defense for jonathan powell and david manning that in that one incident that required the extraction of a few words from one of the most pivotal documents, nothing else. and i think the reason i'm asking about them in particular is that if a prime minister seeks to run a certain style of government, they require the help and support of other people to do it. people that determine what briefing papers they will see, what meetings they will attend, the advisors they see and those two gentlemen would probably have been central to the operation. >> that's perfectly true and on the butler committee we reflected on and found deficiency in the arrangement whereby the prime minister's foreign policy advisor in number 10 also held the role of head of overseas and defense secretary in the cabinet office with a wider set of responsibilities and inevitably -- and we said it again if our own report, that shifted the balance of the occupant of that dual role too

far towards number 10 responsibility to the prime minister and too far away from the collective responsibility to and of the cabinet. now can you or should you criticize the individual for not saying i won't accept both roles? that's going a bit far but the exercise of both roles is a very difficult business and we think it all the evidence we could. we published it.

for you and others to endorse it or find fault or deficiencies. we all agreed this was a unanimous report in all respects which, by the way, is worth drawing to attention because in the thing of that scale and covering that degree of controversy it could well have led to minority views or even on particular points were not. >> one final question for you, mr. chairman. you accused tony blair of being unreasonable in his assessment of the evidence and decisions he made in response to the chairman's questions at the beginning of the session. do you think there are other unreasonable people on downing street who drew similar conclusions and who advised and encouraged the prime minister of the course of action he was taking? >> well in british system i

don't think i can point to a particular individual who i could fairly demonstrate. given unreasonable advice or taken unreasonable position in supporting the iraq misadventure it's hard to answer because there was so much multiple dialogue going on all the time. so much unrecorded and you can't be sure from the surviving documentary archive, vast though it is, who said what to who on what occasion and with what effect. all we can do is read what we've read, published what we published, which is all of it that's relevant and draw what conclusions the five and sadly the four of us could get to. >> if you can't, who else could. you claim one is unreasonable but you don't say anyone else was unreasonable? >> in deference to the chairman, it was his word and not mine of

choice but i accepted the line of questioning, obviously. do i place others in the same position? i think that the foreign secretary faced an extraordinarily difficult task, the formal objective of british policy was to disarm saddam, the instrument chosen by as a matter of policy was containment but then turned into coercive diplomacy. diversive diplomacy can end up in two places and you're subject to a military expedition which we knew our coalition partner was going to do anyway and that was a tough situation to be in but it was a matter of choosing

to be in it. >> thank you. >> sir john, we've talked about the weapons of mass destruction. i remember at the time a dossier or a document put out by by the was about the way saddam hussein treated his own citizens. a few weeks before rwanda, i saw things which made me shamed at this country and other countries did not intervene in any way to prevent that torture of human beings. how much did you consider that regime, that respect was worthy of some kind of action from the international community? >> well, the underlying justification for any action on those grounds, humanitarian grounds, which was defies international law.

kosovo is a very interesting case. it was visited a few time vis be prime ministers and others but didn't arise because the imagination security council was in a gridlock. there was a russian veto and also a collective thought that something had to be done to deal with the disaster that was taking place in kosovo. and there was no objection to it. when it comes to the iraq case, you have the invasion and the majority of the members of the security council, both lekted a -- lekted and unlekted oppose taking action n the face of that, no one was making a humanitarian based argument. normally standing we can't justify an underground, we better save the iraqi people from this dictator. that was never a proposition that was running.

>> united nations were in parliament. and you remember reading the paper put out and thinking i wish i could share with this with all my constituents. they would then understand why voting the way i'm voting. >> yes. but it was -- i just wish i could have shared it with everybody that would then react. what i'm asking you is how much did you consider that when you looked -- how much did you consider when you were looking into the whole justification of some action at least being taken? >> well, some action short of the ministry invasion and occupati occupation. and, yes, that was the policy of the government at the time and of most, not all, other responsible governments. but action short of the invasion and occupation of a sovereign

count country, there is humanitarian grounds. it -- i can understand entirely as we sit in various points. i mean the introduction to my statement on launching the report, the nature of saddam's tyranny was barbaric and beyond any kind of defense. but that did not amount either in international law or international policy making to a sufficient grounds for invasion for sovereign country. >> you did consider it? >> yeah. we've been looking at this since 1945. >> the prime minister has the he could ontive and can go to war without consulting parliament. >> yes. >> if tony blair had done that, would we be sitting here today? would you be asked to look into it in such great detail? >> i think there have been no

consultation from parliament. none of us would be sitting in the same seats today. and that's not a flippant response. it would change everything. but, of course -- >> why do you say that? >> because mr. mayor, as prime minister did consult and if he hadn't, hopefully he would have known he wouldn't be putting out -- >> it having been standard procedure. i don't think people would said he should have gone to war. it would not have been done to that extent before. >> i am under the impression that the convention, short of an xenl or immediate crisis parliament would be consulted before military action is actually taken. that convention is surely now dominant. >> okay. >> just final note. you mentioned that politics have been damaged by this whole affair. >> yes. >> how has it been damaged by

your own -- by your finding? to be fair to politicians, we have certain ways to look at. this we have seven days or. so you spent a lot of money. you have the benefit of hindsight. we didn't have that benefit at all. it could cost $192 million pounds and people questioning what this achieved. >> it's a question that's come up a few times in the internal conversation onz the iraq inquiry. and i think by the time we finished and we're in a position to publish, we're confident that the scope and range of the lessons which we wanted attention drawn to justified the effort that had gone into it. i don't see myself and comparisons get one very far.

they all tend to be very specific. it is notable that a single inquiry has been taken as long as ours and they usually cost more. but that's behind us. if you have an inquire inquiry, the key thing is it should carry confidence among those to whose it's eventually used. >> if you had drawn the headlines then, one headline, what is the single most important lesson, suggestion, finding that you reached? >> yeah. >> what is it? what is that one sort of telling factor? >> if you wouldn't mind i say when i hear that question as frequently, it's like today program. my instanktive answer is there is not one single thing but a whole host of things. i'll say the same thing here. we're asked to look at effectively nine years of central government effort across military, diplomatic and

political things. and you can't pick out of that just one lesson. of which all others sit. the issue is very hard and i will say it was a failure to exert an exercise sufficient collective responsibility for awe very big decision. and then to scrutinize the conduct and implementation. >> thank you very much. >> one quick question. the turkish parliament this week before said no. >> yeah. >> which then led the entire operation had to go from the south. this parliament when given a vote within 24 hours which is an exsoldier is an absurd position to be in. they're not occupied by british troops. former colleagues of mine in the final battle preparation and parliament is thinking this is going to make a decision. it is prak tuckly absurd for us

to be in involved in that at that moment in military terms. it seemed ridiculous for parliament to be consulted on this. >> i agree with you wholeheartedly. >> thank you very much, it's been a long session. and i'm going to have to truncate what i was going to ask you. i declare an interest in the outset from one who was an mp in 2003 who voted in favor of removing saddam saddam hussein but now believes it was entirely the wrong decision. what do you blame tony blair in the way in which he took the country to war and for what do you absolve him? >> i absolve him from a personal

and demonstrative decision to deceive parliament or the public. to state falsehoods, knowing them to be false. that i think he should be absolved from. however, he also exercised his very considerable powers of advocacy and persuasion rather than laying the real issues and the information to back the analysis of them fairly and squarely by the public or public. it was an exercise of 5:00 ray racy. it shared crucial judge ment as has been said this afternoon. one of the most important since 1945. >> who would you think should have stood up to him in respect of those aspects for which you find him blameworthy? >> blameless or blameworthy? >> blameworthy. who should have stood up to him so that he didn't do what he did that you now believe is wrong?

