we talk to ukrainian allies about the fate of russia. i think the issue here is what are you trying to achieve and how do you best achieve it. whether we agree with whether russia has legitimate interests or not, russia has told us for the past 25 years ukraine is a red line for them. they would react. they reacted. we weren't prepared to deal with that reaction. that's poor policy making. that's poor state craft. so you need to understand what the other side is doing, how they think about it, how they might react, and that needs to be factored into your policy. if we want to bring ukraine into the west, we don't have to achieve that today or tomorrow, but we need to have a real plan that takes into account russia's attitudes, russia's possible reactions, and put that in place and eventually get there over time. the flaw is that in 2014 there was a set of actions.

we were unprepared for russian response. we got a russian response and we were caught flat footed. that's poor policy making. that's what we need. again, we need to engage russia and have a better idea of what they're really thinking about, what their capabilities are, and then fashioning a policy that gets us where we want to get if not tomorrow over time. >> and it's been bad for us, but also bad for ukraine because we're in a situation where we made this commitment that we are likely not going to follow through on anytime soon, and at the same time ukraine has had crimea taken away, has been subject to this very brutal conflict. it hasn't worked well for either. >> if you would address this point because this is a very interesting point. yeah, it might be nice.

it might be even right to say if ukraine wants to be a member of nato, they can be a member of nato. if we don't have the stamina to follow through, our allies don't have the stamite farmina to fol through, isn't that getting sort of down a track that isn't going to be productive? >> let's remember what ukraine was looking at in 2013. it was looking to sign a deep and comprehensive trade agreement with the eu and an association agreement with the eu. nobody, nobody, was talking about ukraine and nato in 2013. there was a no alliance or no joining nato policy. what bugged putin was a sudden epiphany that having ukraine sign this deal would be bad for russia after saying publicly on the record he didn't care if the eu signed these deals with his neighbors. he never viewed up until 2013 eu deals with armenia or ukraine or

georgia as a threat. he has viewed nato differently. so it was a change on putin's part, not a change on our part. again, ukraine and georgia wanted to sign these agreements. we didn't press them into doing it. there were criteria and conditions they have to fulfill, but this was a choice of ukraine, georgia to sign. >> there's very, very low support for joining nato among the population. now the situation has changed dramatically exactly because of russian aggression against ukraine, its invasion and takeover of crimea. >> i think germans and others are even less inclined to support that. ukraine joining nato. so perhaps there's much greater interest in ukraine, but there's

much less interest in many other countries. >> the point i'm making is putin from his perspective was in a better position with ukraine before he invaded it because there was almost no support for nato and there was a very split support for the eu, and those negotiations have been going on for quite sometime. so placing the blame on crimea and the invasion of ukraine on the west, on the united states -- >> i'm not doing that. >> but that's what's implicit in your argument, i think. >> no, not really. i don't think so. it was a decision of the russian leadership. i said in my first statement that it was a decision of the russian leadership to respond in that manner. >> but we allowed it to happen. >> let's look forward. today russia occupies -- >> i can see the path so much easier. >> right. today russia occupies parts of eastern ukraine. it occupies two provinces in

georgia. it has annexed crimea and it is still actively involved militarily in these places. what should be the goal of the united states looking at this? what should our objective be? paul and tom? >> the first question you have to ask is what time period are you looking at. if you put this in sort of broad terms, obviously our strategic objective should be to restore the territorial integrity of those states. the question is how do you get there and what time frame. what sequence of steps do we take that get us there or have the best chance of getting us there? >> so you're saying our goal should be restore territorial integrity given the framing. i don't think you guys would disagree with that. >> right. >> so tell us your pathway.

>> i think the problem that you have with this is you can't put this simply in the limited context of ukraine. the problem we have with russia is that you can't solve these issues in isolation. everything's linked for the russians. syria is linked to ukraine. europe is linked to what they're doing in east asia, so i think we need a holistic, a comprehensive, approach to russia. we have to decide how we're going to deal with russia in various parts of the world, where it is our advantage to cooperate with them, where we need to push back, how do we incenti incentivize them to do things we want, how do we create disincentives for them to not do things we don't want them to do.

i think you need to think about this holistically. you know, my -- where you'd want to be, i think, on ukraine is where, as i said, you've removed it from geopolitical competition at this point. you've gotten the russian forces out. ukraine itself is undertaking the types of reforms it needs to be a viable independent state over time. we need to diffuse it in some way. i don't think piling on sanctions gets us there at this point. i mean, that's been demonstrated over time. any any event, holistic and then i think at this point diffusing the tensions so you have space to work out the types of long-term solutions you're looking for. >> to be clear, are you advocating we should also adapt linkage cross issues? >> linkage is a reality. what we do on one issue impacts

how they think about us on another. you know, it's a fact of life. so we need to think of all these things as their interconnectedness. the real challenge to policy making is coming up with that balance of competition and cooperation that best advances our interests globally. not necessarily any specific issue at any specific time. but if we think in five or ten years, where do we want to be, how do we structure the relationship with russia to give us the best chances of getting there. >> just very quickly, i agree with you about ukraine, as curt was pointing out. that is the end goal we should be aiming to effect. however, i do think that sanctions can work. the problem is that our sanctions and our response to ukraine and our policy on syria has been very weak. you're absolutely right that the way we act in various global theaters affects how our allies and our enemies perceive us. and i think the message that we have been sending with a

relatively weak sanctions response, there were many other tools we could have used in russia. we used tools similar to iran that were effective. but the way we have acted in syria by leaving a vacuum open for russia to engage and engage in a brutal war sends a message to the russian leadership that the u.s. is not willing to be a global actor, a global leader in the world. i propose to you the way we change this relationship, that we change the calculus, where we stop reacting to russian actions and start studying the agenda is taking a stronger leadership role in the world. putin, what we know about him, is going to respect a strong u.s. and be willing to come to the table with a strong u.s. leader much more willingly than he is going to be willing to the come to the table with what he perceives to be a weak country. >> sanctions have had an impact. i think they have kept russia

from going deeper into ukraine, but tom used the phrase piling on sanctions. we have nn't been piling on sanctions, and to me, that's the mistake. he's going to get hit with more sanctions if he doesn't change his behavior. we've had this conversation with the europeans will they renew current existing sanctions, not whether we'll ramp up sanctions. the deal should be very simple. russia, get out of ukraine. respect ukraine's sovereignty and integrity. we don't need a bigger discussion or argument about that. we offered putin off ramps. the mh-17 was an opportunity for him to pull the plug. he's not interested. he wants to destabilize ukraine so ukraine is unattractive and unappealing to the u.s. so we lose interest in ukraine because

