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c-span's washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up wednesday morning, california democratic caucus chair will discuss zika funding and campaign 2016. pennsylvania congressman charles dent will be with us to talk about government funding and pennsylvania's role as a battleground state. the new atlantis contributor on why science should focus on real world issues. watch c-span's washington journal at 7:00 a.m. join the discussion. air force general john hyten has been nominated to be the u.s. strategic command. he testified earlier today. general hyten outlined the threats facing the u.s. from russia, china, iran and north korea. this is about two hours.

good morning. the armed services committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of general john e. hyten to be commander of the united states strategic command. we congratulate you on your nomination. we thank you for your decades of distinguished service and your willingness to serve, once again. of course we know today woul not be possible without the support and sacrifice of your family and friends, some of whom are with us this morning. as is your tradition, we hope you take the opportunity to introduce your family joining you today. general hyten threats o to the united states and allies have increased recently. we confront security challenges in the world and in domain including nuclear, cyber and

space. this new strategic challenge has implications for stratcom. scholars and strategists warned we have entered a quote, second nuclear age. this is not something the united states has chosen and indeed there are those that derrive nuk lar weapons. the reality is europe and east asia, there are nations that increasingly believe nuclear weapons are essential to their survival. others are enhancing the role of military weapons in their doctrine and their use on the battlefield. pakistan developed tactical weapons. not to be outdone, india

continues to modernize its nuclear triad under the best of circumstances, the iran nuclear deal gives iran a free hand to develop nuk lar weapons in a decade. north korea's fifth nuclear test earlier this month is the latest reminder that it's boyd dictator remains intent on developing the capability to strike our homelands with nuclear weapons. there's china, which continues to modernize its nuclear forces placing a new emphasis on mobile missiles and submarines. perhaps the most pressing challenge you would face if confirmed is russia. russia's aggression in ukraine and actions in syria take place under a nuclear shadow. russia is threatening our nato allies with nuclear strikes, modernizing the strategic forces, developing a nuclear ground launch cruise missile

cape l of ranging europe and fired sea launch cruise missiles against targets in syria. targets that could be against nuclear warheads and european and u.s. targets. we have to face the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. that's why no matter what president obama may have hoped for when he came to office, the united states cannot seek to reduce the role of nuclear weapons on our national security strategy, providing a modern, credible deterrent is more vital than ever. strategic command face long term challenges to that goal. in the next two decades, u.s. nuclear submarines, air launch cruise missiles, heavy bombers and nuclear capable tactical fighters will have to be withdrawn from operational service. having been extended well beyond

the service lives. modernization programs are in place to replace these systems but there's no slack left in the schedule and a considerable bill to pay. according to official figures, the department of defense plans to devote $234 billion over the next ten years to operate and modernize our nuclear forces. this amounts to just 3% to 4% of our budget each year. any investment is subject to the oversight of this exit tee. today's congress supports the modernization of the u.s. nuclear deterrent. i'm concerned future reductions in funding could delay or harm the relacement systems, increasing strategic risk at a time russia and other countries continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. just as nuclear threat continues

to change, so too have threats in space. indeed, america superiority in space is increasingly at risk as the director of national intelligence told the committee threats of military civil and commercial space systems will increase in the next few years as russia and china progress in developing counter space weapon systems to deny, degrade or disrupt u.s. space systems. director clapper stated that russia and china seek to exploit our dependence on space to achieve effects. they are investing significant resources in developing a range of capabilities including anti-satellite missiles, jamming and cyber capabilities. fortunately, in recent years, the defense department experienced a, quote, counter space awakening. after years of prodding from

this committee to enhance its focus, i'm pleased with the department's efforts to respond to russian and chinese threats in space. one of your top priorities would be to put strategic command on a war footing for space because, if our adversaries choose to extend more into space, we must be capable of defending ourselves there. finally, beyond space and nuclear forces, the third component of strategic command at present is cyber. this committee has been extremely focused on the complicated issue of cyber. i think many of us agree with your assessment from your advanced policy questions, general hyten, the growing importance of cyber warrants the elevation of u.s. cyber command to a unified combatant command. we would be interested in your views on timing and the importance of continued coordination between a future

unified cyber command and strategic command. icon congratulate late you once again on your nomination. senator reed. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to join you in welcoming general hyten. thank you for much for your extraordinary service to the nation. shortly, you will introduce your family. they are a huge part of your success. i would like to welcome your wife and children. they have sacrificed and supported you throughout your career. we all appreciate that. general hyten, you have a service, well qualified for the nomination. the commander serves as principal military officer who advices the president on the nuclear deterrent, space and cyber capability and global and missile defense requirements. as is said, it must be safe, secure and effective. there is one additional facet, and it must be ready.

you will be responsible for articulating and managing the ready iness of the triad and threats to our nation. the upcoming modernization which must be executed in a cost effective and timely fashion. once confirmed, i want to hear your thoughts on this issue in detail. strategic command deploys our space assets and mitigates threats. given your background, you are qualified for this task, but there are other areas you have to lead including missile defense, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, isr and long disstance strike. integrate the capability systems supporting these complicated missions so they mutually reinforce each other and define and fix gaps that exist between them. i look forward to hearing your views and working with you in the future. i must apologize, there's a

banking committee hearing going on in a few moments. my departure will be simply to go there, nothing else. thank you. >> general hyten, we have to ask standard questions of all military nominees. if you would just respond, i will go through this rather quickly. in order to exercise the legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of congress are able to receive testimony briefings and other communications of information. have you adhered to applicable laws, regulations governing con flicks of interest? >> i have, sir. >> do you agree when asked to give your personal views even if they are different from the administration in power? >> i do, sir. >> actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? >> no, sir. >> your staff complies with

deadlines for requested communications including for the record and hearings? >> yes, sir. >> co-operate and provide witnesses in response to congressional requests? >> yes, sir. >> will those witnesses be protected from their testimony or briefings? >> yes, sir, they will. >> do you agree to appear and testify upon request before this committee? >> i do, sir. >> do you agree to provide documents of copies in electronic forms in a timely manner and a dually constituted committee and the basis or a good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? >> i do, sir. >> thank you, general. welcome. >> thank you, sir. >> please proceed. >> thank you, sir. >> mr. chairman, senator reed, members of the committee. thanks for the opportunity to come before you. it is an honor to be nominated

for this. mr. chairman, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to introduce my family. my family is truly special to me. they are, as senator reed said, the reason i'm here. the most significant of them all, sitting behind me, over my left shoulder is my partner and wife, my wife of 27 years, laura. she is amazingly beautiful and the finest person i have ever known. if confirmed, this would be our 15th move in the united states air force. every place we go, she supports airmen and their family. the soldiers, sailors and marines will be very lucky as will the people of home ha and the surrounding community because of laura. in spite of the deployments and the separations and challenges of a military life, we, she, raised two incredible children

who are with us today. sitting to the left of her mom is our daughter katie who flew from boston last night. a graduate of pepperdine and has a master of law and diplomacy. she works for a nonprofit in cambridge in conflict resolution. >> at least she didn't go to r harva harvard. >> i tried, sir. she did not like. she went to the west coast and never wanted to go to boston. >> she's smarter than her father. >> yes, sir. no doubt about that. >> you are in trouble now, general. >> senator, i have been in trouble a long time. next is our -- yes, sir. next is our son chris who flew in from colorado early this morning. he arrived at 3:00 this morning. he has his degree from texas lutheran in physics and math. a college all american in golf. he's currently living his dream

as a golf professional in colorado. he does live the dream life, there's no doubt. each of them have grown into fine citizens and their mother and i are proud of them. one minor disappointment, my little brother, scott, from huntsville, alabama, he hoped to be here, but he was delayed enroute. he wanted to represent all our family and friends, especially those in alabama. my parents, still living in huntsville, my sister in scottsdale, arizona. my parents and sister could not travel today. i know they are watching along with laura's mom and family in california. thank you mr. chairman. thank you for allowing me to introduce these very, very special people. >> thank you. >> now, on to the business of the day. first of all, i again need to thank the president and the secretary of defense for nominating me for this position. i want to thank the chairman for expressing his confidence in my

