♪ c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> and c-span3 live today at potomac institute for policy studies for discussions about the challenges facing nato with terrorism, humanitarian crises,

weapons of mass destruction and cyber security. we'll be hearing from a panel of current and former government officials. live coverage here on c-span3.

c-span3 live today at potomac institute for policy studies. they're talking about terrorism, humanitarian crises, weapons of mass destruction. we'll hear from current and former government officials. and also want to let you know that later on today, live, join us for road to the white house coverage. democratic presidential nominee hillary clinton live at 6:15 p.m. eastern in ohio. all this week on c-span3 in prime time, american history tv. a focus on native american history starting at 8:00 eastern.

folks, i guess we're ready

to start. so, along with our state department colleague and all of our distinguished panelists, we welcome you to this, i think, very, very timely discussion on the north treaty alliance, the post-warsaw pact agreement and the like and where do we go from here. for 67 years, as all of you know, we've had the nato alliance and it was always designed really to keep the peace. and to do things that are proper and consistent with really the western civilization we knew at the time, but it includes really the whole world. i had the opportunity many years ago to participate in a number of high-level nato exercises and certainly nato meetings. and they were -- they were always more than matter of military. they took into account political

considerations, economic considerations, societal considerations and the like. and i never went to one of those meetings without learn an awful lot and coming back and prepared to do what hi to do in my participate role. i think as we all know after the -- after the ending of the former soviet union and the like, nato opportunities began to shift, even before the former soviet union left us, even before that nato began to be interested in what they called out of area considerations and the like in north africa and elsewhere around the world. that was a start. since then, as you know as well as any of one of our distinguished panelists, they have done many more things besides just the sole purpose of

defending the countries in the nato alliance. certainly their work with the european union and the like, all of that, i think, is not only very timely but of great interest today. so, without further ado, i'll kick this thing off here with -- do you want to take the lead here and introduce our first speaker and the like and our -- >> sure. >> and our panelists. can you make it? >> one too many chairs up here. >> thank you very much, general, for your opening remarks. our speakers and the distinguished audience that includes first and foremost our wonderful interns and students are going to be the next generation of scholars and

professional diplomats and media people. there are some of our body guards there. very quickly -- okay. obviously, we would like to invite, first, the panel, but i'm going to share it with our colleague, richard trussin, from the office of european security, political and military affairs at the u.s. state department. incidentally, we have for you the bios in great detail, so you can look at that later on, so we'll save a little bit of time. i've worked with richard for quite a number of years.

first and foremost, we published that particular book. this is not commercial, but on nato we worked on for a number of years. but actually, the journey begins really over 50 years ago when, as a participant, i had the opportunity to work with -- initially with the u.n. and then with nato during the cold war. i won't go into it, but at least we produced an academic book and we want to follow up with the work on nato. we also produced a report which was based on a similar seminar we held right here a number of months ago.

but let me first begin that we actually co-sponsored this event, in addition, of course, to the potomac institute and center for terrorism studies with our colleagues with international law institute, law school as well as the center for national security law of the university of virginia school of law. now, the rationale basically, i think, for having this event is the general already mentioned in terms of marking, let's say, the 28th anniversary of nato. nato daily broad range of new challenges including piracy and terrorism, original global

security conflict, humanitarian crises, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber, and the list goes on and on. in the face of this strategic and other concerns, in the aftermath of the warsaw summit that focuses on various issues that we're going to detail including the modernization of the alliance, and projecting stability and all that, really the question arises for us as both professionals, academic and future scholars and dips and so on. basically, whether the 28th nation members of nato, and some

are represented in this audience, will continue to play the central role, political role, the military role in the coming months and years. and we can really go into a very long list of the challenges which are in the front pages of the media every single day. so, with that i would like to invite a person to-to-share the moderation of this event and introduce some of his colleagues and we're going to move on. why don't you come up here first. >> richard prosin from the state department, i work for the guy, the gentleman to my left, in the office of european regional

security and political military affairs. i've had the pleasure working with him for many years. it's been an excellent collaborative project and i would commend the book to you for your reading in nato from regional to global security provider. i'm very pleased to be with you today to help co-moderate today's event. i want to express my appreciation to our distinguished panelists, members and also to potomac institute for policy studies for hosting today's event. nato as an alliance acquires its potency not only from its military capabilities but also from its democratic ideals. from our belief in human dig and our respect for human aspirations. in fact, the washington treaty, which founded nato in 1949, em fatticly states our collective defense alliance is also a community of values founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. we are now at a pivotal moment, i would argue, for our alliance.

in the nearly 70 years of nato's existence, maybe have we never faced such a range of challenges all at once. security, humanitarian and political. yet nato is as important and violation for our security as ever, especially as we face a more dangerous road ahead. terrorism, as we know, affects us all from brussels to san bernardino to orlando, nice, paris and the list goes on. we stand together in the fight against daesh. nato is stepping up by contributing awax aircraft to improve our overall intelligence reconnaissance. nato is moving forward with enhanced information-sharing measures and other capabilities as well. we have to remember nato's biggest military operation in afghanistan was a direct response to 9/11. as president obama and other leaders have noted in warsaw, we did far more than simply

reaffirm our article 5 obligations to our common security. ally as greed to the most significant reinforcement of our collective defense at any time since the cold war. warsaw just this summer. one of the bumper -- well, the bumper sticker headline for warsaw was nato, an aessential alliance protecting our citizens and projecting stability. nato secretary-general stoltenberg recently at a discussion, he had in harvard just a month ago said kind of poignantly put this together in the phrase, standing together as we always have done, stronger together as we always have been. i think that summarizes where we are right now with nato. in short, with renewed strength, resources and capability, nato will continue to uphold our shared values and meet the full range of shared threats. together with my colleagues from

potomac institute, we have provided documents and few background documents on the -- from the nato's press office. the nato press office put together a summary narrative that was handed out to summarize nature toe's and alliance's recent accomplishments. the goal of today's event is simple and yet important. we would like to take stock of where we are and nato's capabilities and operations of today and provide suggestions on ways ahead for the near future. we are pleased you could join us here today. we look forward to a stimulating and thought-provoking discussion from our panel of experts. with that, i would like to turn it over to the gentleman to my left, joe manso, director of the office that handles nato policy at u.s. department of state. joe? >> thanks, richard. okay. today's topic is nato's post-warsaw agenda.

i would like to put a brief spin on what happened just before warsaw and what happened after warsaw. so, before warsaw we had another summit, the whale summit, that actually had significant accomplishments in three areas. the first area was strengthening of nato itself in terms of the tools available to the alliance and the creation of two new programs. one for enhanced opportunity partners, which brought a number of nations much closer to the alliance, finland, sweden, georgia, australia and jordan. each one bringing unique capabilities and regional insights and these nations are now working with nato in a very close way. also led to the creation of something called defense capacity building missions. the thought here being that part of the security structure as we look forward is going to be training countries around the world in terms of building their

military and security capabilities. so, these two things were created at the wr saw -- at the whale summit. in addition, of course, wales came after soviet intervention or russian intervention -- i date myself -- in ukraine and the immediate reaction of the allies, which was quite firm, was upheld at wales. part of this was the creation of the readiness action plan and the deployment of allied forces on a rotational basis in certain parts of eastern europe and also the suspension of dait day-to-day activities of the nato/russia council, keeping open, however, the possibility of political level discussions at the level of ambassadors. and the third area of work, which occurred at wales, but was largely on the margins of the summit but occurred there physically was the creation of

