and the engagement outside the city highlighting john bell hood's attack on union forces commanded by general sherman. stephen davis talks about his actions at the 1863 battle of chancellorsville. atlanta eventually fell to sherman's troops six weeks later. this 40 minute talk was part of a symposium. >> it is my pleasure now to introduce to you a man that i know as dr. edge. steve davis has a little bit of edge to him. if you want to know what that is about -- his business card says author, historian, yankee killer. [laughter] that should give you a little bit of context about the program we are about to hear.

i had the pleasure of meeting steve a couple of years ago. he lives in the shadow of atlanta's great battlefield. as we got talking, our mutual publishers said when you sit down with steve, he will make eye contact with you and it is like his eyes will bore right through your head. i found that to be true, but what he didn't tell me and i discovered on my own is not only is steve intense, but he is also an intense pleasure. talk about a man who is so deeply devoted to history. he is quick to jump up and remind everybody there was fighting too. we will shift from the campaign to look at the corresponding actions in georgia that led to

atlanta. with the city on the brink of peril and the armies struggling and clashing. steve davis put together the text and information for the civil war trust electronic version of the battle of atlanta. you can take a look at his handiwork there. he is a former book review editor. he is the current book review editor for civil war news. he has several books on the emerging civil war campaign series. i'm delighted to introduce you my friend from the great state of georgia, stephen davis. [applause] stephen: i want to thank the doctor for that very kind introduction. i want to thank you all for having endured through an overly-hot room in our sixth hour of lectures. as chris implies, jim ogden, lee and i are the three antidotes to what i call eastern

theatricality. we are the guys from the western theater reminding you it was fought and won there by the yankees and lost by my guys. i'm drawing from my paperback that will come out in about a month or so. my paperbacks cover a narrative of the atlanta campaign. i want to thank chris and dan for allowing me to write for them. let's talk about hood's great attacking battle of july 22 which is now called the battle of atlanta. a misnomer as i will argue. first of all, after the battle, it was simply called -- here you

have general sherman and his report simply called it the battle of july 22. general dodge and other yankees after the war started to call it the battle of atlanta and the name stuck. look at this map. you will see the battle of peachtree creek, ezra church and you will see the battle of atlanta. when it was put together in the 1880's, they called it the painting of the battle of atlanta. it was albert castille who said let's call it something different. maybe the battle of bald hill. i still prefer calling it the battle of july 22. first of all, there was a lot of action on july 22 not just around the bald hill. the hill has been bulldozed through.

even the marker that once rested atop the hill at moreland avenue and i-20 has been moved south of the interstate. finally, i object to any piece of georgia real estate being named after a yankee general. general claiborne held that day for a day. let's call it claiborne hill, everybody, for god's sake. [laughter] there were three battles of atlanta, not just one. i'm surprised my good friend who wrote this book called it the battle and burning of atlanta. there were three battles. the battle of peachtree creek, north of the city. and, west of the city at ezra church.

why should we commemorate it? it has been on the civil war bubblegum card. i was in the seventh grade when these things came out. there is the house on the five cent packet of gum from 1961. that was a great bubblegum card. the main reason i am boring in -- i want to thank the sponsors of the symposia again for going into the battle of july 22 -- it allows us to compare what happened when they launched two flanking attacks. one was successful in chancellorsville. let's talk about the failure. first of all, a step back. joe johnston from the first week of may to the second week of july gave up nine successive positions from dalton all the way to the chattahoochee. sherman outnumbered him at the start of the campaign 2:1 but he did not use his superior numbers

to bludgeon his way through the rebel ranks. like a grandma was doing at spotsylvania and wilderness. but using them instead to fix johnston's position with shelling, skirmishing, while he would send a flanking column around the rebel left flank and forcing johnston to retreat successively. finally, when johnston got across the lake, davis had to fire him. the president and his cabinet spent a full week gathering all the information that they could, especially from general bragg. he even held a cabinet meeting which took place on the morning of july 14. he talked with bob lee, lee did not like the idea of relieving army of tennessee commanders but

the president did it anyway, firing joe johnston on the 17th. as i say, the lieutenant general was not the corps commander and was placed in command. lee had turned down the army of tennessee command in december after the disaster at missionary ridge. the local guardian angel of history where i come from is wilbur g. crist. here is his oil painting. sherman, as he holed up close to atlanta, did not look to use his superior numbers, especially against the rebel fortifications. which i show here in a diagram that was drawn april of 1864 were formidable. then, it ringed the city in circumference.

