i a slide of the camel billboard. in retrospect, it looks dated and small but i can tell you learned how toad tap into the heads of children like me. everyone knows here how significant tobacco became as a cause of disease and mortality in the 20th century. this chart represents the over 420,000 deaths a year in the u.s. today associated with tobacco and how they stack up against other very prominent, important causes of mortality.

i decided they were critical questions i wanted to get into about what was the meaning of smoking, its impact, as an american historian, i began to realize there was almost no aspect of 20th-century american ,ife from advertising to film medicine and science, regulation politics, that in some way could not be encapsulated by investigating the history of smoking "the cigarette century. the problem again how best to do that. i added a fifth question as i was getting near the end. so did smoking come to be popular in the course of the 20th century? almost no one smokes cigarettes as recently as 1900. cigarette consumption was 50 per capita per adult.

in 1970, it was 4000. it's really a modern behavior although tobacco use would go into the earliest days of native in the americas. those interested in how do you create a modern behavior around major industry and this became the focus of my early work. how do you go from no one smoking in 1900 to a majority of men smoking by mid century and , a significant minority of women become smokers by mid century as well. hello to explain what are the engines, the forces behind this remarkable rise of smoking? we know part of the answer but if we understood this in a more sophisticated, historical way, we would understand more about how to address the problem of

smoking and contemporary culture. it was obviously cultural, social, relating to advertising promotion buts of what both the behavior? some very brilliant early 20th century business then -- businessmen built the tobacco trust. there are very much concerned with how do you move products. on the left is the bonds at machine, which duke begin committed to. he -- became committed to. he overproduced. he had millions of cigarettes to sell and becomes oriented to that part of the business to motivate sales in the context of overproduction.

the industry innovative time and time again the motivation of consumer behaviors. this industry convicted that invented -- invented card collecting. people become crucially oriented to collecting cards. what ones are missing, how to get the ones you don't have. this industry was built into tapping into that psychological behavioral than mx. today we talk about pokemon. bored, collecting you could doers, woman actors. this is how do you initiate and

obtain the clientele. this is the industry that really withed national brands ofnd identity. camel is one the first national brands. clever slogans. it starts on the golf course when r.j. reynolds executives are playing golf and one of them ran out of cigarettes and said walk aother one, "i'd mile for camel." it was one of the largest running slogans in the history of tobacco. questions in this time of building behavior was what about women smokers. even though many men came back from the first world war very

serious and they get smokers, there was a question about the propriety of advertising directly to women. this ad was an early industry advertisingout directly to women to bring them into it. arehe late 1920's, many ads directed at women. brides are smoking. campaign "do you nail? -- inhale?" some of my students think these

ads are sexually suggestive. these were drawn by a well-known pinup artist. racier.them are even it."ybody's doing another popular series of ads from the 30's. said "instead of a weet." integrating.ime of the head of tobacco in 1928 was concerned women warned smoking lucky strikes because of the green package. one of the things was should we change the color of the package and a hired the father of

american public relations and he said it change the color of the package, let's change fashion so fashion turns green. he goes to france and hires the french designers to focus on green and holds conferences about the meaning of the color green and hires academics to come and soon, green is the high-fashion color. i think that story captures something about the social engineering of the cigarette during this time. we understand much more about how it was incredibly sharply articulated. bets has a theory about the engineering of consent and that individuals needed to believe they were making individual choices in the marketplace but it was the job of the corporation to engineer those

decisions perceived as individual choice. i will come back to this but this remains at the core of even contemporary arguments about the sale of tobacco today. it was not unusual to see physicians in tobacco else. concerna good deal of about the character of the risks that were potential around these of tobacco going back to the earliest times. these ads were meant to reassure smokers who might have concerns about the impact of their smoking on health. pitched with a therapeutic effects. -- ethos. celebrities were used in ads. identifythat you could

smokers across social boundaries, economic status was a key element. the utilization of smoking and film. the group he has done work on product placement but from an early time, the people in the tobacco industry knew that smoking in film would be beneficial. articles about how methodically,tes all of which directors began to use in their films. "voyager" with betty davis.

