fighting capability, soft war blocks commonly referred to as block 2 b, 3 i and 3 f. this was the capability required to support ioc in 2015. the completion of block 3-i testing has been delayed due to software issues. in the next week, we will have the final build of block 3-i capability all in support of the air force's ioc schedule later this year. completion of the final block, block 3-f includes the more complex functionality of the baselines including referred to as center fusion. further coding has been impacted by resource demands, software engineers and lab facilities associated with completion of earlier software builds. these factors add up to the program's estimate of four-month schedule risk for completion of

3-f developmental. we press on with testing and it will be critical that the program rapidly correct these deficiencies while mitigating the impact. the program's commitment is to mitigate these risks going forward and to do so within the bounds of the budget while delivering the full capability. meanwhile, the program's focus is shifting to operations and support of in-service aircraft. the program has accumulated 50,000 flight hours and with 152 aircraft operating at eight bases across the country, the feedback on the aircraft and support systems is beginning to shape the program's priorities. the marines have two full squadrons in operation today and will stand up their third this june. they are building momentum as the service in the f-35 effort gains capability and confidence

and employing it tactically every day. they have demonstrated operations in 29 palms. they are training british pilots as well as marine corps pilots in beaufort, north carolina. marine pilots love this plane. the capability it brings to the marine corps air ground task force. meanwhile, delivery of f-35a aircraft are completed, trained for air force international partner, pilots at luke air force base continues to ramp up and it's filling out at hill air force base with seven aircraft at hill and the remaining to support ioc. separately, the navy has gained extensive experience demonstrating launch recovery handling and support of the

f-35c during at sea on eisenhower and nimitz and a third scheduled for later this year. two key points regarding sustainment, first, with regard to aircraft reliability, maintainability, one year ago, we reported that overall performance in that area was poor and trending poor. concerted efforts by the team have reversed those trends. while we have much work remaining, improvements to design, parts availability, maintenance training and support and tooling are yielding improved performance in the key metrics. rma will remain a focus of the program in the years ahead. second, the program is working closely with the services, our international partners and industry to form mu late an operating and support strategy for the program including the business plan that will accompany the strategy and overarching o & s war on cost. a critical element of the o and

s plan, alice continues to mature. in the near term, we'll be testing a new version, alice 2.0.2. additionally, to improve turnaround time for fixing issues highlighted by fleet maintainers, we have service packs aimed to be more timely and responsive to a war fighter's immediate needs. in the long term, however, alice has yet to maeet its full promise. if we're going to increase the operational availability for this aircraft, we are committed to that. and in summary, the f-35 program is making solid progress across the full speck truck of testing and capability. as new issues are retired, new issues will arise. the forecast for initial operating capability for each of the services, including risk, is

largely unchanged from one year ago. yet, the size and complexity of this program and capability it represents is such that a great amount of work remains ahead leading to each ensuing ioc and subsequent operations and sustainment and modernization of the aircraft. we are careful to neither minimize our assessment of the inherent risks or to avoid them but to assess them realistically. the war fighter and our international partners deserve nothing less. thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the joint strike fighter program. i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, gentlemen. i want to start with a question that goes to the public's perception of this plane, of the f-35. we all are very much aware of the difficulties that the f-35 has had both in development and in production.

certainly in getting to operational capability. but i was surprised the other morning to wake up in my own home town. mr. sullivan, you may have similarly seen a huge headline across "the dayton daily news" ohio canceling jet fighter. i thought it was interesting for a couple of reasons. one, no one called me to quote for it and it's my local newspaper but it's a washington bureau that quotes a university of maryland study that then quotes a response from a washington think tank.z want to who actually know

forward with the f-35 and resulting in a $97 million savings. we have not done a good job of communicating the importance of the f-35 and it is capability and why it's necessary. but the article does -- i do want to give jack torey, author of the article, ends with chief executive officer of the lexington institute in suburban washington with this quote. "it is impossible to upgrade any of our cold war fighters that would be as survivable as a stealth plane. that is the biggest single appeal of the f-35 that most enemy radars can't see it. you can't shoot down what you see." the fact that a poll is taken

asking people would they rather upgrade something that's not upgradeable rather than proceed with the f-35 probably bears our discussion. general bogdan, help us here so we can give people some information so they can feel the importance of the investment in the f-35. >> yes, sir. i have to be a little bit careful because -- >> i want to recognize a portion, obviously, of the f-35 capabilities are going into the classified realm and its adversary's capability are in the classified realm. so the need for the f-35 can't be discussed but certainly the concept that this is fifth generation and that we cannot merely plug and play with our old generation is probably worthy of a discussion. >> yes, sir. i agree with you.

