efforts after the paris attacks. public health experts on how to p prevent the spread of the zika virus in the united states. from baghdad, army colonel steve warren gave an update on military operations against isis. he answered questions about air strikes against chemical weapon facilities and military policy on detaining of isis fighters. this is 45 minutes. >> steve, good afternoon.

the down button is not working. there we go. thank you. steve, it's -- i had to push the kirby button. it's a pleasure to see you back on that end. thank you for joining us today. we will turn it over to you. good morning. >> good morning, jeff. good morning, pentagon press corps. so i've got a brief opening statement and we'll jump into questions. on march 8, the 82nd airborne division relinquished command of the combined joint force land component command to the 101st airborne division air assault. that happened during a ceremony here in baghdad, like i said, on 8 march. the mighty all americans of the 82nd division showed their meddle here for nearly a year. they earned the trip home back to see their families, all the way. it was a pleasure serving with

the 82nd. together with the coalition, the screaming eagles of the mighty 101st division will continue to work by, with and through iraqi security forces to make against against isil. with that, let's move on to the battlefield. tom or jeff, if you could pull the map up. in ramadi, which is star number one, the iraqi 76th brigade and the counter terrorist service continued operations just north of ramadi. they have cleared nearly 11 kilometers of along two axis. jumping up a little further north in mosul, which is circle number one, coalition aircraft helped the iraqi army complete a leaflet drop yesterday. i have a copy of the leaflet here to show you.

i'm not show -- it's either hard copy or they have the digital vision. i will let them handle that. while that's happening, i think it's interesting to note on the leaflet job that we have seen some reporting indicated that the leaflet job may have struck a little bit of a nerve with isil. according to reports, we have seen isil lock down the population in the neighborhood where the leaflets fell. they went out there -- isil went out there and picked up the leaflets. when you see the leaflet, you will see it's kind of a leaflet intended to let the population in mosul know they haven't been forgotten and the iraqi security forces are going to come liberate them. moving on to the rest of the battlefield. back down south, star six, the corridor, the isf have begun a new operation. it's called desert lynx. the pup of desert lynx is to

fight up the river valley and to eventually clear the area. progress so far has been good. cts moves north from a suburb of ramadi and the iraqi army begins to push south. to eventually get there. moving over to syria. star number seven. opposition forces continue to engage isil along the forward line of troops there. earlier this week, opposition forces seize ed two areas. unfortunately, isil counter attacks and forced the opposition to withdraw. while the opposition was not able to hold that town, we're pleased that we have seen the willingness and ability of the forces to plan and execute offensive operations. we look forward to seeing more of that.

star number nine on the map, in the last week the syrian democratic forces seized that town. in the process, they closed off nearly 2,500 square kilometers of isil controlled terrain. friendly forces are now working through the clearance of the pocket. in total during the operations to seize the area, the sdf, syrian democratic forces, gained 3,126 square kilometers. they were supported by over 150 coalition air strikes. strikes alone killed just short of 600 enemy fighters, destroyed 42 vehicles, a dozen heavy weapons and 126 enemy for tt fortifications. >> i have a new circle in southern syria in the lower and

left third of the map. in that town, syrian opposition forces seized an isil-held garrison on march 4th. that's in the tri-border area. we also supported that with some strikes. so that's it for my walk around the battlefield. i wanted to keep it short so we can get to your questions. with that, i think i saw lina sitting there. >> steve, just one quick question on your leaflet drop. it sounds then as though the population probably didn't get to see a lot of these leaflets if, as you are saying is correct, the isil forces picked them up. is this something that the u.s. is going to keep doing over time or was this viewed as not a success because it didn't get to the people? i have a second question.

>> so to be clear on the leaflets, these leaflets were planned and designed and printed and everything by the iraqi army. they asked us for some help dropping the leaflets. so we provided that. my guess is that, yes, they will probably continue to conduct these leaflet drops. unlikely that the enemy is able to pick up every single leaflet. because they drop them in the thousands, tens of thousands. so some will get through. this is just another method. one of the things that it the iraqi army is trying to do is to connect with that population there in mosul to let them know, we haven't forgotten about you. you can see in the leaflet where they list all the cities that they have liberated so far, ramadi. i think the purpose of -- the reason the iraqi army wanted to get that in there is to bolster moral and give hope to the citizens there in mosul.

i expect you will see more of that. not everyone can be successucce. it's no reason to stop trying. >> second question is on air strikes. there has been confusion here. i was hoping you might be able to clear it up. the daily strike press releases that we get, can you give us a sense of whether or not all air strikes are included in those press releases? and can you say if not, what are the types of things that aren't included? give us a sense of the breadth and depth of that. >> sure. in fact, i took some calls yesterday. since then, i went and did a little additional research. i intent today resear i spent today researching this for you guys. what i discovered was generally good news. we do everything we can to report every single strike on those releases.

we have missed one or two for admin errors. these happen. but our standard is that if a bomb falls in iraq or syria, it makes it to that press release. yesterday, i was under a different impression. i thought some of our special ops strikes were excluded from those releases. i have since done the research. turns out that, no, even the special ops strikes are included on those press releases. we don't single them out as having been conducted by special operations forces. but they are on those releases. to answer your question more cleanly, every bomb that is dropped is reported out on those strike releases, whether it's a high value individual or a bunker or a tactical unit or a chemical weapons facility. now, that gets us to the next

part of this, which are is how specific are we on the description of the targets? so, for example, on a high value individual, often what you will see -- for example, the omar the chechen who we killed order we struck earlier. that was folded into one of the strike releases. it read a small tactical unit is what it said, in the vicinity. maybe it said something else. a small tactical unit. because that's what it was. it was omar the chechen along with about a dozen other fighters who were in one spot, is the definition of a small tactical unit. and we struck it. so that's how we write it out. on the chem weapons facility we

struck earlier in the week as a result of intelligence that we gained from capturing the emir, that got listed out as weapons facility. then so the question is, why not list it as a chemical weapons facility? that's a fair question. frankly, we probably could have listed it as a chem weapons facility. it was really admin process on that one. it's important to note in some of these, we do very consciously vague it up a little. right? we're consciously vague. because we don't want the enemy to know what we know. we learned that lesson the hard way, frankly. when we did the first set of dash cache strikes, we got ahead and said we hit it.

sure enough, it moved. so we didn't like that. we could have just kind of said, we struck a building and left it at that. the enemy might not have realized we were targeting their cache. hopefully, that explains it. >> did you say that omar the chechen is dead? >> you broke up. can you ask that again? >> did you say the chechen is dead? >> no. i said he was struck. so we initially thought we killed him. here is what happened on that one. there was 13 total personnel when the bomb hit. we know that 12 of them are dead and one of them managed to limp away.

so we figure the odds were in our favor on that. we have seen some reporting out of some of the syrian observers outside of the country indicating that he may, in fact, have lived. we're looking into it. the bottom line is we're not sure. we know we bombed him. we just don't know if we killed him. >> hi. missy ryan. there was a report today from a group of aide organizations and non-profits that have been involved in humanitarian assistance in syria. they blamed among others the united states and its european allies for what they said was stoking the conflict in syria, making it worse rather than making it better, because ofqái arming groups there and then sort of just being part of this bigger proxy conflict. what's your reaction to that?