clyde."eft, "bonnie and "beyond aht, resaonable doubt." the sexual attraction, questions of glamour. captured in are these films. of1950, we've gone from 2% the how did this happen? -- how did this happen? aboutw a good deal more u.s. a smoking

country. is how do weestion know smoking is dangerous . thing mostngle within, best understood modern public health. in 1950, this was a complex question in modern science. has thenique we use basis of evidence-based medicine. here's what the industry said. medical ads from

journals. couldid everything they so the ad on your left -- arguing here is there a doing everything they could to divert attention away from the categorical knowledge that smoking caused disease. a number of researchers began to try to discern. you can say clearly it's obvious the relationship. 1935ld invite you back to or 1951 the incidence of lung cancers beginning to rise steeply but there could be any number of hypotheses about why those cases were rising. the automobile,

paving roads. the ability to determine the rise of smoking with lung cancer with a lag of 20 years was a complicated and important problem. today we see although is often perceived that cancer has increased -- cancer deaths have increased, it lung cancer that stands out as the only cancer that arose so dramatically during the course of this time. this is the same chart for women. this got a lot of attention in the mid-1980's when the incidents of lung cancer began to exceed the incidence of breast cancer among american women as a cause of death. principaltwo of the

american epidemiologists. they were crucial to the development of the epidemiological knowledge that smoking causes lung cancer. they worked with one of the great figures of medical statistics of the 20th century. ad windsor worked with surging all you was a medical student. they demonstrated that by doing very meticulous epidemiological work demonstrating that smoking caused lung cancer. this is the way the industry responded. more doctors smoke camel than any other brand. i try to show how the industry tried to encourage the idea that the question of smoking and health should remain an aspect of independent, individual, clinical judgment as opposed to

a categorical finding. every doctor should decide for him herself whether smoking was a probe. for their pay -- was appropriate for their patients. in this ad on the left, the little gross says "i will grow 100 years old." this is a similar ad. this one appeared in the journal of the american medical association. they're telling smokers to take their own judgment. this is about unseating medical and scientific knowledge.

the use of euphemisms like a mild were about suggesting the problems with the product had been solved. industry begins starting in december 1953 one of the first major campaigns of scientific disinformation, saying we need more research. they said we will commit ourselves to developing new knowledge about smoking and health. now we know so much from the documents that this was a public relations effort in which one of the documents you find on the legacy collection says. industries have used these types of campaigns, sowing the seeds of uncertainty, in order to do

business in the face of new knowledge. these are the four filters. reassured and anxious public. arthur godfree later died of lung cancer. frederick march. what the doctor ordered. byound the document online rj reynolds in my 253. he says we've been doing

experiments on filters and we a few very the ph, the color of the filter will change and in groups of tests with consumers we thought if we change the color to yellow or brown, consumers believe these are the most effective. at the same time, he knew these filters were not effective for removing any of the carcinogens but he said i think we should get a patent on this because it could be beneficial to marketing. this is in your collection. 1953. molboro maybe dramatic shift from being a woman's cigarette to being a filtered cigarette directed at men. this idea of the independent cowboy was one who would do things against the grain.

this campaign had an encouragement of independence in the face of knowledge. living alone on the range, the cowboy image, the image of independence from knowledge. mid-1950's, there was categorical knowledge that smoking caused lung cancer and it has been confirmed the range of carcinogens and risk in labs but it became about what is the role of this state. this is one of the sorriest stories in the history of tobacco. the question of how would tobacco products in the industry be regulated. on your left is a tobacco industry research council. one of their people on the far left is holding a cigarette.

is lutherur right terry announcing the findings of the first surgeon general's report. first report was an important innovation and the government taking responsibility for resolving a controversy that have been generated by an andstry for the public good now we do think of these types of consensual reports as one important mechanism for attempts to end controversies that are often generated by industries and this becomes the model for that kind of work in which they assembled a group of scientists. it would come up with a categorical conclusion. not much good evidence regulatory initiative.

even theow that legislation requiring packages wasabeled with a warning strongly supported by the tobacco industry whose lawyers were warning themit would protect against possible suits. turningegulation and it. question isabout the responsibility for the harms of

smoking. focused on questions of the law and litigation. you are familiar with the emergence of tobacco litigation. started suing as early as almost always without success. it was incredibly expensive to sure, e. in the book, i knew it a lot of the story of rose chipp alone. she eventually developed lung cancer and a young lawyer

her out.-- sought she agrees to sue five of the .ig tobacco companies a the tobacco industry said we are not sure smoking caused lung cancer. the plaintiffs have presented evidence to suggest it did but we've resented evidence that causets smoking did not her particular type of cancer. this was a classic industry defense. they said the real issue is not her cancer and what caused it, the issue is she was an independent, intelligent woman and she knew a lot about the controversy regarding smoking, and she made an independent decision to continue to smoke. it would be wrong for the jury to hold our companies