ability to serve as a commander. if confirmed, i look forward to working closely with the committee, the congress to address the strategic challenges. the significant problems we face can only be worked through open, honest and timely communications. you can expect that from me. first and foremost, in today's complex volatile security environment, we must never lose sight of the advantage that our strategic forces provide. the nuclear force must remain safe, secure, effective, ready and reliable. as potential adversaries upgrade it is essential to move forward and modernize the triad and ensure plans are integrated with combatant commands. we face challenges in space and cyber space. in space, things continue to grow as potential adversaries and encounter what has become a

critical advantage for the nation and allies. we must not only be ready to respond but move to build a more resilient space enterprise. in cyber space, cooperation across the whole of government and the allies, partners and friends to prepare, defend against and respond to cyber attacks. it's to work with cyber commands as well. u.s. strategic command has global responsibilities, missile defense, joint electronic warfare to name a few. if confirmed, i pledge to focus my best efforts working in sync with force to the department and the nation come rehencive -- support of u.s. national interest. throughout a 35 year career that is well beyond anything i expected. i have gained invaluable

operation and command many diverse missions. i have a deep knowledge in many missions, lesser than a few. if confirmed, learn and understand the missions and to lead every day to the best of my abilities. if confirmed, i hope to live up to the expectations of the men and women of the u.s. strategic command and leaders that came before me and my current boss. he has been a truly remarkable leader and commander. he's been a great boss. he's taught me a lot. it's important to me to thank him for what he's done. it's humbling to be considered for a position with an amazing legacy in history. mr. chairman, let me close my remarks with a quote from a great american who reminds me what is important. that would be our son, christopher. years ago he said it loud enough for a lot of people to hear, dad, i have been watching you ever since you made general. i have noticed, you don't do any

real work anymore. you just have people. i have to be honest, it upset me when he said it. i feel i have a difficult job. i work hard. i have to deal with some really difficult decisions in today's crazy world. but the more i thought about it, the truer it is. the real work is done by our people. the sons and daughters of this nation. the soldier that is stand watch every night. the amazing warriors deployed into harms way every day. if confirmed, i'll be lucky enough to have the opportunity to lead and serve longer. mr. chairman, senator reed, members of the committee, thank you again. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, general. yesterday you and i had, in a classified setting, a conversation that i have been thinking about ever since. i know there are a lot of things that you can't say in an open hearing, but is it correct to

assume that our adversaries, specifically the russians but also the chinese are attempting to or have achieved an ability to cripple our operations in space? >> senator, i believe they are building those capabilities today. we have an amazing force structure in space. both the chinese and the russians in particular have been watching those capabilities employed on the battlefield. in response to that, they are building counter space capabilities to deny us those in conflict. >> so they are -- they are developing capabilities specifically designed to cripple our capabilities in space? >> yes, sir, they are. >> it's certainly not something the united states of america is doing? >> we are not going down that path, senator. >> so, again, i understand that

this is an open hearing, but shouldn't we be really concerned about especially the last few years, the increase in capabilities that both russia and china have displayed, have demonstrated that if used in a certain way could, literally cripple a lot of activities in space? i'm very aware that there's certain sensitivity to some of your answers, but i'm not sure that the american people and even members of this committee are as aware as they should be of this emerging challenge. >> senator, it is an emerging challenge. i believe, as you said in your opening statement, in the last few years, the united states and the department of defense moved out to develop responses to the

threats we see coming from china and russia. i believe it's essential we go faster in our responses. we have worked with national reconnaissance office and all our joint space forces developed what we call a space enterprise vision that looks at the future and says this is what we need to operate in a world where conflict extends into space. i think it's a good vision. the vision will always change. we'll continue to share that information with your committee, sir, and we'll continue to work with the congress to make sure we can build the capabilities we need to respond. >> well, i'm not one who enjoys these classified briefings, but i'm seriously considering when we come back having a classified briefing in our committee because the information is deeply disturbing and i say with modesty, i keep up with what's going on in the world, but i was

not aware of the significance and depth of the challenge until our conversation yesterday. do you think that we have a cohesive strategy to counter this challenge or do we need to do a lot more? >> senator, i think we have a cohesive strategy of what that end state looks like for the united states that will allow us to continue as we can today to defeat an adversary that wants to threaten us in any domain, as well as space. i have concerns of our ability to move fast enough to build the capabilities we need to respond to the specific threats i shared with you yesterday, sir. >> in other words, what they are developing in a short period of time, months and a few years is now taking us immeasurably longer time. >> we are moving much slower in

certain areas. we need our industry and acquisition process to move faster, sir. >> the russians modernized each leg of their strategic triad by 2020. 70% of their forces replaced with new systems. russians violated the inf treaty developing a nuclear ground launch cruise missile, expanded their deployment of air and sea launch cruise missiles not limited by the star treaty in which they can target the u.s. in concert with their invasion of crimea. they threaten us why exercising forces near territory and developing an under water drone to cause damage to the united states coastal targets. what does this suggest about the role of nuclear weapons in

russia's nuclear strategy and what should the u.s. do in particular in response? >> senator, i think there's two elements in the response to that question. the first element is if you look at what russia has been doing over the last number of years, i think it's in direct response to what we have been doing as a nation over the last 20 years. they are modernizing what they see. they have watched the amaze zing conventional force we have developed that can significantly dominate any bottlefield in the world today and i believe they are concerned about their ability to respond in a conventional arena. therefore, i think it's logical from their perspective to modernize their forces, including nuclear forces in all arias. i think the second piece to the answer is they have also watched the power of our alliances, the

power of our partnerships. they are challenging the status quo across europe and crimea and a number of areas, pushing and creating tension within our partnerships and alliances, which is another significant advantage the united states built over 20 years or so. >> i thank you, general. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you mr. chairman. i would like to ask a few questions, maybe one before i leave. general hyten, responsible for synchronizing our electronic war efforts. years ago, those were jamming radar and now cyber is a big part of this domain. can you give us your thoughts on the interaction between electronic warfare, the traditional as i suggested, cyber and also the role of cyber

command? give us your thoughts. >> yes, sir. so, i look at the problem in the following construct. i see cyber as a domain. cyber is a place where we conduct missions. one of those missions we conduct is electronic warfare. electronic warfare is basically trying to control the electromagnetic spectrum to your advantage. we have significant capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. those capabilities have also had less focus than they should have over the last number of years. i look at it in my own service where the electronic missions in the united states air force have not had as significant a priority as many of the areas as we have gone over the last 15 years of conflict in the middle east. if i'm confirmed as commander, i can pledge you i'll continue to

look across the entire department of defense, all our capabilities to understand electromagnetic warfare, the role in cyber space. >> thank you very much, general. i look forward to working with you. again, i apologize my departure. >> if i might take a minute of your time, north korea, are they developing the capability to hit the united states of america? >> i believe they are developing that capability. i think kim jong-un has made it clear of that development. in the news this morning, there was a news of a test of a new very large rocket engine. a rocket engine that he said would be capable of going to the orbit in space. if it has that capability, it can reach the united states. i'm very concerned about that. i haven't seen the intelligence report, i'm commenting on what i saw in the news this morning.

