those with long experience know that an air qualm pain on its own is simply not enough. the administrator of the national atmospheric and oceanic association testified on a house subcommittee. they discussed some of the managemented challenge is facing noah, issues of transparency and the role of the commercial sector in aiding weather forecasting. this hearing on space and technology subcommittee is an hour and a half. >> the subcommittee on envooirnts and oversight will come to order. without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recesses of the subcommittee at any time.

welcome to today's hearing entitled an overview of the nation's weather satellite programs and policies. i recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement and then to the ranking member, as well. we've had a number of hearings about all kinds of issues related to satellites from the current programs of record to commercial satellites, we heard testimony about jpss and goes already once this year. this is a second opportunity to do so. some of the concerns that i have are obviously, this is a concern of our country for the accuracy to forecast weather events.

for the data which keeps our constituents. this is a good hearing week. we have heard testimony before the delay in goes. we have an extension of some of our programs and we have questions about if that is realistic or not. we have seen know want 16 break apart over thanksgiving and that gives a lot of concern about it didn't just break apart on itself. i know some have suggested that, but it didn't occur on its own. whatever the case is, it broke apa apa apart and is contributing to more orbital debris, which is a concern. you think about orbital debris, you think about the mpp satellite that also is coming to

the end of its useful life. when you look at the npp satellite, is it being pelted by debris? is it at risk and would that create a gap? we'd also like to discuss know want's commercial space policy which has a wonderful start to, i think, great opportunities for the future to provide more resiliency and redundancy, disaggregated and distributed architectures that the commercial industry can provide to augment.

>> thank you for holding today's hearing. i'd like to thank and welcome our witnesses this morning. as been stated by our chairman, the committee's oversight is simple. it's to ensure that both the joint polar satellite system, jpss and the operational enviempbts and the likes are operationally robust when they're completed, which we all hope is as soon as possible. a satellite plays critical role in weather forecasting. losing coverage of either system could have serious, perhaps catastrophic effects on our public safety. both of these weather saturday lites have had a long and rocky pathd.

they've had technical issues and management challenges. during the subsequent hearing, jpss was the more troubled of the two. now it looks like goes r has now been delayed by more than 6 months as the chairman said can still be at risk. delays in these programs increase the cost of satellites, limit the achblgen sill's resources for weather forecasting and porpt resourszing for weathers oceans and climate sites. these problems are not unique to know want. but this isn't an excuse. i believe noah recognizes this as an unstable model.

shifting back to the team at gao, i understand agency planning. but, to date, just six of these recommendations have been implemented. so i'm interested more in learning about the remaining conditions. it's important to understand the policies relating to these critical satellites. noah satellites also provide the data necessary for our models and warnings and products provided by the national weather services. in fact, the capabilityties are drastly dependent of our satellite programs as well as a highly skilled work force. so while it's not the focus of today's hearing, i want to mention some important work that gao is conducting on behalf of

missile dependency. specifically, we've been concerned about the number of vacancies that currently exist in the national weather services field offices. and we've asked gao to reveal present and future levels in order to support the agency's efforts to evolve and increase decision support services. also central to achieving noah's public safety mission. we can't afford a weather satellite gap. it's essential to keep these programs on track. i know these are technically difficult that noah needs to address. thank you, mr. chairman. i look forward to today's hearing. >> thank the ranking member for his opening statement. i'd like to recognize the chairman of the oversight committee from georgia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. good morning to our witnesses and thank you for being here, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this hearing. today we'll be hearing from gao and noah regarding the geostationary satellite programs.

the jpss programs that noah maintains has speerngsed setbacks. today, we intend to change what was learned since last hearing back in february of this year. detailing concerns that the noah polar satellite program, jpss, is facing an unprecedented gap in satellite data. gao believes that while it remains within is new life cycle cost estimates, recent rises in technical issues during development increase the likelihood of a near term data gap. additionally, although noah has reduced its potential gap from 15 to only 3 months, gao noted that this assessment was assessed on incomplete data and does not account for the risk to satellite hardware. this is even more concerning in light of a recent break-up of a satellite in orbit.

its data gap may last longer than noah anticipates. the geostationary satellite system. since its inception, significant increases in costs and scope and as gao's report indicates, no one has reversed or halted this trend as we've seen with the launch pushing a march 2016 date back to october 2016. this means we could be facing a long period without a back-up satellite in orbit. history has sewn us that back-ups are sometimes necessary to reduce risk to public safety and the economy. in 2008 and 12, the agency was forced to use back-up satellites. a solution we may once again find ourselves needing. when talking about the consequences of a gap and weather data, the devastating effects of extreme weather on the ground. however, professional and

personal experience allows me to discuss the impact of gap weather data on aviation weather. as a private pilot, i know the importance of having accurate and timely weather forecasts to assess flying conditions. pilots require accurate weather data to evaluate conditions on the ground and in the sky throughout the entire flight process from takeoff to landing. without accurate data a pilot runs of risk what was we call getting behind the mean. a general aviation phrase which means the plane is responding to the conditions and the pilot is responding to the plane. a situation that spells trouble for even the most seasoned pilots. experience as a pilot does not exempt someone from getting behind the meplane as weather deteriorates. as i have conducted many search and rescue missions over the years, even led some of those. without exception every missing aircraft that we ended up finding as a result of weather resulted in a fatality.

we were basically taking remains home to the family so they could be comforted they were found. your experience doesn't matter, even the most experienced aviators, when they get in a weather situation, it can spell disaster. one of those being scott crossfield, a pioneer in aviation in america. he was the second to break the sound barrier. we conducted a search and rescue mission to find the remains of his plane as it broke up in a thunderstorm over northeast georgia. my personal experience as well, once flying to florida, i was -- had accurate satellite weather data in the cockpit with me which showed thunderstorms coming off the gulf of mexico. i was able to accurately determine not only that i should be able to beat the thunderstorm into my destination but also alternate airports to my west that were clear and available. without that, i could have ended up in a very difficult situation or not made it to my destination. as i was flying in, i also heard

of other pilots who didn't have that information with mayday calls being into the weather. with our reliance on gps weather data, mr. chairman, i'm afraid that without accurate weather these incidents would be more frequent. from this perspective you can see how a gap in weather data and consequently less accurate forecasts could negatively affect not only commercial flight safety but also the $1.5 trillion in total economic activity that the aviation industry contributes to the national economy. i hope that today's hearing will shed some light on the complex schedule and cost demands facing those weather satellite programs and that the subcommittees will walk away with -- better equ equipped to consider these issues moving forward. mr. chairman, i know as an aviator yourself you understand this as well and i yield back the balance of my time. >> i'd like to thank chairman louder milk for his comments. certainly i have been in those

situations myself and i appreciate your testimony on them. let me introduce our witnesses. our first witness today is dr. steven volz, assistant administrator of national environmental satellite data and information services at noaa. dr. volz has a ph.d. in experimental matter condensed physicianics at university of illinois, champagne. a bachelor in physicianics from illinois and university of virginia. our second witness is mr. david powner, direction of information technology management issues at gao. mr. powner received his bachelor's degree in business administration from the university of denver and attended the senior executive fellows program at harvard. in order to allow time for discussion please limit your testimony to five minutes. your entire written statement will be made a part of the record and we on this committee have mostly probably already read it. i now recognize dr. volz for five minutes to present his

testimony. >> good morning, chairman, ranking member buyer, members of the subcommittees. thank you for the invitation to participate in today's hearing and discuss the status of noaa's satellite programs. as many of you have mentioned noaa provides environmental intelligence in a global way that is timely, accurate, actionable, and reliable. space space-based information to citizens, communities and businesses as they need to stay safe and to operate efficiently. the noaa satellite portfolio provides continuous satellite data that are interfederal to weather forecasting and noaa working with nasa conducts essential satellite development to ensure continuity of this critical service. our current operation algae owe stationary and polar satellites provide space base weather data required to support noaa's national weather service and as well as the private weather industry and many other users who rely on those services as well. the geo stationary satellites currently in orbit goes east and goes west to provide constant monitoring from the atlantic