responsible for the independent and autonomous decision that alone made. these are the brands to smoke d. there were similar slide in the trial. in the closing arguments, they we saw a lot of great documents. we know they knew it caused cancer. they knew it was addictive and yet they put out apps like this like this and had a campaign to confuse their very patrons. at its time for companies to begin to take responsibility for

the health carnage that over the course of the 20th century's has caused. in the end, the jury found in favor of the company and said lone should be held responsible for her smoking. if there's any single theme in my project, it was an analysis of this question of individual versus corporate responsibility and how those questions have been articulated and manipulated and now i'm prepared to argue into our own time for questions of responsibility and adult smoking are beginning to predominate again. these are characteristic tobacco ads of the later part of the 20th century. notoriouscampaign is

for its pitch to kids. knew itnow the industry but couldn't get at the youth market, it was done for the company and the competition with phillip morris. even though it took great heat for running a cartoon character campaign pitch towards case, it did it because it knew it needed a significant percentage of the youth market. this is well documented. the industry continues in the 21st century to spend over $15 billion a year promoting cigarettes in the u.s. alone. some campaigns have been successful. one of the things that turned the tide against smoking were the ideas doctors were quitting. that help patients a lot. the critical issues of secondhand smoke.

as long a smoking was perceived as individual risk, tobacco control programs are not going far. the idea of this risk was imposed on non-smokers as we know from the work done here radically transformed the meaning of smoking in the second half of the 20th century. these are some of the suits that have been success will to some degree -- successful to some degree. this is mike moore who led the state attorney general sued -- suit. we don't have labels like this in the u.s. but these are labels from canada and brazil. two summers ago and wanted to buy a pack with

this label and i asked the clerk for that pack and i was crazy because customers have been trading it back for less offensive warning label. this leads me to what turns out to be the final question. we've seen substantial reductions of smoking in the u.s. it's one of the great stories of public health in the 20th century going from almost half of volatile smoking to one in five. obviously that's a very big number that produces many diseases but for people who say ,t's hard to change behaviors we've had significant success in reducing the numbers of smokers. i originally thought the book because -- because of the rise and fall of the cigarette but i realized how parochial that is.

the industry has been remarkably effective in the new smokers. this raises profound moral and ethical issues for public health. in 2000, 4 million people died of tobacco related diseases worldwide. half in the developed world, half in the developing. to2030, the number will jump 10 million but of that, 7 million will be in the developing world as a result of the dramatic expansion of smoking taking place over the last 25 years. 4-5 timesris is doing his business in the u.s. overseas. it's making most profits by a

wide margin by selling overseas. this is a chart from my colleague robert proctor. cited -- it'sdely a figure widely cited. 100 million people died of tobacco related diseases worldwide in the 20th century. the world health organization x more than one billion -- health organization expects more than one billion people will die of smoking related illnesses the 21st century stop this inverts our knowledge of the relation of science to practice.

if we know more, we can use the knowledge in socially productive, important ways. we know more about the harms of smoking than any product and consumer history but we can expect a 10 time growth in the number of deaths in the 21st century. this raises profound questions about capacity and morality. on the left are cambodian monks. on your right is a tobacco vendor in indonesia. scenes, one street from shanghai. sergei, at is of

seven-year-old in st. petersburg. smokingts on only marlboro cigarettes. this was taken in 1995. i can help but think what has happened to him, a street child in st. petersburg. funny finish by telling you one last story from the book. graham --d everything everet graham. he was skeptical that smoking caused lung cancer. you develop the surgical techniques for treating individuals with lung cancer in the 1930's, trying to save the lives of individuals with lung cancer. he had a debate with a colleague , a well-known surgeon, and when

he first saw the charter of the and hiscancer colleagues had never seen a lung cancer patient who didn't smoke, graham was skeptical. eventually, graham as a result of doing his own work becomes convinced that smoking causes lung cancer. i like to read you one last paragraph. graham had quit smoking. be well understood the difficulty of withdrawing from nicotine. but as decades of exposure to tobacco smoke would confirm in the most personal way, what his and wonders research demonstrated. friend, he wrote to his

