why don't we, if we could, go in the order of introductions starting with you, ambassador cunningham. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman's good to see you again. senator cardin, members of the committee, i am honored to testify today on u.s. strategy in afghanistan, and i appreciate this opportunity to address why continued u.s. engagement in afghanistan is so important, and to place our efforts there in the context of the challenge we face from the extreme distorted islamic ideology which threatens or citizens, our values and our way of life. rather than submit a statement for the record i would refer the committee to the recent atlantic council paper on afghanistan and u.s. security of which i was the principal author. cosigned by 28 former senior u.s. government officials of both parties and prominent policy experts and with senators mccain and reid as honorary co-sponsors, that is jack reid. the paper registers bipartisan agreement that afghanistan matters to america's security, has a way forward to success,

despite all the challenges, merits the continued u.s. engagement required to protect american interests and should be seen in the context of the broader terrorist threat. we argued it to maintain u.s. and coalition military forces and intelligence assets and close to current levels and to leave options open for the next american president. 2014 and 2015 were years of great political security and economic transition and uncertainty for afghanistan. with clarity about long-term u.s. engagement there is not an opportunity to turn that around. i applaud president obama's decision to maintain the u.s. military presence in afghanistan through 2016 and beyond. this is a critically important strategic indicator of u.s. commitment to afghanistan's security and success. it provides clarity for afghans, the taliban in the region, that there will be a significant u.s. military role in the future with no deadline. i wish such clarity hi been provided several years ago. it is critical of the confidence of afghans that they were

succeed and demonstrating to the taliban they cannot. clarity that the afghan project will not fail, that afghanistan will not collapse under taliban pressure and terror, will be crucial to the prospects for afghan confidence, continued success and ultimately for peace. preserving that clarity is, in fact, the priority strategic goal. it must be clear there is no space in afghanistan for al qaeda and daesh to flourish nor a place for the taliban absent a political settlement. with today's increased levels of violence and elevation of new threats the administration should revisit whether the u.s. strategy formulated several years ago it adequate to today's task. the afghan security forces are doing the fighting's they will continue to improve. any further reduction in international forces must be commensurate with ansf capabilities and critical gaps and close air support, intelligence and logistics must continue to close and not widen. the development of afghanistan's

own air capabilities including the sustainment of their own helicopters must be a priority. in this new context of clarity of u.s. commitment, we should explore a genuine regional effort to strengthen afghanistan and promote peace. there are hopeful signs as we heard earlier at last week's meeting at the heart of asia process in islamabad. after the setbacks of last summer, president ghani deserves credit for renewing the effort to open doors with pakistan. the test will be whether pakistan takes concrete actions not only to support reconciliation, but to reduce the ability of the taliban and the haqqani network to plan and launch operations from pakistan, which greatly diminishing the prospects for real negotiations. the crucial task to ahead for afghanistan are exceedingly difficult, improving security, creating conditions for peace, building the economy, strengthening government, forging afghan political unity. for afghanistan to succeed, two mutually reenforcing processing

much be continued. it must be clear adequate levels of military, political and financial support are available to that afghans will have the time to build on progress made and continue to take responsibility for their own affairs. second, they need to demonstrate achievement. the government has an ambitious reform program and is struggling to implement it. the new jobs for peace program is an effort with security and economic implication to provide work as the economy develops. the opportunity is unique and must not be squandered if afghanistan is to be seen as r worthy of continued support. the challenge to our secured afghanistan is one of the long-term threat much of the

world and not just the west faces from terrorism rooted in violent extremism. recently highlighted by attacks in egypt, turkey, lebanon, paris, mali and elsewhere. the goal remains to prevent and help afghans prevent afghanistan from becoming again a platform for those who threaten. we have tended to dismiss the presence in afghanistan as rebranded taliban as if that made it less dangerous. we have seen in libya, that such affiliates eventually control ground and connect with the center in syria. in afghanistan, we had a strat yi that could work with the welling islamic partner in the fight against terror with the clarity of international commitment, afghanistan can increasingly become a contributor to security. we must not lose sight of afghanistan as we did before. our efforts there must be long-term and in concert with the need for the united states to help develop a strategy to defend our people.

