perhaps what putin has in his mind. the miracle can happen to land the plane out of this tail spin. and this can be essential in increasing prices or something which will make ukraine important and will let the leadership to go out of this tail spin. so, what is important, it's first of all that step is dynamic. it's not just like keeping motionless. it's sliding down and it cannot last forever. there are understandable limits to its existence. this limits connected either

financial or monetary sources, which are pretty much limited and you know that the new bunch should be accepted soon. plans to the third of the reserve fund, meaning that the next year, it's impossible to keep all this proportions and they should with revised in a various way. second, it's elite readiness. in my view, they can concede what's going on profitable in this sense that yes, they did pay. they did lose one fifth of their fortune, but they kept monopoly. they lost their usual way of life. they lost opportunities to go to

go somebody else aboard. to spend money, they are earning in russia, in more comfortable countries, so they feel like being at the military camp will not last long, so they are eager to get back what they were forced to refuse from. another reason to think these movements of a plane will not last for long is connected with the concept of multiply funnels, so not only this is the spirit going out, but it consists of serl important funnels. this is like a vicious circle at a time of growing instability. it's absolutely irrational to

make investment not only financially investment, but political investment as well for longer period and this horizon is extremely short and becoming shorter and shorter because of inability and lack of desire of elites to make long investment. the second funnel is connected with the fact that what of course the crimean syndrome. support of the leader after the annexation, but we got approximately the same downgrades in the way how this society looks at different problems like say corruption is 20% points less important now than it used to be.

problems with caucuses at 20% less serious. it looks like society is drunk, then it's easy to think that there are no other problems since your life is good, but it's not that easy to keep person being drunk for long. so, it needs a certain investment and this should increase all the time. third, there is manual criminal and it was clearly described by brian and the problem is that when being exercised for long manual control is making impossible to suede you back to automatic regime. there are no institutions and there is collection selection of personnel which cannot make any decisions at all.

this fourth is relief fights. in decision making, in present day russia, we can see that more and more of them leads to act on their own. and these is the way in which -- elite clans and there are no mechanisms linking to reach a composition, so the danger of making decisions, but not in interest of the whole system or the danger of not make iing.

let me think there is about one year of life expectancy, but not to speak about different ones. we've seen one of these black sw swans today. white swans is almost almost zero. what we see now and what he's studied may see the strategy a. so, the goal i think a achieved and this never was the goal to change something in syria itself or to keep assad in place.

the goal was to demonstrate that putin is a cruel leader, who can bring military victories and these goal inside the country is already chief. so, it goes in line of what i did tell about the need was capable to keep this new military legitimacy. that's why russia switched to syria and due to prop began ta machine, the goal inside the country was already chief which puts him into the position of a strong leader and this makes it possible for him to clean for switch in relations with the west.

from the step of position of a weak leader, but as demonstration of his strength. then i think the exit strategy can be connected with a replacement putin by somebody else. not necessarily put nn the position. here in one position and the name of this position is puente. what is important i think that's the country's planning to new

elections. to a new cycle and the early elections, which should be helped next september. i would wait almost immediately after this elections, it can explain why elections are early. address the need for the nation, for putin to address the nation because the elite understood that china cannot replace the west. thank you. >> thank you. i think we can open up discussion to members of the audience.

do we have microphones? if you have a comment or question, we can bring over a microphone for you. please identify yourself. >> eleanor, i worked for usaid in crew crane for five years, so certainly have an interest in that situation and i was intrigued about mr. taylor, about your saying that the head of the armed services wasn't involved in the decision and do you know whether that was also the case and what the more extreme factor of the innovation of eastern crewukraine, which i

has been less rewarding. >> why don't you take them as they come. >> he was not consulted when the first decision was taken is moscow rumor, right? no one has said publicly on the record officially who exactly were the four people that putin said he consulted with that night. he is officially, unofficially said there were four of us and at the end of the nigtd, i turned to them and said we're going to have to bring crimea back to russia. there's a list of names band died about. later, there were further decisions about implementation and some of his close deputies played a role in crimea, but the claim is that the initial decision was made without the defense ministers participation.

many were opposed to this decision and foreseeing the potential consequences, but putin has the one and only important vote. in terms of the military action in eastern ukraine, by that point, the defense ministry is involved in those decisions, although it's hard to see exactly how the russian side has managed. it looks like they were running a game there, the had various political connections, the rebels or whoever you want to call them. and that the military had its actions and it doesn't seem to me it was well coordinated all the time and there were rumors that head of the security

council was clashing with this person about lines of authority. for the operations there. >> i will not -- any. i would focus on the fact that due to bloomberg and some other news agencies, there are a lot of myth about how decisions are made in russia and who exactly is making these decisions and i would like at decision on crimea and ukraine in general. with three different decisions. the first one, the major one, ip vold confrontation with the west should be taken by shareholders and not managers. they're those guys like -- putin

ol garks. the second decision about what can fall in case ukraine would sign these agreement with the eu, it should be made not only by ol garks, but by guys from secret service and the third decision about a country in crimea could be made by these guys by -- and it's interesting that in a very recent book, one informed russian was trying to explain the decision and he reminds us how decision has been made on innovation to afghanistan. he was stalled by union, so that would it invite you not to tell

us about opinion, but our opinion and to realize this. this could happen with record to crimea as well. >> thank you very much for excellent presentations. first, the comment. on the financing. about the deficit for next year will be $40 billion as planned and totally international. $365 million. so, best of luck to hang themselves with. and three questions. first, hasn't the bureau to consider big stand replaced by the security counts where you had 30 men, ten key, that are meeting quite regular about

every tenth day. such a body today. but the two leads, the north america and team -- they seem to be rising and the other part is the state enterprise managers. if they could discuss if this is really happening. we can see it clearly on state allocations of funding. and then third, to both of you, how to you look up ukraine in the situation. you could have elaborated as you

touched up. the factor ukraine, in four days, putin as far as i've seen, not maintained the capital for the city to ukraine while he instantly complained sharply. >> go ahead. i can start. if you do control everything including the central bank, including the minister of finances and so on, you can or at least it looks like you can easily fix this problems and if needed, you can print. this is exactly what's going on to cover this deficit. i'd like to mention only one

funny story about the fact that just on the eve of the project, the draft of the project to budget to the state, the government wage planned to cut off elite expanding was forced to refuse from this idea. perhaps they did consult whom they should and how they did manage to do this at the last moment, they did just change prices the inkrecrease there ano claim them additional several million demonstrate there is no additional deficit connected with this wise decision. speaking of all the political, there is while the consul assistant agency in moscow all the time with screams of putin's

bureau, in my view, it's a little bit misleading. due to the fact that the bureau at the time of the union central committee was formal institution where all presented which should meet to decide to make important decisions. no more and the only organ wage does meet in real life is security console. it sounds just like it does here in this could be trdroin, but i important. not so much the institute. it's more substitute. shared by the president. who can either make decision on the basis of the discussion or who cannot make this decision.