it is an unstable place, which by the way is not in russian interests to have a destabilized ukraine on its border. >> be thinking about what questions you would like to ask. about syria, we have a civil war. we have an isis stronghold. we have a regime that's killed a lot of its own people, but now a war that's out of control. russia has come in militarily after taking away some chemical weapons, but they did come in militarily. they argue that they're going after terrorists inside syria and they include in that the opposition to assad and they need to reestablish security as the first priority and that the only way to do that is to work with the government. so that's kind of the russian argument on this. it's unsavory for those of us who would like to see a better outcome, but there is an element to which what russia is doing is aimed at least at tackling a

real problem. so i want to ask first, tom and paul, to comment on that. i've tried to pitch it in a fair way to you. how would you explain russia's actions and what we should do about syria in relationship to russia? then i want to pitch it to david and elina after that. >> look, russia intervened in syria to protect its national interests, the way they saw those national interests, and protect a regime that they've had long standing relationships with. that's one. two, their argument has a certain level of plausibility. if you remove the assad regime at this time, the replacement was much more likely to be a lot of bad guys. we're going to replace this regime, we're going to bolster it, then work to a political

transition that will keep this regime in power, but allow us to focus on attacking the real nasty people, the al nusras and isil over time. not necessarily immediately. i think you can understand that from moscow's standpoint. the question again for us is, one, what are we trying to achieve over what period of time and what resources are we, the american people, really prepared to achieve that. russia is there. you're on the ground. you have to deal with them. there's no way around it at this point. there's humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in aleppo at this point, but i don't see where we have many better options than trying to deal with the russians to at least create humanitarian corridors at this point. if you want to put a lot of troops on the ground, go ahead and see how much support you have in the american public to do that at this point. so it's a difficult situation. we face bad alternatives, but you've got to do -- you've got

to work with what you have. you have to understand what the russian interests are, and see whether you can fashion something that stops the bloodshed in and around aleppo at this point, gets us on a political track where there is some possibility of political transition, and i think you need to drop as a condition or even what you think is a final goal is assad has to go. that is something you can work out later on. the real challenge now is to get into a political negotiation where you have at least the opportunity of coming to some sort of resolution of the crisis and focus the real activity against the terrorists. >> what about the argument, to draw that out as well, that russia is just duping us? we meet in geneva. we have a talk. they're the ones who are helping

assad create this humanitarian ca tras trophy. they're trying to get their position established in the middle east. what about their argument? >> look, we have a fundamental problem that we understand terrorism in different ways. >> you know, we think about al qaeda and isis as the epitome of terrorists. the russians, i think, would argue anybody that is fighting a legitimate government using means that approach terrorist means is a terrorist group and that you can't separate them. what's their argument about al nusra? we all agree al nusra is a terrorist organization, but they're intertwined with a so-called moderate opposition figures. we have promised to separate the moderate opposition from al nusra. have we done that? no. can we do that? no. because we don't really control the situation on the ground, so they're going to continue to

attack. again, i understand where they're coming from. i don't think we have to like that, but that's the reality and you've got to deal with that reality the best you can at this -- under these circumstances again with resources that you're prepared to go to the american people and ask for in order to do that. >> david and elina, give us your analysis on where we are in syria and what we should be doing. >> when it comes to syria, both russia and the united states deserve blame and responsibility but for very different reasons. for the united states, it's the decision not to do anything. failure to create a safe zone, safe haven, to save thousands of lives and leaving a void that putin came in and filled in not following through on the threat if assad used chemical weapons. let's remember assad is one of the bad guys. he has the blood of hundreds of thousands of people on his hands, and russia came to his rescue. assad may have been on his way

out. russia intervened militarily, propped up and kept assad on power. further blame on the russian side, their conscious decision to target innocent civilians, hospitals, bakeries, civilian centers. remember the contrast after we hit accidentally syrian forces. we admitted it the very day it happened. russia two days later -- syrian planes with russian support hit a military convoy and they still deny responsibility. we're talking about countries that have very different interests. i don't see how you bring these together. i think they're completely incompatible. how many times did john kerry talk to sergei about this issue? >> to add to that, let's not forget who left the negotiating table on the syria cease-fire.

after multiple meetings, multiple conversations, multilateral support it was russia who broke off these negotiations and then continued its brutal attack on aleppo. it's not about a definition of terrorism being different. it's about the fact that russia specifically targets civilian targets and doesn't seem to care if it can separate between civilians or terrorists. this is not in line with our values in the u.s., our basic understanding of human rights, and this is again not something we can find common ground on. >> putin is a leader that doesn't give a damn about human life. in chechnya, he cut off the adoption of russian orphans. what he's doing in syria is consistent with this. he doesn't attach any value to human life. >> blame, blame, blame, but you still haven't saved a life in syria. >> i would like us to carve out a safe zone.

>> how are you going to carve out a safe zone without risking a military conflict with russia and are you prepared to do that? >> there are no good options now, i agree, tom. >> but i would argue a military conflict with russia borders on one of the worst options at this point. >> we may have a military conflict whether we like it or not. if they keep buzzing our planes and ships, something is going to happen before too long. >> if i may, i think the real tragedy of this situation is that things that could have been possible in the past are no longer possible now. >> right. >> and that really has foreclosed a lot of our opportunities. let's be realistic. when you have a civil war, how do you get a negotiated solution to a civil war? you need all of the parties simultaneously to be strong enough that they're comfortable

negotiating, but weak enough that they think they might lose if they don't. that's a very narrow band you need to be in. you need everybody to be in that same space at the same time, and i don't see a situation that's going to get us to that place largely for the reasons that tom has described, which i think, david, actually you would agree with. >> question from the audience. please stand and please introduce yourself. >> thank you very much. first of all, thank you very much for the lively and very good discussion. today, a lot of time has been spent discussing ukraine, georgia, syria, and other parts of the world, but it seems to me the time has come to talk about the things that are in our backyard. i mean in europe, here in u.s. so my question is to paul and

tom. what is your red line? what russia should do and the united states for you to change your attitude of engagement to at least containment and i would say maybe self-defense? >> please pass the microphone to the right. the question again is, is there a breaking point to what you're suggesting? >> you know, i think there's certainly a breaking point. let me be clear about what we're talking about here. we're not talking about kind of unconditionally engaging with russia. we're not talking about giving away things to russia. we're talking about defining american national interests and then defining a strategy that we think will be the most effective way to satisfy those interests with respect to russia. so what we're talking about is about the united states of

