external patrons, hardly the hallmark of robust sovereignty. so both from the inside and the outside, these states were as much the appearance as reality. debilitated from the start, expected to meet domestic policy standards that were barely possible even in the most economically developed and well administered states while bereft of all but the most minimal economic assets and elementary institutions and it was unclear what constituents they were supposed to serve. so, they weren't very robust to begin with as you can obviously tell and they over the course of time they failed to meet the standards they set for themselves. they never thrived. never. and they slowly and in the beginning imperceptively began to fail. we now talk a lot about failed states, but failed states don't usually fail instantaneously. they fail over time. what you saw was states that

were being hollowed out. they were failing before it was apparent. but a compensatory world developed. it wasn't -- you don't have failed states and then atomized charge on the landscape. today i'll give you an example, in the country that has one of the strongest states actually in the region, egypt, w well over f the commercial transaction are unrecorded. 7% of adult egyptians have a bank account. and this is not for want of access. mobile phone penetration in egypt is 115%. so there are more mobile phones than are people. but the same people who have mobile phones, smartphones and so forth, don't put their money in banks. so even in a country which, as i say, has a fairly robust state capacity, this is not a country that is managing its own fiscal apparatus, is managing its own

monetary policy. none of that is taking place in any sophisticated way. after decades of, quote, fiscal reform, nontax revenue in egypt is 10% of gdp. a figure that christine lagarde of the imf described delicately last fall as very low for a modern economy like egypt's. so in essence, you have a layer of the appearance of a modern economy like egypt's, and below that, or beside it or around it is a different economy. and as i say, egypt is a fairly robust state. if it has virtually no reliable data on the economic activity of its population, we can hardly expect its counterparts elsewhere in the region to know more than the egyptians know about their own populations. the informal world in the middle east is often called the dark sector or the black market or the gray economy, but it's actually quite variegated and

colorful. their associations of extended families, co-religious, regional and ethnic networks, friends and associates move money around and other goods and services in a constant churn of activity. ideas move, money moves, people move, form, reform, constantly. informal savings associations like egypt's credit unions permit small investors to access credit through networks of friends and family. and sometimes when people talk about the informal economy of any place but in this region, particularly, they behave as if it's only for people who are relatively poor. these credit unions have senior vice presidents of the american university in cairo operating in them. they're not for poor people. they're very everyone. particularly people who are not reliant on the formal banking system. illegal and quasi-legal housing communities and settlements circle all of the major cities of the arab world.

some of them are quite posh. this is not simply the informal slums of the big cities but the gated communities that are developing all around cairo, for example, i think it's fair to call them quasi-legal. health care, childcare, legal assistance, job leads, are all bartered and exchanged among networks of family and friend and neighbor. often cemented by ties of ethnic affiliation of religious conviction. and, again, if that's happening in egypt, it's been happening everywhere as well. as the lebanese sociologist put it years ago, gangs, nepotistic privatizations, trafficking and influence, tolerance of drugs, militia corruption, the so-called formal economy and rackets have all been obstacles to democratization says he. to remain at this level of ethical condemnation is inadequate because the gangs are

the instrument of survival of groups by the states as well as forces maintaining those states. and i will return to this. i think the condemnation, the description of this kind of activity, corruption, therefore, not rising to a level we can actually address systemically has been part of our analytical and, therefore, policy failure. the failure of the states of the region produced and sustained non-state actors all over the place. not simply as political and military challenges to the states, but in the daily lives of nearly everyone who lives there. this is important. what general mattus, who was also a speaker in this series, has called a franchising not state terrorist group, iss is operating in a see of nonstate actors of a whole variety of kinds many of which seem quite benign and are well regarded by their beneficiaries.

how do you make these distinctions in a way that resonates in a region as opposed to just seems about violence? that's an important element but clearly not the only one. i think this, the importance of this -- these kinds of non-state actors, some of which as i say are quite bemain anign and well regarded is visible in the second element of the regional revolution. so i talked about the effort to create, you know, recognizable states. i've talked about the fact that those states virtually from the beginning were designed to fail and that they did in most places. i think there's also something else that is going on in the region that i think is important. the advantage that the monarchs of the gulf, jordan, and morocco enjoy in a world like this, they make no claim to operate any other way. dynastic world, which is so tested by the formal impersonal rules of the modern state, is