the security council cannot make any decisions by it. and it combined with with certain formal institutions like the houses of russian parliament whose chairs do not play any essential role in decision making. several servants, managers like here, social security agencies and there are no putin ol garks almost none there, which makes this board not a kind of real sent to where decisions are made. i would agree that at the time of war, military and secret service guys do claim much more important role and although we see this same so-called liberal economists of the government.

their role is to minimize damage, the results of somebody else, not by them. this is very dangerous i think, well change for putin. he cannot allow any of these plans to win against others because he'll need hostage of this elites and i can hardly imagine what can be done in order to restore this balance in elites. are not interested in any kind of radical solution for ukraine. they are interested to keep in its shape the controlled

conflict. i don't think there is anything positive, the kremlin can get -- find huge money in order to keep it afloat or get pretty big number of will be not eager to come back to their subordinate role and this is very dangerous thing, so, it's much more effective to keep certain control to demonstrate that something is going on. to look for any kind of the final solution. >> thanks. a couple of responses in terms of specific question about a

split perhaps between the cronies -- versus. it has been very interesting the way that sections efforts to gain access to verve funds has been blocked. and there seems to be some indication that putin is looking more closely at how the state enterprises have been managed or mismana mismanaged. the shift, despite leaving the formal position as head of russian railways, i don't see that because it's unclear where putin would return. i find it hard to be that he

would opt for a manager type the way he has in russian railways. ton side, some people think -- the bridge to crimea and therefore, raised his influence. i don't know whether we can project that out. i think historically, he was clearly much more powerful than -- so, it would be a shift of important progressions if that is flipped now. it seems on the part of putin, there is ukraine fatigue because things didn't work out the way they hoped and projected they would, but he doesn't know how to get out of it.

he can't get out of it by simply walking away. he really feels like he needs to maintain some kind of lever on the key of government to keep it from drifting closer to the west. the forces can be a lever that he can use at any point he's hoping to recognize those forces as legitimate actors empowered to negotiate on behalf of decentral aigs or solution. but the key of government is not going to give him that, but he isn't sort of willing to just walk away from it, so he's kind of stuck and i think he wants to keep it as low a boil as possible.

if there's a walk back to some of the anxiouses on the part of europe within the next year, that may be enough for him. in the fourth row. thanks. i would like to thank you for very insightful comments from you both. i have one question. i like very much the tour divided governing and i have one comments or one reflection about this. ruining the government is about trying the state. what is the sense of the system request you use the terms --

hostages, other strategies in russia. in terms of ruling about keeping in power and being about the state because to a certain extent, they're both about the state. it's more the nation of the institutions within the state and how decisions are made. we've seen a steady but one direction move on weakening constraints and weakening the role those play and increasing the control on informal structures. so, in that sense, i think it reflects a general tendency that

that he is capable of ruling by institutional procedures and the russia needs manual steers. he said that quite clearly in 2007 and the interview, he said we're coming out of a huge crisis. we need to work in terms of a manual regime and until we get the institutions in place, legal institutional regulatory and so on, we're going to have to work in a manual regime and that will take at least another 15 to 20 years, well, from time he said that, that would put us into 20, 27 and if he stands for re-election in 2018 and serves another six years, that puts us in the middle of f that 15 to 20-year period. it's far off given the

short-term time horizons the problem of disorder if he was to step aside. >> okay. >> nikolai. >> in our studies where did use four of them. another one can be called the towers of the kremlin. these towers, the third mode of a solar system, putin is our sun and everybody radiates around him, so, you're influence is defined by the distance and when repeating, they can form different conciliations.

the fourth mode of the board where putin is becoming chair of the board and ceo. until recently, we were seeing that putin is not czar. he is chair of the board and should do what the board decides. unfortunately now, he is more like a czar and he's much less dependent from this board. perhaps it's not deciding a lot now and there is a new mode according to wage, there are some experts, those who are trusted by putin in different spears and there are a few strategies, the problem i see is connected with the fact that these political geometry does not let anybody else except for

putin and results of that move and that's the problem because different parts of this power machine do act in its own interest, not in the interest of the whole system and nobody can do this in the interest of the whole system except for putin himself. so, those guys who are different between loyal servant, managers and strategists are seeing that well, putin can be seen as a strategist and the chief of staff can be seen as strategist from the opposite side. >> one's coming. thank. >> forgive me if you touched on this side, my name is mindy, i worked in central asia.

first part of my question is what do you see in terms of recruitment from the caucuses to isis, to isil, to syria and other place, libya, and the future leverage of putin on central asia, he's certainly made it clear he wants to exert some interest, but given russia's economic challenges, how realistic is that into the future? >> wrote a wonderful book on regimes and these are regimes, speeds and the problem is that they are agent, so, i would speak about ageing putinism and i would look at crimea as viagra for this ageing reveem. which cannot work for long. and the problem is what exactly

will happen if and when these ageing leaders are coming out of pow power. if there is strong personal israel m, then anything can happen. and central asia is very dangerous place where there is huge pressure put on to why it's not les radical, but can react which can if there are negative consequences at a time when it's -- pretty old and who is -- will leave. so, i don't think, well, this is the real problem and russian authorities do try to do something, but as i did tell,

there is a short time horizon. so, they're trying to deal with problems as the problems appear, meaning they're not in a position to make some fruitful efforts to deal with blood, perhaps contracts or civil war in central asia. speaking of our black swans, about caucuses and russian caucus is in a bad shape and when the government is coming out of money, not only it means that it cannot keep the way going on, but it means also that it cannot play regional elites for their loyalty and will have

