do what they're doing today. >> i think when we talk about

tactics of pkk we have to keep in mind that splintering strategy. which pkk or whether it's the pkk. essentially, when as buy john was captured in 1999, they said never will they capture or kill us. that's why we have to splinter into multiple nodes of decision making. there's a certain degree of autonomy in local assets as well. so, as a result of this, it's beneficial in the sense that when you want to completely, you know, play hardball in the sense that you have to create chaos that nobody can manage it, it works really well. but on the other hand, when you are trying to control that chaos, as pkk itself, it's also very difficult, which became very obvious in two pipeline

attacks recently. when the, you know, one local branch basically said that we did this pipeline attack, but then hdp said we have no connection to the attack. we don't know who did it. and then several days later they all agreed that oh, okay then, we did it kind of. so that splintering strategy has pluses and minuses as well. plus when you want to create chaos, perfect environment. when you try to control these assets, it's impossible. so killing police. one thing, it's very easy to do so. especially when you're running an asymmetrical conflict and when you're trying to gain the upper hand in the psychological aspect of war. when there's a car crash, you call the police. you know, there's a car crash. the police comes. you ambush them and kill them. it's very easy to do so. the same thing is true for health services, firefighters, that kind of state services as

well. but what happened in last week's is that, you know, the leadership started to publish directives to those local commands that do not of target police men that are actually off duty with their families. so that's one way of trying to bring the battle into a manageable phase. but once organizations start to splinter, you can't unsplinter them. because that autonomy's a very sweet thing. you have that operational autonomy, this operational free hand. it would be very difficult for the centralized leadership to manage it all together again. so i think police killings is part of this splintering strategy. and i don't think it's going to go away in short term. >> may i just add something? let's not forget what happened in october of last year when you had, after, during the kobani riots, we could call them that.

and it was down to erdogan to sort of stop that. and these youth movements, and i've talked about when they were learning their trenches, they say they will only answer to erdogan, so, in a sense, this may also be part of this pkk strategy of making erdogan relevant once again, because they need to pull him out to stop it. so that might be part of the strategy, the pkk strategy of getting erdogan back into the picture by activating the youth movement that says it's only answerable to him. that's just a guess. >> yes, sir? >> thank you. jim holmes, retired foreign service officer, retired president of american turkish counsel.

amberin opened something that i think is important. as akin was describing at the beginning, there were differences between the 1990s and the 2000s. one of the differences which you did not elaborate on was provide comfort and security which u.s. and other coalition of course has provided for the kurds in northern iraq in the 1990s. in the absence of that, in the case of syria, indeed, it wasn't 2 million, it wasn't 3 million it wasn't 4 million in refugees that created interest in america. it was isis that did it. now we're reaping the consequences of that. amberin spoke about the possibility of the u.s. using its lerm now effectively with respect to turkey. i wonder, what are the dimensions of an effective u.s. policy that respects the situation as it now exists.

but in that region with respect to refugees, with respect to daesh. what are the strategies of that concept? >> i'll leave the great middle east expert to answer that one. >> jim, shall we sit here for a few days? >> look -- [ inaudible question ] >> oh, a change in the american policy? [ inaudible question ] >> i, look, the american policy is very clear. there's not going to be an american military involvement in syria. however, having said this,

again, looking at the tv so to say, the united states managed to get the turks to open up three bases. all right, three bases means it's n it's much closer to raqqah. i suspect the white house must be planning something much mo more robust militarily, without ground troops. maybe special forces, i don't know. but certainly, you don't ask to open three bases just to send three f-16s as we did. i think we are slowly repositioning stuff for more muscular policy towards isis. again, for us, the focus is isis. there is no other concern. and whoever helps us on isis we

will partner with. it happens to be that the ypg, pyd are the most of imposing force working with isis. and we will help them provided this kerfuffle doesn't get in the way. but i suspect the administration is probably thinking a little bit bigger in terms of military involvement bringing more iraqi troops up. maybe this thing about organizing some of the syrian business men, but that's limbs to which the united states will go. it is also part of the deal with turkey in opening the bases is also sealing the border. that also is very important. and already we are seeing reports that isis is having trouble bringing people across the turkish, turkish border.

that the border is becoming a little bit more difficult to cross. so that's, i think, is the extent of the american involvement for the future. they're going to bring in much more air assets and more drones, more wherewithal. and not just american, but probably british and french as well. but that's it. that's my, what i, i can see u.s. doing. >> thank you very much. chp representative here in united states. briefly comment and i question, just about the presidential debate in turkey. for our party, we've commissioned more than a dozen polls between december of last year and may of this year. and even less than half of the akp voters are convinced that

presidential system in turkey is a good idea. so i think even if no matter what the outcome of this election may be, i still think it's a newspaper-issue for most of the turks in turkey. so this one quick observation that i want to share. and my question is about the pyd policy or u.s. policy towards pyd. we know that they do get all their support from the u.s., but why the decision to grant the visa. >> you should ask this to the white house. i don't, i don't know. united states sometimes works in very mysterious ways. i mean, for a super power, they cannot decide or cannot give a visa to a man because we may offend the turks, that's the only reason i can think of. there is no other reason. i mean, we talked to him.

