invade iraq in 2003. and vice president biden hosts a summit on cancer research. at a house hearing today, two homeland security subcommittees presented reports on misconduct by transportation security administration employees. their findings include tsa data showing misconduct grew by 29%

from fiscal 2013 to 2015. tsa officials testified at this two-hour hearing. >> the committee on homeland secure, subcommittees on oversight and management efficiency and transportation security will come to order. the purpose of this hearing is to examine findings of a joint subcommittee investigation related to misconduct at the transportation security administration, otherwise known as the tsa. before we begin, the chair asks unanimous consent for the majority staff report to be included in the hearing record. hearing no objections, so ordered. the chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. in may 2016, secretary jeh johnson released a new mission statement for the department of homeland security. with honor and integrity, we will safeguard the american people, our homeland and our values. i think most americans would agree this isn't an unreasonable expectation.

the american people expect all federal employees, especially those charged with protecting the homeland to conduct themselves with integrity. unfortunately, a six-month investigation conducted jointly by this subcommittee and chairman katko's subcommittee has found that tsa violates the words and spirit of this new mission statement to a degree that is alarming and unconscionable to most americans. here are the facts of our investigation. egregious misconduct occurs across all levels of tsa, all levels, from the bottom to the top, and is growing. yet tsa's investigations into internal misconduct and the resulting penalties have decreased. specifically, we found that tsa employee misconduct grew by almost 29%. that's -- think about that. grew by almost 29% from fiscal year 2013 through 2015. 35% of airports experienced increased numbers of

allegations. some having nearly 40 times the number of allegations. that's allegations to be clear than in fiscal year 2013. in terms of telephone types of misconduct that are growing, we saw significant increases in areas related to integrity and ethics and disruptive behavior, including sexual misconduct. di including sexual misconduct. neglective duty allegations doubled during this period. there was a 17% jump in the category of failing to follow instructions. it's simple stuff. 17% jump. there are examples of airport screeners facilitating drug and human smuggling. we can't imagine that coming from this dais, drug and human smuggling and sexually assaulting travelers. and a federal deputy federal security director promoting a subordinate with whom he had a romantic relationship, among numerous others. every american should be outraged by these findings. i certainly am myself. we are in the highest threat

environment since 9/11, from orlando to san bernardino, our citizens are under attack from radical islamist terrorists. terrorist groups remain obsessed with both attacking civil aviation and recruiting westerners. just last month john brennan testified that isis is probably exploring a variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the west. that's what he said. the last thing the american people need to be concerned with are corrupt, i sanso lat and unethical screeners. tsa's response has been to investigate fewer allegations and use lesser penalties as the allegations actually increase. we found that open investigations had declined 15% and closed investigations had declined 28% during this very same period. use of nondisciplinary action

like counseling jumped, while letters of reprimand and suspension decreased by 14%. and adverse actions including termination declined 23%. tsa has not taken -- this shows, this is evidence that tsa has not taken misconduct seriously and it's no wonder why employee morale at dhs is among the worst in the federal government. when employees know that people that are engaged in adverse conduct aren't disciplined, then that reduces their pride and incentive to do the right thing and that's borne out in low employee morale. what tsa has done is created a blow to bureaucracy without any substance. multiple offices have varying responsibilities relating to misconduct, but no one oversees misconduct across airports to

identify systemic solutions. what we're saying there, multiple offices, not like when you think of most companies there's an h.r. department with someone who oversees the whole thing. there's a series of different offices for different levels and so forth and nobody at the top seems to be working in control of the whole thing from top to bottom. airports vary in how they address misconduct. some airports have asked staff to track misconduct issues while others absolutely do not. some federal security directors are engaged while others step in only when needed. this misjointed approach, simply, the numbers, the metrics show is not working. several individuals who came forward to us say they were either blown off or recriminated for bringing issues forward. these are safety and security issues. imagine an employee comes forward, hey, i've got this issue and they are either disregarded or literally almost penalized. and one of the penalties is you're moved with little notice,

some cases we've heard three days, across the country for bringing up a salient issue. the bureaucratic response has failed, failed tsa employees, and it has failed the american public and the taxpayers. we recommend several common sense actions, and i know you've seen them in the report just released, which could improve tsa's management of misconduct issues, but tsa must be committed to the reform. dr. gowadia, i'm sorry, gowadia. gowadia, thank you. there cannot be lip service, and we talked about this, to what tsa is doing to address these findings. there needs to be a significant lasting and meaningful reform from the top to the bottom of the agency. if there are employees unwilling to change, you must replace them with those who will, and that includes the ones at the very top. every minute tsa is forced to handle employee misconduct is

one less that they are safeguarding the lives of travelers. the american people deserve better and they are counting on you. they are counting on us. they are counting on you particularly to succeed in your mission. that ends my statement. chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee on oversight and management efficiency, the lady from new jersey, ms. watson kohlman for her statement. >> thank you very much, chairman, and thank you to you and chairman katko for holding today's hearing. just as a matter of on the record i want to make it known that we are just receiving a copy of this misconduct that tsa threatens the security of the flying public, which i understand was a joint report that the majority staff did without our input and, obviously, without our opportunity to see it. perhaps it could have been helpful for me for today, but nonetheless, i'm glad we are here today and i want to thank our witnesses for being here and thank you for the testimony that you're going to be giving.

the transportation security administration provides security at airports throughout the nation and it helps secure our nation's service transportation systems. tsa screens over 2 million passengers at 450 airports in the united states daily. in fiscal year 2015, tsa employees screened over 700 million passengers and 400 million checked bags. travel in the united states is on the rise, seeing a 15% increase from 2013 to 2015. airports are expected to experience a significant increase in passenger traffic this summer. due to increased passenger volume, decreased appropriations for transportation security officers, and changing procedures due to security screening shortfalls, wait times in the nation's airports have increased. recently, tsa has come under fire about the passenger wait times and the extravagant

bonuses that were paid to a former assistant administrator, who oversaw security operations while tsa was known to have security lapses. high profile incidences such as these, in addition to the tsa pay scale and benefits for its front line personnel, have a devastating effect on the transportation security officers that serve the public on a daily basis. the performance and morale of tsa personnel should be of utmost importance. however, many of the front line employees the transportation security officers are short staffed and are often asked to work multiple shifts. in addition, while these tsos are federal government employees, they are not subject to general civil service provisions that include collective bargaining rights, the ability to appeal adverse actions to the independent merit system protection board, and whistle-blower protections. i believe that the tsa

employees, especially those engaged in security screening, should be subject to civil service provisions, and that is why i am original sponsor of hr-4488, the rights for transportation security officers act of 2016. this bill, authored by the ranking member of the full committee, provides the transportation security administration screening workforce with long overdue rights, the same rights afforded to most federal workers under title 5. both the dhs office of the inspector general and the government accountability office, gao, have examined allegations of misconduct by tsa personnel. two offenses account for more than half of all cases. one, attendance and leave, and two, screening and security. based on its analysis, gao found that tsa did not have a proper process for conducting reviews

of misconduct to verify whether tsa personnel at airports were come plying with policies and procedures. tsa implemented the recommended changes, however, allegations of misconduct increased by almost 30% from 2013 to 2015, and i certainly will be interested in understanding an explanation of that. in fiscal year 2015 alone, the dhs oig received approximately 1,000 complaints either from or about a tsa employee, most of which related to allegations of misconduct. specific instances of misconduct included retaliation against whistle-blowers, mismanagement, and security failures. it has also been reported that tsa personnel are afraid to speak up about problems at the agency in fear of being unfairly punished or reassigned to lower positions. in fact, tsa management has been described by staff as the

biggest bullies in the federal government. allegations of retaliation and mismanagement drastically impact the workplace. moreover, it appears rank and file personnel are disciplined at a much higher rate than management. it seems as if management is disciplined when there are high profile cases or media attention that brings negative attention to the tsa. for the six year in a row, dhs saw an overall drop for employee engagement and morale according to the 2015 federal employee viewpoint survey. what is even more concerning is tsa in particular is ranked one of the worst places to work in the federal government, coming in 313 out of 320 in the annual survey by the partnership of public service. dr. gowadia, today i look forward to hearing from you how tsa plans or on better managing its workforce starting from the

top and addressing low morale. i also look forward to hearing the changes that tsa has implemented as a result of the oig and gao investigations, particularly the mechanisms implemented to better hold management accountable, but i would also like to thank the tsos who are on the front line every day for their diligent work under such intense responsibility and pressure during the july 4th holiday period, even before, and as we go into the future. tsa screened 10.7 million travelers, with average wait times in standard security lanes less than ten minutes. that is good news moving in the right direction. thanks to reprogrammed funding from congress, tsa has been able to hire additional tsos and increase overtime to address staffing shortages. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. thank you. >> chair thanks the gentle lady