perhaps you've heard i recently been a patient because of a bilateral carcinoma. oxner wrote back, thank you for your letter, which crushed me. to thinkrrible thing you have carcinoma, a condition for which you've done so much. two weeks later, graham died, the victim of the disease that had been the center of his professional life. in the end, he became one more data point in the legal history of smoking. smoking. history of thank you very much. [applause] mr. brandt: i would be happy to take questions. there is a microphone that will go around so we can get your

questions. if you have a question, make sure you get the mike. -- ic. mic. participant ina litigation and i wonder if you could say something about your colleagues in the extent to which they may have testified for one side or another and tobacco litigation. >> proper nose a bit about how i feel about this -- he knows a bit about how i feel. i've been skeptical about testifying in tobacco litigation. lawyers would come to see me and i would say talk to robert proctor. i felt in a way working on the book, i wanted the book to have a standing outside of the litigation.

came to see mey from the department of justice and showed me a for statements written by -- expert statements written by well-known historians. people like peter english at duke, pediatricians. these guys were testifying on behalf of fellow morris. he showed me their -- phillip morris. he showed me their statements and i was absolutely appalled at the professional historical work they had done. things like there was a controversy, skeptics, and possible to know. i have been working in the archives for a decade and i couldn't believe it professional historian would do this. me lawyer for the doj told the judge is going to believe

that refresh your medical historians side with the industry if you won't testify. i understood my social inponsibility in a new way, a way that's been important to me personally. workinga lot of time for the interests of public health and the litigation. i once thought there were some boundaries in some ways between our work as advocates and our work in the sciences or social sciences. the center here shows how important science is to advocacy and good scientific or good historical work is crucial to the efforts of public health. i learned a great deal working for the department of justice on

an important case and ultimately the judge decided the major tobacco companies had violated the racketeering statutes that congress originally passed to go after organized crime. it speaks volume to the character of this industry. there's more to be said about historians testifying but it's appalling to see professional historians working for the industry in this way. other questions? in the back. >> i wanted to ask if you could clarify some of the moral and ethical implications for globalization.

do you have any suggestions on structural or cultural changes in public help to address some of these concerns? mr. brandt: it's a very important question. with them public health, we need to be thinking more about the larger ethical and moral questions of population health and how to encourage it. of of the worst examples ethical and moral behavior was in the 1980's and early 1990's when our government was working so aggressively to open new markets to american tobacco companies at the very time that our surgeon general was discouraging americans from smoking and trying to build tobacco control here. this raises a fundamental question. if the result of our quitting will be more people smoking somewhere else, we really haven't thought through adequately how to deal with this problem.

i followed pretty closely the evolution of the framework convention for tobacco control, the world's first treaty organized for public health and tobacco. the world health organization's first treaty since its inception. skeletal. it's i think it offers opportunities for thinking about aspects of global governance and the interrelationship of nationstates and society and thinking about controlling risks like the cigarette. when you ask about the wall and ethical issues, over 140 countries have signed and ratified the framework convention for tobacco control. the principal major country that hasn't is the u.s. as we all know. the bush administration hasn't forwarded the treaty for ratification to our senate.

these are the kinds of issues we need to be talking about in order to think of new strategies to better human health and their complicated because they are often very powerful industrial and economic interests on the other side. >> i'm going to preface my question by saying thank you. as a professional tobacco control researcher and a scientist, i find a general history about this field to be really useful in framing a more specific question i ask and i really enjoyed dr. proctor's book. i want to ask you who you hope reads this book and have your publisher will be marketing it. is it academic, general? mr. brandt: i have some ambitious hopes for the book. [laughter] mr. brandt: i wrote the book in a language and in a style very

deliberately that was not directed at my colleagues and this is a big problem in historical and other social science scholarship now because .e tend to write for each other there is a lot of that literature we've learned. bet said, i think we need to writing histories that are .eally for the general public i wrote the book in that way. it's long because it's a complicated story but i think readers will find and i hope when they read it the larger points are there to be accessed

and the broader questions have to be framed in a way that can be part of a public debate. this is my hope for the book is that i will help in a small way. i hope that in a small way it can help to generate some of these questions. how do we think about social response ability for public health. a smoking release an aspect of individual judgment by adult? i don't think so and i think we really need to direct attention to the historical evolution of that ideal within the culture that the industry has helped to create and exploit so effectively. we will take a question here. talking about theory. let me ask you a difficult