ocean, the continental united states, hawaii, the pacific ocean for weather and are backed up by a fully functioning spare satellite situated in between them ready to provide backup in the event of a significant sat lie anomaly of the others. for the next generation geo stationary satellite gozar. while we are working diligently toward this date there are still risks ahead of us to get in new highly capable and complex satellite launched on time. noaa and nasa are working with contractors to identify and mitigate risks, applying all appropriate resources and expertise to meet this important launch milestone. to that end we're monitoring the health of our current on-orbit assets to ensure we're maximi maximizing their utility. meanwhile, while that's going on with the flight hardware, the ground system for gozar and the user community continue to prepare for the launch and rapid exploitation of the new data

stream once it begins. from the polar orbiting the salutes the first sat lift the jpss program is performing exceptionally as noaa's primary afternoon polar satellite. four years into its operating mission the high-resolution sounders are continuously providing essential observations, feeding the national weather service's numerical weather prediction models and ultimate the weather forecasts we all depend on. assuming mpp veers imagery has brought much-improved off serve elevations of sea ice, arc tuck waters, as well as low-light, nighttime clout imagery for that region as well. pole orbiting satellite are particularly important in alaska and polar stations where satellites cannot effectively observe. the second satellite of the jpss program, jpss 1, will be launched providing global coverage and increasing the data flow supporting the nws and the

user community. jpss 2 continues in development, manage expertly by nasa and noaa, and is proceeding on schedule for a late '21 launch as well. noaa's observing system includes beyond these two satellite systems, the jason 2 and discover satellites, soon will include jason 3, the cosmic 2 constellation, and hopefully the cooperati cooperative search and rescue mission cedars, essential environmentaling observationobs. in all of these systems noaa draws extensively on the expertise of academia and private industry, relies heavily on productive partnerships with other u.s. agencies including specifically the u.s. air force and nasa, and on international agencies including umetsat and kines to meet our observing needs. we also are expanding our approach to access to space through the commercially hosted payload approach for cedars, to

find more efficient methods of access to space. in closing, since joining noaa just over a year ago, i have continued to work -- the work started by my predecessors to steadily rebuild the robustness of the nation's operational weather satellite constellations. our current polar and geo stationary satellites are aging but generally healthy as they continue to provide observations. we are making steady progress to launch the next generation of polar and geo stationary satellites in the coming year. to continue and improve the reliability and quality of these earth observations. noaa works closely with that is sa, our acquisition agent, and industry and academic partners to implement proven development processes so we can meet our critical mission milestones. decisions are continuously being made by individuals, governments and businesses based on the weather forecasts. space-based observations are vital. to produce and deliver these forecasts and noaa values the longstanding interest of the economy and satellite programs

and we appreciate the congressional support to ensure these critical national weather programs achieve the robustness needed to support the nation's weather enterprise. thank you and i look forward to the conversation. >> thank you for your testimony, dr. volz. you were right on the five-minute mark which is what we expect from our noaa and former nasa folks. so thank you for that. mr. powner, you are recognized for five minutes. >> chairman brighten side, lauder milk, ranking member buyer, members of the subcommittees. earlier this year we test guide on the goz and jpss satellite systems. at that time we expressed concern about the goz march 2016 launch date and potential gaps in satellite coverage. as we have heard the goz launch date has been delayed again. i will provide updates on both acquisitions by displaying three graphics which provide key launch dates and aspects of these satellites, many of which have been recently expended.

the three goz satellites that are in space. the first bar is 13 which covers the eastern half of the united states, the third bar is goz 15 which offers the western half. the middle 14 is your on orbit spare. noaa's policy is to have a spare if something goes wrong with the operational satellites. the red bars represent an extension to the span of the operational satellites from the last time we testified. when asked what this was based on we were given a 2005 document supporting the life span extension. so a key question is why noaa did not disclose this sooner. i'll add in noaa's 2016 budget submission these red extensions were not included on their flyout charts. this is an area where noaa needs to be more open and transparent with the congress, especially since longer life spans affect the timing of future launches and the annual funding of these satellites as i'll get into on

the next chart. before we leave this chart i'd like to comment on there have been problems with goz 13 that have been mentioned and the backup has been moved into operation several. also, currently a key sensor on goz 13 has not been working since november 20th. moving to the next chart. what this next chart does, the first three bars are basically just replicate what you just saw with the extended life span. the fourth bar represents gozar and the delay in the launch to october 2016. i have three comments on this chart. first, the gozar bar, the fourth bar down, the delay occurred due to technical problems in about two years of extremely poor schedule performance. the program was losing about ten days per month for a 24-month period. mr. chairman, in our opinion, noaa should have more clearly disclosed the poor schedule performance fto this committee. my second point is the potential gap in backup coverage.

the gold vertical bar represents this projected gap. goz 13, even with the life span expense, reaches the end of its useful life about mid-2016, and '14 and '15 are your operational satellites. so there is no backup in orbit from mid-2016 until gozar launches and performs a six-month check out until march or april of 2017. and if the goz october 2016 launch date is not met, this gap in backup coverage becomes even greater. my third and final point on this chart is the final two bars, goz "s" and "t." we agree both goz and jpss need robust constellations to ensure coverage and this is exactly why we placed potential gaps and weather satellites on gao's high-risk list in january 2013. but extending these life spans requires a relook at the timing about your satellites.

with the third chart i'd like to move the discussion from goz to jpss, the polar satellites. as you can see here, the red arrow represents a four-year life span extension on npp, the current operational polar satellite in the afternoon orbit. we question whether this should extend to 2020, given noaa's latest analysis supporting this. however, the good news here with jpss is there is an annual review that is used to update the polar satellite life spans, unlike the goz programs. regarding the j-1 launch, the middle bar here, of march 2017, we are more concerned about this date than we have been prior. key reasons are continued delay in the delivery of the key instrument atms, continued delays in the ground system, and continued problems with the component on the spacecraft. and finally on the chart, we think there is increased risk with j-2 since we have a new

spacecraft contractor. on goz the story was that the performance will greatly improve with the delivery of the second goz because there was a fair amount of learning with the first. it seems odd that that same logic wouldn't be applied to the second jpss satellite. in conclusion, noaa needs to be more france parent on risks and satellite life spaps, there needs to be a consistent policy to evaluate satellite life spans, and we still have major concerns with the backup, the gap in the backup for gozar, and also between npp and jpss-1. but after gozar and jpps-1 launch, given noaa's recent extensions, we're really not concerned about gaps after that point. in fact, congress might have opportunities to reduce annual expenditures on these programs in upcoming years. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, mr. powner, for your testimony. i recognize myself for five

minutes for questions. i just wanted to go back to dr. volz. the commercial speculate policy i think is a great starting point. i think there's more information that needs to be forthcoming on how to actually interact with noaa on the commercial capabilities that are out there right now. one of my questions is, right now when it comes to gps radio owe actualtatiocculttation, we company being tested and evaluated through ucar, other companies that are going to be launching next year numerous satellites into space. we heard testimony from you and it's in your written testimony as well about the cosmic program. when we think about commercial applications and we think about the 2010 space policy, commercial space policy, would it not be appropriate to take advantage of these commercial opportunities rather than continue to develop cosmic for

however many millions of dollars that that's going to take? >> so related to the value -- the capabilities of the oncoming commercial capability, you mentioned we do have assets now in space. spire is one organization that has launched some satellites and there are several others likely to launch in the near term. and from the noaa perspective we're very interested in seeing the performance of these satellites demonstrated on orbit. the cosmic program that was launched first in 2006 and has been flying for many years providing radio occulttation to noaa and integrated into our numerical weather modeling is a proven and demonstrated performance capability that we have been taking advantage of. the cosmic 2 is an expense of that and we expect when launch occurs in about a year to add that, those observations, into our data system. the value, the potential value, of these new commercial ventures, are very high.