negative consequence. in my view, the turn which took place in 2014 are was about closing putin's integration and more about the nation state and the in russia. not only in russian nationalism, but into russia. so, i would say that in my view, one of the -- in 2014, one is connected with the society. and it's under estimated usually. so, i just use the image of the nation. came back to egypt, meaning that

we're -- to change the society. which not only is drunk now, but when we'll ek appearance and hand over. in nationalism, both russian and -- i can say no nobody can guarantee that explosion at the northern caucuses will not take place or pretty soon assume you for different reasons. not only changing our wages, which is under control of another well, dictator. but there is, dagestan as well, where the center is trying very different approaches and it means dagestan pretty dangerous place in terms of well stability

in the future. >> in terms of central asia, it's probably useful since we're talking about ukraine to a certain extent, to remind us that all of this started because of the issue of the association agreement with the eu and putin was pushing for a crew crane signing up for the economic union and just as the old line was, the soviet union can't exist, lodgelically, it makes a lot less sense. it's russia, belarus kazakhstan and other small countries. it's important to make the right choice antd it didn't work out well for him in the long run, so even know in central asia, only kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan are signed up and i think russia in the median term is destined to

lose more to china and central asia given just the economic power that the two countries wield. in terms of the caucuses and recruitment in the region, i'm not a specialist on this. the numbers you see run from the hundreds to the thousands in terms of recruits from russia who may have gone to fight prices. there are even conspiracy verkss that the fsb is urging certain militants to leave, so they go fight in syria. i have no evidence that is true, but you hear that in various places. it is interesting and among itself so clearly with iran and a syrian regime that's dominated by shi islam. this could be creating a source

of initial instability in the country. not immediately, but you know n the coming years. >> okay. thank you. gerard. >> i'm interested in the relationship between the decision on crimea and the decision on a southeast ukraine the don bass. you mentioned brian the february 23 meeting and that's the official version. what there is also an argument that the decision was made in november or december. at least to prepare something and so, what is the relationship of outside entrepreneurs like

orthodox ol garks and who think in terms of things like novaracea to the actual decision making process. is it your opinion that because there's a debate over there was on the one hand -- what's your perspective on that? like how tactical was that, the particular decision on february 23? maybe just a decision to go in, not necessarily so annex, but no response by the ukraine, they sort of made it up further and further, then the one, is that a sort of a -- >> i'll give you my own, maybe

nikolai will add something. i see the crimea decision and the decision as being short-term and tactical and not part of a bigger vision. i see the crimea decision coming on the heels of what putin believed to be and many believed to be a great success of the sochi olympics and the americans were so dastardly to engineer a coup in ukraine on the eve of this great sochi triumph. my sense is that this is something believed among putin and others in his inner circle that that might happen because of western ins gags and plotting. i don't see the evidence, but i think it's believed and in the context, there is a sense of humiliation about this process.

we need to do something to secure our interests and we cannot tolerate a situation in which american naval base might come in there, which is out of the question, but i think that's how it was perceived inside the kremlin and then once you've made that move in material terms of the soes logical and demographic dimensions of politics. that's not really what they had hoped to accomplish, right, to win this territory, but push ukraine closer to nato and the eu, so i see the don bass operation as being improvised in response to understanding the negative consequences of the first decision and surely,

entrepreneurs working this angle and had been for a while, but i see the important decisions taking place as a more short-term reaction to events. i should add i could be wrong, but that's my interpretation. >> crimea in fifth generation. i've been grown up in crimea and i would say that it's important to understand that before all this events, russians more eager to consider crimea russia than say chechnya or northern caucuses in general, so, this move did position put p as the guy who represents interests and expeck tases of the society. although and one russian political elite claims to take

crimea back, they're almost absent for 20 years with something. there is one who all the time was playing this card, but that so, it came in line with expectations of majority of russians and it's very telling that not only old guys who can remember the soviet union or young generation who cannot, but everybody, not only communists, but well, even some liberals it's a pretty long story about crimea, which was inhibited most

of all by ethnic russians, where crimean scott has been played and which used to be in a pretty bad economic shape or during the last 25 years. now, it creates very serious problems. the fact that russia now is directly in front in turkey. there are very different estimates how many crimea tartars now live in turkey and it's impossible to count them precisely, but figures can be starting from two to five million and this is very important. >> one is the term czar has come up a couple of times in each of your talks, so i wonder to what

extent do you think this is a useful analogy or term? is it just is there something that really taps into a notion of czaris measurim, do they see something that connects back to history, my second question is more specific to brian. the concept i think of putinism and the is very interesting. do you think this is something that could transcend putin himself ultimately and leave a legacy like we think of peronism in argentina, lived on long after and instructuring politics in way politics has been conducted. i wonder if there's a future --

>> when he leaves the scene, i don't see a monarchy coming about in those terms, but i think it's more than simply saying he's the top guy, the first person that earn has to contend with. i think it's a reflection of some of the what people have called the putin mystique and that treats him not just as an ordinary politician or president. someone who has has qualities, various quotes from people close to putin over the years, like he described putin at one point as a gift from god who saved russia from collapse and that kind of

language about him goes beyond simply an institutional kind of thing that we would expect for a head of state, so, in that sense, inn the czar analogy is useful, although not entirely. in terms of putinism and can it transcend him tharks really an interesting questions. just to fill in something nikolai said earlier, there is no book, just a manuscript. how much can we think of putinism being connected to society and being simply a phenomena around putin and the elite. the argument it's connected to society is that there was this collective trauma that the society suffered with the collapse of the empire, of the soviet union. the economic traumas caused by the transition from communism to capitalism.

