experts. there's no question about it. there's a record. it's a final agency decision. the courts prove it. yet literally in august of 2010, subpoenas are coming to the department of the interior two and a half years later about this. this is clearly the concern that there was a moratorium for too long, and it was politically based. a final example is something that is still going on right now dealing with mountaintop mining. at the end of the bush administration, there was a rule called the extreme buffer zone rule that defined the types of practices that those who were coming down the mountains in west virginia and filling the streams, what they had to do in terms of protecting the streams. our view coming in was this was not a strong rule, so we started a new rulemaking. ultimately, by the way, that 2008 rule was overturned by the courts. so we needed a new rulemaking. early in the rulemaking, and

this was going to follow the strictures of congress and subject to judicial review, early in the rulemaking, an incompetent contractor was hired by the department of the interior even before there was a draft eis or anything. we ended up firing this contractor. that contractor made some allegations about how many jobs would be lost if you took a different approach to mountaintop mining. boom, that's your political issue. and this is deliberative process, okay? so there are obviously interests in whether the department was biassed or whatever or what was going on. fine, let's answer those questions. here we are, though, this has been -- there are seven letters from the oversight committee. obviously a lot of interest from a lot of congress folks. there's finally a draft eis. there'll be a final eis and a final decision. look, the issue has been

identified as a sensitive issue. but let the process continue here. we have an apa-related process here that this is a sideshow issue. and it's -- but it took the mountaintop mining and the moratorium took all the oxygen out of the room in terms of the issues of oversight vis-a-vis the interior department. it's not time well spent. and what i hope will come out of this discussion, and perhaps it's a mars and venus situation, although i don't like that analogy. i remember the k boo -- books, okay? you can look at your own personal life and see how that works out for you. but i hope -- i do think that we

need to work together better, congress and the administration. and we need to be smarter about it. but it is these kinds of things that put people in their trenches and put their defenses up and lead to, you know, litigation that i agree with kerry, it's no way to solve the problem for all those reasons. so i look forward to -- >> i didn't quite say that. >> i know, yes. fair enough. fair enough. there we go again, the administration putting words in your mouth. thank you. >> thank you, david. martin? your thoughts. >> well, i'm from 35 years of trench warfare. and i see these problems and what's been going on lately. obviously a tremendously different perspective. i grew up, as i say, in the trenches.

i worked with amazing members who are oversighters like john morse, john dingell, ben rosenthal, jack brooks, henry waxman, carl levin, and chuck grassley. and all of them, you know, brought -- and staffs that were loyal, longstanding. and they came to me, you know, to -- for perspectives on how do we get things done, did we ever do this before kind of questions. and over the years, i learned a lot, i think. i think i got a reputation as a zealot for congressional

oversight and it was well learned. first, congress' oversight power is virtually plenary. the investigative authority is irrefutable. courts have consistently recognized that in order to perform its core constitutional responsibilities that congress can and must be able to acquire information from the president, the departments and the agencies of the executive branch. the structure of the checks and balances rests on the principle that congress has the right to know everything that the executive is doing, including all the policy choices and all the successes and all the failures in the implementation of those policies. the supreme court has made it absolutely clear that article i presupposes congress has

meaningful access to information so that it can responsibly exercise its obligations to make laws requiring or limiting executive conduct, to fund programs supporting executive policies to which it approves, to deny funds for those policies for which it disproves, and to pursue investigations of executive behaviors that raise concerns. i found in those years that committees wishing to engage in successful oversight had to establish their credibility with the white house and with the executive branch departments and agencies that they oversee early, often, and consistently, and in a matter invoking respect if not fear. although standing and special committees have been vested with a vast array of formidable tools and rules to support their

inquiry, including, including supreme court and appellate court approvals of practices and processes, including that congress has adopted for the conduct of its oversight and hearings, that do not accord witnesses with the full panoply of procedural rights enjoyed by witnesses in adjudicatory proceedings. it is absolutely critical to the success of investigative power that there be a credible threat of a meaningful consequence for refusals to provide necessary information in a timely manner. in 1795, that threat has been the possibility for citation of criminal contempt of congress or trial at the bar of the house, either of which could result in

imprisonment or fine. and there could be little doubt that such threats were effective in the past, at least until 2002. in particular i would point out that between 1975 and 1998 there were ten votes to hold cabinet level officials in contempt. all of those resulted in complete or substantial compliance with the information demands in question before the necessity of a criminal trial. it was my sense that those instances established such a credible threat that a contempt was possible, at least until 2002. even the threat of a subpoena was sufficient to move an agency to an accommodation with respect to document disclosures and the testimony of agency officials and the white house to allow executive office officials to testify without subpoena.