i have never been associated with a program in my 25-plus years of acquisition where the public perception and the reality are so different. part of that is our problem for not telling the story. but part of it is because the program is so big that every minor issue becomes a big issue we have had a past that is not conducive to people believing in what we say. even though that hasn't happened since 20 10rks people remember that. and it sometimes is difficult to explain to the public how air warfare is changing and how it's not a turn and burn airplane that looks really cool at an air show that's going to win the fight for the united states when we go into combat in the next20o

to 30 years. we have a perception problem and we have an information gap there. what do we do about that? first and foremost, i do want to thank the congress for helping us. you do. and you do that in a number of ways. one, you help us by holding us accountable and when people know that you're holding us accountable and we base what we do and say on our results, people will start having a better understanding and a better trust in what this weapons system can do. on the department side -- and this is where i have to be careful because i shouldn't be necessarily a salesman for the f-35. you need me to be a little more balanced than that. but for our war fighters, there's clearly a role for them to play in advocating for this airplane. and in the past, we haven't done a great job of that simply because the airplane was immature. we were only operating it at a number of locations and we're

still developing it. so let me just give you a few things that are going to happen this year that might change that a little bit. the air force has stood up an f-35 heritage flight, which means that the f-35 is now going to be publicly displayed in many, many places over the next year. in fact, they have 14 public events between now and the end of 2016. some of the places including luke air force base, langley air force base, ft. lauderdale, new york city, chicago, baltimore, reno, las vegas. so the air force is getting out there with the airplane to these air shows and is going to start talking to folks about the airplane. the u.s. marine corps and the navy will bring media with them when they go to sea trials so they can tell their story. the dutch, who are a partner on this program, are planning on bringing their two airplanes to the netherlands in june for two weeks for the very thing that you just talked about, congressman turner, to introduce the airplane to the public, to

talk about it and to talk about why the airplane is needed for them. the u.s. marines, the u.s. air force and the uk will bring five airplanes to gafarnborough to t air show. we also need to continue to base things on fact and when people out there don't have the facts, then it's my job and my team's job to correct the record for that. >> general bogdan, this poll asked people would they rather upgrade the current fighters rather than proceeding with the f-35. mr. thompson -- i think it's mr. thompson. no. lauren thompson said, "it is impossible to do what they have asked. you can't upgrade our cold war fighters". would you agree with the statement of thompson and would you want to elaborate? >> yes, sir. you can only do so much with our fourth generation fighters today. you can only add so many

upgrades and structurally improve them to last a certain period of time. but what i will tell you from the knowledge i have on this program and the capabilities of the f-35, our legacy airplanes now and in the future will not s survive the threat and no matter how much you upgrade them and how much you put into them, eventually they will not survive. this airplane differently. it will survive -- >> in combat? >> in combat. it will survive for decades to come. >> i want to point out one thing before i ask mr. sullivan's comments about this. this poll asks people about sticking with our current fighters until 2037. i wonder what the poll would have been if they were asked if they would be willing to drive their car through 2037. mr. sullivan, would you also agree that the poll is skewed and it gives people a false option? you can't upgrade our current fighters as lauren thompson says

in any way that would be survivable as the f-35? >> i think it's clear that this aircraft, fifth gen aircraft does things that the generations in the past can't do, won't ever be able to do. the stealth threeness alone is a part of this and it's also more versatile. it's three different variants. it's replacing or complimenting a number of different aircraft that are growing oileder every day as we sit here and are having service-like extensions and things like that. so, yeah, i would agree that the f-35 is going to be a more versatile and a more powerful threat than what we have existing. but i -- and i think probably a lot of this has just come

from -- the past is the past, i understand that. but people still see a lot of money being put forth for the f-35. the other thing that i think you have to consider is that some of these aircraft, the production lines are shut down or they are not as hot as they used to be and you can't -- i think as general bogdan said, you can't plug and play these new technologies into those old aircraft anyway. so -- >> mr. sullivan, i appreciate your comments on that because being the director of acquisitions and sourcing for this program with the u.s. government accountability office, you're responsible for giving us some of the most critical oversight information. >> yes. >> that we have in the program. i know you know its difficulties and the areas in which we struggle to try to make certain that the program is effective. so i appreciate your overarching statement. >> our beef has always just been with the acquisition strategy of this and many other programs. it takes way longer and costs more than they thought.