america. i want to make that very clear. secondly, look, i am entirely supportive of being quite firm in dealing with moscow. the question is when, on what issue, and with what goal. and is it is a goal realistically you can achieve through the means that you have chosen to pursue the goal? i would argue that it's not a good idea to set unachievable goals and then fail to accomplish them. that makes us look ridiculous and it puts us in a much weaker position to deal with russia. we're in a much stronger position to deal with russia when we define clearly what we want, we define what the consequences are if it doesn't happen, and we define what we want and what we're prepared to do about it in realistic ways

that they will realistically have an opportunity to live up and that we will realistically enforce if they don't. i think the problem is -- >> let me just pause there because i think that's exactly what david and elina would say, if i'm not mistaken. you have a more expansive view as to what that ought to be. >> yeah. i think we would argue is i'm not sure much more we need to take the approach that we've argued. as i said at the beginning, how many more countries does russia have to invade before we adopt the line we're arguing? how much more people does it have to kill? i think assigning blame is important. i think accountability is important. and i think you have to look at what russia has already done in order to determine trends and patterns and then figure out how to handle it from there. >> i would just add to that that we have offered many not off ramps but areas of cooperation particularly on syria,

negotiations on the cease-fire, to share intelligence information against the desires of senior officials in the u.s. government, and russia turned that down. we have given them ways in which we can seek political resolut n resolutions and find a sustainable peace in the middle east, and russia has refused to take us up on that offer. >> a point of quick agreement with paul, president obama in his state of the union speech in january of 2014 bragged about how the u.s. led the isolation of russia. then fled to sochi. that i agree is ridiculous. >> we didn't isolate russia and you can't isolate russia. >> but the president bragged that he did. >> but you're talking about containing russia and isolating russia.

>> it's not about isolationism. >> it's not about containment. we have this focus on europe and what you're going to do in order to prevent russia from doing things we don't like in europe, but the policies that you're proposing will intentionally weaken russia. they're going to drive russia into china's embrace. china is taking advantage of a weakened russia at this point. russia doesn't have an option in europe, and china is a strategic competitor. if we're looking at our interests over the next 10, 15, 20 years, east asia is extremely important. now, all i'm arguing is that you need to take what you're proposing in europe and think about what the consequences are in east asia and you've got to be able to mitigate those in some way. and we continue to take this policy and isolation and we create perhaps a better deal in europe while we create a larger

problem for ourselves throughout asia. that is not good strategy. >> thank you. i think we got your point. in the front row, your question. >> my name is carla. i have a question for paul and also for david. obviously, we're going to have a new administration. mr. trump has already said if he is elected he will go and meet with putin before the inaugurati inauguration. if you were advising either one, mr. trump or mrs. clinton, and you were the last person they talked to before they went into the room with putin, what's the one thing you would say to them if they can only accomplish one thing, just one, what is it they should say to putin in their very first meeting? >> well, i think the very first thing i would say is i wouldn't encourage a president-elect of whichever party to have that meeting before coming into office. i'm not sure that that's really a good idea.

no, i understand. that's the first thing. i think from my point of view the most important thing in this relationship right now is not to try to envision all of the great things that we can cooperate on in the future. we don't have a relationship to sustain new cooperation. i think that's -- it's very clear. there are a lot of obstacles to that. what we need to do now to my mind as a matter of highest priority in this relationship is to try to prevent it from getting worse. because if it gets worse, there are some really grave risks to the united states. i was a teenager in the 1980s. i remember what it was like growing up in the early 1980s. that was a time when people really thought about the risk of nuclear war and it was kind of part of your daily life. it's not something that people

think about today. i don't want to live in a world where americans have to think about that. so i think we need to avoid -- just try to have some kind of engagement that will try to prevent it from getting worse. >> david, your response to the same question? >> first, i agree don't go. if you are going to go, deliver the following message. get out of ukraine and respect your neighbor's sovereignty and territorial integrity, stop bombing syria, and stop cracking down on the human rights of your own people. lastly, don't give any gag gifts. >> do you think putin will do any of those things after our president-elect -- >> if he does, then you'll have a much better relationship with the united states. if you don't, sanctions will stay in place and get ramped up and you'll not have a productive relationship with the united states over the next four years. >> okay. can we go to the woman in the back there that's been waiting?

>> russian political activists, victim of putin's regime. my question is not about international relations, but about russian domestic policies. when is the united states going to deal with human rights violations in russia with russian oppositional leaders in russia or all over the world? when is the united states going to deal somehow with the upcoming nuclear war with the united states because that's what's right now under discussion in russian dependent from kremlin media? thank you for your answers. >> look, there's no question that as we said earlier what putin does is not the national interest of the russian people as a whole. what putin has established is a

system of repression, censorship, and brutal oppression of russians. the kremlin murdered through poisoning a critic of the regime in a western country, in england, right? it continues to do so. yet we just let it happen despite overwhelming evidence that this happened under the potentially direct order of putin himself. again, what kind of country are we dealing with, right? we're not dealing with a trustworthy, diplomatic partner. we're not dealing with a leader who cares about human life, and we're not dealing with someone who cares about ever seeing democracy or any sort of freedom in his own country. there has to be some consequences for this along the lines of what we have outlined. >> let me broaden the question a little bit, though.

from a u.s. policymaker point of view, first off i don't think anyone here on the stage is going to disagree putin has an awful regime and he abuses human rights and he kills people and this is awful. the question for the policymaker is how much does that impact your decision making about how you engage russia on issues of national interest to the united states, and that's what i want to ask elina and david. >> the question is do you care about human rights in russia. how do you create a situation where it gets better? this is a real conundrum for us. >> can you use your mike? >> excuse me? >> your mike. face this way. >> this is a real conundrum for the united states in how do you do this. our ability to impact successfully inside russia is limited. we don't understand how russia works. we don't understand the

complexity of the society. much of what we've tried to do out of very good intentions over the past 25 years has been counterproductive. that's one. two, i think it's a fact, historical fact, that the room for human rights, democracy building in russia, for the development of these ideas and spread of these ideas is better when u.s.-russian relations are better. you go back to the soviet period as well for kpampexamples of th. on one hand, we have a group that wants to promote and thinks human rights are valuable like we do and wants to do all these nasty things that worsen our relationships with russia. what is putin going to say? thank you. i now see the light. i'm going to open up a free press and real debate in this country. what he's going to do is what he's done over the past four

years. he's going to crackdown. now there's a policy question of how we should do that. there's a moral question for all of us. the people who defend human rights in russia are heros because they go out and they risk their lives every day to get it done. the people sitting on this stage who are going to try to help you are not risking a damn thing. and our responsibility here is to try to create a situation that is most conducive to getting done what you want done. i would argue the pressure doesn't get us there. now if you're talking about the national interest, again you've got to take it all together. >> let's give it to -- >> so tom, why is it that human rights activists and people in the opposition support an act? why do they look to the united states for moral support? why do they hope we'll stand by our principles and our values?