>> general, i think there's going to be a lot of redundancy in the questions you are going to be asked up here. we've had people come in and testify to us as to the fact we are not keeping up where we should. we are not advancing far enough ahead. james clapper from several years ago talked about what we are looking at. admiral hayny testified before this committee. we are not meeting the critical investment time lines to ensure our agent platforms and weapons to maintain superiority. we heard from admiral winfield last year for the house committee when he talked about remaining margin we have for investing in nuclear deterrent. we hear this all the time, then have the non-public meetings, we hear it worse.

chairman referred to that. so, i just look at this and i know that we are concerned when we talk about china and russia. but, i personally get more concerned on what you touched on, north korea an iran. these people, they want to kill everyone in this room. in the case of north korea, it's run by a guy that is mentally deranged. this is scary. you are getting into the toughest job in the united states of america right now. i'm very much concerned about it. we know that russia and china are actively modernizing their nuclear weapons and delivery systems. north korea continues to develop land and launch ballistic missiles and conducted the fifth and largest nuke test two nights

ago. i think it would be a good thing for you to give us as much of a detailed assessment in this setting as you can on north korea and iran. >> the way i look at the threats across the world, senator, i think that russia is the most dangerous threat. china is a close second. the most likely threats and the most concerning are north korea and then iran because north korea is very unpredictable. it's hard to tell exactly what they are going to do. i want to caveat the unpredictability a little bit. if you look at what they are doing with their missile programs as well as the nuclear programs and where we are today, it looks very beginning. but, if you look at it when you

think back to where we were when we started flying missiles and getting those capabilities, we had failure after failure and we ended up getting there. what concerns me the most is they will get there. they will get there. once they have those capabilities, what are they going to do with them. that's my biggest concern. if i'm confirmed that will be at the top of my list to figure out how to best respond. >> i'm glad that's your biggest concern. it's mine, too. back when this administration first went in, i was critical. they cut the '09 budget and cut the missile defense by $1.4 billion and delayed the or terminated the third missile defense site in the czech republic. i can remember being over there and talking to the president of the czech republic, which i have a lot of respect for.

he made the statement to me, if we do what we are talking about doing here in poland and the czech republic where it's going to enrage the russians to the point, we are taking a risk. are you sure that you are not going to pull the rug out from under us? we pulled the rug out. i have talked to a lot of people in private that talked that wasn't a good idea and i'm not going to bring that up now. i'm saying, i didn't like the way we were headed back there at the beginning of this administration. then we went from 44 of sites from alaska down to california down to 30 and i think now we are going back up now where we started? was that a necessary drop in increase? i think it was. so, i just would -- would just

say that it's a tough job you've got. i'm very much concerned about it. i'm hoping we'll have an opportunity, members of this committee and members who care in the united states senate to hear from you on the versions. so we'll know exactly where we are. the chairman mentioned it and i wanted to re-emphasize the importance of that. >> senator, i'll say that if the chairman asks if any of those senators ask, you'll have my top attention and you'll have a rapid response. >> that's great. thank you. >> yes, sir. >> general hyten, first off, congratulations on your nomination. it's an incredibly important post and i want to thank you for your service and thoughtfulness to our questions. i want to start with the nuclear

deterre deterrent. d.o.d. spent on nuclear weapons mods earnization. at the same time, they spent $8.5 billion to service the stockpile and support our nuclear labs. in total, that's roughly $24 billion or about 4% of the base defense budget. so, another way of looking at that is we invest about four cents out of every defense dollar in our nuclear deterrent, which is served as an insurance policy that prevented a war over seven years. i want to get your perspective on how to pursue the modernization of the nuclear arsenal and infrastructure and ask, in your opinion, what will be your biggest challenges to maintain that stockpile as safe, secure and reliable as well as ready as senator reed mentioned. >> senator, i think it's essential that we always

maintain a fully ready nuclear capability. there should be no doubt that the nation needs that capability, it's a backstop for everything we do as a military. one of the duties i will have as a member of the nuclear weapons council chaired fwi secretary of defense of logistics. nsa is also on that committee as well as vice chairman. through that committee, we will look at the nuclear weapons stockpile and make sure it is always safe, secure and reliable. the last year, i got to visit the three big national labs. los alamos and i go there for space reasons in my current position. but, when i'm there, because i'm curious, i ask about the nuclear stop pile and they explain how they are certifying the

stockpile every year. if i'm confirmed, it will become more important to me and i'll look deeper. >> sort of a related question, obviously other members brought up how much the nuclear landscape changed in recent years, the proliferation we have seen over the last couple decades. has that nuclear landscape changes, how should that generally inform or change our nuclear posture in the world? >> i think it's important that as we look at the international situation concerning n inin ini weapons we don't get focused. we need to look at the tactical nuclear weapons. the chairman mentioned them. we need to look at the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and look at it as a total. a nuclear weapon is significant. it doesn't matter how it's employed, tactical,

nonstrategic, strategics. its's an event in the world and we need to look together. >> thank you. in your written response to the committee, you state that the operation response to the space program has been a successful path finder to response in quoting you, we must infuse this thinking across the entire enterprise and the space industry, end quote. i agree with that estimation. i would love to ask you to expand a little bit on how you would pursue that goal and as commercial capabilities for the launch market become operational, how would you intend to leverage those services to enhance the d.o.d.'s access to space as well? >> in my ways, it goes back to the chairman's comment, his opening statement and my response about the need to go fast. the need to go fast is so

important in today's world. many of our traditional processes are slow. in my ways, i don't like the term operation nally responsive. i think we are operationally responsive in everything we do. the thing about ors is it goes fast. it goes much faster than other processes. those are the processes we need to transition into the broader space community. then, if you look at the commercial sector, the commercial sector has been on the verge of something special for a long time. i think they are about there. both on the launch side as well as the satellite side. i think in the not too distant future, we'll have u bik wittous communications and imagery. if that is the case and on the commercial side, we need to take advantage of that. the most important thing is persistence. we may be able to achieve a lot

of that persistence even though we don't get as high of a resolution from those capabilities. >> thank you. i couldn't agree more. i look forward to working with you on that. that encapsulated much of what we have to do in terms of reacting quickly. the last issue i will bring up quickly is trusted supply of strategic trusted microelectronics. nsa requires a trusted supply of strategic hardened microsystems if tr stockpile. our military weapons systems however, do not have a trusted supply of micro electronics. it's an issue the secretary is aware of. what are your thoughts on the microsystems capability in the government to meet the specific requirements of the military and the nation's nuclear stockpile?

do you see opportunities there to partner with the private sector to achieve that goal. >> you have to be partnered with the private sector. they are going to generate the supplies one way or another. i am concerned about the depth of our industry in terms of how many suppliers we have, how are they certified? how are the parts controlled. as a commander of strategic demand, i'll be a demanding customer. if i'm confirmed to make sure that we continue to look at that problem across the board. senator, i agree, that's a concern we need to monitor. >> thank you, general. >> welcome, general. it's nice to see you and your family here today. i appreciate the visit that we had in my office earlier last week and your candor in the information that you provides. in 2011, the president committed

to modernize the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems including the air launch cruise missile. to its credit, the proposed budget supporting the nuclear modernization and senior leaders such as the secretary referred to that deterrent as the bed rom of national security. i believe that correctly stressed the importance we follow through with these plans. do you agree that we must modernize all three legs of the triad, including the air launch cruise missile or do you think the plans should need to be reconsidered? >> i agree we have to modernize all three elements of the nuclear triad. i can't state my support any stronger. if i'm confirmed, i'll continue to state that in all forums. >> thank you. some observers argued that a penetrating bomber armed with

nuclear gravity bombs ovuates the need for stand off weapon such as a cruise missile. do you think the weapon systems are depliktive? >> if i'm confirmed, i will look into it in more depth. from my 35 years in the military, i believe you need the flexibility that an air launch cruise missile with long range strike can provide you. there's always a challenge to a bomber. it doesn't matter how stealthy that bomber is, it doesn't matter how capable that bomber is. i believe a long range strike option, advanced cruise missile gives the president flexible that is part of the try sad. i recommend we purcey that option. >> when we were in my office, i told you when i was visiting with a previous commander, he gave such a really great