>> i haven't seen the report. but based on your description, we disagree. we believe that there is a legitimate international terror threat living inside of syria that international terrorist group is named isil. we believe that they have to be defeated. you know, this is a struggle of savagery against humanity, civilization against evil. this is not a struggle that we can simply turn our backs on in our view. so we believe that isil must be defeated. and so that's what we are endeavoring to do. barbara. >> colonel warren, while you point out that you report every bomb that drops in syria and iraq, what can you tell us about in recent days -- land-based

artillery strike, the u.s. conducted out of jordan, into southern syria? and how that would not be an expansion of the land combat role that you have. what can you tell us about this jordanian-based strike you conducted? >> so that was a high mark strike out of northern jordan in support of the operation. the brand-new circle i showed on the map earlier, it was in support of that operation to seize that garrison there. we have reported out the use of high marchs. we have been firing those since last summer.

it's a very versatile and flexible weapon system. we're able to use it as an all-weather system with pinpoint accuracy. it's every bit as accurate as the air-based strikes that we use. but that's all it is. it's another platform to conduct strikes. there weren't that -- i think it was three. we just fired three shots in support of the operation. but it's a good indicator that we can integrate with these southern-based opposition forces. and we fully intend to continue leveraging that. i think two things. number one -- two things we heard from the secretary many times is that we are going to find methods and techniques that work, and we're going to do more of those methods and techniques. this sean exampis an example of. six or so months ago during testimony the secretary talked

about how in our overall strategy includes strengthening the defense of jordan. right? this is something that we're very keenly aware of. the jordanians have been very close partners. to us in the fight against terror at large. certainly they have borne a heavy burden of displaced persons and migrants out of syria. so we are absolutely happy to help them. >> in this case, what made it a decision -- why couldn't you for the town -- the place you were trying to support where the fighting was going on, a couple of things. why couldn't you just use air? why this very unusual step of going the way you did? were you concerned about either regime or russian air defenses in that location for your

aircrafts, since it is a relatively new area for you to be involved in combat? secondly, is this the first land-based combat mission -- land-based out of jordan? and third, most important, will you go back to including in these press releases your artillery land-based artillery rocket strikes which we have been told you are not including in the releases specifically? in other words, can you make these releases have more than just air strikes on them so we have a full understanding of what's happening? >> okay. i wasn't taking notes. so we will have to go back and forth a little bit here. i guess i will start with the last one. that strike was listed on there. i got a few calls about it. even though i was on leave.

it was just -- we call it rocket artillery. if you go back to the releases, you will see it listed on there. it was the first one there. we don't list every platform that -- in other words, if we drop a bomb in mosul, we don't say a bomb dropped in mosul by this type of aircraft. we're not going to say bomb dropped fired by a high mar system. we're just not going to that. but i think -- i know that we mentioned the high mars, the fact that we used rockets in that day's press release. i think we're probably going to keep doing it that way. so this is the second operation in that town. the opposition forces conducted a mortar raid there probably

three months ago, which i briefed out from this podium. that one we didn't -- we did not con -- we might have to go back and look. we might have done some early strikes, like, hours before as sort of preparation. those were aircraft at the time. and then the opposition forces infiltrated across the border. they conducted their mortar rate and they exfigot out. it's the second shot. now they have taken -- they are holding a piece of terrain there. so that's good news. i can't remember if you had any other questions. >> why this time land-based -- land-combat based strike by the united states? why not air? did u.s. troops acompa s s acco on the ground raid several

months ago? >> okay. so, no, they did not. u.s. troops did not accompany on that. nor did they accompany on this one. why do we select high mars? i don't know, frankly. that's what the weaponeers decide. it was the system available. that weapon system worked for that target set. that's how we do it. they decide. had nothing to do with air defenses, nothing to do with any opposition situation. it was simply, we got the system, it's right here. we can use our aircraft somewhere elsewhere the high mars can't reach. it was simply a practical decision. >> hi, colonel warren. on the chemical facilities, could you give us a sense of how pervasive these chemical facilities are? are there a couple in the country? are they all over the place? for the strikes that we have

seen reported in the chemical weapons -- the group. they have noted a couple of strikes not too far away from where u.s. forces are training iraqi forces. have the u.s. forces taken any additional posture changes? are they wearing chemical suits? anything you can give us more visibility on that. >> well, there's no u.s. troops near there. so there's that. we are, of course, prepared, operating in a chemical environment. we always have. we have been being prepared to operate in a chemical environment in the nation of iraq since 1991. this is nothing new to us. we're very familiar with this threat. so we're ready. what was the rest of your question? >> i thought they were there.

maybe i'm mixing it up. basically, can you give us some sense of how pervasive these chemical facilities are throughout the country? >> well, this enemy has been very clear that they would like to employ chemical weapons as one of their tactics. they have done so several times now. that we know of. and several other times that we suspect and we're working through the process now of trying to determine it. so i mean, it's a legitimate threat. it's not a high threat. we're not frankly losing too much sleep over it. they used two chemicals, primarily. one is chlorine. the other one is sulfur mustard, a blister agent.

chlorine is a common chemical. it's the same that people use to purify water and put in their swimming pools and other things. it's a readily available industrial chemical. its fairly ineffective as a weapon because it's very non-persistent. it goes up, disappears. unless it lands on you, you are probably going to be okay. it dissipates very rapidly. the mustard, obviously, is more threatening. but the mustard that they are using is more kind of a home brew. it's not very potent. so frankly, i'm not aware of anyone having actually -- being killed from either of these chemical weapons used on the battlefield. so there's that. how much do they have? unknown. when we find it, we will strike it. this is something that we're working on to determine how

much -- i don't think it's probably one of their number one priorities. they've got other priorities. but it's something that they're wo working on. it's harder because they lost their leader. he is sitting right now in an iraqi holding cell. they have lost one of their principal chemical weapon production facilities, which we struck the other day. they have got less of it now than last week, i can tell you that. how much total they have, that's to be determined. >> when the emir was captured, a lot was said yesterday about how we couldn't be more transparent about this information because of the need for ongoing attacks. but i'm also getting -- maybe i'm getting it incorrectly from you. the sense that maybe the mustard and chlorine aren't as big of a threat as maybe they were advertised earlier this week. just give us a sense of how dangerous is this?

is there a need to not -- is there a need to keep where these chemical facilities are secret if the threat isn't as big as i guess maybe we thought it was? >> well, sure. we don't -- what we don't want is for the enemy to know what we know. right? i mean, that's what we try to protect. we try to prevent the enemy from knowing what we know. why? because that makes the life easier. that's not the business we're in. we're in the business of making their life harder. i mean, that's our fundamental, underlying operational security philosop philosophy. if the enemy knows -- the more the enemy knows about our knowledge, the better it is for him. we want to know what the enemy knows about us. because it's better for us. so that is the back and forth. we have to balance that, obviously, with our duty to be

transparent and to inform people of what's going on. how we're operating here. it's a difficult balance. we don't always get it right. we try our best. nobody wakes up in the morning trying to think about ways to withhold information from america. right? we do the opposite of that. that said, we do have to be careful. we don't want our enemy to have any more information that will help them. we understand that this discussion we're having right now is probably giving the enemy a little bit of help. but it's a risk analysis. right? we say, well it won't help them that much. it's very important america knows what we are doing. this is a daily thing we wrestle with. >> sir. >> one question. just for talking about some saudi arabia. they are backing some groups. do you have some confidence in

those very strong player on the ground? >> i'm sorry. you are going to have to repeat that a little bit slower. >> i want to talk with you about groups supports and backed by the saudis in syria. they are strong player on the ground. could you tell me about -- what about your confidence in those groups on the ground? >> right. yeah. we are gaining confidence in each one of the opposition groups that we identify and work with. i'm familiar with both of these groups. they are continuing to gain

successes. they're continuing to learn how to fight this enemy. i think they fight a little bit against isil and they fight a little bit against the regime. so they're in multiple places at once. we're familiar with these organizations. we're continuing to watch how they operate. >> actually, you say that your confidence with those groups. according for with some reports from human rights watch, the one group committed some atrocities against civilian minorities. what is your view about that? do you maintain that you have some confidence? just for maybe you know about that, that they have been funded by former al qaeda representatives in iraq. so could you be more specific in the confidence you have with those groups?