but we've never really challenged the need for this or what its capabilities are eventually going to bring us. >> excellent. do you have more you wish to comment on this? okay. excellent. >> the fourth generation aircraft that we have and the systems that they have and even with upgrades wouldn't be able to handle the threats that we've already seen being deployed by our potential enemies for over half a decade. those are very challenging air defense threats that are mobile. so you can't count on knowing where they are. the f-35 with mission systems that work, as i alluded to in my opening statement, will provide capability that we don't have in any other platform to dynamically sense that very stressing mobile threat environment. you can't know ahead of time with certainty. and deal with it. so that's why it's so important that we get the f-35, including

its mission systems to work. provide us capability that we otherwise won't have and can't get in upgraded systems. >> sir, let me just add, our operational planning for major combat operations, first and foremost, relies on air superiority, air dominance. the f-35 is not being designed and built for the fight today. it's being designed and built for the fight in the future against the high-end threat. so we're not willing to take risk in terms of maintaining air superiority that we'll need in the 2020s and 2030s and beyond and the capabilities that are being brought to this aircraft are what we envision today to overcome that threat in the future. i agree with lauren thompson when someone says you're providing a false choice to upgrade. you cannot. the navy and marine corps does have fourth and fifth generation aircraft. we will continue to have a mixed

fleet at least through the mid-2030s. but we cannot enter high-end fight without the fifth generation capability that the jsf brings and that's why we're so committed to this capability. >> thank you. very important discussion. now turning, however, to some of the issues and difficulties that we have in making certain that this plane reaches its full potential. general bogdan, dr. gilmore and mr. sullivan's testimony indicate that significant challenges remain in completing the final software block, block 3-f. this gives the f-35 full war time capability. and you also indicated that the software will be four months late. what is the significance if this software is delivered four months late? could it impact the scheduled operational test and operation, iot&e and what are you doing to fix this?

>> thank you, sir. the issue today with the block 3 software and we see the problem in both our 3-i or 3 initial software has to do with stability. just very quickly, what the pilots are seeing is when they take off and they need to use the sensors, particularly the radar, there are some instances where the communication between the radar and the main computers in the airplane are mistimed and that mistiming builds up little delays and eventually those delays get to be big enough where the radar shuts off. okay. and the radar will recover but it will recover and take a few minutes to regain the picture that it had. some of the other sensors experienced the same thing. that is not good. we're experiencing that kind of problem about once every four hours of flight time. we need the system to be much more stable than that.

something on the order of once every eight to ten hours. so what we did when we found this problem out in the last few months is we went back and did a root cause analysis. as i just talked about, we know that it's a timing issue. lockheed martin has a number of fixes in the software that we are about to flight test starting next week in our next version of 3-i software. in the next month or so, we will know if those fixes work. if those fixes work, the stability fixes and some of the other software fixes, then the impact of this problem to air force ioc will be minimal. the impact to the remaining testing of 3-f, as i said, will probably just delay the end of flight test about four months. that does not impact the navy ioc because we had some margin there but it clearly would impact how ready the airplanes

are for iot&e. so we're looking forward to the flight tests in the next month or so to see if we have this solved. if we have it solved again, no impact to ioc or navy ioc but probably an impact overall to the end of testing and that would eventually impact the start of iot&e. >> mr. bogdan, i must have misunderstood. you were describing a problem with the software that would occur one time every four hours but it would be okay to occur every eight hours. isn't that still a problem with the software? >> it is not unusual for both legacy airplanes and modern fifth generation airplanes every now and then to reset one of the sensors in flight or have an automatic reset. that is not an uncommon situation. what we find is, if that happens more frequently, and it happens at critical times, then that impacts the pilot's ability to get the mission done but over

time and historically we've seen that somewhere between eight and ten hours is probably about what we can expect and that, according to the war fighters, is good enough. >> thank you for clarifying that. mr. sullivan, dr. gilmore, would you like to comment on the 3-f software? >> well, the rate at which these instability incidents were occurring with block 2b was one every 30 plus hours. and now it's one every four hours and the initial versions of block 3-i don't provide any combat capability than block 2b. so with regard to whether eight to ten hours is sufficient, what you want is a low probability that during a combat mission, which can occur -- you know, which can comprise several hours, you want a low probability that one of these upsets that takes time to reset and several minutes in the middle of a fight is not

