all right, thank you everyone for coming back. i want to thank so much for those moving and important remarks that remind us all why we are here and why we do the work that we do. for the spread and the use of nuclear weapons. and it is a reminder that we have all been at this past for a long, long time. more than seven decades of the united states under a republican and democratic administrations alike have actively discouraged allies and folks seeking nuclearnuclear weapons. this effort have been says full a successful. >> some 73% of republicans and

63% of democrats preventing the spread of weapons as a top u.s. foreign policy. it is something that i hope the presidential candidates can keep in the forefront of their mind that this is something that all americans sternly read about. today, there are nine states on nuclear weapons and five recognized under the treaty and four others are not with nuclear weapons outside. that's far too many. but, with the conclusion of the 2015, plan of action otherwise known as the iran nuclear deal which verifies that a lot of irans half way to the bombs for well over a decade, i would say a low probability. the dangerous post and nuclear build ups are still very much

with us. a lot of work yet to be done and to discuss some of the top challenges that we face today that'll test the leadership of the next occupant of the white house. we have four excellent speakers. we are going to share their perspectives. different but interrelated nuclear weapons. first, we'll hear from colby dalton who's a codirector here. he's going to talk about the issues involving nuclear armed rivals in pakistan which continue to expand their own nuclear arsenals. we'll keep in mind that another cross board attack involving these two states, if they could trigger the nuclear conflict. next, we'll hear from doctor

zim. he's also codepartment chair of the national panel. he looks at the challenges posed by weapons used. he's also a member of our board director of the association. he will address this of nuclear weapon usage of materials. it is a challenge that continues after the very important series of nuclear summit that included earlier this year. as we all know, north korea, posted an enormous nuclear challenge. the former senior u.s. negotiator with north korea is the founder of the useful and important and lively 38 north websites. he's going to provide us with

his perspective on what candidate must be done with respect on curving the north korean nuclear and missile threat. last but not least, we have with us, susan burke. we'll share her perspective on what must be done to maintain the health and the credibility of the corner stone. >> and, we just heard in the previous session, a little discussion about one of the more dynamics base that's going on and surrounding the treaty and the open ended working on further measures to read more about those developments.

susan of 2009 and 2012 of meeting of a successful effort. with those introductions, i am going to turn it over to colby dalton. each of them is going to speak for several minutes and we'll take your questions for the panelists. colby, the floor is yours. >> thanks very much daryl. >> it is a real pleasure for me to be here. i didn't haves to travel very far. about one floor down. it is a long time admirer of this association. it is great to have a chance to be with you today. i should also say that, i feel like what i am going to say after the remarks to be heard a few minutes ago seems like a real distraction. it is interesting and important to think about these things of the abstract.

these are incredibly dangerous things and spaces. we need to continue to think about and work on these issues so that nuclear weapons are not used again. a i want to focus my remarks on what's happening in south asia over the last 20 years and what it means for the next administration. >> and it is remarkable that we just passed the 18th anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests by india and pakistan. it is gone quickly and yet a lot of it has changed. you think of the priorities you have had since those tests and first you are trying to make sure that you are immediately following the test and conflicts and prices and concerns. we had network and serial

preparations. more recently, we had issues of nuclear security and concerns of nuclear terrorism and in the meantime, the success of government is not here and the success of administration trying to mainstream india into an operation regime. still, we have these periodic crisis between the states. it seems like that issue is the one that can always bring us back to real concerns. i would argue that as we look at the arms competition that's shaping up in the region, it argues for focusing our priorities a little bit more narrowing. as we look at the region, there are periodic observables of the competition. there are major aassumptissumptt we have to make.

you can see a diverse and vehicles willing to changes and alert levels and then resulting in command of control challenges. we see that certainly in pakistan with development now of short range and a lot of fuel and shifts and strategies to associate with those capabilities. you see it in india with longer range and missiles and now development of weapons and submarines at sea. china is apart of this region

too, relationship between china and india. the u.s. is somehow part of chi china's -- authorities that we have been developing over the last few years. how much of this is a competition verses a series of parallel development or te technological enertia, i think you see some action or reactions that's happening continued to embrace or tolerance of groups in pakistan that attack india periodically which could be a flash point of crisis. the most recent attack is in january on an indian territory base. that's between two governments trying to untangle that. that's a pattern.

india has start to develop more rapid agile conventional military capables trying to punish pakistan continuing to tolerate these groups. that's provided to push justifications for pakistan. similarly of pakistan and the u.s u.s./nuclear deal and spill over effects of development of triads and missiles. these are long standing and they don't seem to have an impact on china just yet. it remains unclear and in the meantime, you have active chinese assistance of pakistan and energy program. but, history also assistance of

clear weapons. indications, first, the security competition exacerbates the existing problems primarily of pakistan relationship. india has a debate sometimes active and sometimes less so about how it should evolve its way of thinking to address the change of environment. focus on shipping from retaliation to repunitive retaliation. pakistan seems to be moving towards a riskier posture and certainly a point of view that includes weapons out on the field and raises significant concerns as well as crisis and instabilities and pressures to use or lose on local commanders.

the next administration will inherit problems that previous administration has not. the primary chanllenges are goig to be continued on security. i would argue on a crisi crisis -- given there is significant chances of nuclear weapons. certainly a lot of administrations involved and several occasions that pakistan has taken in that regard. i think there are more questions than less focus. if you look at how security competition may affect nuclear security of more weapons and greater number of materials and more transportation of these things, those exacerbate the weak links. prices escalation is very difficult problems that you get in front of.

most of the u.s. efforts have been reactive. again, technology added materials and capabilities will make future crisis likely to speed up and making it harder. i take that is part of the reason why we deserve higher priority. there is a tension between these two challenges of security focusing on prices and installations. if you are criticizing countries of what they are feeling. they're less likely to give you the kind of cooperations or opening facilities or building the kind of relationships that would fill state better nuclear practices. how do you stop tendency in

terms of the build up that we are seeing capabilities. it is hard to do that in a cooperative way and measures seem to have greater likelihood. >> figuring out how to resolve tensions between those priorities are significant. >> with that said, i have to say our policy structure has not really allowed the government of the administration to address the security competition -- this is a long standing problem. so as i think of recommendations, the first one i would say is not sexy but necessarily you have to fix poli policy structure that allowing us thinking of this problem in a coherent way. you have a disaggregation of

india and pakistan and responsibilities. there is no process allows for coherence to come to this issue. secondly, i think as the strategic and economic dialogue is happening with china this week. it is important to think about how china's interest in this region are evolving as well. what rule does china seek? it has a major investment in pakistan right now of $40 billion plus investments. that exposes china to risk in ways that it has not been exposed recently in south asia. it may be able to assert more active roles in the future or weighs more heavily in the pakistan side. should there be other crisis. it is important to press that issue for our understanding with

