resistance in the communist party to his reforms. >> i think it's fair you weren't getting questions from the consumers about the state of the soviet economy. it was ultimately the state of the economy that couldn't keep up. in several years in working this process i never had a policymaker ask me about the state of the soviet economy except one occasion. wineburger wanted to know how measure the rubel against the dollar because he wanted to use it in armed services testimony. that's how you get answers to the question you're asking. when there was little interest in the state of the soviet economy, there wasn't a lot of focus on it. there was some surprise that had proved to be so weak and so

fragile that it led to the class. >> thank you very much. we're through our appointed time. we'll break for now and come back at 3:30. i believe there's a break outside for all of you. then mcraven will have his remarks. [ applause ]

let me also thank director jim clapper and director john brennan, two very close friends who have worked with me side by side for many years now. we are really blessed to have these two gentlemen in the positions they are in. i can't think of any two guys that have done more to protect this nation over the years than jim clapper and john brennan. gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us today. [ applause ] and i also want to recognize again former director porter goss. great to have you here. you've added a lot to the last two days. i would be remiss if i didn't call out my very good friend and

ment mentor, admiral. he has graciously worked with me as i have established my tenure here at the university of texas. thank you again very much. i'm going to approach this a little bit differently here. you've been looking at the first customer. now we're going to take intelligence and move it down to a tactical level. then frankly i hope to be able to walk you from the tactical back up to the first customer. i've been asked to talk about why is intelligence necessary. i want to start off with a little bit of a thought experiment. in the world of special operations one of the things we have to tackle often are hostage rescues. put yourselves in a situation where you have a hostage situation, and you have perfect intelligence on what is going on in the single room. you have a single room. there's a hostage. he is on the right side of the room. he is in a chair. he is bound. you know exactly where he is.

there's the hostage taker. the hostage taker is on the other side of the room. you know exactly what weapons systems he has. you know the dimensions of the room. you know the thickness of the walls. you have some understanding of the intent of the hostage taker, and you have some understanding of how the hostage himself or herself might react. you know how the door swings open. you have for all intent and purposes perfect intelligence. and the purpose of that intelligence of course is to mitigate the risk to a manageable level. on the outside of that door you have special operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that were prepared to go in and rescue this hostage. you have it throughout those points in time, so it is constant intelligence. of course, what that does for you is it really does reduce that risk to a manageable level. now, always in the process of going through the door you blow the door open. the first man through the door

could stumble and that creates problems and the next man has to adjust. all those sorts of things are in play. with perfect intelligence, the chances of success on that particular operation are very high. so when we look at intelligence from a military standpoint -- and i'll talk a little bit later about how i think policymakers use this intelligence -- from the military standpoint, we love to -- the defense is stronger than the offense, but the defense just has to preserve and protect while the offense has to impose its will upon the enemy. the defense only has to preserve and protect. the offense has to impose its will on the enemy. if you're going to impose your will on the enemy, the better the intelligence, the more likely you are to be successful against the stronger form, i.e. the defense. of course, intelligence is never

perfect. so we'll start with imagery, image intelligence. many years ago in 2005 we were tracking a very, very high value al qaeda target in iraq, but in 2005 the special forces there, we had only one predator. the predators were fairly new on the battlefield. we had a very qualified special operations force, but we had one aircraft. and we had been tracking this individual through human intelligence and we knew that he was going to have -- or we suspected he was going to be in a certain place out in al ramadi. we had our human intelligence surrounding where we thought the human link up was going to be with this bad guy. as the link up was occurring, we were not able to verify the individual in question was there. we thought we had identified the appropriate vehicle that the bad

guy was in and the vehicle started to move. and that was fine because we had a single predator overhead and we were watching as this vehicle moved and then a second vehicle joined the convoy. now we had two vehicles. at some point in time they came to a crossroad. the lieutenant colonel who was working for me turned and look at me and said, you have to call it. are we going left? or are we going right? we took the right. we followed the vehicle on the right for quite sometime. and again, the predator flies at a fairly high altitude. this was 2005. the quality of the sensors weren't all that great, but all of a sudden the vehicle stopped at a palm grove. right at that moment in time as we were watching this vehicle the optical ball that is underneath the predator recycled. it goes from a picture that appears to be a couple 100