>> but so do the turks. >> and so do the turks. but for some reason, i have no idea. please, if you find out, if your white house tells you, please tell me, because i want to know. and mind you, i said the white house, not the state department. >> i'm from maryland. i have a follow-up question regarding the potential operations on isis and whether the election results could potentially change turkey's position on whom to support on the ground because turkey so far couldn't come up with a strong alternative constantly pushed toward the partners. >> what's the question? >> what could possibly change after the election regarding, let's say erdogan has all the words he needs of are we going to see a change on whom to support as the partners on the

ground considering and issuing that there will be increased number of air operations on isis. >> it's an interesting question, because if he feels confident, he might then pick up the peace process again. and, of course, we know that mr. erdogan is an incredibly flexible person. he may indeed, you know, decide that the hdp needs to support the kinds of constitutional changes that mr. erdogan is seeking. so, with that in turn mean that turkey starts partnering with ypg and that it finally decides that yes indeed, isis is really a threat to itself probably more than anyone else since we have a 900-kilometer long border with syria, that part i don't know,

to be honest with you, whether what happens inside syria, whether the peace process will be pecked up again, whether it will be reflected with the ypg, but if not, that process is going absolutely nowhere that we can safely predict. >> i would say that the danger for this policy change would occur if the election results are an exact duplicate of what happened in june. in order, -- in other words, i he loses again that he might not retaliate but change policy maybe to punish. one of the thing that's a little bit disturbing, very disturbing, i should say. when you look at the erdogan press at the moment, the press is sympathetic. it is amazingly, at the moment, antiwestern and making a connection between the pkk and

the west. this constant barrage of, my friend just wrote me this morning r morning and said she watched a documentary on television about how germany is providing arms and training to the turkish army. that's what they keep saying that all the equipment that the pkk has is using against turkish troops now all came from the united states. that the united states has trained them to put ieds. i mean, this kind of atmosphere is not necessarily conducive to, a, today decision making, because i'm sure a lot of people around mr. erdogan may believe this nonsense, and second, you know, in the event that he's defeated again, it may be, this may be a place where he can change. but maybe not. i mean, look, it's too speculative of a question. >> may i just add something? i think we're all focussing a lot on mr. erdogan, and we're

sort of not looking closely enough at the army and the police in turkey. and i think that there is in a very sort of odd kind of way, some sympathy for i.s. to the extent that it seems that the only force capable of dealing with the pkk, and i've heard this from people who are very close to these security force members. the fact that they hear people within the security forces saying well, good for i. srnlts. good for them. they are going after these guys. they seem to be the only ones who are capable of teaching these kurds a lesson, and i find that extremely worrying, and it's something that you can divide to some extent if you look at twitter, if you look at some of the followers of some of these i. srnlts sympathizers. to me it was quite a shock that

they were of people whose profile pictures who had the gray wall, ultra nationalist types who somehow connected. perhaps it's, i guess, similar case of these old brothers in iraq who had this alliance with people, with al qaeda, because they have the same enemy, and i think that's a phenomenon that people like akin should be scrutinizing more carefully. and now you hear reports, and, indeed, you see it on youtube, of security personnel who, in the old days, they'd have the droopy gray wolf mustache and now have the isis beard and no mustache. and that's kind of really scary. and, as i said, needs to be examined more closely. >> yes, sir. >> art amules.