china. >> i think india has had a free pass on nuclear security for quite a long time. i think it is time for it to end. fourth, on prices escalation, there needs to be focus on clarity. i think with the sequence of events that have unfolded after the january attack of militants in india, you have seen steps trying to share intelligence to cooperate in the investigation to try to build confidence. that's something that should be encouraged and making it possible of facilitated that would allow the process to stop

the crisis or at least arrest the momentum. lastly, an issue that near and dear to my heart. there is been an assumption that seems like over the last 20 years that is taking hold that somehow what's happening in india's nuclear program is more benigh than pakistan. it is taboo and manifesting to the news conference that's given to every nuclear test. this is a little bit of a dangerous tendency. it allows this evolution to take place in ways that don't force us to think about the consequences. we need to find other ways to encourage strengths in the region and not just by india force but also by pakistan. on a few point that we have now of the interests of this state

and signing up to suppliers. i got an issue that the obama administration in terms of indian membership of phone calls, high level officials and other states, but i think it will be better to build al consensus and raises the bar and that we can use the interest of both to encourage the strength. so, with those five suggestions, i hope i will pass it. >> great, thank you very much, toby. we'll turn now. thank you very much for being here. >> thank you, i was asked to talk about the defense materials as part of the challenges for the next president but as i am

sure all of you know at least one of the candidates does not think this proliferation is a problem. so it is harder to think about how to phrase the remarks in a way that captures meaningful set of accomplishments for who ever that take charge next. let me start by making one observation about one lesson that we can learn from the last eight years. that's the last 16 years of nuclear proliferation, policies in the united states. that's if the next president who ever it is, is going to be serious about the material part and challenge in terms of proliferation. we have to get past what is being -- by this, i mean these

some what is a grandiose statement that charactered the bush's administration and the obama administration. >> the most obvious of this is the suggestion that goes back to the bush administration. what they said was the goal to securing all vulnerablevulnerab. many, many years and no mess of political attention, not into this and especially of the obama administration of the nuclear summit that we have seen being in washington. and, what has to be candid in terms of the materials problem in the world. we are talking about not only the tip of the iceberg. we are talking about a snow flake that sits on top of the tip of the iceberg. you know to think that starting

in 2010, we have 50 plus world leaders gathering every two years to talk about this. a lot of prs and all that is coming out is in actual material attempts. not the pr terms but promis promises -- actual material terms and dealing materials. it was such a profound threat. president obama told us what is being achieved. he said in 2010 or 2016, he said, i quote, "we removed all the high security and ukrai ukraine -- more than 3.8 tons which is more than enough to create 150 nuclear weapons." >> wow, the best estimate including the one that president obama mentioned in his speech.

this is 0.2%. 50 president and prime ministers and we have addressed .2% of the problem. >> that's only if you are looking at what's being secured or eliminated. the country we are still producing physical materials and weapons in 2010 are still doing it. that's israel and pakistan and india and north korea. all the other nuclear weapons have struck along before us. oh, with secured .2%, we'll stop -- they continue to do it. what comes from that is that overwhelming policy choices that have been made especially by the united states have actually

pushed things in exactly the opposite direction. securing mostly materials and civilian facilities. it is the stuff that's most accounted for and most wanted already. it is stuff is that should have been the focus. the large share of materials that is held by nuclear weapons. it is unaccounted for and undeclared. i hope that physical materials in the world is -- of the cold war and there is been an amazing reluctant to begin to address this problem. so the first thing for the next

president is of fiscal materials is to decide never mind chasing small amounts of kilograms quantities that by themselves cannot -- but, actually dealing with a ton and hundreds of tons of quantities that are directly under the u.s. are on its control of its direct and close allies. then we can worry about other materials. let me give you two things. first is that -- united states now has enough materials set aside for weapons that's twice as large as the total amount needed for all operational war heads of the united states. all thousand plus operational war heads. united states has materials set

aside for 10,000. that's not including the stuff that's already declaring access and everything else. the first question is why is there such a large over hang of materials that's not going to be used in reference if somebody has a plan some where to double the size of the arsenal ones. in the past, the united states declared it to the military. a long time ago. the last time the united states declared excessed -- i was five. at that time, united states had 8,000 operational work. now, it has 4,000. >> it still has all that it did back in 2005. the first thing is why not reduce the stockpile and set aside weapons and reflect the reduction in the operational

research. it is the fact that when the united states did declare missile materials, okay, we are going to dilute this stuff and turn it into outlets. it is been in a rate of a couple of tons for the year. there is 40 tons left. according to the department of public energy until 2030 to finish down lending itself. the russians were down lending of a rate of 10 times of the united states when they were down. oh, why cannot the united states just hurry up and down letting the stuff that's already there rather deciding it is going to take them another 15 years. that's the question of priorities. priority is one kilogram of of

hydro -- in jamaica and not the 40 tons. material terms when you follow materials and account for materials and taking responsibility for the materials, the focus is really -- in the wrong place. perhaps, nowhere more so than with it. everybody in this room is familiar with if it was so tragic -- multi billion dollar plant that's never going to be built or consumed in no amount of political efforts and energy and count less studies to dispose the 34 tons. we are supposed to have, have to have a grip with this.

now, it looks like it is not going to go anywhere and the russians are about to begin getting rid of their share of their 54 tons. if we are going to deal with this, declaring access, the question is, this term process to continue. all we can think about what can you do concretely now to show good faith and actually moving this process forward. there is been concrete suggestions of how to deal with this. it will be good to see the next administration prioritize urgencies. it is not enough to just say we are going to do this one day or o some day but to say that this is the highest that we have been

dealing with and disposing them as quickly. the easiest thing is it is there if you are interested in the red team report of positions of 2015. look, we can either -- it is going to be too expensive and takes too long so lets stop. what we can do is the strategy of diluting exposing it and repositor repositor repository. there is even faster way d sterilizing it and this will be done in institutes -- prepare them for disposalable. and so one quick way and

beginning to show this will never go back to weapons is spee speedy way. you should think about it if the united states willing to show its dealing with material legacies more seriously, i have geneva talks -- and, are dealing with the materials of stockpiles and other countries. the largest problem in terms of materials is not the small stockpile in india or north korea or even china. real stockpile problems that we face and the cold war held in the united states and russia, the fastest stockpiles that's related to britain and france

and japan. japan has ten tons of plutonium in japan. >> ten tons of polamalutonium - you decided we'll go after it regardless of where we are, we begin to have a different geography of what the problem is. the question is how do we then work with britain and france and japan. we are all close to its allies so say given between us, we have hundreds of tons, what are we going to do to get rid of it? it is dispose as quickly as possible and proliferation. so i think that the next administration is going to take materials perspective to think about this rather than the old

school perspective way. regardless of the fact that they may have materials and are so small is insignificant in terms of what we have to deal with, just to give you one positive and i will stop. when the united states declared its stockpile of highly enriched polamalu condomini plutonium, it was materials we did not account for, or if they made it in the first place because nobody was responsible to the accurate count from the beginning. there is something like three tons of plutonium. >> in terms of nuclear weapons, there are several tons -- these

