white house. announcer: next, jeffry wert talks about the generals who engaged in 1864 shenandoah valley campaign. he looks at how ulysses s. grant and robert e. lee in the shenandoah valley from a strategic standpoint. he also delves into the personalities of the generals and how this impacted the campaign. the shenandoah valley battlefield foundation hosted this talk. mr. wert: i should thank kevin but i always seem to get the timeslots -- i assure you we will be going to lunch on time. i am not very bright but i am bright enough to know that, so don't worry about that. on august 23, 1864, president lincoln held a cabinet meeting.

for the previous weeks, he had been getting telegrams from republican politician say it, you cannot be real elected. -- cannot be re-elected. the people have had it with your administration. you have to address certain things. this meeting, he did. he asked every member to sign a letter which lincoln had written. in that letter, he and his cabinet pledged their support to the next administration, who lincoln thought would not be him. bud touched upon it, but if you go back a little bit, think of this. if you look at the overland campaign -- to put it in perspective, the army of the potomac, that army that defended

little round top disappeared in may and june 1864. they suffered more casualties than antietam, chancellorsville, and gettysburg combined. i saw a newspaper from new york. in those days, when you publish something, it was for pages. -- it was four pages. it was published that summer in a small new york county. it listed the casualties. that is all the paper was about. you can imagine that hurt that is going on within northern communities. this is -- if the civil war was a bad dream, the summer of 1864 was a nightmare.

and certainly so for the families there who saw this. what else do we know? chambersburg was in ashes. you have sherman somewhere outside of atlanta get people did not know that maybe in 10 days from august 23, that atlanta would fall but he was bogged down in georgia and there is no resolution to this. and grant is in petersburg but that seemed to be endless, too. more casualties mounted up. also, though, in june, before grant would cross the river, robert e. lee made a decision. this is the man who in 1862 took command of the army of northern virginia.

he had already formulated a strategic decision. he realized that the confederacy cannot sit there and wait because ultimately, lincoln probably find somebody who will unsheathe that sort of northern power and he is going to crash the confederacy so you have to take chances. what happened in the spring of 1864 -- and lee also understood -- you can read his writing -- he knew what was at stake. what was at stake was a presidential reelection in the north. because the south folks cannot win do a military victory in the civil war. the only way the south could achieve independence was to bring the northern administration to the negotiating table. they had to reach a political settlement. the north had to crush the south.

on may 4, 1864, and for the next 11 months, grant grabbed the army by the throat and started to apply pressure. he choked the army of northern virginia to death, right? that is what he did. lee had been them into taking the terms of war in the east. -- the man who had dictated the terms of the war in the east. he is the one that held strategic initiative. you know as well as i do, the terrains of campaigns, that was lee framing those. when grant to the army across the rapid and river, grant

season strategic initiative and -- grant seized the strategic initiative and grant would dictate away this what was going to be found. so lee was facing in in mid-june. in the west, you can argue that wasn't difficult -- but anyhow, they did with him -- but more importantly, another union army of david hunter was threatening a railroad center in lynchburg, virginia. lee had to address that. he ordered early west to address hunter. early would speed west. hunter would disappear into the mountains -- literally, really. he did disappear into the appellations.

asked of the -- of the appalachians. but then also lee told early that if you have the opportunity, turn north. why? because lee was trying to retake the strategic initiative from grant. this is the truly last great gamble of robert e. lee. bud mentioned this movie about fort stedman. that was a tactical gamble, right? early goes to the outskirts of washington dc and retreats. the new york times editorializes that the back door of the shenandoah valley had been left open to the confederates. it is in the east where sherman