if i'm wrong, please correct me. you mentioned about army position, and you said there's no monolithic leadership. what do you mean by that? >> no monolithic leadership of the pkk. no, i didn't say that. no. i said there's no monolithic leadership of the pkk. pkk used to have a very clear-cut leadership where erdogan was the leader, and the leadership pyramid then spilled over through erdogan. right now there's no monolithic leadership in the pkk as it is splintered. i didn't say that for the army. >> thank you very much. i'm from the turkish embassy. i have a few comments and a question. my first comment is actually

just i think need to underline a fact here which is not touched upon very muchle . and this is how the turkish government is eager to fight against daesh, isis. and against terrorism in general and also isis. i would just, the point that isis, some people can say good for isis for going after pkk, but this is not a government policy. that's for sure. i need to underline this. and one fact is the peace process was started by the government and also its counterpart, the kurdish part. but one point is we shouldn't forget, i mean, this peace process was stopped by pkk

itself. so it was not the turkish government's place to say, okay, let's stop this. it's over. we're finished. but it was pkk who announced, which announced it. and if you think about kobani, there is a general perception that turkey has not supported kobani. but also, i need to put one fact about this as well. turkey, i mean, which was not mentioned here maybe. most of us knew this. turkey has helped peshmerga forces through its supporters and to go to kobani and fight against isis. and there are other helps that, assistance that turkey gives, especially to peshmerga training and et cetera. so fighting isis is a priority. it's very important.

my question is, is a general one. i just, there are some clues that i heard, but maybe if the panelists can comment on it. why do we think the pkk has chose to, opted for stopping this peace process and violent, starting a violent acts, because it started just after surge by pkk. thank you very much. >> i think i kind of elaborated on that at some length. i explained to you what i thought was the pk k's vantage point, but i really don't have much to add to that. >> okay. let me just, one important issue that you brought up. the fact that the turkish government allowed the peshmerga

to cross from northern iraq into kobani, you have to, you have to remember that that came much, much later. it's after united states dropped supplies, after united states started bombing. it was essentially an effort that show both, to repair, if you want, a very significant problem that the government had created for itself in turkey. it was an attempt to show that yes, we're not against the kurds here. we're going to use the peshmerga to help. but by the time the peshmerga came, the fight had already been stabilized, mostly by the united states air force. and look, let me also remind you that mr. erdogan was absolutely livid about american bombing of kobani to support, to support the pyd, because if you remember, he said, he came out and said something like what's in kobani? oil?

gold? diamonds? and, in a way, as if, first of all, the unit would only intervene if there was gold or diamonds. in a way, it was a very demeaning attack on u.s. intentions and u.s. strategy in that particular case. and then anybody you talk to at the time will tell you in turkey, and maybe you know, too, that kobani was not a place that turkey wanted to defend. it came, it allowed the peshmerga to come after both world opinion and kurdish opinion, especially in turkey changed. look, kobani was a main breaking point for turkish kurds, respective of what happened with the person ga, you know, the peshmerga was a way to signal to those kurds who i said earlier who eventually defected from the akp to stabilize that constituency, and it didn't work. and as far as why the pkk started it, look, i think, what

amberin said, i think the pkk probably decided when kobani that the turks were not serious about, it's not just kobani, it's also during the election process. if you remember, during the election pro set, i'm talking about the june 7th, in the period, coming to the june 7th election, both mr. erdogan and the akp press went wild in terms of accusations against hdp. it was a campaign against hdp because they understood very correctly that hdp was the single most important threat to akp getting its place in parliament. so you have essentially a government wabling war on hdp while at the same time engaging in peace process. that contradiction is one of the reasons why i think the pkk decided there was no hope. >> but even before that, as you know, the government was

building these army calico, fort, what would you call them in english? yeah, posts throughout the south east. and also building these dams which were cutting off, well, i mean, i'm not saying that's why the government was building dams, but as the pkk saw it, cutting off their routes and their sort of supply, logistical routes inside turkey, and the pkk was very unhappy about this and was making a lot of noise about that. as you remember, you had those protests, rather deadly ones in legeh and some people died. and so it didn't just happen overnight. there was a lot of mutual distrust and the government for its part would argue that even while they were discussing peace, the pkk was busy stockpiling weapons within turkey. so obviously a lot of distrust between the sides.

that's obviously a big problem, the lack of trust, which i think begs the question of why you don't have a third party as you did in oslo. sort of a monitor the peace process. >> we're running out of time. do we have time for one last question? i think i'm going to take my prerogative and ask the last question myself. and since we only have five minutes, i'm going to pose it to all three of you and ask you to be relatively brief with the answers. i have a rather big picture with where turkey is heading. and there are two conflicting narratives about the june election, one is that the akp lost its majority for the first time. erdogan did not get what he wanted from the election, the other is that the opposition party won 7 million plus more votes. they saw their percentage die crease. which of the narratives is the more persuasive explanation of

where turkey is heading? i mean, is there an opposition movement forming that could be the next governing party? or does it look like it's the next indispensable party for years to come? start with you. >> that's actually the topic of my next article. i'm writing something on party dynamics in turkey. it's a very long debate, so i'll just cut it short. but practically, when you look at turkish politics in crisis period such as during cold war, '60s, '70s, or 1990s, kurdish question, every crisis period election that produces a coalition option, the coalition government, in that setting, whichever party is the third becomes the first party in the next election. this is almost like a 100% uninterrupted pattern that i've discovered. it's quite interesting.