the counter isil coalition. it was a very intense 48-hour period of activity at wales where a lot got done. this sets the stage as these decisions were implemented for the warsaw summit. now, in warsaw, again, i would divide the work of the summit into three baskets. the three baskets would be work that was done in the east as we move from reassurance to deter rans. a large part is the enhanced forward presence, the deployment of four battalions and four eastern european countries, the three balts and poland, the u.s., germany, canada and the uk taking the lead for these battalions but a number of other allies also contributing forces. in addition, we had just before the summit, an exercise that certified the very high readiness joint task force as part of nato's rapid reaction capabilities and we also had

agreement on a tailored presence in southeastern europe. so, this was part of the package of moving from reassurance to deterrence. also a package regarding those in the south. nato was prepared to offer support to the counter-isil coalition, particularly in the areas of awax flights and defense-capability building and nato offered support to the eu, in particular to "operation sophia" in the central med. this was a package of issues related to security challenges coming from the south. and the third basket of issues i would look at in terms of both new challenges and an increasing more effective nato/eu cooperation. nato in the eu issued a joint

declaration. they were going to work on a number of things more together, including hybrid, including cyber, and this is something we're following very carefully. if we look at the recent defense minister's meeting at the end of october, we see that progress has been made on all these fronts. that indeed, the nations that are the framework nations for enhanced forward presence will in the first half of next year be deploying the battalions as agreed into eastern europe. these are on a rotational basis. "operation sophia" in the eu have requested nato support and nato has agreed to provide both information and sharing in situational awareness as well as logistical support to sophia. they've also agreed to continue the activity and, of course, nato is working on further -- furthering its cooperation with the eu. and i would expect that at foreign ministers in december,

we will see a more detailed report of where we are on implementation of our cooperation with the eu. so this brings us wales and warsaw, i think, together represent very significant development in terms of nato's -- both its actual capabilities and the focus of the alliance. nato has always been a political military alliance. allies can come to discuss with their allies, in fact, any security issue that is of concern to them at nato. nato has also been able to adapt to a new security environment through these two summits. so, finally, as we look forward, the brussels summit has been agreed to for next year. it's difficult for me to go into a lot of detail into the brussels summit for a couple of reasons. one is, in fact, allies have not yet agreed formally on an agenda

for the brussels summit, but also because some of you may have heard we have an election in the united states in the next week and i can't commit the new administration to any kind of policy. what i would say is, very likely allies will be looking in brussels to take a look at the decisions that were made at warsaw and to take stock of the implementation of those decisions, which do seem to be on track and will be an important part of the brussels summit. i'll conclude, i've worked on and off with nato summit. i must say that i was very, very favorably impressed by the mood. allies at the summit by the prompt action and the firm

action that they took by the level of unity and the spirit of unity, both in terms of reassurance and deterrence and in terms of the need to take action to new challenges -- regarding new challenges in the south. and i was also struck by the empathy allies -- where eastern allies understood that they were different but real security concerns in the south and southern allies understood that there were real but different security concerns in the east. so, i would say that nato, while not a perfect alliance is a healthy alliance and we can look forward to next year with some degree of confidence. thank you. >> our next speaker is kurt volker. >> if you can see me, i'll do it from here, is that okay? great, thank you. thanks very much. i'm going to pick up right where

joe left off, which is even though the topic here is nato after the warsaw summit, i'm going to start off with nato after november 8th. my thought there to start off with is that it is important we remember first who we are. the united states is a democracy, a market economy, a country that cherishes freedom and abide by the rule of law, seeks the rule of law, seeks human rights and seeks to build security in the world. we are best off in a world in which those things are respected and those things are growing in the world. and we are best off when we are working with allies who share those same values and same goals and we are building security together. and that's why nato continues to be a vital interest for the united states today, during the

cold war, currently and also after november 8th and looking forward, the united states needs a healthy, strong, vibrant nato for its own well-being, for its own u.s. national security interest. we need a strong and effective nato. we are facing around nato, nato countries, the most security challenges we have seen in a generation. let's tick them off. we have russia has has invaded ukraine, has annexed crimea, that continues to support insurance and destabilize the government in kiev, to russia that has invaded and occupy and continues to occupy two parts of georgia, and just "the new york times" just the other day had a piece how they continuously move the border around in the parts they occupy in georgia.

. they have violated the cfe treat y the vie enthat confidence building, inf treaty, violated the budapest memorandum which guaranteed ukraine security for giving up nuclear weapons. of all the agreements done after 1989, they all contained the language respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all european states and refraining from the threat or use of force and refraining from changing borderers by force. russia has thrown all of that out of the window. in addition to all those russia-centric things with the military buildup, threatening nuclear use, violating country's air space and sea space, we also have the largest refugee crisis plaguing europe in a generation and one that has destabilized politics in europe substantially, some going into power, some not in power but challenging the politics there.

we have the -- that refugee crisis is part of the largest humanitarian crisis we've seen in our lifetimes as well since world war ii at least where the syrian civil war has had the assad regime kill somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 of its own people and has produced over 12 million displaced persons. more than half the country is displaced as a result of this. we most recently saw russia's intervention in syria on behalf of the assad government, together with iran and hezbollah. they're laying siege to aleppo in some of the most barbaric direct attacks on civilians we have seen, again, since world war ii. we face an ungoverned state in libya and that is a particular concern for nato because it was nato's military operation that took out the gadhafi government. unlike bosnia, kosovo or

afghanistan, nato did not do a follow-on operation in libya to try to gather weapons, create a monopoly of security and a single security sector and build the mechanisms of a state. that is still something that needs to be done while nato is vital for the united states looking forward, if issing an environment that is more dangerous and more challenging than anything we have seen since the cold war. and nato's adaptation after 1989, i think, was all in the right direction. it was all moving and doing many of the right things. this is continued emphasis on collective defense, a new focus on crisis management such as in bosnia or kosovo or afghanistan. focus on building partnerships, so nato doesn't view the world as a theater of operations but also a theater where we work with partners to try to deal with security challenges together. nato enlarged, it went from 16 members during the cold war to

28 and soon to be 29 today. it built -- it sought to built a constructive relationship with russia through the permanent joint council and it transformed its military capabilities from massive heavy armed forces in europe to lighter, more mobile ones. while doing this, nato lost a tremendous deal of public support, particularly after the war in iraq, which caused a lot of european publics to want to distance from the united states. countries wanted to cash in on a peace dividend. we saw a massive decline in nato defense spending. we saw a disappointment and dispiritedness with the intervention in afghanistan that left allies less and less willing to engage in crisis management. at that same time nato was in that kind of decline, that's where we saw russia turn itself around. we saw it invade its neighbors, violate agreements, all these things i've said.

