>> i would say there's going to be limits to what you can do because of title ix. but this is why you need a committee. >> i agree with that and it shows how difficult it is to have folks educated, to have the conversations about that messiness. and how we need to make sure there's support for everybody on all sides of the issues in terms of advocacy and what are the limits of that? >> and an example of that would be that a number of universities are using the preponderance of the evidence standard in faculty discipline cases and have changed their rules very recently. harvard law, university of wisconsin, et cetera. there are a number of other universities, and i think this universe is larger, where universities do use preponderance of evidence

for a title ix investigation finding. but then they use clear and convincing for purposes of a disciplinary hearing and sanction. and that unhappy marriage is something we're trying to work through. it also curse in other domains like research misconduct. >> we can probably do one more question. okay, i want to thank the panel and everybody who participated for this incredibly interesting discussion. thank you so much. [ applause ] >> five-minute break. american history tv in prime time continues tonight on c-span3 with a look at the life of alexander hamilton, with a

look at how close "hamilton: the musical" follows history and a discussion of hamilton's legacy, tonight at 8:00 eastern here on c-span3. this week "washington journal" is doing a deeper dive on what's happening in the battleground states. wednesday, pennsylvania. thursday, florida. friday, ohio, live every morning at 7:00 eastern on c-span. on election day, november 8th, the nation decides our next president and which party controls the house and senate. stay with c-span for coverage of the presidential race, including campaign stops with hillary clinton, donald trump, and their surrogates, and follow key house and senate races with our coverage of their speeches and debates. c-span, where history unfolds daily.

c-span brings you more debates this week from key u.s. house, senate, and governors' races. this evening at 7:00 eastern, live coverage on c-span. the indiana governor's debate between holcomb, gregg, and bell. wednesday at 7:00, live on c-span, democratic congressman chris van hollen and republican cathy shalega. at 9:00, live on c-span, the iowa third congressional district debate. then at 10:00 on c-span, a debate for the florida senate between marco rubio and patrick murphy. live thursday night at 8:00 eastern, republican senator kelly ai don't tell and democratic governor maggie hassan. now until election day, watch key debates from house, senate, and governors' races on the

c-span networks, c-span.org, and listen to the c-span radio app. c-span, where history unfolds daily. assistant treasury secretary for terrorist financing, daniel glaser, is working on stopping terrorists from getting financing. he discussed unique challenges of the islamic state as well as preventing their access to finances. this discussion is about an hour and 15 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone, we're about to begin, if you could take a seat, that would be great. good afternoon, everyone, welcome to the washington institute for middle east

policy. i'm matt levitt. this is the latest in our counterterrorism series. it gives me great pleasure to welcome danny glaser. he's with the office of financial intelligence. once upon a time danny and i served at deputy assistant secretaries better. he can tolerate the bureaucracy much more than i can. he stuck it out and is an assistant secretary. i think longest-serving person in the treasury department on this set of issues going back long before there was a tfi at treasury. and it's a great, great pleasure to have danny back here today. it's not his first time in this hot seat. today we'll be talking about the evolution of terrorism financing and in particular the specific issues that go into disrupting the islamic state which has a very different set of means of raising and moving, laundering and spending money. it gives me great pleasure to welcome you this afternoon.

those of you with us in the room in person and those participating across the television screen with c-span, so with no further ado, join me in welcoming assistant secretary danny glaser. [ applause ] >> thank you, matt, for that very nice introduction and we were -- matt and i were colleagues for treasury for a number of years and it was great working with him in that capacity and it's certainly been great working with him ever since and it's an honor for me to be here today, to see a lot of familiar faces in the crowd, i'm very flattered that people are interested to come and hear what we have to say about how we are approaching the issue of isil financing at the state -- treasury department and in the u.s. government more broadly. i think it's going to be -- it's a positive story. i think this is an area where we have great challenges but we've also made tremendous progress and i want to talk about the challenges that we face and talk

a little bit about how isil raises revenue, talk about our strategy to address those issues and talk about where i think things are going from there. that's going to be my remarks, my prepared remarks, when we get to the q and a, if people have questions about terrorist financing more broadly i'm happy to address those questions as well. so let me just start, jump right into it and talk about the unique challenge isil does present us, when you think about terrorist financing, it's pretty -- it's conceptually pretty simple. there's infinite varieties but it's conceptually pretty simple when you think about how we try to address terrorist financing. there's two parts. we try to prevent terrorists from raising money and we try to prevent them from gaining access to the financial system so they can't spend their money. that's it.

that's counterterrorist financing in a nutshell. interfere with a group's ability to generate revenue so they don't have money to spend and interfere with their ability to gain access to the financial system so they can't spend the money they have. that's what terrorist financing is in a nutshell with varieties among terrorist organizations in different situations but that's conceptually how we approach any terrorist organization when we think about disrupting its financing. traditionally when we think about terrorist organizations we use very similar tools to approach both, when you think about al qaeda, when you think about any number of terrorist organizations that primarily receive their funds externally we -- by attacking their access to the financial system, we can both prevent them from generating -- raising revenue what's really unique about isil is the fact that it generates such a substantial portion of its revenue internally.

now, we've had -- there are terrorist organizations in the past and currently that control territory, hamas controls territory, al shabab to a certain extent controls territory. but the sheer size, the vast wealth that isil's been able to generate internally really makes it a qualitatively different challenge from any organization we've seen before and it's required us to take a qualitatively different approach from what we've done before. so let me talk a little bit about the first part with isil generating revenue then i'll talk about the second part, interfering with their access to the international financial system. so sources of revenue for isil. the numbers -- wherever i speak publicly about isil i give some numbers and these are 2015 numbers. these are numbers -- these are estimates that we have from 2015 and what we've generally said is they generated about a billion dollars in revenue, maybe even

more than that in 2015 and those are from three different sources, the first source is oil and gas, sales of oil and gas. and the number that we have used for 2015 is $500 million. now i think the number is substantially less than that now and i'll explain why in a little bit but in 2015 we estimate they made probably about $500 million off of the sale of oil and gas. the second important source of revenue is taxation and extortion. people like to say extortion because we don't want to -- the use of the word "taxation" seems to legitimize isil as a government so we like to use the word "extortion." to be honest with you, "taxation" is probably closer, more descriptive of what's going on as they really do levy fees and taxes among the populations that

they control. again, our estimate for this for 2015 was $30 million per month or $360 million per year from taxation and, again, that's internal source. so i've just rattled off $860 million of internally-generated revenue for isil. and then finally in 2014/2015 when isil came and took mosul, there was in excess of $500 million worth of cash in bank vaults in mosul, primarily in the state-owned banks and the central bank branch in mosul. so that's another approximately half a billion dollars that was available in mosul when isil came rolling in and that really does -- those three things together really make up the lion's share. by far the lion's share of isil's financing. now, there is some external financing that comes.

there's kidnapping for ransom, a variety of other sources but those are all, frankly, quite small in comparison to just, again, can't emphasize enough the vast wealth that they're able to raise internally within their territory. so that creates a challenge for an organization like the treasury department, as i said, who -- we've sort of traditionally specialized in preventing these groups from getting access to the financial system. but how do you really prevent them from getting access to wealth that's internal to their territory? the answer is there's more of a military solution to this than most terrorist financing issues and it's pretty unusual to have an assistant secretary of the treasury stand up before a crowd and talk about military operations but that's precisely what i'm going to talk about for a few minutes, because that's an important part of our counterterrorist financing efforts within isil. the coalition has launched an air campaign called tidal wave 2. tidal wave 2 began in november

and is ongoing and the purpose of tidal wave 2 is to attack the entire supply chain in the oil and gas sector. it's attacking the ability of isil to extract oil and gas, its ability to refine and its ability to transport. and this is something we work very, very closely with the defense department on, with the military on and with the coalition and this is a very deliberate campaign, it's a very intelligent campaign and it's one that i think is substantially impacting isil's ability to extract wealth and to extract oil and gas and to make that available. so that's the first part and that's the military portion. there are other ways to prevent isil from getting -- from gaining wealth from this territory and the most important of those is preventing liquidity

from flowing into the area in the first place. if there's less liquidity in the area, there's less funds that can be taxed. frankly it's our very strong view that the very large portion of isil's ability to even get profit from its oil and gas, it's sold internally. we don't think there's a lot of smuggling going on with oil and gas outside of isil territory. the money they make off of that is sales internally, again, going to liquidity. so to the extent we can impact liquidity within isil territory we can impact their ability to profit off of oil, we could impact their ability to profit off of taxation and extortion. the most important step in this direction was about a year ago when the iraqi government took the decision to terminate the payment of government salaries into isil-controlled territory and instead hold those salary payments in escrow. prior to that decision there was