acceptable. you want the time between these instability incidents to be long enough that you have a very low probability would occur in a multihour combat mission, whether eight hours would be sufficient is something we'll be looking at in iot&e and much better than once every eight hours with the block 2b software and, again, 3-i initially provided no more capability than block 2b. as we added a more capability in 3-f, you may see it come down. operational will tell us what is sufficient. >> mr. sullivan? >> yeah. i think depending on the mission scenarios and things like that, certainly it's a critical thing. i don't know if i'd want to be a pilot and watch the screen go blank. but it's a spec -- i assume it's a spec the contractor has and it's in development and we've talked to the program office about this.

and it's very serious problem but 2-b had issues and they worked through those and i would hope that they can do the same with 3-i and i think it will be the same thing with 3-f. so eventually i would hope that they will work that out and get it to whatever the spec is which i think will support the war fighter. if they do that -- that's why the timing is so critical. because you'd want that done by iocs, obviously. you'd want to be able to go to iot&e with problems like that under your belt as opposed to adding that to the burden of the operational testers. >> i'm going to ask mr. stackley to follow up but considering this is our last day for votes, i want to be, you know, sensitive to members who might need to leave. i'm the only one on this side so i'm going to ask for consent if

i let mr. stackley respond and then the order is mr. johnson, gallego and miss graham. what i'll do is let each of you ask a question -- ask your questions and then i'll go back to my next question and then we'll finish up and you can exit, if that's okay. >> the 2b software is performing very stably and i think everyone is satisfied with its performance. what is referred to as tech refresh on the jsf. the complexity of that should not be understated. we don't anticipate as large of a leap in future tech refresh but that complexity should not be understated. that did create a reset in terms of stability and now with each successful build of software going back at building black up the degree of stability that we require. general bogdan's reference to an eight to ten hours at this stage of the program, that probably is

satisfactory. in the longer haul, dr. gilmore is correct. we want to get this up to a low probability of occurrence such that the pilot does not have to worry about resetting his mission systems mid-flight. >> mr. johnson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. to follow up on your questions about the need for our country to invest in a fifth generation of aircraft to take over from the legacy aircraft that have been flying for decades now, the f-18 and 8b would all be replaced by our investment in the f-35. fifth generation. and it's important to note that other nations are investing in fifth generation aircraft. the russians, the chinese and that's what we mean by a changing threat environment,

which america must step up to the plate and if it intends to remain superior in the air, we must step up to the plate and invest and prepare for the long term. and that's what the f-35 enables us to do. and with respect to those who may have participated in the poll that chairman turner referred to and were of the opinion that we should extend the legacy fleet and rely on it for our future protection, it isn't -- and i assume they want to do that because it saves money. so pennywise, pound foolish, that would apply in this situation here. isn't it a fact that if america were to do what some prefer,

which is to extend the life of the legacy fleet, isn't it a fact that operations and supply costs to extend the legacy fleet would cost approximately four times what operations and support costs would be for the f-35 over the next 50 years? isn't it a fact? >> let me start with responding to that. i don't know about the four times number. but what we do know is -- >> approximately. >> -- as our aircraft age, for example, the early versions of the f-18 at the f-35bs and cs will be replacing, as they age, the cost of sustaining them, of keeping them flying, the availability rates for those

aircrafts, they are frankly hurting us today. so we have got to get to this next version, generation of aircraft in order not just for the capability but as the timeline extrapolates out, all of the legacy aircraft are going to be running into similar costs associated with sustaining a fleet that's not just old but a lot of the sustainment is dealing with obsolete parts and capability that we require for the war fighter. >> anyone else ask -- anyone else want to add to that? >> well, i would just say that i wouldn't focus as much on the cost for o & s. the joint strike fighters is going to be very costly with sustainment, too. it's more about the capability. you know, they need that greater capability. the fifth generation aircraft is