in that sense, putin is so popular, not only because they control the media and other forms of communication, but that he responds and in some sense, reflects what the average person in russian society was sort of looking for after the so-called wild '90s. i think it's overused in russia, but a more commonly held view and sort of not even just a few, but a feeling of a population. so, in that sense, it does trand send him. i don't think that means it can transcend him chronologically into the future. only so long claim that we're the bringers of order after the disor, after 15 years of being in power and still plenty of disorder and the moscow commentator said a couple of weeks ago, she said everyone's

talk about how putin restored order. but that's totally wrong because if you have order, an official can't run over a pregnant woman on the street with his car and not suffer the consequences suffer the consequences for it. if there's order, a policeman can't take away a business from a private businessman and transfer it to someone else as part of a raiding operation, so that's not order. that's disorder. but the problem is the people who work for the state don't understand that's in fact a source of disorder rather than order. i think this putin bringing order thing is more of a myth than a reality, and i don't think it can persist given the difficult the system is in today. >> first of all, i would like at putin as a kind of sorryism. this leads me to the problem of russian constitution, which has been adopted in 1992 at a time

when it was clearly a presidential constitution. he was not able to exercise all powers given to him by the constitution, although some experts even at that time used the image of the elected monarchy with regard to the regime. now the first person can enjoy almost all these powers. constitution is pretty much the same, which does not well balance the power of the first person by any institutions and institutions are extremely weak. they became even weaker after 2014 shift in the political

regime. well, first of all, i would say in my view putinism cannot survive putin. i hope putin can survive putinism. >> isn't this the eternal cycle of russian history? arbitrary centralized power followed by a time of troubles with nostalgia and then people forgetting the injustices of the arbitrary regime. this power is arbitrary, the institutions are undeveloped, and the cycle seems to keep repeating itself without end? >> okay. it can be seen as a vicious circle. i would look at federalism or

lack of federalism. russia is huge country by its size, and it should be tyranny if not being federal state. so federalism is absent, and this is due to the fact that none of russian rulers, including present-day rulers, is eager to exercise federalism, especially those who came from paramilitary structures and for whom it's not imaginable that somebody or their subordinates could decide without their permission. i would like at what's going on with russian political regime now. not so much as can this or that person come into power, but as a

very understandable and rational result of all these moves connected with the fact that russia is centralized state -- it's perhaps overcentralized -- russia should be police state. there is no reason to keep such a huge state if there is no federalism. >> i understand many things we see under putin look very much like traditional patterns in russian history. it's easy to draw the kind of analogy that you do. analysts often see putinism as a reflection of russian traditions that are a product of geography or history or culture. i personally am not a fan of those interpretations because i think russia as a society in the international order has changed a lot since those traditional

periods that we're making analogies to. and i actually do not believe the historical or cultural curse that keeps russia in a cycle. it's quite a wealthy country, although the distribution of wealth is not particularly equal. but it is a place that has a lot of the tools, i think, in its society for a more liberal, political order. in that sense, i see putinism as more as a problem preventing a development towards a more open political and economic order than a return to some kind of national tradition of closed policies and closed economics. >> nikolay? >> i would stress one important difference in the present state of russian state with regard to earlier stages.

i think the regime we do have now cannot reproduce itself. that's why i'm saying while there is no way for putinism to survive putin -- and this isn't like all other guys you've mentioned, and we can include stalin there. so that times the systems that could reproduce themselves and different leaders could inherit regimes. now it's different. and i can use such a name. russia is called a hybrid regime. it's not so much hybrid now. it's more like, say, full scale authoritarian regime. but being hybrid it can be seen as result of the children of two parents, like say you can take horse, you can take cdonkey, an

then you get mule. only problem is mule cannot reproduce itself. >> i think maybe that's a certain kind of note to end on, so please join me in thanking our speakers for leading off a very interesting discussion. thanks. [ applause ] all persons having business before the honorable, the supreme court of the united states are admonished to draw near and give their attention. >> coming up on c-span's "landmark cases" -- >> and mrs. mapp demanded to see the paper and to read it, see what it was, which they refused

to do, so she grabbed it out of his hand to look at it and then a scuffle started. and she put this piece of paperwork into her bosom and very readily the police officer put his hands into her bosom and removed the paper. and thereafter handcuffed her while the police officers started to search the house. >> in 1957, the cleveland police went to ms. mapp's home who they suspected harbored a fugitive. they forced themselves into the home and searched the premises. she was arrested and sentenced to seven years for the contraband. she sued and her case made it all the way to the supreme

court. we'll examine the case of mapp v ohio. that's coming up on the next "landmark cases" live tonight at 9:00 eastern on c-span, c-span 3, and c-span radio. and for background on each case while you watch, order your copy of the "landmark cases" companion book. it's available for 8.95 plus shipping at c-sp c-span.org/landmarkcases. up next, a conversation on national security and personal liberty. we'll hear from a pakistani political scientist about democracy in the muslim world from westminster college in missouri. this is an hour. >> good morning. it's nice to see this turnout.

very good. okay. my name is kate perry. i'm a second year ph.d. student. i have the great honor of introducing dr. haq, who taught me during my years getting my ba bachelor's degree at monmouth college. farhat haq was born in pakistan. she received her ph.d. in political science from cornell university. she's currently a professor of political science at monmouth college. she received neh awards to engage in advanced studies on topics of comparative religions at harvard university, islamic origins at the university of chicago, and an asian values debate at columbia university.

she was the recipient of the burlington northern award for excellence in teaching and the full bright teaching research scholarship. she's published in the area of ethnic politics, islam and human rights. she is a visiting scholar at woodrow wilson center in washington, d.c. for 2015/2016. she's working on a book project. on a more personal note, dr. haq has been a personal adviser, mentor, and friend. i studied under her tud ledge while earning my ba in college. follow the completion of my ma, dr. haq was instrumental in cementing my love for teaching.

it is no exaggeration to say that i would not be a thriving ph.d. student at the university of missouri today without the guidance and friendship of the brilliant and compassionate dr. farhat haq. [ applause ] >> good morning. thank you, kate, for that wonderful introduction. it's students like you that make our life worthwhile really, and so i'm really excited to see that i have mostly students

here. you're my kind of people. and so what i'm hoping then is to sort of conduct this in a little bit more informal way, this presentation. so let me just say a couple of things first. i just came back from pakistan a couple of days ago, and so this is my bedtime right now. so i'm still getting over my jet lag. if you see me in between completely losing my strand of my thoughts, that's because i'm still recovering from jet lag. the second thing i wanted to say was about professor tobias gibson who was instrumental in getting me invited to this. we are still really a little upset with westminster college for stealing him away from us. i don't think we've quite gotten over that. indeed, you're lucky to have

him. he's a marvelous mentor, professor, friend. so i just wanted to have a shout-out to him. okay. so what do i want to do? what i want to do is sort of tell you i'm someone who lives in really two different places and two different -- yeah, two different places and cultures. i teach at monmouth college. i've been teaching there for over 20 years. i'm a midwesterner that way and i'm an american. i was 18 years old when we emigrated to united states, and so i was born and brought up in pakistan and then i continued to have connection with pakistan because my research ph.d. dissertation was on the islamist