what i've seen most recently with nato is, perhaps, hitting bottom and beginning to pull back up again. we've seen some countries, particularly those in the east increase defense spending. we've seen the deployment of forces in the baltic states, poland, bulgaria, we've seen an effort to put nato further east. and i think in this respect we should be very grateful to retired phil breedlove who led this effort within nato. he essentially took over where there was a lack of will, lack of political decision-making and allied capitals and he kept nato's core article x defense commitment alive. but, unfortunately, in these other areas of crisis management and partnership and enlargement and so forth, nato has really lost some steam. so, the next thing i would say is that as a new administration takes office, one thing we can

be certain of is adversaries or opponents around the world will seek to challenge that new u.s. government. to see how they will react. i think we will see efforts to test a new administration from russia, from china, from isis, from north korea, perhaps from cuba. and we hope a new u.s. administration is up to the challenge. and i think it needs to look at these proactively. it needs to define clear goals, clear lines, clear strategies and have them upheld from the beginning days of the administration in order to create stability. on that i'll close on this. the question was posed in the written material, what should be on the 100-day agenda for the new administration in dealing with nato? i would say that four things are critical for that new administration. one, reaffirm the centrality and u.s. commitment to article v of

the nato treaty. this is the heart of nato. we can't be casting any doubt about it. the u.s. needs to be clear and committed to collective defense. second, we need to call on nato to re-engage in crisis management. all these crises that i mentioned, ukraine, georgia, syrian refugee, syrian civil war, isis, libya, these are things that nato is largely not dealing with -- or not dealing with effectively at the moment. and i think a new administration needs to call on nato to do that. finally -- thirdly, i'm sorry, thirdly, we need to reiterate our commitment and belief to a europe whole free and at peace. a europe where all the people of europe have the same rights as everybody else to chart their own destiny as democracies, market economies in a secure environment. there shouldn't be a dividing line that says some countries that happen to make it in in 2002 are covered and those that were left out, well, too bad and

now you're part of russia's fear of influence. we should not accept that. finally, we should reach out to russia but we should do so on the basis of making clear that russia has the choice to make. nato is there as a collective defense organization. one, based on these core values. it does not threaten anyone or seek to threaten anyone, but it will be strong in defending its members. and in that context, we would like to have a very constructive and positive relationship with russia, building security. we mean no harm or threat to russia. but russia, which has violated all of these understandsings since 1989, needs to come to terms with that kind of west, with that kind of nato. and if it chooses to do so, i think we'll have a very constructive relationship with russia. those would be the four things i would hope a new administration would put out very firmly and very quickly. thank you. >> thank you very much, ambassador volker, for your overview and insights.

and clearly, it triggers a lot of comments and questions. but i will suggest in the interest of our dialogue and discussion, to wait before coming back to your issues. and i would like to introduce our other speaker now, honorable ken wainstein, who will provide a broader context in terms of some of the challenges, not only related to nato, but beyond. since we do have the bio, as i mentioned before, so you can look at some of the details, let me mention just a few highlights about his many extraordinary contribution to the national security concerns. as you can see from the bio, he's a former homeland security

adviser to president bush, assistant attorney general on national security of the united states, attorney for the district of colombia, general counsel of the fbi and chief of staff to the director of robert mueller, incidentally, who contributed a great deal to our academic work. and we're privileged that he's a member -- distinguished member of the blue ribbon study panel on biodefense with senator joe lieberman and some of the other colleagues. i would like also to mention his academic, distinguished accomplishments. some of the universities we're working with, georgetown

university law school, also g.w. for many, many years and the university of virginia and berkeley. so, it's not too bad. and we're delighted to continue the relationships. i would like to also mention that he received many awards for his many contributions as i mentioned before. so, he will provide a broader context to our discussion. and then we're going to continue with the other panelists, and then invite the audience to participate in our dialogue. ken, would you like to come here or sit down there? whatever is -- >> i'm fine right here, if that's okay. >> if you're comfortable, sure. >> i'm comfortable. thank you. good to see everybody. let me just start off by sort of framing a term that he used twice when he said i'm going to discuss the broader context. that is sort of code for i'm going to discuss something beyond what we're talking about here today. so he asked me about a month ago if i'd join this panel. he said, i've got this great

panel of nato experts. i'd love to you join them. i said, that's great. i'd love to join. only problem s i'm not a nato expert. he said, that's fine. you'll be -- you'll provide the broader context. which you can tell from my buy graphy is i'm a law enforce. intel guy. that's my background. in the course of those jobs i spent a good deal of time working with our foreign partners in europe and nato auspices and otherwise. what i thought i would do in terms of the broader context is discuss nato and counterterrorism. the challenge, the threat we're dealing with right now. and nato, the extent to which it is or is not suited to address the current threat. so, that's the angle i'm going to take. i'm going to do that sort of by drawing on my experiences since 9/11 as part of the law enforcement, intelligence community here in the u.s., trying to take the apparatus we had as of 9/11, the culture, the

process -- the counterterrorism process we had at 9/11 and bring it up to speed so that we can prevent terrorism on our shores. and then draw analogies for what nato has to do to do the same more broadly throughout the alliance. so, if you take a look back at the history of nato, as has been said here by the panel, it's a political and military alliance. yet the one time the article v was provoked was in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. i think since that date we've seen increasing focus on counterterrorism as part of the alliance's mandate. culminating in the counterterrorism guidelines i think were issued back in 2012 and then continuing interest and attention being paid to terrorism threats since then. and that's attention and time well spent because i think it doesn't take much to realize -- much thinking to realize how the terrorism threat that nato across the board is facing is

increasing. increasing in seriousness, increasing in volume of threats, and increasing in terms of the complexity of the organizations and operations we're facing. i mean, you just go through some of the factors that have come up in the last few years. the rise of isis or isil, which has obviously been a game-changer. they almost make al qaeda look quantity in terms of their barbarity, their success, frankly, and -- and the level of infrastructure and operational complexity they're capable of. you've got the flow of immigrants, obviously, since the syria crisis into -- throughout europe. you've got fighters flowing down to the isis -- you know, join isis and fight the wars in syria. and those same fighters returning. hardened, trained fire trained coming back to their homeland

wanting to carry the fight back to the homeland. you've got the homegrown terrorism phenomenon and has that has been actually accelerated and exacerbated by the isis narrative and the fact that, you know, isis now -- it has a caliphate in its eyes. people feel like they can -- that's something that they can grab onto. they want to fight for. and i think we're seeing the impact it's having in terms of really energizing people to become homegrown terrorists throughout the west, including here in the united states. and you've got the fact that with -- with al qaeda core, in other words, the traditional al qaeda that was established and headquartered in afghanistan and pakistan, with the diminution of its authority and the greater sort of franchising of al qaeda and then isis, which is now growth of al qaeda in iraq, you see more and more of these threats being franchised around

the world. in many ways that's a more difficult challenge to deal with, for all of us, including nato, than the sort of more traditional al qaeda threat we had on 9/11. so the long and short of it is, for all of these various these threat is real and only getting more and more serious. so what should nato do about it? this is where i go back to my initial remarks. there are a lot of things that need to be done to try to beat this threat. what i'd like to do is see what kind of lessons we can draw from the experience the united states went through after 9/11 and that i was a part of. just to take a minute to go back and remember the history since 9/11 and what we dealt with here in the u.s. we woke up the morning september 12th with 3,000 odd people dead, counter-terrorism or process not up to the task. it wasn't capable of preventing that type of attack in the future. we had to get busy and get to

work. the challenges were myriad, you had law enforcement and intelligence, not coordinated, ways prevented by law and regulation from preventing their organizations, even though law enforcement going after terrorist as criminal threat and going after intelligence unable to share information. you had the fbi not coordinated internally. you had agents focused on intelligence, agents who focused on criminal investigations and often they did not share envelopation, sometimes were prevent freddie sharing information. you had federal law enforcement that wasn't coordinated with local law enforcement. the eyes and ears, 700,000 odd officers on the street, really the ones who detect a cell in

the first place. while there were joint terrorism task forces, coordination between state and local level not sufficient at all. on a general intelligence level you didn't have coordinating and sharing among federal actors, much less state and federal tribal officers. this was the situation we confronted september 11th, 2001. just to make it clear, this wasn't the fault of one administration, wasn't that anybody was terribly short sided but lack of the whole country the severity of the threat. we were living off the peace dividend, didn't want to acknowledge the threat we were seeing with bombing of cole, embassies. we didn't want to believe it was coming our way and going to be as serious as it was, as it