rather, sherman plan to capture atlanta by capturing the rebel railroads. this is a testament to the weak cartography. i had to draw my own map. you see the georgia railroad going to augusta. the macon and western down to macon and eventually savannah. cut the railroads, that is what he wanted to do. the plan was succeeding. there is the book on sherman's calvary. it reminds us that the line was cut from montgomery in mid july, cutting 26 miles or so. it was out of operation for at least a month. when sherman and mcpherson were going east of atlanta, they

cended on stone mountain. more on the east. hood, on his first full day of command, faced this situation with at least four or thomas's division and corps south of the peachtree creek. most of thomas's army was north -- south of the peachtree creek. most of thomas's army was north of peachtree creek. mcpherson's army corps coming in schofield coming in from the northeast. mcpherson's army corps coming in from decatur. hood saw an opportunity to attack peachtree on july 20. as castille said, they actually had favorable odds with the attack again around 4 p.m., but they repulsed by the end of the day.

mcpherson was approaching from the east. we talked about the perils of colorization. here he is colorized in great photograph. in fort wheeler, they were joined by cleburne. cleburne was thrown in on a night march, july 20-21, to help wheeler's troopers, who were trying to defend leggitt hill. on the 20th, the yankee artillery got within a couple miles east of atlanta and started lobbing shells downtown. night of july 20, 21st, sherman's biggest blunder of the campaign. he had a fixation about wrecking the rebel railroads. even though garrard's calvary

and mcpherson's infantry had wrecked the georgia railroad between decatur and points west, he orders the cavalry division to leave the left flank and go to covington to burn more bridges and tear up more tracks. this left the left flank in the air. mcpherson was alone and notified -- was alarmed and notified shortly after garrard headed out notified commander sherman , who did not care. ,he did not rescind the order. meanwhile however, mac is worried and starts ordering dodge's 16th corps to help guard the flank. an infantry brigade to help guard the wagontry.

the 17th corps held the left and warns that in the afternoon and evening of the 21st, watch out for attack. sherman's blunder gave hood a great tactical gift. wheeler, within one hour of garrard heading to the east, he reports the yankee flank is in the air. this gives hood the immediate opportunity to decide to launch his flanking attack in the rear and flank. on the afternoon of the 21st, lickety-split, he develops his plan. here is the perimeter. during the night of the 21st-22nd, they will go into the main confederate works. these corps would keep marching through the city out by the

mcdonough road, eventually go northeast and into position to attack the yankee army of the tennessee. general hood just asked for too much. after an all-night march, the infantry corps will launch a morning attack? confederates were supermen, but they could not do it all. moreover, he asked wheeler to accompany for part of the march and keep going to attack mcpherson's wagon train at decatur. here is my map colorized from my first book. they recognized the jacksonian

nature of his plan. flank and rear. emulating stonewall jackson, mcdonough and jones, chancellorsville. it promises to be a great victory. here's rust bonds. everyone recognizes hood's plan. he looks to emulate jackson's great roll up. on the afternoon and evening of the 21st, he calls a high-level command meeting downtown on peachtree. all three infantry corps commanders, plus wheeler and the militia leader, attend. hood goes through each of their roles. the movement is to begin after sunset to make certain the yankees do not spot the rebels drawing from their outer lines. cleburne had already been

marching and fighting the night of the 20th, 21st and now he will march again on the night of the 21st and 22nd, that is asking a lot. maney's division is with cleburne as well and does not get through the city until the middle of the night, 3:00 a.m. hardy with his late start, knowing the debilitated state of his troops, stops in along the way circa 10:00 or 11:00 and asks hood, hey, i cannot get into the yankee rear by morning. can we modify the attack? maybe a flank attack? saideir dying day, hardy hood declined. no, i didn't modify my order. as i say, hood asked too much. underestimating the distance hardy's troops would have to march.

wilbur kurtz got in his car in the 1930's and traveled from the confederate outer line through town and by the route down the mcdonough road that hardy's troops would have had to march. by the time he left the outer line and got to where cleburne first attacked the yankees, it was 13.5 miles or more. if you follow the pattern, the divisions had to march even further. kurtz's odometer is 15 miles in an all night march. wheeler's calvary were not particularly effective. some of the troopers peeled away and took advantage of the abandoned houses and stores and looted them. one discussed the confederate -- one disgusted confederate saw the calvary men and said the horses were basically covered