really just far superior. you know, i think o & s costs, it would cost a lot to keep these legacy aircraft in the air. i know they are really old and eventually they wouldn't be able to fly them after a while. so there's just nothing out there that -- you know, the f-16 is another aircraft that the f-35 is going to replace. there's an awful lot of aircrafts it replaces. >> thank you. lieutenant general bogdan and secretary stackley, the marine corps approved capability last year for the f-35b and the air force is planning to do the same this year. this, to me, demonstrates a program that is maturing and reaching a point where it would benefit from increased production. do you agree -- do you agree

and, if so, what are the increased production rates for the f-35 program? >> let me start. first, it clearly reflects a program that is maturing. as mentioned earlier, back in 2010, we restructured the program and within months we are holding to that restructured program's schedule here in 2016 and our costs at the same time are coming down in terms of production while we hold the line on development. the program is methodically increasing its production rates today. that's in terms of both the u.s. and our international partners and foreign military sales customers joining in that production. so the production rate is methodically increasing and what we are seeing in terms of benefit is we're accelerating the learning curve objen the production floor, it's driving down our costs and as described earlier, we're seeing positive trends as it relates to both air

frame and engine manufacturing. the longer term when we complete iot&e and get to the full production rate decision, i think we're on track for that. again, within months within a budget cycle. and as we march in that direction, we're looking forward to such vehicles as block buying contract and ultimately multi-year contract to, again, further leverage the benefits of the stable design, mature production lines and then as ee si fish ently as possible. >> thank you. your back, mr. chairman. >> turning back to the initial operating capability concerns and the requirements for later this year, general bogdan, in addition to software development, i understand that general well shall is closely watching the automatic logistics situations known as alis. air force software stability

affecting the radar. alis was an area of concern during maintainers to our visit to eglin air force base last year. please update us on your concerns concerning the ioc later this year. >> yes, sir. as i said before, within the next 30 days, we ought to know if the fixes we've put into the software on stability will take hold and if that is a case, then we will incrementally upgrade the air force's airplanes at hill air force base with that version of the software and it will not impact their ability to declare ioc. that is not the case with alis. the next increment capability that we're delivering is 2.02 and we were supposed to have that fielded by august of this year. i am estimating that that delivery of that system is probably about 60 days late now.

i'll not sure if we'll be able to pull that schedule back any. if that is the case, then it will be up to the u.s. air force to decide what to do in august when it comes to alis 2.02 if it's going to be about 60 days late. >> anyone else wish to comment? >> i would only say that we have another team that is looking specifically at alis and i believe that they have a draft report over on the hill right now. that might be helpful to look for that. in fact, i could probably make sure that the committee gets a draft copy of that. >> that would be great. we should. because we had significant concerns for the maintenance group. >> yeah. so this team is focused really on o & s and alis. >> thank you. >> one other comment about alis, quickly? >> if you went to eglin air force base today or luke air

force base, what you'd find over the past year is not all but many of the maintenance work-arounds and burdens that we placed on the maintainers over the last few years are systematically getting improved. we are not anywhere we need to be with alis but i think what you'd get from the maintainers if you talked to them today is the fact that they do indeed see an improvement each and every time we put out a new version of software, which means the trending is going in the right direction. we just have a long way to go. >> thank you, general. consumers weren't given iphones however you have to put planes in pilot's hands while developing them. you have to look over your shoulder while doing it and we appreciate the work. mr. gallego? >> thank you, mr. chair. general bogdan, the original account for the f-35 platform

between the three variants in order to keep costs down on the budget but, as we know, this has not been achieved which caused the original concept into question. knowing this, would you support programs in the future that aim for commonality between the services or do you think this would also have too many costs and schedule overruns? >> congressman, what i've said before about joint programs is that they are hard. they are neither good nor bad and it really depends on how you manage them. but they are indeed hard and they are hard because when you bring together a number of different customers that may have varying requirements, it is sometimes hard to meet all of those requirements without going to the least common denominator. and so what i would tell you is, a decision to move forward on any platform in the joint arena would depend on how much overlap

the services see in the requirements that they have. there's opportunities outside of a joint program to benefit from commonality using similar engines, using similar flight control systems. but to embody that in the same airplane that would try and meet the requirements of varied customers is a really hard thing to do. >> i hope to remember that in the future. moving on to pilots, though, in october, two solutions talked about was developing lighter helmets and managing parachute time after ejection. however, today we found out that the jao report notes that the helmet weight was not the root cause. can you say that we've identified all of the problems related to this issue? >> yes, congressman. one point of clarification. there are two technical issues as to why a pilot less than 136