like, whichever third party becomes first party, the other election third party becomes first party. it's a really interesting dynamic. i have a whole set of theories to explain it, but i'm going to spare you from that. but, then, how does, what does that tell us? it tells us that one thing that we have two third parties. one is more like coalition-oriented party. hdp is more ideology cal party. i think the big picture here is the main poority polarities are established. you have one turkish national party, one political movement party. and which i think if the proper political process continues, it's going to become the blueprint for turkish elections for years to come. that's my answer to it. >> thank you.

>> i think that if you look at turkey, traditionally, you've always had a single party rule that's managed to push through reform in turkey, right? and that single party rule has traditionally always been held by a center-right party. and until the president, that was the up party. when you look at the democrat ickes of turkey, any party that wants to rule alone needs the kurdish vote. that's the reality. so given that the akp or mr. erdogan has totally alienated the kurds, how do you move forward? can you move forward with the coalition? even if it's say the chp? i'm afraid i have to say that i'm somewhat doubtful, and i think that what really immediates to happen is for the akp to somehow shake off mr. erdogan, put him back in his box and then only then can we move

forward. hopefully i'll be proven wrong. >> look, the problem in turkey is that the people's party has made significant changes of late, but somehow has yet to figure out the way to connect with the bulk of the population. in turkey, the center left has always been very weak. historically. it's not just this, this rendition. so the center left has to figure out a new message, a new organization, but that will take a very, very long time. i think before that even happens, i actually think there's another likelihood that we haven't talked about, and that is that the akp may splinter. now we are seeing a great deal of opposition within the akp. they're still for the former president who is maybe moving in the direction of a new party or

something new. so it's quite conceivable that especially if the next elections produce the same results as they did in june that you will see new organization and defactioning. he is essentially sucking up all the oxygen from the party. and that's the most likely outcome. >> well, greg, thank you. i think we're out of time at this point. but i really want to thank all of our panelists for terrific presentations and join me in giving them a round of applause. [ applause ] pope francis is headed to the u.s. part of a multi-day visit. c-span has live coverage beginning tuesday with the

pope's arrival at joint base andrews where he'll be greeted by president obama and the first lady. then on wednesday we're live at the white house for an official welcoming ceremony followed later that day by a mass held at the basilica of the immaculate conception. and on thursday, the pontiff addresses a joint meeting of congress before heading to new york and philadelphia for other scheduled events. all that live on c-span and available online at c-span.org. all persons having business before the honorable, the supreme court of the united states are admonished to draw near and give their attention. >> number 759, earnest miranda, the petitioner, versus arizona. >> arguemans number 18, roe

against wade. >> dred and harriet were here on land where slavery wasn't legally recognized. >> it would take presidential orders and the presence of federal troops and marshals and the courage of children. >> we wanted to pick cases that changed the direction and import of the court in society and that also changed society. ♪ >> so, she told them that they'd have to have a search warrant, and mrs. mapp demanded to see the paper and to read and see what it was, which they refused to do, so she grabbed it out of his hand to look at it, and thereafter the police officer handcuffed her. >> i can't imagine a better way to bring the constitution to

life than by tilling the human stories behind great supreme court cases. >> fred komatsu boldly opposed the forced internment of japanese americans during world war ii. after being convicted for failing to report for relocation, mr. coe matt sue took his case all the way to the supreme court. >> they were cases that the court took that were quite unpopular. >> if you had to pick one freedom that was the most sanction to the functioning of a democracy, it has to be freedom of speech. >> let's go through a few cases that illustrate very dramatically and visually what it means to live in a society of 310 million different people who have helped stick together because they believe in a rule of law. ♪

>> landmark cases, an exploration of 12 historic cases. produced by c-span, debuting monday october 5th at 9:00. and, as a companion to our new series, landmark cases the book. it features the 12 cases we've selected for the series, with a brief introduction into the back ground, highlights and impact of each case, written by vet yan supreme court journalist tony morrow in coordination with quarterly press. it is available for $8.95 plus shipping and handling. get your copy at c-span.org/landmark cases. next, the house sub committee hearing on campus sexual