although military force must be an instrument. the defeat can only come from within the islamic world which must play a leading role as part of a mutt lateral effort. this is the context in which our feature work in afghanistan must be seen. the success of afghanistan is part of this largest struggle which the civilized world including more than 1.5 million peace loving muslims must win. our leadership patterns, the discourse with our publics have not kept pace full whether i the threats as they are evolving today and will exist tomorrow. in short, the united states and its partners have much serious work to do and afghanistan must be part of that effort. thank you, sir. >> thank you very much.

i want to apologiapologize. we have an om any bill produced last night about 12:00 and today, there are still discussions that are underway and as we step in and out, it's not out of lack of interest on this topic. we're going to be out of here this week with a massive piece of legislation that has passed and we apologize for tending to that. which, by the way, parts of affect afghanistan, too. >> i thought it was all finished. if i knew it was still open, i'd be out there also. >> okay. well, that's a secret we're keeping. thank you. >> thank you very much. noble chairman corker, ranking member, honorable members of the senate foreign relations committee. thank you for inviting me to offer my evaluation of the administration's strategy on afghanistan. the assessment i offer today is based entirely on my own views

and analysis. mr. chairman, on january 1st, 2015, after the coalition officially concluded combat mission in afghanistan, the afghan national defense and security forces in spite of specific capability gaps independently faced the upsurge of insurgency in 2015. to a large extent held its own albeit with a higher casualty rate. given the complex political and security context of the situation, in and around afghanistan, including the threat of the emerging daesh, we are -- the afghan national defense and security forces are expected to face continued security threats in violence at least in the immediate future. it is a force of immense capability to face ongoing security challenges while still constrained by capability gaps in certain key areas which have been covered by the u.s. forces in the past. the fast-paced numerical force generation of afghanistan national defense and security forces during the transition period left little time to develop certain capabilities

including the air force, intelligence, logistics, that takes longer time in elaborate infrastructure. the presence of u.s. forces and nato and president obama's decision to keep 5,500 troops in afghanistan beyond 2017 will ensure continued assistance to build indigenous security capacity in afghanistan to respond to the threats the country faces. whether the presence of such a force would make a major difference is hard to determine. since there are other domestic and regional factors that affect the situation. however, the absence of these forces in afghanistan would

definitely have an adverse impact on regional stability. the presence of u.s. forces in afghanistan sends a strong message to friends and foes that afghanistan is not going to be abandoned and the united states is still committed to help afghanistan. having said this, the impact of the u.s. forces along with some 4,000 nato troops which are expected to stay in afghanistan depends on their size, their mission and their rules of engagement. the law -- sorry. the current nato resolute support mission focuses on training, advising and assisting of afghan forces, at core and ministerial levels in advise and assist commands located in north, south, and west with a central hub in kabul. the united states leads in two of these commands, plus providing tactical advising to the afghan special security

forces in the afghan air force. the ratio to force -- the ratio of force to region in uneven capabilities of different regional commands is causing capacity shortfalls to help nds or afghan security forces, narrow their key capability gaps particularly in aviation, intelligence, special forces and logistics. further, there are uncertainties in the rules of engagement. the nato partners see their combat role indeed ended last year even as they support the afghan common troops who often get engaged in fighting. the development of the afghan national defense and security forces cannot happen in a vacuum but depends on the development and progress of other areas of institution building in afghanistan including the rule of law. there is a strong need for the

afghan unity government to take effective measures to fight corruption, nepotism and political factionalization within the afghan national defense and security forces. the afghan government faces an enormous challenge to forge political consensus, to implement reforms, to improve governments and ensure unified leadership. it should make extra effort to meet the competing demands of maintaining unity and governing effectively. to conclude, prospect for stability and peace in afghanistan are influenced by three main factors. viability and effectiveness of the afghan government. the capacity of afghanistan national defense and security forces to degrade the taliban

power in cooperation from pakistan through improved afghan/pakistan relations. the first two factors deny the taliban hope to overthrow the afghan government, changing their -- and bringing them to the negotiating table. while the third factor facilitate and speeds up reconciliation and reduction of violence in afghanistan. thank you very much. >> thank you, sir. >> chairman corker, ranking member cardin, and honorable members of the committee. talk for the opportunity to appear before you today and your continued interest in afghanistan. as a civil society organization, dedicated to ending the nexus between corruption and conflict, especially in the natural resource sector, global witness has worked in afghanistan since 2011 traveling regularly to work in the country with our local civil society partners, the afghan government and international donors to build momentum for governance reforms.

