and later economic advisers to hillary clinton and donald trump discuss their candidate's plans for the u.s. economy. today white house national security adviser susan rice outlined new policy directives from the administration to increase trade and travel with cuba now that the u.s. has normalized relations. some changes include allowing cigars and rum to be purchased for personal consumption. and a push for congress to lift a 50-year-old economic embargo. from the wilson center, this is 45 minutes. >> good morning. welcome to the wilson center. i'm jane harman, the president

and ceo, and we're delighted that you're here for a very significant event with our national security adviser. let me recognize a few folks in the front row. our former board member carlos gutierrez, former u.s. commerce secretary, and big fan of the president's cuba policy. he evolved, and i'm delighted that he did. and then some of wilson center's finest, cindy arneson who directs our latin american program, her deputy eric and our -- the director of -- eric olson and the director of our africa program and andrew sealy who is the executive vice president of the wilson center. and the former director of our mexico program. we also -- no, i think there are no ambassadors. if there are any ambassadors here, my apologies if i haven't

recognized you. ambassador of luxembourg is here. my trusted buddy susan would point that out. so a long time ago, i served on a d.c. board. i've been trying to remember which one. with lois rice. an, normously capable academic leader who served as vice president of the college entrance examination board and led the passage of the pell grant program among other things. who knew that lois' daughter would be a rock star in the national security space. over the years, susan's and my lives have overlapped in various policy fora and on the tennis court. i encountered susan early in the clinton administration. she's been recognized as u.s. ambassador to the u.n. and now sitsaed the crux of foreign policy as white house national security adviser.

it honors the wulson center that she is here today to talk about new presidential action on cuba. a country that i personally have visited twice. a fascinating country. it will be more fascinating, i hope, in years forward as it opens up. at any rate, while the cuban government continues to embrace an ideology that restrains change, the opportunities for the country and its talented people are obvious. president obama was right. if a policy in place for 50 years doesn't work, we ought to change it. and he did. much credit for the change in cuba policy goes to someone who we -- we have to do this. who learned everything he knows working at the wilson center for lee hamilton who was my predecessor here. that person is ben wrote, susan's deputy who was one of the two people who conducted the secret talks that led to normalization of u.s./cuba relations. ben has been back with us several times, most recently to

address the board of the latin america program. and today, we welcome his boss, ambassador susan rice, to learn more about next steps. susan will speak for approximately 20 minutes, then take a few questions from me and then take a few questions from you. she has a hard stop in about 45 minutes, i think. please welcome lois rice's daughter and our dear friend, ambassador susan rice. [ applause ] >> my mom is going to be thrilled. thank you very, very much, jane. good morning, everyone. i want to thank you for that very kind and very personal introduction. but more, i want to thank you for your extraordinary leadership of this very important institution. i'm really glad to be back here, and i'm grateful for this

opportunity to talk about our cuba policy at a place where so much good work on the americas has been going on. i also want to recognize and thank former secretary of commerce carlos gutierrez for being here and for his lifetime of remarkable work and achievements that reflect the story of so many cuban americans. i've been looking very much forward to coming back, jane, to the wilson center. and you've been very kind to offer this opportunity on a number of occasions. but to do so and to be able to talk about the administration's approach to cuba and where we see normalization heading is a particularly valuable opportunity. in many ways, it's still incredible to be talking about normalization at all. some will recall that 54 years ago today, marked the beginning of perhaps the most dangerous moment in human history.

on october 14th, 1962, an american u2 plane flying high over cuba photographed the construction of offensive nuclear missile sites on the island. missiles capable of striking washington, d.c., and major cities throughout the hemisphere. for 13 terrifying days, humanity teetered on the brink of nuclear war. mcgeorge bundy called the prospect reciprocal mortal peril. fortunately, cool heads and vigorous diplomacy averted the immediate crisis. but mutual suspicion remained. and u.s./cuba relations remained deeply hostile. for over half a century, the united states tried to isolate and pressure cuba, cutting off travel and trade and limiting opportunities for cubans and

americans to interact. the castros remained in power while over time the united states found itself increasingly isolated on this issue. especially in our own hemisphere. even as we re-established relations with communist nations like china and vietnam, our posture towards cuba persisted. driven more by inertia and political calculation than a clear assessment of our national interest. this policy may have made sense during the cold war. it was rooted in good intentions but, put simply, it wasn't working. recognizing this reality, president obama came into office determined to re-examine our approach to cuba. to begin, we relaxed restrictions on remittances and allowed cuban americans to travel home to visit their families. we stepped up dialogue with the cuban american community.

eventually, we reached out, cautiously and deliberately to the cuban government. it took almost two years of closely held negotiations as jane said, led by my friend and colleague ben wrost. but finally on september 17th, 2014, the people of the united states and cuba saw something that many never expected to see in their lifetimes. president obama and president castro announced that the united states and cuba would begin normalizing relations. it will be, i expect, one of the enduring achievements of the obama administration. now i know not everyone agrees with this decision. there are those who believe that normalization is a mistake, or that we didn't extract

sufficient concessions. some reject any notion that the embargo should be lifted at this time or maybe ever. but the hard truth is that the embargo failed to achieve its stated purpose of overturning the castro regime. while harming the cuban people. as one 76-year-old cuban woman wrote to president obama, the over half century cruel embargo on this lovely, enduring and resilient little island just didn't work. if we want to actuall lely help cuban people, then it's time to turn the page on a policy that was holding them back. we should learn from over 50 years of experience. even as we continue to call on the cuban government to make their own reforms, let's lead by example and make our own.

congress should do its part. we must lift the embargo once and for all. in march, i had the pleasure of joining president obama as he became the first sitting american president to visit cuba in nearly 90 years. i've been on a lot of foreign trips, but this one was rather special. in addition to president obama's meetings with president castro, we met with entrepreneurs and civil society activists. and we capped it off by watching the tampa bay rays defeat the cuban national team in an exhibition game. president obama entered the stadium to thunderous applause. i sat near president obama and the obama family. president castro, jackie robinson's widow rachel robinson, and derek jeter. as the cuban choir sang our national anthem. it was surreal, to say the least.

as i looked at the young people in that stadium, and on the streets that greeted our motorcade, it reaffirmed something that the president strongly believes. and that is we cannot simply stand back and wait for cuba to change. we should be engaged with the government and people of cuba right now. in recent years, cuba has taken some initial steps to reform its economy and open up to the world. and even as we continue to have serious differences, our new policy continues the work that we've begun to build a bilateral relationship. to improve the livelihoods of the cuban people. to connect cuba to the united states and the wider world. and to address our differences through dialogue. today, i'm pleased to announce that president obama is issuing a new presidential policy

directive that will institutionalize this progress and guide the united states policy towards cuba for the future. this directive outlines the future we'd like to see. the future of greater engagement, greater cooperation, and greater opportunity for americans and cubans. it assesses the current strategic landscape and our key policy objectives within that context. and it directs a wide range of agencies from the department of treasury to the department of health and human services to expand their engagement with cuban counterparts to achieve those objectives. perhaps most importantly, this directive is being made public. in decades past, the united states used to have secret plans for cuba. now our policy is fully out in

the open and online for everyone to read. what you see is what you get. this unclassified directive supersedes and replaces the previous administration's cuba policy and any prior classified documents laying out that policy. as president obama told the people of cuba in havana, this is a new day. between our two countries. and with the remainder of my time this morning, i'd like to discuss what exactly has changed about our approach to cuba and why it's so important that we continue on this path. first and foremost, it's a new day for our bilateral relations. after years of bad blood, the american flag flies proudly over our reopened embassy in havana. last month, president obama

nominated an outstanding foreign service officer, ambassador jeffrey de laurentiis to be the first u.s. ambassador to cuba in more than 50 years. jeff has skillfully represented our interests in cuba, including his chief of mission in havana since august of 2014. the best way to advocate for our values and interests is to have a strong ambassador who can travel the country and engage with the cuban people. stronger diplomatic ties will enable fruitful dialogue on areas where we differ. so to our friends in congress who express concern about cuba's human rights record, don't just say you care. empower our embassy to do its job. confirm ambassador jeff delaurentiis as soon as you return from recess.