about $170 million per month that was going into isil-controlled territory in the form of government salary payments. that's $2 billion a year. i don't know, i mean, we don't know for sure exactly what the tax rate is in isil-controlled territory but take a conservative estimate and say 10%. 10% of $2 billion is a lot of money to isil. and the decision of the iraqi government to terminate that was a very, very important decision and one that we continue to talk to them about and work with them on. there continues to be challenges with respect to that decision but i think from a terrorist financing perspective it was one of the most important steps anybody has taken in the area of counterterrorist financing with respect to isil. and finally bulk cash, so the good news about the fact -- the good news about that in excess of half a billion dollars that was in the vaults for isil is that was a one-time take for them. that's not a renewable source the way oil is a renewable source, the way taxation might

be a renewable source. so they're not going to get another $500 million or more from vaults. once they spend that money down, that money is not going to be available to them. we've been helping, again, on the military side of things by targeting bulk cash sites and there's been at least millions of dollars -- the phrase that we use -- at least millions of dollars of bulk cash that has been literally incinerated as a result of the air campaign. so that is how we're approaching isil's ability to generate revenue. this is going to be an ongoing effort but i do think that we can demonstrate that we've had an impact. we've seen that in certain areas, in raqqah, in the raqqah area, for example, we've seen the salaries of isil fighters drop by 50%. and the fighters in the raqqah area are not the first people

who have their salaries drop, i can assure you that. that is a sign of financial distress on isil. we've also seen a rise in internal corruption within isil. we've seen -- isil is concerned about this themselves and they've launched their own anti-corruption investigations because they understand that with the decrease in resources available to them there's going to be an increase of people with their hands in the cookie jar. and this is a real problem for isil and one that we see growing. we've also seen an increase in arbitrary fees and fines that isil is charging the citizens in the territories that they control. and we've seen the increase in taxation in the territories that they control in an attempt to make up some of the difference. so we've seen signs of financial distress on isil and we're going to continue the campaign and continue to do everything we can to deprive them of access to as much resources as possible. that said, we're not going to be

100% successful, we're not going to bring them down to zero, we know that. so it's also important we focus on the other half, what i call the more traditional portion of the terrorist financing effort and that's depriving them of access to the international financial system so they can not make use of the money that they have. this effort starts with the iraqis themselves and we work very closely with the iraqis and the iraqis take this issue quite seriously. i have a very good close relationship with the central bank governor and the iraqis are quite focused on making sure that they're doing everything they can to protect their financial system from access by isil. so where that started was banks, there are approximately -- there were approximately 90 iraqi bank branches in territory isil controlled when isil basically took mosul and took that portion of iraq. there were approximately 90 iraqi bank branches and almost

immediately we were working with the iraqis to ensure those bank branches were cut off from their headquarters in -- almost entirely in baghdad, maybe there were a couple that had headquarters in erbil as well. but the goal were to make sure those branches were cut off from their headquarters in baghdad. in so doing, it cuts them off from the financial system as a whole because none of those banks have the ability to conduct international transactions outside of going through their headquarters. there was one that did have that ability and the iraqis immediately forced that bank to move its headquarters to baghdad so what then became a branch, they did not have the ability to conduct international transactions. so you never say never, you never say something isn't a risk or threat anymore but that's not where i think the focus of our attention should be, i think those bank branches are -- to the extent that you can trust in anything, those bank branchs are

in a good place right now, where i think the bigger concern is exchange houses. there's approximately 1900 exchange houses in iraq as a whole. and to the extent that isil gaining access to the financial system, that's where we need to look and that's where the iraqis are looking as well. there's a short-term portion to this problem and then there's a longer-term solution to this problem. in the longer term they need to shrink that sector down. 1900 exchange houses is not an appropriate number of exchange houses for iraq. iraqis understand that and have a plan to get that number down substantially and we're working closely with them at the treasury department, working with iraqis to put them in a position where they could have a number of exchange houses that could be overseen, supervised and regulated. we need to focus on making sure in the short term that

the exchange houses that are either in isil-controlled territory or that are willing to work with isil are dealt with appropriately. the iraqis, again, have been quite cooperative on this effort and the central bank of iraq has published a list of in excess of 100 exchange houses in isil-controlled territory. this is a dynamic list. entities can get added to this list from time to time if we have concerns about a particular entity and they come off the list as territory is liberated, but there's in excess of 100 exchange houses on this list, a public list on the iraqi web site, i talk about it with central bank governors and others around the world all the time. it's important that financial institutions consult that list and make sure they are not doing business with any of these quote/unquote blacklisted exchange houses. in addition, we have a very, very active information exchange information sharing, a number of information sharing arrangements

with the iraqis so they could be alerted to any information or concerns that we have about particular exchange houses. and then it's of course also quite important and something we work on very closely with iraqis to ensure that this is not just a central bank effort, the central bank is obviously important as a regulator of these institutions but this is something law enforcement authorities need to be involved in, that security services need to be involved in, that their finance ministry needs to be involved in, that the justice ministry needs to be involved in. we've formed a group called the u.s./iraq committee to count -- counter terrorist financing that these groups are involved in. we at the treasury department are part of that group as well. it meets periodically and it's one of the ways we try to encourage iraq to take the all of government approach to these problems that really it needs to bring to bear in order to be as effective as we could be. so that's where it starts.

that's iraq and, again, we have seen results from this, millions of dollars have been blocked by the iraqis from these blacklisted exchange houses. millions of dollars have been blocked. that's an important signal that they're taking this seriously. we've seen iraqis take steps to improve the regulation of their financial system, they have adopted anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing laws and are issuing regulations to make those as -- to implement them, but it's not just -- as we all know it's not just enacting laws and regulations, it's really at the end of the day comes down to implementation and we've seen them take extraordinary steps to make sure that not only are the banks in baghdad appropriately regulated but they've sent teams out to places like kirkuk to ensure that they have an eye on what's going on in areas that are

closer to isil control. they've worked very closely and are working very closely with authorities in the kurdish region to ensure there's a uniform anti-money laundering system throughout the country. so, again, a lot of work to be done. i don't want to paint too rosy a picture. there's a lot of work to be done and a lot of capacity to be developed and this is a really, really tough problem set. as we get information in the united states that gives us greater insight into iraqi financial networks, we share that information as much as we can but that information is hard to come by and it's something we're still developing and it's still a challenge for us. so i don't want to give you the impression that this is an issue that's been solved but what i do want to give you the impression of, it's an issue that's been well identified and that there's a lot of effort going into addressing.

and that again is just talking about iraq. now, even though it starts with iraq, it certainly doesn't end with iraq. there's responsibilities both regionally and globally. we work closely with the governments throughout the region whether it's turkey, whether it's jordan, uae, whether it's lebanon to make sure that they're doing what they need to do to make sure isil doesn't gain access to those financial systems. i will say, this issue is going to become as we succeed in the military campaign, as isil loses territory, this is only going to become more important because what you see isil developing towards is again a more traditional terrorist organization that again relies -- will increasingly rely on access to the international financial system both to raise money and to spend money. and as that happens, as that becomes more important, as they develop towards focusing more on their affiliates, as they develop more on being a disbursed global organization that needs to maintain networks, the work that we do regionally and globally is only going to become more important.

so we work very closely again with the emirates, with the jordanians and other countries in the region to make sure that that's being addressed appropriately. then as i said, globally, as we focus on external plotting, as we focus on isil as a global organization, as we focus on isil evolving towards again, a more traditional terrorist organization, these -- the global effort that we've been really engaged in since 9/11 becomes more and more important in organizations like the financial action task force which sets international standards for anti money laundering and counter terrorist financing become more important. u.n. efforts became important. efforts within the coalition, the coalition is not just a military coalition. it's a counter isil coalition with a variety of lines of effort. one of those lines of effort is obviously the military line of effort. one of those lines of effort is

the counter finance line of effort. and i co-chair that line of effort along with saudi arabia and italy. we're in fact meeting in a couple of weeks in kuwait. that will bring over 30 countries together to talk about the things that people are doing throughout the world whether in asia, whether in europe, in the middle east, north america, south america. to make sure that the global isil financial threat is as contained as possible. that's an important group and it's an important line of effort. and it's one that we take quite seriously. so again, iraq and regional and then global. and that's the plan. that's the secret plan you guys are all clued in on now. you know, again, i was going to conclude by talking about the challenges that we see in front of us. i think i've already kind of touched on them though already.