>> yeah. i can't be more specific. you know, there are almost uncountable number of small groups running around in syria. this is a tough, brutal, awful civil war. we want to partner with groups who are vetted and who are aligned with our objectives, which is to fight isil. so i would have to go back and check and see if we have vetted these groups. i do not believe we have. i do not believe that we are providing direct support to them. we are aware of their presence on the battlefield. >> last question about that. don't you think there is any kind of problem that some group funded by former al qaeda representatives receives support, money and weapons, from

saudi, which is a coalition member and a strong player inside the coalition member? could you be more specific and give me, if you can, your view about that? if any problem for the u.s. authorities to be -- to get some ally like that? >> we're not allied with those two groups. we're aware of their presence on the battlefield. what saudi arabia does with them is really, i think, a matter best addressed by the state department. you know, our goal here -- what we're doing is killing isil. right? that's what we do here. we're in the business of fighting isil. that's what we're going to continue to do. as we find groups who are aligned with our view that isil needs to be attacked and fought, then we will vet those groups. if they pass that vetting, then we will continue to work with those groups. in the pursuit of our ultimate

goal, which is defeat isil. >> hi, colonel warren. i want to go back to chemical weapon issue. can you please clarify how often isil is using chemical weapons in a daily basis in the conflict, in the battleground? do you confirm any major incident where they used chemical weapon? there are two major incidents which occurred in august 2015, one in syria, the other one in iraq. in the incident, they find a five-day-old baby was killed and the other 35 peshmergas according to the report. can you confirm they were conducted by isil? how are the facilities playing in the production process?

>> so there's been a number of suspected chem weapons strikes in the last year. some of those we have confirmed through lab testing. others we have not. i don't know which two you are referring to. i don't have a list in front of me. there's been a handful of them. you know, we continue to be concerned by these. you know, this is back to my discussion with tara earlier. the key thing about these chemical weapons, of course, is that they make everyone very nervous. they have a strong psychological impact, which is one of the reasons that we want to eliminate them. the other reason being that they're a weapon. the fewer weapons isil has, the better.

so i don't know which exact two strikes you are talking about. but i can confirm that there has been a handful of confirmed chem weapon strikes over the last year. and an additional handful of suspected that we are trying to work through to determine whether or not they actually were chem strikes or not. that's all i can remember from your question. >> mosul university and mustard gas production, are they using the facilities there? >> mosul university. so i don't know. i will have to check. we know that they have a presence in mosul university. we know there are some -- there's a chemistry department over there previously. presumably, there's equipment there that is useful. whether or not they're assembling chemical weapons there in the university, i don't

know. >> just one follow-up on the situation. last month, you said that you were considering to support the kurds in terms of their fight against isil. have you made a decision on this? where are you? do you have an update about the situation in the advancement of the kurds? >> no update on the situation with the kurds. andrew. >> colonel, back to the high mars in jordan. could you give us an update how many troops we have in jordan and what their mission is? >> i would have to get that -- will have to take that one. i don't have it at my fingertips. there's several types of missions of juror dan ordan.

we have a presence at the training center there. now we have also got some cjtf-specific operations that are going on. i think you will have to get the big picture elsewhere for cjtf, for us. it's the small high mars detachment. i don't have a number. it's small. double digits. david. >> steve, you have been talking about the strikes that were in response to the interrogation of that chemical weapons engineer. you've been talking about it in terms of one strike against a production facility in mosul. is that it? one strike? were there multiple strikes? if so, what were the other targets? >> there was two.

so far there's been two. one of them -- this just is how i'm doing it. one of them we have been looking at anyways. confirmed it through them. so got it. the other one we got from him completely. so one was already about to hit, both in mosul. i don't have the exact location but in the vicinity. that whole area is the thickest isil area in north. >> was the second one also described as a weapons production facility? >> it was. one of them was on sunday. the other one was on tuesday. >> quick question. general austin told the senate that he had recommended restarting the syria train and

equip program. could you tell us anything about that? i'm assuming this was base d recommendations from general mcfarland. >> phil, unfortunately, i'm going to have to take a pass on that one today. i hope i will be able to talk to you about it next week. next wednesday. i have to -- unfortunately, i just have to take a pass on that one today. i'm sorry. >> lucas. >> colonel warren, what is the u.s. military's policy on detaining isis operatives? >> our policy i guess would best be summed up as short-term and case by case. so there's only been two so far. neither one has been -- neither of those two has been the same.

in the case of the first one, we held on to her for some time and then eventually moved her over to the custody of the iraqi government. in the second case, this chemical guy, we only held on to him for a short time, about two weeks. then we moved him over. we're not equipped for long-term detention. we're not set up here for that. we're not in that business. but there's no real one size fits all answer. as we take people off the battlefield, we're just going to have to make the decisions as we go. >> what is the definition of short-term detention? is case by case -- is that the de facto policy? >> yeah. that is the policy. that's how we're approaching it here at the cjtf.

there isn't even a hard definition of short-term. 14 to 30 days as a ballpark figure. but even that is not really completely nailed down. >> how do i explain to my mother-in-law betty harper from mississippi and other americans out there who are a little confused that if this war against isis is this comprehensive war, it's by all accounts going ing ting to tak fight isis, how do you scare that withholdin a holding a de to 30 days when there's a lot of information to glean from this person months down the road? >> well, this is not a catch and release program, lucas. i mean, we capture them and then we don't have the means to hold them. we just give them to the iraqis to hold. if we have to go back and talk to them, we will talk to them.

if there's more information that comes out, if we have to confirm information, they're still in iraq. we will intear gate them more. >> are you considering building other facilities to hold these guys longer if necessary? >> no. >> just one more, colonel warren. there have been over the years have been numerous prison breaks in iraq from insurgents being freed. how confident are you that iraq can hold the isis members that you all helped capture and intear gate? >> we're confident they can hold them.

if some escape, we will catch them again or kill them. >> andrew. >> colonel warren, back on the high mars in jordan. quickly, this is the first time that detachment has conducted a strike. is that correct? also, has that detachment been there for a while? is it a relatively new presence and new option for you all? >> first time they have done anything. and i will have to check. they've been there, seems to me like it's been a couple of months. honestly, i can't exactly remember. i will have to take that one for you. i will get you the answer through roger. >> anybody else? yes, ma'am. >> jennifer ladd. i was wondering if you could repeat what the said at the first minute of what you said.

we couldn't hear you. >> i apologize. the first minute of your topper was cut. i hate to do this to you. as a closer, could you give us the first minute of your topper? >> absolutely. i think my topper was only two minutes long. i will give you the whole thing. here we go. on march 8, the 82nd airborne division relinquished command of the combined joint forces land component to the 101st air division during a sen moceremon in baghdad. the 82nd showed their meddle here and they have earned the trip back home to their families all the way. together with the coalition, the screaming eagles of the mighty 101st division will continue to work by, with and through the iraqi security forces to make gains against isil. on to the battlefields.