question. i would struggle as a fellow historian with it also so i will toss it your way. many would say historical advocacy for collective control of the public health just plays into and perpetuates a -- a disciplinary operation of power through surveillance. that chimes effectively with a libertarian argument that is often employed by the tobacco industry or other industrial complexes also about individual

states and paternalist bureaucracy undermining individual liberty. how does a historical scholarship as advocacy for public health with the expansion of public health intervention, how do you reconcile that with some of the critiques that would come from within our own profession? i think what we need to do is about ther arguments role of the state in nature of public health, especially in the face of certain incredibly powerful economic and industrial interests, which really shaped many of the questions of global health and the availability of pharmaceuticals.

i think there are a lot of questions at stake in the history of the cigarette that speak to the broad questions of individual liberties versus the material burden of disease. my own field took any terms that need to be modified, if this that we lost touch with the material burden of disease, which was one of the central questions historians wanted to understand. how does the material burden of disease change over time and what is significant? i'm sympathetic to reading a lot of theory but my principal goals were to take on a problem of real significance to human health and the population level and how to understand the dynamics that drive it and our capacity in terms of institutions to remedy those

causes of poor health. i think that's a very valuable potential for many new works in the larger field. there was a question here. >> have you weighed in on the fda legislation that is currently being debated in congress? mr. brandt: i've given it a lot of thought and followed it closely. it occurred to me when of the complexities of the debate about -- mygulation is -- rjtion would be reynolds is against it and on the other side, philip morris is for it as is matt myers. split thesue that has tobacco industry and has the

potential to split on the tobacco control advocacy community significantly. just from a pragmatic point of i don't see serious fda regulation coming through this congress. the real question for us is how has congress failed to adequately bring this industry to regulatory account and there are many things congress could do from the control of vertising that's directed at youth to taxation policy to the greater revelation of what's in tobacco. i think congress could act. federal fda that control at the structure -- juncture is going to lead to significant reductions in these of tobacco.

now pointry is right where it's searching for a new social legitimacy. inevitably be used to say we are legal product regulated by the fda. given the particular historical moment we're living through and where i see the full of morris campaigns, we produce a product for adults that's regulated. i think there are vulnerabilities in the current legislation. it's not to say fda regulation is good or bad. the question is who will serve now in this particular context through this particular legislation.

>> since there's no evidence that smoking tobacco can be used without producing this obama's burden of disease, it seems there's this evidence that saying it does produces obamas burden of disease and wire we --ing any other questions why aren't we asking any other questions other than what's the most strategic way to stop in tobacco? mr. brandt: what the strategic and pragmatic approach to making smoke-free --lly genuinely smoke-free. one of the things i found in the book is in many ways, the cigarette was grandfathered. it was a historic product based on a crop grown before europeans even got here. it became an incredible economic engine of the development of the early states.

really dealing with a product with this historical weight. i don't think realistically a ban is in our immediate future but we should be looking aggressively at ways of reducing the burden of disease associated with smoking. i think we only at the beginning of that effort. . >> this is following up on your question. it did remind me that the concern about the libertarian approach and the concern about

individuality and the role of the state reminds me of an article a few years ago. in the 50's, there was concern about government manipulation of science and scientists have to be independent of interference by government, etc. now, the concern that we should be shifted toward corporate manipulation of science. culture is a, the little slow in picking up and thatstanding the role industries play in manipulating science to facilitate and increasing their profits. i'm wondering if historians who

oursort of more postmodern understanding or if they're taking into account this increased role of the corporations influencing science. mr. brandt: it's a key point. we've spoken a lot about the authority of the state. one of the reasons why states activeacted -- have been are in reconciling the authority of industry. we have a regulatory state in the u.s. that is only partly successful in regulating. and at the things i argue is in the case of tobacco, you have an instance where there is virtually a complete failure in the federal state regulation of this article or product. it's an interesting thing, your point about the concerns the states get involved in science

and after the second world war and the nats experience, there were tremendous concerns about. partly what i'm pointing to is that the state had an important role to play in the character of resolving scientific controversies that were timely and a public moment. forink it's a kind of model how we might conduct business. , we run intond age a lot of conflicts of interest. the interest of industry are diffused. thely what are argue is industry created the entire issue of conflicts of interest because they have to be dissected in order to have reliable and valid science. these are really critical questions. one of the things the industry likes to do in the cases is talked about that's public health science. it has this aura of the state