>> i suppose my short answer is that cabinet ministers and i'm not naming individual ones were given promises by him in cabinet that they would have the opportunity to consider and reflect and therefore decide on a number of big decisions in the course of the iraq case. he didn't give them that opportunity and they did not insist on it being given to them. and that i think is a failure. >> thank you. who else out of this big cast of characters do you particularly single out for blame besides tony blair? >> well, i think it's inescapable that the key ministers along with the prime minister who rarely vote throughout or the foreign secretary and the defense secretary. through a lesser and different extent, the international

development secretary. i think the crucial triangle is clearly prime minister defense and all those, the prime minister had a good deal more seniority and experience and influence than did the defense secretary of the day. >> thank you. making good progress. now i believe you stated that you found no evidence that a secret commitment to war but how can mr. blare's i will be with you whatever message to president bush be interpreted in any other way? >> he himself in evidence interpreted it in the sense of creating a sense in mr. bush's mind that he could trust the british for their support. not necessarily in the military adventure mr. tony blair would say but genuinely. in other words, an exercise in persuasion and relationship

management. >> do you accept that explanation by mr. tony blair? >> i think inspectfully, how did mr. bush take it is the hard question. and he would have taken it, i think, as an unconditional commitment. >> so going back to the initial approach to these matters, you would also think that any reasonable recipient of such a message would have taken it as an unconditional commitment? and therefore, it was really a secret commitment to war? >> and i can accept first part without quibbling. i think another part which hasn't been approached is what would the infect on person policy and decisions have been if there had been either a doubt or dast refusal on the part of the british to support an invasion? would visit delayed them? would it have discourage d them completely or would it have had no infect at all? >> that was going to be my next

question. what is your answer to it? >> i think, depending when the conditions had been tabled by the british side to the american president, if hit happened early enough in the course of it 2002, it might well have had the he fek effect of delaying the invasion. it would have been a much better time then. there was preparation and not least and so on. also, i think it would have changed this pure speculation the internal dynamics within the president's national security council. you find them backing a state of more sentencing. >> was mr. tony blair's decision based on solidarity more than on strategy? >> if i say so, that is an admirably concise statement which i agree.

>> thank you. >> now. is it true to say that saddam hussein behaved as though he still had chemical and biological weapons? and if chemical and biological weapons had been found in any significant quantities, would we be judging mr. tony blair very differently now? >> i find that one very difficult to answer partly because it is hypothetical, of course. and also it is pretty clear from the intelligence assessmentes that the suspicion as it turned out to be unfounded was that he did have chemical and biological weapons. but the battlefield use. these weren't strategic weapons. that changes the whole nature of the analysis as to whether or not invasion should take place. now as to saddam, he was -- all the time. for obvious reasons that we know. part of the plan is deception. part of it is to parade to his

enemy and the gulf states that he did simply have something or other and they better be careful. >> to defend himself? >> yeah. >> thank you. now, looking at some of the original documentation we produced and disclosed by your inquiry, we go from documents from the joint intelligence committee in january of 2003, iraq emerging view from baghdad and from another document drawn up from -- after discussion at the gic on the 19th of march, 2003 by the assessment staff entitled saddam, the beginning of the ent. they judged that iraq had a usable strategy. so i think it's probably true to say that this clearly shows that

the intelligence services believed that mr. tony blair had reason to believe that such a capability existed. is there any possibility that the joint intelligence committee's assessments were right and is still alleged from time to time his chemical and biological arsenal was moved to somewhere such as syria and if that's not believed to be the case, when and how do you believe that saddam destroyed his stocks? >> well, on the committee, we discussed quite long and quite hard whether we could say firmly that no weapons of mass destruction were tactical or strategic would be found. we were not able to do it in 2004. i think now with passage of time and events in the region, it would be quite extraordinary and

we do the iraq survey and reports. it is extraordinary of something discovered and undiscovered at all and how i do show up at one's house is one thing but a systematic battlefield weapons. >> so do you think he destroyed them or do you think he gave them to somebody else? >> i think that -- i don't believe for a moment that they were passed on to anyone else. it would be a great interest and it will be hard to find someone to pass them to. >> syria. >> no. i don't think there was that kind of relationship. but what happened to them? i think that's a fair question. and i think the answer is for a long time it was quite easy to get to. i think iraq group does which is that undocumented dispatch of

materials and destruction of materials took place on a considerable scale after the first gulf war and before the inspectors got back in. i think as important amount it's important and i think some people were misled in the 2000 to 2003 period. the weapons he did have or was document the as having been destroyed represented a hidden arsenal. it was nothing of the sort. it was an accounting problem. >> thank you very much. i have three more points. first is when i discussed at the beginning of this session. we seem to be running into a believe that mr. tony blair is lying in his belief of wmd but

to convict him of exaggerating the certainty of the basis for that belief, and i just want to check with that then that it's correct to say that that is your conclusion and that as i asked you earlier on, if he had actually been more open and disclosed to parliament the uncertainty of the basis of his belief that argued we could not take the risk that saddam might still have this arsenal and might the reasons would make them available to a terrorist group which is what mr. tony blair i remember him hearing him say to us described as the nightmare scenario. we could nwould not be judging harshly if he did not exaggerate the certainty? >> exaggeration, placing more rate on the intelligence than it could possibly bear is a

conclusion that we reached on the butler committee and reached again and even more evidence in the iraqi inquiry. on the other hand, i don't know in putting forward the argument mr. tony blair related it specifically to saddam passing terrorist weapons to terrorist -- passing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. if the regime collapsed, it ruined and there may be a risk of spillage fushgs like, of any remaining weapons. that is a different thing. the fusion case as made by mr. blair was made but not about iraq. >> i remember him saying by some memes they would be passed to grupdz that would be the nightmare scenario. but it is likely to collapse if he didn't overthrow him. this is an argument that mr. saddam may pass the twopz such group. that was a very telling

argumentment on the floor of the house of commons. >> yes. >> okay. >> was the procurement of protective equipment for the troops in particular against ieds and provide explosive devices delayed as a result of the prime minister wishing to keep private his early decision to go to war? >> i don't believe that they can be put together. there is a criticism to be made of holding up the -- some of the preparations, particularly with industry, for equipment in the latter part of 2002. in order to preserve the diplomatic strand and not giving the global community the sense that military action is inevitable. i think there was a delay there. that didn't go directly to the ied and froektive patrol vehicle questions. those i think arrived later.

and this is a big one, the issue for which many of us, including me, were culpable at that time for voting as we did. it was a naive belief that is the dictatorship would have moved some form of democracy might emerge in iraq. and that above all is the reason and in light of what happened that i and i'm sure many others change their minds in relation to subsequent conflicts. now i would like you to tell us to what extent mr. blair was warned of the danger that is from democracy emerging seemingly shia religious fronts would follow the removal of the secular dictator? who gave these warnings and how and why were they ignored and in particular, i would just quote

back to you a quote from your report in which mr. blair himself said in january 2003 to president bush and the very prime minister wrote, and i quote, "the biggest risk we face is fighting between all the rival groups, religions, tribes, et cetera, in iraq when the military destabilizes the regime. they are perfectly capable on previous points of killing each other in large numbers." now mr. blair knew that and said it to president bush. so why did he ignore that terrible possibility that he himself apparently recognized? >> you are have to ask him. but what is clear from all the evidence that we collected is that this risk and other associated risks are stability

and collapse. we're clearly identified and available to mr. blair. there are all sorts of points. you don't want me to go into that report now. it's in the report. there are other signals, too, from other papers. they're able to report the egyptian president had said iraq was at risk and was populated by people who were extremely fond of killing each other. and destabilization would bring that about. mr. braer said he would have taken hindsight to understand. it was not available to him. >> if he got the advice and if

that he even passed that advice to president bush himself. >> indeed. so this is far worse from the exaggeration of the certainty about the chemical and biological weapons was the fact that in the full knowledge that likelihood would be if you removed the dictatorship of saddam hussein, you would have the 1,000-year-old hatred re-emerging and mass killings by the communities of each other and mr. blair nevertheless went ahead. >> you're pulling on tragic contemporary histories. what was foreseeable and what did indeed happen and arguably could and should have been avoided. i'd like to make a more general point which is we, the united kingdom, has insell jens and

deep knowledge about iraq, the population, the strains and stresses and its history. they are built to bear on the decision making process and the saens cle answer is clearly not. it was available and i think that is a tragic -- >> it was ignored. >> well, if you like, it was brought to bear in an infective sense. >> who is responsible for that? >> i don't think can you put that on a single person. but if you consider, for example, the better phrase that i use with anything out of great respect, but the diplomatic surface, there is with great experience in the arab speaking world there are many of them that level expertise.