became manifest on september 11th. we needed the political will to make those cohabitation. we got them. it took 9/11 to do it but we got them and a lot of changes made since then. i'll tick off a few, cia and intelligence community generally working with the fbi on a much more regular basis. joint briefings and information sharing happening almost on day one after 9/11 in a way they had never happened before. national counter-terrorism center, which is designed to draw together terrorism information from around the country, all around the federal government. you've got the fbi becoming much more of an intelligence-driven entity, not just livermore. you've got federal agencies and state and local agencies working very closely together with fusion centers, joint terrorism task forces, dhs, department of homeland security working closely with state and locals. even mundane things like more

police officers receiving clearances so they can actually get access to terrorism information, intelligence they need to keep their communities safe. so you've got all those changes that have been going on since 9/11 in the united states. the result is a lot of improvement but still a work in progress. i say that because as i look at nato and our alliance more broadly, we're facing the exact same challenges that the u.s. individually faced on day one. the challenges really are to develop coordination that's necessary to prevent terrorism before it happened. just to go back and investigate after it happened but prevent it. whether that's under the auspices of nato via cooperation and coordination among all the member states so. all those same challenges are there, but actually even more. i think this is the sobering part of my remarks, which is that, you know, when we were

trying to develop more coordination here in the u.s., we were dealing with one country. one country, same sort of general set of rules. but when we're dealing with 28 different countries, it's a different ball game. i saw it in my interactions with foreign partners. completely fundamental level, even definitional level, different countries see terrorism as a different type of problem. i remember in like 2006, 2007, a meeting with a number of our foreign partners, we were working very closely together, making a lot of operational headway against various terrorism threats. but we were talking about military commissions act, which had just been passed, which set up military commissions by law or by statute. and it was fascinating, because our foreign partners were very upset about that, actually,

because their point was these are western european partners. the point was, this is not a war. this is a law enforcement action. this is not a war. we've seen war on our shores. we've seen what war is, and this is not war. to them they saw what we're dealing with after 9/11 more akin to like red brigades, the gang of the 1970s and less a war, whereas united states often done what we do here, existential problem, called it a war and went after it. mobilized our country and went after it. just that definitional issue, very foundational level causes problems of coordination. another is very different legal systems we're dealing with among the different countries. you know, another anecdote, i remember talking to a number of our partners about our effort, the united states effort to try

to get passenger name record information. the names of people on airplanes, manifest information. for obvious reasons. we were attacked by airplanes in 9/11. in the american legal culture, third party records -- in other words, records held by third party like this kind of information doesn't get that much protection, legal protection. that's the way it developed and that's the constitutional doctrine. in europe they are very protective of that kind of information. here we are asking for something we thought relatively a gimme, they were saying, no, that's something we can't give. in the same meeting, after having that confrontation, we started talking about jihadist websites and how we're dealing with that problem. keeling with extremist websites, not going over the line to encourage violence and trying to figure out what to do with it,

keeping with strong principles of first amendment rights. a couple of the folks we're dealing with said we take them down. to us that was unbelievable. they see it differently. neither side is right or wrong. the concern is when you're dealing with a security effort like this, that deals with law enforcement and individual liberties it's a real problem to court nature activities with different countries, different legal expectations. those different expectations extend to different expectations about classified information, how to share classified information among different countries. here in the u.s. one system by the federal government and could share among people entitled to get that information. every country has its own and it's difficult to do. in other words, we have a number of different challenges fl for nato to try to move to the next

level in terms of coordination, coordination is the touch stone of prevention. you can't prevent an attack, terrorist incident, unless you coordinate intelligence collection, intelligence targeting, collection, intelligence dissemination and the operation is based on that intelligence. and i just to sort of wind this up, get past the more sobering part of it, i applaud the fact there's a new assistant secretary-general for intelligen intelligence. i think that's a step forward. interesting to see how that's defined in practice. i understand it was initially established with the idea it would focus on russian military capabilities. obviously a big part of that person's mandate is going to be dealing with terrorist threat, particularly isis threat. that person's job is going to be to try to do something roughly comparable to what we've been trying to do in the u.s. the last 15 years.

either been made more difficult by peculiar challenges trying to do this across an alliance like he or she is going to have to do and try to get different players to work together despite all these various logistical, practical, and legal obstacles. it's my hope the member states alliance and public will demonstrate and have the will to do that. there is a lot of tough decisions to be made. given the threat we have right now, it's a job that's got to be do done. >> thank you very much. thank you for your overview covering so much territory in a short period of time. obviously we come back to many issues after we ask our colleagues to make their brief presentation. just a quick footnote since you mentioned 9/11 meeting,

anniversary we had this month right here with john gray and our colleagues. a discussion on the lessons of 9/11 and we remember particularly the victims. john o'neill who contributed to academic work we know very well lost his live, trying to save lives of others people. we knew personally a number of people and students who happened to be in the building. i think what's critical since we have representatives of diplomatic embassies that over 90 different nations were affected by this terrible tragedy.

somehow we learned short history. anyway, let me move onto our next speaker. it is, indeed, a privilege for me to introduce dr. -- professor daniel emerson. as i said, you have the bio. i just mentioned some highlights fl former u.s. secretary of state of foreign affairs and special coordinator in southeast european civilization and associate director of policy planning for two u.s. secretary of states. currently executive director of the senator of transatlantic relations johns hopkins university and personal professional level, i'm delighted that daniel published many books. one of them on terrorism and international relations. i was privileged to be part of

the theme -- team in a conference like this one. i would like to mention the particular book. what we're looking forward to is insights again because presently dealing with this issue of the warsaw summit and the follow-up to what's happening, particularly eastern question, russia, the west, and europe, call the gray zone and publish on these issues. professor. >> thank you. appreciate being here with everyone. let me pick up the thread what they are saying and wrap what ken had said as well. so i think we're back to this tale of three summits. actually we have a paper coming out tomorrow on our website,

nato's future tale of three summits. the trajectory mentioned on intel side. nato tends to move ahead because it gets pushed at the summits to make basic decisions. that's how when you have 28 countries you lurch forward or not. so the wales and warsaw summits were important. it's important to step back as my colleagues do just for a moment. i think going into warsaw and even wales, we were facing over the last number of years sort of two tensions within the alliance. one you could call out or intention, which was a couple decades, nato's mantra out of area or out of business following the end of the cold war. time to project stability, trying to do things because all the real challenges were outside. there were others, especially since 9/11, who would tart to make the case, especially since russia's activities, the new mantra has to be in area or in

trouble. i think what at warsaw happened, both those themes came back together. it wasn't posed as an either-or choice anymore. we realized as an alliance we have to do both. make the credibility article 5 sacrosanct, make sure everybody believes it, and you act to enforce it. then you also say we have to deal with real challenges at ho home, which are not just traditional ones. the frontline today used to be gap, worry about traditional armies. today the front line could be ground bazaar in istanbul, frankfurt airport, metro. those are real security challenges not one traditionally, so how do you square that circle? i think at warsaw the alliance did some of that. come back to that in a minute.

i think the other tinge we had building was sort of a attention between what's the security challenge in the east or south and refer to that, where we had a lot of countries in the south saying the middle east is on fire, all this is coming to hurt us. this is really, really, really the main security challenge. then our eastern allies were saying what about russia? look what they are doing. we're really threatened by this, you've got pay attention. this has to be the most important decision. i think the alliance did a good job bringing that back together to say unfortunate not only challenges in the east and south but they are beginning to merge. you could argue that the russian -- intrusion of russian state power in the middle east has started to blend some of the traditional issues, terrorism and instability with an activity state agent intent on disruption and power projection. if you go east you see

instabilities in the middle east starting to go that way as well. the question is do you want a stable area in the east that abuse the east or another unstable area in europe abutting the unstable area in the middle east. none of that in our area. some had tried to bridge that gap. in the meantime, however, i think what we're finding, there's another problem and that's inside the west. there has been a lot of verbiage in this campaign about the value or lack of value of nato. i think many european allies are wondering where the united states stands. there have been over the years sort of a distancing from nato as we thought europe was fixed, yankee jargon, time to move on to other challenges. i think we realized that's not the case. there are really a lot of questions in europe still about where the u.s. is, what it's committed to in terms of the alliance and its commitment to europe.

