care system for veterans, and later, a panel of law professors on the state of free speech on college campuses. u.s. diplomats update members of congress on the violence and humanitarian situation in the south sudanese civil war. they look at actions the international community can take to address the crisis, including a potential arms embargo and the deployment of a regional protection force. this hearing of the house foreign affairs subcommittee on africa is about two hours.

>> so if we can come to order. thank you for being here. on april 27 of this year our subcommittee held a hearing on south sudan's prospects for peace. an accord that finally ended the civil war that broke out in december of 2013 was reluctantly signed by both the government of south sudan and the people's liberation movement in opposition in august of 2015. we were cautioned by ambassador booth at the time. and i remember your testimony on april 27th, mr. ambassador, when you said these are the most significant advancements yet in implementing the peace agreement, but you also cautioned and said it is only a first step towards lasting peace, the most difficult work still lies ahead. those words were prophetic and

certainly very, very true, especially given what happened in july. peace was never fully established in south sudan as a result of the august agreement. in fact, as we all know, fighting spread to areas that had not previously seen armed conflict. an estimated 50,000 south sudanese have been killed since december of 2013. more than 2.5 million have been displaced and 4.8 million face severe hunger. according to the u.n. mission in the republic of south sudan, quote, gross violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale. south sudanese women have long reported cases of sexual assault by armed force throughout the country, sometimes in sight of unmas bases. this past july between 80 to 100 armed soldiers broke into the tehran apartment compound which houses aid workers and

international organization staff. and for several hours, they sexually assaulted women, beat residents, murdered one south sudanese journalist, and looted the facility. unms did not respond to the desperate calls for help from residents, even though their own personnel lived in the tehran compound and u.n. mission officials say the various components didn't respond to orders to mobilize within the organization. u.n. peace keepers were just minutes away but refused to intervene despite being asked. and having a robust legal mandate to do so. a contingent of south sudanese military ultimately rescued the victims from other rampaging troops. the investigation by the south sudanese government is scheduled to be completed within days. and just over the weekend, our ambassador samantha power has asked that there be an independent panel to look into what happened there. and there must be consequences for those who are found guilty. the rapidly deteriorating

security and the increasingly dire humanitarian situation made nato undertake an emergency mission to south sudan two weeks ago along with staff director greg simpkins. i have known since he first became vice president in the government of the republic of sudan in 2005. i met him only weeks after he assumed that office. i hoped my visit might convey to him the outrage over the murder, rape, sexual assault, attack on aid workers and the precarious situation that his government faces. south sudan is at a tipping point. the united nations will likely take up a measure to impose an arms embargo if they do not see implementation of what looks like was an agreement over the weekend to deploy some 4,000 peacekeepers. the international monetary fund has strongly recommended a mechanism for financial transparence circumstances and

that meets next month, likely expecting a response from south sudan. meanwhile, the house and senate both had measures that had arms embargo embedded in it, as well. in juba we met with president keyer, other members of his cabinet and his defense minister kual manyang juk, including his defense minister. the rape by soldiers must stop. and the poemps these despicable crimes must be prosecuted in response to president keyer and agree to produce a zero tolerance presidential decree against rape and sexual against rape and sexual exploitation by armed forces. kier, other members of the cabinet and his defense minister sup suchsuch such a decre

perpetrators that may they be punished for their actions, but it places the government on the lip line line to enforce s. tthe u.n. commissioner for hum abusabuses accountable as quotw and inadequate. and that of course must change. president keir also gave a copy to a presidential order to investigate the incident at the compound. the results of that is due any day now. there are however four military officers and one civilian in custody for looting the tehran compound, but no one has been arrested for sexual assaults, beatings, or the public murder of a south sudanese journalist. one of the victims of sexual assauassault at tehran is from congressional district. aftafter relaying horrible det of the assault by two soldiers, she gave us the name of the soldip soldier whsoldier wh ap and wand who might be abe informati information that coul to prosecute those who attacked hp her her at the tehran c.

aand p andand i convey thar and the defense minister. p as you know, mr. ambassa there were about 20,000 humanitarianpsoutsouth sudan, from the united states and other foreign countries. pif therrif there is not gr security, vital assistance will diminidiminish at a time that needed most. the exploitation of children as chichil child soldiers must st well. according to unicef, 16,000 chirchild soldiers have been recruited by all sides since the civil war began in december of 2013. moreover, this year the u.s. state departmerstate st persons report gave south sudan p a failina failing grade,t because of child soldiers. south sudan faces the possibility again of a u.n. arms embarembargo agai embargo agai implement the deployment of the 4,000 regional protection force. thethere i there is yet time f sudsudan to make its pivot to e

and good governance by faithfulp faithfully implfa accord and including especially the establishment of a hybrid coucourt signed one year ago, time is rung out. it is a very, very fluid and unfortunately volatile situation. the governments of the three gordgordon the governments of the three gordgordo or thes of south sud peace, the united states, and norway all have discussed their disgust with the government and ip iits arme its armed oppo adhering to the peacep and for security and well-being of its people. however, expressions of the state are not enough. tp tthe tp tth syrians not only ino examine culpability but also to try to find solutions that will safeguard the future of one of tthe world's newest nation and its citizens. t r asas p as a guarantee united states can and should do no less. i would like to yield to my friend and colleague. >> thank you for your trip that

yp you and mr. simpkins ma. i know it was on very short notice but a very important delegation. i'm glad that you did that and also that we are having this hearing so quickly. i also want to thank ambassador boobooth and ambassador limon. ip i'm glad thi'm glad thatg your testimony today. i was in south sudan in november and i went there with a small delegation to look at the u.n. peacekeeping mission at the time. ap and that was before mach returned. and the big concern then was wip will he return, and wil nation hold to the agreement. it was shortly after president kier had divided up the nation and expanded the provinces. we were very concerned about how you could possibly since that was done after the peace agreement, how can you hold to the power sharing that had been agreed to in the peace agreement if you have reconfigured the entire geography of the nation.

at the time we were concerned about what is happening then. bp but nbut now what's goin encompassed and victimized yet again south sudanese citizens, and especially the ones that are least abr least able to protect themselvthemselves -- women, g youth. in response to the crisis i joined several of my colleagues in a letter to president obama outlining the severity of the deteriorating situation in south sudan and calling on the u.s. to lead the way and calling for an arms embargo on south sudan to stop the needless killing, endless brutality. the unsc august 12th decision to renew unms, the proposed revision and inclusion of an additional 4,000 strong regional protection force must be applauded, but there must also

be clarification regarding the specific rules of engagement governing the troops. i understand that the government agreed to the additional regional protection force as recently as sunday. i look to ambassador booth to outline the next steps which must be taken to bring an end to the nightmare of violence not only by the long-term suffering citizens of south sudan but also by the foreign nationals who with total disregard for personal welfare seek to assist these citizens. several of the questions that i have we'll get into in the dialogue but i want to propose those in the beginning. and obviously, the central question is what more can we do. an arms embargo, will it be effective? it seems as though there needs to be a whole international effort that is beyond and i want to know what your thoughts are au's capacity. and also, in terms of unms, what will their role be?

will they be able to intervene will they be able to be aggressive? or will they be in a position where they will watch something happening. i just think that this situation has reached -- and we all know this -- has reached dire proportions. i was in nigeria a couple of weeks ago. it was a staff member from the state department actually had just been evacuated from south sudan and sent to nigeria. so i really want to be as specific as possible. it's important to understand the situation but i really want to get down to the brass tacks of okay, now what? what can we do? what can we do as a nation and what should the world do? because otherwise i just don't see the situation getting particularly better. with that, i yield. >> thank you. chair recognizes mr. donem. >> i will yield my time so we give the witness more time to testify. >> i want to thank all of our

and ranking member bass for calling this hearing on the crisis in south sudan and thank our witness and ambassador booth for being here today. i look forward to hearing from you on the deteriorating situation in south sudan and as congresswoman bass said what we can do to be effective in responding. in 2011 as an independent country. however, the civil war that has ravaged south sudan since 2013 has escalated alarmingly since the subcommittee's last hearing on south sudan in april. the impact is devastating and the potential for an even deeper crisis is greatly disturbing. not only does south sudan face another post conflict reconciliation process, high civilian needs and widespread displacement of its population, but increasing human rights abuse, including recruiting child soldiers, which is extremely distressing.