the last such instance was the failed presidential claim of privilege during chairman dan burton's 2002 investigation of two decades of informant corruption in fbi's boston regional office. i would add that it was a bipartisan effort, which was unusual for chairman burton, in which a contempt vote in a bipartisan manner was a certainty if the president didn't cave in. and he did. i'm kind of surprised that, you know, the session relates to simply these two cases, the holder -- the meyers case and the holder case. it's as if everybody is thinking that it came out of the blue.

but that -- those situations represent and underlie that congress is presently under literal siege by the executive. it has not suddenly come out of the blue. it is a calculated offensive. the last decade has seen, and i catalogued this, among other significant challenges, an unlawful fbi raid on a congressional office, the department of justice criminal prosecutions of members congress that have successfully denied them speech or debate protections, a presidential co-option of legislative oversight of agency rulemaking, presidential refusals to ensure the faithful execution of enacted statutory discretion, the directions, an unsuccessful attempt at usurpation of the

senate's appointment power, and with respect to investigative oversight of the actions of executive branch officials, the adoption of a stance that was first enunciated by the office of legal counsel of doj in 1984, that the historic congressional processes of criminal contempt designed to ensure compliance with its information gathering prerogatives are unconstitutional and unavailable to a committee if the president unilaterally determines that executive officials need not comply. in such an instance the department of justice will not present allegations to a grand jury as required by law. that's where we are today. these two cases that have come up, you know, are a reflection of a concerted effort to undermine congressional

oversight. and the only thing that congress can do is to step back -- i agree with the utilization or attempted utilization of confirmation powers, the appropriation powers, et cetera, et cetera. but they're not targeted. they're not going to frighten anybody. one of the panelists talked about transactional, you know, methods of settling, you know, disputes over information. what that is, when translated correctly, is an ability to negotiate and stymie over a period of time. congress has to look at what powers it has and get back to finding a credible threat that will bring the executive to the table and to negotiate. and if not, issue, you know,

either a contempt of congress criminal action or revive the inherent congressional contempt. inherent congressional contempt stopped in about 1934, 1935, not because it wasn't effective. it was. it just took too much time and the criminal contempt process was thought to be more expeditious. neither of which is true. the inherent contempt process can be made better, more acceptable. there's no reason now -- the

supreme court has for over a hundred years in four different cases established the constitutionality of inherent contempt. it has been deemed unseemly because it requires arrest, incarceration. and that isn't necessary anymore. the supreme court has, you know, made clear in a case involving the senate's, you know, power over impeachment that the trial can be preceded by conduct of investigations that will be able to present to the senate at its trial and cut down on the time it takes, you know, for a trial.

the same thing can be done, you know, by internal rulemaking to make the inherent contempt process seemly. you can provide for, you know, an investigation, a presentation of recommendations to the floor of the house. and the penalty doesn't have to be imprisonment. it can be a fine. there is certainly precedent for that. secondly, with regard to criminal contempt, that is also still necessary. and the olc opinions, you know, misstate the history of criminal contempt. criminal contempt is absolutely necessary as -- you know, to be revived. there is no doubt that there is

an analogy to criminal contempt that is issued by courts when there is a contempt of court. the supreme court in 1987 in the louis vuitton case accepted the right of a court to appoint a prosecutor to criminally prosecute somebody who has, you know, been found to be in contempt of court, to bring a private attorney to bring a prosecution. the next year, in morrison versus olson, that louis vuitton case was cited prominently as a seemly and authorized means to -- you know, for a court to appoint somebody, you know, when there is a criminal prosecution.

it should be understood that it is constitutional for congress to have -- congress has the same self-protection that the courts have, and the analogy is appropriate. and i think that the next time that there is a refusal to bring a contempt of congress to a grand jury, there should be a resolution that authorizes both an inherent contempt at the same time that there is a criminal contempt, and that the supreme court, in morrison versus olson, will come and support it, that there should be an injunction, because there is only -- what

the justice department is saying is really that there is a conflict of interest because their client is the president and also the executives. justice department in such situation has rules which says if we do have a conflict of interest we'll appoint a special prosecutor, either somebody within the department of justice who is walled off or somebody private like an independent counsel. both of those should be looked at because there needs to be leverage here. this is all about politics. that's what it is. and congress has had it and needs to revive it and not go to court. the court process as kerry has experienced means delay. delay for oversight means ineffective oversight. it goes away. thank you.