frankly we have the same concerns about europe. we're sort of having the same conversation about each other these days. if you look at europe, not just given the issues he said, but brexit, economic crisis, in addition to migration crisis russian activities, you're facing europe -- i'm saddened to say this, europe is going to be much more fluid, much more uncertain, much less capable, much less credible. only the u.s. presence and continued activity engagement in europe, as a european power, will maintain that affirmation of our assurance to our european allies about what this is all about. i think we're dealing with fundamentally important new issue, which eats away at our ability to do what the other wants unless wegs ahold of that. if you come to the next first 100 days or come to the next

sult agenda, the most important -- and i agree with curt on that, simply a political affirmation, we are in this together. we agree on the broad nature of the threat facing us and we will stand and face them together. the credibility of article 5 and article 4 and all the other articles, in fact, are still with us and we affirm that to each other. that means the next president really has to take the lead immediately, not projecting to summit and bureaucratic schedule but make a political summit perhaps right away to make and affirm that underlying political message. then i think you can get back to the summit agenda as it's unfolding. i would highlight three points on the cor nato agenda. juan is something nato traditionally does and knows what it does. it probably is doing now fairly well, which is defense, deterrents. it has projected forward defense

into its own allies in the east. everything that was said, i don't need to duplicate that. the challenge, we're deploying these forces. but given where europe is and the state of european conventional forces, you can't get there from here unless you beef up the size, scale, operationalable, the ability with all the rules and regulations mentioned across europe to allow forces to get to threaten parts of the alliance which they can't do today. what we call follow on forces, seems to me a core issue now within the summit agendas going forward building on what was done at warsaw and wales. i think there are two others, though, that are important. this takes us into what was said about the broader context. it's not just -- a summit is about what nato should do. you only know what nato should do if you know where nato fits.

because nato is not the lead on every issue we face. it is important in some areas. it's useless in other areas depending what we decide are our priorities. we have to understand where nato plays a role, where it takes the lead, where it can be a supportive actor and where it can sort of be the ensemble of issue that deal with challenges. that's the toughest issue, to sort out where nato should take the lead and where it should do something else. curt's point about crisis management sort of fits in that second basket. here i think we're facing some challenges for nato. one is it's not accustomed to doing these kinds of roles very well. we're also entering into some new security realms that's not accustomed to do on its own. so i think we have to tease that out. so my sect priority beside

follow-on forces is one area. i've been pushing this for a long time, which some know, has to do with resilience. the warsaw summit outlined a number of baseline requirements that every ally should be able to meet under article 3 of north atlantic treaty, which is sort of the self-help part. every alliance -- should protect it's self first, then if you can guarantee that, of course we're working together. i think they have tried to define resilience agenda in a very solid way. it's very practical. it gives every nation some homework to do. i'm encouraged by it. as someone working, just push it a little bit. for me article 3, defining resilience as article 3 agenda is a static notion of what resilience really is. it's really linked the way it's been defined into infrastructures, continuity, government, so on. how do you define the networks

that keep society going, vital functions of society if you want to phrase it that way. unfortunately none of those are national anymore. they are all interdependent. you cannot have a plan in one country for protecting electrical grid if the plan next door is different. so resilience going forward has to be shared. there has to be a project about shared resilience, not just country by country boxes. i think the next piece of resistance we should push on, weak, fragile, susceptible by disruption, either by intentional state actors or groups or individuals. how do you make sure those countries are resilient? if they aren't resilient, doesn't matter how resilient you are because everything will bounce back into territory. my two watch words would be shared, has to be shared, and we

have to project it forward. we have to think about projecting resilience, forward resilience as a new type of project for the alliance. but not only alliance but come back to where nato fits. much of this is civilian. much is where the eu plays a role or individual countries. look at my friend yohan, sweden and finland have huge predictions because of the their particular status, they had to defend their selves. they have a whole notion of societal security and techniques that the rest of us could profit from. it provides a new link for us with those countries as well in this area that nato is probably not going to do the lead. it's going to be part of what we do. the last one has to do with the same sort of set of issues, which is the issue of the basket of issues in the south. some would say nato needs southern strategy, but there's no sort of one southern issue.

it's just a conglomeration of issues. again, i think my guiding question is where does nato fit into that basket. not does nato do it all. i don't think it can. you see this with the point of coalition. yes it was formed as part but nato not part of the counter-isil coalition. many southern allies are very reluctant to get into new commitments in nato and their neighborhood. many arab states reluctant to see nato quad nato engaged. and if we're honest, the u.s. government doesn't know if it should be engaged because we're having a fight among our own commands with sent com saying, i'm not so sure about that. ucom saying, well, we have things to offer. internal battle, u.s. not been clear on its own stake in this and that only feeds into uncertainty about nature's role,

ken's point about counter-terrorism. we need to think harder about where nato fits in the south, there are a number of things to do, warsaw did a number of things, but could accept it up more, maritime strategy, particularly hard power hearts of the southern agenda. so let me stop there. i think those are three points i would say going forward besides broad political point, which is most important. thank you. >> thank you, dan. excellent remarks. just going to turn it over to jeff radke. jeff used to work in the same office i currently work with joe. he's now the deputy director and senior fellow -- deputy director of strategic international studies, senior fellow as well.

we heard about military adaptation since russian aggression in ukraine and some of the military and security issues will test the next administration. i agree with the points that have been developed so far. personally on that score, my view is that after a lot of very necessary and effective work by nato, primarily in dealing with the conventional military posture on the land in central and eastern europe, the most pressing need from military perspective is for nato to address its air and maritime posture and capabilities in the baltic sea region, black sea and eastern mediterranean. but if i can take a step back and look from slightly different angle. if we're thinking about top one or two priorities for an incoming administration, that is

the things that the united states government has to get right in order to advance our interests in europe and to vabs our common interests with europe, in the euro atlantic region and around the world, i think the top priority is a political one. that is to address the u.s. interests that are affected by a fragmenting europe. a europe that is increasingly divided among competing visions, sometimes individual member states and sometimes within member states. now it perhaps should go without saying. the united states relies on europe. it is not only our biggest economic and trade relationship, our most interconnected defense relationship through nato, our intelligence sharing, our political cooperation. if you take almost any area of

government activity, we work closely and often most closely with our european friends and allies. but now we're in a situation where european unity is under pressure from several different directions. unless you're an advocate of american unilateralism, which generally doesn't work out particularly well for the united states, we need to find a way to recognize and to address the way that affects our interests. now, the european reaction to the somewhat centrifugal tendencies has also not been monolithic. you have on the one hand brexit, and at the same time you have the european union producing a global strategy which is a good

document that outlines a number of areas where the european union plays and important role and can play an even more important role in the future. so you have both tendencies. which of these will win out and what europe is going to look like in several years after these various tendencies have resolved themselves is anybody's guess, but it certainly affects the u.s. ability to relate to europe, to cooperate with europe, not just militarily but politically and economically as well. we need to be actively engaged especially if you think about the possible consequences of a so-called hard brexit, an abrupt severing of the relationship with the european union and/or an acrimonious negotiation between the uk and the remaining european countries about the