entirely consistent with -- in both principle and practice -- the operation of these kinds of informal networks of personal and particularistic ties. that these regimes, particularly the gcc regimes, have adroitly managed the oil revenues of which so many are beneficiaries to strengthen their clienteles within their own countries and across the region, has, of course, contributed to and perhaps accelerated the erosion of the republican states and the nationalist secularist and populist ideologies they e spoused, but it's also permitted them to operate in a way that is consistent with the lived experience of many of the people of the region. an egyptian blogger wrote a piece several years ago about egypt being trapped in the 1980s. it's a lovely piece, exceptionally perceptive about how egyptians sort of stopped paying attention once they got to about 1985 and they thought they were the most modern country in the region. but what it does not do is

discuss how at just the moment when egypt became complacent, the gulf took off. and quickly overtook egypt and as the area within the region, cosmopolitan prosperity and innovation. not only did the egyptians not notice, but frankly, i think a lot of people didn't notice that. both within the region and beyond. but the initiative in the arab world has clearly moved east from egypt. at least for the foreseeable future. and as it did, the authority of the impersonal state in regional politics was further weakened. now, by 2011, popular dissolution and cynicism was expressed in outright opposition to the policies and then the governments and then the regimes and in some places the states of the region. the flash mobs of protests we saw all over the world solidified into guerilla forces and militias into this part of the reged supported by transnational networks of money

and sentiment. in working the networks and challenging the legitimacy of the punitive states, they have challenged notion s of crime an corruption. the ruler of the criminals, the states are corrupt, or natural communities of friends and co-religionists and so forth are, in fact, the uncorrupt, the moral, the way we ought to be behaving. so today there are many challengers and few defenders of the formal welfare states that fail to deliver on their promises nor the state system that stabilizes the region. outside powers including the united states are understandably puzzled about how to contribute to shaping an alternative system. what are the alternativalternat? in the first place, i think we need to think about how much we want to invest in the state as an institution and the particular states in the region. this is an existential reflection on what richard haas projected. if states are not going to be the powerful mechanism by which

we organize global politics and economics, what is? and should we be trying at the end of the era of the state to shore up states? again, i think there are strong bureaucracies. israel, turkey, iran, eegypt, tunis tunisia. they, themselves, are becoming increasely the tools of purposes and not serving the sort of formal -- as the sort of formal impersonal apparatus that can effectively collect taxes, distribute goods and provide services equitably among citizens. iran is already deeply sectarian. the ethnic and religious coloration of turkey's state is becoming more and more apparent. in egypt, competing networks of pourer, saudi supported salifies, a u.s. supported military industrial complex has been jockeying for supremacy. even in israel, the attachment to mid 20th century norms of

secular citizenship is giving away to open expressions of religious and ethnic bias. so clearly even in the strong states, the question of whether these are going to be serving the citizens as opposed to some ethnic, religious, familial purposes is an open one. elsewhere in the vacuums of completely, almost completely failed states, alternatives proliferate. that we have an unpofrished p vocabulary and spent the last century or so condemning them as corrupt does not make them any less powerful. as suggests, we need a way to talk about these particularistic identities and patronage communities that goes beyond condemnation and revoltion. the black economy and gray region cannot remain opaque to

us if we're to play a productive role in improving human life in the middle east. so if i were to give one piece of advice to the next president of any country, including this one, follow the money. get the numbers and insist on the data. find out where things are going. as is repeatedly observed about this part of the world, the data on numbers of people, financial transactions, anything that has a number attached to it is terrible. and that's not coincidental. it's because there are essentially two worlds operating here. but the formal world, the formal economy, the formal numbers, what these governments supply to the world bank and the imf and so forth and so on is a small proportion of what's actually going on. and if we really want to understand how people are living their lives, we need to know much more about the rest of the economy, what's below the water line. so unless we're better at doing

that, in our own track record, the most track record in afghanistan, iraq, and syria, is scandalous on this score. physician heal thy self. so we have to do better on our own terms but we also have to know much better where the military budget of these countries are going. what the remittences are buying. who's funding the gangs, the real estate developers, the sheikhs, the tv networks. who's buying the guns and the drugs and the tickets and the villas and the political leaders. unless we know better, a lot of that, we will never understand the politics. and we should not -- we should not know more about iran's nuclear program than about egypt's military budget. so certain of these kinds of things are just matters of information. the u.s. will have to work with the governments of the established states. tunisia and egypt easily the strongest states in the arab world. turkey, iran, and israel. where struggles over the uses of

the state apparatus continue. in the gulf, the skillful outsourcing of state functions from mill their to economic policymaking, education, and health care has permitted reliance on family to fwgrow an indeed, flourish. these governments may be showing us a future in which the bundle of responsibilities associated with modern state, welfare and development of the people, can be fulfilled in novel ways. maybe you can outsource a lot of the welfare state. because there's little difference between the public treasury and privy purse in dynastic regimes, the call for transparency is both more central and more difficult. privatization is a way of moving things out of the public sector and out of the glare of publicity. so, too, a public sphere in which citizens debate policy is difficult to outsource. and the importance of a realm of open and unfettered debate should not be discounted.