>> i'm going to open it up to questions next. and i actually wanted to take moderator's privilege and start with one. mort, you said you served with legends senator dingell, levin, and grassley. we've heard from david and others on our panel about the contrast between oversight used well and misused. i was curious -- this is open to the panel, but certainly mort as well, what do you think enabled that strong -- or does enable that strong good use of oversight leadership and the figures who simplify that in the past, and what is limiting it now? in other words, why aren't we seeing more of the type of leaders and oversight that we had seen in years past? what has changed and what can we do to maybe bring some of that leadership back?

>> a sense of institution is gone, missing, been taken away. there is no sense today that if we enable effective oversight and enforce it by contempt of congress or inherent contempt, that there is not any thought of it, because at the forefront will be the other party will use it. you know, and we want to, you know, be sure that that doesn't happen. there is no sense that -- of the responsibility and the duty of members that's common that there's a need for cohesiveness, a need for, you know,

underlying -- you know, maintain the integrity of the institution itself. it's the result. and it's not there today. >> well, i want to go on record as being in favor of effective oversight. so anything that will contribute to that, i'm in favor of. i guess one thing i would say on this point is, i suspect some of the breakdown, if you will, in -- and let me start by in -- and let me start by saying i don't agree that there isn't a lot of effective oversight going on. i think there is. but there's a lot of high profile oversight matters that suggest that it's not doing well. and obviously it's not doing as well i think as it has in the past. but i think at least in part that's a function of the more polarized political world that we're living in that affects any number of things, bedevils us in any number of ways.

we're living in an age of more tribal politics. i think it makes it harder for the minority to trust the majority in congress and the majority to trust the minority. this at least in part is probably one by-product of that. so if we can figure out a way to make our politics more nice, then i suspect more bipartisan oversight will probably flow from that, but i don't have an answer to that. >> it's worth noting that there's -- we have this sort of gauzy sense that there was this great moment when bipartisanship flourished everywhere. to some extent, that's the function of the moment in which we're living in now. which is to say for much of the 20th century, bipartisan coalitions were possible and the reason is that racists were

everywhere. the democratic party was split down the middle between the northern and southern wing. the republicans could make common cause with the northern democrats. when you look at the votes, often you'll see some democrats and republicans. that's an anomaly in american history. if you look at debates certainly leading up to the civil war, the fact that the whigs started their life as a party called the anti-jacksonians should tell us something. go back further to 1800, which puts the current election in terms of historical nastiness. you can look at the investigations arising out of the great corruption scandals of the 1890s, which are almost entirely done along partisan lines. there are very few moments in history where this great sort of kumbaya happens and it's not for reasons we want to emulate today. i want to push back on the idea that bipartisanship is something that we should see as something

necessarily an indication of good, healthy politics. sometimes one party controls a lot of the levers of power and sometimes that's because they're engaging more effectively with the public. in that situation, it is not entirely inappropriate for them to press those claims. other times we have divided government and that's because the public hasn't trusted either party with the mechanisms of power. and the power we see playing out in those government institutions at those moments isn't a party breakdown. it's a sort of manifestation of the fights playing out in the public at large. look around you. we are a somewhat divided polity at the moment. why should our institutions not reflect the friction we have out in the world? that would be eliminating some part of some of our political diversity. that actually doesn't seem desirable to me. >> since we're all guessing here, i'll put my own guess out here. two of the three of the examples

i mentioned were oversight initiatives from our authorizing committee, the house natural resources committee. and the reality is there's not a lot of legislating going on, and the complete absence or near complete absence of a dialogue with the administration and across the aisle on legislation i think provides a bit of a vacuum that promotes this kind of thing. you know, i served in the clinton administration as well as the obama administration. i think it's getting worse, not better in that regard. >> sorry. we're going to get you a microphone real quick. >> my question for the panel is to get a sense of your advice to congressional staff on carrying out effective investigations on a day-to-day basis. i've seen this as an investigator on the senate side, working for a private law firm,

