of u.s. military tactics and policy. in addition, assistant director of getty burglary's war draws te ian isherwood sim plarets between the civil war and world war i. he discusses the development of theories have their roots in the civil war era tactics. this panel is about an hour and 15 minutes. >> good afternoon, i'm peter carmichael, professor of history here at geties berg college. it is my pleasure to introduce our panelists this afternoon, conversation on lessons learned by the u.s. military. so let me first introduce our panelists. i will begin with jennifer murray, who of course is on my far right. jennifer is assistant professor of history at the university of virginia, her research explores

the relationship between warfare and the creation of historical memory with particular emphasis on the preservation of battle fields. her first book on a great battlefield, the making, management, and memory of gettiesburg national military park earned the 2014 award for contributions to historical nderstandings of the getty sburg campaign. many of you in the audience have benefited from her superb tours. she is working on a geography of general gordon meade which i hope will be published by the university of north carolina press. ian isherwood to the left of jen, he is the assistant director of the civil war institute at gettysburg college

for a few more months. he has accepted a position as a assistant professor in war and memory studies which i assume will be part of the civil war studies program right here at gettysburg college. it's a good thing for our students, not a great thing for c.w.i. he has been a very important part of what we do here. he is fantastic, though, with our students. he is especially, especially gifted when it comes to developing our students' research interests. in fact, he took one of our students to oxford to deliver a paper and i believe, ian can correct me on this, that he co-wrote a paper, a war and memories study, the journal, did i get that wrong? prof. isherwood: war and society. >> it will be coming out in a year. very rare as you can probably imagine where a college

professor, especially in history, that they are able to do their own research but not on their own, not in isolation, but their colleague is an undergraduate. so ian has done fantastic work there. he will continue to do that as he moves on. i should also had that ian is an active scholar as well. he has his own book coming out entitled "remembering the great war, writing and publishing the experiences of world war i." it will be released in november of 2016 and i suspect that we can get ian to come back. he said he would stop by on occasion. will you stop by, ian, to sign some books for everyone? can you work it into your schedule? prof. isherwood: anything for you, pete. >> the devotion and loyalty of my staff, it almost brings a tear to my eye. it's really pretty amazing. christian keller. christian keller is professor of history in the department of national security and strategy at the united states war

college in carlisle where he teaches courses on the theory of war and strategy, national security policy and strategy and the war in history. among his many publications of the civil war, he is author of chancellorsville and the germans, nativism,eth anyities and civil war memory. that is coed it'sed and he is a co-author of the book, "dutch, pennsylvania germans at getty sburg. he is working on a project right now between lee and jackson. you are thinking what more could be said about stone wall jackson. christian has a lot to say about that. he is going to emphasize the religious and spiritual relationship between those two men and that book i hope will be published by the university of north carolina press as well. i should quickly add that christian was also, back in the

day, he was a recipient of one of our high school scholarships. what year was that? prof. isherwood: it was both 1987 and 1988. >> you got two? we don't allow that anymore, man. one and that's it. prof. isherwood: they must have liked me. >> he is a graduate of washington lee college. he did his graduate p.h.d. at penn state. he started with dr. gallacher. i said yesterday, west virginia university, what i was thinking, west virginia university and university of virginia are so close. dr. gallacher moved on to u.v.a. wait, i taught at w.v.u. i love west virginia university, it's a fine institution. dr. gallacher went on to u.v.a. and then you worked with carol rear don and mark neely for your dissertation. so i will turn it over to the panel. christian will begin by reading a paper and we'll have some

comments and questions for the audience. ake it away. prof. keller: thank you, pete, for that generous introduction. thank you all for being here after lunch. i know what this can be because when i have to teach an elective at 1:00, my officers are generally not exactly the happiest to be there at 1:00 in the afternoon. they like the morning classes because they can go and the golf course beckons after lunch. this is a tough slot. we will endeavor to ensure that you stay awake. that's my plan. there are some tough material in this. i'm going to try to make it interesting and make wild jess particularlations and things likes that, we'll do our best. ok.