>> gun of the -- one of >> good morning, everyone. the subcommittee on higher education workforce will come to order. i welcome everyone today's committee hearing we are in a different location and we are a little tighter in here today than we normally would be and ask everybody's indulgence as the renovation work goes on in the committee room. we'll all be friendlier and kinder to each other today and closer to each other. i'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us for an issue that affects far too many student, campus sexual assault. earlier this week as millions of students stepped foot on campus, members of congress returned from their districts to continue

their work strengthening america's higher education system. as we all know, that effort often requires difficult but necessary conversations about tough issues, which is why we're here today. every college student should be able to learn an environment that's safe and free from fear and intimidation. yet for some students, that is not the case. according to one study approximately 1 in 5 women in college has been sexually assaulted. several universities including michigan and m.i.t. report similar findings and a number of recent high profile cases further highlight the scope and seriousness of this important issue. as a former community college president, mother, grandmother, i know i'm not alone when i say all of us have a responsibility to protect students from sexual assault on campus. as one university president claimed, the issue of sexual assault keeps me awake at night.

i feel personally responsible for the safety and well-being of all students. another said i see the issue of sexual violence and sexual assault on colleges and universities as a matter of national importance. students, parents, administrators and policymakers across the country share the same sentiment and have joined a a national conversation about these heinous crimes and how we can better protect students. at the college and university level, efforts to protect and respond sexual assault are under way. for instance, some colleges and universities now require students to participate in seminars to help them understand what sexual assault is and how to prevent and report it. at the university of north carolina chapel hill, for example, the seminars reenforce safe campus culture and explain policies and procedures for responding to reports of sexual violence. institutions are also improving

how they support victims of sexual assault, providing resources and counselling services to help students recover from such a terrible event. complete their education and continue with their lives. just as important administrators are working to put in place a fair resolution process that respects the rights of the victim and the accused. at the national level, the federal government has been working with colleges and universities to prevent and respond to sexual assault for decades. recently members of congress have introduced legislative proposals intended to improve protections for college students. additionally, new policies, institutions must follow. colleges and universities have rightly raised concerns about the administration's one-size-fits-all regulatory approach. the administration has further

complicated a maize of legal requirements added to the confusion facing students, administrators and faculty and made it harder for constitutions to guarantee safety. as dr. rue will explain during her testimony, the patchwork of federal and state policies has impeded the efforts of administrators and educators to prevent and respond effectively to sexual assault on their campus. as congress works to strengthen higher education, it must insure tough responsible policies are in place to fight these crimes and support the victims. i'm pleased we have a panel of witnesses to represent all sides of this difficult, yet important discussion. your observations and recommendations are vital to our efforts to help colleges and universities provide students the safe learning environment they deserve. with that, i now recognize the ranking member for his opening remarks. >> thank you, chairman fox.

i join you in welcoming our distinguished panel of witnesses. the subject of this hearing is extremely sensitive. as ranking member of this subcommittee, i believe that we must raise the level of awareness in our communities and throughout our nation about the seriousness of campus sexual assault and its impact on our victims. both women and men and their families. these impacts are far reaching and include poor academic performance, stress, depression and abuse of alcohol and drugs. in addition to supporting the victim, we must also be sensitive to the rights of the accused. institutions of higher education must have processes that ensure fairness in handling the allegations of campus assaults and that campus investigations

are consistent with our nation's long standing principles of due process. whatever system is put in place, we must ensure victims are not afraid to come forward. many victims are reluctant to report sexual assaults because of shame or fear of retaliation or worried about lack of proof, uncertainty that what happened constitutes assault or because the lack of information on where or how to report the assault in fear of being treated poorly by the criminal justice system. as a nation, we have made progress towards better understanding and addressing this serious challenge of campus sexual assault. for example, through the development of the task force o

to protect sexual assaults, a department of justice's office of violence against women developed a multiyear initiative to provide support to programs o to prevent campus sexual assault and their recent online resource center for changing our campus culture. in the year 2007, the u.s. department of justice also funded a ground breaking study on campus sexual assault. the findings of that study were staggering. let me give you some examples. amongst women in college nearly 20% will be victims of attempted or actual sexual assault. as will about 6% of undergraduate men. most victims are violated in their first or second year at college.

the majority, 75% to 80% knew their attackers, often a friend, a classmate. acquaintance or someone they dated. the study also confirmed that the risk of campus sexual assault for undergraduate women increases greatly with the consumption of alcohol and/or drugs. it's clear our concerted efforts are needed to deal with these serious issues. in addition to these federal efforts, i am proud to report that my own home state of texas is responding to calls of action. starting this year, colleges and universities are required to inform students of campus sexual assault policies during freshman orientation. schools are also required to review and update those policies every two years. students returning to class at the university of texas campuses this fall will also be participating in the nation's most comprehensive study on sexual assaults ever conducted

in higher education. the cultivating learning and safe environments case study will be led by researchers at ut austin school of social work and will include online questionnaires for students, surveys and focus groups of faculty, staff and campus law enforcement and a four-year cohort study of entering fresh men to identify the psychological and economic impact of sexual vie loan. the ut system is spending $1.75 million on this study. so i applaud ut's effort to address campus sexual assault and urge other colleges and universities throughout our country to join in the commitment to end sexual violence on their campuses. in closing, let us renew our efforts to support victims of campus sexual assault.