but it's still potential. and i see we should be engaged with them. we should be watching and observing and leans analyzing the beat that come from them, once we develop the appropriate interaction engagement mechanism. it should be compared against some standard, some measurement capability that we have as well, with cosmic already. i think both hand is the approach i would take in approaching these. i think we need the cosmic 2 because it continues necessary measurement and it will provide excellent benchmark and comparison for these alternative approaches which use the same method, same measurement technique, but different implemee implementati implementation. evaluating those on-orbit activity will be key as we go forward and i lack forward to the opportunity. >> your boss manson brown last month in d.c. at a business roundtable mentioned he supports a line item in the president's budget request for a tech demonstration of commercial satellite weather data. do you also support a line item for commercial satellite weather

data? >> i support my boss, which is a good start. i do support the principle that we do need a focused effort to dem demonstrate the capability of these operations. so yes, i would support that. we've been working with noaa, with the commercial policy that went out and is new being reviewed for updates. on the nesda side as we do implementation we've been working on an engagement process for how we would work with industry, work with potential vendors, to provide data, to security data, to evaluate the data when it comes in, decide whether it's capable of support along long-term operational contract or contractual mechanism. we had a workshop this monday which was well attended by all of the -- at least three of the radio occulttation providers to talk about how we can have a productive interaction and how we can have a relationship going forward to support exactly that, which would be a chem administration project which would eventually lead to sustained operation availability

of data. >> the line item manson brown talked about, any idea the dollar amount that would be that's going to be in the president's budget request? >> i would be speaking from one half of the equation if i knew. i know what it takts for me to develop a satellite, to develop and process the data. what it would take for us to evaluate and process the data. as far as what the commercial side would need as investment or procurement is the part we have to explore. i'm not sure what would be the appropriate price point for our vendors to make their business models close because obviously that's a very proprietary element. it's an engagement we need to have to get a better feel for that. >> i would encourage you to engage with those vendors. the great thing for the taxpayer and for the people on this committee is that those commercial vendors are launching into space right now with clients that aren't necessarily noaa and that gives us an opportunity to share the costs so that it's not just the u.s. government taking on the burden but also transportation companies, agricultural companies, insurance companies, et cetera, that are interested

in this kind of data. so the price point may be a lot less than what we anticipate. and the idea that they're making the business case without the government involved is positive as well. which only makes it that much more interesting for us to be willing to reach out and purchase that data. i am out of time. i recognize the ranking member, mr. buyer, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. dr. volz, i have a culture question for you and it's not a hostile question. just to warn you up front. mr. powner talked about "extremely poor schedule performance" on one aspect of this. i read all rick atkinson's trilogy on the war in europe. world war ii. and the eisenhower again and again gave impossible timelines to his generals for invasions of north africa, sicily, italy, and

normandy. you read walter isaacson's book on steve jobs, jobs again and again gave his team impossible tasks. so the question is, does noaa search, do people work nights and weekends, is there a sense of urgency about these things, how is that urgency modeled by the leadership? or is it business as usual, people come in at 9:00 monday morning and go home at 5:00 on friday afternoon? >> so to -- starting with the ending of what you just stated, i've not seen a more dedicated team working on any program that i've seen on goz and jpss. that's independent of whether they're nasa, noah, lockheed martin, any of our vendors. there's no essential of casual execution of the program. there's a strong dedication of the mission and the time and effort they put into it, well beyond what i could ever expect to tell them to do. so your observation related to, is it a culture of setting

unrealistic deadlines and expectations? we're very sensitive, i'm very sensitive to that. if you set a schedule which is unachievable from day one, nobody treats it seriously. if i'm already behind the 8-ball it doesn't matter if i work extra or not. it has a negative impact i think on perform. on gozar, when we set up the program some time ago, we have standard methodologies within nasa and noah, cost confidence, schedule confidence, probability of success, it's called a joint confidence level, jcl, for cost and schedule. there's usually an acceptance that you budget to a 70% confidence which means 7 of 10 missions will meet or exceed that 3 of 10 will need more time or more money or both. so when we went -- that's sort of the baseline approach. assuming that you will perform to that. on goz we chose a more -- sometimes you choose a more aggressive schedule for a machine net tear mission because you have a tight window for launch. we chose to proceed from

confirmation to first delivery on a 50% thereabouts confidence schedule. knowing it was aggressive but not unachievable. because we understood the criticality of getting this measure on orbit. because we thought we would challenge ourtss and track our performance against that. we never sacrificed the performance during that process. we didn't skip tests we thought were important or necessary in order to achieve that. we tracked then a reserve depletion. the negative performance two years, mid '13 to mid '15 were strong, we were not meeting our schedule. we were still meeting the earliest schedule we could achieve -- >> let me fit in one more question r. mr. powner 11 recommendations made, noaa's implemented two of them, 12 recommendations regarding gozar, noaa's implemented four of those, can you explain the gap made by recommendation by gao and the inability to respond?

>> a lot of the recommendations are addressing the gap. i think a lot of them are in flight. they're not fully wrapped up yet. so we want to see more of that done to address a lot of the gaps. i think the issue with this, with this poor schedule performance, whether it's achievable or not, i think we need to be more open with our risks. so when we were here in february talking about missed milestones on the goz program, we didn't think they were going to hit that launch date of march 2016, and noaa had data saying that we had poor schedule performance for two years, our point is that you need to be open with your risks in order to hit your dates. when you're open with your risks -- i know this committee's been very supportive of noaa to ensure these satellites get up there on time. we need to collectively work on these risks and be open with them so we can all collectively address the issues that are at hand. >> thank you. very quickly, dr. volz, on the life plan extension, mr. powner talked about noaa should have

disclosed that sooner, that data's been around since 2005. it almost, if i were a skeptical person, i'd think we'd action tended the life span in order to make sure we don't look like there's a gap. can you explain? >> the particular study mr. powner mentioned was a study from 2005 whether we could the instruments to last longer than the contractual lifetime. but that's only a piece of the puzzle that we use when we calculate and we estimate the projected future life of a mission. one of the other pieces which really required the expenditure of time was with the goz nop is to see how those satellites operate on orbit. this was the first flight of the boeing 601 bus in a geo stationary operation like we had for go z nop. we need to see when we have a new satellite time on orbit to see how it's going to operate, what its performance is going to be are we going to see life-limiting procedures start to develop. it took many years of watching those satellites to operate from '06, '08, '09 when they were

launched. we could then say, now i'm comfortable saying the projection life will be longer than it is. that's where we came to about this time last year. >> i'll recognize the gentleman from georgia, the chairman of the oversight committee, mr. louder milk, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. children. i want to continue on with the line of questioning that my good friend mr. buyer brought up. mr. powner, you brought up the slides and the charts indicating the life cycle, the launch dates, now we're extending the life span and the useful life of the -- both satellite programs. it's been extended by three years. and dr. volz, you just mentioned that there was other data that was considered beyond just the 2005 documents that was provided to this committee. one question, why was only the

2005 document provided to this committee when we requested data to back up why you're extending the life span of these satellites? >> actually, sir, in the submission in response to the letter we received, we submitted that study. but also in analysis of explanation of how we did use the on-orbit performance validation of these instruments over time and the satellites over time. as of one of the rationales for extension. also what we also provide on a regular basis is monthly status reports in all of our satellites, we provide a couple of examples of the statusing of every subsystem in the spacecraft we do on a routine basis. while we haven't provided that, and that's a good point mr. powner made, we haven't provided a regular routine mechanism for the general health of all our satellites. one of the observations i had to my team is we should be doing that on an annual basis at least providing update of health of our constellation yoefrs all so we don't have a ten-year cycle for updating. we talk about on it a regular

basis as part of our annual reporting. >> so is the studies that you're referencing, extensive as what was done in 2005? >> no, the study in 2005 was specific request to itt, the instrument surrender who built the souner imageer for the goz nop series and the previous ones as well. the study was specifically directed to say although the instrument was designed for a specific lifetime what does the vendor think of that instrument lasting past, well past that lifetime? we really had to go to the vendor who built it, who knew all the parts, saying what do you think an litcally prelaunch these things are likely to see? that's one piece of the very specific sister. the operations team looks at all the operating performance of a series of satellites and watches each of those on a day to day, month to month basis, from that develops statistical understanding of the likelihood of continued operation of features that may show up, initial wear factors in the spacecraft that we need to understand as they age on orbit. different kinds of studies.