multiple ton quantities that the united states counts for are in comparison of what the russians count for. yet, no one is taking it seriously of this question and going to the russians and say why don't we try to account for our materials together and you help us figure out where else and we'll help you figure out where your stuff went and at the end, it does not necessarily expose security but it will start to get a better understanding of the world in the last 70 years. but, these amounts that are unclear and unaccounted for is largely than the stockpiles held by in india and north korea and significantly. you have to ask the question that if you move away from worry

ing about countries that you don't like and dealing the materials which are the real problems and worrying about materials falling in the wrong hand then follow the materials and the politics will follow. >> thank you, of course, there is a course he teaches at the university. um, next, we'll have joel whit talks to us about one country that has gotten the attention of our two leading candidates, joel, thank you for being with us. >> thank you for inviting me here today. i have a long association with the controller. i came to washington in 1980s. it is a great honor to be here to talk to you.

given the limited of time that i have, i am going to make three points. first, north korea's nuclear program are not fake. while you are looking at me like duh, in fact, i have been told recently, there is been a number of experts, and rather people saying that the danger has been grossly exaggerated and there is some people claim that it is an elaborate roots from the north koreans to get our attention. you think that maybe it, it is it was not true before and it is not true now. in fact, it was part of the u.s. and south korea policy to down play the threat. that was part of the policy in strategic patients that was based on the idea. we did not want to see the north koreans craving for attention, therefore, of what we are doing. in the last problem, of course,

has been the media. i read the media everyday and i am sure most of you don't on north korean. a lot of it is focuses on hair style and whether these girls are over weight or all of these important issues. in fact, how many of you know that as we are sitting here today, north korea is going to start another campaign of plutonium. it is obvious. all you need to do is look at commercial satellite. of course, i am not saying that we should jump to the other extreme where the worse case analysis, given what's been going on particularly the last six months has been very visible, at least we could put to rest the idea that this is

just -- last year, our institute did a yearlong study on north korea's future. we came up with three different projections going to 2020. i should mention that david albrite, our findings of north korea is findings of 10 or 16 weapons and it may grow by 2020. 100 weapons which is the worst for us. the current trajectory of 50 weapons. that'll be qualitative improvements in that defense. >> the missile front you see the same movement or what we know is much more difficult to build on the long range.

pistols, we have three scenarios there. the worse case for us is they're moving down the road and which we have seen in grades and we have seen tests of it rocking moe mo motors. putting it aside that the one thing we need to keep in mind even if korea never conducted another missile or nuclear test, it could continue to produce nuclear weapons. it is not a problem. it has the facility to do it. it already has hundreds of missiles. these missiles cannot reach the united states. it is certainly a problem for sou south korea and china. the bottom line here is this is a serious program and it is

steadily advancing for the past several years. quite frankly, it seems to me that north koreans don't have much incentives as us. second, where are the implications that this develop into and there is as litany of danger that most of you are familiar with but i will just repeat them here. first, danger to our allies and troops and the united states yourself. there is every indication there. there is the danger to our ability to maintain strong alliances, that's the bedrock of administration pivoting to asia. >> at bedrock, it depends on its turns and the credibility of our

security now. quite likely, it will be under mi mind. to that, of course, is a danger that south korea and japan will fear they have no choice but to agree their own. the one argument of why that'll never happen but we cannot be sure, particularly, we cannot be sure of what it may do. and, candidates now, we have the trump factor. maybe it would be a good thing for south korea and japan. there is a danger of growing threat in the region and crisis ability. i guess there are some parallels here.

with we know that the korean peninsula is not a stable place and periodic clashes and quite possible that they'll continue to the future. on top of that, well, once again not a lot of attention, there is already a race in peninsula. we all know what north korea is doing but do we know what south korea -- the missile programs and focusing on preemptive use of those weapons. and, may follows. finally, there is the danger and we all know that north korea will export nuclear and missile technology. they say a number of times we are responsible for weapons in the state. i am not sure how much that'll be worth.

particularly, if the sanction continues to grow the impact of north koreans, therefore, it forces to find our currents. third point, i have been asked to lay out what policy options are available to the president, mitigating this threat. well, quite frankly, someone who has worked on this issue, here is now and i would say our option would narrow significantly in the past eight years. it is clear to me from talking to meetings. it's clear to me in talking to them, since at least 2012, they've got a bounce in their step. they've been building these weapons, no one has been able to stop them. impose sanctions on them.

they have done very well even with the limited sanctions we imposed on them. and so if i was a north korean, i would be feeling pretty confident. having said all that, let me just weigh out five very quick suggestions for guidelines for the next administration policy. first, make dealing with this challenge a priority. it may sound strange, but it hasn't been a priority. it's not a priority, even though we talked about rebalancing to asia and the importance of our alliances, nuclear security, and i know there are many meetings between u.s. and chinese officials. senior level meetings where north korea barely comes up. if it doesn't come up in those meetings it's not a priority. second point, stop the magical

thinking about how to deal with north korea. it's amazing that i still maintain my sanity, quite frankly, because i hear all sorts of ideas about how we should deal with north korea. and there isn't enough time in the meeting to talk about all of them, so i'm not going to do that. but there are a lot of ideas floating around from the administration policy of strategic patience to the idea of korea, a regime change in korean unification. in my mind, they all qualify as magical thinking. they are unrealistic. third, a related recommendation, think strategically, not tactically. we are constantly reacting to what north korea does. and when they don't do anything, we don't do anything. so what we need to do is return to basics. what are our objectives here?

how do we achieve them? what tools should we use? this may sound very strange, but we aren't doing this basic thing. fourth, be willing to think out of the box. everyone is so quick to dismiss any north korean proposal that we're never going to get this process going, if we are indeed interested in trying to have negotiations. once again, i don't have time to relate all of those, but i'll be happy to talk about them. fifth, we need to be willing, whoever the president is, should be willing to take the domestic political risk to secure our national interest. as long as there are no security downsides.