terms of that exit. so i think what this mean is there needs to be an intensified u.s. investment not just in our partnership with european union and partnership with the uk, but also an engagement in certain instances of the specific issues that will develop, that will arise between the uk and eu so we minimize the risks to our shared prosperity as well as our ability to act in a coordinated fashion, effective fashion around the world. so that's a bit about the internal challenges. the external challenges, the euro atlantic region, europe and united states face the problem of external malign influence. i would point to anyone who hasn't read it to at least be open in the warsaw communique. the thing is pretty long. joe manson if you had a hand in

any of the language that and in it, i would gunfire you great credit for it. for those of you who deal with those kinds of consensus documents, they often wind up reading like consensus docume s documents. if you look at the opening perhaps of warsaw communique which looks at russia's actions and role, it is quite stark and well put. it says russia has breached the values, broken the trust, and challenged fundamental principles of euro atlantic security architecture. nice words are one things but this is backed up by actions, some we've already heard discussed have changed deterrence equation in conventional terms in europe. but that's not the only challenge we face. russia for many years has tried to exert influence on the political direction and developments in nato partner and in some nato member states.

we are recognizing this more fully in the united states now. if we look to the future, we should expect russia to attempt to influence other election processes and state actions whether or not there's an election happening in a particular country or not. if we look at that clear warsaw statement about how russia's aggressive actions have changed the security environment and the measures that deal with it, i think a priority should be a shared transatlantic recognition of the attempts by russia to exert russia on our politics. that means a recognition that this is happening and that we can't see it separately from russia's military pressure on the transatlantic community and aggression in the ukraine. it means a clear statement that there will be consequences if that behavior continues.

and from that recognition, then would flow elements of a transatlantic agenda that includes the european union as well as nato, because dan was absolutely right. there are certain things nato does well and certain things nato does less well. we shouldn't ask it to do the things it is not well set up to do. i think this will involve several things. it will involve cyber security, economic state craft, which includes cooperation and harmonization on things such as economic sanctions. it will involve transparency, media freedom issues and a whole host of steps that will help reinforce integrity of our democracies which are the fundamental thing we are protecting. i'll stop there and hand the microphone over but that's where the focus needs to be.

>> thank you so much, jeff, for many of the issues you addressed. brought back memories from maybe years ago. ambassador in brussels dealing with some of these issues. finally, we do a brief presentation by george who apparently is director and senior fellow at the center for international security atlantic council. he dealt with these issues for many, many years and looking forward to his views and then

we're going to develop some discussion. >> thank you. thank you for inviting me to be part of this panel and discussing one of the top security issues for the united states, which is how nato is responding to the new security environment in europe. what is this new security environment? after decades sent back two of its neighbors and brought back war to the continent. as you've heard already, nato responded to this in 2014 at wales summit and this summer at the warsaw summit by taking some very important decisions. while i agree that these steps nato has taken so far are helpful and good, i also see these steps have been insufficient and have not

restored to europe. i think i see a strategic gap in europe between the limited steps that nato has taken so far and the more robust measures that need to be taken to restore security in europe. the source of this strategic app for nato is that too many nato leaders are failing to understand three key changes that have taken place in european security environment. to put it simply, nato's response so far has been too sl slow. leaders want them to act as if this is 199 p and they are very unwilling to let nato act as if to face the real threat its facing in 2016. these new threats come in three different shapes and changes. these are changes in nato's

geography, changes in technology nato is facing and changes in the nature of the threat nato is facing. i believe we invest a little bit of time in understanding these threats, we will see why nature needs more robust response to aggression in europe and what some of these additional steps will take. the first change is the change in the geography. this is a map of the geography that most nato leaders are used to. it's what we used to call the layered cake. saw large deployment of nato troops from the united states and other nations in west germany. what you saw here is sort of geographic temperament nato leaders are trying to avoid. they don't want to have large troop deployments, but at the same time they failed to understand as nato'sord boers moved east, there are certain

key geo strategic changes that happened apart from the two deployments. during the cold war the zone of friction between nato and its main external threat was based on one of the four largest nato members, west germany. this nato member was backed up by other nato members with significant military capabilities, france, belgium and netherlands and other allies such as canada and united states. the new security environment we see now is very different. as nato's borders moved east, now the new zone of friction we see, this is a map of the new geography of nato. this displays most of the provocations we see from russians, their military aircraft flying without trans ponders on, violations of nato airspace, aligns in the region. we see that there's greater

friction and interaction between the external forces, nato forces in the northeast. but in addition to that, the nature members most vulnerable aren't geographically away, but geographically smallest in the alliance. it's a very different dynamic than we had in the cold war. the cold war west germany did lack strategic depth, this problem has been exacerbated and greater now with small geographic rockies of baltic republic republics. when we're dealing with a change of technology, this map displays some of what are called anti-access denial sites in the west. most of you have seen maps in crimea, perhaps even a 2 ad zone in eastern mediterranean and

syria. russia has significant capabilities in st. petersburg that cover eastern baltic as well as cover near the arctic circle. with these you can see there's quite a bit of range. with this new technology and these weapons, nato is now facing a situation where if you talk to senior military leaders they describe nato airspace now as contested. as well as nato sea space. this means even now in the preconflict state, the amount of nato military and naval aircraft that go in can easily be pressured. as we've seen by some of the flybys militiamen military aircraft, u.s. military ships in the baltic sea, this changes the dynamic and puts greater emphasis on the need for forward deployed forces. this is a brief chart showing some of the capabilities in

kalinin grad, did he graphically invasive parts of russian capability in nato airspace. from kalinin grad, cover wide access lithuania, poland. we've heard of missiles deployed into kaliningrad, was there range possible as far west as berlin. those were just the -- some of the land p capabilities of the new russian technology. these are maritime capabilities of the rangers, these are caliber missiles disclosed. two new ships having these caliber missiles have been deployed to the baltic fleet for russia now, the same type launch freddie caspian sea to hit russian targets in syria. russia had aircraft in syria at the time. it did not need to use this

capability, but it went out of its way to launch missiles from the caspian sea to demonstrate range of aircraft. in addition russia has deployed russian bomb frers that base we saw all across western europe through the straits of gibraltar into the mediterranean to launch crews missiles in syria. again, it had capabilities in syria already. it did not need to do that. moscow chose to use those capabilities to show what is around and military options. briefly, change in nature of the threat nato is facing. it is true and it is a fact, russia is a much weaker power militarily than the soviet union was. but at the same time, it is also true and a fact that russia remains -- has a quantifiable

military superiority over all its neighbors to the west and to the south. the great red bar we see there, those are russian military capabilities. all of the bars to the left of it, those are the military capabilities of russia's neighbors. russia wants its neighbors weak and unstable so it can comers them and influence them and shape their patterns. but if we also look at the charts to the right of the russian military capabilities, these are some of the largest military powers in europe including germany, france and united k. we see they don't match up to russia. this helps us understand why putin's strategies and tactics are to lean on european countries and nato members bilaterally one-on-one, to separate them from the rest of the continent, the rest of their alliances and apply pressure and threats to them to make them

feel intimidated. this has happened not just with russian threats, to sweden and finland, military leaders threatening them not to joininator there will be repercussions. the danish ambassador from russia threatened denmark, a nato member, that their ships would face nuclear targeting from russian vessels if denmark contributed to nato missile defense system. now, russia is not the only threat that nato is facing and the only threats nato is facing are not just conventional. another significant part of conventional threat is guik gap. russia has deployed a far greater number of submarines in the north atlantic. again, with their technology they are much quieter than we've ever faced before. admiral richardson has expressed great concern about the ability