u.n. officials have asserted that targeted attacks against civil civilians and personnel in south sudan may cute war crimes or crimes against humanity. a u.n. commission in south sudan reports civilians have been targeted along ethnic lines. forces on both sides have committed violence. including an attack on a residence for aid workers in juba in july, which resulted in assaults on several americans and the killing of a local journalist. the dangers faced by foreign workers could have a devastating effect on aid workers. if the current crisis cannot be brought under control, the situation will likery deteriorate further and could spin into complete chaos. i hope that the sudanese government's decision to allow the force to deplay will enable the beginning of real improvement in this very dire situation. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what else we can do to support the stability in that part of the world.

and i thank our witnesses again for being here and yield back. >> thank you. we're joined by full committee chairman ed royce of california. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. i would just start by commending you, chairman, for your sustained focus on the crisis in south sudan. as all of you know chairman smith just travelled to south sudan to engage with our embassy there, and to engage with our other partners. and that is the fifth i think south sudan specific hearing that the committee has held since this crisis began. what's unfortunately and frankly maddening is the underlying problems haven't changed in the past three years. it is still a man-made crisis. it is still a crisis political in nature. and what does change, what changes every day is the number of innocent south sudanese killed, the number displaced.

tens of thousands have been killed. millions have been now been displaced. and i very much appreciate the recent senior level engagement of the administration including secretary kerry's trip to the region and ambassador samantha powers' leading of a security council delegation to south sudan. i was on the phone a few hours ago with secretary susan rice on this issue. it is really unclear whether this high level diplomacy can have an impact on the ground. one of the oddities here is that the anti-american sentiment is growing in juba as of late. there is reporting today of an incident in which the presidential guard deliberately opened fire on a u.s. diplomatic convoy traveling through the city. i understand command and control of armed forces in south sudan is practically nonexistent in

this situation, practically nonexistent. but there should never be an instance in which american diplomats are specifically targeted, ever after lengthy security council negotiation, the security council approved of the deployment of a regional protection force. i met with the secretary general recently of the u.n. on this issue. and i shared that we welcome the establishment of force, but i know how difficult it is going to be moving this from concept to reality. it's going to be far from easy. especially envoy booth in your prepared testimony you explained that if the secretary general

reports that the government of south sudan is impeding the new forces deployment, the administration would be prepared to support an arms embargo. we've made similar threats in other resolutions, and i'm not sure anyone in south sudan takes that threat of an embargo seriously anymore. i hope that we will be serious in terms of implementation of it. interestingly in your prepared testimony you made no mention of the existing executive order that would allow the sanction of individuals who threaten peace in south sudan. i think that is worth contemplating. i look forward to hearing from you why no one has been added to the u.s. sanctions list in over a year. there are surely people who deserve to be on that list. if we fail to hold south sudan's political leaders on both sides accountable for the atrocities committed, we cannot expect

anything to change. so i thank you, mr. chairman, and i yield back. >> thank you very much, chairman rice. mr. rooney? >> thank you, mr. chairman. again, thank you for letting me sit in on your hearing. mr. ambassador, since the signing of the peace agreement in august of 2015, and since the violence in july, the u.n. security council and the u.s. have both failed to implement an arms embargo, as you know, in south sudan. the u.n. and the u.s. have failed to sanction additional individuals that we have proof have been involved in the attacks against civilians and that continue to procure weapons and military equipment. secretary kerry in february in state foreign ops subcommittee that i sit on as well as yourt in april both told me that the u.s. is committed to holding senior officials accountable for

continued ceasefire violations and human rights violations that undermine the terms of the peace agreement in south sudan. you both said that the administration would be willing to implement sanctions on such individuals. but secretary kerry stopped short of endorsing an arms embargo. also in august during a trip to africa, secretary kerry threatened to withhold humanitarian assistance to south sudan if leaders there continue to violate the peace agreement. so i'm curious to hear your testimony why the u.s. is threatening to with hold assistance to the people of south sudan rather than holding the leaders who perpetuated the violence accountable through an arms embargo. i would like to know who in the administration is preventing additional individuals from being sanctioned and who do not want to implement an arms embargo. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you very much. i would like to now welcome in ambassador booth. donald booth was appointed

special envoy to sudan and south sudan on august 28th, 2013. he previously served as ambassador to ethiopia, zambia and liberia. prior to that he was director of office of technical and specialized agencies. ambassador booth also has served as director of the office of west african affairs. deputy director of office of southern african affairs, economic counselor in athens, division chief of bilateral affairs. your full resume will be made part of the record. ambassador booth, the floor is yours. >> thank you very much, chairman smith, ranking member bass, other members of the committee, the subcommittee. thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. i want to discuss some of the tragic events that occurred over the past two months without ignoring the bitter reality on the grown, i also want to focus most of my remarks today on the

possibilities for way forward. chairman smith, as you know from your visit south sudan is in a dire state. the most recent outbreak of violence in early july created perilous security situation in many parts of the country. the humanitarian situation as many of you have noted is one of the most extreme in the world with 4.8 million people, over 40% of the population facing life threatening hunger, 2.5 million displaced and the economy in free fall. serious crime is now a part of daily life for south sudanese, and aid workers and their supplies are targets as well. the violence in early july came about because neither president salva kiir nor vice president was willing to work with the other to implement the peace agreement, or to set up the security arrangements that were designed to prevent a return to fighting in juba. we saw the moment of greatest

optimism since the signing of the august 2015 peace agreement. the establishment in late april of the transitional government, we saw it shattered by the irresponsibility and ruthlessness of south sudan's leaders. both leaders lost control of their forces during a moment of tremendous political fragility and government soldiers engaged in sexual violence including attacks on both south sudanese and foreigners at tehran camp. i would be remised not to pause here and praise the work of ambassador malifi and her team at the embassy in juba. they have faced enormous hardships and real danger in doing their jobs and their work has been extraordinary. they have against long odds reserved the engagement needed to help the people of south sudan. they have done so despite two events that i know are on your minds. first on the night of july 7 just a few hours after a deadly encounter between government and

opposition security forces in the same area, two vehicles carrying several diplomats were fired upon by government soldiers. fortunately, because they were both armored vehicles the occupants were not injured. ambassador fi confronted president kiir the following day and received an apology as well as assurance there's would be a thorough investigation. that day, however, was also the same day that major fighting broke out between the government and opposition. the second event was much more tragic. the attack by scores of uniformed government security forces against the terrain camp where 12 americans and other third country and other south sudanese nationals were located. the attack involved hours of looting, beatings, rapes and murder of a prominent south sudanese journalist, john gadlak. i would like to express at this point my personal condolences to john's family and to all survivors of the attack.

that attack occurred towards the end of two days of heavy fighting in juba which saw government force drive out nashar's security contingent. even as shooting raged near the embassy compounds, as soon as the embassy was alerted to the attack, ambassador fi contacted security officials whom she believed still had command of their forces. and she convinced them to intervene to rescue those under assault at the camp. i want to stress that she did everything in her power and resources in those circumstances to assist those who were under assault at the terrain camp. in the after math of the attack our priority was the care and evacuation of the victims and then to protect their privacy and to demand justice for them. my written testimony contains a thorough account of what we know of the awful events at terrain camp that day as well as what

we're doing to ensure safety of our personnel. i would like to focus the rest of my statement on what i see as the way forward or at least a way forward. or at least a way forward. first, in the wake of the fighting in juba in july, a political accommodation to avoid further fighting and suffering remains as important as ever. but given that neither president kiir nor the former vice president nashar could prevent their security entourages from fighting, we do not believe it would be wise for nashar to return to his previous position in juba. that said, this cannot serve as a justification for president kiir to monopolize power. what is most urgently needed is creation of a secure space for inclusive political process to forestall further violence. that is why we strongly support intergovernmental authority for on development's call for deployment of a regional protection force to juba to provide for free and safe movement throughout the capital.

the rpf should proactively contribute to stability and thereby allow for the demilitarization of juba. we must be clear that the government will allow rpf to do its job once it's in juba. no political process can take place as long as large numbers of armed men and heavy weaponry remain in the capital. stabilizing the security situation in juba is only the first step. any political process to be credible and viable must be inclusive. i believe what is needed for south sudan's political and military leaders in and out of government to meet together to figure out how to jointly shoulder responsibility for preventing further bloodshed. however, this can only succeed if those currently in power are willing to accommodate the legitimate interests of others. the violence in early july drove out significant factions of splm and opposition of the former detainees and other political parties. these groups must be deterred from supporting any further

violence. thus they must see a path for peaceful engagement. south sudan's leaders must look ahead to the creation of a professional inclusive national army and other security institutions. they need to be able to articulate an agreed end state of security sector reform. as any international support for contonement or ddr activities will depend among other things of the credibility of envisioned security sector end state. the transitional government should prioritize legislation establishing an open process for drafting and ratifying a new constitution under which elections will be held at the end of a transitional period. in addition the transitional government should prioritize legislation regarding african union led hybrid court for south

sudan. a recent opinion survey showed 93% of south sudanese believe there can be no enduring peace without accountability. we agree. what i have described is a sequence of interdependent events. i'm describing them as a way forward not because it will be easy to implement them, but because it is difficult to see any other path that does not lead to a future of oppressive one party rule, renewed conflict or most likely both. i am not naive about the chances of these things happening. our ability to influence events in south sudan and steer its leaders towards more constructive behavior is limited. the security council's permanent representatives just returned from a trip to south sudan. we were pleased that the council was able to come to agreement with transitional government on several key issues including the government's consent to deployment of the regional protection force and to work with u.n. mission that is already there.