meters away to a picture that is now several thousand feet away. it recycled up and it shocked us all. we could still see the vehicle. but instead of the vehicle being this large, it was now about this big. about 15 seconds later the ball reactivated and came back done. we thought good. everything's fine. we continued to follow the vehicle.e finally my patience ran out. so we interjected the vehicle. we stopped the vehicle. there was just a driver inside. not the guy we were looking for. there was an ak-47 in the back and a laptop. we scarfed that up. as we began to do the forensics, we went back and looked and we thought something is amiss here. as we did the forensics, we found right at that point in time when that optical ball recycled and went in from a

close-in view to a distance view the individual ran into a palm grove and we missed him. it took us another year to kill this individual. in that year's time dozens of americans and hundreds or thousands of iraqis were killed. and it really shows us both the power of imagery intelligence and also the limitations. the other technical intelligence we use is signals intelligence. i won't go into a great deal of detail. we have the ability to understand what is happening between two individuals on various communications. at one point in time in a country far, far away, not iraq or afghanistan, we were pursuing a target and we had interpreted listening to the two individuals on their devices. we thought again they were going to link up with a very high-value target in this particular country. so we stood ready to conduct a strike.

and as the operation evolved and we were continuing to pull in technical intelligence, we took the opportunity and took the strike and while it was a bad guy, it was not the bad guy we were looking for. later on, i was asked a question about the quality of the intelligence and how i viewed the risk and how that risk was, in fact, presented to the decision makers up the chain of command. it is something as a user of intelligence and a conveyer of the quality of the intelligence and the need for action that i never forgot. suffice to say -- and i'll talk a little bit more about it -- you have to be certain the quality of the intelligence you get is, in fact, reducing the risk. we have other types of intelligence where we have large sensor devices, and we use this quite a bit in iraq and afghanistan to hopefully locate buried homemade explosives. we would position these sensors on large aircraft.

they could at times determine whether or not a particular route, a road had been dug up, and a homemade explosive had been put in that road. the technology was good, but it was hardly perfect. many times we would send assault folks in based on the intelligence we had to see if we could diffuse the weapon. it turned out it was some young boy digging in a road that had no bearing on the threat that we perceived it to be. of course, there's always human intelligence. that's probably the hardest of the intelligence, but frankly the most important and the most vital in terms of understanding the context. of course, human intelligence gives you a sense of the intent of the individual. nothing i think is harder to determine than the intent of a particular individual no matter whether you know them well or do not. you just never know what their next move will be. so what we have tried to do since 9/11 is how do we go about improving the quality of

intelligence? so in the imt realm, the quality of the image, of course, has increased dramatically . in the early days, the isr, the optical ball, is what we could consider standard definition, so the quality of the image you got was sometimes a little grainy. not that you couldn't see people very clearly, but it didn't also operate well at night, so there were a lot of problems with it. as time as gone on and technology has gottenssfx betted better, the quality of that image is as clear as i'm looking at you in some cases and that's very, very important because, again, the purpose of the intelligence is to buy down the risk. if you don't understand the factors that are involved in creating that risk, if you're looking at a picture that isn't as clear as you think it is, then that risk is greater and you're not going to be able to provide the options that you want to the decision makers.

you also need more angles. i talked about the fact we had one predator. if one predator is good, more predators are better. the fact of the matter is a single angle on a target, particularly as we were looking at afghanistan, many times we would be looking at a compound in afghanistan. the angle of the view was obstructed by the compound itself, so consequently you went in without perfect intelligence. sometimes without good intelligence, but it was better because you had some angle. working predators with support with the aircraft in the sky all that requires a very delicate and sophisticated dance and that's very difficult to do, but it is important to make sure under the imagery aspect of this you have multiple angles. fortunately, over time what we found was some ith some of our

platforms is they were limited in time frame. the helicopter was limited by fuel. in the middle of the operation you would have to land the helicopter. it was the only helicopter with the only optical ball we had. you just couldn't do business that way. we invested a lot in making sure we had multiple platforms in order to do the job. then we talked about the time frame. when you look at the pdbs and what they provide the president in terms of strategic intelligence and operational intelligence -- frank asked a question yesterday to director brennan and i about the quality of intelligence and what you can get down to the soldier today. what you can get to the soldier today is unprecedented. the soldier in the fox hole can have a visual view of the battlefield, but if that view is time linked and i associate with

it -- i have a box at the stadium to watch the football games. we have a number of tvs up in the box, but the tvs are about five seconds late. you know what means when you're watching football and you hear everybody cheer and you look up and wonder what they're cheering about? five seconds later you find out what they were cheering about. in the world of intelligence when that intelligence has to be so timely because it is being relayed to the operator, the soldier on the ground, five seconds can be a lifetime fi. five seconds can mean the difference between life and death. the timing between the actual capture of the image and the return is as small as you can make it. it is about making sure the