>> so the information you provided the committee said that increasing life span of the satellite by three years is plausible. >> i think that's a reason -- yes, sir. >> the definition of plausible has three definitions. possibly true, believable, or realistic. which one of those is it? possiblily true? believable? or realistic? >> i'm not sure they're all mutually exclusive. i would say it's a realistic assessment based on the knowledge we have that these are likely to survive through this period. >> okay. so with that, by expanding it by three years, are we increasing the likelihood that we could have a data gap? >> relying on aging assets for a longer period of time is a riskier approach than i would like to take for sure. i would prefer to have gozar up there in march of 2016 as opposed to october of 2016. >> we want it to be a gozar, not

a ghost. >> i would also want it to be a gozar that's functioning, capable, tested out, not a gozar that's rushed so that it may have failures, it may have shortcollings, testing in incompleteness that we had to get to it do to launch. >> i fully concur. mr. powner, wa you like to weigh in on the feasibility or increasing the possibility of a data gap? >> clearly there's a -- the gap on the ggos constellation. the potential for gap is high -- you can see from the chart there. there's likelihood we're going to have that situation. i think the key with the extension of these life spans, no one needs to have a very clear policy on how they evaluate these constellations. i know we start with design lives then we evaluate the reliability and availability of the constellation through detailed analysis. on jpss they do a very good job. we have an annual update.

on gos we continue need. i think there ought to be some consistency here. when you start moving these life spans it really affects the timing before we build and launch these future satellites. we all know these two programs consume a large part of noaa's budget. maybe you could slow that down and budget could be used for other things. i'm not saying these aren't important, they are. there's implications to moving these life spans out. you can't just say move them out then build them as quickly as we have with the original plan. >> mr. chairman, i see my time is up. i would like to add that fiscal responsibility, efficiency, taking care of taxpayer money, is very important. we're talking about an issue that can deal with the safety and the lives of others. so i yield. >> i'd like to thank the chairman and for dr. volz, we understand you've been doing this job now just over a year. these challenges have been developing over time.

we know you're working really hard to make sure that these issues are addressed. from our perspective, just real quick before i hand it over to mr. berra. from our perspective we learn that there's going to be a delay in the launch for gosar and at the same time we learn that we're going to extend the life of another satellite, we're going to predict that it's going to has it longer. it looks like it could be intenti intentionally we're just extending it so we can get to the next launch. i'm not saying that happened, i'm saying as mr. powner said, if there's more transparency, if we knew that well ahead of time, it wouldn't have appeared this way. so just -- i'm sharing my sentiments on that. so transparency helps us and we want to help you. so i turn it over to my friend from california, mr. berra. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank the ranking member. when i think about weather forecasting, thinking about this with my district, state, much of the american west in mind, because we're going through a

devastating drought right now. the fourth year of historic and unprecedented drought. when i think about my district, folsom lake which supplies drinking water for close to 500,000 people in my region. historic low right now. just having the predictability of weather is going to be incredibly important because, again, in california and in sacramento, we have this dual risk. we have years where we have incredibly high flood risk. and then obviously now we're living through this drought. so better forecasting aalthoull to better manage a appreciate asset, water. and that's why i share the concern of my colleagues here. if there is a gap in that ability, that does put us at risk, puts the nation at risk. it really does make it difficult to manage. i'm going to shift a little bit. if in fact there is a gap, we

know there's commercial weather satellites out there that are providing commercial data. is that true, doctor? >> i don't know commercial assets that provide equivalent or -- equivalent data and observations to the nature what was we provide that support our weather services. so there may be specific measurements that mate be available. but in general there are no commercial assets of equivalent or capable nature. >> there's no commercial backup that would be available. noaa's data that comes and goes and the other satellites, that's publicly available to anyone who wants it? or is that -- >> correct. >> so it's a public asset? >> correct, sir. >> that's available to anyone around the world? >> correct. just as other nations' assets and murmurs are available to us. it's a global cooperation sharing agreement on seven serve elevations f -- observations and climate. >> that would be a critical asset for the common good? >> yes, sir, entirely so. >> if we think about

commercialization, then, and this data -- if we were to shift from a public expenditure for the common good to more commercialization of this data, is there a risk that that's no longer available, folks have to pay, subscribe, et cetera? is that going to -- >> there is a perception, there is -- the approach noaa has that we have, is weather services that we provide, the observations that feed those, are a public good and are necessary for health, security of our nation and citizens. the idea of commercial available data sets are not necessarily at odds with public services provided by noaa. if we can find the rye terms and conditions with which to work with the commercial site to use their data in our models, in our operations. data which is restricted, only available to individuals, would not be something consistent with that approach, not something we would support.

doesn't mean commercial vendors can't make observations and sell them any way they want, that's fine, that's certainly open to everybody. >> again from my perspective there is some concern that if we're taking the taxpayer assets and then contracting that out to commercial vendors to replace some of the work that noaa's doing, you over time can lose the ability of this public good, this common good, data set? i don't know if that's a concern that folks at noaa have. >> that would definitely be a concern. if our ability to deliver on the services and observations necessary for health and safety and aviation safety and all other operations we do is restricted because the funds are diverted to a different approach, which is proprietary and controlled in a different way, that would be a negative approach that we would not support and i don't support. >> with knowing that, when we look at space exploration, there's what is ongoing at that

is sa, whatter would talking about here at noaa, this public/private partnership that is emerging, if you're kind of forecasting where weather forecast -- oxymoron, but if we're predicting where weather forecasting is going, where do you see this commercial public smash private partnership in the near future? >> similar to what you referenced on the nasa side, there are features, there are capabilities, that we already rely on heavily on the commercial side to provide. for the most part, we don't build our launch vehicles, commercial do that. we don't build our own space group, we go to commercial vendors for that. all the instruments we i would are from verbal vendors. there's an exteffive public/private engagement in weather services are what we're talking about is the potential next step, to secure data, as opposed to capabilities that way deploy. i think there is an opportunity for us to do that in a way which doesn't sacrifice those public goods i mentioned a few moments ago.

i think as commercial sector becomes more capable and is able to deliver a more quality product, data product, i think there's certainly possibility for strong engagement which can fit in our business model and support a commercial sector better. >> thank you. i'll yield back. >> i recognize the gentleman from ohio. mr. johnson for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for being here with us this morning. dr. volz, how many of the viable u.s. commercial providers for satellite data do you intend to bring under contract in the next three to five years? >> that's a very open-ended question. depends on resources, depends on how many actually apply for a particular -- if we go out with an rfp or -- >> how many do you need to bring under, how many do you want to bring under? >> i'm more concerned with getting a data flow. to getting the operational data i know. if i get -- if we go through with an approach, a pilot approach, we find one vendor that has the quality set of information that we need, that

we can use, that meets our criteria, that is financially viable, that's a satisfactory result for me. fy get three or four competing and they're all providing something i can afford to support several because i need the data for several, i can support that as well, subject to availability of fund and the cost points on these convenient dorts. vendors. >> that is noaa done a cost/benefit analysis of gap mitigation alternatives to determine which ones are likely to be the most effective and worthy of investment? >> when we went through the gap analysis and the exercises in 2011, '12, '13, we had the riverside report which i imagine you've already read which identified a number of admittation approaches to lessen impact of loss of a major asset. we selected a number of those to compete and have been executing on those admittation approaches. we did not do an allocation to say which is the most and least effective.

we saw they applied to different areas of our observing system and applied those that were possible to impact, affect, and we have been working on those. >> why do you not see the need to do the mitigation to look at most effective? >> i would say that we did that -- i wouldn't say ad hoc but in a best-effort approach. it's hard to do an assessment of a particular measurement once the benefit of that to an integrated global model which relies on multiple inputs to say. i would probably say the difficulty of doing a cost/benefit analysis when the output is the value of a weather project, three to seven-day forecast, it's very hard to quantify the value of that from the cost of that approach. we look at the efficacy of those approaches. is it a necessary part to address a particular measurement capability? >> sure. as general aviation pilot myself, i can tell you that that -- the accuracy of that

data and the ability to look out and get those accurate forecasts, both near term and long-term, are important. have any studies been performed on the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs between different potential laurcnch dates for th later satellites such as goes-u or jpss, jpss-4? >> yes, sir. that points to the excellent point mr. powner brought up. what can we do in the latter years, once we get to a robust state, what do we have to lost goes-t and "u" on a rapid time frame. the answer is probably not, we'd launch on need when we get to that. two comparisons here. one is the cost of storm if we build and store. the other is the cost impacts of delaying the development. based on industry assessments

and industry model of the efficiency of building four in a rapid sequence is more effective in terms of buying parts, getting the workforce gained, buying down the risk of implemei implementati implementation. we actually have seep the example friday arrow situation and industry examples, build first, launch later if necessary, as a certain cost benefit from the build and development psych chel and you i would down the risk when you build them all at the same time when you have the parts, availability and engineering. >> okay, all right. earlier this year your office hosted a community engagement work shop to inform outside groups in the commercial sector of progress noaa has made for incorporating commercial technologies. this week you hosted another such event. what updates occurred between the previous workshop held in april and the one this i don't care? what did you learn?