>> decisions, actions and events in the real world. studying the past would sharpen judgment and thinking skills before combat, not prescribed decision-making while it occurred. it allowed future generals to experience the wars of history through the thoughts and actions of the great captains and in so doing, increase their critical and creative thinking. as the prussian himself put it, studying the lessons of military history should aim at improving "the mind of the future commander or more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not accompany him to the battlefield."

history, whether it be from the american civil war or some other conflict was a means to n end. that end was the intellectual preparation of military leaders and their future performance on the battlefield, both of them. education and practical application, if you will, the two went hand in hand and in the 50 years following appear mat ox, the leaders of the u.s. military came to embrace that duel end state. one major way they did that was to study the campaigns of the civil war, indeed, the post-war american military looked primarily to the lessons of leadership conveyed by that recent cataclysm, both to educate its officers and to deal realistically with the military challenges confronting them in the years prior to world war i.

the occupation of the defeated south, the indian wars, the spanish american war, world wars 1 and ii, all of the mode at -- all of them owed some degree of their character to the civil war. pushing towards the middle of the 20th century, the insights of 1861-1865 were relegated more and more to the educational mission of the military academy and war college than to operational doctrine and practitioners in the field. but even so, the legacies of the war for the union were still studied and persevered in a very real and practical matter through battlefield staff rides where officers gleaned nuggets of value about the nature of war by studying the decision-making of meade, mcclellan, jackson, grant, and sherman on the actual ground where those decisions were

made. in the last 40 years, the american civil war has been taught as part of the official clutch la of nearly all of the nation's military institutions at every level of professional military education, what we call p.m.e., of course, the military has an acronym for everything, i will do it, too. perhaps not the corps of cadets and officers' education, but rtainly as a component and staff rides remain critical to all five armed services. i would add that they remain critical to the education of civil war institute attendees as well. this panel will engage in a conversation about a in the tion in legacies u.s. military. we will focus from 1865 through the advent of world war i but also intend to discuss the

lingering value of understanding the art of war for generations of american military leaders who came later. i will highlight some of the themes discussed by the few scholars who have actually studied this aspect of the civil war, offer some commentary about how the war influenced the actual fighting of the indian wars of the 1860's through the 1880's and to end with observations about the educational use of civil war history from the army from the 1880's onward. at that point, i'll turn it over to my colleagues who will each offer their views and will engage in a discussion about this interesting and in my opinion very important topic. we invite your participation after that and look forward to your insights. this topic has frankly been understudied, so for the graduate students out there and anybody looking for an overarching subject to right about regarding the civil war, you have got some openings.

carol rear don's book, soldiers and scholars, which was published in 1990 still stands as the primary publication building on the earlier works jay luvaas, timothy nenninger and others. none focus exclusively on the lessons learned from the luvaas civil war and concentrated on the war for the european armies which he argued were rather sparse. the terms lessons learned has been viewed by the military as reflecting low operation takeaways that have short-term value in the field rather than war winning strategic level concepts that offer longer term value for the joint force. other authors, andrew burdenle, williamson murray, brian lynn

and gregory downs have written or edited studies that touch upon the subject as it pertained to topics of their books, but other than a few supplementary articles, that's about the gamut of scholarship on this topic. this general lack of scholarship should be surprising to us considering the vast public and professional interest in the civil war, but i think much of it has to do with something i remind my students at the war college about in practically every lesson, that would be time and timing. you can see my proficiency with powerpoint is as high as others. i'll leave it at that. as i tell them time when things happen within the broader scope of national and international events and timing, the specific chronological sequence of period ithin a finite

of time, each strategy regardless of the war in question and the particular context, the time of the american civil war, i would argue, occurring as it did near the middle of the 19th century and near the beginning of the industrial, financial and managerial revolutions meaning that it's enduring strategic legacy and tactical lessons learned would have real shelf life of utility to the armed forces. it was most potent in the 50 years after the war but before the entry of the united states into world war i which we know changed just about everything regarding the character of modern war. after the first world war, technological advances such as the advent of military aircraft, political and social changes such as the influence of progressivism and simply the very proximity of another big war, all of this, the timing of

world war i, if you will, relegated the civil war increasingly to the realm of education in the united states, both military and civilian. couple that with the timing of the peace dividend following the first world war that swept the thought of all things military from the minds of many americans along with much funding for the army and the navy which was then followed by the great depression and the onset of world war ii and you can see how the civil war faded in prominence in the minds of america's military leadership. other events intervened. that does not mean, however, that the leaders forgot about the war. instead, the war for the union was sub assumed in priority to more recent wars and contemporary pressing issues. in this manner, how the united states military viewed the value of studying the civil war is no different than how it has consistently viewed its past wars. the further back in time they

are, the less valuable in a practical sense they become. this leads me to some observations about things relevant to our topic that previous scholars have highlighted. the first is the tension between the institutional educational use of the civil war as a means of officer education which found its golden years in the 1890's through approximately 1910 and the practical utilitarian use of lessons learned from the experiences of civil war combat, military occupation and pacification. the growing number of military educators in uniform in the second half of 19th century, most ensconced in posts at leavenworth and the army war college came to embrace the former legacy while the rough and ready tactically-minded officers on the western frontier viewed the latter as essential in fulfilling their