once again, that may make -- that may have some resonance, but the fact is that we haven't been willing to take those domestic political risks. so maybe the fact that donald trump has now said he would meet with kim jong-un, i'm not sure if that will give any domestic political coverage, but at least a new wrinkle in that area. so as far as i'm concerned, domestic political risks are the only downside to an approach that combines diplomacy with -- i'll stop there. thank you. >> thank you, joel. we're glad you maintained your sanity to this point. very sobering presentation. next, former ambassador susan burk is going to talk about the broader set of challenges that face the next u.s. president relating to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a whole, where these issues and others are discussed every five years in a cycle, and in

between, and so thank you very much for being here, susan. >> thank you very much for inviting me. i wanted to thanked the arms control association for all of the work they're doing to advocate for and advance a responsible arms control nonproliferation agenda. from what we heard so far this morning, i feel like i should say my name is susan, and i'm a nonproliferator. the quality of a support group, and i appreciate the arms control association for providing those of us who suffer this affliction, having an opportunity to be with other true believers and kind of share our burdens. this morning, i wanted to focus on the disarmament or the divide between the haves and have nots. i was asked to address the impact of these challenges on the health of the treaty, and so i'll talk a bit about the impact of the divide and some options to address this divide. and i really tried not to be

political, but i may not be able to help myself. in any case, you know, over the years, the parties to the ntp generally have agreed fairly consistently on the support and central role that the treaty has played in grounding and upholding the global nonproliferation regime. at the same time, frustration over the pace and process of nuclear disarmament and increasingly disagreement over the role of nuclear weapons and npt's nuclear weapons security state strategies has been a feature. i was involved in the 2010 review conference, and that benefitted tremendously from the good will that had been generated by the nuclear agenda laid out by president obama in prague. and it was also helped by a substantive decision on the middle east which paved the way for agreements on the action plan. there were a number of pieces of that action plan, and two things

in particular i mentioned. one was that action plan launched an unprecedented process of p-5 engagement, no laughing, and provided for increased accountability by reporting. but perhaps expectations were unrealistically high on all sides. we thought that was possible. or this modest progress was seen as an opening for more ambitious opening of the flood gates, because as soon as the npt party reconvened in 2012 to prepare 2015, what has been known as the humanitarian consequences movement began its surge and the first of three international conferences on the subject was rolled out. the nuclear -- the nuclear weapon states declined to participate in the first two meetings. of the u.s. and uk participated in the third, and by doing so,

in my view, they forfeited the opportunity to contribute to the developing narrative, and they strengthened the hand of the group who were seeking outside of the npt framework, disarmament. as support for this movement was growing, the prospects of further u.s.-russian arms reduction was fading. russian nuclear saber rattling was increasing. north korea, as joel mentioned, was continuing to conduct nuclear explosive tests and engage in provocative behavior, and the conference remained -- against this backdrop, the 2015 conference last year again made a run at a consensus final document, but stumbled in the final hours over the middle east. there's no direct evidence that consensus would have been broken over the disarmament report alone, and i did my best to try to get people to tell me if that was the case, but the lack of enthusiasm has been widely

reported, and so i have even heard from some that there was relief in some quarters among non-alliance states that there was no document because they were not -- but that draft, which was not finalized did include some initiative that including the u.n. working group that was mentioned as well as calls again for regular detailed reporting, and the open ended working group which i'll talk about a bit was something that the nuclear weapons state appeared to support in the document. so not withstanding the fact there was no agreement on the document, soon after the conference, the u.s. signaled its willingness to engage in the oewg on the basis of the terms agreed by the npt party. that is the decision -- i represent only myself.

i think that the decision to establish the oeg ultimately under different terms than had been agreed upon, that was to go to u.n., which was, made for a missed opportunity. you had a proposal that the npt nuclear weapon states engage as long as it was consensus. at least the process calling the discussion in this oewg with the weapons possession. those who pushed for a vote, i think, i question their motives. i have heard from some who attended the oewg. no one in the room, i have to say. who were told that they didn't want the weapon states to participate. that was one of the motivations. if that's the case, i think there's a problem here, and it may not be the usual suspects. engagement is a two-way street.

it requires flexibility on both sides. if one side is setting up a situation that they know the other side is not going to be able to live with -- in any case, the fourth humanitarian conference has not been scheduled for various regions. it has become the focal point for debate on disarmament but without the input of the weapon states. because no states possess nuclear weapons. the oewg is also discussing the so-called legal gap in the npt. this is what some states argue is the lack of a clear definition of the effective measures to be negotiated relating to nuclear disarmament,

the effective measures mentioned in article six of the npt. and there is no con census on whether there is or is not a legal gap. the oewg has gotten some press because several states -- a handful of states to convene a conference next year to negotiate an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons, but there are a number of papers that have been tabled to lay out the proposals we have all come to know and understand. building blocks which are step by step. a convention, nuclear weapons convention. a framework agreement. these are all proposals that have been tabled in the npt review context.

i would say for many of the participants in these meetings, regional and global insecurity is very real. they believe their concerns are legitimate. and their frustration with the nuclear weapon states has led them to this venue. this u.s. has aligned themselves with the prague speech with the concerned expressed about the humanitarian -- they believe -- they're real in the sense that frustration over disarmament and fear of nuclear use has contributed to the growth of this humanitarian movement, and it's led some extremely well informed and well placed observers to conclude

that the two sides are more polarized than they have ever been. now, this movement provides an opportunity not only for states to show concern about and dissatisfaction with the status quo, but to take matters in their own hands outside of the npt and without the nuclear weapon states if necessary. this is not going to strengthen that treaty. it will not fill the void that many believe has emerged in the absence of further progress. now, bridging the divide is going to require we make common cause with our partners to address the concerns that fuel the humanitarian movement. i was asked to provide a best case and a worst case, and i won't get into the issue of politics, but you know, who gets elected in november, i think, will very much influence the best whether or not there's the best you can make or the best you imagine case because the

conference, the 50th anniversary of entering the force, and shortly after 2015, folks already began to look ahead to that as a dramatic milestone moment and a very symbolic conference. so no matter what happens, i think it's going to be something to watch. even under the best circumstances, it's going to be a challenge. so how do you mitigate that challenge. how do you make the best of a bad situation? i think the next u.s. president early on has to reaffirm strong and unequivocal support for the nonproliferation regime, including the npt in all aspects, disarmament, nonproliferation, no spread of nuclear weapons to any countries, and removal. i think that has to be clear. a prague-like speech that reflected continuity in the nuclear agenda i think would do

a lot to reassure international partners about continued leadership, partnership, and shared objectives. i know there's a lot of criticism about the prague agenda not being fully realized, but i think it's a heck of a good place to start, and something like that that builds and moves forward. such an agenda could also include commitments to sustain the work of the international partnership of nuclear disarmament verification. i would suggest seeking to expand its membership to include more partners, explore involving other nongovernmental organizations able to make contributions and make the partnership work as transparent as possible. these are a way to use the time available now to prepare for advances later when the process is linked to understanding and education of a wide variety of states on the verification challenges of the nuclear numbers. the next president should announce.