do i need to read the battlefield or no? >> no. >> we got it. we're up to where we picked up your audio. thank you very much. thank you for your time. look forward to seeing you next week. thanks to mrs. harper in mississippi and thank you, everybody. have a great weekend. >> thanks, guys. see you on wednesday. c-span's washington journal live with news and policy issues that impact you. tomorrow more than, christopher anders will join us to discuss a newly released report detailing the nearly 20 times that the defense department acknowledged deploying unmanned spy drones in the u.s. mr. anders will weigh in on the

privacy and legal implications of those deployments. daniel ikensons will be on to talk about how republican and democratic presidential candidates are not only criticizing past trade dueals ad then deals currently under consideration. then we will discuss the passing of nancy reagan who was an advocate of alzheimer's disease research. we will talk about the state of the disease and treatment in the u.s. watch when i tune in to it on the weekends, usually it's authors sharing their new releases. >> watching the non-fiction authors is the best television. >> the cy can have a longer

conversation. >> book tv weekends. they bring you author after author after author that spotlight the work of fascinating people. >> i love book tv. i'm a c-span fan. [ applause ] the interior minister of france was in washington, d.c. he talked about france conducting count erterrorism attacks after the event. ambassador, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, i would like to thank you for welcoming me today. i am honored to be speaking in front of you at the prestigious george washington university where so many great american political figures honed their skills.

i am thinking of former secretaries of state, john foster dallas and colin powell as well as former first lady jackie kennedy. i also would like, of course, to warmly thank the members of the center of cyber and home security, especially the director who was kind enough to invite me to give you this lecture on france and the terror threat. france and the united states have a very long-shared history. and despite the occasional quarrel, we have always been bound by very strong, even passionate friendship. i would even describe it as a unique friendship because when we are confronted to our times,

we always pull together. after the attacks in france last year, i read the great american philosopher explain that for you the french are not seen, which is why you were so deeply affected. by the tragedy we just experienced. it's also for this reason that we were driving by the same emotion after the slaughter committed in san bernardino on december 2, 2015. i would like to express my deep condolence to the families and their grief. i therefore would like to thank you from the bottom of my heart, both personally and on behalf of

france and the french people for the solidarity you demonstrated during the terribly difficult time we have just been through. the strong support shown by president obama and the american people meant so much to us. we will never forget. and france will never forget. and we will never forget the reaction of three american citizens, spencer stone, anthony sadler and alec scalatos. to avoid another terrorist tragedy in the train which was carrying more than 500 passengers to paris. for that, the president awarded

them our highest decoration. in 2015, my my country was the target of terrorist attacks of unprecedented kind and scale. 149 innocent victims lost their lives and others were seriously injured. in january, the targets chosen by the terrorists had a symbolic significance. the editorial staff of "charlie hebdo." famous satirical newspaper. police officers. they targeted freedom of conscience and expression, democracy and pluralism, and the values of the french republique. on november 13th, 2015, the

killers struck indiscriminately at the very heart of paris, in our street. the bataclan concert hall and outside the stade de france. they attacked our young people. they attacked our way of life. among the bataclan victims was a young american student, naomi gonzalez. my thoughts go out to her family, loved ones, friends. before talking about the main lines of action we are conducting against terrorist networks in france and in europe, i would like to give you my analysis of the threat we are all facing. i believe we must understand it in order to protect ourselves more efficiently. over the past ten years, the threat has considerably evolved.

the november attacks were planned from syria and coordinated abroad, yet all those were perpetrated by people radicalized on french soil. sometimes in a very short period of time. today, in fact, the threat is more and more diffuse. from our point of view the threat now takes many forms. on the one hand, it involves individual or small groups with accelerated training in handling weapons in syria or iraq. back in europe, sleeper cells capable as in november 13th of moving into action in cooperation with the syrian base of isis. on the other hand, individuals who are being progressively

radicalized through environment, sometimes with the help of very informal networks which are thus even more difficult to identify. they feel they are responding to a general call to jihad by isis or by many other terrorists inspired by an organization. consequently, sociological and psychological profiles of jihadists or candidates for jihad has become more varied. some are criminals or former criminals who have been radicalized in prison or through encounters with islamists. this was for example the case of one of the terrorists involved in the attacks of january 2015. others are psychologically vulnerable and for various reasons, have developed feelings of hatred for the society in

which they grew up. others finally tell themselves they are looking for meaning and have a fantasy conception of the islamist revolution thanks to the propaganda on the internet and on social networks. the jihadist organization rely on elaborate propaganda. i am thinking especially of the videos broadcast on social networks and of online media prepared by isis such as --. the battle against terrorism -- have traveled or are seeking to travel to syria or iraq have been radicalized online. basically the new jihadis is a

combination of society and social networks. i am deeply convinced that authorities must cooperate with the actors of the digital community. just under a year ago, i was in california to meet the representatives of the major digital companies for enhanced cooperation on terrorist threats. since then, we have managed to agree upon a set of best practices which we collectively adopted in 2015. together, we are establishing a form of positive cooperation which must be encouraged. my staff and the digital professionals meet in an atmosphere of mutual trust and france has been a pioneer in

this area. one may ask what is exactly the terrorist intent. not only to kill, but to foster terror, so that no one can feel safe anywhere. for that, there is an atmosphere of mistrust. our citizens pit against one another, on the contrary, neglect the fundamental principles of legitimacy by seeking innocent victims, terrorists attempt to place society on a permanent war footing. they seek boundaries between domestic and foreign, combatant and non-combatant and between civilian and military. this is what we must avoid at all costs. the response to terrorism is a

state and the rule of law. very early, france realized the totally new and multi-faced nature of the threat. since 2012, we have constantly strengthened our counterterrorist capabilities and adopted our traditional arsenal to the evolving situation. i would like to tackle a few of the main aspects of this response. in france, in europe, of course, and quite obviously in cooperation with the united states. first and foremost, at the national level, to combat terrorist action and propaganda we have other means better suited to the new type of the natural threat. since 2012, counterterrorism law

has allowed prosecution of french citizens for participation in various crimes abroad which could not be done previously. this is vital for handing down sentences against returnees who were in syria or in iraq. then a second counterterrorist act adopted last 2014 instituted four major innovations. french nationals suspected of wanting to join active terrorist groups in the middle east are barred from leaving french soil. forbidding non-resident foreigners from presenting a threat to national security, from entering or living in the country. finding the individual terrorists -- as an offense and finally, legally blocking and

removing web sites and photographing terrorism. those measures are being applied in an extremely firm way and are proving efficient. in july 2015, we also adopted a major law on intelligence. our intelligence services now have a modern and consistent legal framework in line with the new threats, the most recent technological changes in the developments of national and international law. at the same time, we strengthened our homeland security and intelligence services by giving them additional human and monetary resources. last june i also created a specific terrorism prevention department that oversees monitoring of identified individuals and is enabling us

to establish and update a system that covers such sensitive areas as education and facilities. so while the threat level has never been higher, france's response has never been so strong. this is demonstrated by the fact that 11 attacks have been foiled since 2013. six of them during last spring and last summer. we obviously strengthened our means against terrorists but we also developed innovative methods to prevent radicalization. telephone reporting hotlines set up in april 2014 allowed us to save over 4,007 reports. it enabled us to guide many