definition and explanation of why we need a triad and the importance of each leg of that triad. you have just touched on that. would you like to expand on it? >> after a week, general cano used to be my boss. after we talked i said senator fischer said you had something brilliant about the triad. >> did he remember? >> he said i'm sure it was bril yanlt, but i don't remember what it was. he did send me a couple speeches. the fundmental piece of his wards are each element provides a cig nsignificant attribute th so important to the security of our nation in the triad, the bombers are the most flexible. the submarines are the most

survivable and they are the most ready and responsive. each is essential to the security of our nation. that's why the triad is so important. >> thank you. admiral hainey testified before this committee earlier this year. the 2017 budget supported his requirements but there is no margin to absorb risk. do you agree with that assessment? >> i agree with that on the air force side, certainly, senator. let me just say i'm not as fully versed on the navy programs as the air force. i see it in the corporate process. i'm concerned about the just in time nature of our strategic nature. if i'm confirmed, i will look hard on the navy side. i have talked with the leadership and many people in the business and they are all concerned on the navy side as

well. >> thank you. your predecessor and other senior commanders stated that further reduction in our nuclear forces should come only as a result of bilateral negotiated and ver fiable agreements do you agree? >> yes, ma'am, i do. >> nuclear reductions. seems to me the more modern and responsive our nuclear enterprise is, the less need there would be to retain those legacy systems, yet, on the other hand, failure to modernize could give us no other option that we retain significant stockpiles. what is your view on that? >> i think if you -- there's been five terms that various senators, including the chairman have talked about today. that is safe, secure, effective, ready, reliable. if you look at those five terms,

that's describes what we have to do to modernize our capabilities to make sure they are always there. what you can't have is one element drop off. you can't have the weapons readiness drop off. the weapons have to be ready. they have to be safe and secure all the way. the united states, and any nation that has nuclear weapons is responsible for making sure they are all safe and secure po control. i think that applies to any nation and one of the reasons we need to modernize to make sure that's always the case. >> thank you, general. i thank you for your service and your willingness to continue to serve in an important position such as stratcom. >> thank you, senator. >> thanks, mr. chairman. thank you for being here, and thank you for your long and distinguished service along with your family's. i am here as a father two of sons who also went to harvard

and also became military officers. neither in the air force, and one sout nis out now. one is still in the military. it's a tough career choice for harvard graduates and i congratulate you on making your choice and serving our country with such dedication and ability. so, thank you. i want to ask about one of the legs of the nuclear triad deal, replacement program. and you have mentioned the survivablity of our submarine forces. means of delivering and defending our nation delivering a profoundly important deterrent. let me ask you, are you committed and will you commit to fully supporting the ohio replacement program? >> yes, sir, i will. >> and will you commit to being an advocate of it because it will take advocates in a time of

increasingly threatened fiscal resources, and a very expensive commitment that is necessary to being an advocate of it. >> i'll advocate for all of the elements of the nuclear triad. all three. >> maybe you can describe for americans why the ohio replacement program is so fundamentally important to our nuclear chain. >> from my background, i'm not as deeply versed in the navy's nuclear capabilities as i am the air force. nonetheless, i've looked at that recently to some level, and i'll share my thoughts with you, senator. my concern is that we'll reach a point in the not too distant future where the existing navy submarines will not be able to effectively and safely conduct their operations because of the age of both the reactor and the ship. and we never -- we can never reach that point. that's why the ohio class replacement program is so essential because by the time we

reach that point, it is essential that we have a new submarine to replace it. >> thank you. i want to shift to the cybersecurity area, which is related to our capabilities in space, is it not? >> yes. >> there was a column recently written by david ignatius entitled "the cold war is over, the cyberwar has begun" and it reflects a growing sense that one of the great challenges, if not the biggest, ahead in the immediate future is our increasing confrontation with other powers, notably the chinese and the russians, most dramatically and recently the russians in recent hacking over their capabilities in cyber and their apparent willingness to use them against us. do you have any thoughts about

how we can work to improve our response to cyberattacks with a coordinated reaction from our spire governme entire government. how can it best work with the department of defense to shore up our security system both in space and here, and i might add that the chairman and i recently in a hearing confronted a number of our security leaders, admiral rogers among them, with this kind of question. and i left, frankly, somewhat worried about the ability of this country to respond. >> so much of that question is best discussed in a classified forum, but i'll share my

top-level thoughts with you, senator. from a big picture perspective, if you look at space and cyber, and my current job we have space and cyber in the same command in the united states air force. a lot of the effects are the same. it's to provide information pathways for information, deny adversaries information in times of conflict. that's what we do in space and in cyber. but the difference is the cost of entry into cyberspace is very low. that's the attractiveness for potential adversaries because the cost of access is so low. so to respond to it, you hit the most important thing. it has to be a whole government response, all the way through. from a military perspective, i'd like to get inny to point in cyberspace where we treat it like a domain where we conduct operations. we tend to contaminate that discussion with a lot of legal implications which are extremely important. that usually work through the fbi, the department of homeland security, a number of elements. that's why it has to be a whole

government response. but from a military perspective, it's essential that we look at cyberspace as a place where bad actors are. we need to be able to identify them. and if they are threatening the united states, we need to be able to eliminate that actor from cyberspace. it's the same as any other domain. it's going to be a very complicated process, though, because it is important, as an american citizen, my privacy is just as important to my as it is to every other citizen. noms, we have to figure out how to treat cyberspace as an operation domain. you're right to be worried because in many cases we're not fully embracing the military aspects of it. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. i welcome that answer. i'd like to pursue it in another setting. my time is expired, but this is an important topic. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chair. general, welcome.

in your opening comments you quoted your son who i think graduated with a degree in physics. my son graduated with a degree in physics and said almost exactly the same thing about me. i just have people now. but i welcome you and congratulate your family on being here today. i've got maybe some ground level questions to ask. one is on the current status of the gps ocx project. it's about five years, looks like it's right now 61 months, 5 years or so, past due. can you talk a little bit about your position on the significance and importance of that project? >> so i was quoted in the press, senator, calling that program a disaster. i think any program that's five years late and a billion dollars overbudget meets the definition of disaster. it's horrible. and it's embarrassing to me that we find ourselves in that kind of position in today's day and age. we should not have that kind of

program, but we do. the concern i have is the legacy program we have right now has significant information assurance vulnerabilities. basically, we're plugging those holes as fast as we can, and the best way to do that is with people. and that's what you were talking about. people are our most valuable resource. we have to divert a lot of people to secure that critical capability for the united states and the world. the ocx program would fix those problems. i've told the under secretary, if he thinks that program will succeed, i'll support it. if he thinks it will fail, i'll support the termination of that program. it's up to him. right now he buildielieves that program will succeed and they're doing three-month deep dives in that project but we're going to watch it closely. >> the people involved in it to the extent the people involved in what is now a billion-dollar

overrun and five-year delay that we need to make sure we have other sets of eyes looking at that to make sure the decision to move forward or to cancel the project is one that has independent objective input. i have a question about the current arsenal. this question came up last year. we have some weapons that i understand are reaching a point where they wouldn't be used. and they need to be decommissioned. can you talk a little bit about that issue and where you are on it? >> i am not as deeply versed in that area as i would be if i'm confirmed and become commander of strategic command. i can guarantee i'll get into that in a significant depth. looking at the capabilities we have, we have issues on the weapons deliveries platforms, whether that's's submarine we were just talking about, the icbm or the bomber, whether it's the long-range strike capability

with the new cruise missile. we have issues with our nuclear weapons that we have to continue to look at and figure out how to modernize. if i'm confirmed, i'll work closely with the national labs and national nuclear security administration to make sure we watch those capabilities closely. and then we have some -- i have some concerns on our nuclear command and control capabilities aging out as well. and i think we need to watch closely those capabilities and make sure we modernize those along with the rest of the enterprise. >> thank you. i have a question about unity of command. i think you lean more towards unity of effort. ides like to have you talk about why you do that in the context of something along the lines of one of our satellites get damaged by an adversary. who is in charge in reacting to that threat? that would be one part of the context i'd like you to answer