the first in the area of challenges that we see in front of the us is all the old challenges. so i'm glad i could paint a rosy picture about the impact we're having on oil. i'm glad i could paint a rosy picture about the impact we're having on liquidity. i think it's important that we acknowledge the progress that we've made but i think it's also important to emphasize they're still making money on oil, on gas, they're still making money on taxation. and they're making a lot of money. so there's -- this isn't about resting on our laurels. we understand that this is an ongoing effort and frankly, they're going to be making that money until they get pushed off the territory that they control, which hopefully will happen as quickly as possible. but until that does happen, we're going to be focusing our efforts on the types of things that i talked about before. but in the terms of new challenges, again, it's what i was talking about before. as they evolve towards more

traditional terrorist organization, as they lose control of territory, it's only going to put more pressure on us to up our game with respect to depriving them from access to y going to put more pressure on us to up our game with respect to depriving them from access to the financial system. that's going to mean working in organizations like the fatf and the u.n. and the coalition counter-isil finance group. it's also going to involve a lot of work that the u.s. does bilaterally with our partners around the world. again, that is very similar to the work that we do with respect to al qaeda or other terrorist os in terms of sharing information and identifying donors and in terms of identifying charitable organizations that may be on the wrong side of this issue. those are standard things that we've done since 9/11 that i've -- matt, when he was at treasury was doing, as well. it's something we're going to

continue to do. it's going to become more and more important in the future. with that, i'm going to conclude my remarks. i'm happy to answer questions on broader terrorist financing issues, but thanks for your attention. [ applause ] >> danny, thank you very much. the podium is going to magically be pulled back by somebody so that people sitting on this side of the room can see. i'm going to give au opportunity to take a breather and have a glass of water and stall for a second. thank you. i'll take the moderator's prerogative to ask the first question. then we'll open up to everybody and i'll get you as i see you. dana, let's posit continued success just for the fun of it. i'd like to you answer what that might look like, what the consequences might it be domestically within areas that the islamic state still controls in terms of its financing and what the nature of its financial relationship might be with its far flung provinces. so domestically, if we think about this as a balloon, we squeeze the balloon not so hard that it pops but make it harder for them to raise money through

say oil and gas or other things. the logic has it is they would perhaps move to other areas that would be available to them including some they haven't used traditionally like the donors and the abusive charity you mentioned at the very end there. do you see those or other areas as places we need to keep an eye on, areas for fundraising that they may try to tap into now than some of the more traditional fundraising tools that they've had at their -- that that i have been able to tap into are denied them? and then in terms of their relationships abroad, the u.n. monitoring report talks about payments including through banks, including through

exchange houses that the islamic state despite all of our best efforts have still been able to make to some of the far flung provinces. a lot of us are beginning to think what happens in the post, quote/unquote, caliphate as you mentioned in your opening remarks as the islamic state becomes more of an insurgent and international terrorist organization. might we see them trying to send money to some of these provinces as a place where they could kind of set up shop in isil 2.0 scenario? >> sure. so with respect to the first part of your question on sort of the way you describe it, squeezing the balloon and domestically and what are the implications of that, we've already seen that. so we've seen as they are losing access to oil wealth and other forms of wealth, they're increasing taxation. they're trying to extract more resources from the limited pool that they have. there's limits to that. there's an upper limit to what they're going to be able to do on that. what we're trying to do is push down on that upper limit again. why i focus a lot on liquidity.

at the end of the day, they could only extract resources to the extent there's liquidity for them to extract. and so i think it's a combination of continuing to squeeze the balloon but making sure that the whole sort of potential level of resources available to them is as low as possible and then again, as the territory that they control continues to decrease, that's also going to be a separate check on their ability to expand that. so then the question becomes, as you said, do they turn to foreign resources. well, first of all, there's no level of external financing that's going to equal the billion dollars or more that they could make year, you know, off of controlling a territory like this. so there's really no substitute for that. now, that said, as i said, as they lose territory, as they --

to use your term, move to sort of a post-caliphate entity, whenever that entity may look like, it does become incumbent upon us to look even harder. we're looking at it pretty hard now, but to focus our efforts even more on the ability of them to generate wealth through the more traditional -- i say traditional, you know, methods that we see al qaeda using, whether it's deep pocket donor, charities, ngos, whether it's other criminal activity. and you know -- and i do think,

as i said before, i think that that's as they lose the ability to gain wealth from the territory they control, we need to make sure that these other sources are deprived from them and we'll do that. those sources will never equal what they could make domestically now. with respect to your question about affiliates, it's a really interesting question. the affiliates themselves do not have the ability to generate resources the way isil within syria and iraq do. the only one that people are even a little bit concerned about would be libya because they see a lot of similarities between, you know, isil controlling territory within libya, taking a city within libya, there being an oil sector within libya. but we're talking a fraction, a fraction of the wealth. they don't make any money off of the oil, the oil sector with libya to the extent that they are focused on the oil sector. it is to destroy its capacity, not to take advantage of its capacity. with respect to their ability to extract wealth from territory within libya, as i said, when

they went into mosul, there was in excess of half a billion dollars primarily in dinars available to them. when they went into sirte, there was approximately $4 million available to them. i don't want isil to have $4 million but that's a qualitatively different problem than $500 million. so even in a scenario like libya, they do not have the ability to generate wealth. again, that brings us back to what we, you know, what we were just talking about. so it's about identifying networks. this is what we do. this is what you did, matt. it's about identifying networks and it's about them taking action to dismantle those networks to undermine those networks. that's something we are working quite hard on. we're working quite hard within the u.s. government on it and we're working quite hard with various countries in that region on it. >> excellent. thank you very much. and really that whole question was a plug for a washington institute study on the islamic state provinces that's about to come out with some focus on the financial side and so there was that plug. so i'd like to open it up to questions and answers from the audience now. there will be plenty of time to get to everybody. we're going to take the prerogative starting with a former washington institute research assistant, a.j. beloff. >> hi.

thank you very much. a. a.j. beloff, now at bank of america. so as you see isis kind of resorting to a more traditional financing model, do you believe u.s. financial institutions are doing enough to combat this sort of fundraising? >> again, i do want to emphasize that isil currently makes the vast majority of their wealth and continues to make the vast majority of their wealth from internal sources. i think it's fair to assume that again, as those internal sources are there deprived access to those, they will turn to more traditional terrorist financing models. with respect to u.s. banks, i think banks around the world this gets to international anti-money laundering standards

as articulate bid td by the fin action task force. i think the u.s. regime is a stronger or stronger than any regime in the world in that regard. and i think our banks take it quite seriously and i think that we've demonstrated that when we don't feel that the banks are doing the right thing, we're prepared to fine them and to ensure that those deficiencies are addressed. so yes, i'm comfortable that our banks are doing what they need to do. one thing i'll note, because maybe people might think i'm biased on this question, is next week financial action task force is having one of its big plenary sessions in paris and a number

one item on the agenda is the mutual evaluation of the united states. and that will be publicly released at the end of next week. and that will be an objective assessment of where the u.s. is on mlcft issues warts and all. so if you really want to know what people think, you should look at that. i think we're going to do well on that review. >> are there any words you're anticipating out of that? >> the issues we have identified. have deficiencies in customer due diligence particularly with respect to beneficial ownership. these we're working hard to address. but i anticipate they'll remind us of those deficiencies. >> here please. >> good afternoon. thank you, sir glaser. center on sanctions and illicit finance. really enjoyed your remarks. could you give your assessment on the state of play for the particularly the informal financial sector in syria and affiliate places like libya and also your assessment of you already mentioned that these affiliates can't raise money but what about their ability to receive money from the home base

through these informal -- through the informal sector? >> yeah, sure. with respect to your question about syria, we obviously have less insight into syria than we do in iraq because we have in iraq a willing and enthusiastic partner that we don't have in syria. in fact, in syria it's quite the opposite. we have the assad regime which through gas deals is actually providing financing to isil. that's a fundamentally different set of challenges that we have with respect to syria. fortunately, syria, the syrian financial system has been effectively cut off from the international financial system for some time based on international sanctions on syria that have been long-standing. so access to the syrian formal financial sector i'm not saying theoretically is -- i'm not saying that we could theoretically rule it out, but i don't think -- i don't think

it's very attractive if i were a financial emir within isil. i don't know that that would be the most attractive way of getting to the financial sector. of course of, informal -- other forms of informal money remittance in syria and else is one of the important things we don't have a partner in syria, this is one of the important things that we talk to the countries in the region about. whether it's jordan or whether it's lebanon, countries with traditional -- that traditionally have large trade with syria. there are pre-existing and formal networks. it's important that we identify and crack down on.

that's something we work actively with the countries in the region on. with respect to your second question in terms of the ability of isil to fund its affiliates from sort of its central base, if you will, in iraq and syria, we have seen some of that. i think you know, and again, this just this is classic counter-terrorist financing. identifying the networks, dismantling the networks. and without getting into too many details on it, it's something that we're aware of and something we're working very hard on. but it is -- it's a tough nut to crack. it is very, very hard to identify financial networks. it's hard to understand them. but we're doing -- we're doing our best on that. i will say that these -- that i think that these affiliates have the ability to self-finance to a certain degree, not as i said on the isis model that i was talking about with respect to libya, but with respect to local

extortion rackets, criminal activity, things that, you know, that terrorist organizations and criminal organizations do to sustain themselves. >> thanks. >> barbara up here. >> thanks, matt. i'm from the atlantic council. nice to see you. a couple questions. do you have an estimate for how much isil makes by selling -- is it just gas or also oil to the assad regime? and how that number has been affected by u.s. action? can you talk a little bit about how nusra is funded, where do they -- because that's a more traditional terrorist organization. where do they get their money from? and finally, i can't resist, can you comment on how much progress iran is making on satisfying fatah if they had an action

plan? the countermeasures have been suspended. i just interviewed their economy minister who says they're doing a great job on this now. i'd love your assessment on that now. thanks. >> if he says so. i'm sorry, what was the first part? >> the first question was how much money they get from selling oil and gas to assad. >> so it's just gas. it's not oil at all. it's gas. that's what they do. and it's a very complex relationship and it involves barter and exchange of services, and there's probably some money involved there also, but no, i don't have an estimate on sort of the dollar figure. i don't have an estimate to give you on that. the second question was nusra. thank you for asking that question because i normally mention it in my prepared remarks and i didn't this time. so i'm glad you raised the question because i don't want to give people the impression that this campaign is just about isil. it's not just about isil. we talk about isil. and people say al nusra. and it sounds like it is very exotic sort of thing. al nusra is al qaeda in syria. that's what we should call them, al qaeda in syria because that's what they are. and we have to treat them as such. and they are dangerous. and they are threatening.