duties. these practical lessons were most applicable in the wars against native americans on the great plains and in the southwest in the 1870's and in the 1880's. most of them derived not from the experiences of combat with conventional i don't know federal rat forces, but with southern irregular fighters and hostile civilians in occupied sections of the south. that, i think, is an interesting point for us to consider. the most immediate applicable take aways from the civil war were in the realm of irregular warfare and not in the conventional sphere. yet with the exception of reinstating some of these counterirregular tactics and the endearing policy legacy of francis lieber's code during the insurrection of the early 1900's, the practical legacy of the civil war all about disappeared by 1914. the educational legacy, however, enshrined in what

carol reardon called map maneuvers, war games and the advent of the popular staff rides endured long past the urrender of crazy horse, cochise and geronimo. in 1915, the pancho villa difficulty in mexico followed quickly by world war i. after the interruption of the two world wars and the great depression during which the study of the civil war was still conducted in military education, albeit at a reduced level, it resurged, especially the staff ride, in the 1970's and 1980's and still with us today. the second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century.

i'm going to show you the slide here of what map maneuvers look like. they put a map out on the table and sometimes they had stone or wooden marketing and they moved them around on the map trying to replicate actual maneuvers of larger units of men in historical battles. the second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century. for instance, the hard war measures of the likes of generals george crook and nelson miles during the indian wars learned during their days fighting john s. mosby in virginia or bushwhackers in western virginia were effective in many ways in defeating the sioux and cheyenne in the 1870's and the apaches in the 1880's especially coupled with more lenient pass si indication

measures later, surprise morning attacks, burning out food supplies and hunter strike forces that pursued the indian warriors day and night were all tactics they learned in the civil war and applied to their native opponents in the west. yet, the american public of the post-war period was not the northern public of the civil war era. in cries of hypocrisy and outrage emanated from the big city newspapers who said the policies of harshness and conciliation born of the die could the any created during the war by lieber's famous code and still roughly followed in the west at that time allowed for far too much discretion on the part of the commander in the field and resulted too often in massacres of native americans. the shock to the white american system delivered by little bighorn notwithstanding, many eastern elites including more than a few army officers stationed in washington and in eastern posts howelled against

the hard war measures of the army employed against the indians while the bulk of the army leadership including william t. sherman and philip sheridan, both of whom had their fill of confederate irregulars in the civil war attempted to walk the fine line between frontier necessity as their subordinates in the west called it and public opinion and policy in the east. it was a tension that never really resolved and included a number of unfortunate experiments including the ind indian school at carlisle barracks which was a large the army tempt by for the misguided calls for naturalization of native american children. other use of civil war history in the classrooms of fort leavenworth, kansas, and the army war college, then in washington, tensions also

existed. as early as 1881 when general sherman established a school of application for cavalry and infantry at fort leavenworth, military conservatives, many of them born and bred in the late antebellum and civil war periods that enshrined military heroics leading from the front tough service in the field rose to the challenge of what they called a "map making basillus" and an epidemic of wisdom that was turning their officer corps into a leagues of "book worms." ready allies among the early progressives of the civilian world who in the mold of teddy roosevelt believed in self-made men's, characteristicses that either existed in soldiers or didn't. those characteristics could be groomed only by experience and hard service with but a modicum of formal schooling.

yet these old school officers increasingly found themselves in a losing battle with the rising stars of the army and indeed of the navy as well in their officer corps who came to believe in the theory of what we call safe leadership meaning that it was the responsibility of good military leaders to, one, utilize history in order to learn about the nature of war critical decision-making and the role of chance before they even get on a battlefield, and two, literally lead from behind in war, especially at higher ranks because their carefully cultivated brapes would be no use to the soldiers if splattered on the battlefield. emery upton, one of the great prodigy officers of the union army and about who we will be hearing more shortly from jen was an early pioneer of safe leadership as was colonel

arthur l. wagner at leavenworth, captain eben swift at the war college and secretary of war root. it was under their careful collective eyes that the students in the army officer schools meticulously mapped out, war gamed and visited on staff rides the great battle fields of civil war in order to apply the principals of war and creatively and critically in a crisis situation and deal with the fog and friction of war that are omnipresent regardless of time and present. antietum and gettysburg were favorites for the war college in the 1900's and so were the approacheses on washington in the summer of 1964 and sherman's atlanta campaign in march of the same year. by the time america entered of the first world war, the military education and its use