however, we now need to see those words turned into action. if the secretary general's report finds the government is obstructing deployment of regional protection force or continuing to prevent unmis from fulfilling its mandate, we are prepared to support an arms embargo in the security council. beyond an arms embargo we stand prepared to impose restrictions on individuals involved in public corruption as official corruption has a long history in south sudan and has played a direct role in ferret rans of conflict in the country. mr. chairman, i would have liked to come before this subcommittee today with better news. unfortunately, we now face a difficult and uncertain path for south sudan. it is a frustrating and disheartening situation particularly of course for south sudanese. it's their future that grows bleaker by the day. with them in our minds, i believe we must continue to

press south sudan's leaders to give peace a chance. thank you for inviting me to speak today. and i look forward the answering your quirks mr. ambassador, thank you so very much for your statement and your work, your fine work. without objection your full statement will be made a part of the record. just a few opening questions. and i do want to add migrations and thanks to ambassador, u.s. ambassador to south sudan molly fi and her staff who under unbelievably trying circumstances have been working around the clock to try to secure the peace, provide for access of humanitarian aid workers, which is one of the biggest impediments, and why so many people are dying of malnutrition, and why so many young people, especially children and babies are succumbing to starvation. they are working hard. i want to thank her for her leadership as well. let me ask you about the zero tolerance policy that the defense minister when i asked him said they would do against

rape and sexual assault. he made it very clear that he was going to call the president to try to get him to do it, as well. we did meet with salva kiir. and i raised it with him and he said he would do it. we called back since then, a little over a week. it hasn't been promulgated yet. of course, the mere issuance of a statement without implementation is not worth the paper it is printed on. we are hoping that the two will go hand in hand. good strong statement, hold the service members, armed forces to account and police and put them behind bars when they sexually assault and rape and kill and maim. your thoughts on that. secondly, ambassador limen who as you know will be testifying on the second panel, who performed your job admirably and with great distinction when he

was special envoy makes a point in his testimony that the new rapid protection force should not be under unms, the u.n. mission there. greg simpkins and i met with the head of the united nations mission and she said they tried to get commanders to make the trip, which was only less than a mile away to try to save people who were under assault at tehran. and they wouldn't go. this isn't the first time it has happened. several times. they have the right rules of engagement. this isn't sarajevo all over again or the former yugoslavia and elsewhere. they have a robust rules of engagement in charter 7 powers. he suggested it be under a separate authority or mission. your thoughts on that on whether it would be an improvement and provide additional help. and then the access issue. it seems to me that if we -- as i said, people will do if there is not humanitarian access.

the huge majority of humanitarian workers are south sudanese who in a way are in a special category of risk. your thoughts on what we can do there. and then security sector reform. when you testified last time, you put the agreement under four basic baskets, which are mutually inclusive of each other. security sector reform and justice and reconciliation. i think as you pointed out the hybrid court ought to be set up. it ought to be done yesterday to hold people to account for acts of impunity and crimes against humanity. but security sector reform seems like the most daunting challenge with all the militias and all the lack of chain of command that appears to be the situation there. your thoughts on the prospects of meaningful systemic reform of the military.

>> thank you very much, mr. chairman. let me go through those. first of all, i want to thank you for being such a strong advocate for the zero tolerance policy on gender-based violence for rape and other such crimes and raising that at the highest levels during your visit in juba. it is certainly something that we are following up on. unfortunately, like many commitments that are made when we meet with senior officials in south sudan, the promises are not always turned into reality. but it is something that certainly is important and we will continue to push on that. we will let you know what success or lack of success we may have in that regard. secondly, as regards to the regional protection force, there are a number of reasons why egad proposed and we have supported putting a regional protection force as part of the u.n.

mission in south sudan. first of all, there is the issue of funding it. and a separate stand alone force under an african union or egad flag would have faced problems of being funded and would have severely delayed the ability to be deployed. doing it under the u.n. may not be always the fastest, but that's one of the things that i've been engaging on in my many trips to the region in talking with chiefs of defense and foreign ministry officials as well as other senior leaders to ensure the three countries that have pledged troops to this regional protection force, east openia, kenya and rwanda would be indeed prepared to move their forces very quickly. and we would be prepared to help them move them quickly to do that. also, this force was designed in a way that it would be under one commander and that commander and that commander would report to the force commander of unms,

but would have the authority and the mandate from the troop contributing countries to use that force for the very specific tasks of the mandate in u.n. security council resolution 2304, which is to ensure the free movement of people in juba, to protect critical infrastructure, including the airport and keeping it open, and in intervening should anyone be planning or engaging in attacks on the u.n., on civilians, on idps, a very broad mandate. again, in our discussions with troop contributing countries they have assured us that troops they would deploy to do the mission would have the political backing in their capitals to indeed enforce those tasks. so i understand the skepticism that many may have, having looked at other u.n. missions, but this seemed to be the most

practical and expedient way of getting troops on the ground who could actually provide a security umbrella in juba. but as i said in my testimony just putting those forces on the ground will not solve the problem. they need the cooperation of the south sudanese government, and in the peace agreement and particularly in the security arrangements that followed it that were negotiated after the signing of the agreement in august 2015. there was a limitation of number of forces that both salva kiir, the government, and the opposition could have in juba. and all other forces were to be at least 25 kilometers outside of the city. so that is at least the starting point for taking the heavy weapons and many of the security forces that are currently in juba and getting them out and we would hope that the government would cooperate in further reducing the military footprints so that the citizens of juba can

feel more secure and so that there is the room for the political dialogue that i have talked about. on humanitarian assistance, this is indeed a terrible situation. since the outbreak of this conflict 59 humanitarian aid workers have been killed making south sudan the most dangerous place for humanitarian aid workers, more dangerous than syria i am told. so this is a serious problem. it's something we have engaged repeatedly on in my visits, many visits to juba i have engaged with president kiir, defense minister and others on this. we keep receiving assurances that this issue will be addressed, that orders are issued, that they simply need to have a specific example so they can go after individuals who might have been harassing aid workers or stealing aid. but frankly, this has become a

systemic problem. shortly after the fighting in july there was looting of many different stores in juba. one was the world food program warehouse. it was very organized. a truck came with a crane not only to loot the food but to take the generator from the wfp compound. so this indeed does need to be investigated and people need to be held accountable. i think that is the only way that the message will get out that the government is truly serious, that humanitarian aid workers and their supplies are meant for the people of south sudan and should not be interfered with. this is going to be a continued engagement and a hard slog i'm sure with the government in juba. on security sector reform, the peace agreement and in particular the security arrangements negotiated after it

called for a security and defense sector review board to outline sort of the end state of the security arrangements of south sudan, what the army would look like, the security services, the police, et cetera. that board had just begun meeting when things fell apart in july this year. but even under the peace agreement it was foreseen it would not come to conclusion for p about 18 months into the transitional period whereas the idea of contoning forces and beginning a ddr process was to start prior to that. what i am proposing and i have said in my testimony is that we really need to have an idea of what the end state is. south sudan has suffered for too long as a heavily militarized state. probably understandable and it was the product of a long liberation struggle against the

government in khartoum. so almost 50 years of struggle. it is time that south sudan in order to be able to be at peace and to prosper needs to be a less demilitarized state. so can we get south sudanese to agree on what the end state is, and if we agree that it is a sustainable and reasonable end state, that's something we can look to support. really our leverage on getting a meaningful security sector reform is that we will not fund things if it isn't a reasonable outcome that we are driving towards. and then on the hybrid court, again, we share frustration that this is moving more slowly than we would like. i have engaged numerous times and we had our legal experts engage with the african union. we are at the verge of giving them $3.3 million to actually begin some of the work. we have encouraged them to move forward on at least establishing an officer of the prosecutor so