as one of the leading countercorruption organizations operating there we were invited to meet with president ghani to discuss government reform. corruption remains an existential threat to the afghan state. much hope has been placed in the national unity government and there have been some early countercorruption victories. fct president ghani has set up a procurement board and personally reviews all contracts over $1 million. the senior government have now declared their financial assets but the view from the ground is that corruption continues to grow in response to political stagnation, rising insecurity and economic decline. while the afghan government has publicized important countercorruption initiatives there's a lack of strategy and institutionalization of reforms. surveys show this year that over half of all afghans reported paying a bribe and 90% said that corruption is a problem in their daily lives. recent scandals have hurt the perception of reforms. a highly profitable

public/private partnership on land which should have been already confiscated. a cynical response to all this could be that the place is just too corrupt and to give up trying. instead global witness believes that while anti-corruption efforts will take time, there are immediate measures that can have a substantial impact on corruption and help afghanistan on a more stable path. american leadership is especially needed in three broad areas. first, key aspects of countering corruption in afghanistan are flagging and without efforts there will be stymied. one is the urgent need of a permanent confirmed attorney general who is the only person according to afghan law who can prosecute corruption. also while the independent joint

anti-crumbation monitoring and evaluation committee has had some issues. its dual key approach of having equal number of members is a key point. second, strategic thinking, reforms and capacity building to fight economic crime and corruption have largely stagnated. in order to bring this agenda back on track, reforms made in the wake of the kabul bank scandal and promised in the framework of 2012 should be progressively pursued. the international community largely disengaged from capacity building and overseeing a robust regulatory reform of the financial sector and the associated law enforcement after kabul bank. but if afghanistan is going to fight corruption and investigate and prosecute terrorist related financing and end impunity to corrupt actors then significantly increased political engagement and assistance is essential. the national unity government

needs to take on ongoing piecemeal efforts and craft them into a strategy that links the goals of fighting corruption with the ways and means at their disposal coordinating the bodies to work as one team and fight. and finally, afghanistan needs to further build its legislative and regulatory framework to international transparency and accountability standards to create a secure environment where legitimate businesses can thrive. this includes committing and actually implementing the open contracting principles, the open government partnership, and the extractive industries transparency initiative. it would greatly improve transparency in key sectors of the economy and better enable oversight by civil society. it is hard for afghan or american businesses, for instance, to risk investing capital in afghanistan not only due to insecurity but also because its continued poor regulatory environment and opaque procurement system and corruption and taxation in customs enforcement and for

american businesses legitimate concerns with violating the foreign corrupt practices act. one area where reforms in u.s. engagement are especially critical is in the extractive scter where mining should be a pillar of the economy and for self-sufficiency is instead a source of corruption and conflict that contributes almost nothing to the budget while at the same time the number two source of revenue for taliban after narcotics but the afghan government has not submitted crucial amendments to this law that could help start the process of wrestling it away from violent and corrupt actors. there are no quick fixes but there are many tools available to the united states in this fight. carefully placed aid conditionality along with targeted funding and visa bans and asset freezes and law enforcement investigations against the most difficult actors. but most importantly the united states needs to make corruption and establishing good governance

a priority on par with securing economic development with aggressive action the battle for afghanistan is not yet lost. thank you. >> thank all three of you. we appreciate it. we are privileged to have the opportunity to have people like you before us. and, again, we thank you for your time and preparation in being here. ambassador cunningham, you worked with what i think would be i think people would say you worked with one of the most difficult people ever when you were working with president karzai. we ended up with the ghani government which i think most people believe is a pretty good outcome for afghanistan. and i know there are numbers of things that he needs to put in place. i know he's a technocrat. probably not quite as much of a politician as karzai was. but understands things about

good governance and corruption and those kinds of issues. but at the same time it's going to be very difficult for him to be successful, is it not, unless there's a secure environment there? i mean, i think at the end of the day that's the number one thing that will inhibit his ability to be successful. i'd like for you to speak to that. but also, there are additional diplomatic and/or other tools you think we as a nation at current -- in current times are not utilizing properly? >> thank you for the question, senator. i think security really is at the base of everything that afghans want to accomplish. and the huge amount of uncertainty over the last couple of years generated by karzai's refusal to sign the bilateral security agreement which -- which we negotiated, which i negotiated, the uncertainty around the political process, the uncertainty about what would happen with american troops and