and they are something that we do focus on. they do have -- so they have the ability to extract a certain amount of wealth from territory that they control, but it's not the same sort of thing. and as a result, as i think your question implied, this gets to classical terrorist financing. this gets to working with our friends and partners in the gulf to make sure that gulf-based donors and organizations are cut off from al nusra. it's about working with banks and other institutions to make sure that al nusra and al nusra related fronts don't have access. it's our standard set of issues but it's very, very important. i'm a frequent visitor to the gulf. i'll be going to the gulf as i said in a couple weeks. one of the issues that we talked to our friends in the gulf about quite a bit is al nusra. so yes.

>> country that's qatar, kuwait, any of these countries that are -- >> i don't think there's a particular country. i think that, you know, i'd be happy to talk about individual countries if somebody would like me to. i think that -- i think that there's been a lot of progress in the gulf. i think there's been a lot of progress in countries like qatar and kuwait, but i also think that there are individuals operating in that region that need to be addressed pretty urgently. so i think it's a mixed bag. but i do want to emphasize iraq with respect to qatar and kuwait that they have made -- that we've seen a lot of positive steps from them recently to include criminal prosecutions of terrorist financiers in qatar, which is not nothing, which is actually a real sign of political will. third question was on iran and fatah. so there's really no update on

it, and in june, iran agreed to and made a high level political commitment to implement an action plan to address the concerns that fatf had identified and as a result of that fatf temporary suspended countermeasures at the same time and in the same statement, fatf stated that it remain concerned about the terrorist financing risk emanating from iran and said it continued to fall upon countries around the world to exercise ain enhanced due

diligence with respect to transactions involving iran and said that call for due diligence would remain in respect -- would remain until they address all the issues in their action plan. they've not met since then. there's no developments to report. have you spoke to the iranian government about that and they told you they're making action on their action plan, i suppose that's good news. that's not until that's recognized by fatf, that's not going to be considered progress. >> just to follow up on one quick thing, danny. a great question just now buabt

nusra. technically nusra fund doesn't exist anymore. and i wonder if there's any plan by the u.s. government to designate an aka for the organization and if you think that's necessary or important. >> well, as you know, i can't talk about plans on future designations. but i can assure you whatever al nusra fund is calling itself is not going to limit our enthusiasm in pursuing it. >> yes, ma'am, right over here. >> hi, thank you. i'm with the weekly standard. i had an iran related question. i read the new ofaq that came out recently and i was a little bit confused the new wording seems to allow businesses to work with companies that are wholly owned by the irgc or or irgc controlled entities. is that true? is that an accurate reading? >> so i'm sorry. i'm not talking about the nuclear deal. what i am here to talk about is terrorist financing and if you -- if you would like me to talk about iran with respect to

fatf, i'll be happy to and happy to talk about our concerns with respect to iran in regards to terrorist financing, but i'm not going to talk about the nuclear deal. >> the ofacfaq. thank you. >> what concerns do you have then about iran and terror financing? >> my concerns about iran is that they're a state sponsor of terrorism. and that they are the chief financier of hezbollah, and you know, almost single-handedly keep hezbollah afloat. this is a grave issue. it's an issue we take very seriously. it's an issue that i -- nobody's more of an expert on hezbollah financing than matt levity. >> i'm done. >> but it's something that as you know, matt, i work very hard on and we work very hard with the lebanese on it, and we work very hard around the world on it, in particular on implementing the new legislation by congress that's designed to exclude hezbollah from the financial system around the world. but this is something that is a

priority first at the treasury department and it's something that we are going to continue to pursue quite aggressively and frankly, it's something i think we're having some success on. i think that hezbollah is having a tremendously difficult time gaining access to the lebanese financial system. and i think that that's attributable to the hard work of the people who participate in the lebanese financial system and the cooperation and partnership we have with them because they understand how important it is for their own access to the international financial system to make sure that hezbollah does not gain access through those institutions. and we've seen that -- we've seen all various manifestations of hezbollah's concerns about that. >> that answer has led to hand waving in the back from the lebanese analyst. in the back. >> thank you very much. you just said that you were having -- you can see some success when it comes to hezbollah financing. you're talking about probably about the hezbollah international financing prevention act, right? >> right. >> and it's true that it's causing a lot of nuisance for hezbollah specially close to charity institutions, social and media institutions but the money is still coming.

and they're not going to go broke because of that. the problem they're having is not really about like the banks closing their accounts in as much as the spending policy shifted within the institutions. so are you going to do more about that and going to have more extreme measures to stop the financing coming from iran or this is it, the prevention act is like all you're going to do? thank you. >> so a couple reactions. first of all, to the extent that i implied that terrorist financing is a silver bullet with respect to hezbollah, it's not. our terrorist financing efforts aren't going to uproot hezbollah from south lebanon. we understand that. but what we can do and what we've demonstrated that we are doing and what we are going to continue to do is challenge hezbollah's access to the lebanese financial system. that's something frankly people never thought we would be able to do. that we could -- but we've shown in the area of illicit finance whether it's with respect to hezbollah or north korea or iran, whether it's with respect to any of our targets, what

we've consistently shown is we can reach out and make our a adversaries feel uncomfortable in areas in which they always thought they were safe. that's what we're doing with respect to our efforts with respect to hezbollah financing. i wouldn't characterize any of the efforts that we've done as extreme. i will say that our efforts against hezbollah financing and hezbollah financial access within lebanon predate hipaa. it's a relative new act. our work with the lebanese financial system and financial institutions and lebanese financial authorities predate hipaa. it's another arrow in our quiver. it's not the only arrow in our quiver, and it's not the only one that we use and that we will continue to use moving forward. but we've shown with the actions we took in 2011 with respect to lebanese canadian bank under the patriot act, we've shown with respect to our classic executive

order 13224 terrorist financing. we've shown with various law enforcement actions that have been taken that we have a wide range of authorities that we are going to continue to bring to bear to deprive hezbollah of access to the financial system. i should say this is not just about lebanon. lebanon, the word lebanon doesn't even appear in hifpa. this is hezbollah's access to the international financial system. we will pursue that throughout the world. it's important that i emphasize that. this is not about lebanon, and it is not about the lebanese financial system. obviously hezbollah is quite present in lebanon so it impacts the lebanese financial system disproportionately. it's about hezbollah's access to the financial system broadly. we will pursue that throughout the world. >> patrick lawson, and then we'll come over here. >> if i understood you properly, you were saying that part of u.s. government

counter-terrorism strategy is to block the access of terrorist organizations to the international financial system. one of the organizations which the u.s. government i believe has designated as a terrorist organization is the guard corp. i'd be interested in your comments about u.s. efforts to block irgc access to the international financial system and in particular access by companies that are partly owned or controlled by the irgc. how would you -- what would you say as to the u.s. government efforts to block access to such companies to the u.s. financial system? >> to be clear as far as designated terrorist organization, the qods force is treated as a terrorist organization, and all of our terrorist financing laws and rul rul

rules apply. i think we have a fairly good track record of demonstrating zero tolerance for qods force access to the financial system in any way, shape, or form. obviously, we are also tremendously focused on the ability of the irgc to access the financial system. there's a variety of sanctions that remain in effect with respect to the irgc. and frankly, the fact that the irgc has -- operates through front companies and through other forms of nontransparent ownership has created, you know, problems for the iranians. so it's something that we understand and it's something that we continue to be focused on. >> right here, and then the gentleman right next to him. >> thank you very much for coming. i'm at the washington institute. i have two quick questions bringing the conversation back to iraq. if i understand correctly, it seems that you identified the

structural issues of terror financing in iraq being the cash economy that iraq has. and you also mentioned that you have good contacts inside the iraqi government and good relationships with the central bank. is there any effort to help the iraqi government have a better financial system and away from a cash economy as we start having the conversation about stability in a post-isis iraq and as the liberation of mosul nears? on a related note to the stability in a post-isis iraq, any efforts on curbing the financing of the militias that are slated to be next in line for more instability in iraq? thank you. >> so with respect to your first question about broader iraqi financial system, i think you put your finger right on it. it's a primarily cash economy. and that causes a wide range of problems related to terrorist financing and not related to