party in pakistan approxima. and from then on i was engaged with south asia and pakistan. i've gone in summers and taught there. i talk to american students and i talk to pakistani students, undergraduate students, as well as sort of conduct my research. i often -- i have this privileged position then to sort of really be able to see the world from these two perspectives, but that becomes really sort of multiple perspectives. so that's a privilege, but it's really also a pain because i'm one of those who's always interested in telling pakistanis

they've got to get their act together and stop blaming the u.s. for all their woes and telling my american friends and students and audience, et cet a cetera, about many of the sort of blind spots that we have about the muslim world in general and pakistan and the mistakes that we're making. i'm always in some ways bearer of the bad news, so to speak, but i think i'd much rather do that than to sort of have a myopic view of what's going on. and so what i want to do today -- i'll take about 30, 35 minutes or so and lay out some thoughts in terms of this whole issue of balancing. in u.s. we're calling it rebalancing the scales of liberty and security, but i'll

tell you in the context of pakistan it's not rebalancing. it's constructing this balance. so the challenge there is quite different. and so i'll do then four things. i'll first talk a little bit about how the muslim world views this whole issue of security and liberty and particularly what their place has been, the place of muslims and muslim world has been the american struggle towards rebalancing these scales. then i'm going to talk about the war against terror and desire for security, but at the same time very much desire for liberty in the muslim world. there i'm going to emphasize

pakistan. most of my examples will be from pakistan, but at the end i'm going to talk about egypt a little bit because i think that's important in the overall point that i want to make. and the overall point i want to make basically -- and i'll come back to this -- is that -- i'm sure there's an easy way to do this. i got it. so how do i go -- >> let's try -- >> okay. my overall message is really very much sort of agreeing with the statement that president bush made in his second inaugural address in which he said we're led by events and common sense to want conclusion. the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the

success of liberty in other lands. the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. i think that that is very wise statement given the world that we live in, this much cliched globalized world, if we are to have our liberty and our security in the united states. we must pay attention to liberty and security of people in other places. so just getting back for a moment. there's a deep confusion in the muslim world when it comes to thinking about post-9/11 world and this concept of freedom, liberty.

after 9/11 there was often this question that was raised, why do they hate us. if you put that in google and go to the images there, you'll see there were several magazines that had their cover with this question and a variety of answers that were proposed. one of the answers that was given was, well, they hate us for our way of life. they hate us for freedom. they meaning here. extremist groups al qaeda. sometimes it was they stood for all of the muslim world. it could be a very expansive category, this "they." let me tell you one thing. i don't think "they," the muslims, hate us for our

freedom. they may have -- they meaning particularly now mainstream majority muslims, they may have some qualms about our sort of cultural practices, the way gender relationships work in the west, et cetera, but that does not mean that they don't like political freedom. i want to make a distinction between political freedom and sort of cultural behavior and mores. vast majority of the muslim world very much embraces political freedom, embraces the idea of rule of louaw, embraces the idea of freedom to assemble and freedom to vote and freedom to practice your religion, et cetera. now some of them may not always

practice it in the best way, but they definitely embrace this idea, so they do not hate us for our political freedoms. i think that's the first thing to sort of keep in mind. when it comes to rebalancing the scale of security and liberty, the view from muslim world is indeed grim and complex. there are many in the muslim world who believe that 9/11 was an inside job meant to damage muslims of the world. without buying the first part of this assertion, which i absolutely don't buy, one can see why the second half of the statement may have a great deal of purchase for the muslim world. in the last 14 years, loss of life and limbs and destruction of property experienced by muslims far outweighs that experience by people of other faith. many parts of the muslim world have been pushed into a world of

near anarchy where life can be short, brutish, and nasty. all i have to think about is hundreds of thousands of people who are displaced right now in pakistan because there's a military operation going on to root out extremism in the federal territories or fatah. all one has to do is to think about vast territories in iraq where people are living under extremely grim conditions. many of those areas controlled by isil. all one has to do is think about what's going on in syria right now and how life must be that it pushes people to take their small kids and try to cross very dangerous seas in order to get to a safer place. all of that are just examples of how difficult right now life is for many, many millions of

muslims throughout the muslim world. so for them, post-9/11 world has been a disaster. as the following statement that i just showed you earlier -- let me go back to that -- by president bush at his second inaugural address shows, there's been much talk about bringing liberty to lands mostly occupied by muslims that do not otherwise have a tradition of this kind of freedom or liberty. but muslims have played a double and therefore confusing role in this battle for liberty while maintaining security. thus we have this paradoxical situation in which liberty of the many must be taken away because they pose a threat to western liberty.

we cherish our liberty. we think it's a wonderful thing. as president bush's statement shows the only way we can maintain our liberty is by giving this wonderful gift to the rest of the world, but in doing that there are a lot of people who hate our liberty and therefore we have to take their liberty away or at least we have to sort of emphasize security against them. so this constant sort of difficulty in clearly thinking through us and them, who are really danger to our democracy and freedom, what kind of danger they pose. though not enough critical thinking has been done on that question. so then you can see why the muslim world is very confused because on the one hand they see

the images of things like guantanamo bay, which if you think about it is akin to a medieval dungeon where you can be imprisoned for decades without any process to determine guilt or innocence. it takes us very much before close to time of magna carta. just not what's going on in guantanamo bay undermines all the wonderful progress that had been made that our earlier presenter was talking about in terms of fourth amendment, et cetera. then we have, of course, have had this whole practice of renditions where we could fly suspects to friendly countries that were not really too queasy about using torture in order to

extract information. and so there are many, many such powerful examples of how we have violated our own traditions of liberty and freedom and rule of lou law with the idea we need to do in order to protect security and our way of life in the long run. but at the same time, we have been constantly really kind of lecturing the muslim world about democracy, about liberty, about rule of law, so this very contradictory stance has created cynicism and deep confusion among muslims as far as their relationship is concerned to the west. so even though this double talk has created deep confusion, it has benefitted in the muslim world forces that are less friendly to liberty and that's

what concerns me the most about this fight against terrorism and all the various things that have gone in the name of doing that. so when i'm talking about forces less friendly to liberty, i don't simply mean extremist groups like al qaeda and isil. i mean more authoritarian state tendencies, particularly bringing militaries back into politics in places like pakistan and egypt where people had struggle very much to construct democratic institutions. as i said earlier, right now security is a huge concern for many parts of the muslim world. let me talk specifically about

pakistan. pakistan is part of the top three countries. iraq, iran, and pakistan where there have been the most terrorist attacks, the highest number of casualties, and pakistan is on the front line of this fight and this sense of lack of security. i told you i'm going to be a little discombobulated, but okay. death by victims categories. the vast majority of them are civilian. this is just 2011. it's number not just for pakistan, but for the world.