one of them and they went around to fellow ambassadors and expressing some of these judgements and was told to shut up and keep quiet. >> okay. so when you say number ten, you mean the prime minister? >> i don't know if i mean the prime minister or not. >> you have asked? >> no. >> why didn't you ask? >> because we know who gave the instruction. it was the chief of staff to the prime minister. we found no evidence of written instruction. but then there were no written instructions for the prime minister except occasionally. >> but today you could ask. >>, no we didn't. >> it seems to me that there was a reconstruction issue aept ish u whast infect would be on an

invasion is the most catastrophic aspect. and from judging by your report, i think one needs to have seven different paragraphs. you make clear that no ministers or others incorporate detail analysis of risk and capabilities and so on. but whose responsibility was it to commission that ultimately? >> it must come back to a center and head of government which is the prime minister. >> ultimately the prime minister. the thing that i think surprised so many people about this report in so many places is that this last sentence has not been made clear. because this looks like a war that was pushed through to a large degree by one man and,

therefore, you need where appropriate to take responsibility for the failings that led up to it and the failings you learned from it. so that hasn't been done. so is it tony blair who is responsible for that failing in paragraph 617 which i'm sure you're familiar with. >> yes, of course. let me remind myself. 617 ch 617. i was going to say that -- all senior officials, commission a systematic evaluation of the risks and options. >> i'm asking who is really responsible for that? >> i think you would say all of those involved but ultimately this has to be -- >> some of the senior people were told to shut up. >> i'm reporting what is on the

record. the nams cairo sensed a telegram and to various colleagues who were relevant. and was told for reasons of security and sensitivity because he was running and he shouldn't do that again. and that any such messages should go direct from an ambassador concerned in the region to the head of the diplomatic service. that is what happened. but as to the commissioning of a review, you can blame, if you wish, all of those who failed to initiate such a review. but the fact is it should have happened. it didn't happen. the consequences of it nop happening are there for all to see. and if i can have another moment on this, yes.

it was one of the worst social security spekts of the whole failed enterprise. if security could have been and arguably might have been with much greater exertion of effort and better planning and preparation, the security could have put in place either in the southeast in our area let alone more generally across iraq. the whole process of reconstruction and making a new institution rather than they never had them before. they might have had a chance. >> take you over the page. >> this is tony blair hindsight we see military campaign to defeat saddam and said it would be easy and the after the math is what was hard. at the time we could not know.

>> yeah. >> know that. and they were military campaign. so your conclusion is precise. the conclusion is reached by mr. blare after the invasion did not require the benefit of hindsight. >> yes. >> i think you're so -- >> thank you. >> again, if you give me a half second. i know your time is tight. i red the report by lord franks where he says we were careful not to apply hindsight to any judgementes about the intelligence on defense. we on the iraq inquiry mad the same place to ourselves. we were ver determined not to use hindsight to reach judge mentes but to take the contemporary best evidence at the time. >> yes. i got one last question about

that crucial paparagraph. y. are you stated that he did know and needed to know about that aftermath, why do you think the prime minister pushed on? regardless? what did he tell you? >> he insisted that he couldn't have been aware without hindsight of those particular risks. >> so he denied your conclusion? >> he resist ourd conclusion. but i would like to say is that in the context of the exercise of hindsight, we were scrupulous to look at evidence at the time and to cite it in the full body of the report. i think that you would have to look inside mr. blair's mind and heart to know what he felt,

thought at the time. it goes to a quite large question and a possible lesson which we draw attention to. can a british minister with a 24/7 pressures coming in from every side be expected to retain a consciousness of very important but nont less detailed about one thing? and with everything else at the same time. we came quite close to saying that you really should have a departmental minister working with the prime minister with nothing else to distract other than the surprise of this scale. and nonetheless they were successful. >> what should the foreign secretary be doing? >> the foreign secretary, too, is traveling a great deal and has many other things to do. the minister in the middle east and that worked because they

were satisfied. >> do you think that the prime minister is set ago side and was ever working, swhafr working and going along in his mind? do you think that that was reckless to set aside the information that he was provided and showed him that aftermath would be gruesome? >> i think he came on his own admission quite late to realizing the absolute -- the absolutely crucial nature of security and achieving security in iraq after an invasion. he said it. n. one of the notes to mr. bush. by the way, never received a reply. so we know from telephone records that they did discuss them. mr. bush never put czhis name ta response. tony blair came to the real zigs

that security was the absolute basis for everything else without it. nothing do succeed. and it was not secured. >> okay. my question then was do you think it was reckless to go ahead at that late stage once he had in front of him the information he needed to know what the aftermath could or would be be like? >> i'm always uneasy about accepting this rhetoric. because would president bush have gone ahead anyway, we've been over that ground a bit this afternoon. we can't control everything. but we can control that. >> indeed. but fit was going to be an american invasion, with or without sufficient global or united nations backing, would visit been reckless to associate the united kingdom with it knowing that there were risks which he pointed out at one point to mr. bush in the belief,

i think this is important. somehow or another american resource was have overcome these problems. i do think that a large part of the plan to prepare in london is short of the invasion was based first on the realization of the state department's very considerable planning efforts had been ditched. but nonetheless, when it came to the action, the americans would provide and supply resource that's would be needed. >> thank you very much for your evidence. >> we're very grateful for the outstanding information that you have provided us. >> mr. chairman, may i ask another question? >> i really think that we have taxed him enough. >> i know. just coming back to 617. it's just a question. i fully accept everything you

said about the willingness of the ministers to challenge and having the right things in place. but what machinery could have provided that? it doesn't exist. >> you know, we don't go to war every decade. it doesn't exist. so what procedure or machinery should have been put in place? at least give them something to bump again? >> a brief reply if you would. >> the secretaries of department and ministry of defense have made urgent requests for such machinery to be put in place. a draft was president obao pros out without a crucial element. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. i am directing my thanks towards you for coming here with such

detailed replies to take a number of questions that we understand to be your conclusions of this creami extr thorough work you have done. on behalf of parliament, we're grateful for you for having done the job. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you. >> we have debate in candidates to be louisiana's next u.s. senator and john fleming and democratic candidate foster campbell and republican david duke. can you see that live on c-span at 8:00 p.m. eastern. we'll show you the new hampshire senate debate at 9:00. that's at 9:00 p.m. eastern also

on c-span. on election day, november will 8th, the nation decides our next president and which party controls the house and senate. stay with c-span for coverage of the presidential race including campaign stops with hillary clinton, donald trump, and their surrogat surrogates. and follow key house and senate races with our coverage of their candidate debates and speeches. c-span, where history unfolds daily. >> the french, slovak and german ambassadors to the u.s. were joined about it european union's ambassador to the u.s. recently for discussion on brexit impact on the european union. hosted by the georgetown university law center here in washington this is just over an hour. >> thank you. we here have been extremely fortunate to have manufacture the policymakers, leading officials, regulators, diplomats and policymakers here over at

georgetown and our programming really witnessed a bit of the renaissance here. it is such a pleasure to have all of you here today. s i just wanted to thank as well jennifer hillman and the students of what to our knowledge is the only course in any law school focused exclusively on brexit to help provide some of the questions that you'll be hearing today. as we launch into a multitude and range of issues across different policy issue areas. i think i want to start with ambassador o'sullivan. particularly since this conversation is being broadcast across the united states. brexit has been one of the lead willing stories here which is why there is such interest. and this has been in part due to the sear unexpectedness of it all. what do you think in particular as the representative of the european union that is the cause is worth and how do you believe americans should interpret the drivers behind it and i

encouraged the other ambassadors as well, even those one question may be directed towards any one of them to jump in and to either challenge or supplement or agree or agree to disagree. but ambassador? >> thank you, chris very much, indeed. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. it's a great pleasure to be here. not least because my oun daughter graduated from georgetown in may. she worries her father's pocketbook. if there is one 1, 2, 3 inning we can say with certainty, there is nothing we can k. say with certainty, it's going to be a lawyer's paradise for many years to am could. i congratulate those who took this option. can you spend the rest of your life dealing with the subject. to your question, i mean, we could probably spend a long time on the most mort em of why it