so i think those are the kind of things that within the region, anyone, any outside power, any internal government, will need to be grappling. the apparent paralysis of the great powers or what used to be called the great powers, notably the one we are sitting in, but also europe and in many ways even rush shark is pasia is a r the complexity of the challenges but reflects the impact of the global revolution i was talking about globally. anti-establishment streak that is shaping politics everywhere from athens to madrid to brussels and london and washington, is distracting attention and sapping the confidence of foreign policy establishments everywhere. governments are either beleaguered by political uprisings or, themselves, of an insurgent frame of mind. see the president of russia and at least one of the political parties here. sober modest assessments of national values, vital interests

and national capabilities are disappointing in that context, while inflammatory claims and fear mongering will produce unworkable and dangerous policy. looking over the region the last time, this is my final comment, the last time that globalization was imploding into war about 100 years ago suggests some salutary lessons, not least that outsiders risk getting tangled in local feuds and vendettas in which they'll never be more than tools. this time, however, there seems to be little appetite for taking on the responsibilities of, quote, rendering administrative advice and assistance, on the part of the civilized world, nor probably more importantly, even a clear consensus about what exactly is civilized. it is, indeed, a world at an inflection point. thank you.

>> why don't you sit and we'll have a little conversation then we'll open it up. thank you very much for those very thoughtful and thought-provoking remarks. i think the first question that strikes me is that the shift the gulf states made to sort of modernizing what is keeping personal politics was facilitated by spectacular wealth. what does the advent of scarcity in the middle east with much lower oil prices, probably certainly much lower for the next ten years than they were for the last ten, what does the rise of scarcity mean for the ability to keep the personalization because of a sense that the great thing about bureaucratic politics is they're efficient. or they should be more efficient than personalized. it doesn't have all the extras

given to loyalists. does scarcity change this game? does scarcity just make the game more vicious? how should we think about scarcity in terms of this model to the -- about the rise of personal politics? >> well, i actually -- i think there are two things. first of all, our sense of bureaucracy making things more efficient is not the lived experience of most of us, actually. anybody who's had to renew their driver's license doesn't feel like bureaucracy makes things more efficient anywhere in the world. so i think the lived experience of bureaucracy, yes, you can do a great deal more with a bureaucratic organization, but there are even limits to that. secondly, part of my concern is when you think about the region, you think about scarcity, you're thinking about what's above the water line. you're thinking about what you can see. i am not persuaded yet that

we're really entering that kind of -- so if you -- egypt is a country where scarcity is the watch word, and it's been on the verge of collapse since 2011 and, you know, every quarter everyone says it's run out of everything. it doesn't live that way. it doesn't -- the experience of being able to, you know, continue the staggering building that's going on in the suburbs of cairo and so forth and so on, it doesn't stop. so i'm not sure that we fully understand how the formal economy is connected to the informal economy. so, presumably the element that is the formal economy of, you know, distribution of oil reven revenues, will be reshaped. but since so much of that is siphoned into -- has always been siphoned into an informal economy whose traces we don't

follow very effectively, i'm not sure it's going to feel as scarce as it's going to look on paper, on the one hand, and secondly, i have no idea how actually the choices will be made when they're -- should they have to be made, that i'm going to have to cut out some of my compliant clients because i can't afford it. so i'm simply not as convinced that as, you know, people always say, well, once you have fiscal austerity, then you're going to have to straighten up and fly right and you can't waste a lot of money and so forth. i'm not convinced that we're confronting that. >> and one of the things that you feel is also happening is the decline of the state after a century of not only the rise of the state but also the spectacular relevance of modern states where they hadn't existed

before as, you know, the only borders that have changed in the middle east in the last hundred years have been israel/palestine and the two yemens united. >> now the saudis have gotten their two islands back from egypt. >> they never lost those. these states have proven remarkably not only durable, but there's no near peer competitor even with the rise of all these other institutions and from the perspective of united states government, the european union, china, they only have gears to interface with other governments. there's something about the external environment which seeks states to interface with. does that create a lifeline for the state? does it mean that all the states just decline together and