terrorist financing. and modernizing that economy needs to be job number one for the financial authorities in ir iraq. as i said, i think we understand that. we at the treasury department are providing assistance to iraq in this area in a number of ways. which i could rattle off but it's probably not the best use of our time. they work with the imf, they work with the world bank, with a variety of countries around the world. this is a problem i think that's understood. it's easier to understand the problem than it is to solve the problem because we're talking about building a modern financial system. i don't want to say from scratch but we're talking about building a modern financial system that doesn't exist right now. that's going to be a long-term effort as i said even with respect to the exchanges houses which is just the beginning of the issue. that's an aspect of the issue. it's going to take years to get that sector where needs to be and we're starting right now. starting right now. so i guess the short answer to

your question is yes, we're providing assistance, the international financial institutions are providing assistance, the iraqis have recognized this as something they need to do and it's something that will happen over the course of years. with respect to militia financing, certainly any entity that's designated as a terrorist organization we will pursue with vig vigor. our priority right now is on isil and on al nusra and making sure those entities which have demonstrated a will and an ability to threaten americans throughout the world is where we're focusing our effort right now. >> right here. >> ken myer. a year or so ago, it was announced that the treasury department was going to look into where the islamic state

obtain the funds to purchase all the toyotas it used to take over iraq. this is before the three sources of financing that you mentioned were available to them, before it was called the islamic state. whatever came of that investigation? >> so it wasn't before it became the islamic state and wasn't before the sources of finance were related to. those trucks and those videos or those trucks go back to like last summer. so the summer of 2015, if i remember correctly is when there was a lot of focus on those trucks. to be honest with you, i'm less concerned about those trucks right now than i am about their ability to generate vast amounts of wealth. there's a number of theories which have been put forward as to how they got those trucks. there have been a number of investigations which are continuing. but i don't have any update for you on those truck videos.

but that was from about a year and a half ago, not even. >> come over here to david all the way at the edge here. >> good afternoon. special agent david kane with homeland security investigations. three-part basically intertwined questions. you spoke about the exchange houses. are you finding that the exchange houses are basically doubling as hawaladars or are they separate? second part to the question for the hawalas, are they as effective in their structure in instances within the territories of syria and iraq as they were externally? and lastly, what is the typical transactional capacity for these entities? how much cash do they have on hand? what are we seeing?

>> so with respect to your first question, so technically exchange houses are not supposed to be conducting remittances but it is obvious that through many of these exchange houses there's an ability to transfer wealth. that's -- that gets to some pretty fundamental regulatory and supervisory issues which is going to be very difficult for the iraqis to tackle as long as there's 1900 exchange houses which is why as i said, that's the long-term. short term we're trying to identify which exchange houses have the ability to provide these services to isil or are in fact providing them and making sure those are publicly identified. and then there's other ones that we don't publicly identify but we're working on those, too. so the -- so that's i think that's the answer to your first question. your second question, i'm sorry. so your second question was are hawaladars -- i didn't understand. >> do they have a very extensive network in syria and iraq to be able to remit from city to city

or is that structure not really there? is it coming external with limited hawaladar recipients within syria and iraq? >> it's harder for me to talk about syria. we have less insight into syria. i presume extensive network within syria, but i don't have anything to base that on other than just sort of common sense. with respect to iraq, again, of course, look, it's a common way of transferring wealth within that region and there's nothing theoretically wrong with it. and there have been -- there's historical trade relationships that existed prior to the war that were presumably financed through hawala, so these exist. and they're something that we look for and they're something you guys look for. the -- if you want to know what i'm most concerned about it's

the exchange houses. that's what i'm most concerned about. but certainly i never want to give anybody the impression there's anything we're not concerned about. we're concerned about bulk movement of cash. we're concerned about hawala. we're concerned about exchange houses and even banks. although i do think that of all those banks are the least likely to be abused at this point. and then your third question, i apologize. i'm having a hard time. >> what is the transaction capacity for these hawalas and exchange houses? can they handle a transaction, 1.5 million, 10 million? i know it varies. >> it varies but some of them are quite large. they can handle millions of dollars. >> up front, please. >> thank you. hi there. how are you? >> good.

>> i have an easy for you. >> thank you. >> what is the difference or the similarities and the differences between isil's terror financing and hezbollah's? what are the challenges to step hezbollah's financing and isil's? thank you. >> it is an easy question. the primary difference is that hezbollah makes the vast majority of its wealth through a state sponsor, that being iran. and that's not how isil generates its wealth or isil does not have state sponsors. so i mean, that's the answer to your question. you know, hezbollah gets hundreds of millions of dollars a year from iraq. and that's the fundamental challenge that we were talking about before is it's very difficult for us to interfere to disrupt that, the provision of cash to hezbollah by iran. it's a difficult for us to disrupt that. but what we can do is disrupt hezbollah's access to the financial system as much as possible and that's what we try to do.

there's all sorts of ways, but it's a lot of cash. >> mike craft. one second. let's wait for mike, please. thank you. >> thank you. mike craft, counterterrorism writer. since nobody else brought up saudi arabia which somewhat to my surprise, i'll bring it up in a couple contexts. you alluded to the gulf countries in terms of cooperating on the efforts but there's also been concern about saudi arabia financing the madrasas, and this fits in on the part of the concern of terrorist violence programs. so it's not just centered on syria and iraq but also pakistan and perhaps north africa. what kind of cooperation are you getting? and i know the standard line is the government is not involved, but there's wealthy individuals. are you making any success in cracking -- getting the saudis to crack down on them?

are they enforcing the regulations vigorously? >> it's more than a standard line. it happens to be the truth. the -- look, i think we at the treasure department have probably a fairly credible voice with respect to saudi arabia. when matt was around, we were very publicly critical of saudi arabia and their efforts with respect to terrorist financing. this is going back over ten years. i think we've seen over the past ten years a huge shift in saudi's approach to terrorist financing. and i really do regard them as our number one partner in the gulf in our efforts against terrorist financing. you've seen in recent months and over the past year we've done joint designations with the saudis. they are a very enthusiastic partner of ours in our efforts against terrorist financing. in fact, when i think about terrorist financing, the gulf, my goal is to see that same sort of evolution in the other gulf countries that we've seen in

saudi arabia. this is not to say that there's not terrorist financing going on in saudi arabia. there is absolutely terrorist financing that goes on in saudi arabia. and it's with respect to donors and it's with respect to people who come and abuse saudi hospitality during the hajj, and it presents a lot of difficulties for them and for us. but what i can say is we have a very willing and capable partner in the saudis in our efforts against terrorist financing. again, the goal, my goal, our goal is to see a similar evolution in countries like qatar and kuwait. and i think we're starting to see that evolution. but what i'd like to see is that evolution to come to full -- to fully evolve. there was a second part of your question. or was there? is there a part that i missed? >> in terms of the madrasas.

>> oh, yes, look, that's an important -- that gets into the whole, as you yourself have said, gets sort of more into countering broadly extremism. the challenges that saudi arabia faces in terms of ensuring that as they pursue what they believe to be their religious obligation has that -- doesn't come with -- it is a promotion of extremist view. that remains a challenge for them. and that's something that they are going to be continuing to struggle with i'm sure for quite sometime. and i'll leave it at that.

>> dan, if i could follow up, recent government official statements have included statements along the lines of some of the financing within saudi arabia because of the actions of saudis have taken it on combat terror financing tend to involve things like donors in saudi arabia sending money to collectors or bundlers in places like qatar and kuwait who then send them on warward. can you talk about the nature of fundraising not within any one country but across the gulf and second, am i correct in assuming that that is more likely to be financing the nusra, al qaeda in syria type of groups and less like to be financing islamic states who if i recall correctly the last public estimate was no more than 5% of the islamic state's budget was assumed to have come from charity? >> you sort of answered your -- you just presented a statement

in that first question. >> i put an intonation at the end of it. >> i agree with the statement. i agree with your first question. with respect to the percentage, yes. the center of gravity of terrorist financing in the gulf is related to al qaeda. whether that's al qaeda in syria, al nusra, or whether it's al qaeda in yemen or would be in the arabian peninsula, as they call themselves or whether that's al qaeda or other al qaeda affiliated groups in the

afghanistan/pakistan region. that -- that is where the center of gravity of terrorist financing is. and that's what's very important to focus the attention of our friends in the gulf on is taking steps against isil financing is important and they need to be doing it and they are doing it. but isil doesn't rely on that income stream. what is important is to continue to remind our friends in the gulf that that's equally important that they be focusing on the al qaeda portion of this because that's really what the terrorist financing issue in the gulf is all about right now. now, you know, again, over time, as your first question implied, over time as isil begins to rely more and more on external donors, will that become more of an issue? we'll see. but it is important in the gulf for them to focus on al nusra and an on al qaeda with the same enthusiasm and energy that they focus on isil. >> a moment ago, you were talking about the financing of hezbollah through state experience like iran. barbara asked earlier about compliance with fatf. which leads me to ask you about iran's ability to fully comply with fatf given its vocal insistence it will maintain a cutout for what it calls resistance organizations but what you here have called terrorist organizations. do you think that's going to be a stumbling block moving forward especially as we move forward in the next few weeks? >> don't expect there to be any

