we learned some lessons from versailles. thewe brought japan into coalition of nations that would help contain soviet expansion is quite a remarkable story. japan and the western alliance importance becomes obvious early on. the american occupation troops stationed in japan are floating to the north korean onslaught. it was the counter information by macarthur, the brilliant counter stroke that stabilized the situation it is interesting that some of the lst's were manned by japanese. japan location was critical in that -- for maintaining south korea the way it is as an ally today.

japan is important. it allowed us to fully deploy in the region and provide credibility for the united states. thanks to the agreement in 1972, the uss navasota was able to do minesweeping. do the math. keep one chip forward, deployed, you need to have three ships in your inventory. to accommodate the transit and maintenance cycles. currently, we have 20 ships in the home port authority in japan. two additional air carriers, eight additional amphibious ships, ate mine countermeasure

ships and a dozen destroyers to meet the mission. these forward deployed ships need downtime for upkeep will stop when i was in navasota, i remember the quality of the work done at the shipyard. i recall we were talking about some radio equipment and this shipyard worker told me, i could get this done for you isn't really important and it i said yes. and he said, well i have a wedding tomorrow i could put off. i was impressed by the dedication and quality of work. it should be the midway. the aircraft carrier midway, we

stationed an aircraft in japan in 1974 that was 28-years-old. that's carriers sister ship, the franklin d roosevelt was taken out of service. in the good care in hands of the japanese shipyards in tokyo, our naval shipyard there, she was maintained in pristine condition and served in the western pacific for the next two decades. a very important ship and our efforts in the gulf wars and indian ocean. a forward presence. thanks to the work that was done with her japan, she is now in san diego. almost a museum ship. a testimony to the good work the japanese performed for us. also is the importance of japan as part of our strategy in

bringing the japanese. of course, the cold war is about containing the soviet union and communism. as far as containing communism and asia, take a look at the scorecard. not too good. besides the soviet union, china, south korea, vietnam, laos, cambodia over the course of the cold war came into falling under the coming his banner. not too good. during the 1950's, communism was monolithic. we have learned subsequently that i been his was not monolithic. dr. kissinger accomplished diplomacy but we failed in southeast asia in the 11-year war. in vietnam, we move to containment in the soviet union. to the manchurian border. turn the 1980's, we had pretty

warm relationship and considered china as a strong ally versus the soviet union. as far as some of the challenges over the decades to execute the policy, for the united states to maintain a containment policy it was no easy matter. united states is an island nation. my former boss, james holloway then third, said he had a meeting with secretary of defense harry brown and the carter administration. during the air of the soviet union in the 1970's. brown argued we needed to pursue civility with the soviet union by achieving parity. to be credit he -- for our allies to even know the united

states needed to control the high seas, the navy, on the other hand was as sea denial force. in a war with the soviet union, "thai soviet navy was not an option. let's go to the next life. ok. going back to the 1950's, the eisenhower administration implemented a new look. the air force got a budget to build a be 57 b-52 bomber. the navy wanted to play in the strategic integrated operations as detailed in fisa admiral jerry miller's book. eventually, we put nuclear weapons aboard ballistic

submarines. it took on the mission of defending the motherland from the nuclear bombs. nuclear subs and combatants could go after our [indiscernible] meanwhile, the best in stata g -- strategy was implemented. a general war at sea with the soviet union could go nuclear fast. before the navasota, i served on a ship that had the slogan [-- had a slogan "the next war is on us." one of the challenges operating

with the capability of the western pacific was the sensitivity in japan. torch and only, i can neither confirm nor deny response was -- fortunately, the "i can neither conform -- confirm nor deny was ok with the japanese. regarding comparisons with the cold war today, many have noted commonalities between the former soviet union and china with respect to naval forces. both countries are continental powers and decisions of the soviets to put naval forces to the sea in the 1960's, they had to flee up young, inexperienced officers to command. it followed the collision of a soviet destroyer with another ship in november, 1970. the ussr approached the united states with soviet safeties seem measures. it reduced the type of dangerous behaviors.