and recognizes the chairman of the subcommittee on the transportation security administration, the gentleman from new york, mr. katko. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i'm going to applaud the efforts of the tsa front line workers, but, of course, we cannot stand on good performance that can be better, so that's why we're here. we always must strive to be the greatest we can do in our jobs and provide the greatest security we can for our country in an ever evolving threat environment. since the creation of the tsa after the terror attacks of september 11th, congress had to step in numerous times when the agency has failed to appropriately manage its personnel. these instances have included misconduct from the top to bottom. as chairman of the transportation security subcommittee, i'm particularly invested in and concerned about ensuring that the good men and women who protect our nation's critical transportation systems every day are not only provided with the resources they need, but are also surrounded by an

ethical and positive work culture. such a culture currently does not exist within tsa. in fact, in recent months a number of disturbing accounts of misconduct and just poor conduct on the part of high ranking tsa officials, as well as front line workers at airports and federal air marshals have contributed to a discouraging picture of a bureaucracy struggling to meet the demands of an increased threat environment and spiking passenger volume. all this at a time which we are facing unprecedented threats to our national security. in the last several months, terrorists have bombed two and potentially three commercial aircraft, two of which were likely inside jobs of employees at airports, and have orchestrated devastating attacks in brussels and istanbul. frankly, this is not the time to deal with corruption within our own ranks. the risk is simply too great. administrative nevin jer, one of which i very much applaud was a

ludicrous practice of having subordinates recommending bonuses for their superiors. definition of insanity and how that could happen in the federal agency is beyond me. glad you stopped it and will not happen again. despite these efforts, however, much more needs to be done to give the american people security they need from a tsa responsible to reforms and ethical in its operations. as public servants, tsa personnel must be held to the highest ethical standards and highest moral caliber if we are entrusting them with the lives of traveling americans. unfortunately, tsa management has often saw punitive actions against responsible employees and attempted to speak out, whistle-blowers, rather than taking their concerns seriously. this is unacceptable. covering up or discouraging individuals from speaking out only perpetuates a negative culture and serves as a direct

result and assault on employee morale. employee misconduct, particularly the sort that compromises security and wastes taxpayer dollars must not be permitted to continue. it's because of this that our two subcommittees have conducted a joint investigation to assess the scope and depth of misconduct across the tsa workforce. resulting from this investigation we are releasing a telling report on the challenges facing tsa and the actions needed to rectify years of baked-in mismanagement. much has been written and discussed around the abysmally low morale of the tsa of which ms. watson coleman just mentioned. misconduct plagues through the media and word of mouth no doubt serves as a contributing factor to low employee morale within the tsa. any efforts to improve the culture at the tsa must start with addressing the issue of employee misconduct. as we have continued to -- i

become thoroughly convinced that misconduct among tsa personnel and individuals with access to secure areas of airports is crucial to the traveling public. the ease with which certain individuals have accepted bribes and smuggled through the airport terminals is of serious concern. while the issue extends beyond just tsa personnel, tsa is on the front lines of improving access controls, detecting insider threats, and ensuring the own house is in order being held to the highest standards. i'm going to commend chairman perry's dedication to this issue and developing this report and look forward to continue to work together to reform tsa into an efficient, effective, and accountable organization. work like what we are doing today is what the american people expect and demand of the representatives in congress, and i'm optimistic that we on this committee and together with the tsa can create a better culture within the agency and ultimately

improve the security of the traveling public, and with that i yield back, mr. chairman. >> chair thanks the gentleman from new york. the chair now acknowledges the absence of the ranking member of the subcommittee on transportation security, the gentle lady from new york, she cannot be with us at this time and should she be able to attend, we will defer to her at that time. other members of the subcommittee are reminded opening statements may be submitted for the record. we are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses today. the written statements will appear in the record. the chair will introduce all of the witnesses first, both of them, and recognize each of you for your testimony. dr. gowadia is tsa's deputy administrator. prior to her appointment to this position in may of 2016, so roughly two months ago, she was director of domestic nuclear detection office, where she led dhs efforts

radiological and nuclear detection. in 2000 worked on aviation security technologies and policy. she is a graduate of the university of alabama and has a ph.d from the pennsylvania state university. congratulations and welcome to the committee. once again. mr. andrew oosterbaan is the assistant inspector general for investigations at the dhs office of inspector general. his office investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving dhs employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. previously, mr. oosterbaan served -- correction, department of justice's criminal division as the chief of child exploitation section and was an assistant united states attorney for the southern district of florida. we thank you for your service, sir, and welcome to the committee. thank you all for being here today. the chair recognizes dr. gowadia for her opening statement.

>> good morning, chairman perry, chairman katko, and ranking member watson coleman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. my colleagues at tsa and i appreciate your support in ensuring we maintain the highest professional standards for our workforce. as evidence by the recent attacks in istanbul and brussels, terrorists continue to plot and execute attacks against the global transportation system. the united states faces threats from terrorist groups around the world, as well as from home grown violent extremists inspired by messages of hatred. these threats pose a challenging, dynamic environment that provides the utmost dedication and professionalism from my employees, from front line officers to senior leaders. tsa's greatest strength is its committed professional workforce. administrator and i are dedicated to a supportive

environment for all our employees with an emphasis on values, standards, and accountability. central to our success is a commitment to a common set of values focused on integrity, team spirit and core principals, which are to focus our mission, invest in people, and commit to excellence. to protect the nation's transportation networks we recruit and retain highly capable individuals, reflective of diverse public we serve. we invest in their training, provide them career paths for growth and development and ensure fair practices at all levels of the agency and identify and hold accountable those who engage in misconduct. tsa's recruitment and hiring strategy is focused on selecting the best individuals. all of our employees have successfully cleared an assessment program. this includes a thorough background check and vetting against terrorist watch lists, as well as a criminal history records check. to ensure our workforce continues to accomplish our

security mission and to strengthen tsa's professional foundation while building future leaders, we have increased our investments in training and education programs. a common foundation of training will connect our workforce to a unified culture and strengthen our focus on mission. we have expanded our leadership development opportunities with offerings that range from the rising leaders development program for entry level employees, to the executive leadership program for transportation security administration employees. since january 2016 basic training at the tsa academy. at the academy, officers are immersed in our mission, our history and values, and high ethical standards. and they undergo realistic training that prepares them for the demands of the mission. each enforces integrity, duty to mission, and a commitment to excellence. we are delivering the

professional tsa that the american public deserves. integrity is a core value at tsa, and appropriate conduct is the responsibility of every employee. all employees are responsible for reporting any known or suspected violation of law, rule, regulation, or policy. in concert with our colleagues at the office of inspector general, we investigate all allegations of employee misconduct and employ appropriate discipline. individuals who engage in misconduct while upholding due process rights and ensuring equitable treatment for employees across the agency. as part of our continuing evolution, we are exploring ways to improve our practices. we are reviewing our bonus payment procedures for our front line officers and have proposed new strict controls on bonuses for senior executives. our approach to leadership is driven by our dedication to our security mission. we are holding ourselves accountable for high levels of

effectiveness and supporting our front line officers in a critical counterterrorism mission. every day the men and women of the tsa show passion, patriotism, and a sense of duty while performing tasks under very difficult circumstances. i thank you again for this opportunity to be here today and i would like to echo ms. watson coleman's shoutout to our tsos. if you are so inclined, next time you encounter one, please stop and say thank you. i know your kindness would be deeply appreciated. thank you. >> thank you, dr. gowadia. the chair recognizes mr. oosterbaan for his opening statement. >> good morning. chairman perry, chairman katko, ranking member watson coleman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify about tsa misconduct. i'll focus on the inspector general's role, i'll discuss

briefly examples of our misconduct investigations. our office is charged by congress to preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in agency programs and activities, conducting investigations and audits, and recognizing policies to promote efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. we play a critical role in government. the personal and organizational independence of oig investigators free to carry out their work without interference by agency officials is essential to maintaining the public's trust. the american public must fundamentally trust the government employees held accountable for crimes or serious misconduct by an independent fact finder. i lead more than 200 criminal investigators in our office of investigations. we investigate acts of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving dhs

employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. these investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and we also provide oversight and monitor activity of dhs's various internal affairs offices. we typically receive allegations of misconduct through our hot line or website or another dhs component. after assessing an allegation we decide whether to investigate the allegation or refer it to the internal affairs office or another agency. if we decide to investigate, we develop -- the allegation and write a report of investigation. for administrator of a noncriminal misconduct we provide findings to inform its decision regarding disciplinary action but we're not involved in that decision. for criminal matters, oig presents findings to the department of justice for determination whether judicial

action will be pursued. in fiscal year 2015 we received almost 18,000 complaints and we initiated 664 investigations. our investigations result in 104 criminal convictions and about 37 personnel actions. we're on pace to exceed these numbers in fiscal year 2016. the oig has an important role in addressing misconduct at the tsa, the integrity of tsa's workforce is an important factor and any acts of wrong doing can diminish confidence in their safety. in fiscal year 2015 we received nearly 1,000 complaints relate the to tsa and we decided to investigate about 40 of those complaints based on the seriousness of the allegation, the rank or grade of the individual involved, and whether oig's uniquely independent role was necessary to ensure that the case was handled appropriately. let me give you examples of our tsa-related investigations. chairman katko had mentioned in