news. this is a long-term action plan. for those of you waiting with bated breath, you're going to be disappointed. it will be more of a checking in status check, but i don't expect -- this is a long-term project for iran. i don't want to sort of speak for fatf and don't want to anticipate what the iranians may or may not do with respect to the implementation of the action plan. what i will say is it is quite clear that exceptions to terrorist financing laws that make expectations for national liberation movements or other types of movements have not been acceptable to fatf in the past and i don't expect them to be acceptable in the future. and that is - and fatf has a record on this. there are other countries that have had similar sorts of carve outs. fatf has said those are not

acceptable, creditable -- credible.ble. >> yes, right here. >> foundation for defense of democracies. i was wondering if you could talk more to the role that wi ransom payments are playing in terrorist financing and how we're working to interdict those. thanks. >> well, so in 2015, i think the number we used for ransom payments was $47 million. is that right? yeah, so $47 million i think is the number that we've used for isil ransom payments. maybe we say $20 million to $40 million. i don't know, something in that area. that's like a lot of money on the one hand. on the other hand, it's not a lot of money compared to what they receive from other sources. but it's something that we focus on. it's something that we focused

on within the counter-isil finance group. they're issued a communique a few -- maybe a year ago reaffirming the principle of countries should not be paying ransoms. the united states' position on this is quite clear and has been quite consistent. it's, you know -- when you say disrupt it, it's really not a question so much of disrupting a ransom payment. if it were coming from the united states and we knew about it, we would want to disrupt it. but it's again about depriving them of access to the financial system so they can't use the money. you know, these groups, whether it's isil or anybody else, they're going to make a certain amount of money through criminal activities whether it's kidnapping, whether it's bank

robbery, whether it's smuggling, whether it's whatever. there's a whole wide variety of criminal activities that they participate in. and you know, on a certain level that becomes a local law enforcement issue and how we respond to it is by trying to deprive them of access to the financial systems so they can't profit from it. but we've had a very consistent position on kidnapping for ransom. >> i can follow up with another kind of deep question. one of the areas purported islamic state financing that's been a subject of particular debate is their ability to race money through looting antiquities. has that been a significant source of revenue for them and is it still? >> so i don't think it's ever been a huge source of income for them. you knew i was going to answer that that way. >> maybe they didn't. >> but you did it with such a straight face. >> thank you. i've got four kids. i've got to play that game. >> so look, as i said, isil profits from any economic activity that occurs within the territory that it controls primarily through taxation and fees. so to the extent that there is antiquity smuggling that occurs

and i'm sure that there is, isil profits from it by taxing it or by charging fees to people for engaging in it. that's how they profit from antiquity smuggling in the same way they would profit from any type of smuggling that goes on in their territory. to that extent the way we counter that again is by reducing liquidity in the area and by reducing their access to the financial system. i do not -- i have seen no evidence of sort of global isil controlled antiquity smuggling networks the way it seems to have captured some people's imagination. i've seen very little evidence of that. it's another area of smuggling through their territory that they charge fees to profit from. that's my understanding of how they profit from antiquities trade. >> please join me in thanking danny glaser for coming today.

[ applause ] >> thank you. >> as you can see, there's a huge range of illicit finance that the treasury department is responsible for countering. this is only one slice of it, a very important slice. we appreciate the work you do, day in and day out. and as a taxpayer, i'm very pleased that you're only able to be with us here for this couple of hours. thank you for taking the time. thank you all for joining us. have a great day. >> thanks. american history tv in primetime continues tonight here on c-span 3 with a look at the life of alexander hamilton starting at 8:00 eastern. it's a visit to the morris-jumal mansion. then a look at how close "hamilton" the musical follows history. that's tonight at 8:00 eastern here on c-span 3. this week "washington journal" is doing a deeper dive into what's happening this election year in the battleground states.

tomorrow the focus is on pennsylvania. thursday it's florida, and ohio on friday. with two weeks until election day, this is the headline at politico.com. donald trump's window is closing. joining us on the phone, ben schreckinger. thanks for being with us. >> thanks for having me. >> you have been talking to republican operatives. do they see a path to the presidency for donald trump? >> they do not. many have been warning since he was nominated it was going to be a real uphill battle for trump. at this point there are very, very few republican operatives who will say publicly or privately that they feel confident that trump has a path here. >> early voting is in place in well over half the country. so what do the trends indicate for the democrats, for the republicans? >> they are relatively

encouraging for democrats. in florida where republicans have consistently outperformed democrats in mail and early voting that narrow advantage has narrow eed further this year, a democrats are stepped to outperform in in-person early voting, which is just now starting this week. in north carolina, republicans in 2012 totally dominated democrats in terms of early voting. that margin has shrunk considerably in both places. considerably in both places republicans need those margins to be competitive. in nevada, we saw a very, very well organized effort by democrats with the help largely

of unions this weekend to get people to the polls deploying a lot of surrogates. katy perry, for example, was out in nevada this weekend urging people to get to the polls early. overall, it's positive for democrats, discouraging for republicans. >> you write about utah which has not voted for a democrat since 1964 when lyndon johnson defeated barry goldwater. right now the polls showing a tight race with an independent potentially picking up the state the first time since 1968. evan mcmullin. what can you tell us about that race? >> it is tight. polls tend to show mcmullen and trump neck and neck with hillary clinton not far behind. clinton is sending more staffers to the state, deploying resources there late. privately republican operatives think mcmullen is actually the favorite here. so we could see this conservative mormon independent picking up those electoral votes. any time that you're a republican and utah is in doubt for you it is a sign of not just trouble, but potential

catastrophe. >> another state where democrats are deploying more resources in new hampshire where kelly ayotte republican senator tough re-election battle against democratic governor for that seat, what do the polls see iay that race? >> polls have been neck and neck earlier this month. if anything giving a slight advantage to ayotte. she has struggled with her position on trump throughout this campaign. she has said she's voting for him but not endorsing him. then when this tape leaked of him bragging about apparent sexual assault. she totally disavowed him. last poll wmr showing her eight points behind, which speaks to the pickle republicans are in. there's a danger embracing trump. he has many diehard supporters that are more loyal to him than the republican party. when these candidates disavow trump, they can face a penalty. >> where does this put hillary clinton when she tries to run up

the score in the electoral college vote and pick up key senate races to put senate back in majority potentially and down ballot races where democrats are hoping for the possibility of recapturing the house of representatives? >> they are going on offense now. they are refocusing in many cases on down ballot races. we haven't heard hillary clinton do much senate campaigning up on the stump, but we did hear her this weekend go after pat toomey in pennsylvania. that was a first. we're likely to see more of that. we've seen barack obama come out and issue endorsements largely for house races trying to go on offense, pick away even further at the republican majority there. and so this is becoming in many ways more a story about just how bad the congressional losses are going to be for republicans. >> yet based on all of that, ben, how do the democrats make certain their voters still go to the polls on election day? as you point out, one of the

biggest risks for hillary clinton and her campaign prematurely resting on its laurels. >> that's right. largely it comes down to executing on your ground game. democrats again have an advantage here. donald trump has barely invested in a get out the vote operation. they have to execute on that and manage expectations. there is a danger for both sides in concluding that this race is over. voters will potentially stay home if they think it's a done deal. so managing expectations and executing on the ground game. >> so bottom line for donald trump and for hillary clinton in the remaining 14 days before the november 8th election, what can we expect from each candidate? what's going to be their approach? >> sure. with clinton, we're going to likely see an increasing focus on congressional races and increasing focus on giving her

the strongest possible hand to play in terms of the congress that she's going to be dealing with, as she now is expecting, by all indications to win this thing. with trump, he has been a wild card. he'll continue to be a wild card. when things got really bad for him about two weeks ago with those allegations of sexual assault coming out, you saw him really ratchet up his rhetoric. it got more extreme. he posited this vast conspiracy of journalists against him. as it becomes ever more clear where this poll stands he'll find new rhetorical extremes to go to. it's possible he'll position himself not to be the fall guy, position others to take the blame for an expected loss. it will be interesting, given all the speculation about a possible post-campaign media

venture to see what he has to say about that. >> we'll look for you reporting online at politico.com, ben schreckinger. thanks for being with us. >> thanks for having me. >> i will be voting for hillary. >> she definitely has the experience in office. >> i don't want someone running the country as a business. i'm a human being. >> if we want a hotel, we'll call donald trump. >> all the respect she gives every individual. that's what i appreciate from hillary clinton. >> i'm voting hillary. >> a non-vote is definitely a vote for trump. >> make sure you get out and vote. >> i'm hillary clinton and i approved this message. >> i'm donald trump and i approved this message. >> the man who murdered joshua is an illegal alien and he should not have been here. >> the killer hit him in the head with a closet rod so hard it broke in four pieces. then he took him to a field and he doused him with gasoline and set him on fire. the hardest day of my life. >> hillary clinton's border policy is going to allow people into the country just like the