that testimonies and evidence can begin to be collected even before the court is established and judges can decide on who would be indicted or who would be looked at by the court. so that is something we want to push forward. i have discussed that with the african union special representative for south sudan, the honorable president konori, former president of mali who has been deeply engaged as well for the past year in trying to sort out the problems of south sudan. thank you. >> thank you. ms. bass? >> thank you again, mr. ambassador. i wanted to know if you could tell me the status of the former president of botswana, festus moai, and if you can, one, review the role he is playing, and then the status of that. we have talked about

humanitarian aid. and i know no one wants to see that end, but how can humanitarian aid get to the population? you mentioned the world food program and the theft, the organized theft that took place. i wanted to know if that was the government or the opposition. you talk about -- we have talked about an arms embargo. i mention that in my opening. i wanted to know what is the position of the administration on arms embargo and where are the south -- south sudanese getting arms from now? i also wanted to mention a couple other items. >> thank you, congresswoman. let me start with the question about the joint monitoring and evaluation commission, which is headed by botswana former president festus mohai. he was appointed by egad to fulfill the role as chair of

jmek. now jmec is a committee that is made up of south sudanese parties as well as the members of e gad plus, who are both guaranteetors as well as members of egad plus. and he chairs monthly meetings of that group. his function is to oversee the implementation of the agreement and where the parties get stuck in implementing it, he is to recommend ways forward. if the parties are blocking implementation his recourse is to report to egad, to the african you know peace and security council and to the u.n. security council. he has done a number of reports to those various bodies. he has tackled issues such as the problem of the 28 states, the impasse in seating of members of the transitional legislature and other elements of the agreement that the parties were unable to find a

way to implement because they were not working in good faith with each other. after the events of july 8-11 it jmec temporarily moved its operations to addis ababa. they have now gone back to juba. and one of the tasks that the security council asked jmec to undertake is to hold a security workshop to determine the level and arming of forces that should remain in juba. i understand that president mohai has convened a meeting held on the 22nd and 23 order this month to look at that. those are the types of activities that jmec is doing. we are one of the major supporters of jmec. we have contributed over $3 million to the operation of it. we believe it is a critical component for successful implementation of any part of the peace agreement.

it has been criticized by the government in particular for being a usurping government authorities. we do not see it that way at all. we see it as neutral -- president mohai in particular as the neutral arbiter of the agreement. on humanitarian access, i just really would like to clarify one thing on what secretary kerry was expressing in the press conference. in nairobi. i really think what he was expressing there was not a plan to cut off humanitarian assistance from the united states but rather a frustration with the continued interference with the humanitarian assistance that we are providing. and really trying to put south sudan's leaders on notice that they have to get serious about dealing with this. that was the message. >> i wasn't referencing secretary kerry, really. i mean i know there are concerns about that here. >> so, again, how do we get the humanitarian assistance delivered?

it's a systemic problem and it's partly related to the criminality of the wfp warehouse incident, for example, occurred after opposition forces were driven from the capital. so it would have to have been government forces that were doing that looting. and again, that's the type of thing that needs to be investigated and some examples need to be made of people who are involved in that type of activity. of the people that the government claims it has arrested for looting in the aftermath of the fighting in july, it's not clear to us that any individuals -- of those individuals are particularly involved or being looked at for involvement in this attack. and then the arms embargo. what we have tried to do with the arms embargo, as it is a major tool, is to achieve progress toward peace by

threatening it, and we have used that on a number of occasions, and we think it's one of the reasons that the government is seriously looking at allowing the deployment of the regional protection force. because they know that if there is impediments to that, and they know that many other members of the security council are already on record of supporting the arms embargo. but i think most importantly, what they heard when the security council permanent representatives went to juba this past weekend was a unanimous security council that was saying, when we pass a resolution, even though some may have abstained on it, it is the security council that is speaking. and so, you have to take that seriously. and as i mentioned in my testimony, if the secretary-general reports that there is continued obstruction of this force, we are prepared to move ahead. and as we said in security council resolution 2304, which

we have the pen on, that there is an appended resolution to be is an appended resolution to be voted on, an arms embargo resolution, and we are also prepared to look at other tools, such as sanctions. i must say, though, our record in getting additional people sanctioned in the security council has not been good. we had what we thought was a very good case back about a year ago when fighting flared up in the area right after the signing of the peace agreement. and the two generals responsible for this, paul malong on the government side and johnson maloney on the opposition side, we've put their names forward for sanctioning. and the council, certain several members of the council blocked that effort. so, even when you think you have a clear case, it's not easy to get the council to agree on that.

and to be effective, travel and financial sanctions really do need to have the backing of a broader community than just in the united states. >> did you mention who's the primary -- or where is the primary place that they get the arms from? who's selling them the arms? >> they seem to have mainly come from the former soviet union area. but i think most of them come in through the gray or black arms market. i don't have specific countries that i can attach to specific arms platforms because, obviously, the government goes to some lengths to keep that information to itself. but clearly, it has access still to arms -- >> which is why i wonder about

the effectiveness of an arms embargo, but anyway. >> well, that's why if an arms embargo is voted, it has to be something that is done by the security council so that it will have the impermature of that body and the weight of the international community behind it. >> so, mr. chair, before i yield, i just wanted to bring attention to someone who's in the audience who was a former intern with me, david akuth who was part of the lost boys and lost girls that has been living very successfully in the united states and is leading an effort with other lost boys and lost girls -- i should say lost men and lost women, because they're all grown. but we actually plan to next week introduce legislation calling for a program that would be run by us, by the state department, to allow some of the former lost boys and lost girls to return to south sudan. those individuals who have come here, who have gotten their education, who have been successful and want to go back and give back to their country. obviously, no one would suggest

that they go back right now, but given the length of time it takes to do legislation, we certainly would hope if a program like that was instituted -- it was one suggested many years ago by one of your former colleagues -- that it is something that we might consider. so, i just want to mention that, and i'll save my other questions for the next witness. >> mr. donovan? >> thank you, mr. chair and thank you, ambassador, for your service to our country. many of the things you spoke about are troubling. two things i'd like you to address is, one, the recruitment of children to fight in these battles, and the other is the u.n.'s mission in south sudan's instability to protect the workers that are going there on humanitarian missions. and the last thing, if you have a moment, is you spoke about the path of peaceful engagement. i was just curious about how you think we get there.

>> thank you, congressman. on child soldiers, i think the number was already read out, about 16,000 supposedly have been recruited during the course of this conflict since december 2013. child soldiers had been a problem in south sudan before this current conflict. it's something that we had actually engaged very robustly with the ministry of defense prior to december 2013 on, and which we were making actually some real progress in getting child soldiers out of the spla and even addressing those who were in many of the militias throughout the country. >> what ages are we speaking about, if you know? >> i've heard of children as young as 10, 12 being involved. it could be even younger in some

cases. but this is, you know, something that we have been constantly engaging them on. now, during the height of the conflict, they were recruiting both sides, opposition and government, and they were utilizing militias. and many of these militias are sort of traditional youth organizations that go on traditional cattle raids, and there's sort of no distinction there in terms of age of majority, if you will. and so, they ended up being i think swept into the fighting. so that's part of the problem. but clearly, as we look, and i talked about a security sector end state. clearly, we want to see a security sector end state that the government would support. they would have no place at all for child soldiers. and we will continue to engage on that. the state department last week, i think, issued a very direct

statement condemning the use of child soldiers in south sudan and the continued practice of that there. on the problems protecting humanitarian workers, i'd like to just give a little bit of context. the u.n. mission in south sudan on december 14th, 2013, the day after the trouble started in juba, they had camps in juba and in other towns, their own bases that became the sanctuary of tens of thousands of south sudanese who were fleeing ethnically based killing. and this was sort of a new move, if you will, for the u.n. to actually let people on to their bases in such numbers. but we think it was the right thing to do at the time and that it saved thousands of lives to have that happen. but what has resulted is the u.n. is now saddled with somewhere between 150,000 or so

people that are actually now in, if you will, their own facilities, their own camps, that they have to provide static protection to. and in many instances, they don't control much of a perimeter around where their camps were. and so, it takes a fair number of troops to be able to provide that static protection. so this means that there are fewer troops available for moving out into the city, into the countryside, but we have had numerous successes. for example, back in april of this year, ambassador phee worked diligently with the government in juba, the regional governor in unity state and the u.n. mission to put in a forward base in lear, which is in unity state, so it was a hotspot for humanitarian needs. and the humanitarian community was demanding protection there. and so, the u.n. did go and