2015 we initiated an investigation on a complaint that former tsa assistant administrator kelly hogan improperly received excessive cash awards recommended by a subordinate. our investigation confirmed between november 2013 and november 2014 mr. hogan was given six $10,000 special act awards and a seventh $8,000 special act award. these awards were in addition to annual performance awards of over $12,000 each for 2013 and 2014. while our investigation did not uncover any criminal or administrative wrong doing, it did reveal tsa had inadequate internal controls over the awards process and tsa's internal written policy was unclear. as a result of our investigation, tsa is tightened and clarified written policies and practices. some of oig's investigations of tsa personnel do involve serious crimes. for instance, we investigated a transportation security officer who conspired with others

outside of the tsa to smuggle illegal aliens through an airport. the tso was sentenced to ten months incarceration. another case conviction of smuggling large quantities of narcotics through an airport in the caribbean. the tso was prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment. both employees were convicted in state court, and we investigated a tso for transporting a 14-year-old with intent to commit sexual acts. he was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment. i want to end by noting the important role whistle-blowers play. the employees that step forward and expose fraud, waste, and abuse or other wrongdoing are critical to our mission. the tsa context, for example, we investigated a whistle-blower report he had been prevented by

a supervisor from stopping a member of a -- for which he should have been ineligible. as a result of the tso's disclosure, standard procedures now allow tsos to use discretion to deny screenings in such circumstances and tsa is in the process of changing the program which had granted precheck to this traveler. over the last two years our office made changes to whistle-blower protection program to ensure we have proactive programs that is as good as or better than any other. to accomplish this we've taken important steps, appointed an oig senior executive to be the whistle-blower, improved the process for whistle-blower allegations with specially trained investigators and obtained official certification that our person meets statutory requirements. we're confident these changes

will greatly enhance our whistle-blower program. mr. chairman, this concludes my testimony, i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, mr. oosterbaan. the chair now recognizes himself for five minutes of questioning, and i must say that much of your testimony, mr. oosterbaan, is troubling indeed, but i hope it's not indicative, and we don't think it is indicative, of the vast majority of tsos and employees at the tsa, but it does show the egregiousness of some of the infractions that concern all of us here and we must do absolutely everything we can to make sure that they are dealt with correctly, judiciously, speedily, and that they are minimized. with that, dr. gowadia, there's nearly 60,000 employees, right, at the tsa, 450 airports, and we're talking about a workforce

that allegedly, there's alleged committed misconduct of almost half the numbers of those employees. nearly 27,000. now, they are allegations, they are allegations, but a lot of folks, myself included, we kind of believe where there's smoke there's fire, right? and then you have the case where 14, 16, and 18 allegations on one or more employees. in fact, 1270 employees have had five or more misconduct allegations filed against them. i just wonder in a general sense, i don't know what your private sector experience is. you're obviously a person of high intellect, well accomplished, but it seems to me when i read the report that there should be one person at the top of tsa's human capital, their h.r. department, and, of course, there's a series of directory reports, whether it's somebody that deals with investigations, benefits, and that cascades down through

60,000 employees so that there's a chain of command and that there is accountability. at some point the buck stops somewhere. i don't see that. i'm wondering, i know you've been on the job for two months, and we appreciate you being here, but i said, like i said, you're a person of high intellect, so we have high expectations of you. does that seem incongruent with common sense, the rest of the real world, or does that seem somehow that it's appropriate for tsa to have this structure of a nonstructure, if you will? >> thank you for that question, mr. perry, and i would like to thank you for acknowledging that the large numbers are allegations, not substantiated cases of misconduct. i think that's an important distinction and i appreciate you making it. now as i mentioned in my opening statement, the administrator and i are responsible for the entire workforce, but everyone is responsible for their own

conduct and performance. when it comes to allegations of misconduct or even attendance and leave issues, performance issues, it is important that we have a set of people who investigate the allegation, a set of people who will adjudicate the findings, and then a set of people who will implement the recommended discipline and penalties. of course, all of that, that does not preclude us from having a central focal point for the implementation of policies, making sure there is consistent application of those policies, affording oversight of that role across the enterprise, and you would be heartened to know the administrator has asked me to look at it on an enterprise wide basis. one of the first steps will happen very shortly here. we will be bringing together the management of the human capital of all our workforce under the office of the human capital office, so we are beginning to take steps much in concert.

>> i'm glad that you are, and we'll look forward to try and establish some timeline post this hearing directly with dialogue to determine when we can get together again and see what that looks like, because i think we're very interested to know what the solution set that you glean from that is. but i want to move on a little bit and just drill down on this multiple infractions problem. our investigation found that some employees had over a dozen allegations of misconduct. for the egregious repeat offenders, what do you know about them? what positions do they hold or did they hold? what types of misconduct are they allegedly involved with? what risk do they pose to, you know, regarding insider threats? this is a great concern to the flying public. we want to know these things, so what can you tell us about, you know, who's looking into these things and so on and so forth about these repeat offenders, so to speak? >> chairman perry, when it comes

to the repeat offenders, i do not have all the details on the individual cases. what i will tell you is with every allegation, your entire -- the totality of your service is considered in meting out the discipline or the penalty. as i mentioned earlier, we are bringing a lot of this to the centralized location. all the data we collect we'll be able to mine, look for trends, look for opportunities to improve, opportunities to provide remedial training, et cetera, and certainly, we will work with you, as you requested, to share with you what we're finding and what we intend to do to make it so we do manage our entire workforce to the high standards that you expect of us. >> dr. gowadia, my time is expired, and i think we'll do at least one more round, but i think you'll be interested to know the data you're talking about, it's my understanding the department really didn't know much about the data. even though they collect the data, until our team went in and

started asking questions, they weren't really aware of using the data, so to speak, in judicial actions and in punishments and so on and so forth, and so that's a great concern, as well. with that i want to recognize other members, as well. so i'll recognize ms. watson coleman for questions, thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and chuang, doctor, for your information you're sharing and for you, mr. oosterbaan. mr. oosterbaan, you work for mr. roth and who does mr. roth report? >> the i.g.s are independent, so the word report is a little different than it is in some context. >> who are you accountable to? >> we work for the department of homeland security, therefore, the secretary, there's a different kind of reporting done for the i.g. >> what does that mean? >> that means that our independence is critically important and there's a limited

amount of control that the secretary has over the i.g. >> okay, thank you very much. so, there were 1,000 complaints that were referred to you with regard to tsa, of which you, your office, chose to take on 40 of those complaints, allegations? >> that's correct. >> and of those 40 allegations, how many resulted in action? >> i don't have that specific information, i regret, but generally we're not involved in that, so we generally do not track that information. >> so there were 1,000, so there were 960 other allegations of misconduct that are referred some place else. that includes things like -- does that include tardiness and

taking leave without permission? >> correct. >> i'm sorry, dr. gowadia, right? >> yes, ma'am. >> so those issues were addressed, are addressed to you all to evaluate? >> yes, ma'am. >> all righty. i understand that you are significantly understaffed and that there have been instances where people have had to work back-to-back shifts? >> yes, ma'am. >> do you find that there's any correlation between that phenomenon, that understaffing or inadequate staffing and these tardynesses or these awols or leave without permission? >> first, ma'am, i would like very much to thank congress for the reprogramming actions that have allowed us to hire new officers, bring on and convert more from part-time to full-time

status and give us a significant bank of hours to mitigate some of the impact on our front line officers. while we have not studied the data sufficiently to give you a definite one for one correlation, i will tell you that the informed opinion of our leadership is that the fact that we have shift work, some shifts start at 3:30 in the morning, some officers have to stay late because an airport stays well beyond its usual operating time, all of these conditions do impact some of the attendance and leave, the large number of attendance and leave numbers you see. >> thank you. i looked over your sort of guidelines for disciplinary action, which were quite exhaustive actually, and i recognize there are certain categories and circumstances under which you could do "a" to a person three minutes late chronically versus "b" to a person, and i'm wondering if this new sort of first line

supervisory training you all are engaging in is going to be helpful in helping first line supervisors to kind of make that distinction better, and do you think that will result in less sort of -- i think loose allegations of people three minutes late under those circumstances we think are very stressful anyway? >> i certainly think that training will help, ma'am. i also know that penalty table that you mentioned is a guideline. >> yeah, it is. >> and it allows us to -- >> let me just ask one question, because -- what do you think we need to do to improve the morale? >> so, i think morale improves in many different ways. first, you provide a rallying cry for a workforce, and i think our administrators intent gives that to us. we're committed to our security