it sort of mirrors what was going on in pakistan too. the one important point that i would want to make out of this graph is if you look at it, civilians are the highest number of casualties. there are also significant number that are children, but if you look in terms of people who are fighting against the terrorists, so law enforcement, there you see, yes, there are military and security forces that have been killed in this fight against terror, but that the police are in this graph. they are much higher number. there are more police that get killed in this fight than the military. that point is important because what i want to talk about in terms of pakistan is how since

december 2014 there has been a significant shift in trying to fight against terrorism. and the shift has occurred because -- i don't know. some of you might have heard about this. so there have been many, many terrorist attacks in pakistan before this december 2014. so why did this particular attack become such a turning point? there was an attack by terrorists in this public school. so the fact is that these were children and that the attackers engaged in a particular act of brutality against some of the teachers and students. that's part of the reason why there was so much attention paid to this and it became a turning point. pakistanis have called this our

9/11. i also want to underline the fact that it was army public school is what really tipped the balance, and so that becomes important in terms of who benefitted the most from this turning -- the public turning their attention to being determined to fight this battle against terrorists. so television coverage eager to feed the beast of 24 hours news machine eagerly swooped in to feed off this tragedy. there were emotionally-charged public service announcements. there were the constant loops of footage showing desperate mothers running barefoot to try to find out what happened to their young children. and there were pictures of young teenagers taken from their social websites who joined the ever increasing role of martyrs in pakistan. this attack in december of 2014

became a turning point because the whole sort of nation, country, was now emotionally at this heightened state very similar to what we saw after 9/11 in the united states. and there was this determination that they were ready to do whatever it will take to get rid of the terrorists and in this instance the group that had claimed responsibility is called ttp. one of the sad things about what's going on in pakistan is that there are many groups and there are lots of sort of confusion about who is standing for whom on the ground. one of my most important concerns when it comes to

balancing the scale of liberty and security is that pakistan as a developing country, as a third world country, as many of the other muslim countries are, is still at the very, very early stages of establishing political institutions that will create rule of law that would create some sort of democratic norms and institutions, et cetera. so once scale of liberty is under construction. that then means that events like these kind of terrorist attacks can often be used by those forces that stand for security to actually undermine that very early, very delicate process of building democratic institutions. so in pakistan, for example, we

have had often military take over politics. in pakistan in 65 years of its history military has taken over several times. the democratic institutions have had a really, really hard time getting off the ground, and so any process that ends up strengthening the military and weakening civilian and democratic institutions from my perspective is really destructive for this scale of liberty that we have been talking about. what happened after this attack? what happened after was there was this tremendous glorification of the military. after the attack, the general

went and visited the army public school and met the students. the interesting thing about this picture is that -- you see this picture and you see it all over. it was on the front pages of newspapers. it was all over people's facebook news feed, et cetera. what you didn't see was the other prime minister who had also gone and visited the school children, but there was not much attention paid to that visit. so that's just only an example of what had happened in terms of after this army public school attack, the military getting great deal of attention, great deal of glory, and the civilian government, the democratically elected government really going into the background.

the question is why is that. part of the reason is really very understandable. when you're living in very insecure world -- in fact, one of the harvard scholars put it in a very memorable way. he talked about how security like accident, you take it very granted. you don't think about breathing. we just breathe. when somebody takes away our oxygen, all we can think about is our security. all we can think about is our oxygen. for many parts of the muslim world, the security is right now the most fundamental thing they want. they want to make sure their kids are safe, that they are sort of -- their life and limbs are safe, that they have some sort of basic security. for that, they are very willing to trade away the rights of

privacy. something we saw this similar kind of bargain in the united states after 9/11. so just like after 9/11, the attack in the united states, president bush's approval ratings were enhanced and it creates the space for the united states to launch a preemptive war against iraq. it has given security agencies like the infamous isi a blank check to arrest, detain, use enhanced interrogation techniques, and kill anyone who seems to be a terrorist. no wonder there are conspiracy theorists. i can understand when people

engage in this sort of conspiracy theory thinking because certain forces get so much benefit from an event that you start to think, god, maybe they had something to do with it. that's what at least some paeope thought about the attack on this army military school. all right. the other thing about -- the first thing i want to say about view from pakistan is that given it is in a very early stage of establishing democratic

institutions, any threat to security ends up damaging that very delicate process because people start to glorify the military. they're yearning for stability and for security, et cetera, and they're willing to give up a lot of their rights in order to achieve that. the second thing i want to make is that in this sort of rush to get security there were lots of changes made -- and i'll talk about some of them just very shortly -- that ended up creating a situation in which on the one hand there was tremendous glorification of the military and the nation and patriotism. that's the picture on right side over there. soldiers who have been killed in this military operation that pakistani army has been engaged in, so those are the flag draped

coffins there. and of course the military is ma maki making the sacrifice. don't want to take that away from it, but at the same time there are really hundreds, if not thousands, of people that are being killed, detained for a long time, tortured. and so the picture on the other side is of a father sort of grieving his 18-year-old son who was hung, given capital punishment. but there are lots of sort of unnamed graves where those who are lying in that grave, maybe some of them were the bad guys. they deserved that, but it's really not clear.