analysts you have and the interpreters that you have are good. as we are chasing bad guys around the world, some of the dialects we are trying to translate are not common. therefore there may be one or two people in the department of defense that speak this particular dialect. and they may not speak it as well as you would hope they would speak it. in the middle of a complex operation as you are trying to interpret the nature and the intent of the bad guys through technical intelligence, the nature of that translator is absolutely critical. i learned this the hard way as well when i was giving a speech to the graduating west point academy points in afghanistan. i got up and gave what i thought was a rousing, fabulous speech to the graduating class. and i got a very polite applause at the end.

i thought, boy, i missed have missed the mark. your translator is terrible. he misrepresented everything you said. and so if you take that to an intelligence standpoint and you realize if you do not have the right translator, your understanding of the intent, therefore your understanding of the risk is entirely different. and the analystnalysts. we have a lot of analysts that look at these sort of things and it is the same problem set. you have to have analysts that understand in context what's going on. on the human side, we really do look at the training. the cia are without a doubt the world's finest when it comes to intelligence analysis. we have great folks across the intelligence community, all the parts of the ic, some fabulous intel analysts. what separates us, the u.s.

intelligence community, is the quality of the training that these analysts go through in order to be analysts. it is like any other aspect of life. you have the rookie analysts and you have the experienced ed analysts. the reason you have the quality of pdb briefer you have is because that individual has spent a lot of time being an l analy analyst. then again understanding the behavior of the individual. a lot of times we're chasing people that we know very little about. somebody in one of the organizations with the intelligence community knows something about them. and that person becomes a subject matter expert on a particular individual. sometimes there's only one person or maybe one or two people and you really do rely a lot on them to provide you the analysis of that particular individual and that target set.

as you look at the various types of intelligence, what we learn very quickly in the war in iraq is really where we started this is you have to be able to fuse the intelligence. we have always known that. the intelligence agencies have always understood that, but sometimes on the battlefield you tended to take whatever you got, an image, a technical intelligence, a human intelligence, and that became a little bit of your only source intelligence. what you have to be able to do is fuse them all together. it is the fused intelligence that now reduces your risk again. i go back to my scenario of the room. if all you have in that room is a camera that is observing the hostage and the hostage taker, then you don't understand the dialogue that's going on between the two. if you have the dialogue but you don't have a photo or a video stream, you have an incomplete picture. what is critical is to take these various types of intelligence and fuse them together. this is, again, a very important aspect of what we did in iraq.

not only did we fuse them, but from the military standpoint we realized we were not the sole source of intelligence when it came came to the various types of intelligence. we would bring in cia, national geospatial agency, iraqi intelligence. we created these fusion cells. also the conventional forces were part of these fusion cells. if you want to pass information and use information, you need to be to understand what's going on onyfqt the ground. so you pulled all the subject matter experts together in a single place and you would look at a target and fuse the intelligence to reduce the risk on a particular mission. we used a lot of what we called

metcalfe's law. metcalfe created this law sometime ago that talks about telecommunications networks. in it when you look at a telecommunications network what he said was if you add a new node to a telecommunications network, so if you have "a" and "b" and then you add "c," you get exponential power. every time you add a node, you expone exponential increase the knowledge and the power of the intelligence that's out there. we had analysts from all the intel communities. you had a much better look at

the picture on the ground. and this was vitally important. again, with each node you added, you had a better understanding of the picture. so we took this concept of fusion and we started off small with fusion cells. we created these locally grown joint interagency task forces in iraq and then afghanistan. we began to partner the iraq and afghanistan node when we found out the enemy network did not see any boundaries between iraq and syria and afghanistan and pakistan and other places. then we created this global chart where we could look at the problem set globally. we became better and better. now let's talk about the intelligence and its role to the policymakers. i will use a little bit -- another football analogy, if i can. when you look at two opposing teams on the football field and you said i'm going to have perfect intelligence on my

opponent and i'm going to be able to steal their signals. i'm going to know exactly what i need to know about each player, which one's hurt, which one stayed up the night before, how fast are they. you know how they're going to play on the football field and you say i got it. i have perfect intelligence on that football team. the problem is if that football team happens to be the dallas cowboys and you're a high school footba football team, i don't care how good your intelligence is. it's not going to help you. this is the point for poli policymake policymakers. it's not just about the intelligence. it's about using the intelligence to understand what your options are and how to apply those options against the problem set. i had a chance to talk to the texas football team a couple of weeks ago, and i was talking to them about the notre dame game. the notre dame game of 2007. in the notre dame game -- this