the american troop presence given the president's announced deadline of withdrawal by the end of 2016 created a massive amount of uncertainty and loss of confidence in the afghan system that they're only now beginning to recover from. and that's why i said in my statement that the president's decision to extend the troop presence through 2016 without a deadline is the first time in many years that there has been a degree of certainty that the united states will actually be present in a significant way militarily to continue to support the afghan security forces. that's an incredibly important signal to afghans and to the region that we need

diplomatically with our partners to find a way to magnify and to leverage to effect strategic calculations in the region about hedging activity and which way the future will go and to give confidence the afghans in the security forces that they can succeed and that we and our partners will be there to help them up those times when they fall short. so, i think this is now a new opportunity for all of us to move forward and to try to counteract i guess is the best word the kind of report that you and your committee members were so concerned about hearing from the intelligence community the other day. >> mr. jilali, i don't know what numbers are public and what numbers are not public and so like senator kane, i want to be very careful, but at a minimum, a massive turnover rate in the military. i don't even want to speak to what the officials' numbers are, but they are very large at a

minimum. i know that you have discussed the need for us to be there under this same arrangement for five years, is that correct, in your written testimony? could you talk just a little bit about the state. i think all of us have -- whenever we go to afghanistan we're taken to where the afghan military's being trained and we're seeing the maneuvers they're going through, and while we appreciate the fact that people in afghanistan are good fighters, it's hard to detect a real commitment and professionalism in that regard. i just wonder if you could speak to the turnover rate and also the things we need to do over the next five years to ensure that ghani is able to be successful and/or his successor. >> thank you, senator, for the question. there are a number of factors that affect the situation and

five years is just an approximate number. what we are talking about five years also we get a cue from what the recent nato discussions and nato meetings revealed that nato would like to continue the level of support that will keep about 12,000 troops in afghanistan for the next five years. which i think probably it will be discussed during the nato summit in warsaw in july. but what i am talking about five years is because i see the gaps in the capability of afghan national security forces. they fight well. but because of the lack of capabilities, they are unable to have the kind of agility that

they need in order to respond to the insurgents' attacks everywhere. now, in order to cover the very difficult areas in the country, most of the afghan security forces are based in fixed bases. and then the taliban have the ability to choose the time and space to concentrate against fixed targets in afghan national security forces. the low ratio of force to space can be, you know, compensated by technological force multipliers, that's the air force, that's the

mobility, that's the firepower, and also logistics. therefore, i say it will take a long time for afghan national air force to develop and also the logistic system, the intelligence, and their special forces operation. until that happens, afghanistan will be handicapped by being a kind of mostly static force, not have the agility to respond quickly to the taliban. in kunduz and helmand, it was the air strikes by the united states air force that helped afghan government forces to deny taliban to get control of many districts or to expel taliban from the kunduz city. >> just -- i know my time is up and i obviously want to be courteous to the other members. what is it, though, culturally, what's happening within the afghan military where we have

such a high percentage of people that leave each year that then cause us, again, to have to keep the numbers we have in mind? we have a massive amount of training that we have each year, therefore, you lack the experience if you will on the ground that otherwise would be the case. >> that is a problem, senator. nobody knows the actual numbers of afghan national security forces. on the paper we have 195,000 army and 157,000 of police. however, according to the information i have i got from afghan and also international sources in november, about 90% of the forces are not on duty -- >> 90% of the forces. >> 90% are present. between 90% and 91%. which means in november the number of national afghan army were about 75,000.

so it was 25,000 listed in the authorized level. on the other hand, some of the troops are deployed in difficult geographical areas. and they are there and they could not be moved easily. so then you have the -- many of the forces, the troops, are exhausted and they have little time to go on leave. and plus some are -- when they go on leave, their families are threatened by taliban not to go back. so, it is -- the attrition rate is about 5,000 a month. but at the same time, the number of volunteers who come far exceeds the number of the people who leave the army. so, there is no lack of volunteers. however, the technicalities make it difficult to have the full level of the forces at the same time. >> thank you. dr. vitorri, i'm sure others will ask you questions about corruption, it's been a massive, massive issue in the country and

it cannot go forward productively without dealing with that. thank you for being here. senator cardin? >> that's what i'll ask about. first of all, all three of you, thank you very much. i agree with the chairman, i found your written testimony and your presentations here to be very helpful to truly understand the challenges we have in afghanistan, so i think today's hearing has been very helpful, both panels. i want to try to drill down for all three as to what the united states can do in its policy in order to try to advance the