seeing this at an executive agency in the white house, and in a very practical way some of the lessons i learned in the senate are not necessarily cared through. things like keeping investigations confidential until they are ready to be final. making them confidential, treating materials that are sensitive as sensitive, and in doing other things in a way for congressional staff to establish creditability. i may be using that in a different way than you used, morton, but in a way that there is a balance of power and how both parties can establish creditability. as a lawyer, yes, we do have different interests, but we do believe facts should carry the day and the truth should be the truth, and that's what investigations are meant to get after. if you were giving advice to congressional staff -- keeping

in mind many of them are young and under 30 and not necessarily lawyers -- what sort of institutional advice would you give them? >> i'd advise them first to pay attention to the more senior folks in their ranks rather than going off half cocked. i'm of the school that the executive branch takes inquiries like this very seriously, and in my experience it does. a predecessor of mine in the bush administration went to jail because he lied to congress, so there are terrific incentives to be careful about how administration officials work with congress. and i think it's like any other, you know, potentially challenging situation.

professionalism really pays off. when both sides recognize that they have institutional interests, but ultimately they have the same interest in government working well and ensuring that we're serving the american people, so -- but obviously, completely one-sided reports that -- the opening remarks of chairman burton in one of his oversight hearings was amazing to listen to because untethered by facts. on the other hand, chairman dingell and chairman grassley and others not that way at all.

let's start with the facts, let's talk about the facts, and let's develop the facts. so i do think part of the problem is there has been a little bit of a churn on both sides of the equation. some of the real pros have moved on and you do find some of the chairmen of house resources committee bringing in new groups of investigators who don't have the experience and who are thinking of this as i would guess more of a political exercise than anything else. >> i'll take a brief crack at that from the standpoint of somebody who worked in the general counsel's office as opposed to a committee oversight investigator or oversight lawyer. two things i guess i would say. number one, because of my background as a litigator, my advice would be litigation centric.

you need to be focused. you need to be precise. and i'm talking about subpoenas and requests for information. you need to leave as little room as possible for the departments, the executive branch departments, to concoct objections. so you come at it from that standpoint. the other thing i would advise is given notwithstanding my advice that litigation is not a great option for congress, i suspect it's going to continue to be an option that will be used. i would give advice on how to shape information requests and how to conduct the investigation in a way that makes it more salable in a judicial context when we get down the road. >> one thing that's sort of the flip side to what you're saying which is it probably makes sense

to think about it from a sort of lawyerly litigation-like perspective some of the time, but it also makes sense to think about it in terms of public politics. if you think about some of the most successful in like the broad scope congressional investigations in american history, so think about the 1920s munitions investigations which already certainly delayed american entry into world war ii by creating a public peace movement and movement that was skeptical of the war making capabilities of the administrative state or the church committee in the '70s. these are committees that were careful, but they were also highly cognizant about the fact their work didn't face toward the executive branch but faced out to the public. their reports were written and their hearings were structured so as to convince members of the public to adopt a certain perspective. it's a reminder that facts aren't things -- facts are in some sense found, but in another

sense they're assembled. there isn't a situation out in the world where your job is just defined. your job is to construct a narrative about the world and convince people of that narrative. that would be my advice in so far as you want the investigation to have real public punch. >> i've always experienced working with those people who were legends in oversight that they all viewed it as a stage process, that you start with a problem and try to identify it and construct relationships with the agencies that you're dealing with. at the same time, that's the importance of having long lasting staff, staff that's still there and going from case

to case and being credible as a longstanding group, that information comes in, that there's some attachment to agencies being overseen. before those kinds of relationships developed, it resulted in pulls back and forth trying to avoid a particular situation, showing up in "the new york times" or "the post" or something like that and working through the kinds of problems that agencies do have in order to fulfill their objectives and the objectives of the president

as opposed to the sense that congress has in vesting this power out. the stage of this process usually went from one level of pressure to another never starting out with a subpoena. the subpoena was -- for a long period of time, it was there it was a big event. and scheduling a subpoena conference, to vote for one, triggered reactions, triggered some of the negotiation necessary. and if a subpoena was issued, that was a big deal. this is no longer there. subpoenas are -- more committees have the authority to issue subpoenas on their own than never was there before, and it results in trigger happy kinds of reactions.