one that murdered my son. >> on election day november 8th, the nation decides our next president and which party controls the house and senate. stay with c-span for coverage of the presidential race, including campaign stops with hillary clinton, donald trump, and their surrogates, and follow key house and senate races with our coverage of their candidate debates and speeches. c-span, where history unfolds daily. after i came up with an idea of reproductive rights, i went and researches. with recent events i heard about in the news, i knew i could find information on that. >> i don't think i took a very methodical approach to this process, which i mean you could if you wanted, but i think that

really with a piece as dense as this, i would say, it is really just the process of reworking and reworking. so as i was trying to come up with what my actual theme was, i was doing research at the same time and i was coming up with more ideas of what i could film. i'd come up with an idea like, okay, that would be a great shot. i would think about that, and that would give me a new idea of something else to focus on. then i would do research about that. the whole process is just about building on other things and then scratching what doesn't work, and then you just keep going until you finally get what is the finished product. >> this year's theme "your message to washington, d.c." tell us what's the most urgent issue for the president and u.s. congress to address in 2017. $100,000 will be awarded in cash prizes. students can work alone or in a group of up to three. include some c-span programming

and explore opposing opinions. the $100,000 in cash prizes will be awarded and shared between 150 students and 3 teachers. the$5,000 goes to the team with the best. the deadline is january 20, 2017. mark your calendar and spread the word to student film makers. go to studentcam.org. the french slovak and german ambassadors to the u.s. were joined by the european union. this hour long event was hosted by the gorgetown university law center here in washington. >> thank you, jim. we, here at the institute of international economic law have been extremely fortunate to have many of the policymakers, leading officials, regulators, diplomats and policymakers here at georgetown and the programming has witnessed a bit

of a renaissance here. it's a pleasure to have all of you here today. i just wanted to thank, as well, jennifer hillman and gary and the students of, to our knowledge, is the only course in law school focused exclusively on brexit to provide the questions you will be hearing today as we launch into a multitude and range of issues. i think i want to start with ambassador o'sullivan. particularly since this conversation is being broadcast across the united states, brexit has been one of the leading stories here, which is why there is such interest and this has been, in part, due to the sheer unexpectedness of it all. what do you think, in particular, a representative of the yup piano union, that the causes were and the drive behind it. i encouraged the other

ambassadors as well, one question directed toward them to jump in and challenge, supplement or agree to disagree. ambassador o'sullivan? >> thank you very much, indeed. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. it's a pleasure to be here. my own daughter grarnduated fro georgetown. i would like to congratulate you on starting a course in brexit and the law because if there's one thing we can say with certain certainty, there's not much we can say with certainty about brexit, it's going to be a lawyers paradise. i congratulate you because you can spend the rest of your life dealing with the subject. we could spend a long time on the post mortem of why it happened. i'm not sure it was so

surprising. i know people in america were, many in new york were not. once we knew the united kingdom decided to have a referendum, it was always going to be a close call, which ever way it went. the former french member of the european parliament said after the referendum, before it the position of the united kingdom was one foot in and one foot out. after the referendum, that situation was reversed. yeah, some of you got that. i think it is true, there are a lot of uk specific elements in this outcome. a hesitation about joining the european union. the uk had a referendum two years after they joined in 1973. they had a referendum to confirm they wanted to be a member. i think the slightly semidetached nature, they were not part of the euro. there's always ban healthy

strong body of opinion in the uk, which was frankly reluctant and reserved about membership, if not down right hostile. once you open the possibility of a vote, it was always going to be a close call as to what came out of it. i think, in the end, it was the sense of wishing to take back control as the leave campaign put it at the sense of some kind of, in my view, respectfully, a misplaced sense of lost sovereignty. i'm not going to go through the merit that is won the day. there were specific uk elements that are not easily replicated elsewhere. having said that, this is very important, there are also, you know, generic elements of the moment that you find elsewhere and by the way to a certain extent find in the united states in the sense this was also a sense of frustration with the way economic and social policy developed, particularly since the crash in 2008.

the financial crisis and the economic crisis. a sense of uncertainty generated by globalization. in europe, the european union is seen as the front line of globalization, many regional globalization, if you like. i think these elements and the issue of immigration, a unique feature of the uk was a concern about intraeuropean immigration, perhaps more so than extra european immigration, where i would say elsewhere in europe the concerns about immigration are less about intraeuropean immigration. if we use the words immigration, this is certainly a common theme across europe and we have challenges of populous parties in all member states and very often, their criticisms go hand in hand with some degree of skepticism. there are elements which are common across all of europe at this point in time.

what should the united states make of it? >> well, i mean paul simon says there are 50 ways to leave your lover. i don't know if there are 50 ways of brexiting. we are not yet in a post brexit world. nothing changed. something changed fundamentally, we had an important political development in the united kingdom. they are going to leave. the precise way that is going to happen and what is going to happen afterward, that is out in the open. i think the initial reaction in the united states, of course, is one of concern for what this means for the strong reliance -- alliance with europe. obviously, it's easier from the point of view not just of the u.s., but many partners, if we have 28 countries, a one-stop shop, all party, all part of the same union, the fact that now an important member of the european union is going to withdrawal and

develop separately, i imagine the u.s. is concerned as to what this means for how we manage the relationship. it's of concern to all of us, frankly. we will all be watching carefully to see how it develops. i think the one thing i would say is, i think we are all going to need a lot of strategic patience. this is going to take some time. we don't yet know what the united kingdom is going to propose. the prime minister indicated triggering the article 50, which is the formal article of the treaty by which exit takes place some time in the spring. there's a two-year time frame in there, so, we are looking at, i don't know, two and a half years before we know with certainty exactly how the uk is leaving, the building of a new relationship between a uk out of the eu and the rest of the eu is probably going to take longer to negotiate under a different article of the treaty.

so, i think we are going to have to live with a certain degree of uncertainty for many years to come. and we are all going to have to figure out how we do this and we have never done it before in the european union with the exception of greenland which left in the early '80 ds, a much bigger country, but a less complicated negotiation. we have no precedent and we are going to have to figure out how to do this. and it's going to take time and probably things are going to evolve in ways we cannot predict now. that's my final point. i didn't mean to be too long but it's an important subject. i appreciate everyone wants to jump to the end point. i see so many articles proposing. i figured out how this can be made to work. they may be right. some of the ideas may be in the mix when we get there. we have a lot of politics to go between now and the moment the british make their request to leave with their proposal to how they would like to leave.

then the 27, we will have to figure out how we react to that, the mandate the commission is given to negotiate on behalf of the 27 and what kind of new relationship we wish to build once we worked out the terms of the separation. we have a long way to go before we can see exactly where this process leads us. there are certainly risks on both sides. i'm sure at the end of the day, we will try to make the best of what all of us reluctantly accept is a suboptimal situation but one we have to respect given the democratic vote in the united kingdom. >> this is an important issue and sets the stage for more technical and legal questions that we'll be working through and thinking through in the course of this discussion. i wanted to also make sure if there are other comments or observations about how brexit was seen in your countries or differing interpretations if there were catalysts to these. your views and thoughts to this.

we'll move down through. >> thank you very much. it's really my pleasure to sit among these insiders, very experienced colleagues from the eu. the reason i'm sitting here is so that slovakia is the presidency of the european council and one of the main recommendations or priorities unexpected. that's what in case of slovakia. it happened on july 1st. so, the main focus of our presidency was actually to reflect on the, what to do both on the institution side, the council will be very much part of those considerations, how to negotiation the relationship with the uk in the future and as we can see there is actually

mushrooming of the negotiating themes that are under the council then under the european commission and european parliament will have say to the whole process. of course national governments are stepping in. national parliaments, public interest organizations, groups. it will be very complicated process from the institution point of view, but also from the point of substance as david mentioned. from the perspective of the slovak presidency, the reflection of 27. they will hold their first summit in mid-september. we have for six months to prepare our own reflections back to our capitals. there will be two processes, one will be actual negotiations with the uk, but also the second part of the process will be the

reflection why this happened, why the uk decided to do so and how to avoid these integration of the european union. david mentioned that immigration was very much part of the negative outcome. it happened from the internal immigration so for central and yeern europeans as part of the european union, we'll be very much important to focus on what kind of outcome we'll get especially when it comes to the freedom of movement with the labor force. as many, many eastern europeans move to the united kingdom. it will be to keep the freedoms untouched or to be negotiated in balanced outcome. thank you. >> first, great to hear, thank

you. first, to what david said, why? i think, very frankly, trump is a transatlantic phenomenon. really you know you have your presidential election, we have brexit. in a lot of european countries, you have the far right. we are all facing the same wave of purism. i think it was the financial times say thing that the loserse rebelling. so, it's really, i think, a wide challenge that we are all facing, all western democracies, not only the europeans. whoever is elected president in this country, i think, should have to handle with us this decision. you know, why? in the u.s., why? in uk, in france and elsewhere, we have so many of our citizens who are dissatisfied and who are