low flight overpasses, bumping's, other harassments. recognizing the emergence of the 1990's of the chinese service force, there were calls for u.s.-china a in sea. it had negative connotations because it was signed by two superpowers as an effort to avoid world war iii. a major trade partner with newer social ties, indeed we had 300 thousand chinese students studying in the united states

right now. you did not have that during the cold war with the soviet union. a military consultant of agreement was signed which facilitates the annual discussion of maritime issues. and initially lacked some of the issues. over time, the two nations adopted a code of unintended and counters at sea that was created by the western pacific naval symposium. an annual gathering of navies that operate in the region. a friend of mine, captain smith, shared with me an encounter he had with a chinese forget in the eastern see a few years ago a end discussed the professionalism of his chinese counterpart. i am confident that even with the hc accord, one thing we can say for sure, with the hco court, there was a little bit of hanky-panky tween the u.s. and

the ussr as i revealed in my dissertation. a list of incidents we had post-1972 with the soviets. but the public never saw this because there was a classification called "for u.s.-u.s. ri's only" and we would discuss this every year either in moscow or washington. a difference of concern today is social media. ok? in the 1980's i recall an incident and the soviet destroyer pulled up alongside us and it had its forward gun out pointing at our bridge.

this was clearly a violation of the incidents at sea accord. i was thinking, is today the day world war iii is going to start? is there any reason for this? i was thinking, and no. this guy should be able to read there is an "e" painted on the side of our ship, so any bomb he sends it to our ship is going to take him out. if this was today, somebody on our single bridge would take a drive that, send it home to his father back, atlanta, and next thing you know it is on cnn, fox news for top this is before the white house or kremlin would even have a with that this occurred. -- a whiff that this had occurred and it would make the evening news cycle. that is a concern today. the other differences territorial seas. i am from new jersey.

i used to go down to the seaside and sit on the beach and i could look out and see russian fishing boats there, because our territorial seas at the time, the united states claimed three nautical miles. during a little bit of research, it was not until 1988 that we decided to go to 12. so, that is pretty recent history. one of the issues today, of course, with the creation of 200-mile economic exclusion zones has been determined by some nations as an exclusion zone for non-economic activities. non-identification zones in the east china sea and south china sea. between social media and different views on territorial

waters, i see the potential for artificial crises that could lead to some unfortunate crazies. i will leave it there and look forward to questions. >> there are some seats here. >> thank you very much. let me talk about topical things. cold war challenges. similarities and differences. then and now. finally, japan's future defense role. cold war. some observers argue that japan was a free writer during the cold war. that is not true. south japan was making the biggest national security commitment in the 1980's in the history to-date.

it played a critical role of helping the united states execute the maritime strategy. positioned in the center of the theater of confrontation in the u.s. and the soviet union in the pacific, japan undertook to a important missions. one, locating areas. one here, one here, and one here. and, second, the defense of sea lines of communication. the objective of the trade blockade was to prevent soviet forces from advancing into the western pacific. the maritime self-defense force traumatically improved its

anti-summary and wartime capabilities. they acquired c-130 as a mine-laying platform. it introduced surface to ship missiles to attack soviet vessels sailing through the strait. the objective of the defense was to make it possible for the u.s. aircraft carrier battle groups to stand safely to striking positions. this is the northernmost island here. the maritime self-defense force was tasked with the anti-submarine operation and with providing safe passages in the western pacific for the u.s. carrier battle groups. while taking up these new missions, the self-defense forces continue to provide protection over the united states bases in japan, such as the air force base in several

and navy bases. under the air defense provided by the self-defense forces, the u.s. forces could focus on offensive strike operations against the soviet far east. japan's commitment to the united states strategy did not result from political mischief. it was a result of the concerted efforts made by the officials and officers of the japan defense agency, the self-defense forces, the minister for the fears -- the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of finance. it was only when another came into office in 1982 that the japanese prime minister consciously and doors to his country's commitment to the global security strategy.