non-state actors across the world become more powerful? or is there something where non-state actors in the middle east are already on the weak side? does this give the states a new lease on life? >> no, i actually -- i think you're right. as with sub-saharan africa, there was in essence an agreement saying since it would be such a catastrophe if we really fauought over all of our borders, we're not going to fight over our borders, and moreover, it is easier for the rest of the world to, you know, have an interlocker that it recognizes and that's the presidential palace of a country and a member of the united nations and so there's a kind of international consensus that this is the way we're going to operate. the difficulty with that is it stays at this level of appearances, if you wills, and most of these countries, i world argue this is not unique to the middle east, if you look at sub-saharan africa, you have something of the same sort of patterns that they are sitting on the top of societies that

have very loosely linked to that system. so either the parts of the world, europe, the united states, so forth that are much more invested in the state system figure out a way to force that connection of the states and their populations in the region and elsewhere, or more likely even in the countries that were the origin of the international state system, that will begin. and this is haas' argument. basically it doesn't matter what we want to do. corporations are going to be more important. international ngos are going to be more important. t you're quite right, we have very limited mechanisms for interactions at other of those scales. the state system, international

law, the united nations, so forth, so on, we understand how that works. we understand how you give foreign aid from one country to another country and how the military regimes ought to intersec wi intersect with each other and so forth. as we struggle even now with this business about corporations moving headquarters to avoid taxes and so forth and so on, it's slipping out from under control even in the parts of the world in which you would expect there would be a fairly strong capacity to monitor and control and so forth. so i don't know that there's going to be a great -- and this is what i was suggesting before. i mean, this is part of the real puzzle. this is not an easy time to try to figure out how to make policy in general. but to say, well, we should shore up the states in the region. at a time when the other end of the spectrum, they're beginning to shred doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. on the other hand, since you don't know what a stable

equilibrium will be, you're, you know, either confronted with saying we're going to deal with non-state actors even though we don't really know how to do that or we're going to continue to deal with states because it's the only thing we know what to do. you know, so this is the tool i have, so i have a hammer, everything has to be nails. >> right. it sounds from your presentation like you think the foreign corrupt practices act is a nice idea, but probably not well tuned to the world in which we live. is that an accurate extension of the argument? >> yeah. >> so we should just -- that shouldn't be where we're focusing energy? >> well, i do think that, you know, it is a complicated challenge to be thinking about what we want our own domestic rule of law to look like. and acknowledge that there are whole worlds in which that's,

you know, that's not going to -- just not the lens through which people look at things. so i do think that, you know, the issue -- i mean, there is a growing smallish political science literature now on the growth of pat ramoramonial stan even in the united states. many of the wealthiest people in this country are families in a way that wasn't true 50 years ago, so forth and so on. so it may be even here you're beginning to see digfferent standards and criteria for how people are permitted to operate. i would be reluctant to say we're abandoning our own legal standards simply because it would be easier if we did because that's always the rationale for abandoning legal standards. on the other hand, i think we do need to be alert to the fact

that these kinds of standards are how we interact with each other in this country and beyond are changing. so whereas 50 or 60 years ago, nepotism was something that we simply thought was unacceptable in the united states, that's no longer as unacceptable as it once was. >> and in terms of how we approach the world, we approach the world first as missionaries. we have been investing in civil society around the world. should we stop? should we do it in digit wffere ways? should we be more targeted? how should we think about the project investing in societies that work more, not only like us, but more the way we think we should, ourselves, work, even if we're not working that way all the time. >> well, i do -- i think you put your finger on a challenge that is a reflection of the fact of how little we know. so as i was saying, we don't have data, we don't have -- you know, so we go in and we'll say,

i mean, it was everybody who went in to libya the first couple of years after gadhafi fell and were incredibly optimistic about they were going to create these little civil society organizations and so forth and so on were simply taking, you know, the instruction manual for something that would have happened in new york and take it to tripoli. and they weren't really listening or attending to how people in libya have come accustom to living which doesn't mean people in libya want to continue to live that way, but it's where they're starting. they're not starting where you start on the upper west side of manhattan. they're starting from a different lived experience. so to take the instruction manual without listing was a mistake. so i think we need to know more about how people live and some of that is simply listening and some of it is collecting better data and knowing more about how

money moves around and the kind of things i was talking about before. but i do think if you go and say, and honestly, it was something that many people remarked on during the period of elections after the beginning of the arab spring. the extent to which people came with just, you know, instruction manuals of how to run elections and so forth and so on that they seem to believe would work anywhere. and that's what i mean. they sort of thought, oh, we know latin america, we know eastern europe, we know what happened. there was a very, very well known political scientist who will remain nameless who came to egypt, had never been to egypt before. >> i won't name him either. >> and gave us a list of 18 points to give to the government of egypt so that the transition would work well. >> so there are two issues. one is doing it the right way and the other is whether we

should be doing it at all. should we be trying to move countries toward having a model that we see more compatible, should we be investing in it? when we differ with governments, should that color our relations? i mean, this comes up not only in egypt but around the region. >> right. well, i do think that there's a, you know, so on the one hand, you're talking about government-to-government relations in the expectation that these governments are in some way in control of the states that they're punitive governments of. and i do think that that's a level at which until there are other kinds of non-state institutions that we recognize and understand, we're going to have to be operating at. but i think that can be fairly modest and fairly restrained.