happened. i'm not sure it was so surprise to being frank. i know people were. many of us in europe were not surprised. i think once we knew that united kingdom decided to have a referendum on this subject it was always going to be a close call, which ever way it went. and a foreign french member said just after the referendum that before the referendum, the position of the united kingdom in relation to the european union is one foot in and one foot out. after the referendum that, situation was reversed. some of you got that. a hesitation about joining the european union. the uk had a referendum two years after they joined in 1973. they had a referendum to confirm they wanted to be a member. i think the slightly semidetached nature, they were not part of the euro. there's always ban healthy strong body of opinion in the

uk, which was frankly reluctant and reserved about membership, if not down right hostile. once you open the possibility of a vote, it was always going to be a close call as to what came out of it. i think, in the end, it was the sense of wishing to take back control as the leave campaign put it at the sense of some kind of, in my view, respectfully, a misplaced sense of lost sovereignty. i'm not going to go through the merit that is won the day. there were specific uk elements that are not easily replicated elsewhere. having said that, this is very important, there are also, you know, generic elements of the moment that you find elsewhere and by the way to a certain extent find in the united states in the sense this was also a sense of frustration with the way economic and social policy developed, particularly since the crash in 2008. the financial crisis and the economic crisis. a sense of uncertainty generated

by globalization. in europe, the european union is seen as the front line of globalization, many regional globalization, if you like. i think these elements and the issue of immigration, a unique feature of the uk was a concern about intraeuropean immigration, perhaps more so than extra european immigration, where i would say elsewhere in europe the concerns about immigration are less about intraeuropean immigration. if we use the words immigration, this is certainly a common theme across europe and we have challenges of populous parties in all member states and very often, their criticisms go hand in hand with some degree of skepticism. there are elements which are common across all of europe at this point in time. what should the united states make of it? >> well, i mean paul simon says

there are 50 ways to leave your lover. i don't know if there are 50 ways of brexiting. we are not yet in a post brexit world. nothing changed. something changed fundamentally, we had an important political development in the united kingdom. they are going to leave. the precise way that is going to happen and what is going to happen afterward, that is out in the open. i think the initial reaction in the united states, of course, is one of concern for what this means for the strong reliance -- alliance with europe. obviously, it's easier from the point of view not just of the u.s., but many partners, if we have 28 countries, a one-stop shop, all party, all part of the same union, the fact that now an important member of the european union is going to withdrawal and develop separately, i imagine the u.s. is concerned as to what this means for how we manage the relationship. it's of concern to all of us,

frankly. we will all be watching carefully to see how it develops. i think the one thing i would say is, i think we are all going to need a lot of strategic patience. this is going to take some time. we don't yet know what the united kingdom is going to propose. the prime minister indicated triggering the article 50, which is the formal article of the treaty by which exit takes place some time in the spring. there's a two-year time frame in there, so, we are looking at, i don't know, two and a half years before we know with certainty exactly how the uk is leaving, the building of a new relationship between a uk out of the eu and the rest of the eu is probably going to take longer to negotiate under a different article of the treaty.

so, i think we are going to have to live with a certain degree of uncertainty for many years to come. and we are all going to have to figure out how we do this and we have never done it before in the european union with the exception of greenland which left in the early '80 ds, a much bigger country, but a less complicated negotiation. we have no precedent and we are going to have to figure out how to do this. and it's going to take time and probably things are going to evolve in ways we cannot predict now. that's my final point. i didn't mean to be too long but it's an important subject. i appreciate everyone wants to jump to the end point. i see so many articles proposing. i figured out how this can be made to work. they may be right. some of the ideas may be in the mix when we get there. we have a lot of politics to go between now and the moment the british make their request to leave with their proposal to how they would like to leave. then the 27, we will have to figure out how we react to that,

the mandate the commission is given to negotiate on behalf of the 27 and what kind of new relationship we wish to build once we worked out the terms of the separation. we have a long way to go before we can see exactly where this process leads us. there are certainly risks on both sides. i'm sure at the end of the day, we will try to make the best of what all of us reluctantly accept is a suboptimal situation but one we have to respect given the democratic vote in the united kingdom. >> this is an important issue and sets the stage for more technical and legal questions that we'll be working through and thinking through in the course of this discussion. i wanted to also make sure if there are other comments or observations about how brexit was seen in your countries or differing interpretations if there were catalysts to these. your views and thoughts to this. we'll move down through. >> thank you very much.

it's really my pleasure to sit among these insiders, very experienced colleagues from the eu. the reason i'm sitting here is so that slovakia is the presidency of the european council and one of the main recommendations or priorities unexpected. that's what in case of slovakia. it happened on july 1st. so, the main focus of our presidency was actually to reflect on the, what to do both on the institution side, the council will be very much part of those considerations, how to negotiation the relationship with the uk in the future and as we can see there is actually mushrooming of the negotiating themes that are under the council then under the european commission and european parliament will have say to the whole process. of course national governments are stepping in. national parliaments, public interest organizations, groups.

it will be very complicated process from the institution point of view, but also from the point of substance as david mentioned. from the perspective of the slovak presidency, the reflection of 27. they will hold their first summit in mid-september. we have for six months to prepare our own reflections back to our capitals. there will be two processes, one will be actual negotiations with the uk, but also the second part of the process will be the reflection why this happened, why the uk decided to do so and how to avoid these integration of the european union. david mentioned that immigration was very much part of the negative outcome. it happened from the internal immigration so for central and yeern europeans as part of the european union, we'll be very

much important to focus on what kind of outcome we'll get especially when it comes to the freedom of movement with the labor force. as many, many eastern europeans move to the united kingdom. it will be to keep the freedoms untouched or to be negotiated in balanced outcome. thank you. >> first, great to hear, thank you. first, to what david said, why? i think, very frankly, trump is a transatlantic phenomenon. really you know you have your presidential election, we have brexit. in a lot of european countries, you have the far right. we are all facing the same wave of purism. i think it was the financial times saying that the losers are rebelling. so, it's really, i think, a wide challenge that we are all facing, all western democracies, not only the europeans. whoever is elected president in this country, i think, should

have to handle with us this decision. you know, why? in the u.s., why? in uk, in france and elsewhere, we have so many of our citizens who are dissatisfied and who are telling us they are dissatisfied this way. the second element, i think, and here in a sense as a official negotiator, the negotiation has not started, which means there is, i would say, if i were not a diplomat, there is some chest banging. it's normal that before any negotiation all sides, you know, are saying not going to compromise, that the opposition don't compromise on principles and so on and so on and so on. before the opening of the negotiation, people saying we won't compromise. of course there will be a compromise at the end of the day and as david said, to quit right now, we don't know what will be compromised. any negotiation as its own momentum, its own logic and especially with this negotiation where you have 28 or 29 with the european commission. you know, you have a lot of negotiators. we have a lot of different interests. sometimes different interests. i think it's totally impossible right now to know first whether we reach an agreement because, you know, we are 28 so it means a lot of red lines and when we reach an agreement and what we disagreement. all of us, we want a good agreement. all of us, we want mutual relation with the uk. we are not on the revenge path. we are not on the resentment past. we are defending our interest and the interest of the union.

it's so complicated we are totally unable to tell you where we are going. the second element, i think, and here in a sense as a official negotiator, the negotiation has not started, which means there is, i would say, if i were not a diplomat, there is some chest banging. it's normal that before any negotiation all sides, you know, are saying not going to compromise, that the opposition don't compromise on principles and so on and so on and so on. before the opening of the negotiation, people saying we won't compromise. of course there will be a compromise at the end of the day and as david said, to quit right now, we don't know what will be compromised. any negotiation as its own momentum, its own logic and especially with this negotiation where you have 28 or 29 with the european commission. you know, you have a lot of negotiators. we have a lot of different interests. sometimes different interests.