establish a forward base there, and that enabled humanitarians to access an area that they had not been able to get to for almost two years of the conflict. so, we've had successes like that in some specific cases. but the ability of the u.n. to be able to move about the country as well as in juba has been erestricted by the government. unmiss has had two helicopters shot down by government forces over the years, one before the conflict, one since. and when they need to fly, they need government permission to fly to make sure it's safe. and the government does not always give that. so, again, i would go back to the problem is partly unmiss, but it's also the government which has not allowed unmiss to do all that it could do to facilitate humanitarian

assistance delivery, and that function, humanitarian assistance delivery and supporting that is one of the four key functions the security council has given to them, so they clearly understand that as part of their mandate. >> if you could spend a moment, as my time has expired, about your vision of how we get to this path of peaceful engagement. >> first step i would say is getting juba secured so there is space for a political engagement. now, why would those that are sitting in juba now who feel that they can implement the agreement where they are, why would they go forward on that? i think the answer to that is that they have to ensure that these people that have been driven out over the past two months and others that felt already excluded from the peace process, if they're not given a peaceful path forward, a political path forward, is going

to result in more widespread fighting throughout the country, and can this government afford that? is that what it wants its legacy to be, is a south sudan that goes down with more and more fighting in more and more parts of the country? so, there's going to have to be pressure on the leaders, for sure, but frankly, it's the only way forward that is going to lead to peace, is to have this open up some political space and have this discussion with others. >> thank you very much, sir. >> thank you. >> mr. meadows? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. ambassador, let me come back to a question that my colleague, ms. bass, asked you, because your response was a little troubling with regards to arms and where they're coming from and where they are not coming from. are you suggesting in your testimony that we don't know? because you said it was a gray market, but we have unbelievable intelligence, even in that

region. so, are you suggesting that we don't know or that you can't say? >> well, congressman, what we do know i would have to address in a different setting than this. >> all right. that's fair enough. i just wanted to make sure we clarified, because here's my concern, ambassador. i have followed sudan and south sudan before there was a south sudan. and it has been a passion for my family from a humanitarian standpoint. the stories, the true stories that have been told will break anyone's heart on what so much has not only been done but has not been done. and so, i appreciate you being the special envoy, your work there in a very complex and difficult situation. but what i've also come to find out is that from both sides, those who would be supportive of

sudan and those who would be supportive of south sudan in a particular position, they believe that the united states has failed to live up to the promises that we have made and that we make threats that we don't follow through on. and even some of your testimony here today would seem to underscore that, that when we talk about arms embargo or sanctions, does it not have a chilling effect if we ask for sanctions and they don't get passed by the u.n., that there's no consequences, that life is going to be like it always has been?

>> well, first of all on the threats, and in particular, the example that i gave of the two generals. even then, while we were trying to get them on the list, we were using that as leverage to get them to stop the fighting. and they were both told directly that we were going to sanction them, we were proceeding in new york to do so, and the only way they could get out of this would be if they stopped the fighting. well, while the sanctions committee did not approve adding them to the list, it also did have the beneficial effect of the fighting dying down in the same time frame. so, cause or effect. you know, i can't prove it, but -- >> but the results speak for themselves. here's the concern i have. if we make too many idle threats that are not backed up by action, what ultimately happens is the threats become irrelevant.

and ambassador, do you believe that our country, indeed the state department, is using all its leverage points to accomplish the task at hand on dealing with the issue in south sudan? are we using every leverage point that we have? >> congressman, i think we are using all the leverage points that we have. some take some time to develop. sanctions cannot be imposed, even bilaterally, under u.s. law without a rather extensive package that could hold up in a court of law. >> right. >> so, oftentimes when you find you need to move against someone, you find that the actual evidentiary requirements are not there. this is, as you mentioned the idea of idle threats, this is one reason why we don't just take names up to the security council, if we don't think we can get them through. it's also why we, as we've often

done with the arms embargo, we will say we will move on this and we will put the full weight of the united states behind trying to achieve this if you don't do "x" or "y." >> well, the reason i ask is because it sounds like you walked back a little bit secretary kerry's comments here today. and i guess, why would you walk those back? >> well, i'm certainly not trying to walk back what the secretary said, but our humanitarian -- >> that's what it sounded like. but you go ahead and clarify. that's why i'm asking. >> humanitarian assistance is something that we provide on the basis of need. it's not something we provide on the basis of political -- >> but it is something that we must prioritize. and so, if some groups are using it inappropriately, there is more need than there is ability, even for a very prosperous nation like the united states. and so, do they understand that there is a priority for humanitarian relief? >> that is something that i think -- >> well, if they don't understand it, please let them understand it based on this hearing.

>> i think it came across from what the secretary said. it certainly is something that i've made very directly to them, that they are not the only place in the world that needs humanitarian assistance, that there are many -- >> and this comes from someone who is, my kids collected money in tennis cans to give to them to support. so i mean, it's not out of a noncompassionate heart. let me ask you one other question. i think there's a new law about ngos. and 80% of those ngos having to be south sudanese citizens in order -- is that correct? order -- is that correct? are my notes correct on that? >> yes. >> so, tell me about the implications. if that's indeed correct, would that not have a chilling effect on some of the work that the ngos have done and could do in the future? >> this ngo law is something that's been in the making for a long time, something that i've engaged on several occasions directly with president kiir on.

yes, there is a provision that says the percentage of workers of ngos needing to be south sudanese. this is something that many countries do to try to ensure that aid workers or aid organizations are also hiring local staff. there are a number of problems with the bill that we've pointed out. a lot of them have to do, frankly, with things like excessive registration requirements and also very vague references to sort of what is allowed and what is not allowed that allows the government to interpret whether an ngo is doing the right thing or not. >> all right, so, let me ask and be specific, then. this new law, do you see it having the potential of providing less humanitarian relief to some of the most needy in the country, the potential? >> we certainly see this law as having a potential impact on the ability of ngos, both

international and local, to operate. >> so, does the president -- their president not see that? >> well, i'm sure that they do see that. >> but they think that we're just going to go ahead and just go along and fund it and create a jobs program? >> well, i wouldn't see this as a jobs program. i think most ngos probably do hire more than 80% of their staff being local. i don't think that's -- >> so why the need for the law, then? >> well, that's a good question, and these are some of the issues that we've raised repeatedly over three years when this has been under consideration. >> well, if you could -- >> it is a problematic law and we've made that very clear -- >> okay, if you could, as the special envoy, take to their very highest government

officials a sincere concern from members of congress on this new law that potentially the humanitarian relief that needs to get to needy families and citizens could be stopped because of the unintended consequences of a new law and that we would ask them to reconsider. and with that, i'll yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. meadows. mr. rooney. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ambassador, you know, you paint a very bleak picture in what we've talked about here today and the testimony you've given. i mean, we talk about a government that has lost control of its military from time to time, an opposition that's gone, a government that's raided humanitarian and food aid from this country of which i sit on the committee which helps appropriate that money, which is why it's concerning to me. but as a catholic, it's also concerning to me that, you know, that this would happen in this

day in age, that we as americans won't be able to do anything about it. and the other thing it seems like you've said that we have leverage to use is this arms embargo. and we keep threatening to use it, but we never really get there. and then i just notice that maybe it might be a political thing to say, if we use an arms embargo, then we're admitting some kind of failure as a government. i hope that's not the case. i hope that it's a sincere ploy or a sincere intention of this government to use an arms embargo, because guess what, what can it hurt if we actually do it? if this guy controls the government, there is no opposition. he's used the term overmilitarization. you used that term. if that's true and the only thing that we can control is how much militarization that's in that country, then what can it hurt if the united states does take the lead to say enough is enough? we've got diplomatic envoys being shot at, we've got all

kinds of crimes that we've talked about against its own citizenry, we've got humanitarian aid and food being seized upon, we've got the opposition has fled, we've got a government that's lost control of its own military, and we keep threatening to use this arms embargo as if it's something that, well, you know, maybe, maybe if we say this one more time, we'll put this security force in there of 4,000 people, which i've got to be quite honest with you, i don't think they're going to do anything. i think that this is just going to keep going on and on and we're going to be right back here again at the next hearing talking about how this has failed but we might use an arms embargo again. i just want to know, what will it hurt if we do it? i mean, is it an admission by the administration that we failed in south sudan? is that the problem? >> well, congressman, as i've

said, it's a major tool, and to be effective, it has to be done multilaterally, not -- >> why? just do it. just use the united states as the leader of the free world and do it and other people will follow. who cares if it's unilateral? that doesn't make any sense! we build coalitions all the time and people follow us because we're the number one country in the world. we're the sole superpower. >> right. and because it is such an important tool, we have used it effectively, and we think we're using it effectively now to leverage a way forward for south sudan to get it back to a path of peace and political dialogue. >> do you believe that? do you believe that we're going to create this space in juba, like you say, and there's going to be elections and a political process and a constitution and all that? do you really believe that, unless we do something affirmative? >> well, the something firmive we're trying to do is trying to

get this force on the ground and get juba to be demilitarized. and this is the leverage we're using to try to get there. now, the south sudanese may well not cooperate with this, and in which case we're prepared to move forward with that, as well as potentially other sanctions, so -- >> okay. i hope you do. >> the frustration level, we hear it -- >> hey, you're on the front lines, so i appreciate your service. i'm not -- i just don't believe that any of this stuff is going to work anymore, and i don't think that the security force is going to work. i think that we need to move forward with an arms embargo now and stop as much bloodshed and killing as we can and protect the food and the humanitarian aid that mr. meadows talked about getting in there by however means we need to figure out how to do that. because i think that's the only thing that's left to do is to help the people that are starving and being oppressed. but you know, trying to talk about elections and that kind of stuff, i don't buy it. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. rooney. mr. cicilline. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. ambassador.