issues that you've raised in your individual presentations. and i tell you, i found your statement to be extremely helpful in a roadmap to what afghanistan needs to do to fight corruption. and you were pretty specific as to ways that we could advance that through the tools we have available in our tool kit. could you give me perhaps your first or second or third priorities as to where you would like to see the united states concentrate for change in afghanistan to fight corruption? >> thank you, senator, i appreciate that. as we've put it in our written testimony for global witness, our first immediate priority is that there really needs to be an attorney general appointed, a permanent attorney general. the current acting attorney general has been there for -- >> that's your top priority? >> for the extremely short term which actually present ghani i believe has promised in his -- the senior officials meeting to have by the end of this month. because we have an acting attorney general right now, who has been there since the karzai

administration and the attorney general's the only government official ultimately who can prosecute corruption. we would obviously strongly urge that this be a very high quality individual with a very strong mandate to go after corruption after the difficulties of the previous administration. but overall, our -- we would say in the long term that whereas the united states seems to primarily prioritize security hoping they could catch up on governance later, what we find in everything from think tank studies to academic studies to experience on the ground is that governance and security have to be operated concurrently and have to be prioritized concurrently. and i think the questioning from the previous panel has demonstrated that. when you look at issues like kunduz with the role, for example, of arming warlords for the last decade or so there, you have warlords who had -- who have been think tanks have noted that these warlords in particular made a lot of grievances with the population due to human rights issues and in the end frankly when you're arming warlords and other elicit

actors that are not strongly in the command and control of the government they are acting out on behalf themselves. if they need to switch sides retreat or retreat or whatever because it's best for them regardless of whether it's best for the good of the nation they will do so and we saw that with two key warlords in particular according to "new york times" and other reports in kunduz itself and we've seen it in other locations. we also see it in issues with the afghan national security forces themselves and the police. if the place are highly predatory in a particular location, if their level of unofficial taxation, extortion, is higher than, for example, the taliban, there are cases where it could actually make rational sense for individuals to go to the side of the taliban and the grievances that come with that

as well can push people to the side of the taliban. take, for example, corruption in land. this is one of the major reasons that has been assessed that for local violence in areas but also when people lose their land grievance -- when there's no grieve anticipates resolution mechanisms that can be used legally, people will naturally go to the other side if that's a side that promises to help them get their land back, settle their grievances, perhaps provide a cleaner level of grievance resolution, provide a better level of judicial services. so, you cannot get ahead in the security environment if the corruption environment is undermining every set of security games you make. >> i think that's very helpful. i agree with your statement. and i think you do give us a roadmap for how we need to try to develop the u.s. role in afghanistan and fighting corruption because it's very much related to security of that country. no question. economic future of the country and everything else. ambassador cunningham, you really i think in your statement

put your finger on the principal challenge with pakistan. as it relates to afghanistan. and i'm quoting from your testimony, the test will be whether pakistan takes concrete actions not only to support reconciliation but to reduce the ability of the taliban in the haqqani network to plan and launch operations from pakistan which greatly diminishes the prospects for real negotiations. to understate it we have a complicated relationship with pakistan. what can the united states do in its bilateral with pakistan to further the prospects for reconciliation and peace in afghanistan? >> well, senator, congratulations for putting your finger on exactly the most vexing question that immediately comes to the fore when you're talking about how to bring an

end to the conflict. and this is something that now that i'm out of government that i want to use my current position with the atlantic council to see if we can develop some fresh thinking about. as somebody who sat in kabul for 3 1/2 years knowing that every day that i was there somebody from pakistan was trying to kill the people that i was responsible for, i have certain strong feeling about that dynamic. i think the levers that we have tried to use, leverage and incentives that we've tried to use, have -- as ambassador olson said in his remarks, i think there has been a conceptual shift among pakistan's leaders. there's certainly been a shift in the rhetoric over the last couple years. and as the statements made in islamabad at the heart of asia meeting do open up some new perspectives perhaps. the challenge is to find a way to change the strategic calculations to get them pushed to a negotiation, at

least the taliban, many people think the haqqanis are irreconcilable. but the hedging behavior on the part of pakistan. in their defense, they have suffered a lot in their own fight against terrorism. they don't have very much confidence in developments in afghanistan as i understand it. and they, too, have long had questions about what the united states would ultimately do in afghanistan. we need to resolve those issues. in our own interests. and in our own interests in dealing with the threat of terrorism from that part of the world and then use the clarity about our intent and purpose and that of our partners to effect calculations that up to now have