telling us they are dissatisfied this way. the second element, i think, and here in a sense as a official negotiator, the negotiation has not started, which means there is, i would say, if i were not a diplomat, there is some chest banging. it's normal that before any negotiation all sides, you know, are saying not going to compromise, that the opposition don't compromise on principles and so on and so on and so on. before the opening of the negotiation, people saying we won't compromise. of course there will be a compromise at the end of the day and as david said, to quit right now, we don't know what will be compromised. any negotiation as its own moment momentum, its own logic and especially with this negotiation

where you have 28 or 29 with the european commission. you know, you have a lot of negotiators. we have a lot of different interests. sometimes different interests. i think it's totally impossible right now to know first whether we reach an agreement because, you know, we are 28 so it means a lot of red lines and when we reach an agreement and what we disagreement. all of us, we want a good agreement. all of us, we want mutual relation with the uk. we are not on the revenge path. we are not on the resentment past. we are defending our interest and the interest of the union. it's so complicated we are totally unable to tell you where we are going. >> thank you, chris. i also want to say thank you for including me in this panel. i'm a proud father of a

georgetown freshman so i guess i should say -- >> excellent. >> chris, you ask what does brexit mean for the u.s., how should the u.s. look at it? i introduced a geo political dimension to it. as important as the legal, technical and economic aspects of the brexit are, i think this added another challenge to europe. after the financial and economic crisis, after the greek debt crisis, after the refugee crisis and has hit in a way europe in an already precarious state. that has become a transatlantic issue. now, for the u.s., there is reason to worry, i'm not doom and gloom profit here about europe, but i think there is

reason to worry in the u.s. about the strength and the resilience of the european union. we have a lot of challenge. a new sort of russia. the refugee crisis. the fault line that is are emerging in europe. for the u.s. the challenge is to worry about the strength and resilience of the european union, of the 27, quite frankly. we all are great allies of the uk. we want to remain so. i mean we are losing the second biggest economy in europe. in our case, we are losing our third biggest destination of export and our fifth trading partner but what matters to us most and it should matter also to the u.s. is the coherence of the 27. europe can remain the most privileged partner in the world

of the u.s. and a strong economically and political player on the global scene. now, this will be the most complicated divorce in history that we have ahead of us. we all treading on entirely new territory. it's difficult to predict what will happen as far as my country is concerned and most of the, all of the other countries in europe. we want relations that are as close as possible with the uk. we have a strong self-interest, but our priority is the unity of the 27 in europe. >> that brings up a wonderful set of issues for the lawyers and training for the audience. those are some negotiation questions. unity is important to the future

of europe. to secure a deal, it has to be done with the consensus of the remaining european countries. ambassador kmec, i'll spin around. how have you seen negotiations progressing recently? you remember the states and heads of the eu met in your capital. there were some notable frictions along a range of policy dimensions from migration to the support of southern economies but what do you take -- what are the take aways from that summit, number one, and number two, how do you perceive the take aways as interacting with the ability to negotiate all of the details within the two-year time line that would be started once article 50 is set in motion?

>> thank you very much. as i mentioned, we see the whole process as a chain of negotiations. it's really very important to reflect on the situation that has happened with brexit. there will be very complicated situations. colleagues mentioned that there will be, of course, red lines by different national capitals. it will go public, of course and there will be very many sentiments presented during those negotiations in public and in many political streams that are actually eager to work on further this integration of the european union. we need to be really cautious on how to move the european project further. there are, of course, two main questions, how to keep building the european identity.

the question is, are we there yet to have european identity? because i met very few europeans, if you asked them whether they are foremost for europeans or they have the affiliation to their national identity. the latter prevails. we are not there to be europeans, true europeans. this is very important message especially to the population that is leaning towards different radical and populous movements and messages. the second challenge in this reelection period will be how to move the whole project forward because we have the european union, euro zone, different layers of integration. we need to reflect on the --

where to actually build the ground zero now. how to move. the euro zone will become a fundmental playground to move further or we have to step back and actually start working on the weakest link of the integration and move further. >> ambassador, could you maybe discuss what we talked about momentarily in the green room about the technical aspects of getting those 27 members. what happens if there are disagreements and certainly there will be some kind of negotiation dynamics where different member states want to use or think about brexit as an opportunity to think deeper about not only their relationship with the european union and the relationship of the uk with the remaining member

states, but also the remaining member states at large with one another. how difficult is this and what are the kinds of steps that need to be put in place in order for those article 50 negotiations to begin? >> again, as peter said, as david said, you know, it's quite -- it's quite complicated. first, you know, when brexit occurred, my first analysis was, as usual, the british will be goody viding the 27. the -- three centuries to divide the continental powers to avoid there would be one main country on the continent. at the time, it was france. actually. so, you know, when you negotiate one against 27, it's to be on

the side of one than the side of 27. afterward there was -- partners, which means countries like slovakia, poland and hungary. there couldn't be a compromise limitation of the freedom of segregation of people. for me, it meant, you know, really, that when you need, you know, for instance, you can image that one european country a new country would consider that freedom of separation of people is not that important. so, it's ready make a compromise on that to get something else. but, at this point, you know, countries like poland and slovakia step in and say no way. it's only an example, but it means negotiation. i don't know how many -- every country will have its own red lines making another compromise because a compromise means that

actually you are forgetting some. it will make the negotiation extremely difficult. really, because compromising, every time you want to compromise on the night, you will have a country saying no way. it's really for me for interest. that's what i call the difficulty of the negotiation and frankly, i'm not that sure that we can reach a compromise even if we really do want them. maybe, actually, when you saw that prime minister may was referring to a hard brexit, it can be interpreted many ways. first, i have said chest banging, the negotiation so you don't try. i'm ready to go to hard brexit or it may also, conclusion say i look at the negotiation. i don't know how we can have a good, soft, mutual brexit or i'm ready, preparing everything, all

the ideas that we can find. so, again, that's -- i really want to end. as you said and as peter said, there are many fault lines in the european union. you know, it was referred about immigration with our european friends. our main concern would be, of course, to maintain the unity of the 27. so, it means that we are not going to accept that some uk demands which may actually endanger the unity of the 27. you know, really. that's also, i guess, an element which makes this negotiation still more difficult. >> ambassador o'sullivan. >> the notion of wreck lines has become toxic in this country and anywhere else.

i won't use that. but, maybe some of the premises under which we enter those or wait for the british to position themselves because the ball is in their court. number one, no prenegotiations before they trigger article 50. number two, that's what my chancellor and others, french president made clear, the integrity of the four freedoms. so, an exiting country cannot be better off exiting outside the eu than it was as a member. i think that's a very important principal otherwise, the eu would be in danger to unravel. now once article 50 is triggered and the prime minister of the uk said it will be happening by the end of march next year, there is a dynamic. it might be very ammicable, but

realistic. behind the seemingly technical issues are lurching, lurking political explosive issues. it's not only the article 50 negotiations. and maybe to unfold the complexity of the whole thing, there are many more processes. there is the process of di- vising a new trade arrangement for the uk in case they don't want, you know, the norwegian model, buying into the single market. there is the replacement of all the eu existing free trade agreements with other countries, they are 53. that's the british problem. it's now our problem. then there is this pressing, i think for the british, this very pressing demand to think about a transition. that's extremely important.

what happens to fill the gap between the end of the article 50 negotiations after two years and the new arrangements and then there is, for the british, the challenge to re-negotiate the wto membership which they have only, by virtue, right now by virtue or the european union. then the other issue, how to redevise the relationship and policy. arrangements, et cetera. it's not just this one article 50 dividing up the assets. it's a whole lot of arrangements that have to be sought. that's the complexity and the daunting task of the british they have in front of them. >> ambassador o'sullivan? >> i think gerard and peter laid

it out. just on the mechanics is the institutions and the institutional dynamic would be the following. when the united kingdom triggers article 50, it will be up to the commission to propose to the member states the 27 a negotiating position. that will turn into a mandate, which is adopted by the 27, the basis on which the commission on behalf will engage with the united kingdom. it's important to understand the point of different red lines. ultimately, that is how we in the european union overcome our differences. we have to agree on a common position to be the initial response to whatever it is that the british put on the table. that's the dynamic at all stages, the commission will be managing the negotiations but under the ultimately the supervision of the member states and the european parliament and

that die nynamic is never to be underestimated from a negotiation with 27 partners around whom you can go and talk and try to reach a consensus. there is actually a legal structure within which this will happen. peter said, article 50 is only one part of the negotiation. it is the air brushing of the uk out of the treaties and all the tidying up that needs to be done to make it happen. that is complicated. at the end of the day, it is straight forward in the sense of what you are trying to do. the second part, however, is what is the new relationship. that is going to be more complicated. that will not be negotiated under article 50 depending on what the uk suggests and proposes as the starting point. then, given that article 50 has a time limit of two years, there is no time limit on the negotiating the new arrangement, depending on what that is. if it is a classical