across the board, we're stepping up our engagement between our governments. we've created new bilateral -- a new bilateral commission to collaborate on key issues. six u.s. cabinet secretaries have visited the island and four cuban ministers have come to the united states. these high level meetings have yielded progress on everything from marine sanctuaries to agriculture to biomedical research. as two nations intimately impacted by climate change, we also look forward to partnering to address this great threat to our planet. we're enhancing our security cooperation. a year and a half ago, an outdated approach listed cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. today, it's an emerging partner in the fight against terrorism. our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have begun to deepen cooperation as well on combating drug trafficking and

transnational crime. in january, u.s. south com invited a cuban delegation to its conference to discuss disaster response and other security issues. as general john kelly, our former southcom commander put it, we've normalized now, and regardless of how we think of each other in terms of politics, we have very, very common challenges. and with viruses like zika threatening global health security, our health professionals are increasingly cooperating to combat disease, as well as leading new research into cancer control and treatment. it's a new day for our economic engagement as we aim to promote prosperity for all of our people. even with the embargo still in place, the obama administration has initiated a series of

regulatory changes designed to increase travel, commerce, and the free flow of information to, from and within cuba. we've authorized the use of the dollar in certain international financial transactions. we've made it easier for americans to visit cuba. easier to use american credit and debit cards on the island. easier to sell and to export certain goods and services. american travel to the island has increased over 75% from 2014 to 2015. we've seen american businesses entering cuba from general electric to airbnb. these changes are fueling cuba's nascent private sector. the young people at the entrepreneurship event that president obama attended in cuba would have felt right at home in silicon valley. there was a young graphic

designer who is now getting training from the columbia business school. a woman who created a mobile guide to cuba, similar to yelp. one barber commented one year ago he was the only [ speaking foreign language ] on his street. more than 1 in 4 cubans work in the private sector. roughly double the percentage when president obama came into office. and we want to keep encouraging that creativity and innovation just as we have supported openings for american tech companies like google and cisco in cuba. we want to do still more to engage and do business with cuba. that's why today the departments of treasury and commerce are announcing further regulatory changes.

we're expanding the grants and scholarships that can be made to cubans to include scientific research and religious activities. that's in addition to the previously authorized grants for humanitarian projects that benefit the cuban people such as educational and philanthropic projects. this change will allow the american people to support more cuban students, academics and community leaders. we're enhancing medical cooperation, authorizing joint research so that cubans and americans can combine their talent in pursuit of vaccines and other medical innovations and allowing americans to import fda approved cuban origin pharmaceuticals that can provide relief to people here at home. and we're lifting the cap on cuban merchandise that americans can bring back with them for

personal use. that includes alcohol and tobacco products. i thought that may wake some of you up. you can now celebrate with cuban rum and cuban cigars. despite these changes, there are still firm limits on what can be done without congress lifting the embargo. so again, i want to reiterate that congress should listen to the majority of americans who oppose the embargo, including a majority of cuban americans in the miami community. we need to end this outdated burden on the cuban people. end the restriction on americans who want to do business with them. help us secure a better future for both countriies through the exchange of resources, goods and ideas. and if you want to start somewhere, get rid of the travel ban. a policy that almost nobody in

america outside of congress still supports. in that spirit, we also want to encourage the cuban government to accelerate its pursuit of economic reforms. it should be much easier to start a business in cuba. one country, two currencies, should be phased out. every cuban should be able to share in its country's growth. especially members of marginalized communities like afro cubans. the internet should be a tool for the many, not a privilege for the few. the cuban government has recently established 100 wifi hot spots around the island but internet penetration is still only about 5%. one of the lowest rates in the world. that's going to hold back a young cuban from creating the next great mobile app. or a student from accessing a

world of knowledge. so we will continue to urge the cuban government to do more to connect cubans to this tremendous engine of growth and to facilitate the free exchange of information and ideas that are the life blood of modern economies. while much work remains to be done, it's also a new day in our commitment to promote respect for human rights. and universal values in cuba. i want to be clear. the united states respects cuba's sovereignty and its right to self-determination. president obama has also been adamant that the united states has no intention of imposing regime change on cuba. cuba's future is for the people of cuba to decide. but that does not mean that we will sideline our most cherished principles. just as we speak up for these things around the world. we firmly believe that every

citizen should be able to choose his or her leaders freely and fairly. we believe in the right of a lady in white to walk through the streets in protest just as americans are free to speak out against bias in our criminal justice system. freedom of speech and assembly. freedom of religion. these aren't just american values. they're universal values. as we do in countries around the world, we will continue to advocate in cuba for the basic human rights that are recognized by virtually every nation in our hemisphere and to stand by cubans who peacefully demand these rights. president obam has repeatedly raised these issues with president castro. president castro isn't shy to criticize what he sees as flaws in the united states' political and economic systems. in fact, today our assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights, tom

malinowski, is in cuba right now. so when dissidents are jailed or harassed, we will continue to speak out forcefully and demand justice. and we will continue to raise concerns about the intensifying pressure on civil society. but we don't have to conceal our support for our values. we believe that engaging openly and honestly is the best way to advance our ideals. and that's why we're making our democracy programs more transparent, and we're broadening the scope of the civil society that we engage. it's a new day as well for regional and international cooperation. we sometimes forget that when president obama took office, the united states standing in latin america had suffered. hugo chavez and other anti-american voices were ascending and our outdated cuba policy was a big reason why.

time after time in meeting after meeting, leaders from mexico to uruguay criticized our approach to cuba. it was a constant drum beat. a perennial irritant as we sought greater cooperation with our neighbors. thanks in part to our normalization policy, and an approach to the region based on cooperation and shared values, relationships between the united states and countries across the hemisphere are as good now as they've ever been. while we continue to have serious differences with -- and concerns about countries such as venezuela, virtually every country in the region has supported our normalization effort with cuba. and recognizing that it will continue to be on different sides of some regional and global issues, we're working to integrate cuba to strengthen its adherence to the rules-based

international order. already we're seeing what the united states and cuba can accomplish when we put aside the past and work to build a bright ir future. in west africa, american and cuban doctors join together to defeat the scourge of ebola. just as they've collaborated to care for patients in haiti. in colombia, the united states and cuba continue working to end the longest running civil war in the western hemisphere. obviously, we're disappointed by the results of the colombian referendum. the vote was a reminder there's still work to be done to realize the future for which president santos and so many colombians are striving. last week, president obama called president santos to congratulate him hon his well-deserved receipt of the nobel peace prize. we're encouraged the cease-fire continues to hold and political

figures continue to seek common ground, and that negotiators continue to meet in havana to try to salvage the peace agreement. and we also welcome the announcement of peace talks between the colombian government and the eln. finally, it's a new day for the peoples of our two countries. as we work to renew and strengthen the bonds between cubans and americans. cuban americans have been immeasurably -- cuban americans have immeasurably enriched the united states. as any baseball fan would tell you. but the cuban american story is a painful one as well. for too many decades, families were cut off from one another. as president obama said in havana, the reconciliation of the cuban people, the children and grandchildren of the revolution and the children and grandchildren of exile, that is fundamental to cuba's future.

