various crimes, political or otherwise, so i think that's really important to keep in mind here. and i think that, also, you know, the fact that the crackdown had, in my view and i know people can disagree on this, in my view has been disproportionate, and the net has been cast very widely in ways that i don't think can be justified legally or according to any general understanding of due process. when it comes to, you know, mass resignations or dismissals of members of the civil service or university teens, so on and so forth, of course, after a coup, there have to be people who are arrested and detained and questioned. but i think we also have to talk about what would be a proportional response and if tens of thousands of people are being dismissed or detained there's a real discussion you have to have about whether

that's justified or proportional. what i would like to see here in washington is a kind of middle ground. i think that we as americans should be unequivocal in our condemnation of the coup, that this was an attempted military coup against a democratically elected government. yes, it might be a problematic government. yes, it might be a government that has authoritarian tendencies, and we should -- but at the same time we have to respect democratic outcomes, so that should be one part of our position. on the other hand, that doesn't mean that that we should -- and i'm uncomfortable with the idea that anyone who criticizeds erdogan in the post-coup context is, therefore, being sympathetic to the coup. there should be a middle ground where you can be critical of the coup but also critical of any overreach from president erdogan. so now just in my last couple of minutes i think that there's a -- for me as someone who

thinks a lot about erdogan's personal motivations and what drives him, how many is religion and how much of it is power, i think that there is a lot of misunderstanding, let's see, about what drives erdogan and other party figures so if i was erdogan, let's be honest. i would do exactly what he's doing. i would use this as an opportunity to clean house because i think from his standpoint every day in the -- in the 2000s after the party came to power, erdogan and other party powers woke up thinking a military coup would be eminent. we have to emphasize with that fear and paranoia here's someone in prison for reciting a pretty inokay news its mist poem and if you actually read the poem, it's pretty -- it's not a big deal, but he was imprisoned because of that. so i think we have to understand

where that paranoia comes from when your whole life you've lived with this idea that you had to essentially hide your personal beliefs because they could be construed as being anti-secular, and as recently as 2008, as many of you know, the oc party was one vote away from being shut down, so this is not ancient history. this is very recent history, so that's part of what is driving the paranoia. the important thing to realize about paranoia is that oftentimes it's unjustified, but sometimes it is justified, and now we're seeing why some of it was in fact justified. so if i was erdogan, i would be doing this, but as an outside analyst who is trying to understand what's best for the future of turkish democracy this is not healthy. the move towards a strong presidential system is not good because as a political scientist one thing that we -- we kind of learned reading the literature what is that in polarized

societies you avoid presidential systems. you go for parliamentary systems where you don't have an overarching strong presidential figure. you try to avoid 10% electoral thresholds which are really bad for parliamentary competition, and you look at electoral design and design of political structures. if i had one piece of advice for the middle east going forward, it would be avoid presidential systems, so i'm very concerned that this will only compound polarization going forward. and now i'll close with kind of just a longer term observation. one positive thing and one negative thing. the very positive thing, this was touched on by some of the other panelists, is that what's very inspiring to me is that the norm against military coups in turkey has become entrenched. the fact that no secular opposition party supported the coup is very encouraging, because if this had happened ten years ago, i think it might have

been different. so it's really interesting to me that in a span of just a few years this norm has been consolidated, and that should be very encouraging for the future health of turkish politics. i'm reblinded every day now with the rise of trump and -- and some of those figures in the west that norms are very important for the survival and health of democratic politics. so that's one thing. on the other hand, the coup is not about an islamist secular divide because as other people have said we -- it seems to be the consensus among both sides of the political spectrum that gulenists were involved in some way. we can disagree on to what extent they were involved or what role gulen himself played, so on and so forth, but, yes, gulenists were involved. it's not an islamist secular thing, but let's not forget that the primary cleavage in turkish politics has been, in my view and will remain, one that is not