pounds has an added risk of injury during ejection. one of them is indeed because the helmet is too heavy but the other is a technical issue with having to do with the way the seat fires up and the center of gravity of a light pilot but both of those problems contribute. we have three fixes in place to remedy this. the first is an ejection seat switch. that will be set by the pilot based on his or her weight. we've tested that. we're in the design phase of it and that fix will be cut into production on our lot ten and we will start retrofitting airplanes with that fix in november of this year. we also have a head support panel, which is a pad that will be sewn into the risers of the parachute. that fix has been tested. it, too, will be incorporated into lot ten and it will start being retrofitted in november. relative to the helmet weight,

we needed to get the helmet down to 4.6 pounds. we're in the process of doing that as we speak. originally, the estimate was that that helmet wouldn't be ready for fielding until november of 2017. i can report now that that helmet will be available in november of 2016. so when we have the switch, the helmet support pad and the lighter helmet out there in november, i believe by the end of this year we can remove the requirement of pilot being -- not being able to fly the airplane less than 136 pounds. >> and then just to the second portion of my question was, can you say with certainty we've identified all of the problemress lated to this issue in in terms of pilot ejection. >> sir, we have 14 more slightests and ejection tests to go between now and accept. i cannot tell you right now definitively that we won't find other things. what i will tell you is we will

completely test it. if we find problems, we will fix them because we will not put pilots' lives at danger and in an ejection system that is not safe. >> yield back my time. >> thank you, general bogdan. as you are aware, a lot of our discussions between you and the committee are based upon our visit to eglin air force base and the questions that we pose as a result of that fact-finding trip, there were 14 of them. and you have continued to both answer those questions and update them. i have your march 17th, 2016 letter in response continuing to update us on those issues. if there's no objection, i'll introduce this into the record on your discussions on the items and the issues that we've been looking for for oversight. turn to ms. mcsally. >> i've been an air man myself.

knowing the threats that are emanating, however, i remain concerned about the close air support fact a and combat search and rescue missions being done by the a-10 warhog and the capability to replace that without a risk to american lives. general bogdan, can you confirm that the f-35 requirements document is still that the f-35 would replace the a-10 and the f-16? >> ma'am, what i will tell you is the requirements document that i have on the program does not specifically say that it will replace the a-10 and the f-16. my requirements document has to do with the capabilities of the f-35. the decision to replace airplanes with the f-35 is a service decision. >> okay. i think, though, on the program page, the intent of the department to certainly the air force is that the f-35 are replace the a-10 and f-16.

is that fair to say? >> i would believe from the public statements that i've heard from the chief and secretary and combatant commanders, that's a true statement. >> and that's also on the jsf website for the program as well. on march 3rd, the air force chief of staff said in a hearing that the mission capability of the a-10 will not be replaced by the f-35. he also talked to me about this after our hearing last week and said the workload would be handled by the f-35. this was a surprise to hear him say this, to be frank with you. so i'm concerned, i look at their five-year plan, that they are going to start moth balling, 64 the year after that, 94 the year after that and when do you think we're going to be at foc for the f-35? >> ma'am, the capabilities -- the full capability of the f-35 relative to close air support will be delivered in the late

2017 time frame. we'll have additional capabilities in our block 4 modernization that would make that mission more viable for the f-35 and i am not sure if the air force has declared an foc date yet. >> but from the testimony, i think from dr. gilmore, we've seen the f-35a, capabilities limbed to 20, 30 minutes on station, two bombs, excuse my language, no time to loiter, winchester, 182 bullets, limited night capability, inability to get data targeting information, inability to survive a direct hit in close combat. these are all of the limitations that we know about and have talked about in previous hearings. dr. gilmore, i appreciate that your office has decided to do a comparison test between the f-35 and a-10 on close air support and i am concerned also about the combat search and rescue and

the air control mission. can you give us an update on the comparison test and when that is going to happen and whether there are any concerns about funding or it is continuation in another administration? >> first, with regard to requirements, i reviewed the requirements document before i came here and there's a clear statement at the beginning of the requirements document which has been in force for a number of years now that the f-35 would replace the a-10. >> that's what i thought. >> i'd be happy to send you a copy of that. >> please do. >> can i correct the record? when i talk about requirements on the program, i talk about a specification that i put contractors on to deliver a capability. the document you're talking about is a service document known as operational requirements document. >> okay. >> an ord. >> okay. >> and that's the chief staff the air force signed. >> right. >> namely, the operational requirements document. that's what i was talking about. with regard to the close air support tests, comparison tests, yes, we are planning that. we are planning all of the open air tests as we speak working