up, could not see them with all the plunder atop the saddles. during the march, wheeler's troops got into the way of the slogging infantryman and bollocks-upped the march group. general hardee, his troops or marching and fighting. the men were virtually sleeping en route. they were piled into each other like boxcars on a colliding train. here's the great book on the battle. and hundreds, if not thousands of confederates fell asleep along the line of march. he believes maybe a quarter of hardee's was lost by the time of contact the next day. yet, by 5:00 a.m., bates

division marched a dozen miles. at this point, hardee who was behind bate and walker calls a halt and seeks help. he has to find his own guys. cobb offers to volunteer but warns of bad terrain ahead. cobb warned it is a tangle of wilderness. that there is swampy ground, sugarcreek. he volunteered to lead cleburne and he offered one of his mill hands to help lead walker and bate into battle. meanwhile, mac has his worries about a rebel attack which he had begun to fear on the afternoon of july 21 confirmed

when a single station, lieutenant samuel edge sees dust columns and they can only be rebel troops. by 9:00 or 10:00 a.m., he sends the intel into hq allowing mcpherson to respond. mcpherson orders an infantry division, the 16th corps. tohe sends another brigade the area, brought up artillery. and by new, july to the yankees may 2, are in position. moreover, they are perpendicular to the end of blair's line facing south, the very direction from which the rebels will attack. i'm married to a yankee, y'all. [laughter] there are times like this where she says, steve, i will give just shy of a prince's ransom if you would devote to me just a

portion of the passion you give to these long dead rebels. [laughter] says i, i cannot, sweetheart. you are a yankee. i know, i'm walking into the den of the lion. welcome to the south, brothers and sisters. the confederates the employment was anything but easy given the terrain and the fact that they were all tired and foot sore. these men slogged through underbrush, muck, knee-deep water. he got so angry that he wanted to shoot case turner until major cumming cools him down. just a half hour before noon, hardee knows he is behind, knows he has not gained the yankee

rear so he orders cleburne to attack in flank. he could not see where the yankees were. he said, just go on ahead. i don't need to tell you how surprised bate and walker were that instead of rolling up the flank, they found sweeney's division ready for them. you see this marker along moreland avenue. general bate -- i was ignorant of what i would see but i didn't expect to see yankees with batteries ahead of me. with men tired and demoralized, the contact fell apart. general walker shot from his horse and walker's division is even repelled. this cannon was set in concrete at the presumed place of walker's death.

it is now wilkinson avenue and memorial, i think. wheeler also got a surprise when he rode towards decatur. he found a brigade guarding the wagon train. whoa, i thought i was going to capture them en masse. the infantry holds them off long enough for the wagons to gallop away. by the time he's about the change down the yankee wagon, hardee calls him back to assist in the attack that afternoon. at the start of the firing, mcpherson rode to the sound of the guns. he runs into skirmishes called upon some tennesseans to surrender. he tips his hat, turns, and shop -- bang! shot through the back.

he falls mortally wounded and dead within minutes. during the occupation of the city, the site was marked. late 1870's, u.s. army officers raise this monument at the very site and you see it today. monument and mcpherson avenue. cleburne's attack, unlike bate's and walker's, enjoyed some -- which quickly withered enjoyed some initial success. , capturing prisoners and a couple of batteries, but they run into stiffening resistance as they get close to the bald hill. general hood had ridden out of meanwhile the city and in an , area today that is an open cemetery. hood in the second floor of a house then, watched the fate of cleburne's attack.

he calls in some infantry to march east from the city works and pursue the attack in the echelon way we have talked about today. cheatham's center most division actually cracks the yankee line. some of you in the emerging civil war series may see this photograph in one of the paperbacks of general jackson's attack. the folks at spotsylvania park label this as jackson's flank attack. no, it is south carolinians overrunning the line. do not steal our illustration. don't steal our illustration of the great victory. [laughter] logan, theal john 15th corps commander rallies his

, troops. you can see blackjack. he pushes them back. brown and clayton's divisions have to withdraw into the woods. here is the famous scene. manigault behind cotton bales. the union overrun the lines. the yankee counterattack is shown in the lower right. one last confederate attack trying to take bald hill fails. in the end, the confederates are repulsed and pulled back. 3 3700ies, federal 5500 confederate. , sherman watched from the house that is today in the northeast corner of the carter center perimeter. i pointed this out to president

carter when he had me to dinner to talk about this with his family a few years ago. despite hood's inability to deliver a flank attack, the battle of july 22 was as close as hood came to a battlefield tactical victory during his generalship. it inflicted more casualties on enemy forces than any of his other battles. it killed off general mcpherson, the only union army commander at wilson creek. the confederates drove the enemy from division works. and they captured a dozen pieces of artillery. they only rolled up 14 guns. the confederate artillery haul, the seventh-largest in the field of battle during the war by my count. as i say, it was as close as victory as hood got.