families who benefit from valuable support and can report the risk of departure of syria or iraq when one of their relatives is on the brink of leaving france. thanks to this, we have already prevented many people from leaving and we acted before french youngsters succumb to violent radicalization. secondly, strengthening our protection against terrorism is also a key issue at the european level. it is why finally after the november attacks, i have obtained from our european partners many major improvements, strengthening of internal border control in order to finally implement systematic check at the borders for all persons entering and leaving the

eu. this will also apply to european citizens through the systematic conservation of data bases, the information system and international data base search as interpol -- of lost and stolen passports in order to ensure these controls are effective, member states must systematically include data in the european data bases. i also made very concrete proposals with regard to combatting the trafficking of fake syrian passports since we know that several terrorists involved in the november 13 attacks used false identities to enter the european union. i therefore requested that experts in the fight against documentary fraud be deployed in the eu's external borders, especially at the migrant

registration centers, the so-called hot spots in greece and italy. we strongly emphasized that the european data bases may be used to identify, register and check all the migrants passing through these passports in order to allow our services to better detect and monitor the air travel of dangerous persons, we finally reached an agreement on the european system. the european parliament which unfortunately are still not included this on its agenda must now swiftly adopt the agreement so that it can enter into force. and we are currently negotiating a revision of the eu directive on firearms making it possible to strengthen the control of legally owned firearms as well as an actual plan to combat

illegal trafficking of firearms, notably from the balkans. france has been calling for this essential reform for over a year and a half and we must now implement them as swiftly as possible. finally, i would like to stress the importance of the ongoing cooperation with the united states in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. when we jointly decided after the november attacks to intensify our strike in syria, and iraq, we also resolved to work on improving and strengthening the exchange between our intelligence services regarding our common enemies. moreover, because france got involved very early in fight against terrorism and because our country developed effective tools in this way, we are proud to be today a partner of the united states, particularly in

this common fight. french parliament has recently ratified the so-called trans-atlantic agreement which will strengthen cooperation between our two countries on criminal investigations, that can help us identify wanted persons. you can count on my commitment to intensify to the greatest extent possible the cooperation between our two countries in the fight against terrorism. i'm meeting with jeh johnson today and with loretta lynch next week in paris fully consistent with this goal. above all, in the face of the new terror threat, we must not make the wrong assessment. we must not at any cost fall

into the trap that [ inaudible ] who are trying to pit citizens against each other. it was stated very clearly, the fight is an idealogical struggle, not a clash of civilizations although it causes a major security threat that justify tough measures, we are taking, radicalizati fortunatel remains a very minor phenomenon in western societies. the fight against terrorism is a global challenge and a test for the cooperation of our democratic societies. i am confident in the resilience of the french people. my compatriots took to french streets in the millions in a

spirit of fraternity to demonstrate that they were not afraid of terrorists, that they were ready to fight, to defend our freedoms. once again together, as we have done so many times in the past, we will fight and we will win. thank you very much for your time and attention. [ applause ] >> thank you. the minister has kindly going to answer some questions. they will be simultaneously translated so bear with us for a question. i will take the prerogative of being seated here and ask the first question and minister, thank you for such a comprehensive picture that you painted for us. one of the quotes that i found spot on and something i think we all agree with is that the

threat has never been higher. can you give us some specificity in terms of scale and scope in terms of numbers in addition to the foreign fighter dilemma, what are your thoughts and considerations in the broader maghreb where clearly, france has been a target of terrorist activity in the past? so any figures you can leave with us to give us a sense of scale and scope, and then secondly, since we're at a university, i'm going to ask for you to grade a couple things. firstly, to grade the cooperation between the internal and the external services in france to be able to get a full rich picture of the threat environment. so how are your internal security services working with your external intelligence services. then how would you grade your

relationship with the eu in particular, with information sharing and some of the need to integrate data bases with your eu partners at the borders, and then finally, of course, the relationship with the united states. i think the hybrid nature of the foreign fighter threat has really changed. it's not -- we used to think here we have to worry only about returnees or we have those that are inspired jihadists, inspired in the united states. you are starting to see a hybrid of both. i would be curious of what your thoughts are on this. >> translator: many thanks. i am going to if you will allow me, answer in french in order to promote at every university i go to and visit tosh promote the language of my on language, the french language, which i love very deeply and of course, if i

need to switch to english, i will, if it helps you. can you all hear? first, the phenomenon of foreign fighters. we have about 2,000 french nationals, mostly young people in iraq and syria. this number has raised by 63% since early 2015. in order to be more specific, among these 2,000, about 600 are present with daesh in iraq and syria. almost 300 are veterans that are back, if you wish, back in france and are dangerous which means that among these 2,000, about half of them have the

experience of combat with the terrorists. we have a good number on their way there and then we have some that we watch closely who are trying to go there. so it's an important phenomenon and we are trying to stop it. the first success was our legal system, our law system, that as i mentioned in my presentation. first grade thaw want me to give, the cooperation between our internal and external services. what's the cohesion of the intelligence services. i have to say that the grade is better than it has ever been because these challenges, these threats oblige us to share more,

to connect our vigilence and the leaders of our intelligence services under my responsibilities have to work together continuously through -- under my authority. so they constitute very strong element to protect our country. let me share with you an anecdote. after the attacks at "charlie hebdo" in early january, on the very evening of these attacks, there was a news report and the journalists on the infonews, journalists are merely a few yards away from where we thought they were in this, and as homeland security minister, i

cannot understand that on an operation with special forces, that are so delicate, that we have journalists just within a yard, one yard, from our police people. just because of the sensitivity of the information but also because of the risks and believe me, at this instant, i got immensely angry. i gathered all my collaborators and i sat in a small room and i said if in such crisis we are not capable to prepare these operations while informing journalists that without exposing them, and it's imperative that you share information. we cannot be -- we cannot face the threat. so for me, i'm not interested in

knowing which is our service that is going to be the winner. no. our objective is that the republic, the french republic, wins and prohibits those terrorists to act. it's not about one service or the other. so as long as we are not cooperating, we are not sharing the information, we are not leaving this small room that we are in. so you will be allowed to sleep and i will give myself this right to sleep a little and we will be together and there will always be somebody in my name if i'm not here to collaborate and share this information and that's how within 72 hours, we were able to take over the situation. regarding the european grade that you want me to grade, so

much progress has to be done. why? we cannot win if we are not together. you see, we have now this greece and italian hot spots. we need to have people inquiring within the european data bases, but not all countries feed this data base the way france, for example, does it. then we need -- so i mentioned the information system which is a data base, but we have other european data bases and we need to connect them with each other. we have euro daq, for example, digital prints. we need to be able to use it for security reasons. at this point it's not -- the legal system does not -- framework doesn't allow us to do it but we need to change that

law. if you have digital prints, you connect data bases but if the people coming into the eu have fake passports, then all that work upstream is voided. so as you know, we had two suicide bombers at the stade de france that had been fingerprinted in greece but had fake passports when we found them. this is unacceptable. we need to find a solution to this problem. so for french intelligence, grade a. for cooperation within europe, it's a b because we can do really better, even if cooperation with the american u.s. services, a b. i started with an a, a b, but don't worry.