the question. the other one, i think you were part of a war games shriver 15 and it would be curious to see if there were any challenges exposed concerning that coordination in command and the context of unity of effort versus unity of command. >> so senator, i'm probably one of the biggest believers in unity of command in the world. when we started down this project to figure out how we command and control space capabilities, i was a vocal opponent to the construct. i honestly didn't think it would work. but, you know, we all have a process. we all have bosses, and we decided we'd pursue the unity of effort construct with the intelligence community, the national reconnaissance office and see if it would work. and to my surprise, it actually did work. the record of the nro and

director of national intelligence made sure that if we had to make a decision quickly, that decision process would work very effectively through an operational center and the commander and strategic command would be the one to explain it to the united states if we had to go down that path. we ended up in a very good place. i have to admit, i was a little surprised as we went through that. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to put a finer point on your son chris' observation. i worked here 40 years ago as a staff member and was once called upon to set up a hearing and called the office of management and budget for a witness from the administration. the fellow said we'll send you the deputy under secretary of such and such and i said i don't really understand these titles. can you tell me who this guy is? and his answer will be the title if i ever write a book. he's at the highest level where they still know anything. the bad news is you and i are

now above that level. deterrence has been a theory and a doctrine that's served this nation well for 70 years. it's been a huge, hugely successful theoretical construct. but the problem is, it seems to me in the modern day, is it rests upon a premise of rationality on both sides. does deterrence -- the theory of deterrence work against a mad man, or a suicidal fanatic? do we need to be thinking about deterrence 2.0 because of that potential lack of rationality on the other side that wouldn't be concerned about the destruction of their country or perhaps they're possessing nuclear weapons and don't have a country to destroy. >> i think we need to look at deterrence 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and deterrence in the 21st century, i think is fundamentally

different than it was in the 20th century. deterrence in the 21st century involves all elements of national power. not just nuclear deterrent. involves space and cyber and conventional forces, it involves offense and defense on the strategic side of the house. you have to look at the integrated defensive capabilities if you're talking about responding to north korea or iran, and that defensive capability because an essential element of our deterrent posture. >> we also have to think about who we're deterring. and what works. what would -- what would be the -- again, deterrence is an idea, mutually shared destruction but you have to tailor it to the other side. >> and you do. and i finishing ythink if you lh korea, the unpredictability is the hardest to deter. how do you deter somebody or something that is unpredictable. it's very difficult. that's why you have to have a defensive mechanism that will ensure if they wanted to attack

the united states, it will fail and leave the president all the response options with the rest of the capabilities. >> they have to know that. >> they have to know that so we have to make sure that is readily transparent to all the world and all our adversaries. >> we have both the means and the will. >> to defend ourselves and to respond, if need be. >> a few months ago, a froup of us went on the national airborne operations center and the thing that struck me as we went through a nuclear attack scenario simulation was that in that situation, a, there's a very limited amount of time for decision-making, and, two, only one person makes the decision. the president. there's no check and balance. no congress, no required consultation. is that correct? >> that is correct, sir. that's the constitution. >> and it is -- that's the sole responsibility of that person who will be making that decision in a matter of minutes, i think

the exercise we were in there was 28 minutes. if it was a missile coming from offshore would be 5 or 10 minutes, is that correct? >> yes, sir. like i said, i love the constitution. i swore an oath to defend the constitution. in article 2, section 2 is one of the reasons i'm here is because the advice and consent clause in the constitution requires me to prepare for the senate to be confirmed before i move on. it also establishes the president of the united states as the sole commander in chief. >> and it could hold in the hands of the president the future of our civilization. >> two big elements in that clause in the constitution. one establishes the president and commander in chief and the other is advice and consent of the senate. >> but it doesn't apply in this. >> the commander in chief is the commander in chief. >> [ inaudible ].

>> -- co-equal branches of government, okay? executive, legislative and judicial. and the president proposes and the congress disposes. so i understand your point about the commander in chief. this administration has done more to ignore the congress of the united states than any administration that i have been associated with. >> going back to the naoc, command, control and communication, are you satisfied when talking about modernization, the focus is almost always on the triad. it seems this san area that also needs modernization and strong consideration. >> yes, it does. the big challenge as we look at

command and control in the united states will be the cyberthreat which will be much different than when we created the current. >> should cybercommand be elevated to a separate command? >> yes, i believe it's time to elevate it to a separate command. >> thank you, chairman and thank you, general, for your service to our country. i want to follow up to the answers on your advanced policy questions. what are the most serious strategic threats facing the united states today. and among your answers you mentioned the increasingly provocative and destabilizing behavior by potential adversaries like iran. what i wanted to ask you is why do you believe there's significant concern about the adversary of iran and the impact of the pursuit of their ballistic missile program which they've done quite aggressively

even post-jcpoa. >> so i think you answered -- you provided part of the answer when you started talking about the ballistic missile program. there's three elements that concern me about iran in the last year. element one, they continue to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world. that should be enough to cause the nation concern. second is their continuing pursuit of new ballistic missile program and testing ballistic missiles over the last couple of years. and then third, a statement after one of the tests early in march this year by a member of the iranian military that said we're building this capability to threaten israel. so we put those three statements together, and you look at the technology they're pursuing, that's why i'm concerned about iran. >> and their ballistic missile program from what i hear from your testimony, you believe this

is a real threat to israel. is that true? >> they stated that it's a threat to israel. >> and what about, though, also our forward deployed troops in the european area and also our european allies? i assume it represents a threat to us as well? >> it does. >> and would you agree with what dni clapper said when he's repeatedly testified that tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons? >> i agree with that. >> and so i think we also need to focus on making our own homeland when it comes to their testing and development of ballistic missiles, would you agree with that? >> i think that has to be part of our missile defense. i believe that's the misful defense architecture in the pacific and needs to be in the atlantic as well. >> whoen we look at their even - they've been even post-jcpoa agreement, testing ballistic missiles on multiple occasions.

do you believe that their activities are inconsistent with the u.n. security resolution 2331 which calls on iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology? >> that's more a policy question, but from a military perspective, i find that kind of behavior extremely destabilizing and threatening. >> how are we going to address their testing issue? what do you see your role in your command and ways we should be more aggressively pushing back on iran on something of deep concern to us and our allies. >> again, senator, a lot of that question is for the political realm. my job is to, if i'm confirmed as commandered stratcom, will be to provide military advice to the president, military advice passed by this congress. i think you're asking for my military advice. my military advice is that we always have to make sure that our capabilities to respond to

an iranian threat are visible, powerful and ensure and the deterrent discussion a little while ago that no adversary will want to take us on, at least they will think twice and reconsider their actions before they do that. that's the job as the commander of strategic command and if confirmed, i'll take that seriously. >> in the political realm, i would hope -- i've introduced legislation to impose real sanctions on iran for their ballistic missile program. i've been very disappointed the administration is, from my perspective, pretty much ignoring their testing of ballistic missiles. i i wanted to follow up with you. would love to have you come, if confirmed, to visit new hampshire because we have the 23rd space operations squadron at new boston air force station, and new boston operates the largest air force satellite controlled network, remoets tracking station and they provide stratcom with very

important satellite command and control capabilities. so i wanted to extend that invitation and hope you'll take me occupy it. >> i've been to new boston many times. one of the most beautiful bases in our country. it's a hidden treasure, but they do an incredibly important mission. there's amazing airmen that do awesome work up there. >> we're glad you're very familiar with new boston. they'llb an important asset to you in this new position. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i want to thank your family. thank you to all of you. stratcom recently provided a requiremented letter related to hypersonic weapons systems. and specifically conventional prompt strike. are your familiar with that? >> i'm familiar with the broad topic. >> and i know some of this information is sensitive, but to