not been -- hat have prevented the opening of the doors that need to open to have a real discussion about what the future of that region looks like and a future that benefits pakistan as well as afghanistan. >> well, i look forward to your active engagement as a private citizen on this issue because we need to figure this out. i mean, it is so challenging, some of our private discussions are so much different than the public discussions and realities, unless we have a constructive role by pakistan here it's going to be very difficult to see the reconciliation move forward so i appreciate your comments on that. mr. jilali, i also appreciate you being here. i'm just going to acknowledge that your statement that the key factor in improving prospects for sustained political, economic and security cooperation with the national unity government is to implement the structural electoral and functional reforms with the

afghan state. i think that's absolutely essential. it deals with vittore's comments and ambassador cunningham's, it's really whether we can put a confidence in the reforms in afghanistan that can really bring in all sectors of afghanistan for security and economic prosperity, so i thank all three of you, again, for your testimony and i can assure you it's had an impact on our committee. >> thank you, mr. chair, and thank you to the witnesses. i have a lot of questions, but i'm just going to ask one that intrigues me. the administration strategy in afghanistan is the title, one key element of the administration's strategy was successful elections at the end of the karzai tenure. there were efforts to

destabilize the elections that were generally unsuccessful, so that was a positive, but then the election led to a result that was a potential disastrous stalemate. the u.s. played an important role, the administration played an important role in helping to broker the formation of the partnership between president ghani and ceo abdullah. the title chosen was a national unity government which sets a pretty high standard and it seems to me that virtually you at issues we're talking about today whether it's the security issues or whether it's anti-corruption activity or whether it's relationship vis-a-vis pakistan, all these depend is the national unity government, really a national unity government. so, i would just like each of you to offer from your own perspectives a year-plus into this how cohesive and professional is the working relationship between ghani and abdullah and their constituents. if you want to share positives and negatives and positives or work that remains to be done, i'm really interested in that

dynamic a year plus in. >> thank you, senator. this is a very important question which is being discussed i think daily in afghanistan, too. unfortunately the campaign for the presidential elections turned into kind of a campaign that was not aimed as making a difference, but it was aimed at winning the elections. this way that the two camps brought together -- >> we don't know anything about that kind of election. >> i was going to say, they learned well. >> with different groups with different agendas, different interests, different visions. when that two camps actually finally agreed to form this national unity government, then that problem was there.

now the two major challenges that was faced this government from day one was how to maintain unity, keep everybody happy, but at the same time be effective in governments. the government failed to have that balance. many members of the two leader -- i mean, supporters of the two leaders have their own interests. this affects -- this actually reflects in appointments of people who are considered the allies of different elements of these two groups. that actually undermines the professionalism of the armed forces and also it stalls the appointment of people to key positions. i think that the previous panel it was said that the minister of petroleum and mining said they

cannot fill 290 positions there. it does not mean that they are not qualified people, because the two leaders should agree, and not only the two leaders but also their allies should agree on these positions. that makes this government unfunctional in many areas. second, the government all -- when the two leaders, dr. abdullah and dr. ghani, they have good relations, but they have to listen to their other allies. they are influenced by their other allies. therefore, they share the authority to appoint people. and this makes appointment very, very, you know, slow. on the other hand, this also brings another problem. the problem is instead of working through institutions, empowering institutions, individuals are becoming empowered.

and that undermines the effectiveness of the government. so, therefore, i think the real solution is what is in the deal. it says at the end of the two years -- in order to legalize the system, in order to end this -- in the government. if dr. abdullah is there with the review of the constitution, it becomes the prime minister, then he will be prime minister, then he will work for the president. now president and prime minister or ceo who is appointed by a decree of the president. he has the same power, equal power, authority. and the third while the president has the constitutional legitimacy, it has its power, authority from the constitution. dr. abdullah gets it from the

decree of the president, however, he does not have that power in the constitution. therefore, he plays his political card. therefore, we see in opposition within the government. >> mr. cunningham, you are such an important part of a really successful negotiation. i think it was a huge coup that your role, secretary kerry's role and others in trying to promote the formation of the unity government to get over the electoral impasse. your sense of it a year in? i'm quite interested. and, mr. jilali, thank you for your thoughts. i really appreciate that. >> i'll have to decide in due course whether this is something i want to be remembered for or not.