and going forward without having the full facts before them, pogo organization, brings that forward and is part of the public panoply there giving information to make that kind of oversight process really work. helping with whistle-blowers, providing the background information that's necessary for going from one stage to the next, and i think that's important. i tried to teach the people who were calling me, you know, read this.

it's been done before, and this is why it was done before and where you can go at particular times. we don't have that institutional memory anymore in the committees or even in some of the support organizations that are there like crs or gao, which have been cut by the appropriations process and can't keep the steady people there. we've lost a kind of a sense of how oversight should be conducted in a way that is supportive both back and forth. >> another question to the audience. let's get you a microphone. >> thank you very much. i work for the department of labor. i am an economist by trade, so not a lawyer. just listening to this

fascinating conversation, it seems to me like the executive branch, federal agencies, are being asked to do more and more with less and less. i don't know how much of this is a function of the elections where more and more programs coming online, but where are the resources to fund these programs, particularly in terms of human resources. civil servants are being asked to do a lot, handling hundreds of millions of dollars worth of project, and in the heat of getting something managed it is hard to look at congress oversight as being positive. i was also very pleased in the last session to hear that resources from professor wright are a problem effecting congress also and a lot of these things talking about institutional memory. anybody who has been on congress notices an army of unpaid staff. any member would say that's the staff is the backbone of how

this institution runs. theirs seems to be resources lacking as well to keep people, maybe they'll keep people to do more meaningful oversight in the long term. my question is how much resources at the end of the day causing discord where lack of resources causes people to fight? and if so, how are you having these discussions to try to increase salaries, to try to hire more people, to maybe even promise less to the american people of what government will do so you can get to a better place where you can have programs that are effective, have the proper oversight, and bring this together in a way that is less -- seems more on the legal side, subpoenas, i'm just hoping to never experience. thank you. >> steve, send him a subpoena. >> i'll be real quick. you're raising obviously big

questions about the overall funding for congress and for the agencies. those are really big issues, and beyond the scope of this conference i suggest. i would just say that resources are an issue and when there are investigations that are very broad ranging and with lots and lots of document requests and it appears to be clear from an administration perspective that this is really partisan driven and not seriously driven to improve government and get a better result, it adds to the resentment and it makes the accommodation process more difficult and i think probably elongates the process and makes it difficult to have the professionals like you would have in a lawyer situation where you've got a tough negotiation. just get to the bottom line more quickly. i think it's an exacerbating

issue. i do not think it's a, you know, the reality is administrations find the resources they need to get these things done. but when there's not a lot of respect on either side of the aisle -- not the aisle, the administration, the avenue, then it's the lack, d resources issue exacerbates the problem. >> i think i agree. it probably contributes. i don't really know. i don't have any empirical data. i suspect you're probably right that there are resource issues on either end of this. i doubt there are adequate resources on both ends of it. i don't think the problem goes away. i do think it's more, at the moment, at least, i think it is a more philosophically driven argument between the branches. >> it's concerns about congressional staffing levels

and having adequate congressional staff to do oversight was one of the main driving factors of the 1947 congressional reorganization act, which did significantly increase the staff resources. but one of the more robust public polling findings is that people across both parties think that members of congress have too many staffers and they think members of congress have an order of magnitude, more staff than they do. people think there's this giant army of congressional staff. everybody in the room knows that not true and they've wanted to see it cut. since the '80s, it's been hard to push for more congressional staff because of those two intertwined misconceptions. >> there is a 1/3 less staff at least over the last two decades. it's shrivelled. people don't stay enough. people don't, you know, aid has

been cut, and that's an important incentive for having the institutional memory that allows for more effective oversight and comfortableness between the branches and on the hill itself. >> we have time for one more question. yes, brandon. >> brandon sawyer. from wayne state law school. i had a question. we've talked a lot about committees and subpoena power. do you have any insight into the individual role of members that aren't chairmen of the committee? how can they exercise oversight in things like the senate to get information wholly unrelated to that individual's, merits of

their nomination? is that in the seemingly category or going nuclear category? >> it's not going nuclear. this is conventional warfare. [ laughter ] >> and it's very effective. having been held up twice in many months. both times i was confirmed. don't tell anybody how effective it is, please. >> rand paul did this with david baron for circuit. he did it with dci. he's gotten in many cases a lot of what he wanted out the administration. when i say i think it's great, what i mean is i think it is great as a way of members of congress getting what they want. i don't necessarily agree with paul's goals in their particular cases, but -- what i started out talking about, congress has all these different levers.