in the coming months, those children and grandchildren will be able to travel on up to 110 daily round-trip flights from the united states to cuba. they can send direct mail for the first time in more than 50 years. american cruise liners are docking in cuban ports. we are encouraging that reconciliation when american chefs like jose andres meet their cuban counterparts. when shaquille o'neal plays basketball with young cubans or when the american men's soccer team enjoys a friendly exhibition game with cuba, as they did just a week ago. next month, misty copeland of the american ballet theater will travel to cuba to teach dance classes and clinics. so we're going to continue building bridges between our peoples. we're supporting cuba's extraordinary commitment to

education by expanding education and cultural exchanges, including through our 100,000 strong in the americas initiative. this week, eight cubans arrived in the united states as part of the inaugural class of 250 young leaders of the americas initiative fellows who are making our hemisphere more interconnected, prosperous and secure. that's in addition to the ten cuban entrepreneurs who joined president obama at this year's global entrepreneurship summit in silicon valley. as one cuban american woman says, and i quote, this is not really symbolic. as a young cuban american, i have witnessed the real possibilities that have opened through good will to improve relations between our countries and to improve the lives of cuban citizens. ultimately, that is what normalization is all about.

improving lives. indeed, as we've traveled around the world, we've heard over and over again that the opening between the united states and cuba has been a source of hope to people who no longer have any direct connection to this policy. and that's because it sends a message that countries can, in fact, leave behind a history of animosity. because it shows that people do not have to be defined by their differences. because it sets an example for how peaceful engagement can replace perpetual conflict. later today, like most days, i'll be in the situation room. the same place where president kennedy and his executive committee held their breath for those tense days in october. in fact, we now call part of the situation room the john f. kennedy conference room. who would have thought in those

days that we could concern ourselves not with cuban missile silos and quarantines but with american engagement on the island? who would have thought an american president could meet with cuban entrepreneurs and hear our national anthem in revolution square. or that a cuban president would answer questions from the american press corps. who would have thought that we could one day overcome the weight of history to forge a more secure and prosperous region together. as we go forward, i'm re minded of the words of the cuban american poet richard blanco. words he recited at president obama's second inauguration when he spoke of, quote, hope. a new constellation. waiting for us to map it. waiting for us to name it together. that's the promise of this transformative approach to our

neighbor. this is the world cubans and americans can shape together. and if we continue on this path, i'm confident that our future with cuba and in our hemisphere can be bright. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, ambassador rice. while you were speaking, i couldn't help but look at carlos gutierrez, himself a cuban immigrant who came to the u.s. as a young person, as i remember this, and then headed one of the major corporations in america and then became united states secretary of commerce. so for those who think immigration doesn't matter, just look. exhibit a. i also want to recognize ambassador tony wayne. i saw him in the corner. we did have another ambassador here. maybe we have more. he was the u.s. ambassador to

argentina. played a significant role in afghanistan and u.s. ambassador to mexico and now helps us at the wilson center as we look at developments in the north american space. and finally, on your comment about the internet, i would just point out that i'm told the wilson center website is not available in cuba. hmm. it's time to open up the internet, folks. i had some questions, but the audience questions are better, so i'm just going to go to them in the interest of time. question one -- what prevents a future president from voiding president obama's policies on cuba? tearing them up? >> i would argue the answer to that is common sense. we have seen in the short span of time, jane, since december of 2014, just how much traction this policy change has gained.

and how much support it has among the american people. it was a failed policy that we decided to replace. it had manifestly not achieved its objectives. and while we have no illusions that change in cuba will come overnight or be linear or swift necessarily, we're wholly convinced that through economic engagement, people to people ties, dialogue and advocacy for our values, we will have greater success over the next 50 years than we've had over the past 50. we have human relationships that will be very difficult to break. we have business relationships that won't be in our interest to break. it would be profoundly unwise and counterproductive to turn back the clock. and i'm confident that the sheer

logic and wisdom of this change will endure. >> isn't it also true that the younger generation, especially in florida, doesn't see these issues the way their parents and grandparents did? >> i think that's very true. >> so that's question one. question two -- what has been the response of the cuban government, both positive and negative, to the opening up of cuba that has been driven by the obama administration? >> well, it's been largely positive. president castro has, obviously, himself made the decision to pursue this change. not without reaction from some of his closest relatives. and not without some reluctance in some quarters. and as i said, this transformation in our relationship is not going to be linear. i'm sure we will, on both sides,

experience occasional setbacks. but it's an extraordinary amount of change that has occurred in what is not even two years to date. and when you look back at where we were this time in 2014, it would have been inconceivable to think that we are where we are today. and so i think that across the spectrum as i tried to outline in my remarks, the depth of our ties is growing. the breadth of our ties. government to government and people to people is also growing. and from the united states' point of view, i think as i've argued, it's manifestly in our interest. i think in cuba, there are some who will fear this change. and who may continue to resist it. but i think the weight of opinion and the opportunities in front of the cuban people are such that on the cuban side as well, it would be very unwise to

change course. >> you mentioned human rights in your talk. would that be a significant area of pushback if you had to pick one? >> it's a significant area of difference, no question, and will remain so. but when the president was down in cuba, i joined him in a very frank and very worthwhile discussion with cuban civil society activists, some of who have been mistreated before and after that engagement. but the fact that tom malinowski, our assistant secretary for democracy and human rights is down there engaging in the human rights dialogue that was committed to by the two leaders when we were there in march is a sign that we are making some progress. and i'm sure that dialogue will be scratchy in parts. but that's the point. we don't have to agree on everything to have relationships with one another. any more than we have to agree on everything with other countries with whom we have

complex relationships. >> well, i agree. when i was there on my first trip as a member of congress, a trip sponsored by the center for democracy and the americas, i don't know if -- there she is. sarah stevens is here. we had opportunity to discuss this in depth. they had some issues with us, too. some members of our delegation met with alan gross who was subsequently released. it's an ongoing dialogue and it's very important it stay actively at the top of the agenda. finally, this question is interesting. why is the administration pursuing incremental regulatory change? it is slowing down -- this is the allegation. the business community's ability to be as aggressive as many want to be. the administration may have more wiggle room. why not do it all at once? thought you'd like that. >> first of all, those who are steeped in this know there is an extraordinarily complex and

multilayered set of constraints on u.s. economic engagement with cuba. i mean, this was -- we've had 50 years of law and regulations layered on top of each other. it's a very complex nexus to begin to disentangle. we are trying to do this as best we can, consistent with the law. and we have worked to try to bring opening and change as swiftly as we can. had we waited to try to do it all at once it probably would have been delayed. i think our interest was in -- maximum extent at the outset, but i'm confident that the changes, including those regulatory changes that were announced today will further expand our ability to trade, to

engage, to research together, to do things that are in our mutual interest. and while what is absolutely necessary for us to go the full distance is for the embargo to be repealed. we are doing what we can within the constraints of the law to change this approach. >> well, let me -- we have a few minutes left. let me just close with two questions. one is on the embargo. i know you have suggested that congress lift it and you've suggested -- >> more than suggested. >> -- and that our ambassador be confirmed. how do you handicap the chances of that getting done in the lame-duck session? >> the embargo or the ambassador? >> the embargo, i'm not holding my breath for. >> the ambassador? >> the ambassador, i hope for. i realize a lame-duck is going to be a very short session with many things on the plate, but we think it would be very wise for congress to take this step.