let me say by way of context, first, nobody ever thought this was going to be easy genuinely. it was very clear from the beginning this was a difficult enterprise. both dr. ghani and dr. abdullah genuinely believe that -- each of them genuinely believe that they won the election, so did their followers. and so as we were even starting to begin the discussion, there was already a huge gap, each side feeling that it had won the election, therefore, why was it being asked to enter into a discussion with the other side what the government would be like. and this was also in the context of lack of clarity about what the outcome of the elections would eventually prove to be. so, it was a very fraught political exercise, and anybody who has been involved in politics if you just put yourself in their place for one second, you realize how difficult this was. even in countries that have experience in creating coalition arrangements and governing find

it difficult to come to agreement and to then implement government. there's no experience in doing this in afghanistan at all. so, it's no surprise that they're struggling. the relationship, i agree with mr. jilali, minister jilali, the relationship between the two men is pretty good. they each understand what's at stake, and to their credit they both took an incredibly responsible and statesmanlike position to put aside what their personal preference would be and to focus on the good of the country. the problem is keeping that focus is incredibly difficult and it is much more difficult for the people around them as they go through the difficult dynamics of actually governing, making decisions, making appointments and all the rest of it. everybody's disappointed they haven't made more progress, including both of them, i know from speaking to them. they remain committed to trying to make this work, because they believe, as i do, and as i still

do, that there is no better alternative for afghanistan than making this work, even if it's painfully difficult. the alternatives to forming the national unity government or an alternative now to it in some form can never create the kind of -- even if it's only formal unity that the country requires. and indeed, our discussion about the need for a unity after the elections began more than a year before the elections actually took place, because afghanistan's political classes as i was, they were concerned about the prospect of the elections leading to a break-up in the political fabric and eventually a break-up in the country. so, we talked -- we began a discussion long before the elections about the need not to produce an outcome that would split the north and the south

and pashtuns and tajiks and shia and sunnis. afghanistan's existed as a country for many centuries, and afghans have seen what happens when that cultural and political consensus spins apart as it did during the civil war. and they've looked into the abyss. that's the thing that gives me optimism that this will continue to work. because the alternatives are dangerous for them and ultimately dangerous for us. >> i'm over time, but i can ask dr. vittore to address it. >> thank you, senator. as has already been mentioned, both candidates ran on a strong anti-corruption platform, so in theory this should be a transformative government and broad based if they're both sincere about corruption they should be able to transform the government significantly. but governments are more than just two individuals and are there a number of individuals of

varying quality beneath the executive office that have to be contended with and significant patronage networks that still remain within the government that has to be worked with to be frank. and so while there is no poll and so while there is no poll data or other academic data we do continue to hear concerns from the field because of the preexisting patronage networks that have made the government so difficult to work with, now there could be two sets of parties to pay off instead of one which would be an indicator why we see corruption has grown and not shrunk from 2014 to 2015. but it also speaks to the response of institutionalizing

reforms, putting in good legislative laws and so forth. which are necessary but not sufficient in the government. and professionalizing a civil service away from individuals and more to a professionalized civil service organization to begin the patronage networks, to pull it from the individual and towards a professionalized government that can work for the good of the country versus the good of individual strong men and other interests. thank you. >> thank you very much. you've answered it from different directions but there's some consistent themes among the three answers and i appreciate your testimony. thank you, mr. chair. >> we're about at that time, but i just want to follow up a little bit on that. i know when we go in to a culture and we want to make things happen quickly, we obviously are dealing with a culture where they are at that moment. we hope to have things put in place over time that cause corruption and other kind of things to dissipate and go away. but when we begin we're dealing with a culture as it is. and i'm just wondering if there's any lessons learned that you might be willing to share with us. do we when we enter a country like this on the front end

sometimes send mixed signals relative to our actions trying to generate immediate outcomes and our rhetoric as to what we want to see them do over time? that's you, doctor. >> if i may wear my professor hat in this case, one of the issues we will deal with when we go into countries, we never go into a country that's in a good situation by definition. we don't go into places that are strong and stable and so forth. if we're going in with the 82nd airborne, we're going in because the situation's already a problem. and that means that unfortunately corruption statistically speaking is probably already very high. the state has been very fragile. and most likely they've been through a number of cycles of warfare in these countries. and so unfortunately there will be cases where you essentially have to rent your friends when you first go in to get access