-- richard would know better than me -- banished reporters from the army. it was the east where the news is being made and here is the shenandoah valley once again. it is that great valley of virginia and you can argue, i don't know, in a sense, that the spirit of stonewall jackson still haunts there. have they been defeated? no, they haven't. once again, the confederacy using that valley as strategical entry. grant was very slow in reacting to what. he puts ron siegel in charge. and then david hunter. grant was more focused on the army of northern virginia and

not necessarily the shenandoah valley. and then we come july 30. remember what happened that day -- the crater, the news of that disaster, and more importantly, the confederate cavalry rode into chambersburg, pennsylvania and destroyed over 400 residences and businesses by flame. this is what lincoln is faced with. so lincoln goes and meets grant because we have to do something about the shenandoah valley. george mead certainly would be willing to be a commander of this new army if it is formed. grant sort of mention that -- no, no, no -- can't do that. they has been helping me since gettysburg.

-- they had been howling at me since gettysburg. i am not going to get rid of him -- by the way, you know, george mead is a good soldier per can -- can you imagine how difficult it would be to have the boss sitting over your shoulder? once a campaign started, neither staff could stand each other. you know. the difference of course was that grant had to exercise the ghost of the 12th. -- exercise the ghost of mcclellan .grant came in and he would do that, eventually. nevertheless, a good soldier. basically reduced into a glorified chief of staff to grant, right? then for reasons that are hard to understand, grant proposed william b franklin. . he had been enamored with franklin since their west point is because franklin graduated

first in his class and sam grant thought he was simply brilliant. well, to lincoln, eastbound of of -- smelled of mcclelland and anybody smelling of mcclelland would not be commander of the army, so they left it at that. grant said, i'm appointing a 33-year-old irishman and i don't know whether it was age or the fact that he was irish but stanton -- hard to believe he was going to be phil sheridan, but it was phil sheridan because grant wanted somebody finally to take over the army in the valley and do something about it. phil sheridan will, north through washington and when he does, as far as we know, we are not certain -- said to him, you cannot afford to lose a battle in the valley. the president's political campaign cannot stand another battlefield defeat in the shenandoah valley, so you will

act with caution. and so sheridan will -- what about -- i will tell you, i really don't like sheridan. it doesn't matter. i will tell you that because he takes credit for everything afterwards and he deservedly doesn't deserve to do that. his good friend george crook had some ideas about the battles but when you read sheridan's reports, it was the brilliance of sheridan -- he's not very -- i've always -- if you think of three legged stool and an oak tree stump, that was sheridan. the joke was that it was this little man on such a big horse and also the joke was to get on that horse you have to shimmy up a sword. so anyhow, he takes command.

it is a mountain. the bedrock is the sixth core. and what you speak -- folks i will tell you -- the correct term at this time -- he used to be the eighth core but now it is the army of west virginia under george crook. they are going to bring infantry and a calvary division. at the end of august because grant really doesn't need him on a peninsula, he sends to cavalry divisions to sheridan's army. he was a logical choice to head the second core, the second call was probably the logical choice to go into the valley in 1864. he would not send the first

corps. he is recovering from his wilderness wins. then what is interesting -- and this, you must understand -- in mid-august, robert e. lee decides to up the ante in the valley. he commits joseph kershaw and the calvary division to the valley. so he is sending them there to reinforce early and at the same time, expecting something. just got to tell you something. i guess he was short -- even shorter. i read the best description of a short man i had ever read in the civil war. this officer wrote that he could eat up all of soup off of lee's head when he was standing down and he was standing up, so

evidently he was a short man -- but we don't picture these men as short, right? but he was about 5'4" -- anyhow. so, early acts aggressively. from the early weeks of august, august 7, an officer called it mimic war. sheridan advances south, a here comes fitfully, sheridan retreats back to harpers ferry but eventually he will move down. don't worry about where you are fighting the battle. then things change and the changes here in atlanta. finally, with sherman's capture of atlanta, in grant had become

frustrated with the situation in the valley, he decides something is now going to be done and i am going to unleash sheridan and he will go there. i am not going to address the burning but i will address something prior to it. ericsson talked about the burning this afternoon. you have to understand this in another sense. you can go to berryville, one of you probably knows the route number, you turn right and go down the road and you will come to a farm and there is a little monument that says, mosey's rangers attacked the barn burners and took no prisoners. he captured 30 men.