that's the level at which you cap operate as, if you will, national interest level. there are lots of other things that happen in the region including if i can put it this way, university relationships and connections and so forth and so on that don't have to be driven by national interests, don't have to be understood in terms of national interests. but if you're so inclined can certainly contribute to the wellbeing of people. so my view is that it doesn't all have to be -- i mean, i don't think you have to say, okay, we're going to be isolationists and we don't really care because we think it's beyond our writ to be concerned about the wellbeing of anybody. i think you can say there are other levels of interactions of peoples which, again, so it's a little like pan dodora's box. if you look at the list of things richard haas, a little bit of hope has to be released as well. so that kind of thing of being able to say, yes, i think

education is a great idea, certain kinds of skills are a good idea. so forth. that should just be going. it doesn't need, you know -- so that can be driven by businesses that want to incubate small businesses. that can be driven by various kinds of investments. that can be driven by, you know, accusations of -- i don't care how you do that. that doesn't need to be at the official level. so the official level could be fairly modest in saying we only deal on things that are of national interest but we also understand that globalization is going to bring a whole pllot of other kinds of relationships. we want to keep people safe, beyond that it's up to them. >> when governments say don't talk to these people, should we -- >> ignore them. >> ignore them. okay. i turn it over to you. we have microphones, so if you'd please wait for a microphone. identify yourself. ask just one question until we have a chance. i see all the way in the back. that's you.

thank you. >> hi, i'm bill. thank you, lisa, welcome here. i think everybody has their list of three revolutionary elements and your first two i think were very pertinent. i was surprised on the third that you didn't mention anything about transnational religious zealotry as a new -- or a striking phenomenon of this era, and in fact, you went back and talked about states instead. do you think that's less important or not particularly striking at this time? >> i think i -- well, new york i thi no, when i think i say there are these networks of relationships that are not state. include religious groups, include family groups, include communities in which we can affiliate ourselves so i intended to encompass that as

well. i don't know that i think that this is entirely new. as somebody who studied, for example, the sanasia in the 19th century, large transnational religious groups were all over the region for, you know, centuries and centuries. how they interact given the fact that there's more money sloshing around than there was in the 19th century sahara and given the fact they are also having to intersect with states which are presumably trying to inhibit or enhance their capacity to be transnational, that's new. but the impulse to be transnational is not new. >> gentleman on the right. >> hi. i'm from the wilson center. i'm wondering whether we should rethink promotie ining democracd i'm thinking -- iraq's a perfect

example. political parties, when you -- democracy, you got to have political parties. political parties in the middle east, you know, look at iraq. they're all shiites, sunni, kurdish, you name it. in fact, democracy revives these very traditional forces you're talking about. and so my question is, has democracy promotion actually been part of the problem and we should stop doing it? >> i don't know if it's been part of the problem. i think it's been ineffective and i think after a certain point, you should stop doing things that don't work. what i would regret, however, is encompassing in abandoning democracy promotion which i, as i say, i don't think it's worked so i don't think there's much value in continuing to do it.

but what i would be sorry to see is saying we actually don't care about people's wellbeing. but wellbeing, you know, accountable government, access to certain kinds of services, access to education and information, so forth and so on, we need to be paying less attention to the formal institutions and more attention to the substance that they're supposed to serve. and if those particular substantive ends can be served in a variety of ways, that's what we really care about. at least that's what i would really care about. >> lady right there. >> thanks so much for the very interesting presentation. allison mcmanis. i think your point is very well taken about the recession of states in the global era. however, i guess i'm thinking about laws and legal institutions as still being very

much state based and particularly really law enforcement. the case of egypt, you know, if we're talking about these transnational global networks, maybe not listening to the state and rather supporting civil society, for instance, directly, while as we know right now civil societies are sort of criminalized as it works with foreign entities. how do we think about transnational global networks i guess while law's still state based? >> excellent way of framing the problem, actually, because i don't think, you know -- over the course of your lifetime, probably, you will see legal reform in order to accommodate the mobility of everything. ideas, people, money. all the things that haas and everybody talks about. right now, we're not there. we're not there in very simple