i think it's totally impossible right now to know first whether we reach an agreement because, you know, we are 28 so it means a lot of red lines and when we reach an agreement and what we disagreement. all of us, we want a good agreement. all of us, we want mutual relation with the uk. we are not on the revenge path. we are not on the resentment past. we are defending our interest and the interest of the union. it's so complicated we are totally unable to tell you where we are going. >> thank you, chris. i also want to say thank you for including me in this panel. i'm a proud father of a georgetown freshman so i guess i

should say -- >> excellent. >> chris, you ask what does brexit mean for the u.s., how should the u.s. look at it? i introduced a geo political dimension to it. as important as the legal, technical and economic aspects of the brexit are, i think this added another challenge to europe. after the financial and economic crisis, after the greek debt crisis, after the refugee crisis and has hit in a way europe in an already precarious state. that has become a transatlantic issue. now, for the u.s., there is reason to worry, i'm not doom and gloom profit here about

europe, but i think there is reason to worry in the u.s. about the strength and the resilience of the european union. we have a lot of challenge. a new sort of russia. the refugee crisis. the fault line that is are emerging in europe. for the u.s. the challenge is to worry about the strength and resilience of the european union, of the 27, quite frankly. we all are great allies of the uk. we want to remain so. i mean we are losing the second biggest economy in europe. in our case, we are losing our third biggest destination of export and our fifth trading partner but what matters to us most and it should matter also to the u.s. is the coherence of the 27. europe can remain the most privileged partner in the world of the u.s. and a strong economically and political player on the global scene.

now, this will be the most complicated divorce in history that we have ahead of us. we all treading on entirely new territory. it's difficult to predict what will happen as far as my country is concerned and most of the, all of the other countries in europe. we want relations that are as close as possible with the uk. we have a strong self-interest, but our priority is the unity of the 27 in europe. >> that brings up a wonderful set of issues for the lawyers and training for the audience. those are some negotiation questions.

unity is important to the future of europe. to secure a deal, it has to be done with the consensus of the remaining european countries. ambassador kmec, i'll spin around. how have you seen negotiations progressing recently? you remember the states and heads of the eu met in your capital. there were some notable frictions along a range of policy dimensions from migration to the support of southern economies but what do you take -- what are the take aways from that summit, number one, and number two, how do you perceive the take aways as interacting with the ability to negotiate all of the details within the two-year time line that would be started once article 50 is set in motion? >> thank you very much. as i mentioned, we see the whole process as a chain of

negotiations. it's really very important to it's really very important to reflect on the situation that has happened with brexit. there will be very complicated situations. colleagues mentioned that there will be, of course, red lines by different national capitals. it will go public, of course. and there will be very many sentiments presented during those negotiations in public. and in many political streams that are actually eager to work on further disintegration of the european union. so we need to be really, really cautious on how to -- how to move the european project further. and there are, of course, two main questions.

how to keep building the european identity. the question is are we there yet to have european identity. because i met very few europeans, if you ask them whether they are foremost -- first for europeans or they have the affiliation to their national identity, the latter will prevail. so we are not there to be true europeans. so this is very important message, especially to the young population that is leaning towards different radical and populist movements and messages. the second challenge in this reflection period will be how to move the whole project forward. because we already have euro zone, we have different layers

of integration. so we need to reflect on where to actually build the ground zero now. euro zone will become a fundamental playground now for reflections to move further. or we have to step back and actually start working on the weakest link of the integration and move further. >> ambassador, could you maybe discuss what we had talked about momentarily in the green room about the technical aspects of getting those 27 members to agree on policy? what happens if there are disagreements? certainly, there will be some kind of negotiation dynamics perhaps where different member states want to use or this about brexit as an opportunity to think deeper about not only their relationship with the european union and the

relationship of the uk with the remaining member states but also the remaining member states with one another. how difficult is this? what are the kinds of steps that need to be put in place in order for those article 50 negotiations to begin? >> well, again, as peter said, as david said, you know, it's quite -- it's quite complicated. first, you know, when brexit occurred, my first analysis was that as usual, the british will be very good as dividing the 27. the british centuries will be to divide so that there would be one main country. at the time it was against france. so you know, when you negotiate one against -- versus 27, you know, you can say it's much

easier to be on the side of the one than on the side of the 27. but afterwards, i think there was a declaration of our partners, countries like slovakia, poland, hungary and said there couldn't be a compromise limitation of the freedom of separation of people. and for me, it meant, you know, really that when you need -- for instance, you can imagine that one of the european countries, a new country would consider it a freedom of circulation of people is not that important. so it's ready to make a compromise on that to get something else. but at this point, you know, countries like poland or slovakia will step in saying no way. it's only an example. but it means that you are going to have in this negotiation i don't know how many red lines. you know, every country will have his own red lines making another whole compromise,

because a compromise means that actually you are forgetting some red lines. so it will make the negotiation extremely difficult. you know, because compromising -- every time you want to compromise on an item, you will have a country say no way, it's really for me a core interest. so that's what i call the difficulty of the negotiation. and frankly, i'm not that sure that we can reach a compromise even if we really do want them. and maybe actually when you saw that prime minister may was referring to hard brexit, it can be interpreted many ways. first as i said a sort of chest banging to tell europeans, you don't frighten me. i'm ready to go to hard brexit. or it may also say, i look at the negotiation. i don't know how we can have a good, soft, mutually beneficial brexit or i'm preparing all --

everything -- you know, all the ideas that we can find. i really want to -- as you said, and as peter said there are many many fault lines in the european union. it was referred about immigration with our eastern european friends. our main concern would be, of course, to maintain the unity of the 27. so it means that we are not going to accept that some uk demands which may actually endanger the unity of the 27. so that's also, i guess, an element which makes this negotiation still more difficult. >> ambassador, i know -- >> on this negotiation process, first of all, the notion of red lines has become toxic in this country.

and anywhere else. i won't use that. but maybe sort of the premise is under which we enter those or wait for the british to position themselves, because the ball is in their court. number one, no prenegotiations before they trigger article 50. number two, that's what my chancellor and others -- french president have made clear, the integrity of the four freedoms. an exiting country cannot be better off exiting outside the eu than it was as a member. and i think that's a very important principal, otherwise, the eu would be in danger to unravel. now, once article 50 is triggered and the prime minister of the uk said it will be -- it will be happening by the end of march next year, there is a dynamic. it might be very amicable, but

it might be also antagonistic. because behind all those seemingly technical issues are lurking, you know, political explosive issues. but it's not only the article 50 negotiations. and maybe to unfold the complexity of the whole thing, there are many more processes. there is the process of devising a new trade arrangement for the uk in case they don't want the norwegian model, so buying into the single market. there is the replacement of all the eu existing free trade agreements with other countries. those are 53. that's the british problem. that's now our problem. then there is this pressing -- i think for the british, this very pressing demand to think about a

transition. that's extremely important. what happens to fill the gap between the end of the article 50 negotiations of the two years and the new arrangements? and then there is for the british the challenge to renegotiate the wto membership, which they have only by virtue right now by virtue of the union union. and then the other issue how to sort of redid i viez tevise the relationship of foreign policy and cooperation of the intelligence services or justice and home affairs arrangements. so you can see it's not just this one article 50 dividing up the assets. but it's a whole lot of arrangements that have to be sought. and that's the complexity and the daunting task of the british that have in front of them. >> i mean, i think they have

sketched out the politics of it. peter also a little bit the mechanics. on the mechanics, one of the great achievements of the european union is the institutions. the institutional dynamic will be the following. when the united kingdom eventually triggers article 50, it will be up to the commission to propose to the member states, the 27, a negotiating position. and that will turn into a mandate which is adopted by the 27. the basis on which the commission on behalf of the 27 will engage with the united kingdom. and i think it's very important to understand going to the point about different red lines, ultimately, that is how we in the european union overcome our internal differences, because we have to agree on a common position which will be the sort of initial response to whatever it is that the british put on the table. and that is the dynamic at all stages. the commission will be managing the negotiations, but under the ultimately the supervision of the member states and the european parliament.

that dynamic is never to be und underestimated as being different from conducting a diplomatic negotiation with 27 partners and try to reach a consensus. there is actually a legal structure within which this will happen. as peter has said, article 50 is only one part of this negotiation. it's essentially the air brushing of the uk out of the treaties and all the tidying up that needs to be done to make that happen. that is actually quite complicated. but at the end of the day, it's relatively straightforward in the sense of what you are trying to do. the second part, however, is what is the new relationship. and that is going to be infin e infinitely more complicated. that will be negotiated under some other article of the treaty, depending on what the uk suggests and proposes as the starting point. and then given that article 50 has a time limit of two years, there is no time limit on the n negotiating the new arrangement.