solely about the role of religion in public life but is partly about the role of religion in public life between, again, what we can call broadly and perhaps an oversimplified ways i mists and secularists. this, i think, is also important for understanding what's driving erdogan, not just now but in years to come, this idea that if you capture the levers of a very strong centralized state, and i think it's a curse for turkey that this is a very strong, overbearing, bloated state, but the idea here is that anyone who captures it can then remake turkish society in their own image which is what the kemalists did for decades, and now erdogan and the oc party believe that they have this chance as well, and there's a personal aspect to this because they couldn't live, they -- they felt that they couldn't live as turks and be true to their religion and express it publicly for really decades, and that --

that -- that contributes to a very personal sense of bitterness, and -- and i've mentioned this in other talks, but, you know, i remember that, you know, a senior adviser to davitola who said this in a very powerful way last year where he was talking about his wife wasn't able to work at a turkish hospital until just a couple years ago y.? because she wears the headscarf. that's a remarkable thing to get your head around, or the fact that erdogan's own daughters couldn't go to college in their own country despite the fact that erdogan was the most powerful man in turkey. that's crazy to me. so i think that that is something that we in d.c. to -- we have to be willing and able and comfortable understanding that aspect of it which is very raw and existential, and that bitterness is something that will drive turkish politics for some time to come, unless turks

on both sides -- on both sides of the political spectrum can find ways to mitigate and minimize the polarization, but i'm not very optimistic that there is going to be a real effort from the government or for that matter from those in the opposition going forward to really address those sources of polarization. thank you. [ applause ] >> our last panelist will talk about one of the most controversial top nicks this town for the last one month, the coup attempt and the future of u.s.-turkey relations. >> thank you, kiliik and the panelists for such a wide array of remarks. that makes it much more difficult now to talk at the end of this. but i'll try to restrict my remarks to the u.s.-turkey relations and how this coup

attempt was perceived in that regard. very quick overview of what happened during obama administration past eight years in u.s.-turkey relations. we started with the obama administration's attempt to sort of restore -- restart, jump start relations with muslim world in the wake of the afghan -- afghanistan and iraq wars, and his first trip was to turkey, quickly afterwards to egypt, and that was a very good fresh start from the turkish perspective. and -- but we -- we were never able to sort of get out of the mode where you have crises or tensions coming close to crises every six months or something like that.

but we had in the summer of 2010 an incident and the grand sanctions. this town started discussing whether turkey was moving away from the west. its access was shifting and stuff like that, and that debate quickly dissipated when turkey decided to host a nato radar in turkey and when we got to the arab spring, i'm skipping many events here obviously, but when we got to the arab spring turkey, again, emerged as a potential model for the middle east, and when we got to syria all that dissipated again, and since 2013 especially, because of some of the incidents and the december 17 operations at home, political turmoil at home also

impacted this image of authoritarian perception, et cetera. but it's been ups and downs basically during obama administration. while obama administration was trying to pull out of the middle east like shadi was saying, we did not quite have a positive agenda of what was going to come afterwards, and ever since i think the regional powers are trying to figure out how to deal with each other in many ways, while the u.s. is not completely sort of pulling out as we see in the anti-isil fight. so i would say that administration's perception on turkey has -- has been overly focused on the strategic issues, more the isil fight, how turkey contributes or it doesn't. this is against a background of sort of refusing to deal with

syria issue as a whole. turkey would like to -- has wanted to resolve that issue as a collaborative effort of the west first and then engaging oh, but obama administration has refused to involve itself in that, and -- and restricted its narrow focus to the anti-isil fight. which meant that turkey was seen in a context where are they helping us against isis or not? that's a very narrow focus for a country like turkey that is not just part of the middle east. shadi was talking about the middle east. it's not just part of the middle east obviously. it's part of the -- part of europe. nato. it has -- it is important for issues in europe and elsewhere. so many, we haven't had a holistic approach. of course, i know many in the room will say we don't have that

holistic approach on just about anything, but nevertheless i would just like to observe that and the foreign policy focused perspective in that way, narrow strategic issues, carried over or went side by side with sort of the domestic political turmoil since early 2012, i would say. i'll come back to why i will say that. there's been sort of a lack of appreciation for what was happening inside turkey domestically because i think this attitude to pull away from the region carried over to this attitude basically we don't really need to be worrying about what's happening inside our allies' countries. so, why did i say 2012?