sure, i couldn't do what half of what you and your compatriots do, but the least i can do is to be a voice for you and others to try to bring about some sense of accountability for gross human rights abuses, not let rotten people and the russian officialdom come to the united states, send their kids here to study, invest in whatever properties they want. it's not a right to come to the united states. it's a privilege. if you abuse human rights in russia, you shouldn't set foot on u.s. soil. it is critically important that the united states stands by its values and its principles. we've done it for decades if not centuries, and to abandon russians like you at this greatest time of need, i think, would be an abomination. >> very quickly, paul, you were saying you grew up in the 80s and you remember living with the thr o threat of nuclear war.

i grew up in the 80s on the other side in the soviet union. one thing was profoundly different. the difference was that nobody believed in the soviet system at that time. there was just widespread cynicism. why was that the case? i think the system corrupted internally before it fell apart from the top because the u.s. stood up for its values. we invested in our public diplomacy. we invested in securing the information space. we had a brand, blue jeans, mcdonald's, all these things, popular culture. this is what everybody in the soviet union were looking for. this is what my family was looking for when we came to the united states. this is where our strength is. it is in our values, in our democracy, in our liberal views, and we need to get back to that as well. >> just to respond very briefly to that, that policy took 30 to 40 years to work.

and during the period while we waited for it to work, we regularly engaged with the soviet government on a variety of different issues. >> we have way more questions in the audience then we'll ever be able to handle. >> and i have a flight to catch. >> well, we'll see about that. [ laughter ] >> but i will ask the audience members just keep it brief, if you can, so we can get back and get another question or two if we can. >> so the relationship between baltic states and the russian federation directly depends on the relationship between the united states and the russian federation. it is not good at the moment. right now, latvia and baltic states particularly lose hundreds of millions of dollars because of economic sanctions.

in fact, baltic states became a target from a military point of view. >> so the question? >> the question is what benefit would the regular latvian citizen get out of deengagement with russia? >> what's the benefit of the citizens to the baltic states in the united states takes a much harsher line like you're suggesting. >> i am not complacent about baltic security, but they're in a much better position than ukraine, georgia, muldova, other countries that are not members of nato. if you follow our recommendation, you'll still have article 5 security guarantees. that doesn't change at all. i actually think putin does respect article 5 security guarantees, and that's why i don't think a military move against your country is likely. >> again, we're not arguing for

isolationism. containment and isolationism are not the same thing. it's not about de-engagement. the baltic states themselves are consistently asking for permanent battalions and troops to be stationed in lithuania and latvia for a reason. it's not that they're being strong armed and bullied into having permanent troops on your land. it's that your governments are asking for it all the time in washington, d.c., and i think that signals to the fact that nato actually works. >> there's another gentleman. >> i see where the red line is drawn there. so my question is directed at sanctions. and i guess my question is in terms of re-engagement on one side, would you lift certain sanctions? and on the other side, would you

impose more having seen the sanctions effect on cuba since 1960? i wonder what additional sanctions might be added that would impact on russia. >> would more sanctions really make a difference? tom and paul, do you want to start with that? >> i mean, i'll start with that. i think we don't need more sanctions at this point. i think we need a policy now or an agreement now that will ease sanctions in return for certain steps by russia. i think the problem that we're in now is we've got the sanctions to full implementation of the minska agreement, that's not going to happen anytime soon. again within a broader overall policy toward russia has a chance of getting us where we want with ukraine and in a

broader sense with russia. >> i don't think that's the answer here. first of all, there are more sanctions we can impose. sanctions on a broader swath of the russian financial sector. those are the ones that are going to hurt in the long term and easing sanctions that are tied to concessions is not going to work. let me quote not me, but the prime minister of georgia who just recently said, russia never appreciates when you concede or make a step forward for compromise. they always take it for granted. if we start talking about weakening sanctions rather than adding sanctions when russia violates on a daily basis the agreement, we're sending the wrong message. >> okay, we have another question in the back there. >> hi, ben perkins. my question is how do countries that are not directly engaged with the u.s. and russia are

doing, how to they vido they vi sort of stalemate that we have? my worry is people like the chinese look at this like we're morons. that's my question. >> david and elina, let me turn to you first and phrase the question this way. other countries are getting on with business. isn't that leaving us out? and isn't an approach where we say we're containing, but we're really just keeping ourselves out actually going to help russia and make the problem worse? >> look, it depends on which countries we're talking about. i don't think a lot of countries like the idea that the united states and russia are in the state of relations that we are right now. i don't like the fact that we're in the state of relations that we're in right now, but i think a lot of countries want the united states to show spine and solidarity with countries that are coming under attack and threat.

tom talked about driving china into russia's hands. i've been hearing talk about that for a long time. i don't buy it. there's so much distrust between the too. that would be the end of putin, i think, if he became part of china, inc. i don't worry that we're going to cause all these problems elsewhere in the world. of course, it would be nice if we got along. i wish the red sox were in the world series, but that didn't happen either. >> let me respond very quickly to david. the russians are selling weapon systems to the chinese that they were never prepared to sell to them in the past. they're selling them much more advanced technology, including the s-400 missiles that they have in syria. that's something they were never willing to sell before. that has real consequences for the united states and particularly for our young naval officers here if china has those systems. it makes a difference.

secondly, look, hitler and stalin didn't trust each other and germany and the soviet union could not have any kind of long-term sustained alliance for two years from 1939 to 1941. they kind of cooperated and it created a lot of problems for other people. >> okay. we're going to start moving to our final phase here, which is a rapid fire set of recommendations. so as we had an earlier question, one minute or less, just give us your one policy recommendation. what do you think the united states should do right now? and let's start with tom. >> already done it. i think you open up the channels of communication and then i think you take a hollenististic

at policy. what is russia's role, what role do we want russia to play, and how do we construct a policy that gets us to where we want russia to be? >> paul? >> i'm very concerned about the breakdown in military to military communication, the impact that could have in a crisis situation. that's where i would like to start so we have a channel to deescalate if it gets any worse. >> i'll make it clear that pressure on russia will be ramped up if it doesn't get out of ukraine, if it doesn't stop what it's doing in syria, but also make clear if russia were to change on these things, the united states is prepared to partner with russia on a range of issues. but until putin changes his behavior -- and the track record is very long of bad behavior --