was notre dame and the naval academy. the naval academy had not beaten the university of notre dame in 40 years. it was a given that notre dame was going to beat the naval academy. they had half a dozen four and five-star recruits on the notre dame team. i asked the players on the longhorns, i said i want y'all to raise your hands on those of you who wanted to go to the naval academy to play football. nobody raised their hand. exactly right. you had the case of the dallas cowboys against the high school team. well, the game goes into its first overtime. conclusion of the regular time frame. goes into its first overtime. goes into its second overtime. goes into its third overtime. the navy beats notre dame 47-43. my point to them is navy studied

notre dame. navy understood what notre dame's strengths were and navy understood where their weaknesses were and they developed a plan. they reduced the risk to a manageable level to defeat notre dame. that's the value of intelligence to policymakers. we'll talk about the bin laden raid. the cia did a fantastic job in providing us the intelligence and operators for the bin laden raid. the fact of the matter is we didn't know what the inside of the compound looked like because we're just not able quite to do that. we weren't exactly whether in fact it was bin laden. we thought it was about a 50/50 chance at best. there was a lot of things we didn't know about the compound where bin laden was, but when we presented it to the president, it was, well, mr. president,

we're the dallas cowboys and they're the high school football. we will be successful on this. we have the intelligence we need, but our team is better than their team. and that is the nature of what policymakers have got to grapple with. what are their options? what are their options? what the president did for me in the bin laden raid said i not only want you to be the dallas cowboys. i want you to be the dallas cowboys that won the super bowl. come up with every plan b, c, d, and e so we have all the contingencies. we continued to mitigate the risk. so now let's take that scenario of a single football team against a single football team, the cowboys against the high school team, my s.e.a.l.s against the bin laden compound

or isil, or da'esh as people call it. this is not the single room in the thought experiment. this is a room with another room and another room and another room and another room and another room. these are problems on top of problems on top of problems. so when you have multiple factors involved, you have isis. you have the syrian army under assad. you have the moderate syrians. you have our allies and the turks and the jordanians and the saudis and the iraqis. you have the iranians and the russians. so you can see the dilemma that occurs when now all of a sudden what was a nice, clean picture gets multiplied a hundredfold.

i would offer you begin to slice the problem into definable areas and you tackle the best options you can. so what are we going to do against isis? what are my options? how do a build a better team against isis? how do i build a better team to build the syrian military up? how do i encourage the iraqis to be more forceful? in each one of these cases you build an intelligence portfolio that provides the president with options to deal with these problems. unlike the bin laden raid for me, the military against the military target, you have the advantage of having the diplomatic option. diplomacy can work. economics sanctions can work. the military obviously is an option. the law enforcement is an option. the president has to have the intelligence. he has to look at all his options. he has to work out to bite out those options so that he has the

best force to go forward. i will end just with a couple of final thoughts here. as you look at intelligence -- as i said what intelligence brings not only to the battlefield but to the policymakers is the intelligence is there to reduce the risk, to reduce the risk to a manageable level so then you can apply your options against the risk that you know. and sometimes the risk you don't know. the intelligence is there also because it's not always just about offense. in my business it's almost always about offense. it is the nature of special operations to be on the offense. the president and the national security team also is looking for opportunities to be able to play defense against a threat that might come from overseas. we have to work continuously to improve the nature of our intelligence. when you look at the director of national intelligence and director brennan of the cia and the other directors and leaders in the intel community, that's what they do every day because

the game changes every day. the enemy is a thinking enemy. the enemy is a reacting enemy. you're trying to get ahead of their reaction. every time you come up with a solution it won't be long before the enemy comes up with something that counters that and now you're off on another tangent to tackle that aspect of the intelligence. so you are constantly battling this loop, if you will, of the enemy being able to adapt. and then again, as i said, the whole purpose i see it from my standpoint as a military commander and from the standpoint of policymakers is that intelligence helps them with the options that they've got to be able to put on the table to do what is best for the united states of america. i thank you very much. mark, wherever you are, would you like me to take any questions? i can't tell you who killed kennedy. i don't know that.