>> we talked mostly about principles, about the engagement desires, what we would like to do going into the future. in the workshop this week we spent a great deal of time talking about the actual process by which we would use data, how data are used from observation to services and products. so that we were very clear, very articulate in trying to explain -- depending how articulate it was -- to explain how the data are used in our systems and how different vendors can tailor their business models to deliver data to us at different places in our value chain. >> are you talking to individual companies as well to get a broader perspective this. >> we have gone out asking for inputs on particular measurement types. we've gone out with rfis about technology, next-generation technology approaches they think are worthy of investment or ready for application, ready for primetime as operational. in terms of the overall gachlgment, we have talked on a

one-on one-basis, i have not, some of my staff was, keeping us informed where they are in the development cycle, where we are in our process cycle. why anyone i'm trying trying to talk to them all at once so we have these workshops on a regular basis so everyone can see where we are going forward. >> mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i recognize the weather guru from california, mr. pearl mutter. i would warn the witnesses -- >> colorado, colorado, colorado. >> colorado. from colorado. i would warn the witnesses that his jacket is off and his sleeves are rolled up. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for holding this committee hearing. and to you two gentlemen, thank you for being here again. these are very important assets of the united states. as mr. louder milk said, dealing with life, limb and property, as well as science. i think i mentioned the last time you were here, i've been

working on this since 2009 and '10 with npos. what i'd like to do is go back to basics and understand the structure, the decision-making structure here. so i come from a construction family. and if -- with respect to jpss and the g.o.e.s. systems am i correct when i look at it as noaa is the owner, nasa is sort of the general contractor, then the private companies, the lockhe lockheeds, the balls, the orbital atks, are in effect the subcontractors. that is a fairway to describe this? this is to both of you. dr. volz. >> yes, except i'd add a nuance. yes, noaa is the owner but also the architect. so the architect doesn't just give the plans and walk away, the architect is there with the general contractor, is there when the general contractor sometimes is talking to subcontractors to make sure what

he had in mind in the architecture is what is actually being implemented. so that's the role noaa plays. we do not have the engineering depth nasa does, we rely on that depth. we're there with the requirements, with the user community interphrases, so that we know what the end use is of every one of these observations which allows us then to work hand in glove with nasa and with the major contractors to make sure that end use is remembered -- is kept in mind at you go through the whole development process. >> mr. pouner? >> yeah, i would just add that the contracting situation with the spacecraft, each sensor in the ground component, they all have prime contractors with subs. so you have many contractors and subcontractors involved with each of those many components. >> well, the reason i'm asking that question is because, when it was npos or now g.o.e.s. and jpss, there is a little separation between noaa as the

owner-archite owner-architect, if you will, and the general contractor, nasa. before it was noaa and the air force. and we've had -- i mean, obviously we wouldn't be here if we weren't having some delays and some hiccups in how these things are proceeding. sometimes i feel like noaa gets hammered when in fact it's been the air force or nasa that has caused some of the hiccups and they're not sitting here today. my mistaken in that at all? >> i think be you -- we can go too far with the analogy between npos and where we are now. i believe in the npos days there was a greater separation between the different owners and executers of the program which led to some of the disconnect, some of the bems. the requirements flow down into the implementation was much more complex under npos than it is now. i believe now with the nasa/noaa relationship and the nasa/noaa contractor relationship we have on jpss and goes-r, we have a

much better connectivity across that line. >> let me tell you where i'm going with this because i'll run out of time. as a coloradoan we were disappointed when ball didn't get the follow-on in the jpss program. nasa was the acquisition point person or point agency, and obviously the contractor there. what i'm concerned about is just as mr. powner was saying, the navy has a very good system of building submarines. they really do have an assembly line approach. and given the fact that we've had these delays, dr. volz, more to you but also mr. powner, shouldn't we be trying to do something like that with these satellites so that you can get them done in a way that's timely, that's well tested, am i making a mistake here?

>> no i think you have a perfect example between g.o.e.s. and jpss. you're building a series, a fleet. it does make sense to define the requirements once and do the implementation once. that's where we are right now. that's how we set it up with the program with the g.o.e.s. program. you still have problems as we're talking about. that's why we're here because of the issues in the development of the g.o.e.s. program. we hope to work through those and overcome them. the jpss program, we did not have that same construct. we were building them one at a time. there are definitely significant inefficiencies in doing it that way. whether it's an intentional change in a major subcontract like the spacecraft from ball aerospace or unintentional change because the production lines have changed and the capabilities that the subcontractors change out and you can't control it. so by going with the one item approach you definitely are setting yourselves up for more risky approach. the follow-on to jpss is intended to be buy both at once, eliminate those risks of coming

with multiple serial buys so that you do minimize the risk of implementation. i'll let david answer too. >> we've had a lot of risks and delays on both these programs. i don't know why you'd add more risk. that was our point on j-2. especially when we sat down on g.o.e.s. and the delays and we said, okay, what's going to be different with your schedule performance? they want, we learned a lot. okay, the second one weeks going to be a lot better at it. don't you -- that logic probably applies to j-2. there's a lot of issues on j-1. work-arounds with subcontractors and the whole bit. ball aerospace can lay out all those things. a new contractor doesn't have all that history going forward so we think there is risk with that shift. we're looking for more continuity where we kind of get an assembly line here. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> i'd like to thank the gentleman from colorado. i recognize the gentleman from texas, mr. power.

>> yes, sir. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, our witnesses. dr. volz, if the government has weather or climate missions that you could catch a ride on a commercial satellite to the benefit of all parties, it would seem to me to be a cost effective and sustainable option. has noaa taken advantage of these hosted payload options for weather or climate missions? if so, why or why not? >> you're correct. if we can find a ride, it's an appropriate -- and that meets the requirements, it's an appropriate and potentially more efficient way to do it. we are suggesting and proposing that approach for our search and rescue and adcs systems which would use the air force's hosted payload solutions for buying space on commercial and launch vehicles. commercial spacecraft, not just launch vehicles. yes. >> sure, okay, thank you. again, since the president's fiscal year 2016 budget request

transfers responsibility for developing climate instruments and climate satellites from noaa to nasa, will noaa funds meant to pay for such instruments and satellites stay within noaa for use in gap mitigation efforts? or will they be transferred to nasa to offset the cost of their development? and what effect would such development have on nasa's budget? please provide the committee with a funding breakout how this arrangement would look. >> so i'd be happy to provide you with a follow-up on the funding breakout. from looking at the transition of the couple of measurements from noaa to nasa, there was no -- there were no funds transferred from noaa to nasa, there were no funds allocated. we were underfunded to execute those activities on the noaa side. it was a prioritization question. and the concern was they would have been left off the table entirely because they weren't funded from the noaa side. it wasn't that we had funds that

we should then move over to cover somewhere else. it was both a question of focus. also inability on our side to support those programs because we had to support the primary weather mission. that was our focus. >> okay. mr. powner, you seem to have major concerns about noaa's transparency and openness with congress. what are the key issues that drive your concerns here? >> so we had a hearing in february on these two programs and then what happened was the life span extension occurred in april. the flyout charts changed in april. and we think if a major change occurs like that, this committee should have been informed. that's one example. >> okay. >> another example is i think the scheduled performance could have been disclosed much more directly and openly to this committee when we had that hearing in february. >> absolutely. mr. volz, would you like to comment on that? >> sure. on the first one, the flyout