of civil war campaigns had triumphed over the crusty curmudgeons of the old army. they wouldn't call themselves that. these conflicting themes of practitioner oriented lessons learned versus institutional safe leadership education regarding not only the use of civil war history, but, indeed, the military history of all eras still resonates within the modern american armed forces. the conflicting themes of successfully applying the lessons of the last war to the current one, hopefully while not refighting the last war, i would add, and simultaneously balancing the political impact of public opinion also live on in modern america and indeed in the scholarship of more modern wars. and last but certainly not least, both the u.s. military and academia, i might add, since the turn of the last century consistently displayed

a greater interest in studying wars more contemporary, closer in time to their own era and more resonant than those fought by previous generations. hence, the civil war became paramount in the education of the country's officers in the late 1800's and early 1900's, but did fade in some significance as the 20th century marched into its later decades. perhaps none of these themes are really that surprising, but they do provide insights into how americans, especially in uniform, think about past wars. in many ways, then, we see how the precedent of the u.s. army's takeways from the civil war set a foundation for the next 150 years, both intellectually and both pragmatically, with all of the tensions and contradictions inherent thereto. thank you. [applause]

prof. keller: now at this time i'm going to turn it over to jen who will tell us a little bit more about emery upton and reforms that he accomplished in the post-war era. so, jen, take it away. prof. keller: the questions that our panelists tackling today are lessons learned and my comments will mostly be about the u.s. army and specifically questions of tactics and the way that the u.s. army dealt with what they learned on a civil war battlefield moving forward fter 1865. so i want to start with a couple themes before we drum down to questions of tactics, so just give us a few points of departure for our overview and make a couple points about the status of the united states army. think of ways that the u.s.

civil war influenced the u.s. military and how the army grappled between lessons learned between 1861 and 1865. after 1865, what is the status of the united states army, what are their past, what are they doing. the photograph should be familiar to some of you. that, of course, is george custer, right, and the way that the u.s. army is utilized in fighting indians in the western frontier is something that we'll explore during the course of our questioning. the u.s. army fights over 1,000 engagements with indians on the western frontier, none of which we would call conventional by any stretch of the imagination. after the engagement with the indians, we turned to spain with the spanish american war and then finally getting up to the philippine insurrection and then world war i come 1917. at the same time that the u.s. army is fighting counterinsurgency west and then also dealing with spain, the

u.s. military is going through a period of professionalization and this is the time that army officers in particular start to write in professional journals. this is the establishment of the army and navy journal and they start to think critically about these issues of tactics and strategy and doctrine. this is also the period that the army continues professional military education where people like william t. sherman will acall for educational opportunities for their officers beyond west point, so you have the establishment of the artillery school at fort monroe in 1868 and you have the establishment of the cal valerie and infantry school in 81 and the u.s. army war college. one of the questions that dominates the army after the civil war is the question of tactics.

the civil war scholarship, whether it represented the last napoleonic war or the first modern war or is it both? a lot of times this question comes down to technology and how technology influences tactics. >> if you study the civil war, this is a depiction of pickett's charge where you have these these at assaults with thousands of shoulder to shoulder like we see here on july 30. what you get our high casualties. the influence of technology whether it the in the infantry artillery makes post-civil war officers question the future of tactics. on is noare very clear more cold harbors.

groth -- ulysses grant said this is an assault he regret. what tactical lessons does the united states military take from the civil war? armyhree branches of the are questioning this. throughis going post-civil war conversation. the question is whether or not the cavalry will continue to fight my to -- mounted or dismounted. artillery is questioning their role in the post-civil war era as well. the influence of the gatling gun changes the way that artillery will be used. this is a big question after 1865. and this is something that the infantry also questioned.

how can we move away from these assaults. adage, the u.s. military is always prepared to fight the last war. you can see in the post-civil that they are strongly committed to the banner. -- bayonet. the manuals leading up to the spanish-american war devotes numerous pages to the bay and at -- an at. 1865, you have this covered of young officers question, the the commanding general in the army and sherman is an advocate is --

of reforming tactics and thinking about doctrine. some of these officers are doing this on their own. this is an individual pursuit. army is no cohesion to the in the thinking. it's done individually. it's very different from what you see today if you think about the rate that the u.s. army thinks about doctoring now. doctoring now. you don't see that in the post-civil war era. , this is an --to emory upton. he will lead a u.s. army through a renaissance, a tactical

renaissance where he is at the four of bringing changes to the forefront of tactics. familiar with him he is qualified to lead some of these changes. he had the opportunity to command all three branches, infantry -- alternately -- artillery. a major general by age 26. he was very young and gifted. during the overland campaign you can see he is already starting to think about these questions of topics -- tactics. upton will take 12 regiments and attack the not in a linear fashion but in a column or assault. this will be replicated two days later.