controlling it and it's not as good as real science. every time i read an article where you see someone using the term -- but that was public health science, you can be sure that the tobacco industry has helped to fund that. [laughter] >> thank you for your eloquent talk. it has really opened up my eyes. i'm a psychologist and i'm interested in studying adolescents choosing to smoke and continuing to smoke. angst.s caused me some i'm interested in the individual's choice to smoke and i frame it in that way so i was discussing that wondering if you could discuss how that discussion might play out now as it's coming to public discourse and how that might take shape in

the scientific community. mr. brandt: is a critically important question. a framing of individuality, individual metonymy. i think that we need to have strategies to help adolescents and kids assert their independence against certain types of influence, if not manipulation. where our public health campaigns have gone in that direction we have seen some success. or the industry wants to be is to say we don't direct any attention to children. smoking is now clearly an adult choice of risk. there are many risks and one of the risks people may decide to take a smoking. but the history of cigarette use avert that.--

most people start younger than as adults and most adults want to quit but find they can't. we need to look for aspects of their individuality that enhance their ability to resist. is a little like what i was saying about the engineering of consent. people want to believe this is a sign of my independence, my attraction. the industry likes to say people peert smoking because of pressure. it we know the industry was eer pressure and how to enhance it in the relationship of the use of tobacco. i talked relatively recently to a group of 14 and 15-year-olds. one of them came up to me afterwards and said i didn't have any friends until i started smoking. i think we need to understand

better some of the secondary gains that adolescence and youth associate with smoking if we are going to be able to fulfill some of those needs more successfully for kids. there's so much important work to be done in your field. we'lls a field where over ourhave to look shoulders at how the industry is framing questions. we will take a question back here. >> [indiscernible] what is your view on this car at

argument going on in academic integration and the issue of academics not taking money from the industry? these are will be important questions. -- really important questions. . one of the things that we know from history is that many institutions took tobacco money from way back. i know that harvard took money. millionmorris gave $20 to the university of virginia to fund research on tobacco cessation. issues remains a critical in thinking about the integrity isour institutions and there

just no question that the industry used the funding of legitimate, academic science to enhance its own legitimacy, to claim the importance of its work , and so i have to say i feel very strongly that academic institutions should not be taking tobacco money, and that should be there policy. and one of the things that the industry wants to do is give it to good things, like they say, we want to give it to cancer research at the university, because we believe there should be better cancer research, but in this instance, we know how this industry has used those kinds of moneys to curry political and social favor and to legitimate itself in the public eye. deans who say that

we cannot look at all of where our money is coming from, and i know that is difficult. i know there are other important questions about what kind of money comes into universities, but even this history, and this is where i really base my argument on a historical argument, if you are phillip morris, you can just say, we are starting over again. forget this history. we are giving money to good causes. they want history to go away, and i have to say that i really have to tell you how much i admire robert proctor's work, and robert said, first they bought the science and now they would like to buy the history. as academics working to an institution that is dedicated to the social good, we have to say, we are not taking of money. other questions? question here. around?ic

here we go. >> can i take it from a comment that you made earlier that you would support a ban on the sale of cigarettes? i just don't know if i would be right there for a ban on cigarettes. i am thinking very strategically about pragmatic policies. what i do know is that if cigarettes were no longer sold, we would be benefiting public health in countless ways here and around the world. i don't think that that is where the policy debate is right now, so, mi for banning -- am i for banning cigarettes? it just seems like too hypothetical question. we are just getting a hold of need to get ad we

hold of it. i have no question that if we didn't have cigarettes, we would be in a way better shape. and i am very concerned about the developing world where they are addressing a burden of disease that confines -- combines critical epidemics with diseases. we understand that burden of diseases in a much more effective way than we have in the past, and their burden of the disease looks much more like the developed world, only with much greater numbers. to be confronting aids and tuberculosis at the same time you're confronting cardiovascular disease that is incurred by smokers, it is going to be putting a burden on early systems and if the structures -- system and infrastructures that is going to be unbearable. >> another question, how do you way into the underground -- weigh in to the idea of an underground market comparable to prohibition? likes toe industry

talk about prohibition and they say, well, what about black markets question mark -- black markets? i always hear my economist friends say, well, i don't like bans,r about tobacco there with your black market. but every policy has anticipated and unanticipated -- anticipated unanticipated consequence. but i think strategically, we should be looking at very substantial strategies for reducing tobacco use, that is where i am. [indiscernible]