[ applause ] i can take one or two questions. yes, sir. >> fantastic. do you prefer chancellor mcraven or admiral mcraven or both? >> it's bill to my friends. i'm happy to be called bill or chancellor. my time as an admiral is behind me. >> chancellor mcraven, i have a question for you about a media report that came out four years ago regarding a freedom of information act request for the osama bin laden death photos. yes or no, did you destroy the bin laden photos in request to an foa request? >> thanks. we've answered that question. that's for the record already. you can go back and check the record on that.

thanks. [ applause ] yes, ma'am. >> sasha parsons here. third year student at ut. we have heard a lot about how policymakers are consumers of intelligence. you've spoken about the very strong relationships between the military and the intelligence community. i was wondering if you could go a little bit deeper about what kind of training military operations get. >> we have learned a lot as a nation on how to deal with pulling the interagencies together, how military officers can be better consumers of intelligence. if you back to the gold waters act, it told the military you really need to become joint officers.

so as a naval officer, i was required to spend time with the army and the air force in order to be jointized. when 9/11 happened, we realized that if you want to learn and understand how intelligence is built, how other people think about problem sets, then you have to have this interagency flavor to you. what has become standard is that we cross pollinate all the time with our interagency partners. so a young army captain who in years prior to 9/11 would have gone through the standard schools and learn how to do army intelligence, now they will spend time at the cia or the national geospatial agency. they get a whole different look at, one, how the intelligence is developed, how it is produced, and the questions to ask. by the time that captain becomes

a lieutenant colonel in a combat zone, they are very well schooled and very well educated in the process and understand the questions to ask because they've had an opportunity to live with the people who do this for a living. >> thank you. >> thank you. one more question? okay. seeing none. thank you very much. appreciate it. [ applause ] >> thank you, chancellor mcraven. it is my pleasure to introduce our next speaker, director of national intelligence, james clapper. in his role as dni, he leads the united states intelligence community and serves as the princip principal intelligence adviser to the president. as a lieutenant general in the u.s. air force and director of the defense intelligence agency. after working the private sector

for six years, general clapper returned to government service in 2001 as the first civilian director of the national imagery and mapping agency known today as the national geospatial intelligence agency. he then went on to serve as the undersecretary of intelligence. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming our director of national intelligence, general james clapper. [ applause ] >> thank you, mark, for that kind introduction and thanks for being such a great host. for whomever decided i should follow chancellor mcraven, i'll follow a much more sarcastic thanks. this seems to happen every time i come here. in all seriousness bill mcraven

is a great american, a skilled warrior, and someone i consider a personal hero. he is a national icon. [ applause ] yes. now, i follow the advice and counsel without question that bill mcraven as offered. i know you're familiar with his iconic advice. the first thing is to make your bed. i know you've heard that, and so i did have to -- it was a very early get up for me this morning because i flew here this morning. so i was going to endeavor to make my bed just like bill advises, except i got a groggy but assertive voice from my wife, not this morning. but i tried. but he's right about that. there is wisdom here. if you can't do the little things right, you never get the

big things right. following bill at the lecturn is a big thing. to eliminate, which we rarely can do, or at least reduce uncertainty for a decision maker, whether that decision maker is in the oval office or an oval fox hole. bill, thank you once again for your long and distinguished service and your friendship. also, i want to pay tribute to a mentor of mine, admiral bobby. he's been a mentor for me a lot of years. he officiated at my promotion ceremony for colonel in 1980, 35 years ago. i've never forgotten that. he's been a great mentor to me ever since.

i am very, very pleased and honored to be a part of this significant milestone. it is a significant milestone for the central intelligence agency, but it is also one for the entire intelligence community. this afternoon john brennan, i thought, did an excellent job of taking a long historical look at the president's daily brief in the terms of a year's span. i could not be prouder. i could not ask for a better partner, colleague, friend, and as we call each other, f fox ho buddy than john brennan. i'm so proud of the relationship we've had not only going back to john's teen -- tenure in the white house, but now in the cia.

by the way, the cia modernization effort that john talked about integrating the disciplines and capabilities across the agency reflects changes we have been making as an intelligence community. it will make the agency faster and more responsive to world events.

haven't talked publicly about our work, at least very much. now, i think, the american public expects us to talk about how we're using the power of u.s. intelligence responsibly. we, by the way, certainly includes me. more and more, we're discussing our work, to help correct misunderstandings and to try to help people grasp what we do.