ambassador delaurentiis has been previously confirmed by congress. he is a career foreign service officer of the highest caliber. an apolitical appointee. and he is down there now doing the business of the united states. and by having him confirmed as ambassador will strengthen and enhance his ability to do the job he's already doing. so i know nothing in washington anymore should be called a no-brainer. but this comes as close as i can think of. >> yeah. well, we were all for more brains in washington, and we have many of them at the wilson center. >> amen. >> and we watched painfully as it took so long to confirm our current ambassador to mexico. a good friend of the wilson center, and a very capable woman. so hopefully this, too, will happen. final question, legacy. president obama seems to be going to the places on his bucket list which are again places that showcase issues he

cares about. he's been making many moves about national parks. and so forth domestically. he also has an international agenda and, obviously, this is part of it. where does cuba fit in the obama legacy? >> well, i think if i were wise, i wouldn't try to forecast the legacy with any certainty while we're still in office. i think that would be for scholars at the wilson center to research and analyze. but let me say this from where i sit in the heat of things. the opening to cuba was something that president obama long thought would make sense. that our 50 years of failed policy ought to change. that we didn't want to reaffirm the definition of stupid is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.

so that was our hope. the primary impediment, or the proximate impediment was the detention of alan gross which was a horrific and unjustified, painful legacy of the past. and he suffered enormously. and job one was to resolve that. in the context, however, of working to resolve that, we saw the opportunity to do more and to change in more fundamental ways what had been a relationship that was not productive and wasn't serving our interests. it was, in fact, hardly a relationship. and so we decided that given this opportunity, not only to see alan gross come back home to his family but also to change in p profound ways 50 years of foreign policy, was something we had to do to the extent we could

at once. and that was the decision that we made, and that was the approach we tried to drive. and i think that it has transformed in many respects the way the united states is viewed in latin america more broadly. it's created openings and opportunities for improved relationships, even with countries that we had good ties to, but we had this sort of weight around us and hanging from each of those relationships and our larger relationship with the region. so i think this will, in all likelihood as i said in my remarks, be something that when we look back with the benefit of hindsight will have been a wise choice, and a bold choice. and one that i hope we will continue to be very proud of. >> well, i am guessing that most people in this audience physically here and those in overflow rooms and listening in as we live stream this, sadly not in cuba, yet, are applauding

the change. and recognize that u.s. leadership, even when it might have been late to this party, matters. and i want to salute you personally susan for your leadership. thank you for coming. >> thank you for having me, jane. appreciate it. [ applause ] >> please stay in your seats. we thank you for your cooperation.

c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up saturday morning, washington examiner campaign reporter ryan lovelace will talk about campaign 2016. and the growing divide in the republican party over donald trump. then mark mower, executive director of the sentencing project will discuss the voting rights of felons. and "new york times" correspondent michael schmidt will discuss the role of the united states in yemen after the u.s. military fired missiles inside the country on radar sites operated by rebels earlier in the week, rebels in yemen launched failed missiles on two u.s. navy shipss in the region. watch c-span's "washington journal" live at 7:00 a.m. eastern saturday morning.

join the discussion. next, a discussion about government surveillance. speakers looked at how data is collected and shared and what restrictions are necessary for protecting privacy without risking national security. from the constitution project, this is an hour and 45 minutes. good afternoon. i'm ginny sloan. i'm president of the constitution project, and i want to welcome you all here today. just very briefly, i want to say how pleased we are to co-sponsor this event with google. they've always been a terrific partner, and we hope to continue to partner with them on many other things. i also want to thank all of our panelists. but especially, i want to thank jake who is a constitution project expert on these issues and whose brain child this event is. and he is going to step up here

now. jake, where are you? oh, there he is. and give you some more details on the event. but again, thank you for attending. >> sorry. i just wanted to say good afternoon. i'm david lever, not jake, from google. senior privacy policy counsel. i promise i will be blissfully brief, but you really shouldn't believe that because i'm a lawyer and we're never blissfully brief. but thank you for everybody for coming here today. we think this is a really important discussion to be having. and, you know, clearly there's going to be an ongoing debate about the very issue we're talking about. to date that debate has already been happening since the snowden revelations of 2013. the incidental collection of information about u.s. persons in the process of gathering foreign intelligence information obviously raises important fourth amendment issues, and we believe there's a role for congress to play in fashioning

appropriate policy solutions around this collection of this information. so with that, i will turn it over to jake. again, thank you all for attending, and we're very much looking forward to the discussion. >> hi, everyone. how are you? thanks so much for coming. i'm jake. i'm the privacy fellow at the constitution project. as far as what we want to talk about here today, we're in sort of unprecedented age of collection and surveillance. something that one of our panelists likes to reforeas the golden age of surveillance. the constitution project wants to examine not just how we can limit collection but also important areas of post collection reform opportunities. and what we see as one critical component of this post collection form

>> legal and administrative barriers between different tolerance agencies and intolerance agencies in law enforcement that existed previously to 2,000. this was removed to facilitate information sharing. what we refer to now as giving up, the government the ability to connect dots. but this goal lead to law enforcement that has been restricted in surveillance capacities and intelligence surveillance that's always been in terms of the restrictions that existed. can we create instead of the wall a chain length fence to replace it. but also restore the type of use restrictions and limits on law enforcement use of intelligence surveillance through reform that we have previously with the wall. so these are the topics with the

excellent today. board of directors and partner at mayor brown's washington d.c. office. he leads the firm's security and data proxy practice. he's also part of the security practice group and the firms congressional investigation and crisis management team. and served as the general counselor and prior to his service, he served in the white house as a staff secretary and to the president of the united states and i'll hand it over. thank you. >> thank you. thanks to all of you. thank you for coming. first let me repeat thanks to google for hosting this event and obviously it's interesting for many of you and thanks for focussing on issues like digital privacy and national security which are clearly at the

forefront of everything that we're thinking about these days and a special thanks to jake for all of his focus on this issue for writing the piece at the constitution process that's on and chain length fence for intelligence that's inspiring him to organize this event and it's worth a read if you have him. >> no doubt there's been a great deal of focus for intelligence collection. there's been relatively less attention paid to the post collection treatment of intelligence. how is information used? how is it shared? how long is it retained? we had a few flashpoints in the public discourse. think about information and think about the use of intelligence in criminal prosecutions but by and large issues about use sharing, retention are less sexy than the collection issues that dominated the headlines but given that we're in an era of big data and iot objects collecting data and

social media, clearly use of data is the next forefront and use of data and intelligence is the topic for today. couldn't have a more qualified panel with us so let me introduce them and i'll get started. to my left we have becky richards. chief director of privacy and civil liberties at nsa she served in that role since 2013. prior to serving at nsa she worked at dhs in a variety of senior roles as the acting deputy director. and compliance regarding privacy issues. thank you for joining us. directly to our left, peter is the golden age of surveillance guy in case you got that reference. but really he is the professor of law and ethics at the georgia institute of technology and also

a senior fellow with a future of privacy forum. most relevant for today perhaps in 2013, peter served as a member, one of five members of president obama's review group on intelligence and communication technology. the independent group of experts that president obama asked to review intelligence activity in the wake of the snoeden disclosures. to peter's left, we have sharon bradford franklin. sharon serves as the director of the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. a role she held and previously joining the board. she served for 8 years. she served as senior council for the constitution project and is very familiar with these issues. she worked on a wide variety of matters. cyber security and government secrecy issues and also served as a member of the cyber