mission, we invest in ourselves and our workforce. in everything we do we strive for excellence. i think that forms the core basis for how we train, how we prepare to do our work, how we arrive at work, what we do every day. in building that, in affording opportunities for training, for career path progression, leadership training from the most junior employees all the way up making sure our senior employees receive the adequate leadership training. i think you build and support a workforce by making it an environment in which they can grow, and i think we're well on our way with that with the establishment of our tsa academy. >> thank you, my time is up. i think that as we have an opportunity to revisit some of this discussion with you and see how you are moving in that direction and how successful you're becoming in creating this, which will improve the morale issue and efficiency issue and performance issue, something we'd be very much interested in exploring later. thank you, with that i yield

back. >> chair now recognizes gentleman from new york, mr. katko. >> to follow up on the last question asked, it's fair to say also that how the front line workers perceive upper management and how they are treated compared to how they are treated in the front lines is important, as well, is it not? >> undoubtedly so. >> when someone is getting $60,000 or $70,000 in bonuses for poor performance, that's not a good signal to send. >> it isn't, which is why it's a practice that's been discontinued at tsa. >> fair to say sometimes, but upper management at tsa, there's been some problems, and when the front line people see those problems, i think that impacts negatively the morale issue as opposed to numerous other things, as well. what have you done since you go on the job there to address the issue of upper management proper performances and when they mess up making sure they are held accountable as well? bonuses is one, but can you give

other examples? >> so let me dig into the bonuses issue and the controls that the inspector general mentioned that we should take into account. so first, a subordinate may no longer nominate a supervisor for an award. only a supervisor can nominate -- >> can i digress, where the heck did that come from to begin with? >> that was well before my time, i was in the nuclear world at that time. >> okay, figure nuclear equations would be figure out rather than why that program was implemented in the first place, but go ahead, please. >> so that was number one. number two, we have capped the annual amount that a senior executive service employee can get at the tsa to $10,000, so in any fiscal year, no more than $10,000. third, the office of human capital has to review the package, and finally, as deputy

pl administrator, i get to approve the bonuses. bonuses no longer happen the way they used to at tsa. >> drilling down a little farther, at local airports, the discipline for the front line workers seems to be more handled at a local level and, of course, tsa handles the discipline management at headquarter level. how is tsa working to streamline the processes and procedures that provide some continuity or consistency across the agency for all levels of employees? >> so, as i mentioned earlier, sir, we have taken our first step in that regard. we are bringing the management and the policies and the oversight under one central person, office of human capital. of course, it is important that we allow our federal security directors and our leaders in the field to be sufficiently empowered to address performance issues, to address as much as they can at the local level. an empowered workforce, a

workforce that works diligently through leadership and management actually is a morale that is a workforce with higher morale. this is why we are all going through training at our tsa academy, why we are affording our junior -- young leaders, aspiring leaders new training, and even our most senior leaders are going through the same training. we are beginning to baseline and build the same values and same integrity across the board, sir. >> does that -- first, i applaud that action. does that also include refreshers how to report misconduct? >> we do, indeed, yes. >> with respect to -- you're getting more analytical with respect to how we look at employee misconduct, you're analyzing data more frequently, is that correct? >> yes, we will begin to do so with greater rigor with each passing day. >> as far as that goes, we have not seen evidence that the employee misconduct cases are

really being affected -- assessed, excuse me, for trend analysis, trends in misconduct and what's causing those trends to go in certain areas. what are you doing, if anything, to implement a trend analysis to try and nip bad conduct or pervasive conduct in certain areas? >> my background as an engineer, i value data, i do appreciate the data when carefully analyzed can help you shape the course of an organization. i hope to bring some of that personal touch to the analysis of this data moving forward. >> is the fbi system currently in operation? >> i do not have details on that at this time, but i do believe, yes. >> one thing i'd like to know, perhaps you can follow up with a written answer, is the fbi system in effect for all of tsa employees, not just the officers? all employees, number one, and number two, how are they using that data to ensure that people

that may have breaking bad or committing crimes outside of the workforce, how are they being dealt with? >> so we do conduct on an annual basis a criminal history background check on all our employees. we also conduct random and reasonable suspicion-based drug testing, and we certainly have a lot of recurrent training for our staff and the allegations. the data you see before you are direct result of colleagues reporting things that they see out of place. so i think we have some of that in place. >> certainly enhance that. need to get that online. i'd like to know if it's online, if it's operational, and number two, when is it going to be, and number three, how are you using that information? >> i'll take that, sir. >> thank you very much. mr. chairman? >> chair thanks the gentle naan from new york. the chair recognizes the gentleman from new jersey. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

first, let me say i'll be glad to have the opportunity to look at this report after the fact. we are just receiving it, and that is something that is a bit of a concern, but i'll have a great opportunity to look at it later. you know, we're here discussing allegations in terms of tsos and their ability to do a job properly. let me just say that the front line workers in these airports have a job that is of the utmost importance to the flying public to make sure that no harm comes to them during their travel.

they work diligently and they work hard, and i think we need to understand that and make sure that we let them know that we support them. naturally, there are people that aren't doing the job properly, allegations of misconduct, but there's misconduct in everything. there's misconduct with attorneys, there's misconduct with police, there's misconduct with members of congress. so, we need to just focus on a true, true issues and not just blankly penalize the entire workforce. you know, most of these allegations, from what i understand, deal with tardiness and absenteeism, but we have a

workforce here that is because of the issue around wait times, are doing double shifts and just really being pushed to the limit. so, if you do two shifts and you go home and you try to rest, you just might be three minutes late getting back to the job. so, we just want to make sure that, you know, the misconduct that we're talking about is -- rises to a serious level. also, there is an issue around chicago o'hare airport, and contract workers, two unarmed

security guards at o'hare were fired under the pretense that they leaked sensitive security information to the press. prior to that firing, they made statements to the press complaining about their pay, poor working conditions, and retaliation of union organizing activity. they also said that they had no training to deal with emergencies other than to radio supervisors in case of an event. what do you have in place to make sure contractors are giving the type of training that they need in these airports? >> mr. payne, when it comes to the contractors that you're referring to, chicago is a federalized airport, so the

transportation security officers there are federal employees, so i imagine -- i am not familiar with the report that you cited, but if i had to take a stab at it, i would say that the contractors you're probably referring to are the ones that work for the airport in other duties. we certainly have an insider threat program at tsa where we work with our airport and airline partners to make it so that we are putting into effect as many of the recommendations as possible, reducing the number of access points to the sterile area, and increasing the expectation for every airport worker that they will be screened or they will be questioned if they came through a gate that required a badge screening. we have -- we are beginning to see some significant improvement in the insider threat piece, and

we are improving our insider threat training across the system. but if i may, mr. payne, may i just address something you mentioned earlier in your statement, i would like to go on record as saying that 99.7% of tsa officers have passed integrity tests. so i would say 99.7% of our tests have seen positive results. over 5,000 tests at over 200 airports since 2012, and to have that rate speaks to the integrity and the values driven workforce that i am very proud to be a part of. >> okay, well, my time is up, so i yield back, but just before i say that, i do reach out to tsos when i see them. as a matter of fact, on my way back to washington picking up my clothes at the cleaners there was a tso that came in, and i definitely thanked them for their service. >> thank you so much for doing that. >> and i'll yield back.

>> chair thanks the gentleman from new jersey and would like to state for the record all parties on the committee, as well, you folks received the report at the same time, which was yesterday. nobody was given any deference, we all got it at the same time, so with that, the chair will now recognize the gentleman from alabama. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank the witnesses for being here. dr. gowadia, i want to follow up on mr. katko's question about the bonus compensation. you mention these were all senior executive officials and it's now been capped at $10,000. is there a total cap on annual compensation for s.e.s. officials? >> our program is in concert with the opm standards. i do not have the exact number for you, though. >> but is there a total cap? on top of their annual base compensation they can possibly be paid? >> performance bonus? yes, they will be paid -- they are paid a performance bonus

commensurate with their performance in that year, but i do not know the exact cap. >> my question really goes to this, if somebody's being paid $175,000, is there a cap on how much over and above that they can possibly be given, or is it unlimited amount? >> we have controls in the department, so at a certain level you have to pay an s.e.s. 5% as a bonus level. if you decide it's 0 or 5, that's the starting level. beyond a certain dollar value, i can't remember that dollar value, we have to go through the department, the deputy secretary has to approve it. we have a performance review board that reviews everything across the department, but as to the exact value or do we have an absolute cap, i would have to get back to you on that. >> please, do. check and see if there is any cap or not. anyway, the -- i wanted to ask you, five entities within the tsa have responsibilities for