terms. in commercial terms. now, much less these other kinds of ideas. so you're right, we're caught at a moment where we know that there has to be some kind of legal regime for access to information globally. there's going to have to be. you can't do that state by state. it doesn't make any sense. at the same time, there is no such regime and whatte esfforts there are at this point are certainly not well integrated and accepted and so forth. so you do run into the problem of saying, so this is the problem of if the government says you shouldn't talk to them, you do anyway, and then you're going to get in trouble because that's the legal regime you're living in. so i understand that. i still think that it makes sense to try and be thinking about this in a way that does acknowledge that there are these kinds of relationships in

networks and so forth, that there are, you know, conceivably ways to put your thumb on the scale of supporting people's aspirations which aren't necessarily the sort of cliche democracy promotion, so forth. and, you know, but you're right, it's a particularly challenging moment to figure out how to do that. and i think you see that all over the world. this is, again, this is not -- you know, we care about the middle east but you see it all over the world. kind of how to support some of the protest movements in other parts of the world in a way that's effective has proven to be a challenge. >> yeah. with wilson center. one, there is no doubt that the

number of failed -- very large number of states failed since the 9'90s. we have yugoslavia, the soviet union, itself. the result of all this, the states failing, the states have multiplied. it's not that states have become less important. it's just that we have different states come to the surface. and this is what's happening in the -- in the middle east now. in the levant. i don't think isis is going to last as a territorial state, but i think probably we are going to have not one, but two kurdish states that are probably not going to disappear. so what i'm getting at is that we do not seem to be capable at this point to go beyond the concept of the state as a way of organizing human societies essentially. all these organizations that you talk about do exist, but we

still seem to hang on, collectively, to this concept of the state. you care to, you know, to -- >> i think in a way, yes, of course, but the expectation -- so at the global level, if you look at this as, you know, as an international relations exercise, yes, of course, states are the coin. i mean, there isn't any other way that -- there's a little bit of the international financial institutions. there's a little bit of the world trade -- you know, so forth. but basically it's state-based interactions. so if you have a piece of territory, somebody has to have planted a flag. there's no other way that we can think about it. and that will presumably obtain for some time and in territorial terms, it may be that somebody has to be assigned responsibility for a given territory forever at this point. that's not the same thing as saying that the way these

entities operate internally is recognizable from the perspective of the people who established an international community of states in the united nations. so if you look at central asia, yes, of course, there are the central asian republics and they are members of the united nations and so forth, but the way they're operating internally is not the way the soviet union operated. they're not small versions of the soviet state. they are patrimonial system, operate much more like the nonstate actors i was talking about. they just happen to have captured a state. so some of our non-state actors are non-state actors. some of them are no-state actors that are operating officially as the representatives of states. that's perfectly fine. but that's not the same -- so i think what we need is a vocabulary and conceptual

apparatus to say there is a state, it can operate as a european-style bureaucratic state with a rule of law and so forth and so on, then we have these states that are actually captured by non-state actors but because of the language we use, that almost doesn't make any sense. >> backs to tribes with flags? >> we're back to tribes with flags. >> on that note, i'm afraid we're going to have to cut things off. i want to thank president anderson for her presentation. thank you for coming. we look forward to seeing you.

and senator bernie sanders holds a rally in salem, oregon, which also holds its primary on tuesday. live coverage on c-span begins at 10:00 p.m. eastern. on american history tv on c-span3 -- >> there has never been a full public accounting of fbi domestic intelligence operations. therefore, this committee has undertaken such an investigation. >> on "real america," the 1975 church committee hearings convened to investigate the intelligence activities of the cia, fbi, irs, and the nsa.

saturday night at 10:00 p.m. eastern. the commission questions committee staffers frederick schwartz and kurt smothers. detailing fbi abuses including attempted intimidation of martin luther king jr. >> king, there's only one thing left to do, you know what it is, you have 34 days in which to do it. it has definite practical significance. it was 34 days before the award. you are done. >> then associate fbi director james adams admits to some of the excesses while defending a number of other fbi practices. then at 8:00 on "lectures in history" -- >> the rest of us may in a bad life see a death or two. they see hundreds. and so they're the first to sort of see patterns or shifts in how people are going out of the world. so they are the ones who sounds the alarm. >> university of georgia professor steven barry on the role of a coroner and how they