if you redo his journals, you'll find him taking very critically about issues of tactics and leadership. does not work and you see him through the later weeks commenting on the futility of frontal assault during the campaigns. sentencesa couple of from his memoirs for us to to -- take a look at. this will help bridge the gap for when he is encouraging the army to address post-1865. is june the fourth gum 1864. all give you a minute to read through this. you can see his tone is very critical of a couple of things. he said the assaults are few to full -- viewed all. for men are being expected to do

the impossible. -- i mustentence confess as long as i see such incompetency, there is no great in the army to which i do not aspire. 25-year-old officer writing this. he continues writing in this thing through the duration. all give you two more quotes to make this point. -- the's talking about sentiment is very much the same. our losses are heavy and since once. our men cannot accomplish such a possibility. court commanders are unfit to be corporals. 20,000 killed.

upton finds obvious disappointment and loss of life with the tactics practiced during the civil war. role in the post-civil war army and this renaissance? he is 26 when the civil war is over. in easting to be tennessee during reconstruction. when he is there he has an opportunity to put together what will become the u.s. army's tactical manuals that will be adopted in 1868. he is good friends with william sherman and sherman is championing his tactical reform. it's not all original. some of it is from a manual that came out earlier. the big change that upton sees is twofold. he puts forth a system that he called force. andways that force works

basically what it sounds like, instead of fighting in linear , he is a encouraging lose border formations. he puts men into force where you would begin a number one through four, he sees this as having flexibility. loose order flexibility. it will allow amendment over a billion the battlefield. fromso changes the tactic double rank to single. with the advent of quick loading weaponry he doesn't believe we need the double ranks any longer for the volume of firepower that will begin in -- be given in the civil war. grant loved it. grant sent he has never seen a plot -- a system then applied so

efficiently. it's adaptable. it is purely an american work. , this is a system that the united states developed for the tactics. loose order formation in force. there are a lot of critics of the system of force. one critic said that the best chance would be a keynote caller where you just call out your number one through four on a battlefield. continues to think about these questions of tactics through the rest of his life. he makes different revisions and cavalryth a manual for and he puts forth one for artillery. if you are familiar with his career to its end, at the end of his career will be acting as a

official observer for the u.s. army. china,sent on a tour to and rush out where he makes observations about their military. he finds much to be admired with the he iss, -- with leading this renaissance while -- he is frustrated at the way his tactics and doctrine are being implemented and some of the resistance he meets along the way. on march 15 1891 he is in california and he will commit suicide. the last thing that is published

is a military policy of the united states. they were published in 1904. upton is a key figure in these lessons learned as it applied to tactics on the battles legal -- battlefield. thank you. [applause] thank you very much we will usn to ian, who will take across the pond, as it were, and look at european legacy of the american civil war. thank you, chris. first a bit of a personal antidote. four years ago i was getting my history. as i was graduating, again, a proud moment. i did a dissertation on british memoirs of the interwar.

. memoirs written by servicemen who fought in world war i. would have come up to me and reach out your hand and said to me and then said, in, i am looking forward to having you speak at a civil war conference on reconstruction. i would have said you have me confused with another en. one who did a phd in the civil war or in reconstruction. i hope to stick to what i kind of know something about and talk a little bit about how we expand and think about the american civil war's legacy moving andard on the western front perhaps beyond a little bit. 1917, the h battalion

of the queens royal regiment began training for major attack. this is a battalion within the british army. the attack was to be a part of the third battle of passion dale. a volunteer unit, not unlike a lot of volunteer units in the civil war. 1914, theyered in went into battle in 1915. they suffered a lot of casualties over the course of .wo years they fought and marital -- some major battles. the battalion lost hundreds of man due to attrition. name --alion commander [indiscernible] pierce beauty-- yet risen in rank from lieutenant to major and have been decorated for bravery.

picture, buthe also he tweets as jack pierce. he received operational orders from his staff that were detailing an upcoming attack did what operational orders looked like in 1917 were dozens of pages of the site -- precise type orders, then used to instruct his own officers and instruct his men for an upcoming attack. on july 30 the battalion went up to their trenches for the assault. at 3:30 a.m. on the 31st, the division artillery opened up with thousands of shells eating fire from hundreds of heavy guns upon german trenches opposite.