and this would be a way to re-engage russia on nonproliferation arms control issues and i do not in any way underestimate the difficulty. they -- he or she should persevere with the p-5 process and promote p-5 transparency and accountability. last year's annual meeting, lewis dunn outlined several possible p-5 initiatives to be pursued through this process, including p-5 action to minimize the risk of nuclear weapon use by anyone as well as a p-5 code of nuclear conduct, and i would urge people to take another look at those ideas, and if i were advising the next president, i would urge that. i think pressure should be kept on getting the negotiations going into geneva. i understand this may be a fool's errand, but it is

important for a number of reasons. and if the u.s. has flexibility on stocks as has been reported, that would be an important development. the next president should uphold the 24 plus year testing moratorium. continued support for the international monitoring system, and a way to make sure that that system is made a permanent part of the international nonproliferation architecture. the ratification is a tough issue, as we all know, and it depends what happens in other races. i think more effort should be made to make the case to the american people and to congress on why -- and i think this is something both the u.s. government and ngos can do more on. i know aca is doing a tremendous

amount of work. don't underestimate the importance of getting out the word to the american public. and then i would say reaffirm the u.s. negative security assurance contained in the 2010 review, and recommit to the ratification and don't forget the other zones once the protocol is completed, and in another step, i would suggest that the next president signal willingness and an appropriate venue to discuss the conditions under which a global negative security assurance agreement, under what condition. and then finally, we should not shy away from joining the ongoing multilateral discussion on disarmament. if we believe that our mission is a sound one, we should be prepared to partner and defend our mission. maybe they'll learn something. maybe we'll learn something. i think this would signal a clear commitment and to work with and through multilateral institutions, better or for

worse. this should be part of the president's agenda. while this would not discourage certain states from pursuing solutions outside of the npt to force disarmament process, this is going to strengthen the hand of allies closely aligned with ours. you can't fight something with nothing, and this is the way to get a real discussion going. now, even under such a scenario, a successful review in 2020 is a 50/50 proposition. that's probably generous. nuclear disarmament is not the only issue that can derail agreements, but if the goal is to re-enforce the centrality, the indefensibility and the irreplaceability, then strong, responsibility, and creative u.s. leadership and engagement, and a respectful sensitive to a large number of nonnuclear

weapon states, now, i'm not even going to talk about -- i'm already stressed about what i have heard so far, but i'll be happy to talk over coffee or answer questions, but in conclusion, a proactive and positive u.s. nonproliferation and arms control agenda is essential for a best case outcome. and i use best case. but it's not a guarantee of such. as i have noted, bridging the divide is a two-way street, and the nonweapon states and even the ngos must be willing to engage on common ground. i would also note on arms control, it takes two to tango. right now, i would say this government doesn't have a partner. so it should not be held -- to be blamed for not moving forward without a partner. but maybe work can be done to try -- humanitarian consequence movement has provided a vehicle for nonnuclear weapon states to articulate their concern and their fears about nuclear weapons, which are legitimate. i think as we have heard today,

and prevent their frustrations with programs and policies they believe rightly or wrongly put them at greater risk. the challenges facing the npt regime will require steady, informed united states leadership to build on the decades of work that has been done. >> thank you. >> as i said this morning at the outset of the meeting, we have a very substantive and high-level program, and i appreciate all the ideas and the problems with the issues from our four speakers on four important areas. and because we have put forward a presentation on four different areas, when you ask your question, please be specific as to whom you're directing your question, and try to keep it tight. we have about 25 minutes before we're going to take our lunch break, and then move to our keynote speaker at the noon hour.

so with that, the floor is open for your questions. i see a number of hands going up. i will try to get to as many of you as possible. why don't you try to head over here to the right side with mr. wolf by the wall. >> thank you. i would like to ask questions of each. i'll confine myself. i have always thought strategic patience is not the right term. it should have been strategic indifference. but toby made an interesting point for me, and he said that one of the first things he would recommend in dealing with south asia is fix the policy structure. i wonder if you think the problem with the structure, that's the recommendation you would make in the area of

dealing with north korea. >> before you take that, joel, why don't we take one more and do a couple at a time, since we have several right behind you. >> i'm from italy. also with a question. the presentation is rather pessimistic. but i agree with you. but there's one element of hope and it's an evolution. both russia and china are becoming concerned. and you said that their missile capacity could even reach china and i guess also russia. so maybe also they are fed up with the situation, and they can

exercise pressure. and also, what is wrong with the suggestion for negotiation, for negotiating a peace treaty? after all, 60 years have passed from the korean war, and maybe this time at least to establish the border, the most dangerous one is the northern limit line, which is not defined at all. thank you. >> thank you. joel. >> policy structure. this is obviously a very difficult issue to deal with. so the question is, can the

regular bureaucracy opt out, so i and norm also have been part of an experience where you had one guy in charge who actually grows to a conclusion, a framework. i think today that's what you need. otherwise, leaving this to the state department, to other bureaucracies, nothing is ever going to happen. you're just going to have more patients. secondly, on your point, first, yes, every time i give a presentation, people, there's always someone who rightly points out, you're being pessimistic. yes. you're absolutely right. but i would say maybe it's a psychological defense. i'm being realistic. that's what's important here. yes, we would all like to find elements of hope, but i would suggest that relying on russia

and china and some sort of change in particularly china's approach, isn't going to work. been doing that for 20 years. how many times have i had a discussion with people where they're saying it looks like china is changing its approach? it happens over and over and over again. there may be changes, but they're tactical. you probably follow the newspapers. you saw president xi with the former north korean foreign minister who is now a member of the -- a lot of people are interpreting that as china accepting north korea as a nuclear weapon state. so i don't see that as an element of hope. third, on the north korean suggestion, let's negotiate a peace treaty, i agree. i don't see anything wrong with that as long as we get our

issues on the table. the problem is that's really very difficult for americans and people in northeast asia to visualize because a peace treaty in theory could lead up to a very different northeast asia. a very different korean peninsula. i don't know what the impact would be on our alliances in northeast asia, if there were forward progress. so it's very hard for people to make that leap. but i would argue, as i said in my presentation, think out of the box. the only way we're going to deal with this problem is by addressing core security concerns on both sides. and i have been in meetings where people say, the north koreans, they don't have anything to fear from the united states. why do they think we're a security threat? well, you know. i mean, you don't have to meet with north koreans regularly to see what's wrong with that

statement. so that's what has to be done. and it's very hard. >> before we move onto some questions for the other panelists and other issues, if you could quickly remind us no matter how difficult this is, what are the stakes? and your institute has done some careful research on future scenarios in terms of what the north koreans may have in their arsenal down the road. >> you mean the implications? >> i mean by 2020, by the end of this next president's first term. how many nuclear weapons might the north koreans have at their disposal? what might their missile capabilities be based upon? >> the technical part? >> yeah. just to remind people what's at stake here. >> we did three different

scenarios. david albright did. the range in weapons was 20 to 100. that doesn't sound like a lot to us in the united states, but it sure sounds like a lot to the south koreans and the japanese. and of course the qualitative improvements are almost as important. it's unclear. i think and david thinks and now the u.s. government thinks and the south koreans are admitting the north koreans can put a war head on top of at least a regional range missile. they've made qualitative improvements. and depending on the pace of nuclear testing, they could make a lot more, including the possibility of developing a very simple single stage hydrogen bomb by 2020.