the ditch is still there. they lined them up and shot every one of them. they missed one penny called away because he is lying in the bushes with a head wound and he sees some rangers coming back and they go systematically by every one of them took on their throat and put another bold in their head -- this is 1864. and what their throat report another bullet in their head in 1864. this is not the days of 1861. this is the reality of 1864. when grant said to clean it out, he meant clean it out. they got permission -- in fact, grant -- you can go to charleston, you can go to the house -- it is it is a bed-and-breakfast -- probably in the front lawn there -- if you want to go to the casino, it is right across the road. that is where sheridan got permission from grant to advance against early's army at

winchester. in fact, grant issued the shortest order in military history after he heard everything sheridan was saying, grant simply said go in. on september 19, he attacked. the problem with this, i may not like sheridan as a man, as a tactician, he was lucky in the valley. he could make mistakes. he probably outnumbered early 2.5 to 3. early could not make any tactical mistakes. but early made a critical mistake. this cautiousness by sheridan which early could not quite understand -- here is this man with this weapon and he is not using it and he thought his opponent was timid.

he was just waiting to be released. early had strung out his army in day before -- for example, as richard mentioned about the calvary, early had disdain for the calvary. many of them were armed with muskets. they were called dog soldiers. they said you can see calvary men with the hooves of their dead horse strung over their shoulder because they had to cut off the hooves to keep the horse shoes. he hears news that the federals are going to reoccupy martinsburg -- now, what would you do? no, he sends two infantry divisions. early goes along. and he goes into the telegraph

office in martinsburg and reads that grant had visited the army. he very quickly realized that if grant is here, something is as a confederate would say later, we were like a string of eads with a not-b in between. in the morning of september the 19th, the one thing early needed was time and phil sheridan gave him time by signed to his entire army. .t was a battle standoff in this time of the war, it's one of those battles you don't have anymore.

it was a very standup fight. guess in the sense symbolically, certainly for the valley and the war, it came about 4:00 that afternoon. if you were in george patton's brigade defending the north and looking north, you would have heard the sound first. there was the sounds of thousands of horses coming at him with men that were carrying sabres, revolvers, well-fed it behind them was the military might of the north. those factories that produced that allowed these men to be here and so well-equipped and early simply could not handle them and they crashed that line north of winchester

and sent the rebels through winchester. the decisive tactical element in the valley was sheridan's calvary. again, it would fall three days later with fishersville. early should have thought there before winchester. by this time, he had suffered morale. his lines were too thin. the week as part of fishers hill, go to the east and -- really a series of ridges but down in the back road is where he puts his calvary. those guys who would rather run than fight in the air going to be outflanked thanks to george kirk -- george crook. anyhow, in the aftermath of fishers hill, one of the fighters said, early is

played out and early was about played out here and right before that, whom lee had ordered kershaw. after fisher's hill, he is going to send kershaw that. by the way, also understand a little bit of that, in the twilight of fisher's hill, sammy pendleton who had just gotten married -- his wife as a child -- there he is rallying troops and sammy pendleton would be mortally wounded. this campaign not only wrecked the calvary of jackson, it is killing its soul gradually and pendleton it to

myself. well anyways, early retreats up the valley. and then, very interesting -- this is the clear difference between sheridan and grant, immediately grant saw the opportunity. he saw it. all you need to do is cross the mountain and come in the back door to richmond and we can end this war a lot sooner in infill sheridan started to send him reasons why he cannot do it. in fact, sheridan unlike any general, sheridan says, you can take my army. i whipped jubal early, you do not need me. you can have the calvary back. we will occupy the valley know, grant was absolutely right. but sheridan did not see that. early would have put up a fight in the