february, this was the first sort of fireworks in let's say four-year internal struggle when the gulenist judges and prosecutors wanted to question and potentially arrest a confidant saying he was having secret talks with pkk and the perception in turkey was that target was erdogan himself. they were going to try to arrest him on -- on this score. and -- and then we had the crisis with the university prep schools. gulenists leaked that the government was preparing to shut them down. soon afterwards we had the december 17 operations. gulenists said there was widespread corruption, so there

was another attempt to bring down the government, and that tension and this purge we're talking about didn't start after the coup. it started long before, trying to basically -- this was -- the state, the turkish state, not just erdogan, i would say, has seen this as a national threat for a while now. here you have an organization who is acting outside the chain of command in just about any institution, not just the security institutions, but also civilian ministries, et cetera, which is pointing to why are so many sort of civilians, et cetera, are being dismissed or arrested outside the government after the coup. the answer is you will have a lot of civilians who -- who can override the government officials' orders by bringing orders from outside from the

movement from often gulen himself. sort of one of the coup leaders, alleged coup leaders apparently came to america more than 100 times over the mast 14 years and wednesday to pennsylvania. anyways, this messy sort of struggle of the turkish state itself, which initially as was pointed out, were secularists, camelists, wanted to design a certain society according to a certain model. in the oc party years, that oc party tried to make sure that the government was more open to other segments, including the gulenists. when kemalists came after the gulenists the oc party said, no, they can be in the government, but the -- the threats became

more -- much more clear and acute much later. i would say especially with the start of the kurdish resolution process, and then the gulenist opposition to that. anyway, these internal dynamics are hard to summarize here, but they are being missed in much of the conversation in d.c., and we keep haergd erdogan this, erdogan that. erdogan dismissed it, erdogan did this. erdogan is fighting against this and that. he's a powerful figure in turkish politics. there is no denying it, and the oc party is -- is obviously very close to what he wants to do in the country, but there are so many trends, and we've seen in the coup attempt also how the institutions, unfortunately, were much more vulnerable than we thought, and there's a

failure in appreciating also the united common front against the coup. all segments of society opposed this, and they were in the streets. luckily and unlikely too close to the bridge that night, but we saw it. wefl saw it in the street, and i think they were the real sort of heros here, but it's -- with the -- ashore teranianism debate going on in turkey for the last couple of years, i think a lot of is,is being lost in translation or close turkey followers might see this, but they keep reverting back to this authoritarianism argument and putting erdogan at the center of everything that's happening in turkey. so with the administration's narrow focus and not wanting to be involved involved in any of

this, to some extent while demanding that you need to -- while expecting that turkey should be part of the anti-isil coalition, which it should and it is, it is a direct theat to turkey, this is creating a lot of misperceptions on both sides, and this is not -- on top of this gulen's extradition request now going forward will become a central issue. and -- and from a turkey perspective this is really not a -- a question whether he did it and he was behind it. so this is going to hamper the overall sort of health or lack of health or the relationship that is already damaged or -- that is already struggling from

the past couple of years, both the perception of authoritarianism and the middle east. we don't want to do much about the middle east turmoil which is sort of syria is a very close example where that becomes a serious problem for u.s. allies including germany and others but much more so turkey, and all those security problems emanating and affecting turkey in so many ways. three minutes, thank you. so going forward we are going to have a new administration. whoever we throw in the sand they have no clue what happens if trump wins this election and everybody is praying maybe that's only this town though so