we don't have good mechanisms. we don't have good ways of really judging of whether that's the case or not. to me, that's sort of a very poignant picture where the father is grieving and he insists that his son is innocent. but he's not been given fair trial, so we don't know if he is innocent or not. the first thing that happened after the attack is that the death penalty that had been suspended in pakistan by the previous democratically elected government was reinstated immediately because people were -- they wanted revenge. there were several dozen terrorists who were on death row because the death penalty was suspended. people wanted to see them hanging. many of them said we want to see them hanging in the public

square. again, i sort of have some sympathy for that desire for revenge, but again the only problem is that given a very underdeveloped criminal justice system in pakistan, it's not clear that many thousands of those on death row really ever got a fair trial. one of the reason this was suspended by earlier government was because there had been a lot of criticism by human rights groups about the process that had led to people given death penalty. the idea was the government was going to review a lot of these cases because many innocent people might have been given death penalty. once you had that highly emotional attack of the event against the army public school, death penalty is revived. it was not just terrorists that

were given the death penalty. i think there have been over 300 people that have been hung since then. thinking about that grave we're not sure if really only the guilty ones have been caught in this. one of the things that happened after army public school, pakistanis constructing it as their 9/11 and focusing in now on doing something about terrorism, they come up with this idea of national action plan and create a constitutional amendment. it was the 21st constitutional amendment to create military courts. the idea was that previously the civilian courts had often let these terrorists go free because they were not able to get the right evidence or they were threatened. there had been judges and lawyers that had been killed by terroris

terrorists, so the only way of getting rid of this scourge of terrorism was by having military courts. that's problematic because you have a democratic government. the civilian institutions should be able to handle these cases, but once again this was a way that military was reasserting itself. some people have called this soft coups. and that really works out well for the military because what happens is basically a lot of the problems in society -- the gas is too expensive. there is shortage of food. there's a lot of corruption. electricity is often gone. all of those problems people

blame it on the government and the government is, of course, the democratically elected civilian government, but anything that might be good that's going on -- we're fighting against the terrorists. our brave soldiers are making sacrifices. the military is engaged in cleaning up corrupt practices in various places, most importantly in the largest city in pakistan, all that glory and praise is heaped upon the military and in particular the general. so this becomes a way for military to continue to exercise a lot of influence without having some of the blowback of being actually in power. so as this international crisis report sort of concluded, though, all this national action plan creating a constitutional amendment to have military courts, they have not

necessarily achieved the objective. the objective, i think, almost all pakistanis support that objective, which is to try to get rid of the terrorist elements and the various jihadi groups in pakistan. instead often some of these new military courts and new ways of operating in law enforcement have been used actually to either suppress certain ethnic groups or to try to sort of contain certain political parties like in karachi. one of the main political parties have been brought under this whole new law enforcement wi where a lot of their leaders have been arrested, et cetera. the problem is when you talk to ordinary pakistanis, they like

this. they're tired of corruption of politicians. karachi had tremendous amount of instability and violence and organized crime and gangs and all that. again for people, the desire of security, they're happy if the military comes in and cleans the operation. i understand that, but the political scientist in me sort of looks at that and really worries deeply because what that means is that it's once again given the history of pakistan this glorification of military means the military is so powerful and well entrenched in pakistan's political system gets strengthened further. that democratic process gets weaker. that's one of the main points that i want to make about this.

okay. all right. this fight against terrorism then has been used to clean up a lot of things in pakistan. so this is a picture -- i was actually in islamabad when this happened. islamabad, which is the capital city of pakistan, has these slum areas, we might call them. in pakistan, these are irregular people who are desperate to find a place to live. they construct some temporary housing there. the capital development quality decided there was enough of that. they were going to go in and clean up these areas. mostly what that meant was to demolish all these temporary housing of hundreds of thousands

of people and throw their stuff out and basically leave them with no shelter. so this is a picture of that operation clean up. so you see this younger kid being manhandled by the police. and there are lots of these kind of pictures where basically these people were made homeless. now the reason i show you this is because the way -- there was a lot of outcry against this. there are still groups in pakistan that focus on ngos, human rights of the poor. there was a lot of criticism of this. there was a hearing in the pakistani parliament about why this happened, how this happened. the inspector general used the framework of terrorism to justify this.

he basically said that many of the people who are living there are unregistered. many of them are refugees. we simply need to sort of make sure that we know who lives where in order to secure ourselves, so that's why we had done it. of course, i can understand that. there are hundreds of thousands of refugees and some of them could be engaged in terrorist fra practices, but really balancing that with hundreds of thousands of people being extremely poor impoverished people being thrown out of whatever temporary shelter they had, that's the kind of frustrating situation that we face in pakistan. very quickly, there's also an electronic surveillance bill that got pasted in pakistan after this army public attack. and so basically what you see is

very much the process that was described in the earlier talk happening in pakistan where there a lot of agencies, element agencies, but most prominently the isi that has been gathering -- moving towards mass capture and storage of communication of ordinary citizens. and so pakistan is one of the biggest partner of the united states when it comes to international surveillance. it has been cooperating with nsa in capturing data, so that's also a huge problem for pakistan. a problem in what way? of course, i'm very much convinced by the presentation that we had earlier about what the government is now doing is

not reasonable in terms of search and seizure, but in pakistan it becomes much more of a problem for two reasons. first, you have a government that is not very efficient. it's und it's underresources. police doesn't have enough training. they may gather all this data. doesn't mean necessarily they're going to really be able to capture the bad guys, so to speak, out of that. but it is also that this kind of data would be used to suppress minority groups, to suppress undesirable political speech. let me just quickly go to egypt. this egypt now. in pakistan at least the military is trying to have some sort of a constitutional cover

for its soft coups. in egypt, there is no pretense. remember egypt in 2011 we had the arab spring. there was so much hope for liberty and democracy and all that. things have become really grim in egypt right now. that's because the military is absolutely intent on taking away any notion of liberty in egypt because from their perspective they are securing people. and so this is just one example. 529 muslim brotherhood people sentenced for killing one officer. i said earlier and i don't have enough time to unpack this but the problem is the moment you say muslim brotherhood, for many that's guilty as charged. they are muslim brotherhood.

they are islamists, so they must be involved in terrorist activities. that's absolutely not the case, at least in egypt, because the vast majority of them had been very moderate. but their moderation might not stay for very long. in a situation like this in six to seven months you had thousands of people killed at protests, and you had hundreds and thousands of people arrested. the top graph is the state violence against protesters, right? the bottom graph is now response by the state groups responding to that terrorism. the state people are killing a lot more people than the terrorists are.