mr. ambassador, what is your best assessment of the anticipated timeline for the regional protection forces, both troops and deployment? and how long do you expect that negotiations with the government will continue on the composition of the rpf? how long will that delay the deployment? and have any countries outside of the immediate subregion, besides rwanda, indicated that they might consider providing troops to the rpf? >> okay, on the timeline. what i have been told by the military leaders in the region is that they are prepared to deploy the troops very quickly, within a matter of weeks, after there is permission from the government to go in. they've made it clear they're not fighting their way in to juba. the u.n. does not send missions to fight their way into countries.

but if the government in juba accepts this force and provides land for it to be bivouaced on, what i've been told is they're prepared to move the troops very quickly. moving the equipment will take a little bit longer, and that's something that they've indicated that they might need some help with. >> maybe i wasn't clear with my question. i recognize that the troops are prepared to -- i guess my question is what's the length of time the government is likely to engage in negotiations? that's really the unknown. >> well -- >> piece, i think. >> there's also questions about how fast countries can actually mobilize their troops. >> right. >> but in terms of that, this is what the secretary-general's report, which should come out and will be discussed next week

in the council, will be about -- is the government really moving forward to accept this force? and the message that was given by the security council visit that secretary kerry gave with regional leaders, including to the south sudanese who met in nairobi on the 22nd of august, was a clear message that we expect this force is going to be deployed, it's going to be deployed as envisioned by igad, which is with the troops from those three countries who are committed to this mission of actually the ensuring freedom of movement around juba, protecting the critical infrastructure, including the airport, and preventing violent actions, so protecting civilians in a more robust, not a static, manner. those troop-contributing countries have agreed to that mission. so, we don't want to enter into a negotiation with south sudan on who the troop contributors will be, what arms they will need, how many of them can deploy. that is foreseen -- and what their mission will be. that's all in the resolution.

and so, that's where we get to this idea of using the threat of the moving on an arms embargo and potentially other sanctions, if, indeed, the government tries to delay this. so far, their actions have been on the one day to say, yes, the next day to say maybe, the next day to say no and then to say, well, probably yes again. so, this isn't something that we are not going to have patience with to drag on. >> so that leads to my second question, mr. ambassador, and that is, what influence does the united states have with the government of south sudan to encourage them to develop a more inclusive, transparent and accountable approach to governance? and what other things might we do to accelerate that process? >> when i was here in april and we were actually looking at trying to help a transitional government to succeed, one of the pillars of the peace agreement that i mentioned was this idea of the economic reform, and particularly strengthening the transparency of public financial management. and that's something that we

believe needs to happen in south sudan. the kleptocracy of the past must end. as i mentioned, we are continuing to look and utilize information to utilize sanctions that are available, particularly travel sanctions, for corrupt practices, to send the signal that being in charge in south sudan, it's not about just enriching yourself. trying to change a little bit of the mentality of those who might lead the country going forward. so, a very important component. how do we get them to do it? again, i think our main leverage is, you know, what is it they want from us? at that point, they were clearly looking for support for their budget, for their economy, and they've recently come out again and said to the international community, we need $300 million from you this year. that's not going to be

forthcoming, unless these types of reforms occur. >> and my final question, mr. ambassador. the director of the african center for strategic studies has suggested that it may be time to put south sudan on life support by establishing executive mandate for the u.n. and the au to administer the country until institutions exist to manage politics nonvaliant and to break up patriots networks underlying the conflict. this were to be considered, how do you think it would be executed given the sensitivity of the current government to foreign intervention and apparent reticence of some of the security council toward u.n. actions perceived to threaten south sudan's sovereignty? it seems like that would be a very difficult initiative to move forward, but i'd love your assessment of it.

>> i've seen that proposal. we've looked at that idea. frankly, the u.n. cannot impose this on a member state. the african union i think certainly has absolutely no appetite for putting one of its member countries under an international trusteeship or guardianship, whatever you want to dress it up and call it. that is something that i don't see that we would have any support for. it's impractical, and i don't see how the south sudanese would ever accept it. the visceral reaction they've had, even to the role of jmec in overseeing implementation of the agreement as an extra sovereign force, the reaction that they've had were the initial reaction to the regional protection force was, you know, not one more foreign soldier. we will fight them. this is a matter of sovereignty.

i think we get the idea of how that would be received in south sudan. >> thank you. i thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. before we go it our next panel, i would like to just ask. you know, i make it a point to always meet with the bishops, the faith community, the protestants, whatever the denominations might be, and even country. greg simkins and i met with archbishop marino akudu loro, had a very good exchange on the reconciliation aspects of what the church can provide and also the humanitarian assistance. are we fully utilizing the faith community in south sudan? secondly, there's a foreign policy article, september 6th, very disturbing. i was briefed on it when i was in south sudan about the gunning of -- the bullets that were sent in to two of our vehicles as they passed by salva kiir's compound by his troops. thank god nobody was hurt, but the state department says we don't believe our troops or personnel were specifically targeted, but the article's author, kallum lynch, points out

that 50 to 100 rounds were pumped into the two vehicles. the armored suvs held laminated cards with the american flag on it and also the diplomatic plate number 11. are we investigating this? do we believe it was by design or by mistake? even by mistake is bad enough, but if it was by design. and finally on the sanctions. we've had sanctions for two years, ofac sanctions, the office of foreign assets control. they are well laid out, child soldiering sanctions against persons contributing to the conflict in south sudan. there are only six people on it, and i wonder if you're looking at that to expand it and make it more robust in terms of those who meet the criteria laid out, so well laid out two years ago in this sanctions regime.

>> well, mr. chairman, on your question about engaging with the faith-based community, yes, we do engage with them, both within south sudan and also the vatican. we've been in touch with them on numerous occasions and comparing notes on south sudan, and they have also engaged i think one of the senior cardinals who recently went there as an emissary for the pope. and a number of the religious leaders spoke out during the visit of the u.n. security council perm reps this past weekend in favor of the regional protection force being deployed and moving forward on a political process. so, i think the faith-based community is finding its voice. we've also through usaid given it a $6 million grant to the south sudan council of churches to work on community-based reconciliation efforts. so we are engaging the faith-based community, i think.

i think in the many meetings that i've had with religious leaders in south sudan, after the outbreak of fighting in december of 2013, they showed a lot of frustration, and the leaders seemed to have turned a deaf ear to them. and i think they are beginning now to, as i say, find their voice in unison, and it may become harder going forward. on the july 7th firing on two u.s. vehicles that contained several u.s. diplomats. this occurred, as i mentioned, very shortly after a similar looking vehicles that were driven by the opposition forces, who had come into town on some mission, and they were going back to mashar's compound area, and they were driving in this --

it's always an intense area right by the president's compound -- and they tried to stop that vehicle. the opposition people refused to get out of the vehicles and they sped off, and the soldiers fired at those vehicles. the opposition security officials in the vehicles fired back and killed i believe five government soldiers right in that very vicinity. so, it was a very tense environment. there were a lot more soldiers out on the street after that incident. and our cars came along, and they were -- it wasn't a formal checkpoint. it was a lot of soldiers on the streets sort of waving them down. it was very dark, and our vehicles have tinted glass. so, even though for the brief time that they stopped and tried to show identification, it is not at all clear that these

soldiers would have been able to see it or, frankly, even understand the license plates. you're dealing with, don't forget, with an army that's primarily illiterate. and so, when our vehicles, according to standard operating procedures, when they tried to open the doors of our cars, also sped off. the soldiers opened fire, just as they had when it had happened with opposition vehicles. and again, shortly, again, in the same area shortly after that incident, the country rep for unesco, an egyptian national, was driving in the area and encountered a similar problem, and because he was not in an armored vehicle, he was seriously wounded. so again, to say that this was targeting americans, i'm not -- we did not deduce that from the circumstances, and the regional security officer working with diplomatic security back here in washington conducted an internal investigation of the events.