we'll see what happens. but going forward we've been talking about this, writing about this. we do need between these two countries for the bilateral relationship to sort of proceed in a healthy manner and for -- for healthy cooperation on all these regional strategic issues they need to talk a lot more, and they need to move away from this narrow focus on issues. don't forget the u.s. cooperation with pydc in syria has already created an outcry from the turkish people. if you ask people in the street, it's like u.s. is supporting pkk. there's no question. add to that, u.s. is supporting gulen, so this -- this perception on the other side is coupled with, you know, the

authoritarianism argument and what is turkey doing on isis, that kind of narrow focus, sorry about repeating on that, but when these perceptions and approaches clash, we're not going to have a long-standing healthy relationship out of this, so the next administration will have to think lock and hard about this. one last thing about turkish military. turkish military often was sort ever dealing with the west on its own, often independent of the syrian control. this is an opportunity -- moment of opportunity for turkey to establish true civilian -- true civilian control of that institution. several years back we thought that that was happening gu but apparently gulenists were taking forward instead of the

kemalists. going forward we need a true restructuring and true civilian control of the military, and that won't come in a day or two, but that can be much more healthier for u.s.-turkey relationship as well. thank you. >> thank you very much. thank you for all the panelists. normally when i moderate the panel i'm kind of asking questions for the panelists so since were have only limited amount of time, 20 minutes, i'll open for the floor for the questions. please identify yourself and keep the question as short as possible, concise, so that we can have as much questions as possible, and i will collect some questions before answering. we have the mike at the back and can we start from here. >> i have a question for shadi and another one for the panelists.

erdogan's visit to russia, you talked a little bit about regional implications. do you see this visit as a beginning of realignment, or is it just the political gesture for normalizing relations with russia, maybe lifting the sanctions and all? i'm the executive director of international institute of islam islamic. so this is the first question. >> thank you. >> the other question for the panelists in general. the pop lift dimension in this, do you see it as an enduring feature in turkish policy, politics, and what are its potential impact on civil

militarizations in the region? >> okay. >> so go ahead. >> okay. >> i'm from turkey, i'm the president of the turkish center there. actually i would like to have some comments but maybe because of the time it's not possible. >> just the question. >> but at least i may ask halil berktay. he talked about the history of the coup d'etat in turkey. i think it's very crucial to understand what happened here because especially i would like to understand how the military cove covers. the army was thinking that they

have this authority on the turkish people's destiny, so they decide in the history turkey several times, maybe even we can go further to the ottoman times because also army had some party in ottoman times. this is a kind of tradition, so can we compare this tradition of believing that they have this better understanding of what the turkish people needs, and also this superiority on the turkish political system and the army, camelists army, but this is very interesting that this new attempt is done by a religious group. they have also -- as professor duran mentioned they have a messianic vision. they believe that they will not just for turkey, but even for whole world they have this new vision, so they may make a better world in their opinion through their attempts.

it's kind of a religious vision, but very similar to this army's belief that they have -- they have superiority on all the systems, and how come states like united states support this idea which can destroy all -- all the nation? >> okay. >> let's move here and have another question. >> thank you very much. i am the president of a global policy institute, and the question is for mr. shadi. you alluded in the course of your presentation, and i think it was quite appropriate, about the high evidentiary burden in the u.s. for an extradition process. in a lot of give and take with a lot of observers and people i've heard in turkey the perception is an extradition process is

essentially a political process. it doesn't really work this way, and perhaps you can elaborate as to the division of powers in the united states within the executive branch and an independent judiciary and what does it mean that sufficient evidence has to be presented to convince a judge, not the president of the united states, not the secretary of state, as to what is necessary and what looks like probable cause, et cetera, et cetera, so perhaps you can elaborate on that because i think it's important to clarify the general context of how u.s. institutions work. thank you. >> thank you. >> and let's have another question here. >> thank you very much for all the remarks. i'm the director for the middle east program at the national endowment for democracy. two points. one to dr. duran. trying to understand a little