there are no bright prospects between the u.s. and russia. >> just to go back to what i think i opened with. there are many things that russia could do and putin could do to prove their trustworthiness. as long as he chooses not to do them in regards to ukraine, in regards to syria, then i think our policy has to be what it is. in fact, i think we should ramp up sanctions. i think we should have sanctions related to what russia has done in syria specifically. there is no way forward if we start giving concessions. that's a slippery slope. >> if there's one takeaway we can come away with from here, this is complicated and hard. our next president, whoever he or she may be, is going to have to deal with this and we certainly hope they do it the best way possible. join me in thanking our

debaters. please tell your friends and colleagues about the mccain institute, about our mccain institute debates. check us out online at mccaininstitute.org, c-span brings you more debates this week from key u.s. senate races. tonight at 8:00 eastern, live on c-span republican senator rand paul and democrat jim gray debate for the kentucky senate seat and wednesday night at 8:00 live coverage on c-span of the louisiana senate debate between a field of candidates, republican congressman charles beau stanny and the democrats and republican representative john fleming, republican state

treasurer john kennedy. and at 9:00, kelly ayotte and maggie hassan debate for the new hampshire senate seat. from now until election day, watch house, senate and governors' races on c-span.org and listen on the c-span raid yes app. c-span where history unfolds daily. c-span where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and it's brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. now the deputy chair of the people's freedom party in russia delivering remarks at the atlantic council. he'll talk about the new report on the connection between vladimir putin's political party united russia and organized crime. from earlier this month. this runs over an hour.

so good afternoon. we're going to go ahead and get started. i'm the deputy director of the atlantic council and it's my pleasure to be the host and moderator with ilya yashin. we have seen ilya here quite a few times. we have worked very closely with the free russia foundation. i'm thankful for that relationship here. ilya we first met in may 2015 when he wrote his first report together with colleagues that pulled together the remaining

pieces of reports that show that the russian deaths and casualties happening in ukraine. that report called putin war was incredibly successful, many thanks to ilya's efforts. and he followed up that report which we also presented here, the atlantic council a few months ago in the spring of this year. as many of you know, the chechen leader is by many considered to be a close ally of putin and in some ways a puppet of putin and ilya has called them a threat to national security. that is the report that he presented here in march. so we're gathered here again today to speak with ilya and his new report. titled the criminal russia party. this report ilya will talk about shortly really uncovers the kleptocratic networks and gangs

that ruled the ruling party which is headed by vladimir putin. for those of you watching at home, please follow us in this conversation using #ac eurasia and at the twitter handle -- the #is ac russia. so i would like to hand the stage over to ilya. many of you know, but i'll quickly introduce him. he's a russian activist, liberal politician. one of the few remaining in russia today. he's a deputy chairman of the freedom party which was led by boris nemtsov until his assassination last year. please welcome ilya to the stage.

[ speaking a foreign language ] >> thank you, and good evening to everybody. i'm glad to have this opportunity to meet the people in the atlantic council. i do appreciate the fact that you do care about what's going on in my country. because i'm aware that not only in russia, but in the world and i really would like that my country, russia, would be a part of the world community. recently we had parliamentary

elections in russia which is called united russia gained a majority of the votes. it would take a separate topic and a separate debate about why did it happen. but right now i'd like to talk about what is united russia about. this is my report which i would like to present to you. it is translated into english. and i would like to express my particular gratitude to the free russia foundation for producing this english version. the title of this report is

criminal par -- party of criminal russia and the title reflects the essence of this political entity. the public opinion polls in russia, very often reflected the people's awareness of the fact that this political party is directly intertwined with the criminal world in russia. one of the leading polling organization in russia, a number of times raised the question. which party would u.s. associate with the -- would you associate

with the party of thieves and crook and a majority of the respondents would name the party of united russia. the latest center report said that more than 50% of respondents associated the united russia with this title. with the title of parties and criminals and crooks and then the center was deemed as the foreign agent in russia and basically ceased to function. and doesn't do any polls anymore. in the 1990s, there was a conflict between the criminal world and the russian government and as the list to certain

extent the criminal world was able to corrupt russian government buying its loyalty by paying bribes. in the 2000s when putin came to power and the new political trend dominated in russia, the new alliance, the clearer merging of the criminal world and political world were found -- were -- what was established in russia. the criminal organization started infiltrating the government apparatus very efficiently and very quickly using the channels which were provided by the new putin's party.

kremlin and his spokespeople claimed that this only unique cases in general the party the party of the russian patriots. however, in my report, i approved -- i prove the opposite. that the united russia is intertwined with the criminal world and actually the united russia became an apparatus for social upward mobility for the criminals.

this is the map which my colleagues around i, we prepared for this report which show how many crimes and where crimes were committed by the russian government. and the tentacles of this octopus have penetrated into all levels of the russian government from the east to west, from the lowest basis to the highest levels of the russian government. and in our report basically we provide the many cases which show how the system works.

how the people -- how the people use the criminals use this system as the social upward mobility mechanism. let me provide -- let me give you several examples in order to illustrate what i'm talking about. the first example is the former governor of the republic of commies which is one of the russian region. and he's not only just a governor. he's one of the exemplary boys of the united russia who was make -- who made it to 100 best officials representing the united russia.

he was repeatedly received in kremlin. he met numerous times putin and medvedev and he was quoted and his name was used as an example to other governors. both putin and him both repea d repeatedrepeate repeatedliedrepeate repeatedly did said to the governors you should work like him because he's an example of how regional partnerships can function. several years later it was revealed that geyser is a leader

of the criminal group that took over the entire apparatus of this region. geyser and his fellow friends took over the regional section of the united russia. and basically, this regional -- regional section of the united russia was a criminal group which came to power and took over the entire russian region. with putin's support, guys took over the region and dozens of criminals who were fellow members of geyser's criminal gang took over the administration of their regime.

geyser's people -- geyser's group seized -- more than 20 most efficient enterprises in the region and they were wiring the -- transferring the revenues of those companies to the foreign bank accounts. another good example would be the gang which was working active in the region in southern russia. this gang existed back in the 1990s and it was known for its very aggressive approach. they were doing basically everything, they corrupted the officials, they attacked people

and they were known for multiple rape cases. in 2002, the gang leader was shot and killed by another gangster during the intergangster war. as a result a new leader was the nephew of the killed one, legalized his -- this gang and it attained political power. they all became members of the ruling party in united russia,

and became the members of the local municipal executive authorities where this gang was active. several years later, all the gangsters were members of -- became the representatives of the local government and the municipal level and all of them were members of the united russia. law enforcement agencies were perfectly aware of what kind of people they were and there was a file -- criminal file for each of them in the criminal law enforcement agencies had criminal files for each of them.