some part of the process to address misconduct. but no one senior official has been clearly designated to oversee it. despite this, tsa has 20 direct reports to the administrator. i find that just phenomenal, 20 direct reports, and nearly 3,000 headquarter employees. that's an awfully big bureaucratic hierarchy. do you think that's the best structure to be used to deal with some of these problems that have been outlined in this report? >> sir, as i mentioned before, when it comes to misconduct allegations, there are different functions that have to work through the system. you need somebody to investigate, you need somebody to adjudicate the findings of the investigation, and you certainly need leadership that can implement the disciplinary process, but all of them do come through for their policies, the office of human capital, and, of course, ultimately their responsibility to the

administrator and myself, so we do have a structure that is actually rather in keeping with the rest of government when it comes to the assignment of functions. the centralization of the workforce management is under way, as i mentioned. we are in fairly short order here we will begin to use an administrator for human capital as the central body that will oversee the policies and the implementation of the policies across the enterprise. >> i guess i'm hearing you say that you don't see a problem with the administrator having 20 direct reports. >> so, we have -- when the administrator came in, he did look at his structure, and he has already consolidated many of those direct reports under a chief operations officer, and so as we look to the future of tsa, we will certainly absorb the findings of your report, any best practices available, as we keep evolving tsa to be an effective and efficient

organization in days ahead. >> i would urge you to look into the private sector for some of these organizational charts as opposed to the government. the government's not been the best role model for that. according to administrator, tsa vets employees on a recurrent basis, you made reference to that earlier today, criminal history checks to identify activity that might not be self reported or disclosed as required. however, our investigation found that other agencies identified criminal activity that tsa missed, which referred to the oig for investigation. please reconcile these two facts. how effective can the current vetting process be if other agencies are identifying information tsa is not uncovering? >> sir, i do believe it depends on what it is that was uncovered. so if it is recreational drug use, that would probably not show up in a criminal history check, for example, so in those

instances, the annual criminal history check would not catch it, but if you were polygraphed at another agency, you might self report on that. >> thank you, i yield back, mr. chairman. >> chair thanks the gentleman from alabama. the chair now recognizes the chair from georgia. >> thank you, thank you both for being here today. this is an extremely important, in my view since i've been here and looking at tsa, tsa is definitely an important aspect of our national security, but i also believe that it is viewed by the american people as potentially one of the most mismanaged and ineffective from the perspective of as we hear about now long wait lines, but also the interaction between tsa employees and the general public, and some other issues, which i'll get into. understand you haven't been on the job very long, so this isn't geared toward you.

you have a lot of work ahead of you if we can turn things around. my first question, mr. oosterbaan, is -- and i'll pose this to both of you, of the numerous allegations of misconduct that are made, generally who makes those allegations? coworkers, supervisors, the allegations, supervisors, the public? who is it that makers most of the allegations? >> i don't have specific information to provide to you, an exact number, it certainly all of the above in terms of the allegations we get. and depend -- and it of course depends on the nature of the allegation. you know, the narcotics through the airport came through a confidential informant, so someone who was not part of the organization at the time. >> okay. would you like to address that? >> i would concur with everything he just said. >> okay. >> one of the things i've known from working in the military and as well as in private business,

one indication of poor moral is exactly what we're seeing here, a lot of allegations, which many may end up being false. i think there is a morale problem. another question, i have is, regarding the number of employees -- i think 781 have been placed on add maybe administrative leave between 2013 and 2015. are generally those employees paid while they're on administrative leave? >> i do believe they are, but i can get back to you on the specifics. >> okay. i would appropriate that because in a previous investigation, we did through this committee, showed that during that similar time frame, the department of homeland security spent over $30 million paying employees to stay at home and not at work because they were on administrative leave, and some of those, for as much as two years. and quite often, our friends on the other side of the aisle say that our biggest problem in tsa is a lack of funding and i think there's at least $30 million we

can use there if we can adjudicate these on a much quicker basis. let me address one other thing very important. i'm going to be meeting with an a.m. bass door of a foreign country over the issues we've been having. . last year a constituent was put in prison in india because when they arrived in india to work for home -- for habitat for humanity, it was found that he had four live bullets in a backpack that he carried on to the aircraft. he didn't know they were in there he borrowed the backpack from his son, went through two tsa checkpoints in the united states and was not found. but when he arrived in india, they were found. right now i have a constituent in mexico, who is arrested. he made it through tsa checkpoint here in the united states for the same thing, live bullets in a backpack that he didn't realize that was there, but was caught as he was trying

to return back to the united states in mexico. he was arrested and imprisoned there. self-employed, he has no income at this point. a friend of mine came to dca without realizing, had a backpack carry on, he had 12 gauge shotgun shells in his backpack that he didn't realize that was there until he got to the hotel in washington d.c., made did to a tsa checkpoint. another one recently made it to the gate at tsa with a pair of sheers that were in their pocket, and reached in their pocked and found a pair of shears that made it through a checkpoint. i personally experienced getting, several years ago, to dc, had a large flat head screwdriver in my briefcase that was not there. i made it through a tsa checkpoint. we're talking about bonuses for performance. these issues, we're lucky these were people who did not have ill

intention. how is this happening? is it a morale issue? is it because we have people on drugs working? i noticed a lot of the insurance stances are not because we're following procedures? is it because technology is not up-to-date? if you could opine on those, please. >> so all of that begins with training. we have to -- you have to prepare your workforce to do their mission, which is why we have started our tsa academy and why we will be sending -- we have sent all of our newly hired officers through there. they receive training on the specific technologies they will use when they hit the airports and we will continue to give recurrent training to our officers. secondly, the technology can and will improve in the future. i will tell you that our rededication to our security mission has resulted in appreciable uptick of the

prohibitive items we find daily at the airports. in 2012 we found about 2,000 five hundred firearms, this year, we are on track to finding about 3,000. we continue to work for our staff to be better vigilant and have better training needs. you may have heard of the training in atlanta, for example, not only does it speed up the flow divesting themselves and moving through the check points, but it allows us to give an officer real time feedback on tests that are run in the system. this helps officers learn and keep improving their skills. working in a check point is a demanding environment, but we do not have the luxury to fail, so we are continuing to invest in our people, and commit to their excellence services support of the nation. >> thank you, doctor. that's the amount of time. mr. chairman, i yield back, but i'm gravely concerned over the bonus issue when the performance issue bonuses do not seem to be

commensurate with the performances we're seeing. thank you. >> chair, thanks, gentleman from georgia, and the chair recognize a chair from florida, mr. clausen -- correction, mr. ratcliffe. you owe me now. >> thank you, chairman. thank you perry, and chairman katko for your work over the last six months to put together this report, and its findings. i want to thank both witnesses, mr. oosterbaan, for the investigative work that your office did here, dr. gowadia, good to see you again, for the benefit of others in the room, i've had the chance to work with dr. gowadia in her prior role as the head of the domestic nuclear detection office and my role of the supcyber security on the ho

han land, and i will day the d.o. under your leadership repeatedly received excellent marks and reviews with respect to its morale, with respect to its efficiency, and effectiveness, so i think that really bodes well. i was pleased to hear about your selection as the deputy administrator at tsa. so, having said that, these are challenging times, and i related the same to administrator nefinger when he was here a few months ago because we know that aviation traffic is up, passenger load is up, and we know terrorists continue to make civil aviation both airlines and airport the target of their twisted ideology, and that being the case, it makes some of what we have in this report, and its findings all the more troubling.

i think that it looks like, i think tsa employs about 60,000 people, and according to this report, a total of 17,611 allegations of misconduct, and so if i'm doing my math right, that means about 29% of tsa's workforce has had misconduct allegations with in the past year. and given that the vast majority of those relate to the tso's, the transportation security officers, folks on the front line, that's even more troubling. you know, one thing that i have almost observed universally, with respect to all successful organizations, is they can point to one of their greatest assets being their people. so dr. gowadia, i want to start with you, and say in trying to get tsa to that place, where it can champion its people as one of its greatest assets, i know

you've only been there for a short time, but i'm -- i'd like your assessment. so is this a problem? is it a need for better protocol? is it an issue of retraining the tsa workforce? you talked about the tsaaa aca y academy, is it a combination of all of those? i'd like your candidated and frank assessments given where you are at this point? >> sir, i would like to reiterate something i said to mr. payne earlier this morning. since 2012, we have conducted almost 5,000 inspections at the airport, integrity testing tests at airports over 200 airports, and 99.7 pass rate for our front line officers. that is an incredibly diligent and proficient workforce, a very professional workforce. we do have some issues with

misconduct, and even one case, is one too many. it starts with training, it starts with providing them the right basics, giving them all the right tools they can possibly have to succeed. career path progression, making sure that technology that they have enables their ability to do their job, keep up with their skills, and certainly i want to thank congress for the additional resources that you have accorded us by virtue of our reprogramings because it allows us to bring on board the right size staff, convert people from part-time to full-time, which also increases performance, retention, and overtime hours, precluding the shift work, tired officers, et cetera. thanks to you we'll have better k nines and better technology and more people on the front lines, and all of that companied with the training and technologies, it has to be a holistic approach. there can be a single bullet