this close defense u.s. strategy produced good results. according to a require -- a retired u.s. navy officer in a day japan specialist, no u.s. navy operator would doubt the importance of executing the strategy, he said it was unbelievable that we tracked every soviet submarine by the end of the cold war. former soviet leaders say one of the retired soviet officers has acknowledged the soviets took the presence of allied navies such as japanese, in exercises, very seriously.

he even mentioned his respect for the japanese maritime defense force. there are successes, there are challenges. during the cold war, u.s. planners were concerned that japan might become neutralized in case of war. the u.s. government clearly indicated this concern. soviet power, for example, the soviet military power from 1989, published by the u.s. department of state of defense, stated, the soviet merger objectives in the past included, into a quote, "neutralizing japan and south korea by military or political means to prevent them from supporting the united states." several scenarios were looked into as the global war games

were conducted at the u.s. naval war college in the 1970's and 1980's. in the 1979 games, the social -- the soviet union offered incentives to france, israel, japan, pakistan, and algeria to remain neutral. in the 19 80 game, the soviet union detonated three nuclear weapons east of japan to intimidate the japanese government into neutrality. in the 1984 game, the soviet union perceived that it would be impossible to keep japan that neutral just by diplomatic and political pressure into a threat. so they launched a large-scale air attack on japan. the scenario in the three-year games in 1985 in 1980 seven was

more interesting. in these games, japan went back-and-forth between the united states and soviet union. during the first week of hostilities, the united states conduct did air operations in japan using u.s. and japanese bases against the soviet union. when there was a protest that this was not in keeping with japan's professed neutrality, the japanese condemned the united states actions and band the future use of japanese soil as a base for u.s. attacks on soviet courses. but then, japan decided to take two aircraft carriers into the ports and o socko not a defensive action, but it was regarded as a serious violation of neutrality and they attack japan. then the japanese government made a decision to fully take obligations and pledged to use it self-defense force to protect

united states forces in japan. these are hypothetical scenarios used for wargames. nevertheless, a repeated appearance of this name clearly indicated that the united states planners took this seriously and examined how best to prevent japan from getting neutralized and, if it did, how to fight a global war without participation. it is hardly surprising that the u.s. planners were concerned about the neutralization of japan. first, despite japan's acquisition of modern equipment such as f-15 fighters that and other aircraft, it was doubtful the self-defense force had the real war fighting capabilities. shortage of ammunition supplies seriously limited the execution

of realistic live fire exercises. many of the japanese self-defense forces did not have aircraft shelters. there were no emergency plans defining the rights and citizens of japanese citizens and major operations conducted by the self-defense forces and wartime. in 2003 and 2004, more than 10 years after the cold war, the japanese parliament announced registration necessary for wartime operations. but a few differences between then and now, there is both good news and bad news when the current strategic environment in the pacific as compared with that of the cold war era. during the cold war, some of the

islands here, offered the soviet union a natural barrier separating them from the sea. today, japan controls these islands, the southwestern island and can use it as a natural defense of barrier. the bad news, however, the only exit the soviet fleet had for advising the western pacific was a straight, today, china has at least nine or 10 locations that could be used because it is a long island chain with a lot of gaps between them. china is superior to soviet union, which collapsed because

of the arms race it locked itself into with the u.s. according to the stockholm international peace institute, chinese expense expenditure grew by a remarkable 167% in the last decade while the u.s.-japanese defense expenditure decreased by 0.4 and 3.7% respectively. finally, japan's future roles. defense roles in the future conflict will look very much like the ones during the cold war. the air force defense force will focus on defense with a new emphasis on crude missiles for defense. u.s. bases in japan are becoming more vulnerable by the day with the continued korean air force buildup.

planned introduction of s-30 five fighters will help ease the mounting pressure. the s-two fighter-bombers can help against southeast vessels. the maritime self-defense force will continue to divide safe sea lines of communication to u.s. carrier battle groups operating in the western pacific and with his anti-submarine warfare capabilities which are one of the best in the world. moreover, it will now protect u.s. carrier battle groups from not only submarines that also from anti-ship missiles that china is developing. the ballistic missile will be upgraded to more advanced systems in the years to come.