we can't wait for yet another high profile incident to occur before we address this issue. i look forward to hearing what recommendations our panel of witnesses may have to reduce sexual assault on our college campuses and i thank you and with that, madame chair, i yield back. >> thank you. pursuant to committee rules, all members will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the permanent hearing record. without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 14 days to allow such statements and other material referenced during the hearing to be submitted for the official hearing record. it's now my pleasure to introduce our distinguished witnesses. the general council at dickenson college in carlisle, pennsylvania. previously, she was in private

practice in harrisburg, pennsylvania, where she chaired her firm's practice and represented several pennsylvania private colleges, including dickenson. ms. scaduto is an active member of the national association of college and university attorneys and a member of the legal services review panel of the national association of independent colleges and universities. dr. penny rue is vice president for campus like at wake forest in north carolina. she's responsible for the well being and safety of wake forest university students and their education outside the classroom and is nationally known for her creative leadership in strengthening campus communities. ms. lisa maatz is vice president of government relations for the association of university women

here in washington, d.c. she previously spent 16 months serving concurrently as the interim director of the aauw legal defense fund. she has done similar work for the now legal defense and education fund and the older women's league. mr. joseph kohn is policy director at the foundation for individual rights and education in philadelphia, pennsylvania. he's a former staff attorney for the united states court of appeals for the third circuit and a law clerk in the field court of common pleas. immediately prior to joining fire, mr. cohn served as the interim legal director in nevada and utah. i now ask our witnesses to stand and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect the witnesses answered in the affirmative. you may take your seat.

before i recognize you to provide your testimony, let me briefly explain our lighting system. you have five minutes to present your testimony. when you begin, the light in front of you will turn green. when one minute is left, the light will turn yellow. when your time is expired, the light will turn red. at that point, i will ask that you wrap up your remarks as best as you are able. members will each have five minutes to ask questions. now, i want to recognize ms. scaduto for her comments. >> good morning, i thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

as a higher education senior administrator with a long history of involvement in the issue of sexual misconduct on our nation's campus, i'm here today because we share the committee's commitment to educating our nation's students in safe and supportive environments. american colleges and universities are happy to work in partnership with the government and others on finding solutions that will help bring about cultural change and put an end to this most serious problem. as we move forward, i want to take a few minutes to share with you some of the challenges higher education is facing in our efforts and to propose some ways in which our government and this subcommittee can further help us achieve greater success in preventing and responding to sexual violence. as i make my comments, i will use my term victim out of expediency and because it's referenced in the campus save act but without personal preference as to terminology. first, please recognize that the reports of sexual violence we receive on our campuses are not straight forward or easy to resolve.

the sexual violence claims we see most frequently do not involve force or attacks by strangers but between individual who are acquainted, where one or both are intoxicated, and the primary issue is whether con extent to a sexual act was given. we're left to resolve word on word conflicts between two people whose memories may be impaired and where there are no witnesses. add to this the fact that reports may not be made for days, weeks or months following an event and i can hope you see the complexity of resolving such issues in a manner that the parties believe to be fair. while speaking of fairness, colleges and universities are committed to providing fair treatment to all of our students including not only victims, but also to those accused of sexual violence. the changes over the last four years have resulted in complexities and challenges in maintaining the necessary balance. for example, on a small campus removing an accused student from a class in order to keep the student away from an alleged

victim before any determination of responsibility can be made may result in the accused student being forced out of a class where there are no other sections or being forced out of a class shortly before graduation. we're also trying to navigate the complexities of title ix regulations and guide and as well as state laws. simultaneously and without the confidence that we can do so to the satisfaction of all. employees duties to report under various standards differ what and how we're supposed to advise victims of options of moving forward when they report a sexual assault are just two examples of those complexities. additionally, the current laws and guidance do not appear to proceedings are not equipped to replace law enforcement or judicial functions. the members of our campus communities expected to meet and discharge the new standards for claims are faculty, staff and historically students, not

judges nor lawyers. to support colleges and universities' efforts to improve culture around this serious issue and to help us in our efforts to hold violators accountability through processes that are fair and impartial, i recommend the following four points for your consideration. first, pause and considering legislation that adds additional requirements to those already complex network of federal and state laws, regulations and guidance until there has been an opportunity to evaluate whether the efforts to date are working. as a reminder, the regulations went into effect july 1st of this year. second, consider creating a safe harbor for higher education that does not relieve us from accountability for failures to comply, but which provides us with certain presumptions of good faith when reviewing our conduct.