if they continue to take away their liberty, then soon this might very much be flipped. yesterday some of you might have heard this news. there were several mexican tourists in egypt that were killed. they were at this sinai desert, which is a place where a lot of tourists go because there are amazing rock formation and all of that. a military gun ship started to shoot them, and so 18 of them died. right now there's all this kind of a controversy because the government, which is the military, is saying these tourists were not supposed to be there anyway. we were conducting operations against terrorists and the tourist agency is saying absolutely not. we had all the permit.

we had sort of taken groups there all the time. anyway, but think about -- we don't see this. this is not in the front page of the news, but egypt is conducting military operations like that where it is just shooting at groups of people, mistaking tourists for terrorists? so the point then, to let me conclude, is that unfortunately post-9/11 world has not only brought a lot of insecurity for the muslim world. it also has pushed back the possibility of liberty or democratic evolution. so at this point, things look pretty grim. i wish i could leave you with a more optimistic kind of a

picture. i'm more optimistic for pakistan that i know more in depth because the fact that the military needed to take a constitutional cover itself for me is a step forward because it means that the constitutional cover is important. but otherwise right now things look pretty grim in the muslim world. okay. there's still 11 minutes, so we can have our questions. [ applause ] >> thank you, dr. farhat haq. we have a few minutes for questions. if you have a question, if you would please take position at one of the microphones down front. there are two of those. looks like those are being switched on. feel free to come on down if you have a question.

>> hi. i'm ryan. i was wondering from your perspective what the public reaction to the government's kind of crackdown on mqm in karachi, if that is seen as an overreach or if it is generally welcomed? why can they garner so much support in karachi if they're not a popular group there? >> mqm is one of the political parties which is very strong in karachi. they have had virtual monopoly. they are a political entity with legitima legitima legitimate constituency, but they've also been a party that

have engaged in a lot of criminal activities. they had run karachi andislamab. and so the military going after them and cleaning up some of that because there was a lot of kind of target killing that the mqm supported, et cetera. there is general support of that and even in mqm's own constituency has been very muted in coming out on the streets to oppose some of these military actions. so, for example, a couple days ago there were three or four mqm workers that were killed by the rangers, which is part of the military, and the mqm asked for a general strike, and that didn't happen very much. there were a few places that were closed for a while, but then life went back to normal

and that's probably the first time in mqm's history since the late '80s that it had called for a strike and it was unsuccessful. so i think that shows that people are actually, you know, sort of supporting right now the military's actions of restoring law and order because as i said, when you don't have that and people in cakarachi for a long time suffered from that, they ve very much support that. this doesn't mean mqm support is gone. i think they're hoping there will be change in the top. if that's gone the party itself can survive. yeah. hi. >> hello. i'm micah finer. i was wondering how would you compare pakistan or egypt's reaction to terrorism to the u.s.'s or would you even compare them? >> i think, you know, both

pakistan and egypt, their reaction shows how what we say in political science all politics is local in a sense. and so for both of these countries, the kind of terrorism they have faced is very much to do with their own political histories, et cetera, and their geography. so for pakistan it's because it is, you know, right next to afghanistan and after the soviet invasion the jihad against the soviet union, et cetera, and all those jihadi organizations has meant that the government in pakistan has sort of had this kind of strange relationship. they divide these groups into good taliban and bad taliban, for example. so the good taliban are the ones that help pakistani states, cooperate with them, and the bad taliban are those who do things like attack that army public school. so there isn't this sort of a

very determined clear us and them. the them is then divided up into those who we can work with and those we cannot, and all of this because pakistan is very focused on its animosity with india. so anything that helps pakistan against india, pakistan is willing to do that. in egypt since the '50s, what is known in egypt as the deep state or the establishment, the political elite, many of them coming from the military, have seen islamists in general as the other. they have no, you know, kind of confusion about that, and so in earlier in egypt they had engaged in lots of suppression of islamists and now we see the same thing. the only problem is that unlike pakistan, the islamists in egypt are much greater in number and

much more moderate. the muslim brotherhood, morsi, who was the president for a short period of time may have made some strategic mistakes, but the muslim brotherhood as a party was generally much more moderate, and so for me it's really rolling back political evolution of egypt by so strongly coming against them. it's only going to create much greater authoritarianism and tyranny in egypt and the response to that tyranny is going to be we are in for a very bad time in egypt in the next eight, ten years because there will be more terrorism as a result of that tyranny. >> thanks. well, in times of war like in the case of pakistan and egypt, don't you think it's a great thing for the military to stay

put since you cannot have the civilian population take over in case of this crisis. don't you think it's a great thing and maybe we just have the army in the wrong hands. maybe the right people should be the ones in the army. thanks. >> yeah. that's a good question. that's a very good and fair question. because when you have this tremendous instability and anarchy, all you wanted is order, and if you have one institution that seems to be most coherent, organized, and able to deliver that order, absolutely one would sort of say so why not military if military can come in and that's why a lot of pakistanis have constantly told the military to come in, to come in, to go to karachi to try to restore law and order and all of that.

but there's -- but i think many of these situations were not as dire, first of all, as, you know, to demand the military intervention, but secondly, when you are putting so many of your eggs in the military basket, then you are really underfunding -- that's where i went to the earlier graph i showed -- the police, the police are on the front line. the police are tremendously under resourced in pakistan. they're not trained very well. they're not given much of the resource. much of the big share of the pie is eaten by the military in pakistan. as a result there's not enough left for other groups. what it does is it continues to create this very lopsided kind of situation, and that's just not good for overall security of the country. so, you know, we're talking earlier about thinking of security not just in terms of,

you know, law and order and military security but think about addressing demographic problems, problems of extreme poverty, educating your public. for all of that you need a more balanced, and what had happened in pakistan is that there is this imbalance, military has taken so many of those resources, and so in that -- that is why for me this is very worrisome, this soft coup, because it simply means military will continue to be that overdeveloped, overresourced,at the expense of other sections if that makes sense. [ applause ] abigail fillmore was the first first lady to work outside the home teaching in a private school. she successfully lobbied congress for funds to create the first white house library. mamie eisenhower's hairstyle and

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supreme court's 1961 mapp versus ohio case which strengthened fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. then some of the changes at the smithsonian institution. all persons having business before the honorable, the supreme court of the united states, are admonished to draw near and give their attention. >> landmark cases. c-span's special history series produced in cooperation with the national constitution center, exploring the human stories and constitutional dramas behind 12 historic supreme court decisions. >> number 759, miranda versus arizona. >> number 18, roe