that will fix everything. >> well, thank you. my time is about to expire, but as i have already said i have great confidence in you and your abilities and i'm very pleased so far with how administrator neffinger approached the job in his short time. you and the administrator only have six months until a new administration comes in, so what are your plans with respect to making sure the in i guesstivit the approaches is that you want to fix some of these issues and problems with respect to employee misconduct will carry forward into the next administration? >> mr. ratcliffe, thank you for your vote of confidence. in taking this job i went back to the federal service, so the next administration will continue to see me in service. i hope to stay there for a good bit of my career. but the adminstraighter has

given us a strong foundation virtue of the academy, intent, constant, consistent training across the board. he has set us on a good path and whether he stays on in the next administration or not, i think he's set us off in fine fashion, sir. >> my time's expired. i thank you both for being here, i'll yield back. >> chair, thanks the gentleman from texas, and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from florida, mr. clausen. >> thank you for coming. i'm going to go a little off topic, okay? appreciate what you're doing for our nation. my district is fort meyers, naples. it's a great district, right on the water. we live and die on tourism. we live and die on tourism, and we don't mind being team players. right now, the tsa takes dogs and people out of our airport, to go to chicago or wherever you have long lines in our down season and we hear you. we don't -- you know, we don't -- i ain't been kicking up a lot of dust on this, but when

october and november gets here, we want our people back, y'all. you hear me now and we want our dogs back. >> i hear you, sir. >> i hear you. >> everybody's on the record here. y'all gotta give us our stuff back, we -- you know, we're always small child, you know -- we're the youngest child compared to some of the biggest airports and regions around the country. we already have anne echologica disaster we don't do anything about, and if we don't get on top of that, it's going to hurt my people and hurt my economy, so please give us our people back. we're being team players. we're not squawking, but when our season comes, y'all figure out a way to get our people and our dogs back. i'm pleading with you. >> i hear you, sir. >> home team first. we've got a lot of working-class vote that depends on that industry. the second thing i want to bring up with y'all, this is not -- it's not, you know, bad behavior

or anything like that. it is my impression through my own investigation, and you know reading and studying this, that our dog -- our k9 thing is kind of helter-skelter. if you look in the past we shut down some of our breeding and other internal dog development and it kind of feels like we're a little understaffed on k9s, t particularly that can track that vi vapor sent and if you look at dhs at a broader level, it just feels to me, and seems to me that we could be spending a lot more time and a lot more money on dogs, and that we could under the genetic -- we're buying dogs from europe and mexico, for g ' god's sakes. we send them to texas and we put them out on the field.

it kind of makes me wish we had five x more good dogs and wouldn't be such issues -- because those dogs are pretty -- they're very good, and so -- and machines and humans are not as good in my view on some things. so, it feels like we should be putting a lot more into the dog program. are you agreeing with me on that? >> yes, sir, which is why we are aiming to get up to 500 passenger k9 screening teams. and many thanks to congress for helping us in the reprogramming, that is going to be one of the focus areas for the money. >> are we going to keep buying those dogs from belgium and other countries or in source more of it so we understand -- look if i buy a used car and somebody else has had that motor for three owners, you know what i mean, i don't know if he's reboarded or not, you know, and so i'd -- i think for the genetics of dogs is very

important in how effective they are, correct? >> absolutely. >> but we're outsourcing the genne genetics and the upbringing of those dogs right now. am i right about that? >> mr. clausen, i think it would be very beneficial and walk you through the full extent of our program, how we train the dogs, what it takes to train the dogs and how we put them out into the field, the partnerships domestically and internationa y internationally, i think it would help you to see all of that. at your convention, i'd love to bring the team and share that information. >> i've been talking to some of your folks because i am concerned about my airport, and i think we'd like to put more into it and if y'all want to start training dogs and put up a facility southwest florida, we'd love to have it, i'm very supportive. thank you for coming in today, i'm very appreciative. >> thank you, and i'm going to go for a second round, it's going to be you and me, so with

your in dulljb gence. as you incur more infractions, the pent kurveg goes penalty curve goes up. half of the workforce allegedly committed misconduct from 2013 to 2014. and i say allegedly. and almost half of that did so repeatedly. so half of the 27,000 alleged allegations and of those multiple infractions. and that -- that suggests that this model of increasing penalty is a failure because it hasn't detoured it, but it probably also suggests maybe that's not being implemented, the increasing penalty with increasing infractions. you can speak to that? i know you've been here two months but that's a concern for us. >> chairman perry, i think it is important that we look at the

individual cases to a certain extent, because if you just look at the raw data, the valst majority of those allegations fall within attendance and leave, things that can be addressed using administrative processes. it is not so much an issue of misconduct, as much as it is know issue of performance. so if somebody is tardy once, if somebody is tardy once, it goes from counseling to letter of reprimand, et cetera, et cetera. when it comes to some of the larger numbers, perhaps it would benefit us to tear the individual cases apart. >> then maybe you should have two separate categories so that we can further determine where the bigger problem is and then resources can be extended there. because i tend to agree with you, if it's -- you know, if it's something criminal, that's obviously different than showing up a few minutes late for work. and i think we all get that. but i would also say, and i think you would agree, that integrity of the system depends on everybody doing the best they

can at all times, and while none of us are perfect, if you can be three -- as a boss used to tell me, if you can be three minutes late, you can be three minutes early and you're holding the other person up and the line and these things cascade, so we have to have that level of expectation, of excellence. we -- we're not often -- are often enough going to meet that, but we have to have that expectation that we're going to strive for that every single time and if our metrics don't bear that out correctly, then we need to look at something else, that ad quitly reflects the circumstance so we can address the problem, would agree? >> absolutely, chairman perry. our conduct permeates everything we do, so to the extent that we can separate the more egregious, and devote enough time to training and retraining and continue to praise raise the pro

possessionalism possessionalism, we as a team are committed to excellence. >> let me turn to mr. ooft bam. do you have any thoughts? >> thank you, chairman perry. one thing i would note in reviewing the report of the subcommittee is -- and it's been mentioned earlier, is the lack of consistency, with regard to discipline, perhaps a lack of transparen transparency, and it sounds like tsa is addressing this. i think that's krcritically important. we talked about morale, this notion displcipline is being applied consistently. our legal precedence relies on that to assess whether this discipline was correct. so, i think that's an important point of your report. >> right and if we've missed the

mark, and if the administration has missed the mark, i would also say that attendance can turn into misconduct, and attendance and leave, that category includes awol, absent without leave, and as a military guy, you know, awol is a very, very serious issue. when you're expected on the line, and certainly in the military and certainly in the combat situation, these are issues of life and death, and i don't want to dominion issue im ability of that, or the import of had this at tsa, but these employees are expected to be on the line and it increases the workforce on the time spent and that leads to potential failures so this can be an issue of life and death, right? >> undoubtedly, sir, which is why i said conduct permeates everything we do, how we prepare for the work, how we do when we show up for the work and how we recover and retrain along the

way. you will not get any fight from me on the notion that our workforce needs to be disciplined, needs to commit to excellence, and a course that you're not having to lean on -- >> those adjudications fairly meet meated out are seen by everybody. you mentioned testing -- i want to make sure i understand that, is that integrity from the standpoint of personal integrity? you said it's somewhere in the 97%, is that -- >> 99%. >> i have to tell you, from my standpoint when you said that, how i do jux opposed? how i do view that in light of 27 allegations of misconduct -- nearly half, right -- so 99% integrity rating, i'm wondering do you see that as maybe there's an issue with that system? is it adequate? is it appropriate?

because it's saying everybody has this great integrity but half of the workforce is alleged to have been involved in misconduct, so where is the disconnect there? >> so your personal integrity -- let me give you a sample test that might happen. >> sure. >> an inspector might walk through a checkpoint and accidentally drop some money. in 99% of the those tests since twen 2012 -- >> somebody says, i may have dropped some money, did anybody lose it. >> those are the kinds of tests they're looking at an officer's personal sbintegrity. again, the allegations range from criminal misconduct, about 1% relate to sbintegrity, and 5 attendance and leave. i'm not saying that is any excuse for not having a strong, effective, professional workforce, which we do have at

tsa. i came home. i came home to be a part of a proud workforce, sir. >> all right. i'm going to turn to mr. katko at this time, but i probably have a third round for me with his in dull jendulgence. >> thank you. mr. oosterbaan? >> oosterbaan. quick question for you. in doing your report -- i know the report is not completely finished yet, but i presume you looked at the access control issue, as far as employee misconduct, and by access control, i mean the employees getting access to secure areas of the airports. that is a major concern of mine, particularly in light of what's happened in istanbul, and brussels, but more importantly in mogadishu, where the airports were bombed and the egyptair, as well, and the latter two were definitely inside jobs at airports, it looks like, where bombs were smuggled into corrupt

employees. so, we are very concerned about the access control issue and the site of badge issue and we pass legislation to that extent, sitting in the senate hopefully going to get some attention at some point. with that as a background, double tsa is currently capable of effective oversight of its own employees' access in sterile areas of airports? >> we have in our work we've addressed that concern, and have expressed that concern previously, and your concerns with regard to the screening that isn't currently being done at the vast majority of airports, while we don't have a specific position on that, it makes great sense to us. we get screened when we came into this building, you know we get screened if people come to visit us at the oig get screened so it seems to make great sense to do it at airports.