for example, when we are applying fact-based tests by various laws such as in deciding whether to investigate or a victim's objection, if we miss the mark but have found to acted in good faith, provide us with protection from penalties or administrative action. third, if new requirements are considered at some point in the future, ocr should follow, notice and comment requirements of the administrative procedures act. the title ix guidance put in place since 1991 was done -- since 2001, was done without notice or comment from parties outside the agency depriving colleges and universities, victims and survivors and other interested parties of the opportunity to provide input that may have been helpful in improving clarity and alignment with existing laws and regulations. i'll leave my fourth point for your reading. thank you for listening and considering my perspective as a higher education administrator. >> thank you, chairwoman foxx, ranking member and honorable

committee members for the opportunity to testify about this critically important issue. the higher education community takes the problem of campus sexual assault very seriously, and we are working diligently to manage systems fair to all students. these are not new issues for us. it's been a priority for decades because of our genuine care for the health, safety and well being of our students. currently, we must address sexual compliance responsibilities under a swirl of regulations. this one size fits all creates challenges to impede our effort to prevent and respond to sexual assault. added to these challenges now are state legislatures that are enacting statutes creating a patchwork of conflicting regulations. prevention and education efforts are critical to reducing incidents of sexual violence. many campuses imply online modules allow new students to participate in prevention,

orientation and beyond. online training programs educate faculty and staff to whom students might report about where to turn. according to the cdc, bystander intervention training are promising practices, but have not yet been validated through rigorous design. some more grant support is needed to conduct evaluation research in had this growing field. at wake forest, we use prepare peer educators to deliver highly interactive situational programs to put incoming students attitudes to the test and really get them to think. a highly engaging peer theater program reenforces those messages and is followed by an online curriculum that uses scenarios highly relevant to students. this program will also give us benchmark attitudes that we can use to assess the effectiveness of our programs over time. after students have time to navigate the social scene, they will participate in a program.

in their residence halls on intervention training using the step up model. surveys are another growing practice. these are used to assess perception of and experience with sexual violence and these surveys are designed to provide an institution specific picture that in turn enables leaders to coordinate with the community to strengthen e prevention efforts. one survey imposed on all institutions would not accommodate the wide array of campus environments. they range from four-year residential like my own to community colleges and primarily online universities. each institution should have the awe tommy to develop the best survey. although prevention strategies are in place, sexual violence will still occur on our campuses. student affairs administrators are committed to being fair and balanced to all students engaged in the conduct process. critical to this process is the widely established practice of

confidentiality for the victim and accused. one of the reasons a student will choose an on campus practice over reporting to the police. one of our most important points in trauma informed work is to allow the survivor the right to choose the path to follow in. the wake of an incident. some may want to report to the campus, some may want to report to the police or both. some may only want support. the institution really needs to respect that source. to take the decision out of the victim's hand by mandating that a report to campus automatically is turned over to police will create a chilling effect on the willingness of victims to come forward. exactly the opposite of what we want to happen. the confidentiality of our conduct processes guaranteed creates uncertainty about their fairness. we know that. most recently towards the respondent, but it's important to reiterate the processes are structured to be fair and

equitable to all parties. in the recent "washington post" foundation poll, 84% of current and recent college students said they are very or somewhat confident in the school administration's ability to address complaints. we are not a court of law. ours is an educational process intended to derive at a fair outcome for all parties. at the core of this distinction is our standard of scrutiny. of the evidence. is our standard of scrutiny. of the evidence. i think i speak for most colleges and universities in saying we do not need more regulation. e we need more consultation. guidance from the department of education coming without notice often does not help us navigate these waters. i strongly believe it is important to provide opportunities for public comment and discussion where the full complexity of the issues can be explored from those who know them firsthand. in closing, i must express deep

concern about the narrative from the media that colleges and universities care more about their institutions, reputation than the rights and experiences of our students. nothing could be further from the truth. instead those of us who handle incident us of sexual violence are professionals who share an overwhelming commitment to strike the delicate balance in today's legislative environment to preserve the educational rights of students, to manage conduct and above all to prevent sexual violence. thank you. >> thank you very much. ms. maatz, you're recognized for five minutes. >> good morning, on behalf of the more than 170,000 members, over 1,000 branches and 900 college and university partners of the american association of university women, i thank you for inviting us to testify today. my remarks are informed by my 12