the ground self-defense force will attempt to stop hostile vessels at the straight along the south western island chain. it can deploy new targets or ship missile on the island chain like this, with a range of over 150 kilometers taking cover all over the straits in the island chain. as the self-defense force will execute similar defense missions, japan will face similar challenges. as the soviet union seeks to japan and case of conflict, north korea and china will do the same. why now, north korea has deployed more than 200 missiles capable of reaching japan. with possible miniaturized and usable nuclear devices.

north korea can explode a nuclear bomb in japan's vicinity in order to do as the soviet union did in 1980. they may seek to neutralize japan's population. according to the public opinion poll, while on the 32% of the japanese responding felt the new legislation would strengthen. 64% of them answered it would make it more likely that japan might get entrapped in foreign wars. 74% agreed that japan would not

get drawn into wars by the united states even if the situation was and acted. keeping the isolation of japan -- the isolationists in japan committed to security will remain a challenge. thank you very much. [applause] ms. goto: we have a full house. we are excited to have c-span with his. there is a microphone if you have questions. please raise your hand and introduce yourself. in the interest of time, i would like to take two or three questions together. let's initially go with this gentleman, and then with the gentleman who is up high.

>> thank you. i am henry, a researcher and retired federal government. in the last few years, we have seen japan fortified as an artificial island in the sol cg. -- south china sea. many years ago, all chinese serious military strategy indicated in a war they must be clever. i wonder what the strategy will be or should be. prior to world war ii, japan fortified all of these islands that were mandated by the league

of nations. was supposed to guarantee their independence at the time. but other strategies also did not work out. as such, it was a powerful region they had but secretive no other naval ships entered the area. now, we have a similar situation we will face in the south china sea. what can and should be done to develop a strategy to face this? >> hello. steve, officer of senator dan coats. the first part of my question is, how is the situation both similar and different with the cold war with americans and japanese versus the soviets. now, the situation with china. also, today, would using terror groups defensively and forwardly deployed like what was supposed to be done in the cold war, is that still viable world might we -- or might we have to move to

something else or do you have any thoughts on that topic? thank you. >> i guess regarding the question of what can we do about the artificial islands that are being created in the south china sea? the one thing that the navy and government has made a commitment to his freedom of navigation operations. freedom of navigation operations is, i guess it has been argued, that it would be beneficial to join me since 1979 but in reality to go back to naval history, all the way back to the barbary wars against -- in tripoli, establishing our right to freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation operations, we conducted them in the -- against the, you know, soviet union. they claim some survey waters that we did not agree on -- some soviet waters that we did not agree in. the bumping incident was the

karen and yorktown being bumped -- being met by a soviet frigate in 1988 in the black sea. we were demonstrating freedom of navigation. there is a rule in international law that the insula juts out, you do not have to go around 12 miles around that. you can just cut through. we were demonstrating that international right and to the soviets disagreed. subsequently, there was a meeting at jackson hole and the soviets came in line with the correct interpretation. we were, you know, innocent passages in that case.

our understanding is the united states navy and other navies of the world, will continue to transit these waters close to these little island outposts that the chinese are creating in the south china sea. that will continue on for, you know, the near and distant future. >> a couple points are important. first of all, in the time before world war ii, given the nature of the world situation, technology, and domestic policy, navies did not normally operate off the coast of their designated enemies. during the time that edmund mill was writing about, the fleet practice near hawaii, near panama. it did not practice off other islands. that'll changed after world war

ii. not immediately after world war ii. but by 1947, 1940 8, 1940 nine, it became pretty clear that based on the expanse of world war ii, based on new technology, and based on the unfolding world situation, the thing to do with the fleet was to stick it in the face of the enemy and the time of peace to keep it from doing anything at time of war. so they set up the six fleet in the mediterranean and turned it around with the seventh fleet in the western pacific, extremely fortuitously, because the carrier was in the pacific one north karina -- one north korea came south and it showed the futility of having this but it did help stop them. but ever since then, the convention has been to the u.s. navy to keep to forward battle