but it didn't stop the gang from rising to power and the climax of this rise to power was the participation of the leader in the presence of the leader of this gang at the president medvedev's inauguration on may 7, 2008. basically, back next to medvedev's back. several years later, he and his fellow member gang members were arrested for organizing crime, bloody crime in the village.

the gangsters killed businessman who refused to pay money to the gang and they killed not only the businessman himself, but all his entire family including women and children. i should say that many of the heroes -- the characters mentioned in my report ended up doing time in jail by now. but not to be mistaken, it would be -- you would have the wrong impression if you believed that the law enforcement agencies efficiently deal with this issue of criminal -- criminal people who came to power.

according to my report, the -- these people end up in jail only when they -- when they clash with the interest of the other more influential representatives of the government authority. in other words, the high level representatives of the united russia can do whatever they like as long as they play by rules and do not act against dangerous -- more influential and more powerful criminals who are members of the united russia. but i would like to highlight a

special cast which is -- of the so called untouchable people who are closely related to putin himself. and there is a whole bunch of them in my report. one of the most outstanding characters is the governor of the region kachuck who was accused of organizing an attempt to assassinate famous journalist oleg cashen. the people who were involved in this crime once they were arrested they answered very clearly that the organizer, the mastermind of the crime was tkachuk. however, nothing happened to tkachuk. he's still free and he was not

removed from his position of the governor. and the reason is very obvious his friend is an old friend of putin, but from back from the times back -- going back to the 1990's. here's one of the pictures that tkachuk's father and putin are together at one of the athletic events. another untouchable on this list is united russia deputy in the russian parliament whose name is urisnick. back in 1980s he was one of the seal of the bunk russia i with is controlled by the oligarchs who are directly related to

putin. there was a quiet, scandalous place in spain where resnick was accused for representing interest of russian mafia. and of course we cannot omit from the list the chechen politicians. there is a chapter in my report dedicated to the man who is the deputy of russia, representing in the russian parliament in the chechen region. he's a right -- he was the right man and he was associated with a number of killings.

for a while, interpol declared him in the international search after one of the kadiro's opponents was killed in the united arab emirates. and all this so-called untouchable criminals who are members and the activists of the united russia feel themselves free and safe in the russian federation. putin is running russia for almost 17 years. and one of the -- his key credits he claims the fact that he -- that there is no more organized crime in russia.

however, the facts which are revealed in my report show that the organized crime is -- did not disappear in russia. it has been transformed and basically became part of the foundation of the state government system. if back in 1990s a typical representative of russian organized crime was a tough guy in a robin colored jacket with a chain on his neck. today -- in today's russia a criminal looks like an official

who is wearing an expensive suit. wearing the united russia badge on his lapel and putin's picture in his office. and who is -- who claims to be an absolute patriot of russia. if you read the interviews of each character which i described in my report, you would be surprised how close they are. how much they love russia, how much they care about -- how many efforts they put for their country.

in reality, this report shows how cynical, how false, how bad is the system which is built by the government system in my country. during 17 years of his rule of russia, putin not only got rid of the criminal organized crime in russia. in fact, he laid the foundation for the state criminal link. and unfortunately this state continues destroying my country. thank you.

>> so ilya, thank you very much for that troubling presentation. i think you only give troubling presentations here at the atlantic council which i think is mainly just the testament to the kind of society that russia is becoming today. while president putin is at the helm. always appreciate your insights and investigative reporting on this. so we're going to have the discussion. i'll speak in english and ilya will answer in english or russia. we'll go to q&a, and please ask your questions in english which will be translated. i want to go to the more interesting pieces that come out in the report. you mentioned the polls on united russia and what russians think of the party. not of president puten who --

putin who gets incredibly high ratings in all of the polling. but united russia specifically. i was fascinated to see that in 2013 half of russians consider united russia a party of crooks, 62% believe that united russia was only interested in obtaining the power and not in the welfare of its own people. so when you have this kind of disenchantment in society with the ruling regime, yet you have incredibly high approval ratings for the person who was at the head of the regime, how do we understand that? how do we understand the high approval ratings for putin but the rising distrust of russia as a party? >> you said it correctly, that while everybody believes that the united russia is the party of crooks, the united russia still wins on every election.

there is an old russian tradition which would divide the czar from the bad buyer, in other words, the bad advisers who surround the king. and often putin efficiently places his card and opposes himself to the united russia. >> so for all 17 years, putin there was not a single day that putin was not a member of the united russia. there was an interesting period when putin was a chairman of the united russia without being a member of united russia.

today's united russia leader is medvedev and on his background, putin looks quite impressive. medvedev looks -- looks like a clown i would say. looks -- >> comical figure. >> comical figure who cannot be trusted with the serious business. and in this background on the background of the other people, there's crooks and thieves, putin looks like a man who can bring in order.

and though real problems, social problems and economic problems are -- the people who are in charge with dealing with problems are local governors, putin is seen more as the russia's ambassador to the rest of the world. in other words, putin is too busy to take care of retired people's pensions. he needs to go to the west and deal with the global issues. >> so what you're basically saying it's very much in putin's interest to maintain this level of criminality so he has somebody else to blame for russia's economic problems, his domestic problems basically, and i think that's very interesting because here, we tend to

question how long can russia really maintain this aggressive foreign policy. while it still struggles economically and will continue to struggle over the years and this is the answer. you place other people to blame while you are seen as at the helm of putting russia back in the -- where it belongs in the world as a great power. but what -- i want to dig down a little bit more into the patterns you described at the local level. and i think what you're really pointing to, the criminality that goes from the micro, up to the macro level. so from mayors, governors all throughout the regions and all the way into the heart of the kremlin where you have ministers who are implicated in some of the schemes and in corruption scandals. but my question for you on that is something that was in your presentation or your report.

it is that criminals who enter party and use it for their own political power and mobility and profit from that, or is it that the political system itself encourages and facilitates criminality? so which one is first? is it the criminals enter or that people enter and become criminals after they're already politicians? >> obviously, the united russia party was not designed from the very beginning as the party which would serve the interest of the criminal gangs. originally it was designed for serving putin's personal interests. however, the very nature of this party allowed to the old kind of criminal gangster to come to power using this party structure.

and the reason why it happened is because corruption in russia is not a taboo. corruption is allowed and acceptable as long as you play by the rules of the other key figures on this figure. and as a result, the corruptioners and the criminal gangs as long as they play by the rule they get their revenues. and the classic example would be the regime built in chechnya which i described in a lot of detail in the previous report. kadero claims he's a patriot although he's not a patriot by definition.