of the united states to move through the contested sea space of the north atlantic. this is one of the reasons why deputy secretary of defense bob work visited iceland and the united states is committed to reopening our base and position orion submarine helicopters there. in addition we have threats from the south, migrants, unprecedented level of human movement from north africa and middle east into europe. in addition to that we also have terrorism. now, for many nato allies the russian threat is the main threat. there are key nato allies from france and belgium that see terrorism as number one priority and main threats of their countries. while the terrorists that attacked paris were about less than dozen in number, they may be perhaps the most successful

force in military history. those dozen terrorists are holding down 7,000 french troops that are deployed domestically in french cities for counter-terrorism operations rather than being available for other french military ornate missions. on top of that a very robust hybrid warfare campaign by russia not just in the gray zone in alliance countries but nato capitals. we've seen references to the incidence of this, such as dnc hacked in the united states. this is not an isolated incident. we see multiple of these types of attacks in nato territory. british intelligence admitted in 2015 they filed a significant cyber attack against the election. german intelligence talks about the increase in russian spies and their attempts to influence german public opinion. these are things the alliance is facing all across and needs a

much stronger response. so as you've heard earlier, there have been key deliverables from summits, some of the major steps. nato has prepared eight units, these are command cells of 40 personnel, 20 from nato, 20 from the host country. they are good, they are helpful. again, they are limited to help nato plan more exercises and facilitate the deployment of some of these other forces agreed upon at wales and warsaw. so wales, nato just had the nato response force, which was supposed to be the rapid reaction force for alliance but alliance leader saw the speed with which russia acted in ukraine was much faster than capabilities that the alliance had. so it almost tripled the size of nato response force and increased it so that nato response force should now in theory be deployable within 30 days. even that was not considered to be quick enough.

nato created vhrtf. a small unit of 5,000 troops like infantry that should be able to be deployed within two to seven days. the first units of 1500 troops in two days and the rest of the 5,000 within seven days. at warsaw, we saw some more significant steps taken. the most famous of which have been efp, enhanced forward presence, the four battalions in the east, which we'll go into deeper. in addition to that we must also remember through president obama's european reassurance initiative united states putting a third team in europe on a rotational basis. we're also seeing greater did he ploipts in the black sea region with uk, canada and poland pledging to send fighters for rotational exercises which the alliance sometimes called baltic

black sea air policing, but they will be there a very limited time. here is a little bit deeper some of the details of the four battalions going into nato's northeast. these are the ones nato is making a huge -- russia is making a big impact about and even nato it's self i feel is exaggerated the extent to which the military capability is deployed. as you can see in each of the baltic countries and poland, there will be a battalion. these battalions will be roughly about 1,000 troops. they will be led by one nation nato refers to as a framework nation. in addition to that, other countries will contribute smaller size units to that. what this means basically is that except for the united nations, which will be mostly close to 1,000 troops, most of the other battalions deployed, even the framework nation won't be deploying close to 1,000 but

probably half or a little more, 5 to 700 of the troops. the rest of the battalion will be provided by some of the other nations. nato, i think, is very confident and claiming credit for participation of 20 countries in the enhanced forward presence. i think it's good to have that type of political solidarity. militarily as a strategist i'm concerned it takes 20 countries for nato to scrape together 40,000 troops. and the reason why i'm concerned about the size of it is this. this a response to russian aggression in crimea and ukraine. after wales nato created, expanded size of nrf and created bgtf, about 5,000. after warsaw nato deploying east 4,000 troops in these battalions. before nato announced this decision at the warsaw summit in

july, as far back as january, the russians announced they were going to add 3,000 -- i'm sorry, three divisions to their western military district. since then, they have changed those numbers. they are adding two divisions or 20,000 troops to western military district and one of these has been reassigned to southern military district, which is the one closest to ukrainian border. so this is currently the balance of power in the northeast. you see on the left the size of the nato defense border, the fourth bar shows nato enhanced forward presence. the fifth bar shows if we added on top of that the vjtf. the sixth bar shows greater size of 30,000 of nato's p ra i had response force. and then the last ber before the

red one, this is if we added all these nato capabilities together what they would look inside. this is compared to what russia has just in the we shall military district, the district that borders nato territory. i think i'm having a little trouble. there we go. to put it very briefly, i see that nato has some key challenges, some key vulnerabilities. these are size, which you saw in the previous charts. speed, which requires two different types of speed, and readiness. in terms of speed, nato needs to improve its political decision making speed because none of these troops are going to move until nato provides political approval for them. also even once that very

difficult hurdle na nato has been wrestling with over two years is overcome, we still have military speed. the actual deployability of these troops, which leads to what i consider nato's main achilles heel, which is there is a very serious readiness problem all across the alliance. nato does not have sufficient military capabilities to face the threat it is seeing from russia. even if it had it, the problem is more severe, not only does it have capabilities nato thinks it has on paper, it has far fewer. more significantly we see this in germany where they have far fewer combat planes than they had before. even the ones that are remaining, about half of them are not combat ready. but this is not isolated just to germany. the readiness problem is all across the alliance. for example, great britain, royal navy with lustrous career has more admirals than it has

combat ships. the french as we talked about are overstretched, not just with counter-terrorism movement operation sentinel but also with their consider terrorism efforts in southern region in africa, ma mali, central african republic. so in the united states, because of sequester, the commander of ucom had to ground 25% of our fighter aircraft because there wasn't enough funding for them. so my last chart, just a basic comparison of where we are now. the current approach, i see a stronger version among too many political nato leaders to take political risk or spend a lot of money to actually deal with the

threat we're facing. as a result of that, every time russia acts and creates a provocation to the west, we have a very muted response. too often this means a bilateral response. there is a lack of political deterrence within the alliance. when russia pushes one of our allies or partners in europe, i think there needs to be a multinational diplomatic response. this will reinforce our military deterrence. likewise i think nato is taking too long to resolve the decision making problem. i think it needs to remember it has already delegated in the past authority during the korld war and secretary-general during balkans conflict. nato needs to return to these things and not think it's reinventing the wheel. also i think we need to see a change from basic defense budget planning among alliances.

there's too many free riders in europe, but at the same time i feel washington is enabling this because we're doing too many unilateral actions. i feel already two rounds of e.r.i., the united states has put money on the table. according to the nato secretary-general's report, nato defense spending grew in the past year by over $3 billion, over european and canadian allies. e.r.i. it's self is 3.4 billion, which is a significantly large number. so they are spending more on their national defense but not committing more to nato missions. i feel that before a third e.r.i. is approved or recommended by the next u.s. administration, it needs to be a multi-lateral e.r.i., one in which both the united states and our allies both put capabilities on the field. thank you very much. i look forward tower questions. >> thank you, very much, for

your assessments. the imbalance as you mentioned and vulnerabilities and particularly we'll come back to it. i would like to develop a discussion first among the panelists and then with the audience. i have one general question. i think it was already referred about the next administration, let's say the first 100 years -- i'm sorry days. first 100 years would deal with the challenge. but anyway, i would like the panelists first to respond to that or respond to some of the other perspectives in regard to the agenda of the next administration. secondly, the agenda of the many summit in brussels in early

2017. we have at least two dozen challenges or issues that ken weinstein and ambassador volcker and other speakers mentioned. can you cite, for example, some five top concerns that the administration should consider and then, of course, the nato mini summit in brussels in early 2017 should consider. we'll start with you, maybe. >> why don't i defer to my colleagues that are not in the government. >> thanks. you and i did include that in my opening remarks. just to recap, for the 100 days i think it's important -- dan hamilton stressed this point, too, can't wait for a summit. the new u.s. administration needs to come out strongly on collective defense in article 5.