he trumpeted the news. the press association blared it. by the next day in richmond, this headline was appearing "glorious success by our arms." the richmond papers even ran an extra to carry the story. wrote davis that was it true that general hood won a glorious victory at atlanta? we know it didn't really turn out that way. if you can come close to a victory, i say trumpet it. [laughter] he certainly lost the campaign, however. long story short, a month later, it was sherman who got his infantry on the railroad and cut the last confederate railroad leaving out of atlanta south towards macon. this is a map i had commissioned for my first book and i have colorized it. the yankees here on the macon and western, about the time,

3:00 p.m., that hood ordered his infantry to attack down here. it was not the battle of jonesboro that sealed atlanta's fate. it was the fact that the infantry got a hold of the railroad about the time party -- ardee was launching his attack. the interdiction of the railroad forced hood to evacuate atlanta. here is the famous scene from the movie. mayor calhoun surrendered the city. sherman here photographed in a federal fort west of the city. he dow telegraphs lincoln. let's get back to the comparison we have. you know what?

said, we are going to have a lot of eastern theatricality. let me import some near victory from the western theater, but i will throw a thought to the eastern theatricality cats. and compare hood's attacking battle with jackson's. it is most instructive in terms of tactical differences between the two fights to count for victory of our arms in the one and the failure of our arms in the second one. one, lee's experience as a tactical planner. bonesd already made his planning great flanking attacks .ike at second manassas john hennessy said in his book, that was the largest attacking

battle that lee delivered during the war, 25,000 troops. so lee knew how to do it. good had never done anything like that. a couple of days into his army command, this was only his second battle as commander. that is an important factor. two, understanding of and enthusiasm for the plan. i am drawing on chris' book, why lee and jackson were so giddy about the possibility of rolling up the 11th core, they were even excited at their prospects. on the other hand, hardee was worried. remember, riding through town he asked hood to alter his attack. hardee was going into battle worried and certainly not

enthusiastic. third difference, the relationship between the army commander and flanking column leader. lee and jackson were marvels, it was a marvelous example of a great congruence of talent. on the other hand, hood and hardee were not especially best buds. as we know later on in the campaign hardee is writing his , wife complaining johnson is giving so much attention to hood. and if you remember, hardee had for sagan army command them -- command andmy his junior is promoted over him. finally, and what i have not mentioned to you, after the failure of his attack at peachtree creek, hood began to

criticize hardee for launching his attack so he knows he is already being stung at plates --at hood's headquarters. that is not a good working relationship. fourth, tactical talent and experience of the attack column commanders, jackson was brilliant where essentially he told someone here is the plan, go and do it. on the other hand, hardee's best-known epithet is "old reliable." he is not a genius, but he is plotting and reliable. that is a big difference. position of the men. jack allowed his men to sleep all night and have breakfast before they set out at 7:00 a.m. hardee troops were slogging through all night. jackson knew his march through with 10 to 12 miles. hardee had no idea.

in fact, hood later in his memoir thought it is probably just the distance between my outer works and decatur. hold was completely in the dark about the length of his march through which thanks to kurtz and others, it has been estimated at more than a dozen miles, maybe time allowed for 15. hood'sch and lee and expectations for the attack time lee just said get into position. , he did not order a dawn or morning attack. hood challenged hardee to keep his attackd launched in the morning. that is unrealistic. the weather, jed hotchkiss talks about the first days being pleasant in his diary. welcome to atlanta, georgia, in the third week in july. it ain't pleasant and even at

night, the temperatures are still teetering toward 90 degrees. road conditions, we have talked about the brigade, greg's brigade, and caldwell talks about how the roads in the wilderness were still moist and spongy to the step. hardee, this is atlanta georgia. it is hot, dusty red clay. calvary service, i have alluded to the fact that wheeler did not do very well after he brought in frank.el about max service to wheeler's the assault was mediocre. on the other hand, they brought in the intel that the 11th core was in the air and helped find guides and maps to direct jackson's column, and accompanied it all throughout.