it won't be a c. do not worry. the cooperation with the u.s. intelligence services is excellent and has never been as strong. when we were faced with serious, most serious difficulties, our both countries have pulled together especially in the counterterrorism fight. i hope you will forgive me for not giving you any details over this cooperation. if i were doing this, i would run the risk of not being minister tonight. i would be fired and my work is not finished. recent events have in fact led us to reinforce both cooperation and trust. >> if you have a question, please provide your name, your affiliation and one thing, minister, before i ask that question, that i think you

raised a very pertinent relevant point. that is the role of media not only covering these sorts of issues, but from an operational tradecraft perspective. we had our first significant situation in the boston marathon bombing where you had media well intended but potentially unintentionally identifying what our operations are, what our thinking is. this ace issue that i think goes beyond and extends beyond simply media but also to social media, where everyone and their iphone could suddenly become a potential source. that's a great topic i hope we will have some time to discuss. but we had a question. we will start with pat and go to francois. please identify yourself. try to keep the question short. >> minister, bit of a question but also bit of information to share and support the minister's

background. we can certainly say from the european perspective, director wainwright is sending our full resources to try and get an eu integration to belt the information gaps in ct and the migration smuggling center, european counter terrorism center. in addition, i have to say that during the attacks in paris, the terrible attacks, i witnessed firsthand the u.s. agencies standing up to the plate and giving intelligence leads particularly in the financial tftp program which we understand we cannot disclose operational matters but we are very supportive to the french investigators. my question really is, cooperation has never been higher and indeed, we have always found the u.s. has always stood up to the plate when we're in trouble. does the minister feel is there any particular area where we could add value to the existing operations we have and task force fraternity, anything we

could do better for you? >> i agree with you. all you tell is the truth. we are all involved in europol and all involved in europol to be more efficient together. of course, we would like more cooperation inside europol but not only inside intelligence services -- for example when we were confronted to the terror attack in november, we of course exchanges a lot of information between our intelligence services in order to be sure that we should be able to find a good way to stop the terrorists as soon as possible. but we also exchanged

information between security forces because when we are confronted to such situation, it is very important to be sure that the intervention of the security forces, for example, belgium, france, germany, austria, for example, will be strong enough to stop the jihadists on their way. we are trying to find new way or new means of reinforcing the cooperation inside europol between the intelligence services and the security forces. there are a lot of -- in the european unions. there are also a lot of debates between european unions and the states. a lot of agreements are possible in order to be more efficient and we are working about that strongly. it's a very hard job and very

interesting with very interesting prospect. >> francois? >> catalyst partners. merci. thank you, frank, for this venue. i think i will ask it in english just so that everybody else understands. one is three months before the awful event that happened, there was a deposition that essentially outlined what was going to happen in what kind of venue it was going to happen. how could that have happened and what has been done to make sure that when somebody spells out potential issues like this, it's taken seriously? question number two is how much

money can be given to turkey and how much control can turkey really do when a lot of human trafficking is done out of turkey? thank you. >> translator: a judge received a deposition laying down what was going to happen. i want to say who is this judge? what was the information that he received? we have many judges in france. we have many judges working on inquiries and on investigating all over the world, by the way, and even if i knew what you're alluding, i may not even be able to reply because there is the secret of the investigation as

you know. i cannot -- i'm not the minister of homeland security. in a country where there is no separation of powers, there is separation of powers in france, so i'm in a difficult position here. but i don't even know, understand what you are alluding to. second question, turkey. that, i understand what you are talking about. to tell you the truth, i even see it too much. it's a topic that is in front of us every day, especially sensitive and complex that requires a lot of clarity in our understanding and action. how can we decrease the migratory flow, not because we do not want to open our doors and welcome the homecoming, hospitality but if we welcome, we need to be able to master this welcome, to master the flow

in order to be able to keep worthy hospitality. we need to be very lucid, very clear because with the greatest generosity, we might lead and create huge humanitarian crisis so we need to be able to have -- to be in control of this process. we need to have hot spots that are functioning. we need localization to a special camp, for example, needs to be done properly and in an orderly fashion in order to do all these things, we have to also ensure that the people that are in the refugee camps can be hosted in those camps in the best humanitarian conditions so that they can go back

country as soon as their country is capable of welcoming them back, or we are going to deprive a country like syria, for example, from an entire generation of young people who could reconstruct their country and also to prevent smugglers, people smugglers, to stop their traffic. so in those camps in turkey, in particular, we need to create very good camps there. it might be a very good solution. so with germany, we discussed with turkey in order to organize this kind of organization to organize this mechanisms so that the turks can be faithful to their commitments, so that the

eu funds be distributed in a responsible way with great rigor. >> we have time for two more very quick questions. i know rich here and then we will go all the way to the back. i'm sorry for favoring the right. i didn't see hands up. >> my name is rich wilhelm. i'm retired. as you know, in this country, minister, there is a huge debate either taking place or about to take place over the encryption in telephones. as a result of the authorities have not been able to access one of the phones the terrorists killed in the san bernardino attack. it's a very complex issue but do you have a position on unbreakable encryption in any

form of digital communications but particularly with respect to what is going on right now with the iphone? >> joining the minister as a senator who knows a little bit about that. >> translator: yes, i want to underscore the presence here of senator richard, who is minister of defense since between '97 and 2002. he's most involved in those questions and he's most happy to be with us. feel free to reinvite him to talk about those topics. he would have many things to tell you on those topics. i hope i'm not bothering him or obliging him by saying this, it would be for your university a great opportunity.

so you are inviting me to take part in the u.s. debate. >> it's an easy one. >> translator: i could be embarrassed. i could avoid the question but in fact, it is not a u.s. debate. it's a debate -- it's a u.s. debate today but it's a question that we are all facing. i alluded to attacks that we avoided that we foiled. when i look at those attacks that we foiled and i cannot of course unveil the content of the inquiries, what i'm talking to you about has been in the press already, in the french press, we had to face exchanges, communications between terrorists that were encrypted. those communications that we had access to were encrypted. so our peoples have very strong

demand. they want to be protected from terrorist crime which means protect our democracy and our civil liberties from the will of terrorists that want to destroy it and at the same time, promise us that it will be done at every second in respect with our individual civil liberties. so that's both the strength and the constraints of democracy that we need to target terrorism while respecting this very sensitive bands so i understand some information regarding terrorist activities are hidden within a phone, for example. and so of course, authorities need to have access to it.

i have looked carefully at the judicial debate that you are having particularly the justice element so i understand it. i don't want to get into the details here. but we need to face this question head-on. if tomorrow we are not capable to use encryption -- sorry, if we are not able to crack encryption, our citizens who care so much about freedom and privacy will say but what have you done to protect us because these attacks are going to continue indefinitely if we do not solve that problem. so then we will have other debates, much less healthy. what is a democracy worth if it's not protecting us? so it is most important topic philosophically but also practically. then there will be a debate

around internet and as follows. how can we develop all that digital work contains in itself in terms of capacities of communication exchanges, relationships between human beings across the globe, if freedom had been demolished, destroyed by the terrorists. the ecosystem of the digital work is democracy and if democracy is not capable of defending itself, the ecosystem of the digital work collapses. so you see how everything is connected. it's not that on one side there is the digital work and civil liberties and on the other side states and government trying to defend security. no. we need to have a joint venture between the states, the governments and the digital work. how? we need to create trust, mutual

trust so that together, we can prevent terrorist acts so we need to define principles, rules, that won't let states to take advantage of the necessity that they have, this obligation that they have to intrude on the privacy of everybody and that balance can be achieved. last year when i went to the silicon valley i said that we wanted the blog sites that are calling, encouraging terrorism. i said we want to take them down. and they understood us. so i understand what's going on in this debate. my responsibility, it's my responsibili responsibility, i do not think that in order to solve this problem, we need to be in a position with these operators.

they are our partners and it's also their interest to be our partners, because if we cannot solve the problem in the trusting community, the ecosystem of -- on which these companies thrive will collapse. i know that in saying this, i have not satisfied your appetite for a scoop but i am not minister of homeland security or defense minister. if you like scoops, the there a other ways to indulge in scoops and of course it's not with a big declaration and big noise that we can solve this problem. it's with determination and rigor. when i'm no longer homeland minister of security, i can come back and speak slightly differently. >> we have time for one more question in the back. please identify yourself.