security subcommittee for the department of homeland security data privacy and integrity advisory committee. d-pac for short. to sharon's left she is the legislative council with the american civil liberties union here in washington with a focus on surveillance, privacy and national security issues. we kept you busy for the past 15 years. she worked in the chief of staff's office at dhs concentrating on national security and civil rights issues. she also worked in the office of the assistant secretary for civil rights at the department of agriculture and was on council with the house oversight committee. you can see we have an array of perspectives and experience. with that, why don't we get started. most of you know the intelligence community has long

consid considered information in the form of something called minute mization procedures. in short those procedures are designed to minimize as the name suggests the collection, protection and dissemination. these things are required by statute and by executive order. two of the most relevant places they have required and in executive order and other types of signals intelligence collection. so to make sure that we're all on the same page and give us a baseline could you provide us a sense of what those authorities are and civil liberties and privacy protection for things like section 702 and -- >> thank you to everyone being here and for the invitation. basically i'm at a level set and

many of you have experience talking about section 702 but we want to make sure that we're all starting at the baseline. 702 starts about minuimization procedures. we are meant to be targeting foreign persons outside of the united states and assistance of u.s. providers. this one is being generally referred to as prism. this is the u.s. providers and the other is referred to as upstream. and the backbone of those u.s. providers. and specific requirements and on the backbone, there's no u.s.

person and in upstream also we only retain the information for two years. in the prism, they can be done but those have to be done if we have articulated what we expect to receive in foreign intelligence and based on recommendations sharon will talk about we made some of those requirements more explicit in the most procedures. as a way of sense last year, as we reported in the transparency report, it was issued in may 2016. we did -- we had roughly 40 -- a little under the 4500 u.s. person materials. that we wruzed against it and in a meta data context it was in there and it's non-minimized and non-content data. we did roughly 23,000 quiries. that just gives you a little bit so in both of those for 702

prism, the retention is five years. so those are sort of the basic outline of what those are and there's extensive training. we do a number of -- we have strong compliance program and then we have a reporting process where folks when there is a problem report those and we mediate it. often people will say if you have incidents then you're obviously not complying, you must not be doing the right thing. but really you want to make sure that people are recording it. if you have zero compliance you would be worried you had a totally ineffective compliance program so we want to set the stage to understand that when folks have incidents that they are reporting those we're all human and we make mistakes and that's an important one.

there's no u.s. person quiries. >> you cannot do a u.s. person query against 1233 data. it was outside of the united states. foreign information, a foreign country and unlike in 702 you are not allowed to do u.s. person queries. i say generally because there's exceptions like hostage or consent. if you're going into a war zone or battle and you might have military concern you're going to want to do that. generally speaking there's no u.s. person query. we're retaining that information for five years.

we need to overlay the issue in 2014. this is directive 28 that provides privacy protections to all people around the united states, around the world, excuse me. and that is -- what that has meant is a couple of things. in that document we are being very transparent so we're explaining how we were doing our business. we also put forward reasons we would use bulk information. we give six of those. those are things you would expect. terrorism, counter proliferation. threats to military. those activities in addition, comparable safe guards for foreigners. a retention for that information is now explicitly five years before we could have kept the information if theory forever if you thought it was foreign

information about foreigners. that's no longer the case. all of those things put together that you overlay so those are the basic protections and how they work. >> peter if i could turn to you next, you served on the president's review group. can you talk about the focus that you and your fellow members had on post collection issues? how dominant was it in your conversations and recommendations and your thoughts generally. >> first just a word on this golden age of surveillance that got mentioned twice. wrote a paper published by the center for democracy and technology six years ago now and it's gotten kicked up as a contrary to going dark. lots of sensors now and lots of ways to collect information.

then the answers are what are are the checks and balances. how do you build a system. could collect lots of data. upstream could collect a lateral of data. and there's lots of checks and balances built in and part of that review group was going in. we have top secret clearances and so one sort of nice feature about the u.s. is that we have people with clearances coming in from outside to see how things work and section 702 this is in 2013 after snoeden. an looking at concrete cases that 702 sealed like a useful program. and recommended it be shutdown basically. and made a very different view about the usefulness of 702.

when you target specific people that are not in the u. s., that are not u.s. persons and you go through the procedures and compliance that exists. that's getting important information. we also had some concerns. and the concerns were about the uses possibly overtime. so one -- our set of concerns were really about ways this could be used against u. s. persons and maybe later in the talk today we can talk more about how much the concern should apply to our friends in germany or england. so there were three recommendations that we made as parts of our overall recommendation 12. the first one was we should purge information when we find out about it unless there's a clear foreign intelligence value. if we find information in the

data base that 702 has been collected from then we should purge it, the u.s. person part and talking to becky before now sounds like that five year retention applies to that. so 28 responded really to that sort of thing. we get rid of it after a retention period. the second has to do with something closer to the chain length fence idea. and chain length fence is sort of not quite as solid a wall. there's something that could get through a chain length fence. collected under 702 because they were never targeted. you can't target persons under 702. if you find evidence against u.s. persons, we should have a rule. we shouldn't use that against the u. s. person and that, the

idea there is if you want to be paranoid about law enforcement people, everyone has their own dial but if you want to be paranoid, this is great. let's use 702 to the maximum. and use it to prosecute a person. and get into this ability to do things against u.s. persons. one way to cut it back is to reduce the use of it because you couldn't use it as evidence in court. >> and then the third recommendation has not been adopted and it would be a big thing if it were and the third recommendation and then i'll stop is that in this hypothetical data base that might be a fun place to go search if you were law enforcement against u.s. pers s

persons. we should treat it as it was incidentally about u.s. persons so if you're going to go into this data base about u.s. persons, then you should have a warrant. there should be the right kind of trigger of the right level of cause for that. reasonably likely. >> of the foreign intelligence. >> foreign intelligence value so there's been a reasonable showing of it having foreign intelligence value because it's a foreign intelligence data base. >> that's the standard for nsa. >> that's the standard for nsa and people around these and

sharon will cover this. >> i have studied this on and off and i keep getting confused. it's complicated and hard to say it right and there's a complexity to it but the overall idea is there's a reason to have targeted against non-u.s. persons overseas. >> that's perfect. what i would like you to start with is what recommendations have been made and changed thin

things. >> so for those of you that may not be familiar with the privacy and civil liberties oversight board our agency is a fairly new independent agency within the exec queue tif branch created based on a recommendation from the 911 commission and to review counterer the r count terrorism programs and the board issued a fairly comprehensive report analyzing the section 702 program that included ten organizations. two are relevant to today's discussion because they did focus on the process of mfgs that had already been collected so once you have the data how can an analyst go through and look at that and when they conduct searches using identifiers that maybe associated with the u. s. person

and this was an area of concern and great amount of focus because as becky made clear this does not initially target u. s. persons. they cannot. so the u. s. persons are on the other end of a conversation with a target for example. so the board's two recommendations split out the fbi on the one hand and cia and nsa on the other because of different standards and different practices and with regard to the fbi it was a two part recommendation first that the procedures should be updated to more clearly reflect the fbi actual practices including the frequency with which section 702 data may be searched when making routine queries as part of

assessments and investigations and it would run against 702 data. the second part of the recommendation was that some additional limits should be placed on the fbi's use and dissemination of 702 data in connection with nonforeign intelligence criminal matters and i'll get to that in more detail in a moment. >> the second focused on the nsa and cia and they recommended that queries using united states personal identifiers should only be permitted, quote, if the query is based upon a statement of facts showing that it is reasonably likely to return foreign spell jens information as defined and the board also recommended that agencies issues on written guidance and what information and documentation would be required to meet the