the battalion attacked and they did so behind the creeping barrage which was a curtain of artillery fire moving before them as they then rushed the german trenches opposite to they were successful in taking the first line of german trenches. they then regrouped and followed a second barrage forward to take the next absent -- objective. mother thete to his following. in the battalion did well and took all of its objectives. the weather is file, the trenches felt the end i am cover ---- with modern must watch with mud and must watch." beyond his desire for hot bath

it shows something about differences in warfare in the 52 years between the civil war and the great war battle of passion dale. first to note is the sophistication of the assault. european1860's onward military thinkers placed emphasis on officer education as being essential elements of fighting and the major war. by 1970, officers had learned hard lessons from the realities of combat on the western front. lessons that they might not have learned if they study civil war. training, intelligence, the application intelligence of construction have all advanced rapidly due to the changing world war i battlefield. their attack was a product of that planning. the attack is in and of itself

revealing. in its first attack in 1916 pierce and his men suffered in an open assault against enemy machine guns. they followed a strict artillery timetable using a barrage of shells to cover for a rapid charge against enemy trenches which was used as a jumping off point as the next attack. they were trying to move quickly and to mop up pockets of enemy resistance. in their assault they carried machine guns, mortars and grenades. firepowertrained in and the use of firepower so that they could not just kill the firepower could be concentrated to protect soldiers and dominate the battlefield so they could receive tangible results. there was no great breakthrough

for peers and his men -- pierce and his men. he was proud of his men for meeting their objectives and for following their orders. how does this story and the point relate to the legacy of the civil war? war, a warn civil that was described as the first it hinged steam age, on the doors of rapid industrialization. the war demonstrated in an embryonic stage the direction in which warfare was heading. both during and in the decades after the civil war european observers of the civil war were keen to jump down notes about the war's conduct, railroads and logistical supplies and artillery and placidly the changing role of cavalry.

these observation did little to change the nature of european warfare. the european officers saw what they wanted to see, affirming existing doctrine. why this is as to the case is an important one. why didn't military thinkers of the 18 70's and 80's extract greater lessons from the americans doubled or. why didn't they predict the awful industrialize help to come. i think to some degree the problem is with the question is self. for our desire to look for examples of the past punctuated by our own pragmatism. when we look at the civil war refracted through the lens of the great war, it is easy to see the similac or -- similarities between the two. as a warning as to what will come. the cultural malaise and the social upheaval, the great

disenchantment of those who fought it. these are similarities between the conflict. this was not exactly how military thinkers approached the war. there is was a world of robust muscular marsh reality. they study the civil war's battles and campaigns. but they had other wars to study also. wars which were bloody but nearer to their own distress. -- interests. , would bery planners one of maneuver and european and to some degree american staff officers had developed their own theories along what we call the colts of the offensive. that --tencil belief which was in part a product of materialistic theory of survivalstic fiber of

and social darwinism. through bitter experience offensive and maneuver on the western front which are playing offense andatism, maneuver were tactics. lessonin that heartfelt that i think the legacy and a similarity between petersburg and passion dale. it is the heritage of attrition and the elusive nature of battlefield victory. the nature of industrialized war became one of material where exhaustion was equally if not more important. the comparison is not necessarily in the physicality of the battlefield. the trenches as indicated with these pictures. is what those trenches

represented, the failure of a offensive, the strength of defense in the advantage of defense. they desire to protect men from further slaughter. a sense of frustration on the part of generals and the struggle of staff and military thinkers to break the deadlock and win the war. in both wars those lessons were heartfelt and hard-fought despite the fact differences in terms of the tactics of technology that was used. those lessons proved to have an enduring legacy. thank you. applause] thank you, that was very enlightening. i have copious notes from both of your presentations. are going to do is engage in a conversation about that all three of us brought up and then we will open it up into you.

the first thing that strikes me technology and how that technology as we get into the second half of the 19th century really begins to play a major role in all levels of war regarding how we are going to your lies the left -- the lessons of past wars. profound team that we see here in both the u.s. and in the european armies. do either of you have some ideas on that, on the role of technology and its centrality? sure. technology is usually hugely important to the development of warfare.