bit some of the let's say blurred boundaries. the coup shed light that for the first time maybe secularists and as you said the ow party which is a conservative islamic party have stood together clearly against a coup against democracy. but maybe more light needs to be shed hon behind the scene where it is not very clear. obviously there has been an element of the conservative gulenist movement involved, but it's not very clear to what extent there has also been in the army some of the secularist or camelists involved because certainly the gulenists do not have that much of a penetration into the army. and the second point is also just looking at a blurred area, current and in the past it was very clear, back in 1999-2000, one of the foundations that led to the rise of the oc party was

the gulenist support to the oc party, and there was a very mutual deep understanding and cooperation, and obviously this has eroded over the years, so how will -- what are the dynamics now, and to what extent this deep history is playing into the current dynamic? >> okay. >> let's start getting the comments from the panelists. >> shall we go in this order? >> sure. >> i'll begin with this. the military's civilizing mission with regard to the rest of turkish society is very deep seeded. it goes back to the 19th century. oops, sorry. >> mike. >> okay.

all right. the military or rather the military democratic establishment, not just the military but also the civilian bureaucracy and also the judicia judiciary, 19th century ottoman modernization from the top down generated the profound process of class formation through the state, not class formation through the economy in the classical way, understood in quasi-marxian fashion but a profound process of class formation through the state meaning special education. although as i said ottoman turkey was not in the strict sense a colonial society. nevertheless it was something like a semi-colonial periphery, and within it there emerged an enclave of turkishness, that is

to say an enclave of westernized elites. having internalized euro centrists and looking upon the rest their society in euro centric oriental fashion and looking at the vast majority of muslim peasants and thinking of them in terms of these are our primitives, these are our primitives that we have to civilize, and it was through that internalized, imported and internalized euro centrism and orientalism that they launched these reforms from the top down in a process that we refer to as authoritarian modernization which did not necessarily entail democracy. in the history of the west, most

of the time, modernity and modernization went hand in hand with democracy. in turkey in a country like ottoman and then kemalist turkey there's modernity between modernity understood as progress and democracy. it was the military bureaucratic establishment that fashioned itself as the carriers of this civilizing mission with regard to the rest of society and it's on the way out against the muslim masses in the long run as keeping them forcefully at bay. creating a cordon center of prohibitions and banned party and repressions and legal clauses and this and that, excluding them from political

participation and excluding them from public space. the west basically went along with this. that is to say in countries like turkey, in the only in turkey, of course, but all over the so-called third world, especially islam land, the basic western outlook has sadly, regretfully been one of trying to prop up such westernized elites with military democratic support against the rest of society, and it's a legacy that still remains with us, and it is a legacy that lies at the heart or at the bottom of. all these doubts or suspicions or allegations, including false allegations, all the sinists and skeptics that have now burst out into the open of turkey in the

aftermath of the defeat of the coup with regard to the west and especially the united states. it's not just the young turks in the early 20th century. it is not just the kemalists from the 1920s onwards. there is a long history behind this mental configuration. military bureaucratic establishment in turkey and the resonances between it and western outlook on countries of its lam. how do the gulenists come into this? in my initial intervention i thought that i would have some time to say a few things about also the gulen congregation. i failed to do so. it is -- i would readily admit that it is something very difficult to describe to western

audiences. think of purpose the jesuits as an instrument as the catholic counter reformation. think of the temple onites coming out of the crusades or thing of falun gong in china, something like that but nothing much more, but think of sacred organization, okrganisms that start listening to a different drummer, not in a good thorough sense but in a very vicious and malignant sense. in the 1920s, in the 1970s, sorry there, took place a parting of ways in the turkish islamism. the main strome decided to go ahead with open public political

struggles and that is to say set up a political party. if it is banned, set up another political party. if it is banned set up another political party. persist in using nonviolent means to politically go and address turkish islamic constituents. a small group that's by then a little known provincial preacher and his close circle decided on a different way that they would to dispense with open political struggle and to troy and conquer the turkish state from the inside. they started doing this in the 1970s and initially they were small. i know that it sounds like a bizarre hard-to-believe fairy story, nary tale, but this is actually what they did. in anti-terrorist discourses