fleets, sometimes three, pretty stretched, things dave talked about, you need a lot to be able to do this, off the coast of wherever you are operating. why is this important? because in the south china sea, we have been operating in the south china sea since world war ii. forward. always. trudging back-and-forth, and also being that. and we have a strategic ally in the ec. it is a direct line to another treaty ally, depending upon where you are going, japan, south korea, austria. it is also a line of communication to emerging friends india and vietnam. so, the presence of the fleet, the seventh fleet, in the china sea, which has been continuous

since 1950, is a difference in the kind of things you are talking about when japan was fortifying islands out in the pacific and no one went near them. we have made a practice is world war ii of going near those places that are of interest to us, even if they are 10,000 miles away. parenthetically that is one of the things that drives the large, robust, fully-capable ships we build because they have to be able to go out and stay out there for 6, 7, 8, nine months to do their jobs. that is different from operations in international waters, different from the insertions of freedom -- the assertions of freedom of navigation in which we assert things are a national waters that the local things are not. in waters that are incontestably international, we operate. we operate forward and we have since then and that seems to do the job for presence, crises, and war fighting. the point about it having -- the point about of having such a strategy is viable given the threats of an creasing like air carriers, and article came out

recently by a guy named michael hass. it is on a blog that just came out in the last week. he makes a point that carriers have always been vulnerable. they are of fighting ships. that is what they're for. when the japanese carriers met american carriers off midway, the assumption was not that the japanese might lose a carrier, the americans might lose a carrier. we better back off. all during world war ii, carrier fought carriers and other ships in the western pacific because that is what warships are for. it is not pleasant. it is not nice to think about. but this is what fighting ships do. in the case of the soviets, the time i discussed, they had, still have, backfire bombers. having a backfire bomber overfly

you carrying these humongous missiles under them really sober s you. as dave said, is world war iii going to start? look at the size of that. but we have countermeasures. we develop in equipment, we develop tactics. an amazing ballet of 14 fighters. and, the kinds of radar-caring planes. smaller b-twos that can see out for thousands of miles and tell where everybody is an vector in the scenes. where tankers have to be to resupply at-14's. where the electronic warfare planes have to be in order to jam the radars. all of those were worked out during the cold war. the same was submarine tactics.

the same with surface tactics. we're doing that. well, i am not doing that i have not been in the navy for 20 years. but the naval forces are doing it today. they are not going to touch us. the answer for 40 years, i don't know. between now and then, many things can happen but what the navy is -- thinks that's what you pay for. figure out ways to make sure those carriers can stay forward, the cruisers can state or word, -- can stay forward, the submarines can stay forward to do their job.

whether or not it is going to work as wonderfully as i just laid out as a maritime strategy we do not know, but the navy is certainly trying and you just saw a recently, for example, secretary of defense carter mentioned off hand in a speech, a mission we had never publicly disclosed. in our there are other systems we have that we never publicly disclosed we are working on, just as, i am sure he must suspect, the russians and the chinese and others are also working on their own systems. somehow the carrier, well, they might hit it. we better back off. that is not why you have a carrier. the carriers are built to stand and fight to and hopefully win if we develop the right kind of systems. and we are working away at bad as we speak. >> let me take the u.s. defense question. i think the most important similarity is how we divide our roles. we continue to, the u.s. continues to, provide strike offensive capabilities were as we kind of take care of our

defense. we do so partly because, i mean, that is what -- partly because of the japanese defense policy which basically is not -- we are not willing to possess offensive capabilities because it can be destabilizing in because the ban was aggressive in the passive war. at least, in the beginning just after the end of the war, it was not allowed to possess offensive capabilities and this has continued. we focus on air defense, submarine warfare, you know, in case of mine warfare, we undertake both offensive and defensive mine warfare of those things. what is new after the end of the cold war is the introduction of missile defense. but, even not, even that is we invest a lot of resources and defense which is basically defense-oriented capabilities. and also, another reason why we