>> and one of the things that's particularly concerning to me, is a visitor to an airport gets screened at an exponentially point, to individuals that are trusted to secure areas, and we've seen in dallas/fort worth, for example how they exploit that, and i'm concerned about that going forward. soet so to the extent going forward, i would very much appreciate that. now, the last thing i'll note is a little off topic, but it is important, and i do want to note it for the record. prior to coming in here today, dr. gowadia, we had a discussion in the room here about the cuba issue, and i was just handed an e-mail that was sent out this morning, which is celebrating the fact that from the department of transportation, that multiple airlines are now

giving multiple daily flights to the united states from cuba, and that the process is ongoing and looks like it's going full speed ahead. it's going full speed ahead despite the fact that my committee was denied access to even look at the airports in cuba, my committee being the transportation security subcommittee, and we were -- that trip to cuba was necessitated on the fact that we believed some of the conduct at the hearing about cuba led to basically stone walling us, about trying to get that information, so we were compelled to go to cuba ourselves. now we're talking about opening up the airways -- airports, ten airports in cuba with direct flights to the united states, that we have no idea what the security levels are. i know you told me that there is charter airlines that have been operating out of there for quite a while. so quite a different thing from a charter airline who has an occasional stop in cuba to multiple flights with direct flights to the united states.

and also, i will note that there are many security concerns about that, and that is on -- also on the heals of whatels of other a. i'm very concerned about this and the lack of transpatierency coming from tsa and i'm concerned about the fact we were prohibited from going to cuba and making sure airports are safe enough for people to fly from those airports to the united states. i'm very concerned about that and i want to make sure i reiterate that concern on the record because this seems like with this administration, it's a run away train and no one's going to be able to stop them from being able to do this. we're going to try our hardest to at least make sure the american people are safe when they fly to and from those airports and there's a lot of work to be done. there's concerns about the -- whether or not air marshals are going to be allowed on the flights, there's concerns about

the integrity of the employees, and whether the equipment is sufficient or existent at all. these are all things we need to have secured and vetted in a public setting so the american people can make inform would decisions whether or not they want to go to cuba based on these security concerns. and overlay that with the fact the communist government with cuba is not letting us in, is still subject to the sanctions from the united states, which i don't think any other airport in the world has, and overlay that cuban passports are showing up all over the middle east, and especially afghanistan, and certainly people are looking into cuba as being a new gateway for terrorists and hostile relations between united states and cuba lent that people in cuba might be so pissed off, and so mad they might do something stupid, and all of those things are at a high concern and i ask

that you convey them that we need to have access to those airports so we can see for ourselves whether or not they are in proper shape to allow american travelers to come and lastly i'll note it's our job as oversight and we feel like we're not doing our job so i asked in strongest words possible that you convey that to the folks at tsa and at homeland security. >> i certainly will, sir. >> the last thing i'll say -- and i'm sorry -- the other thing i want to ask about, and perhaps i'll wait until the next round is the overuse of the security classifications by tsa to shield themselves from discussing unfavorable topics in public and i want to talk about that perhaps if we have another round. >> chair, thanks to the gentleman. the chair would like to followup on one of his line of questions regarding -- and it was also the good gentleman from alabama, mr. rodge rodge

rogers about vetting, screening, testing e et cetera, other agencies identify criminal activity tsa missed. and i just want to make sure how that's done. so there is concurrent testing of current employees, so not justin comi just incoming employees, so as you're employed by tsa, you have some on an annual basis; is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> is there a variation in that not only in time, but say a different paradigms? the whole panoply? so this year you might have been tested -- let's say you're a two-year tsa employee, and you think you're going to have another check in say check, that check happens in september so you can't predict when. that didn't include a polygraph, but tit includes a polygraph net year and didn't include a state

police background check. i just want to get a flavor for the variations of that so there's an unpredict abiliabili the point of tsa employees to be able to thwart that system that we're all concerned about. >> let me confirm that. the annual and concurrent piece is a vetting against your criminal history. >> okay. >> the testing happens for drug testing for example, happens on a reasonable suspicion basis, or a random basis. >> or a what basis? >> random basis. >> but regularly occurring. so in the military f you're in the military, there's going to be a random drug test. you might show up for six times in a row t might happen a couple months in a row, it might not happen for eight months at a time. is that similar to tsa? >> i do not know the full details of this program yet, but i imagine that random translates

just as you mentioned. >> you can confirm that for me. >> would you allow me to take it as a getback, please? >> yes. >> and on the other paradigms, it seems to me once you get in, look, people are people, and we have people that are radicalized, we have people influenced by different things. they become dejected what have you, influenced by blackmail, and it seems to me this infrastructure that we protect, the american flying public, there should be a pretty robust paradigm that is random and covers the full panoply so that we keep honest people honest. i don't know how else to put that, but i would like your thoughts and if you could get back to me on that, as well. let me move on to another question that i have. according to individuals who came forward to the committee, senior managers at tsa have used directed reassignments, that's a terminology i'm familiar but i

want to make sure we're clear, to at times punish those who elevate security concerns. this practice potentially poses a significant cost to taxpayers, the adm the adminstraighter, neffinger is concurring this is no longer happening. in june, tsa reassigned an fs derd requiring her to report from across the country in the past few days. if you can explain, explain how it can occur. >> i would like to reiterate what the administrator said at the hearing you've referenced. an operating agent needs to move its people periodically, mission-driven, full controls applied, well vetted, does it go through the office of human

capital, is it financially sustainable, et cetera. when it comes to individual cases, it is a discussion we should probably have in a dfrtd environme different environment and i would like to present offline all the details. >> are these permanent reassi reassignmen reassignments, or are they temporary, are they both? three days to relocate across the country, i'm thinking if i had to relocate in three days across the country, it would -- i've got a family, we've got a house -- most people do, so that's a hardship and we understand they're usually -- like a military tdy move or some other government move, there's fairly robust today of time of selling your home and setting up your new home and all of that. what is the circumstance there and is there, if you would, do you have any thiknowledge of it being used as a point of reprisal, and how do you gauge, how do you monitor so that

doesn't happen in the future? >> so, again, in this particular instance, what we can discuss it, all the details in a different environment. we do use a details, tdy's. we do ask for permanent reassignments. sometimes employees themselves ask for reassignments to be directed to new assign mentds. whatever -- however the case comes about, it is presented to executive resources council, we work through the human capital office, we work through the cfo and make sure that decision is being made in the best interest of the mission while keeping the employees -- the employee in mind. >> and i do appreciate your mission focused attitude. it has to be mission focused. i do want to set up a further time if it involves particular employee information that would be appropriate but i do want to do that.

>> right. i would like to underline, sir, this practice does not occur as a retaliatory measure on admin neffinger's watch. he discontinued that practice. >> and since you brought that back up and if you can, in this setting, so i don't know if -- we don't want to divulge operational issues here, but how do you monitor whether it's being used in a -- what is the safeguard to make sure it's not being used in a retaliatory fashion? >> it can no longer be done as a unilateral action. there are controls in place. >> so it comes up to various agents -- people -- >> it comes up the agency, has -- there's deliberations involved -- >> is there a process for redress for the employee if they feel it has not been correctly adjudicated as it moved up the chain? is their a process for redreadds and maybe the ig knows -- is familiar? >> certainly, we would address that if the allegation was raised to us, that that would be kind of a classic retaliation case that we would investigate.