depending what it is, if it's a classical trade agreement, the classical time is six, seven, eight years. that's what it takes to negotiate an important trade agreement. that's the sort of time frame. and then there is as peter says there's a question then what is the -- is there a transition between the end of the article 50 and the completion of the new relationship? all of this is unchartered territory. nobody has been here before. and we're going to find out how this works. but i do think that in terms of the most important message i want to give is the in terms of the 27, there will be now a dynamic of the relationship of the commission operating on behalf of the 27 under the political ultimately the political control of the 27 and the european parliament to forth common positions and to address the issues which the uk will put on the table. that is as i say very important from the positions taken by individual countries at different points as they have said.

different people going out and speaking and taking positions. it's one thing what you say this is my national position at this point in time. it's quite another when you then have to sit around with 27 and agree a common position which you will ask the commission to present to the united kingdom. >> i've been struck by this common theme of compromise, perhaps it's because i have such an accomplished diplomatic set of panelists here. but by its very implication it seems to imply that the uk at the end of this process, as uncharted as it may be, that at the end of the day one would more likely than not expect the uk to still have a status that's somewhat different from other third countries out there. and that the -- even when one thinks about the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the european union, that really is not an on off switch but more or

less a spectrum of potential possibilities that could be negotiated. no? >> sorry. i don't think everything is up to negotiation. i think that needs to be clear. i think peter made very clear and others have made very clear the single market is the four freedoms. when i sometimes hear people talk about we would like access to the single market but without freedom of movement, it's a contradiction in terms. if you want a trade access to the european union without freedom of movement, it's something else. i mean, i think there are certain fundamental values of the european union which will be maintains and which are -- i won't say non-notiegotiable. i think, yes, there will be as others have said -- everyone comes to this as adults wishing a sensible outcome. the uk is never going to be a typical third country.

it's part of the european geography and history. it's part of nato. it's an ally in so in other respects. no one is going to want to damage that relationship. on the other hand, there is going to be a difference as colleagues have said between being inside the european union and being outside it. and i think that is something that we're going to explore how that is developed. i think the idea that everything is up for negotiation and it's all a spectrum and that somehow any outcome is possible, i think that -- i don't think that is where we are at the moment. >> i wanted to continue this conversation perhaps a little bit about what's going on within europe. from your vantage point, do you believe that the answer in light of some of the tensions to be an anti dote to be more europe or less europe? it's an important question. and there are lots of different responses. the french government in particular has taken a very

interesting position, i think, when it cops to everything from military bases and military solidarity to rethinking the economic bases of regulatory agendas. if you had any comments or thoughts on that. >> when you ask the question to a french diplomat, immediately the answer is better. so i have done my job. so better europe. again, the problem that we have been facing is obviously the fact that a lot of our citizens and not only in the uk, a lot of our citizens are disenchanted versus europe or are considering that europe -- as i think david was, was only the front line of globalization. for my generation, europe was something which really -- we

couldn't even question. you know? it was the way of avoiding war. the war which have devastated the continent. it was also prosperity and security from the soviet union. it was all these elements. but obviously, for a lot of europeans and especially young europeans, it's not anymore the case. so we have to answer to their concerns. so already you know some decisions have been taken. for instance, to have a very real bodyguard on the borders of europe. you know, really it's clear that the immigration crisis has been a strong element in the vote of the british. and it's a general concern throughout europe. not only in the external. so we have to ensure the safety of our borders if we want to

keep the freedom of full circulation. we have also to answer in terms of security. security, you know, we are frightened and we are victims of terrorism. so it means that, for example, we could have a sort -- you know what is the -- you know, he has to -- we could have a european -- a way of checking the circulation of the people. another element is that prosperity. you know, the crisis of the european union is also largely the result of the economic crisis. the economic stagnation that actually most of the european countries are going through. since you have very generously exported the economic crisis to european 2008, 2009, so we need

investment in key areas. again, there are also the question about tax. you know the tax. you saw that to pay .005% of the its profit as a tax in europe. that's totally unacceptable not only in the sense in financial terms but also in political terms. we have to also to think in terms of tax fairness, social fairness. so we have all sort of questions to answer, which don't really -- are not obliging us into sort of debate about more or less europe. again, it's better europe. and a europe which is responding to the concerns of our citizens. >> i wanted to -- ambassador, respond as well.

you have penned a very interesting and well written and thoughtful op-ed in "the washington post" called don't write europe off. in light of your comments there and in light of the comments, how do you view this question of more and less europe? and do we not write them off but instead write them on to more and better europe? >> yes, i do think that americans and all of us, we should not write europe off. although i must admit this brexit came as a shock. and it really triggered also a lot of soul searching, which is now the faphase that we are in. it's kind of natural that we are requesting ourselves what can we do better. i think it's three things. first, we have to deliver better on the expectations of our citizens. we have got to make -- regain

their trust and ask at each and every measure how does this benefit the citizen? does he see tangible results? second -- my french friend i think has mentioned this. we have to focus on the core business. the core business is defense. here, france and germany have presented some ideas to make european stronger defense union. not a competition to nato but harmonize that better with nato. to protect better its internal and external borders. to fight terrorism. also the economic damage. be a more competitive europe. work on youth unemployment. those issues. and there we really have to focus what is it that we can do

only together as 27. and that's what we should do. and the third thing is, we've got to unmask the truth behind all the rhetoric, the anti-brussels, anti-eu rhetoric that is rampant in europe. i'm taking this seriously. i don't want to brush it away. and i think there are real issues behind it of so-called losers of globalization. but there is also a scapegoating in a big way going on. and some of us in the member states are guilty of blaming brussels for our own defects and what is going on -- what is going wrong in our countries. that has to stop. otherwise, we will not regain the trust of our citizens. >> i know that there are some questions in the audience. i'm going to -- to the extent to which folks have microphones to begin keying up that process, this is probably a pretty good

time. although, have i mai have many questions. i think a of folks in d.c. and the country may be interested in, japan and other countries have highlighted the fact that third party countries like the united states have an interest in brexit. not just because it's one of e the -- really the largest trading block and a key partner to the united states, but there are questions that arise as to the rights of third party countries where they have interests either in the uk or frankly vice versa. what can or should folks in the united states do to really think through what the likely outcome is for those interests? and to what extent has washingt washington, d.c., been involved in those discussions in the european union? >> well, i think that's a good

question. firstly, there have not been a huge amount of discussions. i think it is quite important to get this message across. sometimes people think we're already engaged in almost the end game of this discussion. frankly, we haven't even begun. we are at a very, very early stage. you can see from the discussions which we all follow in the press, the intensity of the debate within the united kingdom and every morning brings some new revelation of disagreement or a different approach. frankly, i think we owe it to the british government and people to give them the space to try and sort all this out and come forward in due course with a sort of thought out position which reflects where they -- how they see this and where they want to go. until that happens, frankly, it's very difficult for the rest of us to actually respond beyond the sort of things we have been saying here, which i think are protecting our interests as the

27 but also wishing to have the best possible relationship in this new world, whatever it looks like, with a close friend and ally, which will be the united kingdom under any circumstances. so i think the first thing i would say -- you are absolutely right. i think this is a big question which affects everyone. i mean, this is one of those tricky issues where you have a referendum in one country which i understand which is within the jurisdictions of one sovereign nation. but which actually has ramifications for everyone. it has ramifications for the rest of us in the eu. because it profoundly affects the future development of the european union. but it has affects for the united states, both geopolitical and geo strategic as peter was saying but economic and commercial, massive u.s. investment in europe and massive u.s. investment in the uk. what are those investments now worth? how are they going to be managed going forward?