focus on defense is that we are close to the source of threat. you know, we are close to the soviet union, north korea, china. we have to defend across the board before we start thinking of strike capabilities. differences, i think the two forces, u.s. and japan, are now much more closely integrated. so that, i think, is one of the most important differences. for example, in case of ballistic missile defense, we have a ground defense and environment which is integrated with the u.s. and japan intervention gary target information-sharing system acquisition. second, in terms of alliance

management, the relationship has become a little bit more complicated because of the emergence of --. japan was worried about, you know, in the 1980's, getting entrapped by the wars that the united states might fight with the soviet union on a global level. but we don't have to worry about abandonment because the united states needed us. but now, we certainly sometimes, when the u.s. relationship improves, we kind of start worrying about abandonment and also because the u.s. and china are not in a cold war. right? as it in the soviet case. also, the island is a small island into important for us but not really, doesn't, don't have a really critical strategic importance, so it is more like a symbolic importance that they

have. now we are much more comfortable after president obama said, you know, the united states would be willing to defend as part of a treaty of litigation between the countries two years ago. but you know, japanese planners are a little can -- concerned about that. the u.s. does not have to worry about entrapped and by japan in the war. so you know, we have both we have to worry about defending. and, thirdly, and maybe finally, now japan has a much stronger leader and is interested and willing to undertake in a serious manner and think about and implement policies leading this process of japanese defense policy and i think this is, you know, a good thing for japan because it has accountability and democracy in my country.

ms. goto: we have time for two more quick questions if we can get the gentleman here and tom. >> [inaudible] a problem we did not see during the cold war between the united states and the soviet union.

thank goodness the japanese were not provocative. i was wondering whether there were any lessons you could learn from japan so we can adjust our thinking in order to try to dissuade [inaudible]. mr. michishita: thank you for coming. japan native. i have two questions. regarding northern territory. can you comment on that. because i understand that japan and russia are meeting in may. that is what i heard last week. so, what is the possibility of talking about territory?

and, the marine base in okinawa, i heard they may be moving to guam. can you comment on that? are they going to stay? are we moving? >> you know, you might think that chinese provocation in the vicinity is more serious than what the soviet union was doing. i do not think so. what the soviet union was doing was much more provocative in terms of the capabilities that they had a and the aggressive

maneuvers they were conducting in the vicinity in the face of our self-defense assets in the sea and in the air. it was, quite, you know, -- soviets naval vessels frequently pointed guns at us. partially, the navy suggested now this is the information age. we get information very quickly and easily. we did not know, at least the japanese citizen, know that the soviet destroyer was pointing its gun at us. we did not know. so, all of these things,

difficulties and provocative action going on, we just had blind eyes. good news, bad news. we are not informed by the united states. we kind of feel at peace, that is the good news. and, so, i am not too -- but it is certainly in a way more difficult because we have to defend. northern territory's. because the russians occupied them. we did not have to defend them. it was easy. so, that i think is good news, that we were maintaining administrative control. sovereignty over the islands. bad news, we have to defend them. >> i would like to make a comment. i attended a conference in shanghai about five years ago on united states, japanese, chinese, trilateral maritime relations. in reality, that trilateral relationship was more like two bilateral relationships. this was after the instance of

the bumping into the japanese coast guard and chinese fishing vessel. shouting at each other. what we have is kind of like during world war ii, china and the united states had a very close alliance vis-a-vis japan and during the cold war, japan and the united states had a very tight relationship vis-a-vis the soviet union and in part towards china, especially during the 1950's and 1960's and early 1970's. i do not recall any situation where china and japan were aligned against the united states. so we had this interesting dynamic. as far as dealing with china, we must continue to engage. we need to work with china as far as -- [laughter] we work with them on the

anti-piracy controls offer -- patrols in the indian ocean off of somalia. they have a fabulous hospital ship. they have been a participant in annual rimpac exercises. that is one of the ways to counter these concerns that we are trying to do another into thent, bring them international community as a full partner. that is something that we have to work hard. >> we have had 35 years, more or less, of non-cold war and nonmajor hot wars against." competitors.