with the joint operational test team and services. we expect to have that effort completed in june or july of this year. we're happy to share those results with the committee and with you. with regard to funding, the costs of the close air support tests including combat search and rescue and sandy, compared to not doing them. >> right. >> compared to not having the a-10s fly conducting the same missions as the f-35 varies between 3.5 million and $5.2 million. the difference is the amount of refly that you have to do, just like when you're doing a test, you can't count on every scenario that you're trying to run actually working. >> right. >> so you have to plan on the test for refly, the same way general bogdan is planning for refly in developmental testing. that's the reason for the range of 3.5 million to 5.2 million. we are working to -- with the joint operational test team to

fit all of these comparison tests within the budget for operational testing which was established, i think, about five years ago and the temp that is now out of date but we take the budget seriously and we're working to fit all of the comparison testing within that budget. if there is -- if we do go over which, again, we're trying very hard not to do because we take the budget limit seriously, it wouldn't be by more than 10 or 15% and i would remind the committee that the block 2b utility evaluation, which was supposed to have been done in 2015, was canceled at my recommendation two years ago because it was clear to me that the aircraft wouldn't be ready for that kind of rigorous operational test and the service acquisition executives agreed and that was a savings of about $100 million. so we are working to keep within the existing budget and the cast comparison testing and so forth is, again, a small amount of the

overall costs. 3.5 to $5.2 million. >> when would we have those results delivered to congress of the tests, do you think? >> well, if we begin the operational testing according to my estimate, which would be medical l mid- calendar 2018, it would be a few months after that. >> so late 2019, early 2020 would be fair? >> yes. >> okay. thank you. i appreciate it. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. walz? >> thank you, chairman and thank you all for being here again. we really appreciate it. the strategic need for the f-35, i think everyone knows that. we hear it. it's now crunch time, though, on the delivery piece of it. general bogdan, you were right. there's a perception issue both in what they are going to get and what they expect to get but there's also this perception that i've held and i use this as an example. i've been to know less than 14 hearings dealing with changes to

retirement plans, taking away of the housing transferability and tri-car. when the pentagon needs to save money, they go to those programs and i always use the example that we haven't had as many of these. so i hear statements like this from one of our partners from the australian defense, keith jointer said it. he's responsible for evaluating this and he said some systems like the radar are fundamentally worse than earlier. that is not a good sign. here we are with bug fixes for the next seven years and they are looking at -- am i correct in this? they are re-evaluating their purchases on this. i go back home and talk to soldiers and they say, i just lost a gi benefit. how do i talk to them about this? i kind of feel like i'm asked to come into the play and do my part and say this and then it's going to be delivered. how do i go back? how would you answer on this?

>> it's a tough question, congressman. and i clearly understand the point of view here. i guess the best i would offer, if i were asked that question, is that bringing a new weapons system online to defend our country is never easy and it always is fraught with mistakes, bad choices, technical challenges and the history of especially developing airplanes has been murky. we've had lots of problems over the years bringing new airplanes online. >> general, that's a helpful piece. you have more experience in this. how similar is this to when the f-16 came on? >> it was a very simple airplane when it first came out and over the years got more complicated.

and it had setbacks. the very first flight of the f-16 was an accident. they were not supposed to take airplane had to take off. so airplanes experience this. >> i think that's true. and i want to be clear on this so i'm not teeing this up because i'm one who believes we need these systems. is it apples to oranges because of the technical differences between that launch and this launch? and i know that's kind of a hard question, because we were at our technological limit then and now maybe we're there. it's similar to that. is it the case of there's more things that can go wrong so they probably will? >> sir, let me jump in and say, that's absolutely the case. and it's not unique to the f-35 program. we're going after a high-end capability on this and other warfare systems that are significantly more complex than