>> eli lake with bloomberg view. i wanted to ask how many french citizens is the french government currently monitoring and can you talk a little bit about what that monitoring entails? >> translator: i see through this question that the simplest questions are not always the easiest ones to answer but i'm going to try to answer. we are monitoring several thousand people, individuals, but not all of them are necessarily terrorists. we are not convinced that all of them are but some of them respond to low signals, some we

are certain that they are in connection, in communications with terrorist groups or radicalized groups but it doesn't mean that they themselves are radicalized, but at some point they may. so this is the spectrum. the difficulty of counterterrorism today is less the difficulty of intelligence that we have but it's the difficulty in analysis once we have the intelligence. when we have a low signal and we think it's a low signal attached to an individual, does that person for example doesn't seem to be involved, doesn't mean that person is not dangerous. for example, we had in marseille a few weeks ago a young high

schooler who tried to kill, to have -- to kill a teacher. we didn't know he wasn't a good student. we had no idea. he had self-radicalized himself on internet in a very short term so we try to distinguish those who are less dangerous, those who are highly dangerous, those who were foreign fighters and are there, those who were foreign fighters and have come back, those that are on the way, and we are trying to enhance continuingly our capacity for analysis. we organize in terms of human resources with -- we work with universities, we develop of course collaboration within our services, with foreign intelligence services, so that when we cross-reference all of these, we can have an analysis that becomes more in tune with

the reality and that's really the challenge that we are confronted with and not just us, but the entire world. >> we could go on for hours but the witching hour is here. let me underscore before i say thank you, one point that you brought up in your remarks and i think if we were to look at this issue holistically, the missing dimension of our own counterterrorism state craft is recognizing to paraphrase bill clinton, it's not the economy stupid but the ideology. this is one area where i would love to see more effort not only within the united states but in partnership with other countries to expose the hypocrisy of the islamist ideology. this is something i hope we can do in tandem. with that, mr. minister, thank you for sharing your insights with us today. while it's a truism trans-national threats do in fact require trans-national

solutions and your courageous leadership on some of today's most difficult challenges i think deserves to be singled out. thank you for what you do. thank you for what france does. merci. let us continue this fight together. thank you and may i ask everyone to please remain seated while the minister exits and please do leave your headphones as well. mr. minister, thank you. [ applause ] >> i would like to thank you for treating me so kindly today. it was very interesting moment for me. i'm sure that the exchanges we can organize in the university are very important to understand what we are confronted to and also to be more efficient in fight against terrorism because the link between the intelligence services and the

universities of the world are constituting a strategic issue if we want to win the battle -- >> we will win. >> we will win. thank you for this moment. be optimistic. i'm sure that partnership between france and the united states will be very efficient in order to stop terrorists in the world. thank you so much. [ applause ]

we'll have two campaign events tomorrow on c-span. first at 10:00 a.m. eastern time, donald trump holding a campaign rally in vadalia, ohio. at noon eastern, live coverage of hillary clinton in st. louis, missouri. you can watch both events live on c-span and catch up on any campaign events you have missed on our website. c-span.org/campaign 2016.

i am a history buff. i do enjoy seeing the fabric of our country and how things, just how they work and how they're made. >> i love american his tore tor. they're fantastic shows. >> i had no idea they did history. that's probably something i would realliy enjoy. >> with american history tv it gives you that perspective. >> i'm c-span fan. >> next, a discussion about the zika virus and the risk of it spreading in the u.s. the bipartisan policy center, the u.s. global leadership coalition and the harvard global health institute hosted a panel of public health experts at the capitol visitors center. this is about an hour.

>> good morning, everyone. it's my pleasure to welcome you all to today's event about the u.s. response to the zika virus. i'm director of national security at the bipartisan policy center. [ inaudible ] producing the event on global health issues. the short answer is that pandemics and health threats if allowed to fester long enough spread globally and can become threats not just for wherever they started, but for our own u.s. national security. it's a well-worn cliche in washington that washington never acts until a crisis forces its hands. there's at least two problems with that. the first is that prevention is usually cheaper than intervention and secondly, that if you are dealing with a crisis, you tend to think that

everything is unique, that you are doing something for the first time in standard of learning lessons from past examples. two recent reports highlight the importance of not waiting for crises to evolve in global health. the first written by senator daschle and frist, the case for strategic health diplomacy, looks at pet-far and argues about the success of that program and what can be learned from it. the second put out by the harvard global health institute, will ebola change the game, ten essential reforms before the next pandemic looks at when we can learn from ebola. the pandemic we were dealing with last year. this year, today, we are talking about zika and hopefully we will learn from our esteemed panel what lessons we can learn from past interventions, what the real threat from zika is and what the u.s. can be doing to help battle that threat today. so on our panel, starting on my left, we have the senior advisor focusing on aging, prevention and global health.

he worked for a decade at the u.s. department of health and human services, ending his tenure as deputy assistant secretary for health. next to him, ambassador carl hoffman, the president and ceo of population services international, a nonprofit global health organization that operates in 60 countries worldwide. prior to that, the ambassador served as ambassador to togo. on this side, the director of the harvard global health institute and the kt lee professor of health policy at the harvard t.h. chan school of public health. and as moderator for our discussion today, serving to try to tease out the difficult issues, is lindsay plaque, director of government relations for the u.s. leadership coalition. thank you for joining us. i look forward to an engaging discussion. thank you. >> great. thanks. thanks, everyone for being here today. this is really i think important conversation but also a very timely conversation that we are going to be having.

i just saw a report yesterday that 200 zika viruses have been, 200 individuals within the u.s. have been identified as having the zika virus. so most of those folks i think are in the southern states, florida, puerto rico, but really important conversation to not only discuss zika but what we learned from just a couple years ago with ebola, how that can help us with zika and you know, future pandemics as well. so i'm really excited to be here with our distinguished group of panelists. let me just set the stage quickly for you here. over the last several months, everyone knows the world has been watching and paying attention to the zika virus which is spreading of course throughout central and south america and of course popped up here in the u.s. most worrisome is the potential link between the virus and the serious and deadly, sometimes birth defects. the world has responded at least begun to respond to this. the u.s. government is already ramping up its domestic

preparedness and of course helping countries most affected by the disease. most everyone in this room probably knows that the administration requested $1.9 billion in emergency funding to combat the zika virus just about a month ago. most of that funding is for the national institutes of health and centers for disease control and prevention but a chunk of it, about $375 million, is for the state department and u.s. aid to really assist those countries most affected by it in central and south america. then of course, our international organizations, the world health organization, the pan-american health organization, paho, are already working to combat the disease at its source. so if this sounds familiar to you, it's because it should. two years ago, the world was facing a similarly scary disease on a much larger scale, but very scary. countries in west africa were being decimated by ebola. the disease was spreading across the borders and as easily as someone getting on an airplane to the u.s., the disease popped

up here on our shores. so the questions that we need to ask today are quite simple. what lessons did we learn from ebola and how will they help us respond to zika or the next pandemic, how can we better utilize existing platforms and partnerships to build resilient health systems so if at all possible, we are not dealing with emergency situations all the time. and then of course, what more needs to be done today, tomorrow and in the next several months to combat zika, both in central and south america and of course, here in the u.s. so to help us unpack all of that, i'm really pleased as i mentioned to be here with our panelists to discuss this today. we have mikes floating throughout the audience. in just a little while we are hoping for a lively and dynamic conversation with you all, so i'm going to start off with a couple questions but we will turn to you and just look for a microphone when we get to that point in the conversation.