and the review of that report is still ongoing. and we were very thankful, of course, that our people had the resources, that we had the fully armored vehicles there for them to ride around juba. it's why our security protocols call for them to be riding in armored vehicles in most parts of town and particularly after dark. and in response to that incident, the embassy's emergency action committee met the next morning and changed the curfew to a dawn to dusk. so, took appropriate actions to try to mitigate that. in terms of sanctions, let me just say, yes, we share the frustration. i mentioned some of the difficulties of actually putting together packages that meet all the legal criteria, but we certainly will look at taking actions against those who continue to impede the peace process, are hindering

humanitarian delivery and the like. >> yes, i just wanted to take a moment to acknowledge that there are several people here from gabon, who are expressing their concern about the elections that took place. i just want you to know that we see you. we read your posters. i know you were asked to put them down, but we did see what they said. and we also are concerned. and i just want to acknowledge that your presence has not gone unnoticed. >> and i fully concur with the ranking member. thank you for being here. i would like to now yield to mr. meadows. >> ambassador, let me come back with very, very quick points. i mentioned the ngos, and technology's a great thing, so i got some information that would suggest that even within the last few hours or few days that

there has been potentially the shutdown of 40 ngos and the threat, if not the reality, of seizing their assets. are you aware of that report? >> we've received reports over the past several hours of harassment of a number of ngo civil society organizations -- >> so, you're saying that report could be accurate? you're getting the same -- >> it could be. we have to look into that and try to verify it. >> so would you get back to this committee right away on whether that is accurate or not? and i guess the second follow-up question to that is, if it is accurate, will you be resolute in your condemnation, of saying that we will not tolerate that behavior if our humanitarian aid is going to continue? >> i can assure you, congressman, that we will be very direct and very strong in a condemnation of any harassment of -- >> but it's seizing of assets and it's more than just harassment. so, that's my concern. so, will you commit to get back

to this committee within the next seven business days to let us know what is happening on that? >> let me say, we'll get back to you as soon as we can confirm what's actually going on. >> what's a reasonable time? if seven days is not reasonable, what's reasonable time? >> again -- >> 14 days? >> not on the ground. 14 days? give us 14 days, yes, please. >> all right, 14 days. we'll do that. and the last thing is this, is you talked about a political environment which is open and inclusive. and yet, we're hearing reports that potentially someone took a letter to the u.n. security council and might have been murdered after that. would you care to comment on what's happening since the u.n. security council's visit? >> well, some of this harassment of civil society that -- >> well, murder is more than harassment. >> -- that we've been hearing about as been subsequent to the visit by the security council. but it's something that has gone on in the past as well. we have long been engaged --

>> so, how much of that are we going to tolerate? >> -- suppressed movement and freedom of movement for the ngos and the like. >> how much of that are we going to tolerate? >> well, it's a matter of what can we actually do to affect that behavior? >> well, i'll yield back. we have many leverage points. thank you, mr. chairman, for your flexibility. >> thank you, ambassador booth, for your leadership and for spending your time today with us at the subcommittee. thank you. i'd like to now invite to the witness table ambassador princeton lyman, senior adviser to the president of the united states institute for peace. he served as u.s. special envoy for sudan and south sudan from march 2011 to march of 2013. as special envoy, he led u.s. policy in helping in the implementation of the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement. ambassador lyman's career included deputy assistance secretary of state for african affairs, u.s. ambassador to both

nigeria and south africa, and assistant secretary of state for international organizations. he also is a member of the african advisory committee to u.s. trade representative who began his career at usaid and served as its director in ethiopia. we will then hear from mr. brian adeba, a journalist by training, previously an associate of the security governance group think tank that focused on security sector reform in fragile countries. over the last few years, his research interests have focused on interlinkages of media conflict human rights and security. he supervised the coverage of the conflict zones in darfur, blue nile and eastern sudan for the boston-based education development centers radio project in nairobi, kenya. prior to this, he served as project and public communications coordinator at the think tank, the center for governance innovation in waterloo, canada.

again, he is representing the enough project. ambassador, please proceed. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. and let me begin thanking you personally for all the support you and the committee provided when i was special envoy and you and congresswoman bass and the members of the committee continuing to focus attention on these set of issues. it's very important and it's very much appreciated. i'm not going to go over the background to the situation. i want to address some of the key questions that you've raised and have been raised in the previous exchange. let me start with the peace plan itself, around which the various activities are organized. the igad peace plan, which was signed in 2015, on paper is a very comprehensive agreement,

but it has a fatal flaw to it, and that is it rests very largely on the willingness and ability and commitment of the very antagonists who brought the country into civil war to carry out a fundamental political transformation. it is not in their interests to do so. and what we've seen over the last year or so is that instead of carrying that forward, they fell back into conflict, and now machar has been driven out of the country. without a strong international oversight and administrative oversight of this program, it was not likely to succeed. the second problem that we now face is that it would be a mistake to assume that with the succession of taban deng gai to

the vice presidency, we have a government of unity. he does not demand the loyalty of all of the various forces that were fighting this government, and to assume that it's capable of carrying out a comprehensive and being inclusive would be wrong. it's not. now we have the humanitarian crisis which people have addressed. it's an outrageous situation that the international community and the united states alone spending over $1 billion a year, that over 50 aid workers have been killed trying to carry out a humanitarian program, that they've been attacked, and again, most recently in the terrain hotel. and both sides have impeded this activity that the international community seems to care more for the people of south sudan than the leaders on both sides. that's an outrageous situation. and what it does is really call into question whether the government has the -- can claim to the rights and responsibility

of sovereignty, which goes with the claim of sovereignty. recently, kate holmquist, as congressman cicilline mentioned, and myself, did an op ed saying that there should be an international oversight administration of south sudan. without that, we do not see how this peace plan could go forward. ambassador booth described the role of jmac under the peace plan and the role of festus mogae. the fact is that mechanism has no real authority over the parties. festus mogae himself has said on several reports that almost no progress has been made on implementing the peace process. now, the proposal we made, of

course it would be extraordinarily difficult to do, and ambassador booth indicated that. but here's the fundamental question and the fundamental challenge. the peace process is in the hands of igad and the african union, primarily. and if they are not prepared to amend the current peace process and create a true oversight authority, which they will back up, back up politically, back up by enforcing an arms embargo, by taking other measures, then that peace plan won't work. now, if they're prepared to do that, then no one needs trusteeship or anything else. but the problem is that igad is badly divided. they are not in agreement. they have threatened an arms embargo many times but never followed through. and for the u.n. security

council, we have an adage that guides your practicality. when the africans are divided, the security council is divided. you're not going to get sanctions through russia and china unless the africans are united and say this is what we want. and the africans are divided. the igad is divided. so, even if the u.n. security council wanted to pass an arms embargo, those surrounding countries would have to implement it, make sure that arms weren't sneaking through, weren't being violated. so, the primary attention effort, seems to me, for the africa union and for igad to decide exactly if they are in control of this process how to strengthen it. now, let me just come to this question of the 4,000 troops that are being added. as you pointed out, it's a

question of putting these under unmiss and whether they will act differently. it's very difficult to contemplate a u.n. peacekeeping force confronting in an armed way the forces of the host government. i don't think very many u.n. peacekeeping forces are prepared for that. i'm not sure the security council is even prepared for it. so, the question is, is this force really going to have the mandate to confront not just outliers, but an attack like the terrain hotel complex and go up against government forces? that is a very difficult thing to do, and it has to be backed solidly by the troop-contributing countries and by igad and by the u.n. and if they're not prepared for that, then this force may secure the airport, but they won't be able to protect civilians. now, the other question is the political context. putting more forces into juba

without changing the nature of the peace process and the way it's enforced seems to me is going to have a continuation of the situation we now have. so, i think it is critical that the u.s., the international community, the united nations call upon africa union and igad to strengthen that process so there is a real oversight and enforcement of the peace process with sanctions and punishment for those who get in the way of it. otherwise, we won't get the transformation we need. and i think that's the great dilemma that we now face in south sudan. thank you very much. >> ambassador lyman, thank you so very much, and again, thank you for your prior service as special envoy. mr. adeba. >> chairman smith, ranking member bass, members of the subcommittee, i want to thank

you for your continued focus on south sudan and for inviting me to testify. impunity is entrenched in the system of rule in south sudan. the horrific terrain hotel incident is an example of that impunity. the country's leaders commit horrific crimes and treat state resources like their personal property. the country's money is captured by a few and used to wage war. with financial leverage on these leaders and your continued leadership and support, it is possible to counter this system and the perverse inclinations of its leaders. it is possible to disrupt access to the process of corruption that fund war and to shift the incentives of south sudan's leaders toward peace. congress can do the following four things to have an immediate impact.