we have slashed our defense structure, at least united states has, japan somewhat, the europeans in or mislead. we have got used to the fact that we can send naval forces around the world anywhere to do anything. if you decide that you want to go bomb libyans or iraqis, you just do it. you put together a coalition. all of it made it look easy and we are forgetting with the cold war was like. i want to reiterate. there were provocations every day at sea. some of them were enormously dangerous. as one of the reasons for the sea agreement that gave so brilliantly chronicled and reminded us of all the time. every year the japanese navy does is specific exercise. you would expect if they are keeping the navy current that it would have an exercise. if it is expect of --

an ally that you would be invited to join. that happened during the 1980's. destroyers and fishing boats that were not really fishing aroundnd agi's following each ship and each unit. that was routine. that was not some exciting thing that just happened that would make the newspapers because that is how we operated. all of the exercises were conducted under the umbrella of soviet anti-ship bombers and followed around by ships on the surface. it does not even account for what happened on ships under the surface. the famous incident in which one of the soviet ships is following too close and rose up under one of the american ships and sliced it open and the crew were all , we are ad they said

sub-getting aircraft carrier. but that could have resulted in serious loss of life. those kinds of incidents took place, unfortunately, routinely. we got out of the habit, wonderfully. what is happening now is worrisome, most certainly but it compare toen really the things that happened every day that caused people to sit around and hammer out the agreement that dave has discussed. i want to answer the questions about the marines. i am not an expert so i am not trying to be quite. -- not trying to be coy. i simply do not know but i will what i do know, which is vague. there are three divisions of marines and three air wings of marines. the smallest of the three divisions and air wings is located on okinawa and has been since the 1950's. the marine corps likes it there, the air force likes it there.

meanwhile, okinawa has changed. it is not this little island where a few people live and there are fishermen. with huge a big place cities, and the cities have grown up around the bases. that has happened on mainland japan, in the united states, where a naval base or near four -- or air force base was put out in the woods in the 1920's and now it is surrounded by a giant city. we have this at oceana in norfolk and we have this near san diego. it happened in okinawa, too. okinawa do not like having this. these 19-year-old's marines running around with testosterone, bumping into each other. they want the marines out. ok, so marines out. but, a wonderful place. so, a compromise got hammered out several years ago in which

-- i will not be clear on this, but i think it is about half of the marines that are currently were going to leave and go to places like guam and rotate in and out of australia. there were a number of options explored. other marines were going to remain in okinawa and there were going to be some buying of land, exchanges of land, operations remote part of the island and so far. the okinawans and marines have never been happy about that. the american congress says, you are going to build facilities? i think that is great. i think if you are going to build them in the sovereign

state of indiana, that would be super. but your not. [laughter] but your building them in other places. we not going to give you a dime to build them in guam. it is a complex issue and it is still in play. recently, there have been changes. abe just made a statement which i do not want to paraphrase, because i will get it wrong, but this continues to cook. the japanese government, central government, traditionally regards the marines in okinawa as an important part to the deterrent and an important contribution to the alliance. they get it. they have a whole bunch of marines living in an area they would rather they did not live. this continues. this remains a discussion. nobody is shooting at each other and hopefully something will work out that will be satisfactory, at least for a few years before they have to renegotiate something else. something has recently just

happened to perturb an agreement they thought they had over the last couple of years. >> [inaudible] way, those islands are part of okinawa. you have to remember that. ms. goto: it is time for us to go our separate ways. you may be questioning why our speakers did not question each other. there is a reason for that. to four hoursee last week in a small, windowless room hashing this out. [laughter] they have reached a peaceful conclusion to their talks. we will be summarizing their findings from that conversation. we hope to have that available online and in print within the next few weeks. those of you who are registered for this will automatically be

getting an electronic version of that. i hope you will be able to read that and continued the conversation. i want to thank our three speakers for joining us and i want to thank you all. thank you for coming. [applause] >> i am a history buff. i do enjoy being the fabric of our country. seeing how things work and how they are made. >> i think that is something i would really enjoy. >> with american history tv, it gives you that perspective. >> each