what degree it is possible, what are your thoughts on the importance of making progress on conventional prompt strike? >> i think that from my position today as air force base command, i think that has a role to play in the future. if i'm confirmed as strategic command, i think that i'll need to work with all the combatant commanders to make sure we get the requirements right. i see a significant role in terms of our ability to double any target on the planet without having to move into the nuclear realm. i think there's a powerful requirement there, but it's just not a stratcom requirement. it's a requirement that i think awl combatant commanders will have to be involved in developing to make sure we get it right before we start going down that path. >> the sooner cps transitions from a dod risk reduction project to a navy program of record, i think the sooner that's system will reach its initial operational capability. what is your view on the ideal

timing for cps from stratcom's standpoint? >> i think from a commander of stratcom perspective, i think yesterday would be a good answer. i don't think there's -- if we had a capability to provide prompt strike, just think how it would fundamentally change the equation to go back to senator king's question about what deterrence is. because now you have a conventional capability that can deter and nuclear capability that can deter. i would like to see that answer be yesterday. >> the air force general i think has an historic opportunity to leverage research and development, common parts and lessons learned from the navy's recent program to reduce risk, enhance savings and field an extremely capable follow-on to minuteman 3. there's been some difficult back and forth on how best to leverage commonality across the

two services, but when i go back to my home state of indian anaval surface war center crane, our navy and air force personnel are working very closely on this. and we're doing incredible work for the air foerks particularly in the area of radiation, hardoned electronic parts. i know collaboration between navy and air sfoers happening on a daily basis at the staff level. if confirmed will you work to establish commonality and collaboration across the air force and navy strategic programs to reduce cost and risk? >> so if confirmed i'll advocate for that. the commander of stratcom is not in the direct acquisition realm. that would be the service chiefs for the most part. i'm a huge believer as we build things for the future in particular, to make sure we can leverage commonality across those capabilities. i'm not a big believer in trying to go back and insert

commonality in retrofitting because almost always that costs us an enormous amount of money. every time we modernize, whether it's a component, subcomponent or entire weapons system, we should look at commonality as much as possible. >> do you have any idea at this point where you see the greatest potential for commonality and collaboration? >> i think the greatest potential will be in the missile technology of the future, especially the microelectronics side of the missile technology that will go into the future ground base strategic deterrent element they are implementing to leverage ground force from navy programs. >> let me ask you this, i think we're coming on a battle wave of cost and modernization around 25 to 35 which is a ways off but we also have an obligation to try to help at this point. last year admiral haney said it currently represents 3% of dod's

budget and the figure could grow to 6% in outyears under current plans. how do you see the defense budget flexing to accommodate the things we need to do and how to prepare the next administration for success in this effort? >> senator, i think the nuclear triad is affordable as we go forward in the future. but it should not be looked at as a blank check. i actually -- i don't like when i see the numbers that show up in the paper of a trillion dollars or $85 billion or $500 billion. i don't like to see those numbers. they tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies. if we say it's going to cost that much, it ends up costing that much. we need to define our requirements, figure out what we need to build and then within the defense budget, because it is the backbone of what we do it is everything that our defense department is based on, we have to modernize the triad. and i think the money will be there to do that.

but we still need to do it smartly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> general, thank you for the effort you made in very thoroughly answering some advance questions which i've had a chance to review on page 24 of your answers with regard to electronic warfare and spectrum operations. you say among other things, russia and china have each committed significant resources to electronic warfare capabilities and dedicated military operators. and then you talk about their layered advantage that each of these countries has attained. would you explain what their layered advantage is and enlighten the committee with regard to china and russia in this regard. >> senator, if you look at what china and russia have been looking at themselves for the last 20 years, they've been

looking at the united states developing incredibly powerful conventional military that without a doubt can dominate any battlefield in the world. and so they have taken those lessons and started building capabilities to respond to that. one of those lessons is in the electromagnetic spectrum. they see us dominating that. ution gps, satellite communications. they see us basically conducting information age warfare where in the not too distance pass, industrial age warfare. developing layers of capabilities in the elect romagnet, cyber and space to gain a strategic advantage in those areas. our job is to make sure they never get an advantage in those areas but it's clear that's what they're trying to do from my perspective, senator. >> will you further say with our increasing spectrum dependence, assuring access to and freedom of maneuver within the

electromagnetic spectrum can no longer be guaranteed, this san area we must improve. what suggestions will you have for us in that regard? >> i will continue to advocate if confirmed, for improved capabilities in each of the domains i just described. space, cyber, as well as the elect romagnetic rect rum. we have to build resilient capabilities to fight through and respond to threats. it's no different than a threat to an airplane, a threat to a ground system, a threat to a ship. the navy has a layered approach in how they respond to a threat to the fleet. we need a layered approach in how we respond to threats in space, threats in cyber or threats in the electromag nettic space. >> it can be achieved through redundancy, through prolifration of capabilities, it can be achieved through defensive systems that can defend you against such as anti-jam capabilities to allow you to

fight through a jamming scenario, which is an electromagnetic spectrum operation. >> i read a novel awhile back, i think published in 2009 entitled one second after by william forshten. i wonder how fanciful that is. i don't know if you've read that novel, but the concept is there's an electromagnetic pulse which shuts down our entire gps grid and electric grid. and renders this country pretty much defenseless. how big of a layered approach would russia or china have to have to accomplish that, and is this just fanciful science fiction that could never happen, or is it something we need to be prepared for? >> i haven't read that book, senator, but -- >> i've i've described it. >> yes, you did, very well. the concern is an

electromagnetic pulse that goes off in space. that's the concern. it is the most dangerous threat that a space officer, which i am right now, is concerned about because it is the most threatening and the most damaging. but if a nation in the world does that, they now reached a very significant threshold, and the response of the united states could be broad and very -- and more likely not a response in kind but a response in another domain. >> it would be more damaging than a nuclear bomb, would it not? >> it is a nuclear bomb, basically. it is a nuclear bomb in space. that's what creates the electromagnetic pulse. >> who has the capability of doing such a thing now, if they were mad enough to do it? >> anybody with a nuclear weapons capability and a launch capability into space. >> and how prepared are we to respond -- to prevent, not to respond in a mutually assured destruction manner, but to defend against such a thing?

>> our nuclear command and control architecture, including the space elements of missile warning and satellite communications is very well positioned to respond and operate through that scenario. we built that into our scenario. the rest of our infrastruct surnot as well prepared to respond. now the good news about gps, for example is that it is a global architecture, and we can go in another forum into the details, but there would be slight degradation of a single -- if a single electromagnetic pulse went off, it heals itself as it comes over. so i don't want to get into too much technical detail, but it's fairly resilient because of numbers. our missile warning are very resilient because of the defensive capabilities. it will allow the united states to fly and fight, but the concern is what does it do to our civilian infrastructure.

>> thank you, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman. congratulations, general. i would just say that your upcoming new position, if you are successful as you've been in selecting your wife and raising two fine children, you're going to do great. >> thank you, sir. >> with that being said, sir, the whole procurement system, b-52, we built in in '52, came into operation in 1955. built 744. still in operation, okay. we did total upgrades for $1.1 billion over that period of time. maybe a little bit more. then we come along and someone makes a decision. we're on track to spend $1.5 trillion. and we had the f-15, f-16, f-18. how come all of a sudden -- we're trying to get rid of the warthog. the others doing what they do. we spend $1.5 trillion. and it makes you think of president eisenhower saying, be

aware, be very concerned about the industrial. as you know, his comments as far as what we do in procurement and defense. how do we explain that, and why is a 15 and 16 and 18 not able to be upgraded and continued service? >> so, senator, it's really not a question for me. it's a question for the commander of air combatant commander. i do have some opinions. i'll be glad to share those opinions with you. the f-15, f-16, f-18 are fourth generation aircraft. going up against a modern 21st century threat, they cannot penetrate many of the threats that we are going to have to be able to penetrate. >> what generation is a b-52? >> b-52 is at least a third generation weapons system. and, oh, by the way -- >> still the most efficient and cost effective.