because they're the individuals that can give your airfields and intelligence and so forth. that involves suitcases of cash. but if you're still going through 10 years, 15 years into a warfare where you're still handing suitcases of cash to try to rent your friends, mission success is going to be extremely difficult to get to at that point. i think the biggest lesson we're learning in all of these operations in any of the countries that we've dealt with whether we're looking at iraq or whether we're looking at afghanistan, when we first go into the country have been wonders what the new rules of the game are going to be. everything's up in flux. will the united states be putting in strong institutions, will there be prosecutions for previous war crimes, will there be accountability and transparency put in what can individuals get away with. and we saw that in afghanistan as well. it's one of the situations where an ounce of prevention is really worth a pound of cure. putting in those issues early on right away establishing good governance along with security is much easier in the early stages where everybody's waiting to see what's going to happen then waiting until the

entrenched interests have gotten with their money and militias and so forth and trying to weed it out later. now you have a problem where weeding out corruption is probablily generational at that point when you've gotten that far. so, i would say the lessons learned to afghanistan we should see being applied to ukraine. where is the oversight and accountability? they have a tremendous corruption issue. how do we deal with oil politics, pipeline politics, and the resource issues that can face ukraine? how have we insulated the ministry of defense and interior there against corruption and ensuring, for example, that promotions are merit based and assuring that logistics networks are sound that the quartermaster general groups and so forth aren't diverting assets that should be going to ukrainian troops and instead be putting it, for example, on the black market or even sold potentially to enemies? if that does occur. there's no information that i know that that occurs.

when we first go in to locations whether it's diplomatically or militarily how do we start the process early on and shape the battle space, if you will, so the rules of the game come out with a rule of law, governance, solid military and the democratic reforms we would like. thank you. >> you gave the answer that i thought you would give. when we go in, we go into a crisis mode. we want things to happen quickly. and i think, again, we establish on the front end that we're -- i understand this may be out of necessity, but we start building on the existing culture of corruption. and especially when you're dealing with people like we've had in leadership up there until recent times. it just perpetuates that and,

you know, we've heard, you know, it's almost i guess a joke, you know, we hear the stories of our guys going in to meet with former leader there about corruption and then right behind him would be somebody coming in with suitcases as you're talking about. so, i think that's a real challenge for us. and on that note moving back to the ambassador, since you're on the private sector side now and utilizing your experiences around the world to help look at things in a new way, just briefly at 30,000 feet, do you have any advice for those of us who still are here on the inside as it relates to going into countries like afghanistan, like iraq and, you know, potentially portions of syria, if you will? any advice to us as we look to trying to reconfigure those, if you will, in our own image? >> first of all, let me say how much i appreciate your continued interest, your personal

continued interest in this, i know you have a lot of other business pending. i think one of the lessons of afghanistan -- i wasn't directly involved in iraq, i was indirectly involved through my work at the united nations. but i think one of the lessons in both places actually is that we tend to overestimate our reach and our capabilities. it's exceedingly difficult to refashion or repair another culture, to repair a broken state, especially in a situation where you have imperfect knowledge of how it operates, how the culture operates. you have people cycling out after one-year tours. it's a -- i would just say it's difficult. and when i got to afghanistan in

the summer of 2011, it was the peak of the military surge, which was actually already starting to turn around. but i was instructed to complete the civilian surge which we hadn't quite topped out at, which we never did because as soon as i got there, i realized we needed to reverse course just like we did the military. >> just to refresh our memory, the time spans, the years were? >> i got there in the summer of 2011. and when i got there, we were still trying -- we americans and our partners out of the best of motives were still trying to fix every broken window in the country. and that generated that impulse and the amount of money that was -- that was available and which people were trying to manage and doing so in very good faith created a whole bunch of secondary and third-level effects that i don't think we understood very well.

>> damaging to their society. >> and damaging to their -- did a lot of good. >> yep. >> don't get me wrong. none of the statistics and benefits that the other panelists cited would have happened without that effort. but i guess i'd say that one lesson learned is that we need to be -- first of all, i hope we're not going to be doing that sort of thing in the future. but to the extent we are, i think we need to learn lessons a little bit about the limits of our capabilities to actually accomplish the very good things that we might want to accomplish under those kinds of circumstances, and we certainly need to do a good job of learning what worked and what didn't work in afghanistan. >> well, listen, you all have been very, very helpful. we thank you for the service you've provided our nation and the service you're providing now on the outside. and hopefully you'll be back up to help us again in the future. if you would, we'd like to leave