>> and do you have a familiarity with this case or any others? >> i'm not sure which case we're talking about, so -- >> okay, fair enough. all right. at this time, i'll yield to the gentleman from new york, themr. katko. >> thank you. as we alluded to earlier, there was a hearing a while back built whole cuba issue, and prior to the hearing, they -- many of us, staffers, congressmen and women, many individuals met with folks from tsa to get briefed on what was going on in cuba. based on that briefing, we became very concerned about the security issues with respect to cuban airports. at no time during that hearing -- at no time during that meeting rather did anyone from tsa raise any concerns about any of the information that they were discussing being of a sensitive, secure, confidential, secret nature. no security classification, whatsoever. it wasn't even discussed, was never discussed. we've come to the hearing to

discuss the very same matter, so we could have a public discourse on it, and immediately that information was designated by the same witness who spoke to us in the meeting as being security, sensitive information which we could not discuss in public public. it raises thespe spectrum, tsa s the security classifications to avoid having certain discussions about things that may be unpleasant to discuss in public. let me ask you, mr. oosterbaan, did your report look at this issue at all, about the over use of security classifications with respect to employee misconduct? >> we have just begun an audit on this, so we do not have a current report on it. we're very concerned about it, and while it's just start ago and i don't have a date yet -- it should be relatively soon. >> i'm very glad to hear that has started. it was requested -- i made a request to the inspector

generagenera general's office after that hearing. let me ask you dr. gowadia, and you've been very patient with some of my questions. let me ask that hearing and since i raised the issue with admiral neffinger, has there been any discussions at tsa? >> we have definitely spoken to our staff to be more deliberate, be more up front when they are discussing material that could expose vulnerabilities, et cetera, to make it very clear to whom we're sharing that information, that is that is security-sensitive information, and apply the right wrappers to it, so that you know ahead of time, what can and can't be discussed. >> okay. now on top of that, not just with respect to this issue, but with respect to other security issues, basically to over use it with the allegation is, in order to not have to talk about unpleasant things with respect to tsa, have you looked at the larger issue? >> we have not started that,

sir, but we'll certainly take that under advise mement. we'll wait for that under the inspector general, and act on what we would like to see. and i know you feel the same way about this matter, discussing vulnerabilities, aiding and abetting the enemies is certainly not in the interest of the american public and i do appreciate your support in that regard. >> of course. no one wants to do that, but we also have a solemn responsibility to protect the american public and when you have memos like we got today, saying that they're going headstrong in with opening up airports all over cuba and we are still don't have any of these things answered, and they may be opening up as soon as the next few months, american airlines i believe is already selling seats for september for those flights, and we have no answers, understand why we are concerned about this and understand why there needs to be a public dialogue, and understand why we as a committee, may be skreeptical

about some of the security designations because anybody who walks through the airports in cuba can see the same thing. so i don't understand how they are considered to be classified. so with that being said, i want to thank you for your patience, i want to thank you. i know some of the questions were tough, and personally, you just started on the job. i have great faith that tsa is going in the right direction with your leadership and admiral neffinger's, but there are also tough questions. like i said in the room, the tenor and the relationship between the committee, my committee at least, and tsa's to be dictated by how some of these questions are answered, and we've had a very good relationship so far. that relationship has been tinged by the last hearing and i'm hoping it gets repaired and we move forward together because the security of airports is what our job is to do -- to make sure we do as best we can, and i am not at all confident that's the case with respect to cuba. >> you have my support in that partnership, sir.

>> chair, thanks. the gentleman -- let me wrap up with just a couple final questions and thoughts. i'm wondering -- and mr. oo oosterbaan, and dr. gowadia, did you conduct a survey where you survey the employees on a battery of questions that's ever changing about their perceptions of management, you know their upper management, lower management, punishment -- all of that stuff, what i would call a c climate survey, is that something you institute in the performance of personnel management? >> i know we take the federal employee viewpoint survey, which in some aspects is a climate survey, sir. i know we take that annually, just like the other federal government. i know if we add on to that other climate surveys. >> mr. oofter boosterbaan? >> we conduct regular

inspections of ourselves and we do a morale survey that addresses the issues that you mention. >> let me delve into that, with the morale, what kind of things do you glean from the survey that you can put into action or some actionable item to address an issue? can you give me examples of actions or solution sets? >> if the surveys are done correctly, you're going to get a lot of information running the gamut, but an example would be inconsistent application of disciplinary rules, favoritism -- >> are those issues that you've seen in tsa, because you mentioned them, i mean, i don't know if you're just giving me potential data or these are things you're familiar with because you've seen them and there's an increased occurrence of those items? >> i was speaking more generally. >> okay. >> but i think your report reports to these things more

directly. >> okay. is that something that's done -- how often, the climate or employee survey? how often does that occur? >> i was referring to our internal. >> right. >> surveys, and we do those somewhat independently, in other words, not on an expect recurrent basis. >> okay. >> but we also have every one of our field offices and all of our people on a regular inspection and survey. >> doctor, do you know? >> i can speak to the federal employee viewpoint survey, which we do take every year, and that are certainly very similar to what my college mentioned. i will tell you that my experience with the survey is they have very good data. first encourage staff to take the survey and increase the response. when your soldiers are talking to you, you can lead them, right, because you have to inspire that response.

some of the things we did at dndo back in the day, we analyze today carefully, and found a couple places we could make immediate improvement. the solution sets don't always come from management. in fact they usually come from people who know what is broken and know how to fix it. so relying on employee teams to have solve things is critical, and a lot of these experiences that i did have at dndo, i hope to bring to tsa acknowledging they're completely different workforces in size and scale and mission, but i will stress to you in the federal employee viewpoint survey, question 43, my supervisor treats me with respect, i find that to be a tremendously powerful question, because if you're treated with respect, you're more likely to overperform, and more likely to feel that you work in a safe and secure environment, and so this is the one question that i will continue to pay attention to. i have seen supervisors peg out at 100% on that question.

and deservedly so. i will throw a shout out to tsa supervisor supervisors, they do rather well in the survey, sir. >> thank you, i appreciate that kind of winding this down, just a couple thoughts. you need to know -- and i don't know if you do -- that gentleam that misconduct runs from the bottom line brand-new employee to the very top and i want to make sure oig has investigate the former leaders including former admin stristrators for alleged misconduct and i also don't know -- i received information recently that some of your folks in management -- not tso's, but in management were asked to be deposed and be asked some questions and they declined. agency council because they have no confidence in the chief council, and you need to know that. this might be a pesrsonality issue, but the chief council is

known to me, and it's known to me from the madison guarantee issue, where the chief council was then an object of investigation as purported to provide information of the investigation to other people that were objects of the investigation. and i tell you this because in this context of low morale, or not optimal morale, at the same time we see this issue of misconduct, those issues are important to people and how they react to them, and how you -- in this new job of yours, you have very little time to make the first impression -- and you know this, you're a smart lady -- and set that standard and that -- and that circumstance where justice is blind and there's standard that everybody from the top to the bottom has to adhere to and will be judged on accordingly. you're the person to do that, right? and i just wanted to outline that. we appreciate your time here today, we thank you very much

for it. i thank you the witnesses. your testimony has been valuable and i thank the members for their questions. members may have some additional questions and we'll ask you to respond those in writing. pursuant to the committee rule 7 e, the hearing record will remain open for ten days without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. cspan's washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. and coming up friday morning, one of donald trump's initial supporters, congressman tom reed will discuss mr. trump's meeting in a bid to unify the party and community activist, and black lives matter, deray mccus in, we'll discuss these issues,

beginning live at 7:00 a.m. eastern friday. join the discussion. the presidents of the european commission and the european council address the eu parliament on the subject of britain's referendum vote on leaving the european union and their meeting with outgoing british prime minister david cameron. this portion of the parliament' proceedings includes remarks by british representatives. >> translator: ladies and gentlemen, please be seated. we it now continue with our debat debates. our next item on the agenda is the conclusions of the european

council. this is a council collusion to the european council of the 28th and 29th of june. i'd like to give the floor to the president of the european council, mr. donald tusk. welcome mr. tusk, you have the floor. >> thank you. the president members of the european parliament, before presenting discussion on the political consequences of the uk referendum, i will first report on the other results of the june european council, because the uk cannot stand until. the referendum in the uk does not relieve the eu of its guilty to solve immigration crisis, which has undermined the sense of security across the whole of europe. the eu must also boost its resistance to growing hybrid and cyber threats. to thisse this end, we adopted

increased corporation with nato. even in the uk referendum campaign fewer questions the fact that economic integration among members state benefit europeans as it kcreates jobs. this is why we've made the decision to work more closely together in the areas of digital and capital markets. the decision taken during the summit will have a positive impact on the lives of europeans regardless of the uk leaving the eu. on migration, the leaders reviewed the situation on the extent of our borders, acrossin acrossings from the turkey to greek islands have almost come to a halt. in october 2015, that border was crossed regularly by 7,000 people daily. now, it is around 50 per day.

given the significantly lower n infl influx, we can lower the part of our external border. this, in turn, should restore the sense of security in europe, which was our aim from the beginning. now, our attention will focus on the central mediterranean route to flows of predominantly migrants remain too high, although there have not been a significant rise in numbers compared to the last two years. leaders agreed to move to a new way of working with third countries applying the necessary leverage to ensure fast and operational returns of illegal legal migrants. the aim is clear, all irregular economic migrants must be rushed to the countries of origin. the high representative is

already taking negotiations with these countries forward. we also address libya and what needs to be done to stabilize the situation there. more broadly, we welcome the presentation by the high representative of a new global strategy to guide the unions foreign and security policy. the leaders thank prime minister for the dutch presidency and the hard work over the past six months including the arrangement with turkey to stem migration flows to the greek islands and the political agreement on the new european border and coast guard. i would like to thank this house for your invaluable contribution, in helping achieve this in the necessary time frame. the members, let