>> it is because of the cruise missile because it can't penetrate either. we'll need to penetrate with fighters. we need a fifth generation fighter. we have to have it for our airmen to fight and win in any conflict in the future. one of the reasons we need a b-21 is because the b-52 cannot penetrate. we'll need a penetrating capability out of the bomber and fighter. we'll need to handle any threat scenario. as for the cost, it should not have cost that much. i think any american who looks at the cost and is proud of that cost has not seen the big picture. it cost too much. but that capability is critical. and it will be awesome on the battlefield. it will create an advantage for the united states for decades to come. >> i have a question being asked by west virginians every day. does the president of the united states have the absolute ability and power to call for nuclear

strike? without any input from congress, legislators, any input from generals whatsoever to negate that? he or she alone can call for that strike? >> my job as a military officer is to follow orders of the commander in chief. >> so there's no checks and balances. you don't check with someone else to make sure. if you get that order from the president, then it's a go order? >> the president of the united states will ask me for my military advice. i'll give it as strongly and powerfully as i can if i'm confirmed, but he is the kch compa commander in chief, or she is the commander in chief, and their orders will be followed. >> so that person, whoever the president may be, has the ability, sole ability to call for a nuclear strike? >> they are the commander in chief. >> also, i'm very supportive of the national guard as you might know. i would like to know how you see that your sister the national guard's performance in space,

missile defense and cyberoperations, how they can be more effective. >> spectacular. but in many ways we've just scratched the surface. if you think about many of the missions we do in space and cyberspairx they are stateside missions. it's perfect for the reserve. some of our most impressive cyber units are guard units because they karn leverage the civilian workforced in civilian population. the guard and reserve are stepping up into the space area in new and exciting ways. i met with the head of the air national guard and head of the air force reserve. we're looking at new ways to expand both space and cybercommand. as the -- if i'm confirmed as commander, it's a total force problem, everything that's we do. and we'll leverage the total force in every way possible. >> do you think we're exercising every option and opportunity we have to enhance that with the guard or that more needs to be done? >> i think there's always more

that needs to be done. i'm not exactly sure what that is but i just looked at the potential that's out there and realized that i think there's even more that can be done. what we're doing, a tremendous amount. >> thank you, general. >> i think you ought to read the constitution. nuclear strike, depending on the circumstance, would require a declaration of war. only the congress can declare a deck la -- approve of a declaration of war. >> yes, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and, general, thank you for being willing to take on this task. thank you to your family for being here and for all of the service they've also provided. there was discussion earlier about north korea and the eratsic behavior of north korea's leader. and we saw as you pointed out just this morning that they tested a new rocket engine to

launch satellites. it's the latest in a succession of nuclear weapons tests and ballistic missile launches as they steadily increase their nuclear stockpile. can you discuss what you see as stratcom's mission and operations to, as we look at what we can do to deter what's happening in north korea, if anything? >> i think we have two roles, if i'm confirmed as strategic commander, that we have to play. role number one is strategic deterrence and assurance mission for our allies. and i kind of lump those both together. the ability to deter our adversaries n assure our allies thad they are defended by the capability of the united states. i think it's extremely important. the second piece of that puzz cell to make sure we provide the right kind of ready forces that can allow the united states in

concert with the other joint combatant commanders to respond to those capabilities across the board. >> senator inhofe earlier talked about the missile defense system in eastern europe as being one of the actions that might have contributed to russia's aggressive behavior. do we see that the thad missile system in south korea has the potential to produce that kind of a response from north korea and from china for that matter? >> i am not sure, ma'am, if i can properly assess how china or north korea would look at that. from my military perspective, the thad missile does not change the strategic deterrence equation because it provides a point defense capability against a close-end threat. doesn't impact the ability to effectively operate. >> do you think that's clear to

china and north korea? >> i think we have done everything in our power to make it clear. how they perceive what we've said and what they believe, i don't think i can comment on that, ma'am. >> there was a very interesting segment of "60 minutes" on sunday night. i don't know if you saw it or not. it was talking about the nuclear deterrent. and one of the people they interviewed was former secretary of defense william perry who -- they were asking him if there had been -- ever been a close call in terms of someone launching a nuclear weapon from the united states. he pointed to an incident in 1977 where someone put in a training tape that was misinterpreted. as you look -- and the reason i think that is so -- has so much resonance right now is because i think this campaign for president probably has had more discussion of nuclear weapons

and who should control nuclear weapons than any campaign i remember since 1984. so as you look at the current nuclear command and control structure and architecture, are there any concerns you have about the potential for something unforeseen to happen for somebody to make the wrong call and a weapon to be launched inadvertently? >> i believe ours is the most robust architecture that can be created by man. i think there are multiple checks and balances through the system that you have men and women in the loop that can respond to those kind of anomalies and make sure if it is an anomaly they can report that up. nonetheless it was created by man. if it's created by man, there's

no way to create perfection, but that's why we put so many checks and balances in the system. all the way up to make sure if we do have to give a recommendation to the president of the united states, that recommendation is clear and based on solid data. >> one of the concerns that i have heard from folks in the foreign policy arena is that unlike during the cuban missile crisis and much of the other periods of our history, we don't have the same kind of communication channels between us, our military leaders and the military leaders in russia. i don't know if -- they didn't suggest that china is in that category as well, but certainly said that was true of the united states and russia. do you share that concern? >> i don't have enough information to really comment on it, except to say that i'm a big believer in military to military relationships.

and i think that if we have military to military relationships with allies, friends, and potential adversaries, we're in a better posture to defuse the situation if something should happen. if i'm confirmed, i'll find out the details of what relationships there are right now, and then i'll advocate for improving those relationships in the future. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and, general, congratulations on your nomination. i think you're highly qualified. i want to also -- as we talked about, i appreciate your example at all alma mater and what you did there and stand for. sometimes our universities in this country need to see and respect the military and rotc, and i think you are a great example of that. i want to just continue on. i know the discussion has been a lot about missile defense. and i want to continue on what senator shaheen was talking

about and senator inhofe. do you believe it's part of our job and your job if you're confirmed as combatant commander and the senate's job to anticipate threats to our nation and then be able to address them? >> sir, i think it's the responsibility of any public servant to look at that always. my primary job if i'm confirmed as a combatant commander will be to make sure our forces are ready to respond today, but i have a secondary job to advocate for capabilities to respond to future threats in the future and, if confirmed, i'll take both of those jobs very seriously. >> so it's my sense that's we talk a lot about north korea here and the threat, and it's definitely a growing threat. but i think that the american people probably continue in general to see that maybe most members of congress as a regional threat to japan, korea,

to the region. today's -- there was a "wall street journal" piece today that north korea successfully tested a high-powered engine for launching sat lied and intercontinental ballistic missiles. do you believe in two to three years the leader of north korea is going to have the ability to reach the continental united states with nuclear weapons? do you think that's just a matter of time? maybe not two to three, maybe three to four, but don't you think the american people soon, maybe within your tenure, if you are confirmed, are going to wake up to the fact that this is not a region al threat. this is a direct threat that a crazy dictator from north korea has the capability to range our country with intercontinental ballistic nuclear weapons. do you think that's going to happen within five years? >> sir, i can't put a date on it. i've talked extensively to the intelligence community over the

last couple of weeks. i don't have a confident date, but -- >> you think it's going to happen -- >> it's a matter of when, not if. >> shouldn't we start preparing for that now? >> we should. >> so the american people won't wake up and say, my gosh, nobody has even thought about this. >> i think we are thinking about it, and we have to be prepared for it. >> i think we're not doing enough in terms of missile defense to prepare for this inevitability. can you give me your sense right now with 40 ground base missile interceptors in alaska, a couple in california. a new ladr system being deployed. do you think we're doing enough in terms of missile defense to be able to anticipate a threat that we know is coming? literally a dictator who has no stability in his mind being able to range our country with