houses have levers they can pull. individual members have levers they can pull. another thing they can do by the way, brought up the clause earlier, leaking state secrets. it's one way members have influence in public policy in really helpful ways actually. for example -- >> don't go there. don't go there. >> so for example, a senator leaked the pentagon papers to the press. in the '80s, actually in the '70s, a lot of what led to the creation of the church committee was leaks that had come out of congress. in the 80s, leaks about cia activities came again out of congress in ways that have been tremendously helpful. as long as it's members doing it on the floor, which in many cases it has been, henry gonzalez in the early 90s in the run-up to the first iraq war, that is one of the constitutional tools they can use.

>> yes, and you understand that the executive branches' argument with the respect to anything that might be sensitive is we can't give it to you because you will leak it. >> that's their argument no matter what happens. if you look at all the major leaks recently, it's all executive branch. then look at who is leaking the most harmful stuff. chelsea manning was military. edward snowden was nsa. that's the argument they're going to use, but they're going to use that argument whether it's true or not. >> next up we have the vice president of the constitution project with a few remarks, but before we get to scott, please join me in thanking this distinguished panel of experts. thank you. scott? >> thanks very much, joslin. i have to say i didn't think that was the discussion i was going to follow. i want to take two or three minutes to offer a few concluding observations on the basis of what i think were two

terrific panels today. and i want to start by taking a step back to comments senator levin made at the outset. an effective oversight system is critical to our democracy. it is important to congress and the executive branch. in that regard, it should be important to all of us, not just immediate stake holders in the process. and i think we've heard different folks on both panels sort of touch on some of what makes high quality oversight and the kind of obstacles that stand its in way. i think it is worth highlighting a few of those things on the way out, particularly given the moment in time that ron white flagged on the first panel, which everybody is aware, congressional and presidential elections coming up with uncertain results are a good time to reflect on all these issues. some of the characteristics i noted that folks identified. probably the number one that it is fact based and not

politically driven. it is not partisan. it has an objective legitimacy to it. that it's bipartisan. josh might disagree that's an important thing. that it's in-depth so there's a mechanism if there's an investigation for oversight to then be ongoing. there can be follow up and regular monitoring beyond whatever the initial sort of investigation is. that executive branch folks who are the subject of oversight feel like they're being treated fairly even if the process is adversarial. some of the challenges or obstacles that i noted that folks raised. low quality oversight might have been the most repeated one. when the executive branch feels that the oversight is politically driven or it's unduly burdensome in some other

way, that it isn't bipartisan. insufficient resources or capacity for committees and staff or the members who are carrying this out. andy's point is there an inherent philosophical difference between the branches with respect to oversight. i think both of those sort of characteristics of high quality oversight and the challenges and obstacles that stand in their way suggest some potential conditions for facilitating better oversight going forward. i think some of them are going to be obvious from what i've flagged already. avoiding low quality partisan oversight so courts don't have to step in and fix rights and responsibilities on both sides in a way that neither branch may

find acceptable going forward. making sure committees have experienced professional staff with the appropriate resources and training. ways to build relationships between executive branch personnel and the committees that oversee them. maybe there need to be more opportunities if staff turnover is happening at a rate that it wasn't previously. one that i find really interesting that was brought up numerous times is the 80/20 problem. if 20% of the oversight is what the public sees and if that partisan driven part is that 20%, they don't know there's anything working. is there a way to raise up the 80%? both so people see it as a functioning democracy and there can be lessons learn fre learne 80%.

again, flag this all because i think it's an important time to be thinking about it. as david said, these are not issues that we sort of dove into in depth today and it is sort of beyond the scope of this conference. i do think it's you know, risk of the mill for the next one of these, which i hope we have because this was wonderful. i hope the various stakeholders who i know who are in the room and may have tuned in remotely you'll think seriously about this stuff and the ways in which they can facilitate more effective oversight in the next administration and the congress to come. with that, i want to thank the levin center, senator levin, all of aur ponl iour panelists, pewr for hosting this. i really thought this was a terrific event. please join me in thanking them. [ applause ]

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