it's a very interesting question away hear a lot in civil war conference this. i suspect it would make a very good essay questions as well. i think in terms of the first world war and the frustration of commanders at least in the first few years of the first world war, if they understood that technology was incredibly important to the direction in which the war was going, and that it would be very important for the way in which the world before, one thing to keep in mind the last quarter of the quartertury, the last of the 19th century is completely revolutionary in the technology that people are experiencing and a

day to day level. i think the last 20 years is incomparable to that as well. there. see a comparison ,he machinery and industry there are huge developments that happen in the late 19th century. comes developments in terms of firepower and great challenge for them -- military thinkers to figure out new ways of fighting based upon far powder. if you compare the tactics used orthe american civil war just the types of weapons that are used, you will see some very striking differences there from breach loading weapons. from later on some artillery second saturated battlefield quickly and very concentrated. huge developments that we cannot overstate in the late part of the 19th century. up with a follow

context, it. these are things we grapple with way that figure out a the u.s. military is grappling with the use of drones. ramifications as well as legal and moral ones. for the post-civil war army the question about tech six is one of utility. they are excited to have all these rifles and gatlin guns. all, theutilized at question is to get your technology and your tactics to sink and to find that opportunity where you can put the best of them forward and defeat your enemies as quickly as possible. >> that seems to be a theme you will see in world on terror history. how do you manage to sink technology and tactics and even operational thought.

i see this all the time when i teach my officers at the war college is constant grappling with new technology that is coming out and how do you find a way to implement it successfully , at the strategic level. at the tactical level it has a concrete and direct impact on success. this isn't something that just occurred in the latter half of the 19th century. this is a pain that is still greatly dealt with by militaries of the world. how do you then think about the last war? how do you use the history of the last war when the technology is so rapidly increasing. that very salient question we should all consider more. another thing that i wanted to bring out and see what you thought about it, was this idea of a fighting -- fighting the last war. both of you have some rate comments on.

canard that we talked about before. .t is often misapplied it is often stated in the context that really it shouldn't be stated in. i think we all know that there is a proclivity for armies to focus on what they did in the last war right, rather than look at the new war in its own context. that's a difficult problem to assess at any level of war for any military. where do we see the reading fighting of the civil war in the wars of the late 19th century and up through world war i would you say? where do you see that mistake core that -- or did it lead to victory. >> i guess my comment to that is

think of the status of the u.s. army post 1865. it is in a dark stage. the southerners want very little to do the army. the westerners have no use for it. the indian wars have been wrapped up. weapons you see these and is conversation happening are at a lower level of command. upton is 26 years old when the war is ending. him, andcareer above he is the one propelling this change forward. they meet so much resistance along the way. constantly that he can't get his tactics to be adopted by the u.s. military. he self publishes a tactics manual and it generates him a lot of money when the army adopts it. he makes like $3000 more -- in each year. my book doesn't make that.

the point is that these conversations are hard to have with the status of the military as it is from 1865. it's a few of these young --.lutionaries >> all be very brief. -- i will be very brief. war,do constitute the next where you constitute the last the franco-prussian war is a major war, then going into the wayt world war, it has a germany will be fighting. sudanes fighting in the really prepare soldiers for them going out to fight on the western front?

how do they fight in south africa? the concept is very different to the conflict that will be waged in europe. these discussions are being had within colleges. the british staff officers are also writing papers on the american civil war. writing on the campaign of fredericksburg, they are writing on vicksburg and gettysburg. question as to what the nature of the last war is when you are looking forward when you're looking to a future war you can't predict. i think with that, and there are some a more themes we could discuss, but i'd like to open it up to the audience with any questions that you may have for us. we can talk about what you would like to talk about.

>> my question has to do with the fact that the principal armies of the north and south were citizens and not military people. it was also to some extent large conscription process with the army. ,ilitary thinkers after the war how did they think about these type of soldiers and did they influence their thinking towards future wars? how did theion was legacy of the citizen soldiers primarily fighting the civil war affect postwar military thought in preparation? that's an excellent question. i'll start out by saying that there was great concern in the mentioned in my

paper, not only about the treatment of native americans and the tactics that were utilized against them were shocking and these were published in eastern papers. there is also concerned about having the army be large. this is one of the problems of , that thetion overall armies mobilize so fast. that is an american ethic. the mobilizer armies after the wars. it is only since world war ii that we have had a professional large standing army that was not the tradition. there are still many who question this. there was a believe that if you have the need for another big call up of volunteers, they will do it. after the war, when the army was very small, professionalization and united states as least, the professionalization was seen as special and necessary job of all

officers. that they were truly to become specialists professionals. that included the correct use of history. the next wars will be fought by professionals as it was foreseen in the 1880's. you will call of volunteers at necessary, but in the spanish-american war where we see volunteers come up they were switching between them and the regular army. a lot of that stems activists believe that only professional soldiers took should be fighting the next wars. we go to the volunteers and we do in overall call up if necessary. upton wants $25,000 in the army and that's why he likes the system of force because he thinks it is easy. the american way of war is something we cannot overstate. the american military really is exceptionally different and a lot of -- ways.