nuclear weapons. are we doing enough? >> i'm a big believer in missile defense. we're doing a lot but i think we need to do more. i think that the number of interceptors we have, we have to constantly look at that abillities of that force to respond to the size of the threat. i think the force of size is correct today. i have concerned about the size of that force in the future. if i'm confirmed, i'll take a hard look at that along with command and pacific command to make sure we understand what that response option is. >> i'd like to work with you on that issue. i think it's a critical issue on the issue of defense for our nation. a lot of senators are interested in it, and i don't think we're doing enough to be ready for a threat that we know is coming. and if that, you know, if we're not in that position to tell the american people, hey, we knew this was coming, and we took -- we took decisive action to create a strong missile defense, i think that's not what we

should be doing, any of us. can you just describe in terms of the technical aspects how important lrdr -- we often talk about ground base missile interceptors but the raider syste -- radar systems we're trying to deploy. >> they're important. you can't target a weapon without the sensor. you need the sensor to queue that. that starts with the overhead infrared capabilities. hands off to radars today. the radars we have are old. they need to be modernized. one of the most critical radars we're building is the long-range discrimination radar. clear in alaska to be able to respond to that threat. it's a critical element of any future architecture in that part of the world. and we also have to look at the space base element. we need to be able to broadly use the global nature of space to be able to add a global tracking capability because that not only allows us to track but

allows us to operate weapon systems more efficiently than just firing many at one time. >> thank you, general. i think you are highly qualified. i look forward to voting in favor of your nomination -- confirmation. >> thank you for your service. thank you to your family. i want to start with a little bit about the b-2. in august of this year, we deployed the b-2 from whiteman to guam. at least the second time this year that we have deployed these aircraft to the u.s. pacific command area of responsibility. in march 2013, two b-2 spirit bombers conducted a long-range precision strike by flying more than 6,500 miles to the korean peninsula and returning to the continental u.s. in a single continuous mission. i know that you understand how important missions like this are to demonstrating our commitment and our capabilities and what an

important role they have in deterrence, particularly as we look at the actions of north korea. they continue our adversaries continue to develop advanced systems which eventually could hold even our homeland at risk. i know there's been a lot of discussion regarding the affordability of maintaining -- upgrading nuclear triad. there are some improvements in the communications systems of the b-2 spirit which will extend the viability of this flexible, dual use platform. what would be the consequences of a delay in completing the communication upgrades to the b-2? >> senator, i think we have to look at the communication upgrades of the b-2 in concert with the entire bomber force. right now it's probably the most important element of our bomber capability. so that capability is extremely

important to maintain the viability now and in the future. but i think the best answer that we owe to this committee and to the congress is natural. it looks across the entire bomber force. i think that's a question the air force should answer but as the commander of stratcom, what i'll advocate for is an effective bomber force to handle all the threats we have in the future and then it's the air force's job to say then we have to upgrade the b-2 or wait for the b-21. right now the b-21 is a little too far off to respond to that. but i think the answer has to be across the entire bomber force. >> we have to make sure we don't make the same mistake as we did with the we started pulling back on the fa-18s and hornetses but because of the implementation of a system that was way over budget and way out of time. as a result, we had vulnerabilities on our aircraft carriers we shouldn't have and we're continuing to scramble to make sure that we don't have

those. i want to make sure that i make that point. in addition, i am really proud of the 131st bomb wing at whiteman of the missouri national guard. was the first national guard unit to be certified to conduct a nuclear mission. this is -- took a tremendous amount of work at whiteman and a tremendous amount of commitment on the part of the active air force at that base, along with the missouri national guard. do you -- can i get your commitment today to continue this integration and continue to allow the guard to play this important role going forward? >> so, senator, i'm a huge fan of the total force were. the guard and the reserve provide a huge capability to our forces worldwide. so i pledge to constantly advocate for full integration of the guard and to all our military forces across the board. if i'm confirmed as stratcom, it

will be inside stratcom. >> and i alsome menwant to talkt missile defense as it relates to north korea. the first ballistic missile defense test against an icbm missile range target will be conducted this fall. first time this has happened since 1984. a second ground base interceptor was scheduled for fy 2017 but due to budgetary sdrin arary co will -- it was scheduled for 2017. it will have to slit to 20 season. a gao report found a system delayed or removed 40% of its planned flight tested in reprioritized the testing of polite plan because of the fiscal constraints we placed upon the military. if we don't stop playing games with what we need to invest in our military as it relates to

oco and spending money off budget, what is going to be the result in terms of our capability, in terms of ballistic missile defense, particularly in light of what north korea is up to? >> senator, i think we desperately need a missile defense capability. it's got to be robust, tested. our adversaries have to be concerned that it will work if they operate against it. if it's not, it's not there. therefore, just like in every other element of our defense department, i think we need stable funding, close working relationships with the entire congress, especially this committee, to make sure we understand exactly where we're going. i'm concerned if we go back and you had a hearing last week on readiness that if we go back into a budget control act level, that many of those decisions that we'll make will be bad decisions for the security of the united states. >> thank you very much, general.

congratulations. >> thank you, senator. >> general, you are an outstanding choice for stratcom. you have been an outstanding and have done an outstanding job as the head of air force space command. a subject that i understand a little bit about, and i just want to say that for the record. we thank you, and i look forward to you being our combatant commander. would you characterize your thoughts on the need for modernization of our nuclear arsenal, as well as our nuclear command and control. >> senator, i think it's -- i think all three elements of the triad are essential to the security of the nation. i think it is the foundation of what we built our entire defense

posture on. each of those elements of the triad are aging out at a similar time. in order for us to have an effective triad in the future, we'll have to modernize each element. we'll have to modernize the capabilities for icbm, we need an ohio class replacement program on the -- cruise missile, the long-range strike option. each of those has to be pursued. they have to be pursued in an integrated manner, and then we have to pursue the nuclear command and control piece on top of that. the nuclear command and control is the most inportent piece of the puzzle. and as we continue to focus on the delivery platforms which are essential, we just can't take our eyes off the nuclear command and control capability. without those we can't successfully have a nuclear

deterrent. >> and specifically, do you have any thoughts on the modernization of -- i said the nuclear arsenal, meaning the nuclear weapons. >> so i think as we look at the nuclear weapons, we have to consider the environment that we're going to operate in. we have to consider how many nuclear weapons that we need. we need to take a whole approach to looking at the existing goin approach to looking at the existing nuclear stock pile and what we need in the nuclear stock pile. ideally i might like to have flexibility across platforms with those nuclear weapons. it's really a conversation meant for a different class piaificat forum and i'll just say if i'm confirmed i'll work closely with the national labs as well as the other elements of the nuclear weapons environment to make sure that we have a solid plan going in the future. especially given the test environment that we're in.

>> thank you senator. >> earlier assessment that the growing importance of cyber warrants u. s. cyber command from a unified command. is it also your professional military judgment that maintaining a relationship with the commander of cyber command sa er is also in the best interest. >> that's my belief, sir. i believe that right now. there may be a day in the future where that's not the case but today is not that case. >> i thank you that that discussion continues. i was going to talk with senator

reid and other members of the committee but i think they may asking you to come back and not maybe this week but later on to brief us on the information that you provided me with yesterday was quite t word compel atlanlia different one.

>> after a very long campaign. why should he be our next president of the united states? >> help education funding. >> my name is natalie. i'm a senior and i'm a medical laboratory science major. and our health care system.

and my question is as president of the united states what would you do to help alleviate some of the tensions that are building. >> money out of politics. >> on cspan. >> the race gender age and education of the electorate a look beyond the numbers who is supporting donald trump or hillary clinton and why? the polling and analyst and also the director of the university of san francisco washington d.c. program and a professor in the department of p