shed light on the emerging patterns of death within a society and spot potential threats to public health. sunday evening at 6:30, secretary of state john kerry who served in the vietnam war and later became a vocal opponent of the war, shares his views on vietnam at the lyndonb. johnson presidential library in austin, texas. >> our veterans did not receive the welcome home nor the benefits nor the treatment they not only deserve but needed. and the fundamental contract between soldier and government simply was not honored. >> then at 8:00, on "the presidency" -- >> one other person sitting at home watching tv watched reagan deliver the speech. it was dwight eisenhower. he immediately called his former attorney general and said, what a fine speech ronald reagan had just delivered. he then called a former special assistant and said, what an

excellent speech ronald reagan had delivered. dwight eisenhower wrote back a multi-step political plan for romd reagan to follow. ronald would end up following eisenhower's advice to the letter. >> author gene cope lson examined dwight d. eisenhower's behind the scenes mentoring of ronald reagan and pivotal role the former president played in reagan's political evolution in the 1960s. for the complete american history tv special, go to c-span.org. book tv has 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors every weekend and here are some programs to watch for this weekend. on saturday at 10:00 p.m. eastern on "afterwards" don watkins author of "equal is unfair." >> what we're concerned with is not how much money do you have but how did you get it? did you get it through something that was fair or did you get it through a process that was unfair? and when you try to equal iize

people who earn their money honestly, that's something we're challenging saying that's not a their way to treat people. >> he says the american dream is threatened not by income inequality but limiting success. sunday afternoon at 4:30, pete hegseth, iraq and afghanistan war veteran and former ceo of vets for freedom, he talks about theodore roosevelt's citizenship in a republic address and offers his revisions for americans today. >> this book is not about me. it's not about roosevelt or litigating where he is on the political spectrum. it is a call to action. to me meant to inspire, motivate and remind americans of every generation what makes america special and it is worth fighting for and some of us carried a rifle and many in this generation still do, but you don't have to carry a rifle to be in the arena. it's our job to instill in every generation the principles that perpetuate what is, as you all know, an experiment, an

experiment in human freedom. >> then at 10:00 p.m. eastern, erin mchugh and her book "political suicide." >> what should be a series of thoughtful activity on which the future of the country rests is instead filled with budgetary tightrope routines, sparkly partisan costumes, ethical disappearing acts and most certainly clowns. instead it becomes three rings of horror. we're sofa teague e so fatigued we're often exhausted by our anyone legislators before they had a start their jobs. >> she accounts memorable political missteps in american history. go to booktv.org for the complete weekend schedule. senator mike lee paid tribute to fellow utah republican former senator bob bennett who died last week. senator lee defeated the three-term incumbent senator bennett at the utah gop convention in 2010.

>> mr. president, senator from utah. >> mr. president, i rise today to pay tribute to a man who was truly a giant in my home state of utah. and in this institution and the united states senate. he was a friend to everyone he met. and someone whose life of service to the people of utah we celebrate. at the same time, we mourn his passing. senator robert f. bennet. senator bennett loved the political arena. his heart was always with his family in utah, he spent many years working on capitol hill in both the senate and the house. and later, as a congressional liason for the department of transportation. he also spent many years in business. where his management abilities and his keen mind helped build a successful corporation. and earn him awards such as inc. magazine's entrepreneur of the year. but senator bennets true passion

was for sound public policy. for the development of good policy. he cared little about who wrote policy. and he cared even less for who would get the credit for good policy. so long as wise policies were enacted in law, he was happy. that was his objective. and it was a noble one at that. this was apparent to me after a memorable conversation i had with him in 2010. just about six years ago, just a few days before our states republican nominating convention, at which we were both candidates, i was in the lobby of a local radio and television station waiting to go on the air and watching the national news on a large television screen. and i don't remember the exact issue that was being discussed, but i remember the general topic and i will never forget what happened as i watched this broadcast. senator bennet walked into the lobby and seeing me, simply

strolled over to stand next to me. to be honest, i was anticipating the type of understandably awkward reaction that might occur between candidates near the end of a heated political contest. instead with his character and charm he quickly put me at ease by nodding toward the screen and saying rather diplomatically, there is a pretty good chance that you may be the person who has to deal with this issue. having gracefully diffuse the the situation and any tension that might have otherwise been between us at that moment, he shared personal wisdom and insights imparting to me the lessons he learned on his own experience on that matter. it was clear to me had not only thought long and hard about it, but that he was ultimately less concerned with who addressed the issue. less concerned with who would get the credit for fixing the