there is talk of, you know, sleeper agents or sleeper cells that are supposed to be activated one day with, you know, a certain do or die kind of mission. think of an entire sleeper organization. that turns out to be so long-winded and so patient that for 10, 15, 20 years it has no plan of action except to keep growing. an entire sleeper organization of hundreds of thousands or hundreds and some thousands of people making their way into the legal profession, judges, prosecutors, centuries of lawyers, whose mission is to protect one another and prevent

them from being eliminated. likewise in the police and likewise in the army. all of this is coming out now in terms of large numbers of confessions in the wake of the coup. judges are procreators volunteering to provide testimony and are coming out to say we were told simply to protect each other and to prevent each other from being identified or dislocated or thrown out of the bureaucracy. they kept doing this. very, very patiently for something like three decades. ideology and enormous cleavage between the inner ideology and outer ideology. we are not talking about a mass movement. we are not talking about a movement that had any idea or intention of ever launching any kind of mass action by directly appealing to the masses. therefore, there emerges an

enormous cleavage between what i provisionally call the inner ideology and the outer ideology. the inner ideology as professor duran has said is messianic. the leader is identified as the new mehdi offis almost, and within the inner circle as you go up through various levels of initiation, especially if you're rights through the bureaucracy, the police and the army. as you keep going higher and higher, more and more stringent ideological requirements of loyalty are introduced so that at the core there is this total obedience and loyalty. our day will come. we wait patiently, and the mehti will tell us our day will come. this is what i mean by an

anti-sleeper organization. now, this is obviously not something that you can come out into the open with. you would be stopped for an insane asylum. you know, consider especially a society like turkey where the vast majority is quite knowledgeable about islamists. they are believing and practicing sunni muslims, let's say, most of them, and, of course, the ideology is within sunni islam. it's not shiite or alowite or whatever, and this cannot possibly be a mass modernization ideology or any kind of foundation for a political program for political platform or agenda. what you try to do with respect to the outside world is, as various panelists have said, you try to present yourself as

moderate, meaning more moderate than the akp, pro-western, not radical in terms of foreign policy and in as much alliance or potential alliance with the real kellalists as possible. certain things have been said on this panel and in terms of the questions from the florida about how this cannot be all gulenists. they cannot be so powerful. they must have been a my north in the army, et cetera, et cetera. yes and no. there is a problem here and as there is a declaration that they had on turkish television the night the coup declared, they had to present themselves in terms of their alter ideology and their platform as quasi-camelists.

the declaration that was read on the night of 15th july was really not that different from 27 may, 1960, 56 years ago. that is to say it was -- it was perfectly, perfectly acceptable. it was deliberately, designbly written as perfectly immaculately acceptable from a camelist and from a western point of view. as these are central, legitimate, moderate people. it was written by the gulenists and that night and in the true moral of the next 24 hours or so their best hope was that the real camelists within the army, that is to say the general staff, et cetera, would move over and align themselves with them. when that failed the coup went. thank you. [ applause ] >> just to remind the question

to dr. duran, did the camelists support the coup at the beginning of the oc party and the populist dimension of the democracy movement and the future of civil military relations in turkey. in the future. well, starting and talking about is there any alliance of camelists and gulenists behind this coup d'etat. actually if there was a real alliance between camelists and guleni gulenists this attempt would be much more bloody and more difficult for the government to suppress this attempt, but, of course, there can be some people and some soldiers who were expecting promotion in their offices from this coup attempt, you know.