the question of prohibition, then you have to go down the road of debating the legalization of other addictive substances. liberal,nd, there is a political argument about decriminalizing other addictive substances because of social conflict and social injustice that the criminalization of it causes, and we are all very familiar with that. but if you end up with tobacco as the only addictive substance that was virtuously prohibited, then you have a level of inconsistency in your argument. allan: i think there are very complicated problems about bans, and i think we should think about it more as a group. everything is on the table. shows we need to

be strategic about how to reduce harms to people, and this would and ellicitcit drugs. any questions before we stop? has really been a pleasure and i really enjoy being here and i really admire all of the work that so much if you are doing. thank you so much for having me. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] on history bookshelf, here from some of the best writers in the past half-century. for more information, visit our website at c-span.org\history. history tv.hing truman's wifey

had little to say to the media especially after some particular public moments. [laughter] she spent a good part of her white house years home and in his or he -- and in missouri. c-span's program "first ladies: influence and image." from martha washington to michelle obama on american history tv on c-span3. >> today, i am a reporter for went back to the office and i called him up and i said, mr. mayor, i have just been to club 55, don't you realize where people are --

realize that people are watching what you do and where you go and people see you watching naked girls? and there was a pause on the phone and then he said, "it's nice, isn't it?" theuncer: time sure what on political corruption in washington, d.c., maryland, and elsewhere. -- tom scheerd sheerwood: certain politicians wouldn't report gifts. the problem is, bob mcdonald had been potentially considered as a vice president shall candidate. that's -- vice provincial candidate -- vice president presidential candidate. in august of 1945, 70

years ago, american forces dropped two atomic bombs over hiroshima and one next, we will , whofrom murray peshkin site oft the new mexico los alamos on the manhattan project. involvedow did i get in the manhattan project? i was an undergraduate student in cornellol university, and it was obvious that we could not be kept out of the army for very long. they were looking for programs

in which we could serve, and i really believe that there was something else behind it. in the first world war, a man, whom i think was named henry , the youngest and probably the most promising young atomic scientist in the country, had, against the -- advice of his friends and colleagues, had fought in the infantry and died to risk that was a shocking thing to the entire science community. and i think our professors were really trying to save us. it wasn't that los alamos needed me. >> tell us about your road to los alamos. urray: well, i was informed by one of my professors that there

was this project where i could serve and make use of what little training in physics i already had and that it would be a really good thing to do and, secret, is completely would be somewhere in the united states, but i would not be able to tell my family where and would not see them again until the end of the war. and that was really all he would tell me it, except that he advised me to go that way, and so i did. oft happened was, at the end the semester, i informed my draft board that i was ready, i , i was sent tod basic training in louisiana, and somewhere in the middle of basic training, i was pulled out and sent very dramatically on a train with about 10 other young men with sealed orders which carried us first east to oak

ridge and the north to cincinnati and so on, and finally to a train which took us to los alamos. it was a very interesting demonstration, i realized later, of the power of that project, because not only could they pull us out not just when people were needed to fight in the infantry, but even in traveling, whatever we got to any station, we were given immediate priority. is it lewis, we were given our own -- in st. louis, we were given our own railway car and our own engine to pull it. at the station in santa fe, we got off of this train and we found ourselves in the middle of a desert. we were tired and dirty and

discouraged and we wanted to sit down and cry, but we were ashamed. eventually a car came and picked us up and took us to los alamos. also in the army was david green greenglass, a notorious spy. he was not in my barracks. fellowa mutual friend, a soldier, who had an apartment in albuquerque where he met his wife weekends. she was also in the army but not at los alamos but nearby. and one time his wife was away for a few months and greenglass came to him and begged him to let my friend use that apartment for his wife to stay. she was in the last part of , seemedy and he was rather pathetic. andriend knew greenglass

disliked him intensely, as did i, by the way, and he asked me my opinion and i said, don't do it. this guy is nothing but trouble. but he did it anyway because he felt like a dog in the manger. well, that was the apartment where greenglass gave his secret information to his rosenberg-law, julius , and in the end, i friend had serious problems with the afterty people about that the war and it even rubbed off a little on me because i defended him, which was not the political thing to do during mccarthyism, but the consequences for me were minor, mainly because i was lucky that mccarthyism was just about over by the time that they got to me.