to show we're worthy of america's trust and prove we make worthwhile contributions to the security of americans and our friends and allies around the world. it's why, over the past two years, the community has declassified thousands of pages of documents about our work. importantly, about the oversight of our work that's conducted by all three branches of our government. publishing these declassed documents on our site, i see on the record, and pushing them out on facebook and twitter, they reach millions of people in the u.s. and around the world. that includes, as well, our adversa adversaries, who have also learned a lot from our transparency. the admiral, i think, spoke compellingly about this dilemma. we believe transparency is worth the cost. releasing historical documents like we're doing today is another way we can talk about what we do.

while protecting the trade craft behind today's intelligent work. i believe the pdbs we're releasing today are from an interesting time in our nation's history. i received my commission in the air force when kennedy was president. in fact, in august of 1962, i met president kennedy at rotc summer camp. i was attends in massachusetts. as luck would have it, i was in the front row of the rope line, and president kennedy spoke briefly to each cadet. most of whom he asked were planning to be pilots. he asked what i planned to do in the air force. i said, i wanted to be an intelligence officer. he said, that's good. we need good intelligence offices. never forgot that, obviously. i also served, of course, in air force intelligence through the

johnson's -- president johnson's time in office, and served two tours in southeast asia. the first in vietnam in 1965 and '66. all to say, this event has personal significance for me. i think there is a certain relevance and semmatry. under the terrorism prevention act, the management of the pd process moved from the cia,the central intelligence agency, to the office of the director of national intelligence. so as a result of that, in the past decade, the pdb truly has become an ic product, as john mentioned. but we've tried to build on the pdb process. tried to build on the foundation

of cia's tradition of excellence. i think i can say, and i'm proud to say it, that i believe the intelligence community is living up to the cia legacy. cia continues to be the mainstay of producing pdb articles, but the rest of the ic makes major contributions, as well. all 16 components of the community. every intelligence agency and element has contributed material that has made it to the president. it is truly a community effort. it's been an honor this afternoon to be at this library to talk about the work of our top analysts. president johnson himself once said, quote, a president's hardest task is not to do what is right but to know what is right. having worked closely with him,

i can vouch for his words. knowing what is right, deciding what is right, is the president's hardest task. the ic can't decide for him what is right. he wouldn't want to. when it comes to national security, it is our job to give him the intelligence he needs to help make the hard decisions. i can also vouch that our current president is a faithful and voracious consumer of intelligence. he's been right there with us through the difficulties of the past few years. i believe he has a profound understanding of the intelligence community. the intelligence process. where his intelligence comes from and, importantly, the men and women who do all that. today, as we celebrate the release and publication of the documents that informed presidents kennedy and johnson, each the most powerful man in the world in his turn, i want to assure the american public that today's intelligence and today's

pdbs live up to the cia's tradition of excellence. exemplified by the briefings, you can now read here in president johnson's library. in today's pdbs, tapped the excellence and diversity of thought of the entire intelligence community. again, it was a great honor for me to be here and play a small part in this really significant milestone, not only in the history of the krircia, but the intelligence community. thanks very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, general clapper. to conclude our conference, i'm going to bring up our friend, joe lambert, once again. joe? joe, i want to thank you and the cia for not only releasing these documents, which are really a

treasure-trove to history, but for helping to organize today's conference. i thank you so much. [ applause ] >> this marks -- this concludes the event today. the documents that were referenced throughout today are live right now on the cia's website. you can gain access to them right now. would you join me in thanking all of our senior intelligence community speakers today in the front row, both current and former. [ applause ] they did a terrific job giving you insights into the pdb and the process. as i thank you, we have a small token of our appreciation we'd like to give three organizations. if i could ask for those right now. the first one is for the lbj library, for your help. nice piece of crystal that has the cia's seal and today's event on it.

>> thank you. [ applause ] >> we have one for the university of texas. mcraven, if you could come up for this, please. [ applause ] and we have one for the association of former intelligence officers. jim hughes, if you're in the audience, could you please come up? [ applause ] thank you, folks. safe travels home. [ applause ] up next on c-span3, our new series, landmark cases. with tonight's program focusing on the 1857 supreme court

decision in scott versus sandford. then american history tv continues in primetime with cia director john brennan and other current and former cia officials. talking about the history and importance of the president's daily briefing. all persons having business before the honorable, the supreme court of the united states, draw near and give their attention. >> landmark cases, c-span's special history series, produced in cooperation with the national constitution center. exploring the human stories and constitutional dramas behind 12 historic supreme court decisions. >> number 759. u ernest miranda. petition ner