the big development out there, the elephant sitting in the room is whether they can build an icbm. we've seen it. we've seen mockups of it in parade. we've seen tests of the rocket engine motors. these are all things that shouldn't be taking people by surprise and are coming down the pike. >> we've got some other questions here. marissa, why don't you come here to the front table and take this lady's question? thanks. >> my name is angela beach. my understanding is that

pakistan wouldn't participate in negotiations because of its strategic concerns -- [ no audio ] my question was a little bit of a technical one. i was hoping you could talk about the estimates on the size of stockpiles and at current rates of production how long it would take pakistan to catch up with india under the scenario that that would be the critical juncture at which they could join up in ct negotiations. thank you. >> why don't we take one more question here in the middle? then we can thumb wrestle over your question. >> pierce gordon. i've probably been in the business maybe too long, but there's something called the united nations disarmament commission, which meets annually. its primary objective of -- [ no audio ]

by definition all u.n. members are there, which means all of the states both in and out of the npt and the united states participates but i don't say it gives very much attention to that. what are the prospects that the u.n. could become a more central point of dealing with nuclear disarmament involving all of the possessing states and all of the other states and perhaps the oewg efforts could sort of morph over into that forum which is ready to continue working indefinitely perhaps as a beginning point. bearing in mind that russia has made it clear that they're not prepared to do more bilateral negotiations.

>> thank you. >> yeah. thank you for that. our international panel on fissile materials does these estimates on a regular basis. you can find the most recent global fissile material report. but i think the interesting thing is actually not the current balance of materials. the question is the presumption behind your question and the claim that pakistan makes that it is delaying and blocking the beginning of talks at the conference on disarmament on a fissile material cutoff treaty. it's true, pakistan has made an enormous investment in building up the production capacity for -- especially for plutonium, weapons plutonium in the last 15 years.

as of 2000-2001 it had one plutonium production. now it has four that are operating. but the thing you have to understand is that there is actually not that much difference in the stockpiles of material produced for weapons purposes between the two countries. what pakistan points to is india's live stockpile of unsafeguarded plutonium which is from indian nuclear power reactors. in other words putting on the table indian stockpiles which is outside safeguards but india claims is not for weapon purposes. there is a concern behind this. and that is that india's fast breeder reactor will use plutonium as fuel, but it can produce weapon grade plutonium as a byproduct of its operation. it will take reactor grade

plutonium for fuel and produce weapons grade plutonium. if it operates at any reasonable rate, which is uncertain, because most people who have tried breeder reactors have realized they're very hard and very unsafe and have lots of problems and can't get them to operate well. but that breeder reactor, if it works, could increase india's weapon plutonium production rate almost tenfold. the sad part, of course, is that the united states has had 15 years to deal with the pakistan concerns and the indian breeder reactor program and has refused to take either aspect seriously because of other interests. since 9/11 the united states has been more interested in chasing al qaeda and killing taliban than dealing with pakistan building up its weapons program.

and it has been more interested in recruiting india to its side in an emerging cold war with china and having access to the indian market and all these other things. so we won't talk too much about what indian is doing with its nuclear program. so the real reason, i think, that pakistan is blocking is the fact that it can. and it's using that time to build up its arsenal to whatever size it thinks is appropriate, really regardless of how big india's stockpile is or isn't. and it's largely, you know, our fault. >> all right. why don't we go to the question with the undc. >> pierce, i don't know the answer to that question. i mean, i see randy. he might know better. i'm not aware of the undc producing anything in recent memory. and i remember years ago,

probably when i was at the pentagon, you know where it was a more -- doing stuff. but i'm not aware that it's being used by any state to do anything meaningful. if it's under u.n. rules where you can vote things in or out, well, if it's consensus, i just don't know. my impression of it is that it has not been particularly active or you know in the front lines or even in the middle lines, maybe not even the rear lines for a long time. so it would require a retooling, yeah. well, i just don't know the answer to that question. >> before we go to the next question, let me just ask a followup of toby on the fissile material cutoff treaty issue. at the end of your response you said that pakistan was blocking the start of negotiations because they could. because the conference on disarmament operates according to the consensus rules so one country can block.

just this january as we reported in arms control today, the u.s. put forward a proposal that would meet one of pakistan's concerns, which is to discuss the stockpiles as part of -- pakistan is still opposed. then when prime minister drew trudeau came to washington and met with president obama, there was a small notice that they issued in their statement that perhaps other approaches to pursuing this material cutoff treaty other than the conference on disarmament might need to be explored. quickly, if you could just address this question. i mean, is there another option for the u.s. president -- the next u.s. president to get negotiations going maybe outside of the conference on disarmament where consensus based rules are not necessarily in effect and work with the other nuclear arms states with fissile stockpiles? is there another way, yes or no?

>> it's possible to go outside the conference on disarmament. there's no reason why not. the issue, of course s that just in the way that susan mentioned, the nuclear weapon states, when they want to protect their interests, insist on a consensus based approach. like when we talk about nuclear disarmament, the other nuclear weapon states that we would want to be involved in a fissile material cutoff treaty, the russians, the chinese, the others may say, well, look, the u.s. may be fine because it has all these allies who will vote for whatever it wants, but we don't. so therefore we want consensus in any process. you can get a process, but other weapon states to protect their own interests in negotiations will want consensus also. whether it helps the process grow that much faster is unclear given the differences they have in their negotiating positions. i think the real issue is not to

go outside the fissile material cutoff treaty negotiation in geneva. we could have them in geneva. the question you have to ask is whether a country as dependent on the international system as pakistan is able to withstand the entire international community. the only reason it doesn't is because no one cares enough to call them on it. and they're getting away with it precisely for that reason. everyone else has more important interests with pakistan than fissile materials. the day that changes -- the pakistanis said sure we can have negotiations. they saw that the world was really concerned about the nuclear tests and wanted something done. it's going to be that kind of determination that will force pakistan to say we'll let the process go forward. doesn't mean they'll agree to a treaty when it's done.

they've got enough fissile material to suit themselves. this really is a question of how badly the international community want this is treaty. >> i wouldn't add much to that other than to reinforce what he suggested, which is that within the p-5 certainly there is a range of views on the desirability of an fmct, let alone an fmt. so the risk in shifting outside the cd is that we might find the five quickly becomes a much smaller number of states that are actually interested. >> all right. i see a couple more hands. there's one way in the back. i want to respect the people in the rear of the room. if you could get to her, yes. then we'll take one more up front and then we're about at our lunch break. >> from voice of america, persian tv network. i know it's focused on northeast asia.

perhaps i can ask the panel about china's investment in pakistan and recent trade cooperation between india and iran, do you see any possibility of nuclear cooperation between india and iran? and how can the future united states president strike a balance with regards to china's president there and india -- >> let's take 100 more question.