there is a lot of tension between 1865 between the civilian and the professional military and you see it moving through the 20th century. i thought we left out triage in the american military started with --. today if you've were in the middle east you will be triage. you will be put on another plane. if you have other one jiggled to walter reed. it is a very efficient system. to serve asivilege chief of infectious diseases. it was very efficient. i thought when you have this topic that you are going to talk about triage. >> you are referring to the letter to the reforms that were done during the war in

especially federal medicine, which were critical. the way of being implemented by the time of the battle of antietam, and they were well advanced by gettysburg. that was a legacy that stayed with the u.s. army. that is correct. i would second with what he just said. it is more of a comment and i henry -- fact that upton committed suicide. anduffered severe headaches hatefulwent very medical treatment unsuccessfully and that is the reason he shot a self because of the sinus tumor. he had no ptsd or anything like that. >> thank you for your comment.

and missed how the cavalry the artillery were reformed by engines ideas. your question is about how the cavalry was reformed after the civil war? >> and artillery. that, but it to might take 25 minutes. do either of you have short synopsis? thing that upton champions is integration. , theunded the civil war simulated tactics on the

battlefield. approach,mbined arms which was what they were trying to move towards. we now have it still today. we have time for one final comment. you talked about this grappling with technology and strategy. eventuallytechnology becoming so overwhelming that the study of civil war tactics at the war college or west point or annapolis will be moved? -- moot? >> it will all be in twitter. >> you would have a better sense onworking with your students whether to figure out an army officer 20 years from now would even consider whether this was a

field of study. sense of how that is moving? >> all started by saying that if i am still teaching at the army war college we won't have to worry about the march of technology. i think your point is well taken in the sense that the tech -- technology, the newness of recent wars, new technology, sometime obliges the armed forces at least in this country to focus more on them. that is a trend. it is undeniable. i don't think it means that we won't study old wars. we do study the peloponnesian war and we read a great deal. the reason for that and i think this would apply to some of the significant campaigns of

the civil war as well is that there are lessons to be gained that are applicable about the nature of war that don't change. the you andas dimension and more, things such as the role of technology in war and how that affects the conduct of warfare. the role of good leadership, command teams. and civil military relations. these are some examples i can give you. we still teach these primary themes today. the onwardnse than march of technology, drums and everything being done is going to knock that out in our lifetimes, at least. a continue the question about the onward march of technology. ian mentioned that there is this -- that it is present

during the civil war as well. could the panelists comment on the fact that it appears that soldiers perceive themselves as men and soldiers and behavior on see behaviorld, we that can often overcome tech knowledge he. on there, is there a tension there and would you agree that the spirit of manliness has persisted and continues to persist even in the to minimize the role of individuals. >> that's a great question. i probably should not have used that phrase. the way that i would approach a question like that is by looking at the changing definition of heroism.

the ways in which cultures and societies see the idea of what the hero is. there have been lots of scholars that have written about different perceptions of heroism in different wars. in the civil war you have a particular culture of heroism , and thoseps definitions of heroism change a bit. as veterans kind of reassessed their own conduct during the war. the same thing happens in the great wars. in many ways the change that you see, they should do see an is one that is being driven by technology. where the physical presence of being in the trenches in a confined space, where you don't have a sense of marshall agency, we are you are not actively

attacking, where we are instead being shelled. the way ofchanging being perceived the idea of the hero. just being a survivor, and in during this trial and coming to the other side as a survivor. ?s there a similarity there maybe, the technology is different. but the idea of the survivor is than somebody who is able to roll up their sleeve and show their scars and say they were there on that day. it is something that is kind of universal, that soldiers are able to then feel great pride and survive in a great trial. i would just add that the concept of safe leadership, which i mentioned arose as early

as the 1880's and persist wholly into the second world war. .nd still prevails today this was a new thing, and it received a great deal of flack from the old-school army officers who believe that as much is the question applies, that heroism is something that you get on the battlefield through experience and you hone over time. it became known in the army leadership isafe smart leadership. there is this tension between the hero school of thought and whichperiential thought is still in exist -- existence today and the safe leadership chool, whereby george

marshall is safely ensconced behind the lines in washington where he is brains can be best utilized. i think this concludes our panel. thank you very much. [applause] >> on thursday, august 25, american history tv will be live from arlington house, the robert e lee memorial to mark the centennial of the national park service that celebrate their anniversary on this day. join us for at 7 p.m. to learn more about the park service. > american history tv university of washington at st. louis professor elizabeth elizabeth andwardt discusses franklin eleanor roosevelt. she focuses on the atlantic charter as part of the " grand strategy."