chart change, that's on me. as i came in from nasa, i remember looking at the flyout charts over the years and trying to understand what the logic was in those. and i brought in with my experience, there are certain -- there are different analyses, different approaches to assessing the extended life since i've done that for many years at nasa that would be applicable i thought to these systems and these programs. that's what i asked for. i probably -- it was my error not knowing how sensitive it was, how important it was, that we communicate those. so we will -- as i said, we will make that a regular thing in the future. on the other question which i'm drawing a blank, what was the second one? on the schedule performance, that's a fair point. and to the degree that we're not communicating well, quantifying the risk that we see in the execution of these programs, i think we need to do a better job of that. we work regularly with your staffers, with the committee, it's our quarterly briefings. to the degree that those are not communicating appropriately, i'm happy to find a better way to do that to improve that communication. >> okay. and once again, mr. powner, one

of noaa's challenges is that it needs to obtain more and better weather data with less money. one way to do that is to buy data from the commercial sector instead of trying to launch satellites by themselves. but noaa's satellite division nesdus has also been delegated the authority granted by congress to the secretary of commerce to regulate these new commercial providers and they're having trouble granting licenses on a timely basis. isn't it a conflict of interest for a bureaucracy to regulate the industry that is competing with its traditional satellite programs? and should the authority to regulate and promote this innovative and money-saving industry be moved to the office of the undersecretary for oceans and atmospheres instead of being buried inside nesdus? >> yeah, in terms of where that should reside, i think the key point here is this. we need robust constellations for both g.o.e.s. and jpss. we're always going to have noaa own and operate these big

satellite programs. that's not going to go away. we need to supplement these constellations with commercial data to ensure that we have a robust constellation. i think where everyone wants to go with the use of commercial products and the like, we need to look strongly at that to build the most robust constellations. that's what's most important for the american taxpayer and this country. >> absolutely. okay. thank you and i yield back, mr. chairman. >> gentleman yields back. and i recognize the gentleman from florida, mr. posey, for five minute is. >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. volz, in your opinion how likely is g.o.e.s. to meet its launch date of october 2016? >> i think our current performance and the schedule execution is strong. i think we have margin -- we definitely have margin against our august delivery date to the launch site. the poor performance that was mentioned by mr. powner in the two years leading up to the thermal vacuum test in july and august is real. and following that, when we

re-establish this schedule for an october launch date, we provided a new schedule approach for lockheed martin and nasa and noaa to work together. since that, since the september, october, november period, as opposed to ten days a month of reserve being used up, they are ahead of schedule. so the way that we have rephrased the schedule and reframed it with reserve appropriately has been working and the program is working on schedule since that time. in the face of problems and issues like we typically see during integration and test. so i'm reasonably confident that we will meet the october launch date. >> okay, thank you. mr. powner? you see that thing the same way? >> well, we are aware of there's some failed transistor parts that affect battery operation and the like. i think that's been a key risk going forward that we have heard that october launch date possibly could be at risk. that's a key issue. i don't know where we're at on that right now. but that's something that we're watching. we're still cautiously optimistic on these launch dates going forward. because we've heard indications that there's still some risks to

the october '16 date. >> okay. you partially answered my next question for dr. volz. that is, what do you see as the biggest factors that could cause another launch delay? >> we are -- we have finished -- we have still some mechanical environmental testing ahead of us. and the likely factors on the goes-r spacecraft since it has been integrated and the transistor power fail or unit has been corrected and the pieces are back in integration is the nature of similar things like that happening which that could be a bigger problem that takes time to resolve. a parts problem, a mechanical problem during test, those are still ahead of us. until we get through the mechanical testing, vibration testing, acoustic testing, those are maim tests we still have to complete. the ground system is solid. the antennas are completed and ready for receipt. the user community is prepared. it's getting the spacecraft through the last eight months of environmental testing to launch. which is always a challenge. but that's -- i see as a systemic challenge we have for the program right now. >> okay, thank you.

what are some of the potential impacts of a delay goes-r launch? will it increase the life cycle cost? >> it will not increase the life cycle -- well, depends on the type. if we have a major issue -- within the expected range of delay here or there or the operations that we have to do to execute, we're operating went the life cycle budget, within the annual budgets, so i do not expect based on what we see now that we will need additional funding for the goes-r program. >> okay. what is the current estimated time during which g.o.e.s. constellation will not have a backup satellite available? >> that's a good segue into what is the -- i don't predict that we will have any point that we won't have a backup satellite available, based on our estimation of a current life expectation of these satellites. however, we are all only one failure away from losing a satellite, that can always happen. between now and the launch of

goes-r our estimation is the satellites we have on orbit are functioning, ageing and healthy, as i said in my introduction, and i do not expect that we will have a gap. however, if we do, if we lose one of our assets, we do have a backup in space and if we lose -- if we reduced to two satellites we have anticipated this possibility and worked cooperative relationships with our international partners so that they could loan us a satellite in the dire circumstances that we have two major system failures. we worked this -- >> okay. i was going to asked if this has ever happened in the past. >> it hs in the past occurred that we have had to borrow assets from our foreign partners and we contributed assets in the same, they have needed the partnership sharing arrangement that we've had. it's been successful and it's been exercised two or three times in the past. >> we had a hearing earlier and had testimony about the sunburst that crossed our orbit last year

that we missed by about one week that would have virtually some experts say knocked out every single commercial satellite. how would that have affected yours? >> i don't know the magnitude of that particular solar event that might have hit us. our satellites are hardened for what we understand the normal environment is, normal means some deviation from the normal environment. a major solar storm would have an impact on all of our satellites. major is hard to determine when exactly what it is. but we are as vulnerable as of some other satellites to major solar flare events. and we do what we can to harden it. it's still the event of a significant event would have an impact on us. >> mr. powner, do you want to comment many. >> i have nothing further to add on that. >> i'm concerned about what we do to harden these. how much they can be hardened, if there's any cost that's

prohibitive in doing that, i just don't think that congress, quite frankly, or the public communications industry is taking it serious enough. we had experts come in here and tell us basically it would change the world as we've known it. they say the impact would be in the trillions and they talk multiple trillions. they wouldn't even dare attempt to quantify it. but we seem to be doing so little about hardening these for the solar eruption, is what they called it, or emps. they just dismiss that as well, before someone uses an emp against us there have to be bigger problems, which is not true. and so -- is there a plan that contain s noaa's on going

strategies to mitigate a satellite gap? >> yes, it's been exercised for the last several years of our program. the point of getting jpss 1 and 2 and the pfo under contract to get to a directly to your point where we have a spare, hot spare on orbit for our polar energy or stationary satellites and in the event of a significant events we're thinking about a satellite, moeteorite or a sola flare. that's the objective. that's one way rather than trying to harden a satellite against an unknown size of event is to have a replacement satellite readily available. when you look at the goes-t and u available we won't launch those to sit in orbit, we can have them sitting on the ground in orbit in case when something like that happens. our programs do support getting to a robust state but we're not there yet. >> that's a great plan, but if we had an impact the consequence of the one the scientists told

us last year, it's very possible, there would be not been an electronic grid to enable you to send up the replacement within a year. >> fair enough. the magnitude of the event is -- there are events of a size that we can't model for or plan for. but we are planning for the loss of satellite assets. there's something that we only affect the satellites and not the whole ground infrastructure. >> i thank you for your indulgence. i yield back. >> mr. powner, would you like to address, i saw you maybe indicating you had a comment when he mentioned that the goes-r delay could have an impact on life cycle costs. did you want to say something about that? >> life cycle costs, so there are reserves, okay, you have an overall life cycle. any delay there's going on the an impact on cost. the last delay there was an impact on cost. it want to be clear on that. any delay we further have there will be an impacts on cost and there will be an impact on the

potential -- increase in the potential backup capability. >> that's important for those of us on this committee to understand. i now recognize the gentleman from alabama, mr. palmer, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to thank the witnesses. mr. powner, you mentioned that noaa needs a clear policy on what analysis should drive the adjustment of satellite lifespans. could you expand on that? >> back grouped, if you look at what d.o.d. does, they have very robust analysis on the availability and reliability in their operational satellites. to noaa's credit on jpss they do a pretty nice jop on jps, annual assessment on the reliability. we don't see it on those. even to -- they just need to be real clear on what their policy is on how they determine the lifespan. so, for insan francisco, i've been doing this a long time, looking at m-post for this committee, even prior to congressman perimutte made.