the systems that they are replacing. there's no such thing as replacing las angelessy, whether it's aircraft, ships, on a one for one basis near the same cost of the legacy systems because these are so much more capable. comments and perceptions from folks that are not well informed on the program, those are tough to defeat because now you are talking about an education process. the reality is that the f-35 program, albeit it has gone through restructuring is on a path to deliver all the capability promised day one. it is going to cost more than what was estimated back in 2002 timeframe. those costs were rebaselined and we have kept those under control to the extent that now we are reducing costs with time as the program gets more and more mature. what you are not hearing -- i think general bogdan touched on this -- the war fighters that are flying this plane, what their perception is. my comment in the opening statement was the marines love

this aircraft. absolutely love this aircraft. this is what they plan to go to war with if called upon. i think that you are going to hear that overtake the other rhetoric over time as more and more of our air force, marine corps and navy pilots and our international partners climb into this cockpit, see what its capability is, train with it and deploy with if over time. >> yes, mr. sullivan. >> your question is an excellent question. and it's not just the f-35 program. it's about the acquisition process. we do acquisition reform all the time. and actually, it has been improving the last few years. but the bottom line answer to this is, there's got to be a little truth in advertising when these weapons systems start up, because they're always started up with optimistic cost estimates and schedules. this program was originally planned to be completed, everything purchased by 2026. now that's 2038.

and so that additional 12 years of funding -- >> that has as much to do with this side of the table as that side? >> yeah. i mean, that's what you are talking about is that's the congress is faced with unplanned funding for 12 years that they weren't planning on when they started. and i know, like i said, it's not the f-35. it's most of the major weapon systems. they just don't have a good business case at the outset. the f-16 was a really good aircraft when it was delivered and it was simple. and it's not that simple anymore. it's a very complex aircraft. because they planned it properly. they had incremental planning on that, and they did upgrades. that's really what i think what this is all about. and so other priorities go by the wayside. >> thank you. i yield back. thank you, chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i do want to follow up on a discussion on requirements to make sure -- i flew airplanes.

i never had to procure them. this process seems cumbersome to me. dr. gilmore, the air force chief of staff has said that the a-10 will not be replaced by the f-35 on the record within the last few weeks and said that to me last week surprising me. is the air force going to be updating their ord or whatever you called it? >> the operational requirements document? >> to reflect that. >> i haven't heard they are. the f-35s are going to replace the f-16s. >> right. >> i'm a bit puzzled. all i know is what the existing document says. >> you know of no efforts to update that. and if it's -- >> i'm not aware of any. >> if it's going to replace the a-10 and f-16 but he is saying the f-16 will replace the a-10, but the f-35 will replace the f-16, we're still in the same situation where we are in specific circumstances for close air support we potentially have additional risk or a gap or capabilities that are going to be degraded which is why it's important we have this fly off.

do you agree? >> well, i don't know whether the capabilities will be degraded. that's what the comparison testing is supposed to show. >> absolutely. >> that's why we're planning it to be absolutely fair. we're going to consider all the conditions under which close air support are done. all the different kinds of threats. it certainly will be a challenge. in fact, the a-10 couldn't survive in the highest threat environments. we're looking at less stressing threats like the ones that the a-10 is being used in the environments it's being used in today. urban rural situations, buildings, vehicle personnel, different kinds of control for the close air support, different kinds of control interaction, all of the things that you know are done in close air support missions. we're going to set up the missions and then the a-10 pilots and the f-35 pilots will use those two aircraft to their best capabilities using whatever ttps they have. we're not going to specify how

the missions are done. we're going to specify what the mission is and then we'll do match pairs -- comparisons of how well each seft pt can perfo their missions the way they choose to. >> thank you. it seems like there's just some different messages coming out of the pentagon. the secretary of defense said it will be replaced squadron by squadron. we're asking questions. i highlighted this to the secretary. we will follow up with him and the chairman. between the air force and the setting of defense, they have two different messages going on. we believe that any movement forward should be conditional. let's have the test. let's get the results of the tests. then let's make a decision afterwards as to whether we're going to be increasing risk to our troops on the ground. i appreciate the time, chairman. thank you, gentlemen. i yield back. >> thank you. this is one of our most important and certainly largest programs. i want to thank each of you for your diligence in trying to

ensure that this program reaches all of the capabilities that are obviously going to be necessary. because of that, before we conclude, knowing your diligence, i want to give each of you an opportunity if you have anything else you want on the record or you want to raise before the committee as we consider this, knowing that your input is incredibly important. if not, i know we have your opening statements. we continue to have your advice and counsel. we appreciate the information you provided to the committee. thank you.

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