>> israel seems to be opening up on the program. how do you see this moving ahead in the next few years? there was mention of nuclear weapon free zones. thank you. >> thank you. i'm going to ask toby to try the first question and then we'll turn to the second. >> the question was how should china and india and iran, how does that all look in asia, particularly as nuclear trade is concerned going forward and whether there's potential for some stablizing role there. i think the questions about iran have focussed more on the closing down of the weapons infrastructure. what we see still is interest in nuclear energy there and russia has been the primary recipient of that interest and i imagine would continue to be the primary

recipient of that interest. india has been conducting reactors on its own territory but has not been participating in that and is quite a ways away from being able to do that but the question mark is china becoming a supplier and what that means in the international market and the rules associated with that. until now it's primarily been building reactors in pakistan but has participated in a number of bids to build reactors outside pakistan. in the future it could play a much larger role in the nuclear power programs of other states. that kind of then leads to the questions about whether china has the same priorities in terms of safety, security, responsible

practices. i think that's not something we should take for granted. there's not a lot of evidence that they don't. >> you want to try to take the question about israel's interests or its role in reducing risks in the middle east. >> the middle east issue as i mentioned has been a substantive issue at mpt review conferences since '95 although proish ior tt there was some dustup that would keep people in the conference room until 3:00 in the morning. i'm not going to comment on whether or not they're opening up or not, but there were

efforts made after the 2010 conference to try to convenience a conference of regional states to discuss establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone. that's the proposal, not just nuclear but all weapons of mass destruction but in the end the israelis were participating in these meetings but the arabs ended up not participating and iran was not participating. the conditions don't seem right there but it's not israel that is the problem as best i can tell in terms of getting together with regional part iners to scope out the parameters of a conference. i think it's safe to say the obstacle has been the larger group of states and i won't go any further than that. >> i would add that as we look at the middle east region which

we've not covered too much in this session, we have been talking about and we will continue to discuss ways in which we can build upon the gcp way and the iran deal to head off possible interests in nuclear weapons beyond the terms of that agreement as well as looking for ways that other countries can join in some of the measures like the conference of nuclear test ban treaty which was signed but not ratified. there are ways in which other countries can help reduce nuclear risks and create conditions in the region beginning with a nuclear free zone. that will be a subject of focus for the arms control association at future events but we are out of scheduled time for this session. i hope this you found this conversation rich. it may be unsatisfying. it may be a little difficult to

take sometimes. these issues keep coming at us but that is why we do our work. i want to note before we thank our panelists that we are now going to be breaking for about 20 minutes for lunch. i would encourage all of you to step outside to get your plate of food. there will be two lines. we're going to resume the program as close to 12:00 as possible for our key note speaker ben rhodes. join me in thanking our panelists. [ applause ]

the washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up wednesday morning the texas rek congressman will react to today's investigation by the fbi that no charges be brought against hillary clinton and this week's vote on gun legislation in the house and then the michigan democratic congresswoman will talk about the latest on the flint, michigan water crisis and the congressional response to the orlando shootings and the 2016 presidential campaign. be sure to watch it live at 7:00 a.m. eastern wednesday morning. join the discussion. democratic leader nancy pelosi will be joined by victims of gun violence wednesday morning at a press conference on the capitol steps. members are calling for votes to prevent gun violence. watch live at 10:00 a.m. eastern. in the afternoon the house rules committee will begin to

establish debate rules for a 2017 funding bill for defense programs and may take up gun legislation. that's live 3:00 p.m. eastern. the state department special envoy for libya on the security and economic situation in the country. this is about an hour. the committee will come to order. thank you for being here. i want to thank our witness for testifying today five years after the u.s. decision to intervene in libya which i think most of us would agree was a

textbook case and not what not do in foreign policy if you look at where we are today. i'm still wondering what our libya policy is. i read through the briefings and i know the senator and others did the same. yet we spend most of our time on foreign policy issues and i have to tell you looking at the memo that was put in place by crs the forces on the ground in libya are really many and very very tough complex situation that has developed there. i think our hearing today is an attempt to understand what is an achievable outcome in libya that is in line with u.s. interests and at what cost. obviously if we can call people to come together through the efforts we really will be getting back to where we were in 2013. there's been a lot of time lost

and lives lost, a lot of backward momentum. as different factions continue to compete across libya and isis continues to use the chaos to establish an operating base outside syria it appears that we are again contemplating providing arms and training to some type of libyan national security force. i hope it can be explained to us what lessons the administration has learned from the failure of the last time we tried to develop libyan security forces and what political progress needs to occur in order for us to try again. to determine the way forward we need an accurate assessment of the ability to goven and what we are doing to help them and what can bring the rival administration on board with the new government. we have sanctioned libyan individuals who are hindering the formation of a government in the past but are we prepared to do so in the future.

for a county with vast oil wealth and thankfully void of widespread sectarian intentions libya should become a success story. i think we all are disheartened that in many ways the u.s. policy has hindered libya's progress. i want to thank our special envoy for being here who i know has concerns about the future of libya. we look forward to your testimony. we thank you for being here today to help us understand the way forward and with that i'll turn to our ranking member senator ben guarder. >> thank you. i think this hearing is particularly important as to how we proceed in libya and it's complicated and i thank our witness for being here and your service to our country but in order to counter sooisil in lib the united states has stepped up diplomatic efforts to achieve

libyan unity. this is the right approach although i'm pleased to learn that isil is now on the run i'm distressed that they continue to make inroads by inspiring people online to commit atrasties as we've seen in our own country in orlando. oftentimes in the rush to beat back the latest terrorists threats, the counter terrorism actions outpeaces and exceeds our political strategy and that's a matter of major concern. we want to take action but we need to know we can follow up that action with a workable strategy. i fear if we are not careful, if we do not devote the same amount of time and resources to good governance then we will be worsening the country's division and repeating past mistakes that we've made elsewhere. if we arm one malitia to counter isil today, even if it's acting

under the new government, who knows will take up arms against us tomorrow. now let me be clear. if the administration has information about a threat against the united states, then we have to act. we have to act and do what's safe for the people of our country. i know this administration is trying its best to support the government of national gna. three months ago before this committee i convoyed the urgency for libyan national unity and enhancing the legitimacy to help libya take its place among the nations. control over libya is critical to combatting isil and resolving a migrant crisis that has witnessed the deaths of thousands. we've lost thousands of people that have been trafficked through libya.

that's one of the casualties of instability in that country. while they're doing they're best to restore order but the country continues to block a vote of approval. as long as libya remains fractured terrorist groups will thrive. the gna itself has not requested foreign intervention and while we can provide training to gna controlled units we cannot fight this fight for them. i think that's a very important point. if and when the u.s. decides to give military equipment and training to libyan forces it must be with the confidence of who we're giving the support toened a the potential for that support to be turned against the united states. we need to have a clear strategy in libya. i've said before this committee i'm concerned about the open ended nature of this every ending war on terror that is is pursued without congressional

authorization. what began as a small mission to build partners could grow into something much larger and all this is based on the authorization of u.s. force predating the upheavily in the arab world. predating the u.s. invasion in iraq more than 13 years ago. our libya policy must strike a balance. the core problem is that it's fractured along many lines between the old order and the new. we in the international community must continue our best to try and bridge these gaps. libbans are tired of having multiple competing governments. they deserve better. i want to compliment the u.s. leadership and security council in working with our british colleagues in getting the security action to deal with the arms embargo.