you have a backup on orbit. on the polar constellation we always thought the policy was you have a backup on the ground. but now i'm hearing a backup in orbit. we just need to be clear on what our policy is on ensuring a robust constellation. and noaa is not always clear. they're not always clear. we need to get that clarity so that we have a robust constellation. >> let me ask you this. how can noaa determine that appropriate has been made in implementing gap mitigation activities, mr. powner? >> we looked at this with our last review and testified in february. there's a lot of good work on mitigation activities. and i do think there are some mitigating factors that yield greater benefits. we've heard like aircraft observation, some of the adjustments to the models and the like. and noaa is working on those things. so a lot of that's being worked on now and that goes back to some of the comments and

questions earlier on our recommendations. we want to see some of those mitigation activities rounded out even further so that if in fact we have gaps, leading up to march 2017, that we have some of these backup capabilities. >> in that regard and, dr. volz, you may want to comment on this. go back to mr. posey's questions right there at the end about having -- whether you've got a soot light, backup system already in orbit or if you've got a -- if you've got backup systems on the ground, do you have backup launch capabilities because if you do have a massive solar event or some other emp type event, would you have the capability to launch more satellites? >> we rely on the launch services provided through the national assets, the same launch service that are provided that support the defense department, nasa, noaa. we all use the same commercial launch providers. in the event of a loss of a

catastrophic loss of significant asset we also have the capability and to prioritize our mission over others. so i think that -- >> what i'm asking, and you may not be able to answer this if you're relying on other agencies, other parts of the government for the launch capability, it's not just losing the asset in space, it's -- if you had a catastrophic event like an emp where your ground systems are eliminated, do you have backup systems or you may not be able to answer this. are there backup systems that could launch -- that have been hardened, that we could get in place to get something back in orbit? >> and i'm not the right person to ask about what the capability launch, backup capabilities are for the nation. >> mr. powner, back to you. jpss, report earlier this year focused on a potential the gap in the 2015-2017 time frame.

are there similar concerns about a gap between the first and second jpss satellites in the early 2020s? >> the first -- we're not so concerned about a gap on -- between the first and second assuming we hit the march date and jpss-2 stay on board. the issue with the gap between mpp and jarks-1, if you didn't have this recent four-year extension on the lifespan there would be a gap. so, you know, the key here is we hope that mpp continues to function well and we hope that j-1 does launch on march 2017 so that we don't have a gap between mpp and j-1. that's the concern of ours. >> if i may, sir, i have almost the exact opposite assessment. based on watching the mpp instrument and flying over the

past four years, analysis and mitigations that we've seen in execution of those operations i have a stronger confidence now that the satellite, barring a meet your right or some other activity, is likely to function for many years because i've seen these satellites to that over time. i think the uncertainty in launch of the gap between j-1 and j-2 is because we haven't launch eed j-1 yet is something i'm more concerned about going forward. but we're talking ak probabilities and risks and we have to address all of these. so i don't think that once j-1 is launched that our risk of a gap is necessarily gone away. we still have to worry about getting j-2 developed and dlied on orbit as quickly as we can. >> one thing if i could add. i do think mpp overall is functioning well. it's not perfect. you can read their own availability analysis and there's questions about atms lasting beyond the five-year life, not a nine-year life. so there's watch items there and we need to continue to watch it

so there's not -- we need to be clear that there are still risks with mpp. >> mr. chairman, i assume my time has expired. >> i think the gentleman from alabama. we're going to go into a second round of questions and i recognize myself for five minutes. wanted to share with you guys some of the challenges i see going forward as it relates to a commercial data by the president's budget request is due to this congress in february. we'll do a budget process in march. then we start doing -- we'll be doing authorizes along the way and appropriations, even before, and -- i should say after. what i would be interested in is what that number might be. and i know you probably don't have that number for a line item for a commercial data buy. i'd want to be clear that we're expecting that. i'd like to, if you're rabl to provide that to us even before february, it would be very valuable as we go through the authorize skaigsizations and appropriations processes. so just -- you're under no

obligation to give us anything until p president's budget request. i understand that. but if you can help we want to be helpful as well. so that would be good. on the commercial space policy that came out an september 1st, it's been open for comments. the comment period closed october 1st. there have been 15 comments. do you have a timeline when the final policy might be released? >> yes, sir. and we have 15 respondents and we look through the responses we came up with on the order of 90. different actionable comments that we think should be addressed in some way or the other. noaa has set up a team and is -- a team to review those and adjudicate those. i'm expecting and i've been told by the management within noaa that we expect the revised policy to be coming out within the few weeks, within the coming weeks. >> that's great. >> and in the meantime we've been working the process. the workshop on monday was addressing that and we would

like to follow up with a release for draft process for comments just like the policy within a few weeks of the release of the formal policy. >> so after the release of the formal policy, there will be more comments? >> no, a draft release of the process which is next level of detail down about execution of industry. >> got it. you can expect that, we can expect that a couple weeks after -- >> after the release of the noaa policy. >> fantastic. we're talking about january, february? >> yes. >> okay. >> yes. >> fantastic. let's see. i want to go through a couple of comments, i should say statements that were made regarding the space policy. and i want to get a reaction from you on it. one statement is that -- i'll just read it. it says in its entirety the latest iteration of noaa's policy fails to mark a distinction between raw satellite data ingested in oaa's operational weather models versus the output of those

models and derive data products. it is full, free and open access to model output der vooifed data products, and current ground conditions that underpins the robust u.s. commercial weather sector. do you agree there's a difference between the output and the raw data, like the satellite data coming, coming down from the satellites? >> let me predicate this with saying i'm not an expert with the essential versus nonessential or additional data sets. they address mostly the issue of the data. there is a difference. no question about that. so the -- so simple answer to your question is, yes, there is a difference between those. and i don't know to the policy was meaning to address the output products, the output services as they are free and open to all. >> okay. >> but is focused on, from my perspective in using commercial data in our operations is how we deal with the data that we receive from the vendors, which

is input data you're referring to. >> going back to your mention of wm-40 there's another statement that ace wmo-40 resolutions 40 and 25 explicitly permit private sector companies to restrict the redistribution of their data. and allow those same member countries flexibility and discretion in determining which data sets are freely exchanged and under what conditions they choose to do so. so it looks to me like under wmo-40 private industry providing data to augment the numerical weather models, that data should be protected. would you like to make a comment on that? >> probably not. i am not -- >> probably not -- >> i'm not a wmo-40 expert so i don't know the nuances of it. so i probably should let it go at that. we would be happy to have a separate conversation related to wmo-40. >> i'd like to get these kind of resolutions in this final space policy coming from noaa, commercial space policy.

and i know it's going to be in a couple of weeks but these are the kind of things that absolutely must be definitively determined before -- if we're going to have a robust commercial segment that can augustment our numerical weather models and save money for the taxpayers. that's my concern. and i think we can do that but we've got to be really clear about what's required here. i've got about -- well, i'm out of time. i'm going to stop now and recognize the gentleman from virginia, mr. beyer. >> dr. volz, he talked about the critical instruments, the atms, advanced technology microwave sounder had been delayed. but in the last quarterly update that this committee received, noaa said it had to be delivered by the end of november to maintain the jpss-1 launch date.

in your testimony now you say you can maintain that launch date despite the date the amts won't be delivered until december. can you explain the conflict? >> the atms delivery date for the plan we established in the summer was no later to the end of november to support the plan going forward to a december 2016 launch date, correct. the atms has slipped and now late december potentially early january. and we have had to look into what we have had to take time-out of reserve, schedule reserve. the late november date would have -- was planned for and did not incumber any of the reserve. the schedule reserve in the schedule left beyond november. we've had to debit against those reserves to accommodate the late delivery of the atms. >> you have flexibility. >> we still had flexibility. wasn't a no deserve date. we've had flexibility and we've been using it. >> great. in your testimony, doctor, you say the goes-r team applies the lessons learned from the last

two years to do timely and successful completion of goes-s, t, use satellites? does the same theory work with the jpss because i know you've now moved to a new contractor for jpss-2? any risks because you're not building with the old contractor on what you learned doing that? >> yes. and i agree with mr. powner going to a new -- two points. first, what i said is we're applying the lessons learned over the last two years and test of goes-r to make sure the schedule we laid out through this time next year, october next year for the launch, includes those lessons learned. that's why we have confidence we're meeting schedules. we still need to revisit what that means for the goes-s, t, and u's schedules. as far as changes in the contract for the jpss, that does increase risk. that's a factor. it's a risk factor now that we've added to the system.