standard and she was stating that she would not extent this to meta data queries. they can be conducted through the contents and the me at a data so she made this distinction in the recommendation. now for both board members actu actually wrote separately to further define their views and regarding the fbi this consisted of additional short statements by each of the members explaining what they meant by the additional limits they would like to see on the fbi when they conduct those and on recommendation three with regard to the nsa and cia there was a

further tdivergence. they wrote to recommend that they would further recommend requiring additional restrictions conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. namely seeking approval for united states person identifiers that could be used for such queries. they wanted a neutral and detached judicial officer approve these queries and that's a little different from the recommendation that peter was talking about in that all though both would seek a judicial approval, the then chairman and member would have applied a lower standard and use the current standard that applies to return foreign intelligence information and board members

also wrote separately to explain that they would not and noted instead that based upon the board's review of the current use at the nsa and cia that we characterize as rigorous the majority declined to recommend such a requirement i want to pick up on what has happened. in february of this year the board issued a short recommendation assessment report looking at where we stand on implementation recommendations. with regard to recommendation two on the fbi the board found that recommendation has been implemented and this was done in november of 2015 the court approved -- revised updated

minu procedures that incorporated changes designed to address both parts of the recommendation making more clear how frequently they would use these was addressed by certain footnotes that do appear in the declassified version of procedures that were released this past summer and with regard to the recommendation for additional limits. the text, the fbi implemented this including the appropriate text of footnote 4 procedures. it's redacted in the version put out this summer but i have clearance to say it is there. in regard to recommendation 3

this was also addressed in november of 2015 when the court approved revised minute mization procedures for both of those agencies and both included additional language to design to implement the board's recommendation about the standard and the board assessment that did, indeed, meet that recommendation and those are are both available in the unpredakted in the declassified versions. the board did assess this recommendation was still being implemented because with the cia, with respect to the me at a data query using identifiers they accepted and planned to implemented the recommendation as it refines internal processes for data management. thus the cia's new procedures do not reflect changes to implemented this recommendation

with regard to me at a data queri queries. overall, those either have been implemented by the agencies or are in the process of being implemented. >> that's great. thank you. >> now you have participated in the discussions and you know what the agencies are doing and put out publicly. what do you see as the big issues when it comes to intelligence information from your seat is at the eclu. >> first i want to talk about what's the world i worry about? and we worry about a world where there's a whole lot of collection not to protect

national security or not to find information about an upcoming potential terrorist threat but in your every day normal criminal enforcement police would be required to go to a neutral judge and get a warrant. demonstrating probably cause that someone has been accused of committing a crime and we worry about that in a world where even if that information has gained and is used in a criminal court that person doesn't even know. they don't know enough to say hook i think the nsa may have collected this and i'd like to challenge it because i think my rights have been violated. that's the world we worry about and i want to talk about why i think some of the procedures in inadequate and are leading us closer and closer to this world.

we have been talking a lot about foreign intelligence. we're only keeping the stuff that has foreign intelligence value. foreign intelligence is an incredibly broad term. it could include a journalist overseas. communicating with a journalist in the u. s. about a drone program. it could include communications from human rights organizations and families in the u.s. that may have talked about issues surrounding foreign affairs. we're conceptualizing foreign intelligence. more broader than the public thinks because when they think foreign intelligence they think stopping terrorist attacks and that's not what foreign intelligence means under many authorities. the second thing i want to talk about is okay now we have this

trove of foreign intelligence information and we're going to allow agencies to run queries on it. they're not just running queries in cases where they may want to gather information. they're running queries on data bases that include the information in your normal criminal case. we don't know how many times because despite many requests we don't have a sense of how many of the searches are performed but what we do know is that it may be substantial because that data is co-mingled and i may do a query and that might involve data bases that include foreign intelligence information and the third layer is now you have queried it and you want to use it in a criminal case.

maybe to effect something else in my life. i'm now subject to additional search or wiretap or i don't get an immigration benefit i applied for. let's look at criminal prosecution. one of the most damaging out of those three options is we're not seeing people get notice in court of how the information was collected. section 702, prior to 2013 there was not one defendant that got notice. apparently at some point there was a reexamination of doj policy and some notice since that. not a lot but some. we don't know how that notice is being interpreted and whether, really those provisions that require notice are making sure that everybody that's had information used against them knows and gets that so they can challenge unconstitutional surveillance. in other context we haven't seen an acknowledgment from the government that they have an obligation or duty to provide

notice. under executive order 12333. if it's used in a criminal prosecution we don't know whether the government takes the position that yes they must expose that to the defendant that can then challenge it and i raise these examples to i think demonstrate the increasing evidence that an authorities that have been developed and on this idea that we need this information to protect our country against terrorist threats or proliferation and those authorities are increasingly bleeding into every day general law enforcement activities and there need to be more to prevenn against that bleed. >> we have a range of perspectives and it can be easy to be dragged with particular authorities and questions. when lawyers think abprocedures there's a wholistic view.

that's the legal approach taken. in other words was it an issue. do the restrictions on collection align with the restrictions of use, sharing, dissemination. so in other words viewing the use wholistically the implication is perhaps you need more restrictions on how information is used. i would be curious to get perspectives from this panel is that how we should be thinking about it generally? restrictions on use and sharing and dissemination separate from how it is collected? if anybody would like to start. >> i would say two things. looking at the front end is important and thinking about the back end so to speak. we have to think about not just the quantity of information.

we're not talking about 20 or 30 e-mails a year. million of e-mails and communications and transactions a year and it increases the likelihood that should a government agency decide they want to mine that information the implications is substantial and think about what is that protection and the intelligence contacts, the process that you have to go to to collect the information is less than would be required in a general criminal court. so for example the government is never going to a court judge to say this particular target is permissible. even under 702 where the government goes to the court it's not an individualized review so you have to think about the lack of -- potential lack of oversight and restriction on the front end which then effects the back end and the risk that you have using

that information is the types of collection we do, when we adopt certain procedures is that a disadvantage to our communities? let's take a hypothetical scenario where most of your targets come from a particular country. it may be likely to get information of individuals that have family in those countries and if we have procedures that are dealing with this data that may have implications and we should think about whether that's happening and if it's happening what are some of the solutions. >> so, yes, absolutely the wholistic approach is what the board looked at and it comes from a number of sources. under the 4th amendment the board declined to express in

that opinion as a whole as to whether there is a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. something that has not -- the supreme court has not yet opined on but look to the 4th amendment reasonableness test which is a circumstances test so what is the standard? how high is the bar, what do you need to show? that will have an impact for when and how the government may access the information and those are relevant as to what they should look like. they reach different conclusions. it doesn't necessarily lead all decision makers to the same exact conclusions and so then chairman and member felt that because at the front end there's

not an individualized determination made to the target and using that u. s. person identifier. now members brandon collins looked at this differently and they noted for example in the criminal context, talked a little bit about notice, in the criminal context if it were to get to that stage where the government wanted to use evidence derived from 702 they did recommend that they would require such approval before it could be used in these contexts. they extinguished the investigation stage when they did not want to create greater

barriers to that being conducted. but looking at that analysis and also noted explicitly this is the same kind of analysis we would do in a policy context and of course the board's role fundamentally under our statute is to look as a policy matter at are we appropriately balancing national security concern with privacy and civil liberties and this is reasonable. >> we use this process today. we look at 1233 where you're sort of -- or even if you start with what is now under usa freedom act and we have looked at the totality and in various places a plied different space guards to protect u.s. person