and he publicly expresses his bromance to putin. kadero is secure that when they have elections gets 99.9% of votes in chechnya for putin. on the other hand, the government spends -- gives lots of subsidies to chechnya and nobody is accountable for this money. this is the most -- the most blatant example. but actually the system works this way everywhere else. in other words, the -- any official, any government official or party member starts to have problems once he or she

starts to violate the rules of the game and enters into conflict with more influential person in the party or in the system. as a result, step by step, year by year, the criminal were merged with the government system, with the party system and they became a perfect symbiosis. >> so to follow up on that, you describe a few instances when there are clashes between interests when one criminal gang doesn't respect the informal rules of the game and then you have the judiciary and the legal system step in. and one question i had for you, so there are many instances of when people are prosecuted,

there are criminal charges pressed against them at the local level, also at the level of the kremlin and ministers. so is there at all any independent judiciary in russia? i tend to think here that the judiciary is essentially under the control of the kremlin, but in some instances do you describe at the local level, they actually do seem to be acting independently to seek out these corrupt officials to arrest them and actually put them in jail. so the question is is there an independent judiciary in russia in some capacity or is is there not? >> first of all, the government is interested in proving the case that it still fights the criminal gang, criminal organizations. and some of the united russia representatives picked up to

play the role of scapegoats as the victims. and in this few particular cases represented by the government propaganda represented by the largest world. and sometimes the city mayors, deputies of municipal authorities, and even the government officials end up in jail. however, every time when the issue is are they the figures of the higher level, the law enforcement agencies give up.

the most blatant example is in the case of the former minister. it was clearly a large scale propaganda case for proving that the government fights corruption. the national tv conducted the investigative reports, they published the schemes. how the -- they revealed how the money was stolen. one of the high level officials from the defense ministry who was close to the minister spent almost a year under house arrest.

so it was a very particular case of house arrest because she was repeatedly noticed visiting shopping in expensive store, bringing the people to take care of her -- >> nails. >> nail polisher. >> nail technicians. as a result, she spent in jail not really more than a month. while sergio himself was pardoned. a very similar case happened to the former agriculture minister's clinic who was using

a very primitive scheme to steal money. you should read it in my report. it's really interesting. once a criminal case was opened against her, she flew to france and lived in her villa since then. and nobody tries to find her. >> so it's all pr and smoke and mirrors where you have to have some low-level small fish to fry and then some bigger sacrificial lambs. in reality the system stays intact. >> well, it's quite natural to expect that the system which is criminal based nature is supposed to protect itself. so in order to prove that you're not a criminal, you need to

make -- to have a public -- activities to prove you are fighting the criminals. putin's closest friends, oligarchs, they have monopolies on major assets in my country. however, they declare themselves -- they always position themselves as the people who fight corruption and sent to jail, small fish. >> so now united russia after the last elections has a super majority in the parliament, right? and my last question to you before we open to the audience, where does this all go? you're describing the system where there's no separation between criminality, mafia and the political party. the political party that now controls politics in russia basically. so where does this all go?

where does this all lead to right after putin, let's say. if putin is not going to be there forever, how -- what kind of country and political system does this produce in the end? what's the end game here? >> well, the reason -- the real problem is not the fact that criminal -- that the united russia has ties with the criminal world. many other parties in many other countries have ties with the criminal world. the real problem is that in putin's own realities, the united russia is the estate building element.

in putin's russia, the united russia is a part of the government. it merged completely with the governmental institutions and is a governmental institution itself. and the biggest -- a real problem is that this state institution became a social upward mobility -- mechanism for criminals to go move up into the government. and the system is basically finished. it is completed. it is not going to evolve anymore. i don't believe that it's going to last for a long time.

when putin is gone for some reason he's gone, the system should evolve. because the person who secures the system and is -- who designed the system and is the main security asset of this system is putting himself -- which was designed to reinforce his personal -- the system can collapse in very different ways. for example, you might know the very good example of how the ruling party in ukraine which was called the party of the

regions ended up. it will be not completely appropriate to call -- to draw direct parallels between the ukraine and russia, but the ukraine and ruling party, the party of the regions was closely tied with the criminal world in ukraine. and once the party ceases to exist and the former members try to disassociate themselves as much as possible for its former -- >> but given that the current situation, am i -- in moscow is it really a possibility? >> i don't know.

i would not make any bet about this, will it not happen or happen in moscow but i know that the changes will happen. they are not unavoidable. putin is there not there forever and the system is not eternal either. because the system started to devolve itself. and probably in our lifetime we're going to see another political system in russia. would it happen via -- by means of the transformation, it will happen.

i simply believe that my mission and mission of my colleagues as a russian politicians is to mitigate the impact when this -- when this -- when it happens. in other words, my mission is to make this transformation transition period as bloodless as possible. >> thank you, i hope you're right. i hope the system is not eternal just like putin. so let me take some questions from the audience, please. i see hand here and a hand here. so please. better in english, i think. if possible. [ speaking a foreign language ]

>> okay. can you speak english, if that's possible. i think it would be easier for the audience and then we can translate freely. >> okay. i forget what i want to say. just the goal -- i want to ask you about the goal of the report and your personal goal as to russian politician. is the goal to tell people the truth about the crooks and thieves in putin's -- you know, team or the goal is to, you know, defeat putin. because you mentioned in the presentation the importance of a clash between the elites. don't you think that that kind of clash can actually cause putin's, you know, step over from power and it could ease the

process of transition of reforms of peaceful transition to russia because i personally like doubt that you want the -- like in moscow we don't want our business to happen in moscow the die. you know, the kremlin. we need someone to open the gates from the kremlin. don't you think that's such reports the cause that or at least will, you know, surround putin and fight for him? >> personally, let me assure you that i didn't mention a single name in my report of a person who would be able to open kremlin gates to opposition --

to the opposition. we're talking about real criminals who are not only involved in corruption cases, but who are going -- who in one or the other manner were associated with the contra killings. and my ideal is the russian society. this report was prepared before the elections and during the election, electoral campaign i travelled all around russia and presented to the electorate t the -- this report in order to

raise awareness of the russian -- of russian people. in other words, the major -- the main message of my report was that although you are invited to vote for united russia do not be surprised because of your vote criminals are going to come to power. the idea of the split among elites is quite clear just for me. though i don't believe that neither me nor my fellow colleagues from the opposition movement are able to make a difference in this interelite processes.