and in each coup d'etat or military intervention, military officers gained many things, so maybe some of them expected something from this attempt, but it was not an alliance, actually. we cannot say that, so -- the reason for this, you know, different sectors of turkish society, including kemalists, kurds, suffered from the -- from the acts of this gulenist movement in different times, you know. when the relations between oc party and gulen movement was good, kemalists and kurds and alowis suffered from their power, so when the oc party became the last victim of this secret organization, then

this -- the debate for the unanimity, this concensus against the gulenist movement established actually, so i don't see any real alliance between kemalists and gulenists for the coup d'etat. the second one is the relationship between gulen and oc party. you know, there's simply erdogan himself said that we didn't realize, we didn't recognize the real intention behind this movement. you know, professor berktay clarified really how this organization is unique from other islamic movements or any other religious organizations. so the relationship between gulen movement and oc party was somehow helping each other when

facing kemalist pressure on them, but, you know, national a very quick time it has become clear that this is much more than, that you know. the fissure of state structures in the hands of gulen hand his supporters is the real aim of this movement, so then all the things started apart, and that is the beginning of the struggle between oc party and gulen movement. so for turkish domestic actors, of course, there should be self-criticism for the relations between -- for the relations with gulen movement, but this is not just peculiar to oc party. all other opposition, even used

some cadres or discourses of this movement, so there should be an overall self-criticism for all actors in turkish politics, including the government as well. what was the -- >> just the future of relations. >> we have a chance to restructure system during the old security sector, but, you know, turkish government is not so much successful in reforming these traditions in the last -- in the last years, so this is a chance that there is consensus in reforming the institutions. if this sense of consensus continues with the political actors including opposition parties, i believe that we have a chance to restructure state

institutions including -- including the army, and i -- i hope that we will not miss this opportunity. >> thank you. >> and shadi? >> yeah. >> the erdogan's visit to the russia. >> yeah, sure. i see erdogan's visit to russia as being part of something a bit broader. this general sense that the u.s. is ceding its influence in the middle east to russia, which i think has been one of the defining features of obama's eight years, and in particularly the last few years, so i think that when people are thinking, oh, is the u.s. going to disengage in the middle east, they get a little bit nervous and they panic and they are looking for ways to hedge their bets. if the u.s. will in fact continue its general trajectory towards disengagement and, of course, that will depend on who the next president, is so i wouldn't take it too seriously. i just think it's sort of a rite

of passage now for people who sort of want to, let me put this nicely, piss off the u.s. and, you know, and to put pressure on the u.s., let's say. on the question the u.s. let's say. on the question on evidentiary standards and extradition, so there is no such thing as a truly apolitical extradition process. i mean, politics will play some role. but there still has to be some kind of legitimate judicial process. and judges are going to have to meet those evidentiary standards. and it's a little bit different. so the u.s., there is also the concern of whether or not gulen can get a fair trial in turkey. i think it's clear he could not get a fair trial in turkey. this is not a formal requirement for u.s. extradition, unlike the eu where it is a formal requirement. that said, it is something the judges will probably take into

account as they make any kind of a determination about whether or not extradition should go forward. so i understand that all of this is not very -- does not sound good perhaps from a turkish perspective, but this is where i think there might actually be a clash in terms of what turkish interests are and what the u.s. has to do. i'm also very concerned about setting a precedent going forward that people who find refuge in the u.s. are then sort of put in a very political extradition process. in the case of gulen, perhaps it's justified. we don't know. i don't have access to the evidence. but i'm worried if that precedent is set, in the future, that will be -- that could be used as a kind of judicial precedent for cases that have -- that have less evidentiary support, let's say. let's say we want to make nice with an ally, and that ally is putting a lot of pressure on us, you know. so that's part of what i worry

about as well. >> professor wants to ask something i think. >> on this question of evidentiary requirements, mind you, i should make my own position clear. if i were erdogan, i would have never brought this issue up. that would have been my political tactical choice. i would have raged against gulen, i think justly. but i would not have tried to in any way bring public pressure on the u.s. or the barack obama administration to extradite him, et cetera. having said that, do you remember the conversation after 9/11 between then president george w. bush and the pakistani vice president about

the possible extradition of osama bin laden when and wherever he might be caught? do you remember that conversation? >> yeah, but i don't see how that would be relevant. >> no. the relevance is this. i mean, the relevance in the mind of -- and mind you, i'm not arguing for lowering the evidentiary thresholds. i'm talking about outside the u.s. perceptions of this administrations. faced with this ultimatum, as it were, the pakistani vice president then responded that they had to have evidence. strong evidence that osama bin laden was involved. and the george w. bush respond was, if you'll pardon me not in so many words, bullshit, what evidence? we want him. >> come on, i heard this comparison being -- look. >> let him finish. >> okay.