it was not there before. i agree with you that it does. you can't say that's not the case. now, whether that risk -- where that ranks in the overall risks or different risks in the program including cost and schedule risk issing in we had to look at when we made the procurements in the process. it is an increase in risk but not necessarily an increase in the overall programatic execution riching. >> when you made the award it was an understanding it was a piece of the overall puzzle. >> yes. >> mr. powner, you said the very attractive idea that perhaps congress could reduce expenditures in upcoming years. can you expand on that a little? >> well, clearly when you look at the outyear satellites, the follow-on for the polar constellation and then when you get into the outyear goes, there's a question about what's the most economical way to go forward. do you build everything as

quickly as you can and get economies to scale there and perhaps store them on the ground? perhaps. do you perhaps slow down the acquisition of some of those outyear satellites? perhaps. and i think what -- and i know this committee, we've worked with both your staff and majority staff, they're looking for analysis. there was a comment made that congressman johnson asked a question about this, about tradeoff assessments. i'm not aware of those tradeoff assessments that satisfied your staff on this committee. i think they need those tradeoff assessments to make the right decisions on outyear deliveries. >> great. thank you. dr. volz, did you have a comment? >> i'd like to respond to that. i agree entirely that the outyear execution is -- needs to be addressed. what we have focused our activities on over the last five years as we came to the critical -- assessment of risk on both the polar and geo stationary satellites is that we did not have a robust configuration on orbit. our first and overriding

priority was to get to a situation where we had -- we were fault tolerant. we had a single fault. we could suffer a loss of a satellite asset and not disable the weather system. and that has tated the aggressive approach to building the goes-r satellites and aggressive schedule as we went through what could be a mission ending failure. the skam with the jpss. that has been our primary motivation. once we get to that oh we we're in a comfortable in that risk to lant or fault tolerant situation on orbit, exactly as mr. powner mentioned, look at what is the cadence we need to launch but we need to have the assets available to make the choices. until we have that we can't do anything to make it better or worse. >> thank you, have must have. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i'd like to thank the ranking member and in closing, we're -- oh. very good to see you down there. recognize the gentleman from alabama, mr. palmer for five

minutes. >> mr. chairman, thank you for recognizing. i'm trying to do my job. >> that's what the taxpayers in alabama expect. >> exactly. mr. volz, the president's budget requested $380 million for the polar follow-on program. having seen the cost overruns and delays faced by the current satellites, i think maybe you can understand our hesitation to fully -- or some of us, our hesitation to fully support fully funding this program. how exactly are these funds going to be used? >> thank you for the question, sir. the polar follow-on includes the third and fourth series of the jpss satellites. the funds for this -- for this -- the initial $380 million are primariy lily to start, 85% those going directly to the instrument providers who built the instruments for jmpp and jps

one and two. the benefit of this approach we tried to articulate is that we are buying the satellite instruments, the highest risk, potentially the highest and most impactful elements of any satellite system at a time, bulk buy, two at once, maximizing the efficiency, procurement, at a time when the vendors are ready to build those having just finished the instruments on jpss-2. the money is going directly to the main four vendors who are supplying instruments for the jpss 3 and 4 satellites. >> are those vendors building the components that you think are most crucial? >> they will be prioritizing -- >> 85% of the money so the no jority of the money is going for that? >> yes, sir. >> all right. let me ask you one other question, or ask one other question. goa's opinion, would noaa incur higher costs if they did not receive all of the requested funds to initiate the polar follow-on programs?

>> i'm not certain. this is back to where the appropriated analysis and the tradeoff assessments needs to be given to this committee to gao so that we can actually answer that question. you need analysis that supports it. >> well, to close this, and i assume this will close the hearing, i just think, you know, handing noaa another blank check to build satellites whenever -- when they can't get the ones that they have off the ground, that it appears a bit irresponsible, mr. chairman. i think noaa needs to fix their systematic problems that have plagued the program for years before we throw any more money at it. i yield the balance of my time. >> i'd like to thank the gentleman from alabama. it is -- it is -- it's a very challenging issue that, you know, we have delays. we have these challenges. and it seems the only answer is

more money, more time, more money, more time. and if we don't provide it, then we have, you know, quite frankly, even bigger problems with data gaps and the inability to predict weather. it puts us here in congress in a tough position when we have these issues. but i want to close on -- i really believe that we can augustment a lot of these challenges with commercial data. i believe it can reduce the cost. i believe it can prevent these kind of scenarios from even occurring if we do it right. and we might not be there today and i understand that. these kind of things take time. i'm very grateful that in the next couple of weeks, you know, before the end of the year we're going to see a final commercial space policy from noaa and then more policies that come after that so that our, you know, private sector knows how to work with noaa in order to provide the data that can augustment our systems. when i see that final commercial space policy i would really like

to see two major things. one is that there's a difference between upstream and downstream. a difference between flatout raw data, ones and zeros coming off of a satellite and the downstream, the end products that are available to the public and in the national interests. and i'd also like to see a very clear resolution that, in fact, wmo-40 and wmo-25 explicitly permit private sector companies to restrict the redistribution of their data. and allow those same member countries flexibility and discretion in determining which data sets are freely exchanged and under what conditions they choose to do so. i think that's important as we develop this commercial industry that is going to be good for the taxpayer, good for those of us who are trying to protect lives and property. i think these are important issues that need to be put in the commercial space policy. for that i'd like to thank our

witnesses for the time today, thank you for the hard work that both of you do. with that, we are adjourned. friday morning a panel of journalists will share their experiences covering complex around the world. it will be hosted by the women's foreign policy group in washington, d.c. watch it live at noon eastern here on c-span3. on the road to the white house president smul candidate and businessman donald trump will speak to supporters at a campaign stop in des moines, e io iowa, friday night. we'll take you there live at 7:30 p.m. eastern on c-span.

every weekend on american history tv on c-span3, 48 hours of programs and events that tell our nation's story. saturday afternoon at 2:00 eastern historians and authors on the life and legacy of stokely carmichael, a voice for equal rights and organizer for the all african people's resolution party, field secretary charles cobb. >> stokely called the sit-in movement an apprentice ship in struggle. i think he's about right in that no matter where you come out five years later, i mean, stokely, you know, eventually moves to africa, embraces pan african socialism. other people embrace the democratic party. >> then at 8:00 on lectures in history. town son university history professor elizabeth gray, public opinion of its abuse by men and

women. >> the attitude toward women drinking at the time was that this was very inappropriate. that a woman should not drink. why would it be something that she could loo to as an alternative? >> sunday morning at 10:00 on road to the white house rewind, we look back to the 2000 campaign of al gore as he tours the state of new hampshire. >> and for the last 6 1/2 years you've seen new hampshire change from a time when you were losing 10,000 jobs a year to a time now where you're gaining 12,000 jobs a year. and that's partly because we've had fiscal responsibility, president clinton and i put in place an economic plan that has balanced the budget and turned the biggest deficit into the biggest surplus. >> al gore went on to win the democratic nomination but lost the general election to george w. bush in one of america's highly contested presidential elections.

american history tv, always weekend, every weekend, only on c-span3. fbi director james comey testified before the senate judiciary committee yesterday. he discussed the san bernardino, california, shootings and released new information about the suspects. the director also touched on several challenges facing the fbi including data encryption and ability of isis to create foreign passports. this is about 2 hours and 50 minutes. director comey, we welcome you and thank you for coming. the fbi's mission is to protect us from most dangerous threat facing our nation. the deadly attacks in paris last month and california last week confirm that radical islamic terrorism continues to be such a threat regardless of whether that's politically correct