the japanese, of course, have come forward with an elaborate paper setting out their concerns, because they are a major investor. i think peter mentioned the ongoing trade agreements. we have 53 trade agreements with nearly all the major economies of the world. we're just about hopefully to conclude a very important deal now with canada. and we have them with south korea. we're negotiating with japan. we're upgrading our deal with mexico, chile. all these agreements. again, the stakes are high as to how do we deal with a uk which is no longer a party potentially to those agreements? so the global stakes of this are also very high. my first advice, however, to everyone from outside is on the one hand to be as honest as they can with the uk about how they perceive this and what they perceive as their interests and what they would like. because i think the uk needs to have that information before it takes its sovereign decision. secondly, to keep a little distance from this and to let us as europeans try to find a way

forward. i think people jumping too quickly to say i figured it out, i know what you need to do, this is it and -- this is also a process which is going to take a certain amount of time to work its way through our respective political systems on the part of the united kingdom and the part of the 27 as we go forward over the next 2 1/2 years thinking we will evolve. we will understand better what are the issues, what might be the solutions, what might work. i think ultimately, my earlier message is one of just a bit of patience and letting time do its own job in this is going to be an important part. you can't rush to judgment on any of these issues, especially when there are just so many issues which are -- which is new -- which are new and where we really will need to figure out how we can arrive at solutions which respect the decision of the british people, the interest and values of the 27 as part of the european union

going forward with the strong commitment, political and economic, that we have to taking the process of european integration further and our international partners who have a very strong stake and the investment in europe which we will wish to protect and continue to have an environment in europe which is conducive to attracting foreign direct investment which is vital for our competitiveness and future well-being. >> one short comment to david's statement on this. gradual process, some of the colleagues mentioned that, the ball is now on the uk side. it's very important to watch the dynamics of the final decision by the uk. be it government only or there are some considerations that the british parliament has to step in in order, of course, to vote for the great repeal but also to have a say whether they want -- they would like to have a hard

brexit or a softer brexit. the second thing is the situation in scotland. the question remains whether the uk -- london will represent the whole uk or there will be certain dynamics in this dimension. that will influence the considerations on the eu 27 side, because as you know, we are facing the elections to the european parliament in the second of 2019. we have to decide whether we need to prepare the election for 27 or for 28. so it needs to be gradual process, but i don't want to serve as devil's advocate, but i think march 2017 might not be the last deadline for presenting the uk position. thank you. >> interesting. i did see some hands up. do we have a microphone? excellent.

>> thank you. i would like to ask any of the am bass do ambassadors, whoever would like to respond, the uk and eu 27 have agreed on one thing, and that is inter-eu immigration is a bad thing. uk want the benefit of single market but without the burden of inter-eu immigration. not extra-eu immigration. the rest of the eu say no for freedoms have to go together with single market. you cannot have the good parts without the bad parts. that's immigration. can you change the narrative to say that inter-eu immigration is one of the best things that has ever happened to the eu because it have countries with aging population than otherwise it could.

>> would anyone like to -- >> please. >> i don't know whether you can change the narrative immigration in such a powerful paradigm right now. and it inspires a lot of fears. but maybe just a reminder how this came about. in 2004, the eu accepted in a big bang ten mostly eastern european countries. there was a measure to stabilize eastern europe. some of them were probably not as mature to enter the eu as we would have wished. but it was one of those assets of the european union to prove that it is a project of peace, stability and prosperity, more than economic club. at that time, many leaders said it's too early to grant them

freedom of movement and settle down and exercise their profession. so we agreed or most of the countries agreed to have a transition period of seven years to waive that freedom of movement. and there were two -- if i'm not mistaken, two countries that didn't accept that waiver. and that was sweden and the uk. >> and ireland. >> and ireland. so it was prime minister blair at the time who said they are welcome. they should come. so they came. from poland, from other countries. in a way if i may say so, it was a self-inflicted wound that later on there was certain resentment in the uk against those intra-eu immigration. although, at a previous stage, i think safe to say that this immigration benefitted not only immigrants but also the eu-uk

economy. and maybe -- it's not a story to change the narrative. but it's useful to remember that story. >> if i may. i think peter is absolutely right historically correct and i think it is true that perhaps the uk as being the single biggest of the three economies that opened. you had large numbers of central eastern european people coming to ireland. 250,000 poles. still living there, working there. many went back after the financial crisis. many are coming back again. there is no resentment in ireland over this migration, which everyone thinks has been beneficial to all. i think generally speaking, that was the point i made, intra-european migration is not a problem in europe. the populist vote and the populist criticism of immigration tends to focus on extra-european migration and particularly with the recent

refugee crisis and asylum seekers. i think it's important to make that distinction that most people in the european union think the freedom of movement of people of europeans within europe is an enormous benefit. we were talking earlier about young people. i think we have a new generation in europe which has been said takes for granted so much of this. perhaps doesn't understand quite how far we have come. those of us who actually lived through immigration controls, capital controls, controls on employment going back to the '70s and '80s. how far we have come and what we have built. young people basically take that for granted and move seamlessly. it was very interesting to note in the uk the generational difference in the voting pattern. it's not for us to interpret how they voted. but it's interesting to note the majority of young people tended to favor strongly remaining.

it was the older generation who tended to favor leaving. i think actually the european union from that point of view is already a success with our young people. i think many, many young people in europe would wish us to maintain this possibility of freedom of movement. >> from an outside perspective to piggyback off this question and your response about populism, how well suited is european union as a highly technocratic -- is this a responsibility that is something that the member states have to take upon themselves? certainly, the drivers i think between whether or not it would be migration, the refugee crisis, there's a different intensity of policy preferences depending on what people's direct experiences are. how well suited, even where you have reforms in key european institutions like the european parliament, how well suited is europe?

what can nation states, when you look at france and germany, what exactly can they do to engage this? >> can i say quickly -- i'm sure my colleagues want to respond on that. a degr i agree with you. peter said it very well. brussels is held in about as much esteem in europe as washington is in the rest of the united states. all politics is local. at the end of the day, it's very difficult for the people in brussels to get through to other parts of our national democracy and subnational democracy. this is -- we have a common ownership of the european union. the institutions are the creatures of what member states have wanted to build as a form of european governance. we are answerable and accountable for our mistakes and for things we get wrong. at the end of the day, it is for the national politicians to explain to their citizens the benefits, some of the costs perhaps of european integration and why this is ultimately in their best interest.

and i think we need -- that was the point i think peeter was saying. we need a renewed effort of communication about how this european union has worked. what it does and what it does not do. what it is responsible for and what it is not responsible for. and how we get this synergy between these two levels doing things. when we get better outcome by doing it together, we should do it together. when we don't need to do it together and we can perfectly leave member states to do it, they should continue to be 100% responsible for that. getting that message across is in my view very much also the responsibility of national politicians. you are right, the european institutions on their own are not going to be convincing in passing that message. >> again, i do agree. you know, there's a basic principal of the european union which is called -- it means you

should make the things at the level where it's the most effective level, most convenient level to do it between european the national basis. so as peter said, we have to focus the european union on its core business. what should we do at the european level? you know, there is -- we are not going to be able to be the united states of europe. we are old countries, old nations. we have a very long history. very strong commitment of our citizens to our national identity. further more, let's face it, like in europe, like in the u.s., we are -- we have a wave of nationalism. really, all our opinions, you know, may be because -- they are afraid but they are going back to the national roots. so we have to find the right balance. let's do what is necessary to do

at a national level and the rest at the other level. >> of course, you ask how can an elaborate organizational structure that the eu has really counter the rise of populism. and i think -- this is the challenge that not only the eu has but it was said before that it's a common challenge of the liberal western democracies. it's a challenge of the west. i'm not sure we can speak of a crisis of the west, but it's a rather dramatic challenge of the west, the rise of populism. i think there are two aspects to it. the economic social aspect and the identity politics of it. there are losers of globalization. we should not kid ourselves. it's not a win-win global

development. there are losers. and we have to win back those loo losers. we have social tools. we have economic tools. we are better placed in many aspects in europe than in the u.s., because we have a more elaborate social system. we can retrain people when they lose their jobs in the rust belts that we have to. our welfare state system looks potentially better after those people. but we also have -- that's much more difficult to address. the loss of identity and that is something i think we have to struggle with. how can we harmonize the idea of a common europe, which should be all our house, with the rooms that are in it that should be still regional and national?

and there's no easy answer to that. but that is one of the biggest challenges. >> this has been a fantastic conversation. and we are unfortunately about out of time. but i did want to give at least each of you an opportunity to maybe offer maybe a silver lining, perhaps, in terms of your view as to what or whether this experience provides a silver lining or opportunities for europe. and if you could identify maybe one or two of what those potentially silver linings may be. we have a lot of students here. they're looking forward to the future. i think particularly as lawyers, it's useful to look at potential opportunities, besides apparently jobs. that brexit may be able to create.