the split among putin's establishment can happen only due to objective reasons. and i can see the -- those reasons are taking shape now. because if you remember in the first stage of his rule, in the first phase of his rule, putin positioned himself as the person who was securing the interests of the russian oligarchs and high level officials. and today, putin's policies have harmed us -- those interests.

basically, what is the nature of the oligarchs? they prefer to steal money in russia and spend them overseas. and as a result of putin's adventures in ukraine and syria, very often those oligarchs cannot only use their money overseas, but they can't even travel overseas. and this is what is going to -- what is going to cause the split among the putin's -- not -- so not my reports because my reports are not -- were not written for -- the audience of my reports i'm not oligarchs, but simple russians. >> so more questions, please.

gentleman there. please just a reminder to present yourself, name, affiliation and to ask a question rather than a comment. >> mitchell pulpman, it just returned from election observing from russia. but my question has nothing to do with that. it's a good follow-up to what you were just talking about with respects to these people keeping their money overseas. a lot of these cases you cite are from some years back. i'm wondering the effect that sanctions have had on their ability -- the ability of the united russia officials to send money overseas, keep money overseas, to invest in property. it's well known they have been buying property in florida and new york. how have sanctions and recent events impacted all of that? and if they're not able to send money to the west, then what

exactly are they doing with it? >> i always -- i always supported the idea of general sanctions, not person sanctions. i believe that personal sanctions targeted against specific people are going to be much more efficient for the -- and have much bigger impact on the evolution of the system. because the personal sanctions,

the most vulnerable spot in putin's regime which are the pockets of the -- pockets of the elite. back when he was leave, nemtsov was trying to convince when he visited the united states, he was trying to convince people, the congressmen, what they should do is to replace the jackson vanik amendment with the law. it was a very smart idea. instead of punishing the entire people, let's punish specific crooks and thieves. >> ilya, can i interrupt for a moment? >> sure. >> to follow up on on the

personal sanctions is it also not true that individuals that have much that wealth and power can easily get around the personal sanctions by transferring property to their grand mothers, uncles, all these other things? >> no, it is not that easy. yes, they do try to find a loophole -- find loopholes but it's not an easy solution. first of all, not everybody is that brave to give all his assets and money to his or her spouse. though russia is a very conservative country and it claims a great deal of spiritual value -- devotion to spiritual values. but officially, even our

president in mayor moscow are divorced men. therefore, there's always a potential for complications. therefore there is always potential for complications. don't get me wrong, the personal sanctions should be very, very efficient. >> next question, ariel? >> good evening, ariel cohen, senior fellow of the council. i can not only admire your work as i admired their work, but let me play devil's advocate. your and barissa's reports were published before. now he is busy doing what i is

doing. probably if you did an independent polling in russia a vast majority of people know it is famous to say how to say things in russia, how are things in russia, they steal. this is early 19th century. not much changed. so with all that, what makes you think that at the crisis of this regime if and when it comes and i i agree with you, sooner or later, every regime facees a crisis. that what comes next, it may not be even nastier, even more violent and not necessarily cleaner than what you have now. once people used to say last decade before 2011, people used to quote yosef bros ki sayingk

saying --i ki saying --ki saying -- saying -- something like that. i like the thieves more than blood suckers, the murderers. but looking at what is out there in the political soup, looking at the last elections, how many votes the liberal wing got, how do you think people will vote and will people vote or there will be a different power shift not necessarily through the ballot baks if and when this regime faces its ultimate crisis. thank you.baks if and when this regime faces its ultimate crisis. thank you.obaks if and when thi regime faces its ultimate crisis. thank you.xbaks if and when thi regime faces its ultimate crisis. thank you. if and when this regime faces its ultimate crisis. thank you. >> translator: with all due respect, this line of defending putin's regime is outdated.

>> translator: the man that the thieves are better than the murderers is quite outdated. it's antiquated. putin's regime is liable for thousands of lost lives in ukraine and syria and russia. and it is quite tough unless russian people are still going to realize that they are supposed to call shots in russia, the next regime, the next government is going to be

as bad as it used to be. and therefore, the main idea he tried to convey and which i'm trying to convey now is -- russia institutes a mechanism to enable the russian society to hold their bureaucrats and functionaries accountable. it would be a mistake to believe that the goal of opposition is to replace putin with novinski.

our goal is to change the entire system, the entire institution. our goal is to make sure that there will be a political competition and the government is going to be -- would be replaceable. no matter who is going to become the next president in two terms he or she is supposed to leave. so it doesn't matter whether what will be the last name of this person and whether me personally is going to support or be in a position to support this person. and what is most important is that this person should leave in two terms.

twice if this doesn't happen, if we're not going to create mechanism to hold accountable officials, law enforcement agencies, security, institutions, in a hundred years we will have the same good old russian system. >> it actually sounds like what you're saying now is the system is in fact potentially eternal and durable with or without -- trance tra >> translator: the system may have natural features but as long as people do not play -- do

not get involved actively in the regulation in the whole system accountable, the system will preserve its usual settings. and i should say that i'm a historical optimist. for example, i can give you an example of some european nations or even the united states here where the case is 50 years ago and compared to what is going on now. and i believe, and i can see that there is a progress among human progress. and i also believe that

russians, as people, are not dumber than people in europe or in the united states or anywhere else. or what they need is the right kind of philosophy. >> c-span brings you more debates this week from key u.s. senate races. tonight at 8:00 eastern, live on c-span, rand paul and democrat jim gray debate for the kentucky senate seat and wednesday live at 8:00, live senate debate between charles, democrat foster campbell, democrat carolyn fayer, representative john flemming, republican state treasurer john kennedy and republican david duke. and at 9:00, republican senator kelly ayotte and governor maggie hanson debate for the seat. watch key debates from house,

senate races on the c-span networks, c-span.org and listen on the c-span app. where history unfolds daily. >> this week on c-span 2 featuring political radio programs with national talk show hosts. tuesday morning from 6 of okay to 9 oblg eastern with the left liening perspective on the bill press show live from washington, d.c. on wednesday also from washington, conservative radio talk show host hugh hewitt is live from 6:00 to 9:00 a.m. eastern. live thursday from noon to 3:00, author and progressive radio host tom hartman and on friday from 9:00 a.m. until noon. a conservative political perspective on the mike gallagher show. live from new york city. all this week, live on c-span 2. >> c-span where history unfolds

daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite proo provider. provide >> next on c-span 3, it's american history tv with programs on native american history. we begin with historian paul andrew hutton on the 19th century conflict between the apaches. mexican, american settlers, native american settlers and groups. this is an hour. >> good iening. welcome. my name is eli paul and with the special collections of the tennessee public library. it is my honor to introduce our speaker paul