>> i am -- i am in favor of evidentiary thresholds. but isn't it the case that there generally is an assumption, in fact you just said so. you said if returned to turkey somehow fethullah gulen would certainly not be facing a fair trial, that you are persuaded. how can you be so convinced? there is a presumption that western and specifically american courts will always be fair, will always adhere to strict standards, and that outside, for example, back in turkey, it will be -- is that really the case? >> very quickly. >> very, very quickly. i don't think it's a good strategy. and i've heard this osama bin laden comparison. it's something that has been

raised by a number of turkish officials and pro government supporters. even if you think that, it's not a good strategy for convincing your american counterparts. because when we as americans hear, that we're like seriously? the comparison doesn't make sense to us. everyone knew that osama bin laden was the head of al qaeda. he didn't pretend otherwise. he was a terrorist. there was no debate about this. i feel there is a better way to make your case in fact you want to make your case. and yes, i'm sorry. u.s. courts are more fair than turkish courts. that's just the way it is. not to say that u.s. courts are perfect. but i don't see how you can make the argument that in the current environment where there is a lot of over-the-top -- some of it understandable anti-gulen hatred, that gulen could ever get a fair hearing. even perceived sympathy toward the gulen movement can now be considered a criminal act. >> just a minute. >> and we will wrap up.

>> this is getting hostile. >> well, the trial was considered fair and it was done under european observation and outside observation. in this particular case, turkey is asking for gulen as the leader of a terrorist organization. if extradition were to happen, particular processes would apply, i assume. so a fair trial is perfectly possible. we have actually precedent for that. but here legal question, administration is right to point to the legal process. but i think turks perfectly understand that. but there is also the political side of this. and political side from the turkish perspective is not includes kerry's first sort of

message. later on u.s. military officials' statements that appear in a certain way at the very least. and then when you didn't have an immediate sort of visit to turkey or, you know, turkish perception is that politically, u.s. is not standing with us, and they are using the legal process as a delay tactic. so i think that the channels are a bit messy these days. which is why we need much better sort of cooperation on this issue. but you need to assure the turks who are going through this trauma that the u.s. will be there as their ally politically, but also legally. so i think this is the issue we are having. >> okay. thank you very much, and thank you for the panelists kadir from

washington, d.c. and for the professors coming all the way from turkey. so thank you very much and thank you for joining us today. an join us to thank for the panelists as well. [ applause ] with the house and senate returning from their summer break next week, on thursday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we'll preview four key issues facing congress this fall. federal fun why? because mosquitos ravage --

>> all of these votes are very vital to the future of this nation, in a time of turmoil and a time of the greatest number of refugees since the end of world war ii. >> gun violence legislation and criminal justice reform. >> every member of this body, every republican and every democrat wants to see less gun violence. >> we must continue to work the work of nonviolence and demand an end to senseless killing everywhere. >> and the resolution for congress to impeach irs commissioner john koskinen. >> commissioner of the internal revenue service for high crimes and misdemeanors.

>> will review the expected congressional debate with susan ferrechio. join us thursday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span for congress this fall. c-span, created by america's cable television companies and brought to you as a public service by your cable or satellite provider. dartmouth college professor colin calloway leads a seminar for high school teachers on native american history, from the colonial era through a westward expansion. he talks about how tribes operated as separate nations, both in their interaction was each other and with european countries. this class is hosted by the gilder lehrman institute of american history. it's about an hour and 15 minutes. >> good morning. so we have been talking about ways in which we can incorporain