privacy. this question of the uses, it's important to keep in mind that there's this very difficult tension where we're holding our intelligence community and law enforcement community to no bad things should ever happen and so that puts a level of incentive and we want to think about how do we build those safe guards in and not turn around when the next thing happens and say well you could have connected these dots because they were here it's really important to keep both of those in your head. we need to have both of these. all national security without any privacy left us in no better place. all the privacy and no national security is equally not going to

leave us in those places. there's been a lot of conversations of use restriction and we see those in terms of things like you can only disseminate for terrorist related purposes. that's one of the first places we have started to draw those lines in this context and where do you make sure that we're not using these i'd like to talk about limits in the commercial sector because they get talked about a lot over there and that might shed some light. there's the do not track process which is what are the rules

going to be for companies. can you say please don't track me as we do it. the way the sper nekt works now there's a tremendous amount of collection that just happens logging your website visits. making sure that the advertisement is replaced properly. so there's an unbelievable amount of collection that didn't exist ten years ago and we didn't have the internet at some point. so if you're going to try to figure out what it means to have less tracking and more protections from the privacy you get pushed to limits because there's enormous logs that exist from the way the internet works on the collection side and in a world where there's senators in lots of places we're going to have a lot of collection in ways that didn't used to happen how

often are you going to be on camera compared to 20 years ago. that's part of why this conversation which is post collection use discussion that's why this is really important because in a world of senators everywhere and huge data bases that happen just because they happen and for a lot of reasons we have to have discussions. you can't avoid it. >> so this is a good set up for the next question i'd like to pose for all of you. we had a conversation about tayloring restrictions and how that might be related. so if one starts to think about restrictions on youth or sharing or dissemination, what are the factors that are important? is it the nature of the data? is it how the information can be used or not used in certain context?

is it the standard? we had a discussion about reasonable probability versus probable cause. what are the key vectors that we should be thinking about as important for the intelligence community to incorporate into these sorts of restrictions. >> you're willing to give it a go. >> sure. i think all the things you listed are relevant you know, one i think that really ensure there's some type of judicial oversight when the government seeks to query information or use information is important. in the 702 context there isn't a ton of front end judicial oversight. people may differ on how substantial they think it is but the reality is they're not at least approving individual

targets in 12333 you don't even have that so i think that the government seeks to query that information and it should be going to the court and getting a kour order for that. and i see that as one of the most important restrictions. the second is limiting the uses. i talked about this beforeful foreign intelligence. foreign intelligence is awfully broad and we had these conversations during the usa freedom act. most people are are thinking about terror i feel and we need to narrow that and hone in on what are really the uses that the government thinks are most key and how can we have the type of dissemination and use we're going to have and we want to

think about whether we'll have use in domestic criminal enforcement you should have that and i was shouldn't be using information collected for intelligence purposes for general every day domestic law enforcement because we have a process for that and law enforcement goes to court and they get court orders and warrants to do that so those are the top line things when we think about what is important. >> i would say yes to all of those. >> i knew i liked you sharon. >> so the nature of the data in this context, communications there's been difference between content and meta data. now everyone here is familiar with this as well. section 215 that was me at a

data and the board did talk about how that could also be highly revealing of the sense of personal information and privacy indications as well but there's a consensus that people treat content as being more revealing and have greater privacy implications so content is treated differently than meta data. you would draw those distinctions. how the information can be used that's what they're all about. the fbi has the law enforcement mission and when you bring in the function you have much more front and center. people's 4th amendment rights. their criminal procedure rights if evidence can be used against them in a criminal proceeding so

you're likely going to have different standards. i talked about the board members that were implicated. this changed some what with presidential policy directive 28 that becky talked about a little bit as a policy matter to provide enhanced protections to nonu.s. persons and the fact that u.s. persons are the ones who are recognized to have 4th amendment rights we have applied greater protections and that's the case that u. s. persons are considered to have greater rights and their data should be handled with special handling

restrictions. this is a report where there's a lot of skepticism and those are areas where there's concerns and have foreign intelligence leak over into the criminal area and you can have lots of different standards of how strict you are there but those are issues that deserve serious discussion in

europe they have some concerns and might get off of data in various ways so i'm going to talk about this. here's a reason to be careful. one is the 4th amendment applies but beyond that when you're thinking about checks and balances and surveillance you don't want to have your surveillance agencies going after political opponents so when you have that attack on political opponents you could be on a slide down into bad things. that's a special reason in terms of checks and balances. i think what happened in the discussions with europe in the

last few years since 2013 especially the europeans are saying hey we're people too. i'm german and i'll british, i'm french, we deserve to be treated like members of an allied rule of law, democratic society and not be the target of u. s. surveillance. you'd probably feel that way. why should they have open season on me. i thought we lived in a democracy. i shouldn't be a target like this so the push back from a reasonable place in european side has been don't treat our citizens as targets whenever you feel like it. have some thoughtfulness. sure go after the terrorist subpoenas but don't go after the butcher and the baker and the candlestick maker we basically said we're going to expand it to our allies and now germans or

french or whatever, have many countries be listed yet? so once there's the right certification but the point i'm heading towards is if we have our post collection debates in the united states i bet the europeans are going to say, hey, what about us? don't just protect u.s. persons but stop searches for criminal proceedings or for searching more generally. stop those more broadly. and have pretty much the same protections for the european allies as well and i'll not sure that washington is ready for that discussion. i'll not sure people have worked through what would that mean and what is doable about it and maybe you can tell us that we know the answers but i think that europe will push back as

part of the 2015. they're very aware. the european commission is very aware that 702 is up for renewal next year and the u.s. government hasn't even mentioned if you don't like 702 today wait until next year and you can weigh in on the process. it's going to threaten our ability to say u. s. persons only because for foreign affairs reasons we'll have some way to talk to europe about why they deserve the same respect for their sids as the u.s. gives to its own citizens. >> okay. so maybe i'll work my way down. >> all the way to the bottom. >> or all the way to the top. did i hear that you thought we should have something any time we do a query or is it just on u. s. persons? because i'm not sure why we have a foreign intelligence agency if

we have to go every time i have a foreign intelligence query i want to do. >> so i was referring to u.s. person queries. i think in the 12333 context. i heard you and others say they don't run them on content. i don't know if we have more information on whether they're run on me at a data but to the extent that they're being run on me at meta data that's also concerning. >> so i just wanted -- i mean, i understand that. i don't think we want to have an intelligence community where every time we're looking at foreigners outside of the united states that we're going to do a query because you would stop the intelligence community i think largely there. >> the europeans might. >> the europeans might and those are going to be interesting conversations. they have a very different approach to what it is i want to

make sure that we're not losing the u.s. persons protections for r that historically that hasn't worked well for other countries and we want to be thoughtful as we have these conversations that we aren't diminishing the protections that we do have in place for u.s. persons so under 12333 generally speaking there aren't u. s. person queries that are allowed and right now i understand when you look at all the different procedures that we have in place it can be difficult to point to that so department of defense issued new guidelines for generally under 12333 in august.