the united states and international community can and should help a country like libya. it's my hope that we pursue a balanced policy and not just an exped yant one. thank you. >> thank you very much for those comments. we really appreciate you being here as people know you're the special envoy for libya. the bureau of middle eastern affairs at the u.s. state department. you can summarize your comments without objection. all your written testimony will be entered in the record. thank you for being here and if you would please proceed. >> thank you mr. chairman. i thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss u.s. foreign policy on libya. i've just returned from consultations with regional and european partners to discuss our mutual support for the transitional government of national accord in libya whose

challenges include ending civil conflict, promoting stability and addressing the ongoing terrorist threat. our interest in libya is to support a unified government that meets the needs of the people. we also seek a government with whom we can partner on bilateral and regional objectives which threaten security and stability across both north africa and europe. at the center of our on policy has been support for the creation of the gna as a unifying bridge to help libyans move beyond the damaging period of political competition referred to by the chairman and the ranking member and fragment tash until the country adopts a new constitution and a long term government. to do that we engaged last year with a wide range of libyan international partners to

support the negotiation of the libyan political agreement which was signed on december 17th, terrorist to bring about gna. since march 30th, 75 days ago roughly, the gna has been to able to demonstrate his effectiveness and has begun the critical work of rebuilding the libyan state. rather than fighting one another through the gna backed by the political dialogue libyans have begun therd ha work of addressing common challenges. our collective international support for the gna has already had practical impact on the ground. in recent days we've seen libyan forces aligned with the gna engaged in sustained fighting against daesh and entering into the city. they've made impressive gains against a ruthless enemy. there have been plans to form a presidential guard.

it has established command centers to combat daesh. the prime minister has stated he will seek international assistance to train and equip gna forces for this fight which will not be a fight that will be over in merely days or weeks. the libyans will look to the united states for our help no fighting daesh and we are prepared to provide it. the united states counter terrorism policy is devoted to eliminating daesh and reducing the threat they pose to our national security. in libya the president has made clear his willingness to take action wherever our interests is in danger. the united states has conducted direct action against several targets in libya including a february 19th strike that took out a daesh training camp. we've also been working to disrupt connections between the daesh branch and libya and the

core group to shut off daesh finances there and to counter and defeat its destructive messages. as with our other policy priorities achieving our counter terrorism objectives depends on helping the libyans repbuild a state. with our partners in europe and within the rental we continue to urge all libyans to put aside their personal interests in the name of uniting libya. we end courage to them the institutions in particular the central bank whose unity is vital to the country's recovery and stability. u.s. assistance has played an important part and we look to congress for continued support. the administration has requested

$20.5 million for assistance to libya in 2017. these funds would enable us to respond to their needs and help the gna and support increasing libya security and counter terrorism capabilities. the administration is planning to provide $30 million to help libya's political transition and produce an effective government. as part of this assistance we intend to commit up to $4 million for the stablization facility for libya. mr. chairman and members of this committee, as i described at the outset today the united states supports the aspirations of libyan people for a responsive national government capable of overcoming the country's significant political challenges and divisions. we remain deeply engaged with libya because it's vital for our national security for of that libya and north africa and

europe. i look forward to taking your questions. thank you. >> thank you very much. i assume you believe it's reasonable that libya can be put back together as a unify fd state that can secure its boarder and maintain mon oppositely over the use of force. is that something you believe can occur. >> i believe it can occur. several things in your statement need to all be taken into consideration. a un tarn state for libya is essential. boarder control is something that's going to require work by libya's neighbors as well as by libya. >> based on the way things are progressing at present, how long into the future do you think that is? >> well, the government of national accord has made more progress over the last 75 days than most people ever expected it would be able to make in that period of time.

the advances they've made against daesh are impressive and involve a tremendous amount of sacrifice by soldiers. >> is daesh the unifying force right now that's causing them to come together. >> samuel johnson said the process of a hanging kons traits the mind and that's an element that has helped them come together is a concern about their security. >> after isis is dealt with effectively is there any sense that because this is a unifying force that's bringing people together citing historians is there a concern after that is dealt with the civil war can again break out. >> i think that the approach of having a government of national accord for a transition is designed to produce mechanical yichs for getting services provided and political support in the east, west and south.

for the government to succeed it has to be able to provide services at the local level. there has to be buy in and municipalities throughout the country with attention given to underserved areas from the past. >> are they capable of doing that? we don't have sectarian issues here but we have divisions within the country. so is it reasonable to believe in a period of time that matters thatter going to be able to do that. >> i don't think it's easy for them to do it. i think they're working on it. the council consists of nine people representing three major regions and i've seen them begin to work together and grow together into a working unit. i think they're committed to that. the constitution that the libyans still need to buildout and elections they still need to carry out for a permanent government are going to have to be designed by libyans to address these core issues so they have a nation they can build for the future but given

their potential oil wealth past and future they have the tools and in theory they should be able to do it. >> this was a case of -- i know that most of the committee were in a different place than i was on this but i didn't understand what our national interests were in going in in the first place. i certainly didn't understand going in, decapitating the government and leaving as we have. you laid out a series of numbers which certainly to most americans is a lot of money and but on the other hand as we know as it relates to dealing with these kind of issues very very light amount of resources. i'm wondering what role you see the u.s. playing right now? are we one of 30 countries, are we the lead country? it does not appear if you look at the resources being allocated if we're the major force in helping this all come together,

this much effort that's happening on the ground. can you share with us your thoughts in that regard. >> yes. the assistance money we're asking for are small amounts by comparison to what we're doing in iraq for example or in many other places. there we're part of an international coalition to try to help libya through this -- >> who is leading libya through that. >> the u.n. is essentially in the lead. the europe union is committing substantial amounts. >> are they taking more of a leading role in libya than the united states is? >> no, sir. but in the assistance area, our requests are what they are. our core work over this past year has been political in the first instance to get alignment amongst all libya's neighbors, important regional players beyond libya's neighbors to work with the libyans to try to bring

them together and get them aligned instead of fighting one another. it played a substantial role in the creation of the government of national accord. >> i think all of us on the committee have traveled through northern africa and seen the hav yok that the fall of libya has created, the amount of arms that have traveled through those countries, the support thus given for transnationalist terrorists groups. that's water under the bridge. i still am having difficulties seeing the progress. i'm glad we have someone like yourself there but do understand that if we end up in a situation years from now where a country cannot maintain its boarders, cannot --