general hood did not help when he ordered wheeler off, so that hardee was plumbing through the woods on his own. lee directed jack to the point where they could see the yankee end of the line. uck, that quantifiable but certainly present factor everywhere on the battlefield. as jackson's forces are marching across his front, some of the corps soldiers are able to see woodsrebels off in the and report it. he sends the intel up the chain of command. as sears points out in his book on the battle of chancellorsville, no one responded. on the other hand, mac was already apprehensive and when lieutenant edge on the

morning of the 22nd sent in his observation report, mac acted, that is just kind of low. hooker and his officers were so indifferent to this intel that they sent even if his cavalry had been present in the wilderness it probably would not have mattered. man and his troops spotted jackson, who is to say he would not have disregarded those words, too? we are up to a dozen differences between chancellorsville and east of atlanta. jed hotchkiss drew a map, tucker lacy already alluded to, and charles welford corroborated it. hardee had no such man and he did not have the local guides

with him. he had to find his own guides two thirds of the way toward his objective. difficulty of deployment. jackson's went smoothly if you remember. jack was in position circa 3:00 p.m. and spent another two and a quarter hours getting his troops into just the right position. hardee had run out of time and was operating blind in the thick, swampy underbrush east of atlanta. at a certain point, walker said let me redirect. hardee said no. this attack has been delayed, follow my orders. numbers engaged. k against 11. better than 2-1 odds. hardee has 11. remember the attrition from straggling. if you count up the 16th and

17th core, the yankees outnumber the confederates. that is certainly not a 2-1 advantage for the southerners. condition of the enemy troops, the 11th core, the yankees of howard were demoralized. a lot of the troops were green, had not fought. and then most of them had never been in a successful battle. so much for the 11th coro. on the other hand, mcpherson's army, 15th, 16th, 17th, they are veterans and they share their commander's confidence. condition of the troops, kind of a factor. most important of all, the enemies' awareness and preparation for the attack. the yankees had seen jackson's, march but at army command they disregarded the intel. great god.

they thought that jackson was reading a retreat of lee's army, the enemy is fleeing. meanwhile, however, mcpherson was ready and used every bit of intel to amass troops, facing the likely direction from which the rebels would attack. for all these reasons, jackson's attack may 2 rolled up the 11th corps. hood's attack july 22, despite initial success failed to have those similar successes. i am fond of quoting hood's memoir. afterward he wrote, "no man is justly entitled to be a great general unless he admits it to himself."

general hood failed in his battle of july 22 so he was no jackson. but he saw an opportunity, he acted upon it, he marshaled his troops with as great a command as he could. in other words, he tried as hard as he could and thereby despite the absence of success on july 22, john bell hood earned his spurs that day. i will close with this. i am a big fan of "broken arrow" in 1996. wu and when deacon tells pritchett, battle is a highly fluid situation, ask john bell hood about that east of atlanta july 22. that is the story of the war. see you around. [applause] >> we have time for a couple of

questions. [indiscernible] [laughter] >> i think we discussed this a bit this morning. but it would seem one of the other big differences was by shermans menlot of have repeaters. how much of an impact do you think that had? >> i do not know how many of those guys had repeating rifles. some of spriggs' guys at decatur had repeating rifles. i do not know the preponderance or raw number of repeating rifles in the 15th, 16th, 17th corps. but thanks very much, that is worth looking up later. >> another question. >> we know that the audience is well in need of air-conditioning and hydration when after the first question, the audience is

fairly flagged and exhausted. [laughter] thank you all. [applause] >> this weekend on cspan3, today at 7:00, the texas general land office commissioner, the state senator, and musician talk about the spanish mission, the alamo, at the 2016 texas tribune festival in austin. >> the memories of my impressions of that time were that this group of people going and knew that they were going to die, but they went or were there. noblewas something very and romantic. i have learned it was not quite as black and white. that is one of the things i think would be good in this day and age that we put it into

context. >> sunday evening at 6:00. >> macarthur is upfront. he is not wearing a weapon. he would often lead attacks carry nothing but the riding crop. the men looked at this and realized if the colonel and later the brigadier and take it, i can take it, too. >> revisit the macarthur memorial in norfolk, virginia, to learn about the early life of douglas macarthur who commanded allied forces in the pacific during world war ii. at 8:00. >> the great service also serve as conscience in chief of the highest level of integrity, with their moral compass locked on true north so we can always count on them to do the right thing when times get tough or no one is looking. >> the author explains his "10 commandments for presidential leadership" and provides

examples of presidents who excelled at each one. for our complete schedule, go to c-span.org. next, the author talks about how washington changed during the gilded age focusing on the expansion of the railroad system in the building of union station and the lincoln memorial. the u.s. capital historical society hosted this 40-minute event. >> it is good to be here with old friends. this is one of a series of books i have written on washington, d.c. it has been a great opportunity to develop the concept of washington as a national capital and ultimately as an international capital. it has been a great opportunity.