they're being now worked now that we have the broader document and you're not having to back your way through that process but you have to draw a couple of lines. it's not clearly obvious. we're trying to work on the next one. when we do training that's one of the big training ones. all nsa employees have to take a number of different training courses i take all of that training and i just fibbished it earlier next week because it's going to expire and it's these really important things. but that is a u.s. person query and a key function. when i get to foreigners if you tell me i can't do any foreign queries, peter, what are are we

doing? we have to have a foreign intelligence person outside of the united states. we have to document that. that's one of the requirements put in there not every foreigner is targeted under 702. you have to have gone through that process and it is not the bulk collection on all foreigners everywhere under 702 so we put that -- but because it's not that you have fewer protections around some of the u.s. person inqueries. when we get to 12333 it's a broader collection but then we started to put more controls and safe guards in there.

we have an intelligence community designed to protect the united states from my number of different issues and we need to have a discussion as policy makers about what you want your intelligence community to do. if we're not comfortable with the authorities we have given the intelligence community that is absolutely what we need to be thinking about as a democracy and that's when we have to think about how are the different forms of government really engaging in that conversation? a lot of conversation was had after snoeden about how much does congress really know? those are great conversations and thought pieces we need. not everybody in the united states can have access to intelligence to the level and degree. we won't have any intelligence. the foreign targets are going to go figure those things out. i can't put all the good people

of the united states over here and tell you what the intelligence community is doing and then say okay my list of bad guys over here you don't get to know this. it doesn't work that way. so we have to think about how do we build these in there's a number of overseers in this area. we have the privacy and civil liberties oversight board now. that's relatively new folks here. we have the fisk. we have the director of national intelligence and congressional committees. and then internal at nsa we have a number of folks that are specifically focused on oversight and compliance in addition to the inspector general so one of the questions as we go through the discussions is we should say well are all of our oversight functions working? are we putting -- do we have too many of them? to we have not enough?

are people held accountable and responsible for those activities? i've seen a few times folks say well if i had one more person checking to make sure if this was really the right target then we'll make sure that we're only, we have all the targets correct. it turns out people start to lose accountability the more people up the chain they think are going to find the problem. so how do we design these different activities. >> something we lost a little bit in the conversation. i think we lost what a large shift 702 fundamentally was in the term, in the way it approached foreign intelligence collection and how some of the

they're proving procedures, not individual targets. and you're able to target people for a much wider variety of circumstances. and i think that, you know, that's very irrelevant when we think about, you know, looking at this ap which you are, you know, the wording we used before, this front and large ap pe which you are and effects whether we think, you know, queries, you know, context for example, or appropriate. thinking about protections need to be higher given the global realities of us sharing information with foreign entities, foreign entities sharing information with us and not wanting us to create, i want to make sure we're not losing that.

we're in a different moment now in terms of collection and that effects whether we think about those programs. >> and debates about how technology changes standards, there's often, at least, two ways to talk about the status quo. there were communications let's say between france and pakistan in the old days and now the e-mail. it's a french person in pakistan, in the old days that would have been a 12 triple three very few safeguards compared to the fourth amendment and now it's been raised up to 702. to the extent it's about foreign targets for people who are overseas, you can see it is raising the standards compared to what it use to be. but because it's being done in the united states, it's lowering the standards.

so each side has a good claim for why they've lost something in this new thing we have since 2008 in section 702. >> i just want to say one of the things i think has changed for the good in this case is the greater transparency now. so the best term is for the unauthorized disclose sures by us is we've had this public debate and because of that very unique context and there being a lot of leaked information, the intelligence agencies made an extreme effort to try and declassify a lot of information that was previously classified and in particular with the boards report on section 702, we were able to obtain public interest declassification of a lot of information and put out a pretty comprehensive report -- it's here. i was going to -- of that

program. now, there are new leads details that remain classified, importantly, need to remain classified and this is a unique context. it's not that i would expect or even encourage that the intelligence agencies are going to declassify everything they do. but we do have a greater commitment to transparency. the -- and the creation of becky's position. the fact that becky is here on this panel is really, i think, a c change. and as we come into this debate in 2017 over reauthorization of section 702, i think the good thing to look at is now there can be a very informed public debate based on a lot of facts about how the program actually has been operating and a commitment by the intelligence agencies to engage and have that debate, largely in the open.

but i think that's an important change that should be recognized. >> i think there has been a shift towards more transparency. i think there are key facts and key pieces of information that are missing that we need to have this debate whether it's 702 next year. and one of those key pieces of information which, you know, becky knows about it's near and dear to my heart is the number of u.s. persons who have their information collected under section 702. this is something they mentioned they did have this information. it's something that civil liberties groups an members of congress are key to have and how does that impact what are very real implications for people in the u.s. i suspect that we will also want similar information for some -- well maybe things have shifted and we're not now using 702 for and that's a good thing.

it would be great to be able to test that over time. right. or are we really shifting a lot of our flux into 702. is the problem maybe not as big as i fear in others fear. and i think the only way we can really have that conversation and tests some of the things we all are saying is by actually having the data. >> before i open it up, please think of some questions, i will in a moment. i wanted to come back to this one question since we talked about it and since it's up for reauthorization next year and it's question queries for u.s. information that's been a flash point in the post discussion, you know, it's amazing how people's reactions who don't think about this all the time variy depending on how the issue is presented to them. if you were to say to somebody, you need a warrant to target a u.s. person somewhere in the world for surveillance, how can it be the case that you can search on their name, in for example, for this sea of information and you don't need a warrant. it seems like a back door search loophole, which is a term of art that critics use.

you talk to analyst like the place of nsa and they say we have the legal authority to collect all of this information, i can read it from front to back. i'm suppose to, i'm behind. i'm 10,000 pages behind. if i can read everything we just collected and i'm suppose to do that. how can you tell me, why should it be the case that i need a warrant to do my work more efficiently, that's the perspective an analyst might bring. i'll be curious, how do we help the public bridge what are two different world views and the review group and p club have taken and so, i'd ask you just to think about or maybe articulate for folks here which version of the world should they pick and why. >> can i just briefly, the review group we finished our report near the end of 2013. the club is really fantastic and

very large report on 702 happened after that. and i just have no idea whether we could have come out with exactly the same words if we had had as much study on 702 specifically as p club have had. i think we did flag it as an issue. i would say more it's an issue that needs to be resolved rather to say i know what the right standard should be. >> got you. and i'll add to this as we think about it and give you a few more seconds to think about it, we've move today a situation where now there is judicial authorization for queries. we've seen a model where we've moved to judicial authorization. in many ways it's a different beast program. 702 is targeted voluminous. it's not content. should we look to the 215 program as a model for thinking about queries and other areas. >> i think your question just goes back to the totality of circumstances approach before and sort of how you look at that

and what your view is of the front end collection and to what extent do you want to balance that with post collection standards and requirements and that is very much going to effect the lens that you see it through and how you want to -- what kind of standards you want to create and different people are going to see that differently. >> how would you defend to the person on the street, you need a warranty target, why can you do the search on my name. >> i don't know that i'm hoping for that conversation any time soon. what i was going to say is we're relatively new into this constructive transparency with the intelligence community. you know, my job is new. i've been there two-and-a-half years. we now have a privacy officer at cia. these are new roles in figuring out how to be more trarns parent is going to be an ever sort of

changing process and so one of the things that i think rather than do you sort of as peter said, you look at we've actually increased the amount of protections because it's under 702 as 0 we use to have it under the fourth amendment. one of the things i think is important is to make sure we truly are talking about the same set of facts to the extent that those are not classified and we really worked to do that. so whether you think you should have a warrant to do the u.s. person query or not based on sort of how we think about these things, what i think has been really positive is the fact that we are now talking almost about all of the same -- nina and i can totally disagree on this. we're disagreeing based on our own policy perspective as opposed to truly different facts. that's where