blue ridge mountains, but his morale is that that and so forth, so sheridan starts to retreat back in marches south down the valley and outset middletown along cedar creek. in the meantime, robert e. lee is -- early as saying, look, you have to do something. i think you are fighting your army piecemeal. we need a victory, in other words what lee is saying. early is writing back saying, damn yankees in this valley. lee did not think it was possible. heating thing with the army opposing him at petersburg that

they had so many yankees soldiers in the valley. oh, there is a lot of them. so early decides, he follows them up fisher's help. -- fisher's hill. and by the way, gordon and early did not get along. early saw gordon as a threat to the second corps. he looked down upon those camps and saw -- by the way -- just want to tell you something -- you are afflicted with tangents -- you go off on pages that are inexplicable but i want to tell you this. when we were doing this study, we go into the belly of one of those government buildings in washington for lack of a better word we run into a geek or nerd. and this geek or

nerd is mapping the valley with something called gps. but he was using jedediah hodgkins' ma[p. in this nerd or geek was dumbfounded that somebody could have such an accurate map. he imposed his own it and he was dumbfounded. i just want to tell you that. but anyhow -- so they are up there looking -- the left shank -- by the way, sheridan had left because he figured the campaign is over and he was heading to washington to end it. so, early really takes a gamble.

folks, this is unmatched in this civil war. no other army marched all night. got into position and launched an attack. he will not find it anywhere else. the sweep the yankees away. if you ever go there and study cedar creek, he was the one mistake he made. the key to victory was the valley pipe. he had to get north of the valley pipe. he had to nature the federals could not rally, ok? well, he is halted in the cemetery. that time, the yankee calvary was in position and you are not going to move those boys. phil sheridan arrived from winchester. that long ride that

was memorialized by upon. he got it together and his officers said we are ready to retreat retail winchester and phil sheridan said, retreat, hell, we are going after them. sheridan 's had an odd hit among other things -- an odd head. he had a lot of bumps on his head. this is a true story. think it was william mckinley third to take off your hat so you can see your head and they will know it is you -- so sheridan took his hat off and phil was back. because,

what sheridan had done, starting in winchester, he had taken these men and made them an army and a 4:00 that a bugle blaring the charge, they rolled over what was left of the army of the valley and got a victory. i will be honest with you, when i first wrote my talk, it was my first book, and i don't talk about books at all, you know, but when i wrote it, but i was young, dumb, and i'm not sure i wanted to overstate things, you know? and i don't think i gave this campaign its significance politically, but as time had gone by and i looked at this --

and there is no question that all of the land is critical to lincoln's political fortune -- but then you have in this region of the east, this region dominated by confederate arms in '61, you have a drumroll of victory, winchester, they finally, they finally achieve victory. this sealed the deal for lincoln's administration as far as battlefield victories. now clearly, the end was in sight. lee, now lee at petersburg must have looked at

this and said, look, we have to have victory here. because this presidential election is nearing and we have to somehow, if we can, change our fortunes. because lee fully understood that once lincoln was reelected, it is only a matter of time. he had voiced that earlier. because he knew there would be no turning back. there were a couple of what if questions asked a while back, but i don't answer any what if questions except if someone offers me a drink. [laughter] mr. wert: but anyhow, let's say they won, in my view, lincoln would have not stopped waging this war. he would have done everything possible to end it. i am not sure of that, i don't know, but i believe that. but anyway, he didn't have to, because thanks to sherman's army in georgia, and the army in the shenandoah

valley, lincoln's reelection was reassured and the road appomattox had quickened greatly. thank you. [applause] coming up this weekend on american history tv on c-span3. tonight at eight eastern on lectures in history, virginia commonwealth university films maden student it during the cold war out of fear the u.s. population was falling behind the soviet union and science education. and sunday morning at 10:00 on road to the white house we want, the 1952 and 1948 national conventions. in an 1952, dwight eisenhower accepted the republican nomination and adelaide stephenson received the democratic nomination on the third ballot. in 19 88, the first televised conventions were pren