>> well, carl popper said optimism is a duty. and i always remain optimistic. i have to be honest with you. i cannot see this brexit decision as anything other than rather regrettable. and not likely to have many opportunities. we can certainly make the best of it. we can try to ensure that we -- it does the least damage. but i think it is a decision which is ultimately going to leave us all slightly poorer and slightly less well off than if the uk had stayed. i have to be honest about that. i think we will all work diligently, i think, with the british government to try to deal with this, both the exit and the building of a new relationship in the most constructive way possible. the net result i'm afraid is probably a weaker uk and frankly, a slightly diminished eu 27 as peter has said. we're losing one of our largest member states, permanent seat in

the security council, a nuclear weapon state, a state with huge diplomatic experience and adding a lot to our collective value. it's very regrettable. i'm not questioning the right of the british people to decide what they have decided or putting into question that we have to work with that. to find the silver lining probably will be that we will have to figure out how to do this in the best way possible. that will probably require creativity and innovation on the part of all of us. but my overall conclusion is that this is not the best outcome either for europe or for the transatlantic alliance. it will complicate matters. but we will all work diligently to try to make the best we can out of what is for me unfortunately nonetheless a second best outcome. >> on that happy note -- >> thanks very much. in spite of the brexit referendum and outcome, i think the main challenge is to win back the confidence of the

europeans, including uk population and especially this refers mainly to the young people who need to feel the ownership of the whole project. because it's about them actually to move the whole project forward. the second thing is actually that has been mentioned by peter we are really being challenged by other forps of government when it cops to liberal democracy. this is the main challenge of the transatlantic region. we have different items to form. so we need to explain the benefits and the contribution of the liberal democracy in the current modern world. that also refers to the globalized developments. thank you. >> just to sort of add maybe a little bit to this, any opportunities for consolidating

opinions with one less chair around the table? >> well, i think i'm not really -- the uk has always been a very good scapegoat, you know. and actually, they enjoyed to be accused of blocking the consensus in brussels. from time to time, actually, they were the ones blocking it. but i don't think it will change dramatically the chemistry around the table of the european council. it's a sad day. we have the right even for diplomats, even for french diplomat to be emotional. actually, to try to build a european union without the uk, you know, really frankly sounds weird. the british are an integral part, essential part of europe in every sense of the word.

really, they were our best enemies in history. really, we want to keep them on board. last point. as i have said, now the time is to respond to the concerns of our citizens. and the concerns of our citizens are about identity. it has been said. and maybe i'm going to be controversial, but i think we have to decide what are the borders of europe. you know, europe has to end somewhere. we simply can't have a sort of open space. we need an identity, a common civilization. we need also to defend our citizens, as i have said, to defend our welfare state. because something very difficult to understand from the u.s., but the welfare state is a part of our identity. european identity. and we have to defend the welfare state, which is not easy in a globalized world.

so basically, the european market shouldn't be a social jungle. the european market shouldn't be a tax jungle. we have to really to defend, i think, we have to defend our values. we have also not to be naive. our single market is also, you know, really versus some countries out of the single market which are actually competing on unfair -- on an unfair basis with our economy. so a lot of things to do. and i think it will be our good summary that i think we agree, the citizen -- our citizen has to be more than ever really the center of our policy. >> no silver lining, i think. we lost an ally. we lost a great free market economy. we lost a beacon of freedom.

we lost a country that brought all those virtues to the table, pragmatism, common sense. but if there are -- if there's an up side after the brexit decision, it's two things. first, it's a shock that helps us to refocus. second, it was mentioned it might help to mobilize the youth. because they are the hope for the future europe. and they really are in favor, mostly, of all the assets of the european union. and i just hope that they will be more of a voice in europe after this shock. >> with this wonderful conversation, let's give our guests applause and thank you so much ambassadors for your time. [ applause ]

more road to the white house coverage as the clock continues winding down to election day next week. be with us later today for remarks from republican nominee donald trump. he's in orlando, florida, for a rally there. you can see that live at 4:00 eastern on c-span. also, an event for you on health care policy and technology. you can see that live starting at 3:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. later, the lib libber libertarians vote this year and if so, who? watch live at 5:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. on election day november 8, the nation decides our next president.

and which party controls the house and senate. stay with c-span for coverage of the presidential race, including campaign stops with hillary clinton, donald trump and their surrogates. follow key house and senate races, with our coverage of their candidate debates and speeches. c-span, where history unfolds daily. now a group of policy analysts examine the role of money and politics, including the impact of the 2010 citizens united supreme court ruling and how millennials can be more engaged in the political process to advance their ideas and beliefs. speakers include representatives from public citizen, democracy alliance and the campaign legal center. this is about an hour ten minutes. it's hosted by the american constitution society. >> so, what we're going to be talking about today as both attorneys and organizers, folks involved in the field, is how

millennials are uniquely situated to tackle the issue of money and politics. money and politics has always been a problem people could argue in the united states. we have never had a perfect democracy. in the advent of decisions like citizens united and mccutchen, recent supreme court jurisprudence has more it more difficult for folks to have an equal voice and vote in our democracy. we are very lucky to be joined by a dream team of young millennials up and comers in the democracy space. on the far left is brandon fisher, associate council at the campaign legal center. next to him is austin bellali, the director of the youth democracy fund and right next to me is alley bolt. a couple things programming-wise to start off on. acs has a couple of events coming up next month. we are getting attorneys in the area who are able to volunteer their type on election day or a couple days preceding to do

something called election protection. that's where we man the phones and try to answer questions of folks from around the country have in collaboration with the lawyers committee for civil rights center law to make sure everybody's vote is counted. we have an event on the 17th of november. it's a voting rights training. there's an organization, it is part campaign legal center, part american constitution society and we will have a training for how attorneys can help on pro bono basis to make sure everybody's vote is counted. it will be a legal seminar for that. today, we are going to talk about five big topics. we're going to talk about what the current legal landscape is, the u.s. supreme court has the given. what's been possible under the current rule rules. we will talk about looking big picture. how millennials have engaged in other progressive movements, what kind of successes millennials have been able to get behind in other area s of te law and policy. then we will look inward and we

will talk about what the democracy field is good at doing and where it has deficiencies. how it can become more inclusive, about tinclusiv inclusive, better positioned to have millennials move the movement. we will talk about what's possible now that we have a supreme court vacancy that could result in a progressive supreme court majority. so we will hear what a new democracy agenda could mean not just for millennials as we grow up but for folks around the country. let's start off. my name is scott gratsack. we are devoted of taking ideas into action, to promote and reclaim our democracy and to go from the defense to the offense in order to get initiatives moving that can help build an inclusive democracy for all. speaking of a legal landscape and what we're looking at now, i will turn to our resident attorneys on the panel, which is brandon and ali, to give us an

idea of where we're coming from and how we got here. ali, if you want to start us off. >> sure. can you hear me in the room okay? first things to scott and acs for having this important conversation and great to be up here with these panelists. in terms of the legal landscape, probably the most well-known money and politics supreme court decision is citizens united, which was decided in 2010. citizens united really unleashed spending by corporations on our elections. the reasoning in that decision also paved the wait for super pacs which are other vehicles that wealthy interests can use to spend in elections. citizens united really made a lot of people mad and it sparked a lot of great activism around the country that we're going to hear more about. but we see the problem in the legal landscape as actually going back farther to a case

called buckley versus valeo. that case was decided in 1976. it was after the watergate scandal. around that time, the congress had passed a fairly comprehensive package of money and politics reforms. some of the provisions in that package were challenged and were the subject of this buckley litigation. so some of the provisions in that package were upheld and they remain part of our legal landscape today. that includes contribution limits. there are limits on the amounts that individuals can give to a particular candidate or party. but on the other hand, the buckley court struck down limits on spending. that includes limits on how much individuals can spend of their own money on elections as long as they do so independent pely candidates. so we have never really gotten a chance to