years with auw and my tenure as the executive director of a domestic violence program re recognized by excellence and also at whitten burg university where i was a a hall director that responded to incidents of sexual assault. i can personally attest to the fact this is not a new problem. when campus environments are hostile because of sexual harassment and violence, students can't learn. it's that simple and that devastating. schools have an important and necessary role to play in addressing this epidemic. why? because student rights to an education free of sex discrimination are on the line. auw has identified the need to end violence on campuses. our own research revealed that two-thirds of students experience sexual harassment. 1 in 5 women said they had been sexually assaulted in college. this impacts both men and women and students from all walks of

life at all types of schools. title ix provide the very tools schools need to improve campus climates for everyone. 1972, title ix is a a law that prohibits sex discrimination. the law requires schools to take steps to eliminate sexual harassment and violence, prevent reourns, and address impacts on individual students on the campus. this includes evaluating current practices, publishing anti-discrimination policies and implementing grievance procedures providing for an equitable resolution of complaints. schools must provide accommodation for students such as adjusting housing arrangements and providing academic support. actions that schools are uniquely situated to provide. all schools should have a title ix coordinator as well as monitor patterns and address systemic problems. these requirements are not new, but date back to the laws first regulations back in 1975. since then over the course of

republican and democratic administrations, the department of education has continued to provide technical assistance and guidance that promotes compliance with the law. schools also follow a consumer protection law known as the clery act that requires colleges and universities that participate in financial aid programs to disclose crime statistics and security information. originally passed in 1990, it was updated in 2013 as part of a bipartisan reauthorization of the violence against women act. these updates require schools to report additional crime statistics on domestic violence and stalking and provide ongoing sexual assault prevention and bystander training campus wide. this public report of a school safety effort is valuable to students and parents and provides insights to school working to improve campus safety. title ix are long standing complimentary law that work together to ensure they have a clear course of action when sexual violence occurs.

appropriately schools are not in the business of imposing criminal punishments. those decisions are best left to authorities in charge of criminal investigation and prosecution. if a survivor chooses to pursue that course. the school's civil rights immediatings represent parallel yet equally necessary paths. laws and legal precedence spell out schools to be fair, prompt and impartial in all disciplinary u proceedings. title ix echoes these requirements. similarly, the clearly act requires processes be fair, prompt and impartial and both parties receive timely notice regarding the outcomes of proceedings. there are next steps that congress can take to help schools and students in their effort to end sexual harassment and violence. the time immediately following an incident is especially critical for survivors. they need access to a safe space, medical and counselling and information about their rights and where they can seek additional support.

schools should ensure an adviser is available o to connect survivors to resources. the au wrk supported outreach and support campus act would ensure schools take these critical steps. in addition, climate surveys can help schools better to understand the die nynamics beh reported and unreported incidents of sexual violence. schools need information in order to effectively combat this epidemic. when done well, surveys provide transparency crucial for safety and a useful tool to fine tune their response. the auw supported halt campus sexual assault violence act would also require surveys at all schools. finally we urge congress to provide additional resources for the department of education to support coordinators and other stake holders on laws and best pr practices. there were schools working diligently to respond to incidents of sexual violence and technical assistance can help them make real change. further with more attention to sexual violence, we have also seen an uptick in complaints and

unprecedented number of schools are under investigation for title ix compliance. they need additional funding to provide ongoing technical assistance for schools as well as to hold bad actors accountable. we all believe, i think, that a single incident is one too many. when it interferes with a student's education it adds insult to injury but we have tools to make real change. we look forward to working with you as you reauthorize and consider this important topic. thank you. >> thank you. mr. cohn, you're recognized for five minutes. >> chairwoman fox, ranking member, honorable members of the subcommittee and members of the committee at large, thank you for the introduction. i'm the legislative and policy director for the foundation. we're a nonpartisan nonprofit organization dedicated to defending student and fak culty

civil liberties on america's college campus. i thank you for the opportunity to discuss this critical issue. one of the core constitutional rights that fire defends is due process. universities are both morally and legally obligated to respond to known instances of sexual assault in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent its occurrence. for more than 50 years, courts have held that the constitution requires public institutions to provide meaningful due process protections to accuse students. fire believes that these twin obligations need not be intention. access to higher education is critical. the stakes are extremely high for everybody in campus disciplinary proceedings and it's essential that no student's education is curtailed unjustly. while efforts to address the campus sexual assault have focused on eliminating bias, far too little attention has been placed on preventing bias. against the