i'm calling on nato to join with u.s. in doing crisis management with these major crisis surrounding nato territory, to renew a call for building europe whole, free and at peace that's inclusive for of europe's democ. and to offer to work together with russia on terms that uphold the post-1989 security order. when you come to the nato summit then, i think it should be an affirmation of all allies on those things. and i would add to that as what i said and as others said, we need to have a greater emphasis on capability development for the future. nato's behind. >> well, i think i think i try to outline son-in-law of that. i think the main point about the political statement, political affirmation is the most important. i think there's an agenda as was underscored here about developing capabilities to move

forces to forward defense. i do think the resilience agenda is quite important and it's new, it's different for nato. it's not only for nato, but it's important piece now within that framework. and the south needs huge amount of attention. at which nato will fit somewhere. it won't be the answer. it's not going to be the answer. but there are many things that nato can do. but i think overall, especially first day type of thing, it's this political statement of affirmation. europe free, that's been our focus, but today, europe is fractured and anxious. and unless we sort of get that discussion going again about how we work on these thing us together, not just how governments do it, but how populations think we're working on it together. that's probably the more important job as public diplomacy part of that. i think getting governments to do more systems and doing hard.

>> i agree with what dan and kurt said. the strong declaration at the next u.s. administration is extremely important. not least because of what dan noted about the burden sharing debate and the extreme criticism of nato at some points in this presidential campaign. so i think, you know, addressing the way forward with our nato allies is extremely important. and keeping up the momentum on resources which has been built up so effectively over the last couple of years. and is, you know, bearing fruit perhaps slower than some would like, but is moving in the right direction. keeping that moving, it would be important as well. >> i agree with the good ideas that have been proposed already. i'll just reinforce too that

i've made and one i didn't get to a chance to include in the presentation. i think it's important right off the bat that we change to these unilateral and align these bilateral responses to russia by having multi-national political and diplomatic responses to russian provocations. if russia threatens any one of our nato members ever again, there needs to be a unified nato response from all 28 perhaps we should all dispel some of the members from their embassies in the national capitals a the a sufficient level, but i think there needs to be that kind of a message that wherever russia pokes any one of our nato members, they will face politically diplomatically, military ri, and even economically, they will face a unified nato response. i also feel in the same wie that the next level of eri that the president, administration should say, start off working with the new summit by saying that we expect there to be a multinational eri with a

proportional and tangible european contribution to it as well. and then lastly, i'll also say that part of these things that are consistent with these two things is there is a lot of talk about the a2 threats in europe and the u.s. military are particularly moving and having to deal with it. but, i am concerned that there is very little attention and very little activity being seen publicly about a european contribution to the a2 ad column in nato that nato is facing. that should be one of the priorities going into the next summit. >> before i turn this over to richard, i would like to ask the questions of the panel, obviously we focussed on nato, nato membership, do you see any role for the partnership for this countries all the way from finland to sweden and the ukraine and so forth and

istanbul cooperation initiative on the gulf states for example, and the mediterranean, some of the countries like egypt and israel and morocco and so forth. in other words, non-nato members who can also participate in the strategy whether it is in europe and elsewhere. >> i will start off on this one. i think you've touched on something that's very important. and i think nato partnerships have greatly extended the reach of the alliance. the great thing about the po partnerships is they are demand-driven. no one is required to be a nato partner. nations decide to become nato partners because they think it's in their own interest and in turn the allies also see the interest in having a partnership. so in different ways because the partnership activities are

tailored to each nation many countries have drawn closer to nato. we have very close relationships with finland and sweden. also a close relationship with jordan. we have increasingly an increasing tempo of activities in kuwait and in tunisia, so there are a lot of countries that see it in their own interest and security terms to draw closer to nato, and this is a real resource going forward. >> just to make the obvious point that those partnerships, the last few that you cite d don in the middle east are tremendously helpful going forward as to my area of interest, the counterterrorism area and the more we can foster that and translate that partnership into actual operational coordination and cooperation with others. >> yild say to the partnership

of peace efforts offer a tremendous opportunity to blend them into the overall strategic thought process. and kind a strategy that you can't tell the nato country, you don't have a nato strategy. so i think some thoughts are better. >> exactly. and again, the bridges the communities try to develop one is the partnerships for peace review that cherokee was mandated by nato to combat terrorism and beyond that it reveals internals and it's

particular area, partnership for piece review as well as terrorism. >> partnership for peace needs a rethink. it has worked well for 25 years, but in a very different context to why it was created, for all the reasons were said, we're facing a whole new threat, new technology, new kinds of issues many of the partners have become nato members and others have sort of graduated, but it's not really coming together in any way that i think is attune to the challenges as it could be. for instance, the enhanced opportunities partners now we have these five countries that joe mentioned.

that would get them as close as they can. strategy frankly given the swedish debates is keep gettings a close as you can, so by the time the question is really asked in sweden or finnland, everybody knows what the answer will be. instead of trying to push it too hard, have a backfire, but also it means incremental progress meaning partnerships mechanisms get them to be value added contributors. i mentioned resilience. it's a whole other area. why wouldn't we do partnerships? we need to know how resilient ukraine is in all sorts of ways it could be disruptive. otherwise, efforts won't be that useful. we need to have a project for that. we have proposed resilient support teams, nato, eu teams,

small teams, experts to work with the country on where they need help, what are the problems? that's applied at the moment only to nato space or eu space, but i don't know why we wouldn't do advisory support teams to a country like ukraine. it gives us a new plank of engaging a country like ukraine. japan and south korea wanted to be partners. they've been rebuffed we have an article 5 commitment to those countries as well. if we really to want harness combined assets, we should see how we should develop that so they could also provide activities. australia's enhanced opportunity partner, why aren't the others given that same opportunity? so i think there's a rich area for new thinking in the partnership project. beyond where it has been. >> anyone else? okay. want to open it up to the audience to have persons.

>> please identify yourself, we'll go label the over -- >> in view of the upcoming elections and also the changes in europe, where do you see the support, the u.s. support for nato going? that the point, i know it's everybody's guess, in any case, where will the pendulum swing in terms of u.s. support for nato? >> thank you for the question. could we take one more? we'll take a couple of questions, sir. >> the russian embassy. thank you so much for your insights. mr. weinstein, i guess how you can fit into this panel, you mentioned that, but there is in nato. being from the russian embassy

definitely support obviously it's a main threat in the world is terrorism. which our countries and our position to eliminate in this world, if you are together. that is the idea. and speaking of events in 2001, september 11, you might remember where the president putin was in the first point to president w. bush and offered assistance and also -- [ inaudible ] also russia supported the information in afghanistan by security council in new york or providing logistics. nato suspended all the military

operation very much intel cooperation. i had hardships to go through the pentagon and so it doesn't go with the security. that is the situation i have now. i understand the electorate here within the beltway and definitely russia, it's it kind of supports you're here too. russia in front of the campaign we'll call it. and war mongering people here, opportunities in the circles and say what russia does next will be threatening the united states. i just hope that this is a fading political campaign election, electoral campaign -- >> is there a question? >> yeah, to be short, i don't approve the messages that my

country contrasts and did everything wrong and is, you know, the heart of the united states and the world. let me remind you that nato was the first one to break trust by building up military equipment and around our borders. and provoking basically rules. what kind of resilience does the alliance brush it forward, like in ukraine by supplying arms there and sending instructors. and many here call for more robust measures. so is that the kind of stability that aligns? >> that was the question? >> question, do you see any -- what exactly can nato do to resolve, resolv