problem. and more concerned that ensuring tra the problem was dealt with thoughtfully, wisely and in a manner most likely to result in a good outcome for the american people. in senator bennet's view, there was no such thing as a political opponent. there were only potential political allies. though senator bennet was a serious statesman, he was one who did not take himself too seriously. this is one of the many reasons why people were drawn to him. some remember his flare for self deprecating humor em blazed on his campaign billboards in 2004. summarizing his most distinctive qualities, one billboard read -- bold, brilliant, bean pole. in a slight variation on that same theme, another one read,

big heart, big ideas, big ears. and perhaps everyone's favorite, declared better looking than abraham lincoln, adding parenthetically, just barely. in the political arena where inflated egos loom large, bob bennet was a breath of fresh air. his command of policy was lentil endary. he could speak at length on anything from the federal budget to the utah changing demographics to business trends and he could do so never with any notes. she was a master storyteller, one with the uncanny ability to entertain and challenge his audience at the same time. the result of a lifetime of learning and profound thinking. he always maintained an open mind. never unwilling to rethink policy issues in light of new information. these qualities are butt a f a f

the reasons he was a trusted colleague and he was trusted by colleagues on both sides of the aisle in this chamber. though much has been written about his public and his political accomplishments, there was a side to him that does not receive the attention that it probably deserves. a day in the life of a u.s. senator is often stressful. and invariably unpredictable. the likelihood of error is high and as one of his staffers once told me, there were plenty of times that scheduling mistakes were made and anger at us, the staff, certainly would have been justified. but these same staffers, also said that in 18 years in the united states senate they never saw bob bennet get angry, or even so much as raise his voice at any of his staff members. he was always kind, patient and

understanding with them. and they were committed and loyal to him in return. i'm convinced that one of the reason so many members of the senate trusted bob bennet so completely is because they saw how his own staff treated him and how he returned that trust. i've been the beneficiary of the staff that he built. some of my best staffers were those i hired on from senator bennet's office who not only helped me get my office up and running but have helped to keep it running efficiently and effectively as the trained professionals that they were, having been mentored by one of the greats of this institution. senator bennet was a man of the utmost integrity and was the same calm, deliberate and tho t thoughtful personal speaking in public or to close confidants. at 6'6" he towered over most

people but that didn't mean not meeting people where they were and treating everyone with respect and exhibiting true understanding and true compassion with all with whom he interacted. whether he was talking with ranches in iron county or consoling a grieving parent visiting him in a salt lake cityoit or debating during a banking hear, he treated everybody the same, with kindness and respect and concern. he often quoted president reagan that there is no limit to what a man can do or where he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. but senator bennet didn't just recite those words. he lived them. they were part of who he was. of what he did. on more than one occasion, he worked for months on end to craft legislative solution to a difficult issue to discover at the last moment that the price of the passage could be to give

the credit to someone else. because his objective was first and foremost to make sure the right thing was done, this is a price that senator bennet was always willing to pay. this was an obstacle from which he never shied away. this was something that never deterred him from doing the right thing. since the election of 2010, i've been asking countless times about my relationship with senator bennet. my answer invariably reminds me of the great privilege it is to serve the state of utah in his seat. our conversations were always meaningful. and focused on innovative approaches to dealing with difficult and important policy issues. a consumate statesman and a classic gentleman. he always made clear to me that good policy is always good politics in the end. senator bennet's achievements were numerous and he'll be remembered for his tremendous impact on the state of utah.

however, i'm certain that if he were to make a list of his greatest accomplishments, it would likely say nothing about his business, successes, or his political endeavors. rather, it would focus entirely on his family, on his dear wife joyce, the six children they raised together and on their 20 grandchildren. mr. president, senator bennet truly was in every way a giant. he was a man of integrity, a man whose word was truly his bond. a man who left both the state of utah and his country better than he found them. he was a man who had a firm and unwavering commitment to his faith in god and was true to that faith until the very end. it is my hope and prayer that senator bennet's wife joyce and his children and his grandchildren are comforted at

this difficult time. knowing that our state and our country are forever grateful for their husband, father, and grandfather's exemplary life of service. thank you, mr. president. i yield the floor. madam secretary, we proudly give 72 of our delegate votes to the next president of the united states --

up next on c-span 3, a senate panel looks at the latest dyslexia research. then a conversation on how to regulate what shared over connected computer networks. later, a discussion on the role history and policies of the federal reserve, which was created in 1913. c-span washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up on wednesday morning, oklahoma republican congressman tom cole joins us to discuss this week's meeting between speaker paul ryan and donald trump. he'll also talk about disaster relief in the wake of deadly storms in his state. and then new york democratic congressman gregory meeks will be on to talk about issues before the financial services and foreign affairs committees. congressman meeks sits on both committees and discuss the