first, congress can make sure the u.s. treasury department has the funds it needs to use more antimoney laundering measures. the measures can be used to target and freeze the assets of elite politicians and leaders in south sudan who perpetuate violence, loot public coffers, and use the international system, including u.s. institutions, to process their ill-gotten wealth. second, you can ensure the administration sanctions assets on top leaders and others who take these measures. we've had discussion about how the threat of sanctions alone is not inducing the change that is needed in south sudan, so when we look at this recommendation, this is a call to action. third, you can push for stronger enforcement of existing sanctions and asset freezes in the united states and

internationally on the south sudanese political elite. fourth, you can pass the global human rights accountability act. this act authorizes the u.s. president, like those in south sudan who misappropriate state assets. and attack anticorruption crusaders. i believe these four steps can strike directly at the wallets of the people suffering in south sudan, the people that commit crimes and enrich themselves because they believe they would not face consequences for their actions. these leaders are more likely to support peace when they pay a price for war. the institutional challenges in south sudan require your long-term support, as well. i analyze this very issue. epu was a man full of hope, the first vice president and

opposition leader had returned to town, people believed that the fighting would stop and the two leaders would work together to govern. there was hope that the critical governance institutions could begin to function properly, as well. i focus my research on three key institutions. the anticorruption commission, the national audit chamber and the public accounts committee in the national legislative assembly. i found that all three were severely undercut, intentionally. top-level politicians deprive them of the money they need to function. conflicting laws prevent prosecutions of officials that have been investigated and cronyism undermines the effort to fight the corrupt. the mechanisms and institutions that could promote accountability do not have what they need to be effective. but there are several things congress can do to help south

sudanese people address their institutional and systemic challenges. first, continue to support the people in south sudan who fight for transparency and accountability. listen to them, stand with them and help their raise their voices. second, ensure there is strict budget oversight for assistance to south sudan. those who command or commit atrocities and seek personal enrichment should not be able to misappropriate public funds, especially those given by americans who support the south sudanese people. third, support and strengthen the institutions in south sudan that can build an open and accountable government. these institutions could work much more effectively than they do today, but they need political, technical and financial support. most of all they need the space to operate without undue political interference.

an institution that meets these things is the hybrid court for south sudan established in the august 2015 peace agreement to ensure accountability for war crimes. next week on september 12th, the century on the initiative of the enough project will publicly present the results of a two-year investigation into corruption in south sudan. they have documented the connection between high-level, grand corruption and violence in south sudan, and we encourage u.s. policy makers to take immediate action on the findings we release. your support is critical. the stakes are very high in south sudan. if south sudanese leaders face no prize, no deterrent for their crimes from anyone, south sudan will disintegrate. with your help, that can be prevented. thank you very much for your efforts on south sudan and for your tireless commitment to the south sudanese people.

>> mr. adeba, thank you very much for your personal work, your trip which really uncovered, and you got to see those three institutions in particular. thank you for relaying it to us. so, without objection, your full statement, both of your full statements, will be made a part of the record. and unfortunately, we do have a series of votes, well over an hour we expect of voting. so we will conclude here, but i want you to know how deeply appreciative we all are on the subcommittee for your leadership, for your guidance, and we will stay in touch going forward. in a week i look forward, or so, to that new report, which the committee will digest, and i'm sure utilize as we have in the past with enough projects. and ambassador lyman, thank you, because you did extraordinary service under very difficult situations. so, thank you for that leadership all those years, and your entire foreign service career. the hearing is adjourned.

i would have liked to have asked some questions. i will submit a few for the records, if you could get back to us in a timely fashion that would be greatly appreciated. hearing is adjourned.

friday on c-span3, senators tim scott and james langford at the value voters summit. live coverage from washington begins at 8:45 a.m. eastern time. coverage continues on c-span2t 2:05 when donald trump is scheduled to appear, along with rnc chair reince priebus. former senator rick santorum and actor john voigt. watch our coverage of the conference on c-span networks and c-span.org. >> c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up friday morning, new york republican congressman tom reed will join us to talk about his endorsement of donald trump and the statements that congressmans made on the record

saying mr. trump needs to be reined in if he wants to win the . . . . . then i started because he was the dominance force, i started asking about him and his competitors including steve

nguyen and people who work for him and some big gamblers. donald does not know anything about the casino business. >> sunday night on q and a c-span. this committee meeting begins with a debate on a subpoena after the vote members of testimony of veterans. this is two and a half hours.

good morning everybody, thank you for being here today. before we begin, i want to take care of one item of committee business right here, i am hearing a motion of an issue on a subpoena to the secretary of veteran affairs of work as well as evidence here associated with the denver construction project with the aie report. i want to say it is unfortunate that va continues to lack of transparency has led us to this decision. we have not done so ample jurisdiction. i made the original request for art contracts at the time related to the palo pinto health system. i think most of you remember that. what follow was a yearlong back

and forth between myself and the va of their approvals and procedures and practices for purchasing and nationwide as well as an accounting of art work aor ornamental furnishing. the va made any attempt to respond to my request for their spending. however, true reform what they gave us is holy incomplete. for example, va claims who have spent approximately $4.7 million on our nationwide from january of 2010 to july 206. yet, the committee has already substantiated over $6.4 million segment during this period for

the palo alto system alone. spending data that the va finally did provide even of art purchases in the palo pinto system that the committee had already substantiated. both the eclipse which i will ask the clerks and you have a copy of this slide with you on your desk purchased for $250,000 and the sculpture also pictured on the screen was purchased for $220,000 were omitted. of the va's total figure that's divided. va took it on itself to admit amounts spent on-site preparations for art work and installations which amounts to

millions of dollars in palo alto. do remember the art work that's a rock? it was supposed to cost $250, 0 $250,000. by the time it was purchased, it was $500,000 and sit cost costs -- this was not included because the cost is $1 million to put the rock up. that was omitted from the number that the va provided us recently. when taken into account, the va provided no data at all and quote negative responses and from vision, 27, 9, 16 and 20. i am confidence that we are not receiving the whole picture from the department. this is compounded by the fact that va compile the data by searching for all contracts under the budget operating code,

31-26 which indicates art work. by definition, art work purposes that were not categorized by our work and not made by bona fide contract. the committee has seen too many instances in the past. all miss categorized. as for the denver construction, the committee received a similar lack of information. we have seen -- va claims they provided thousands of pages in the aiv and august 19th letter to this committee highlights

that is simply not the case. in this letter, va -- documents that it has provided and most either congressionally mandated or required for some other purpose or in one case, an advertising contract that was totally unrelated to our request about the aiv. the va out right stated in the letter that they did not intend to release documentary information that is entirely within the authority of this committee to accept or reject. we'll not accept va trying to pull it over the eyes of this committee or the american people, important decisions making or made on the part of the department. as such, today we are going to vote to issue a subpoena which will demand complete answers on both of these issues. the subpoena will cover of the

spending of art work of fiscal year 2010 to present. and medical center construction project and registration report. are there any members having any questions to ask on this issue? >> mr. kaufman. thank you for your leadership on this two very important over sight matters. everyone on the committee is painfulfully aware that it is b a long struggle to get straight answers from the department of the aurora project. as late as april 2014, at a field here in colorado, despite the findings are numerous and a scaling gao review. officials continued to tell congress that the va hospital in

aurora could be billed with funds already on hand. keep in mind, that as far back as 2010, va officials were internally discussing how the va project was broken and at least that five separate committee hearings were held detailing to evidence. it was not until december 2014, when the va lost its case on all counts that it was forced to publicly admit that it had a construction problem. a full three months later in march 2015, weeks after the project was shut down could be required, the va told congress that as much as a billion dollars, and additional funding was needed, still mr. chairman, it is the department's effort to hide the problem in aurora sounds bad, the department's

effort to avoid sub accountability had been worse. deputy told members at the colorado delegation after the aip completed and following numerous congressional requests, the committee was provided of a 31 page summary. one va official collected over $60,000 in bonuses while over e overseeing a project that's spiraling out of control. i believe this committee and the american people are entitled to review all the documents associated with the aurora aib and to draw their own conclusion as to what went wrong and who