so let me start. you recently co-authored the report will ebola change the game, ten essential reformspanp. here we are with the next pandemic. what were those lessons and how can they inform our zika strategy? >> great. thank you, and thank you all for being here. i am excited to be here, obviously not ideal under these circumstances of facing another pandemic when we started that work of our panel about a year ago, about 14 months ago, we thought well, this is not just about ebola. it's about preparing us for the next one. i don't think any of us expected that the next one was going to be 14 months later. if you look at the global response to ebola, the big lesson in my mind is that we failed miserably to do what we had all agreed we would do. we had a plan in place for responding to pandemics like ebola and it just, it didn't work. almost no part of it worked.

the national systems that were supposed to have kind of disease surveillance, public health response, those didn't work in the three west african countries. the regional response from w.h.o., the regional office, that part didn't work very well. and then certainly the global response that was supposed to be coordinated by w.h.o. out of geneva failed miserably. and the bottom line is that if we had responded even somewhat well based on a plan we had in place, we would have prevented 90% to 95% of the deaths that occurred in west africa. this was a wholly preventible disaster and it didn't work. so the question, of course, is why and what are the big lessons we could learn. i'm happy to get into more details on them as we go along. but at a high level, the key things are you need countries with basic health systems to be able to identify and respond to

disease outbreaks. we are only as safe in america as the weakest country in the world in terms of having a basic public health infrastructure, right? that is a lesson we learned 15 years ago with terrorism, where we learned that failed states can be a place for attacks oour homeland. epidemics work very much in the same way. where are vulnerable spots, and there are a lot of them around the world. second, we need a global system that responds effectively. you're not going to be able to prevent every one. and we recommended a series of reforms. we actually thought hard, should we recommend we get rid of w.h.o. if you make w.h.o. go away tomorrow, with you're going to have to create another one. you need an agency that can coordinate across borders and you need an effective w.h.o. and again, we laid out a series

of principles to do that. and then the last set of recommendations were around research and development. each of these diseases reminds us it takes us too long to develop diagnostic tests. it takes us too long to develop vaccines. the key point coming out of i think both ebola and zika is we've gotten lucky on both of them. ebola is not that contagious and zika started in a country that had a pretty good health system, brazil. and we identified the problems early. i'm not confident on the next one we're going to be as lucky. and because we can't predict where it will begin or what disease it will be, we need to start preparing. and there's a series of things we need to do to get going. and the time to do that is now. >> it's interesting, you say we, that's very much a collective we. it's not just a u.s. government proposition or government proposition at all. it takes partnerships with international agencies. it takes civil society and the private sector to really create

a comprehensive strategy. so carl, i would love to ask you about these partnerships and how they complement government programs, what you've seen obviously from your work in the field, how we can do a better and what is the right mix of partnerships. >> thank you, lindsey. and thanks to everybody for being here today. i think ashish laid it out comprehensively and we shouldn't underestimate the scale of challenge you articulated there. what we're really talking about is certainly in the case of west africa and the ebola context, the part of the world where just about every institution is weak. public institutions are weak, private institutions. it's obviously a place with

stronger institutions, stronger governments, stronger leadership. and so obviously the two viruss are different, and represent themselves in different ways. so i think we have a better shot in the current context than in the context of ebola. but partnerships, from my perspective, you know, when we look at an effort to mobilize all the actors in a particular geography or a market to respond to a public health challenge rein we tend to look at this now through the lens of what we call the total market approach, we try and understand where the failing exists in each marketplace. it could be in terms of government policy, it could be in terms of the health sector, it could be in terms of civil society actors within the health sector. it could be in terms of what the private sector is doing to be engaged. every one of those is subject to

market failure as we respond to a health challenge like that. the context for zika is much more promiselinging in terms of all the different players that can be brought to bear. between the private sector, they can have a hugely important role to play. in the immediate context for zika, we know that even as all the research is under way, and a day doesn't go by where we don't learn something new about what this really means, right? we still have to focus, in particular, on the women who are pregnant now, who are considering becoming pregnant, remembering the fact that half of all the pregnancies in latin america and the caribbean are unintended. what are the practical steps that can be taken right away to

help protect them. and we know insect repellant is a part of that. private sector is the one that's manufacturing insect repellant and marketing it in all these markets in latin america and the caribbean. so, you know, that's a conversation that needs to take place rapidly as we talk about practical steps to help women deal with the consequences of this threat right now. >> interesting. i want to ask you about the report of strategic health diplomacy. i know you looked at petfar as a case study for this. can you tell the audience what uh yo mean by this, what it is and how it can be used in terms of the response to zika. >> by addressing global health, we can advance our national security sfwres. it's bringing global health and

national security closer together. when we do global health work, we always look at it from a humanitarian and a moral and a public health perspective, but what we wanted to do in the bipartisan policy center report that blaze referred to, we know that it was tremendously successful in terms of reducing morbidity, mortality, reducing maternal and child transmission, inkreeing education for health care workers, but we wanted to see whether there was any second order effects related to the global health initiative. what we did in this study that bbc released is sub saharan african countries. we looked, for example, at public opinion and found that in petfar countries, public opinion of the united states was

significantly higher than the rest of the world. when surveys were done in residents of those countries, it was asked if petfar hadn't come in, what would your impression of the united states be and it was always lower. we looked at the developmental index. and and they outperformed non-petfar countries. we looked at vulnerable populations like the prevalence of hiv and military personnel. we looked at aids in orphans and found significant reductions in petfar countries. and then we looked at gofr nance issues, rule of law. the con cluks of the report is that we weren't trying to prove or demonstrate causation here, but there's a correlation here

that there's something here that there's an important connection between health improvement, public health and global health initialives and our national security interests. i think the lessons learned from ebola for strategic health diplomacy initiatives and for zika are one, initiatives need to have very clear goals. and these need to be understood by all partners. there need to be defined interventions going back to clear goals, i think carl is absolutely right. the focus here is really on ensuring that pregnant women do not get infected by zika, and also child bearing women have the information, education and resources they need for family planning. so there have to be clear goals. there need to be defined interventions. they need to be implemented in a way that's sensitive to local context and culture. and i think ashish will probably talk about it with respect to ebola, but understanding culture context is critical for

strategic health diplomacy initialive. you need to be in it for the long term. you need to build the capacity and you need to be transparent and accountable. these are all lessons learn eed which we'll probably talk about. but when we looked at pepfar and looked at why was you can successful and also these second-order impacts, these are things that bubbled up and i suspect they'll be fortunate for zika as well. >> thank you. i want to follow up on your lessons learned, particularly with the regional and international response in some of our international partners. some have said the speed at which the w.h.o. declared zika a public health emergency was a direct reaction to the criticism they received over their response to ebola. as of now, what do you think of the international response? >> that's a great question. a couple of things, if you think