that can actually be a net positive. so making the argument that this is a financially positive economic engine argument can be a much more effective argument. >> other questions? >> at davos a couple years ago you talked about the readiness for the pandemic. jim kim was playing a large role. how much of that has been hard wired now? >> we have a lot more work to do. within the u.s. we've done a lot to enhance our preparedness. we need a w.h.o. that's more functional than it is today. we need new tools. we don't have a vaccine that could work against the flu overnight that arose. we have been tweaking our methods. we've been cutting days, weeks, sometimes months off the production process and increasing the ability to produce things that are rapidly

deployable. >> talking about global readiness in terms of countries working together, the cdc, the world bank, all of that, as opposed to the science. >> i think there is a lot more collaboration. that's what the global health security agenda is all about. we have more than 70 countries involved. this external evaluation process, we've had over 70 countries sign up for. by this time next year, probably 70 to 80 will have had these evaluations. we're having a common vision of what's needed and where we are now. we need people quite frankly from outside government pushing to make more progress. >> w.h.o. is in a transition on the leadership front. i think we'll see more from w.h.o. there is some pushing. i would only echo the more pushing is helpful. on the science side many more investments and i think both on the science and on the monitoring side we're seeing a lot of progress and many investments. >> other questions?

>> thank you, doug peterson, s&p global. we heard a lot of conversation about opiates in the u.s. and heroin usage. >> this is a horrible problem. we have an absolute outlier. in the u.s. we use more than 80% of the global prescription opiates. what's happened over the past 20 years is that the number of opiates prescribed has increased by 300 to 400%. that has been directly correlated with an increase in overdoses and overdose deaths. over the last couple years, the drug cartels have recognized a new market and we have more accessible, lower cost heroin and illicitly produced fentanyl. last year more people died from opiate overdose than from car crashes in the u.s. it is a leading cause of death, more than 10 million americans have used opiates, more than 2 million addicted to them. we need to address this with a

comprehensive approach that looks at two different population groups. one are people who are currently dependent or addicted. they need better treatment of addiction and better management of pain. cdc last year -- this year rather, released guideline on management of chronic pain. opiates are dangerous drugs. you take just a few too many and you stop breathing. you may be addicted for life after just a few pills. so there are better ways to treat chronic pain. second, for everyone else who hasn't yet had an opiate, we need to protect them from it. it may be just a few doses until you're addicted. that means greatly improving prescription patterns to prevent this. it's a very serious problem. there are communities in parts of the u.s. where new businesses can't start because not enough people can pass a drug screen. >> the prescribing habits is a very big part of that. literally, my husband had a shoulder replaced, he walked out with a prescription for 90

oxycontin. >> this is a huge problem. it shouldn't happen. >> they say we don't want our patients to be in pain. >> when i went to medical school, they taught us, if you give a patient with pain an opiate, they won't get addicted. it's completely wrong. >> i threw them away. >> there has to be a complete rebooting of pain prescribing and it has to be done with a sense of urgency that -- i'm an oncologist by background. there are times when you need pain medicine. however, what we've got in the united states today is inconsistent with those times. >> can i ask another drug-related question. a number of states legalized marijuana. we have a couple of questions sent in. is the science good enough on that? what's your feeling on the safety of increased marijuana use as a result of legalization? >> well, just two comments.

one is, it's severely understated and needs more research. i'm a data driven person. tom is a data driven person. we need more data. there are data on young people and marijuana. from a public health standpoint and a health standpoint, that's my number one concern. >> how is it possible that after decades after the grateful dead that we don't have science. >> their brains are gone by the time they're 15. >> there are harms that are known but not widely known. there are lots of things that we don't know because it hasn't been legal to study. as sue said, we need to know much more, but there are known harms particularly for young people and other contexts that aren't widely understood. there's a big difference between legalization and decriminalization. >> yes. would the two of you as medical specialists be advising a state to legalize or decriminalize

marijuana use? >> as a fashion i would say decriminalizing, sign me up. legalizing, i want more data. >> i agree with sue. >> other questions? yes. >> thank you. when we are looking at global health risks from a business standpoint, it has never ceased to over the last decade, we have never been prophylactic, we have been reactive, whether it's ebola or sika. it occurs to me, i haven't seen enough studies on the consequences of climate change as a root cause for certain of the mutations and pathogens that we're talking about. it would seem to be that you -- i would be interested in your thoughts on the prophylactic

aspect of it so we're not constantly fighting a ses sifian might, trying to climb up the hill. >> i'll let sue comment on the climate issue. in terms of prevention, because we don't know what, where or when the next threat will come from, what's most important is to establish systems that can find it when it emerges, understand it and respond rapidly and figure out how to prevent it. that's what global health security is all about. that's why we establish laboratory networks all over africa and the world so they can figure out what's going on, where and when it first emerges, that's why we train disease detectives all over the world. what we need essentially is what we would call in health care, a pluripote pluripotent, something able to do many things at once, capacity that is used every day. if you want to break the glass in an emergency and use some new system, it's not going to work well. if you use it every day to deal with, whether it's food poisons or measles outbreak or other problems, then you can scale it

up if there's an emergency. that's what we have to do to strengthen those systems to make it safer. >> just a k0ucouple of quick comments. there's no doubt that deforestation, changes in water availability, changes in climate have driven changes in both animal patterns of infection. they've changed patterns of productivity on farms. so one of the great concerns we have is small holder farm activity globally as a result of global climate change. part of our investments at the gates foundation is to enable those small holder farmers to corporate to feed their families despite the changes. we're also interested in how does that change animal health and what are the implications for human health. >> can i fit in one more 30-second question from the both of you? it's from one of the ceos. what country has the model health care system in your impression and what makes it so.

>> i'll make two comments and sue know mores. without naming a country, there are scandinavian countries who have very sensible models where the goal is to optimize health. if you look at our health care system, it's not a prominent goal to optimize health. there are lots of other goals we have. that's not really a prominent one. if you look at low-income countries, i would point to ethiopia, who has had the most success and most impressive system i've seen where they have young women, well trained, well supervised, well supplied all over the country providing -- if you look at a e lo income model, keeping costs down, focusing on the bottom line in health is helping people live longer more productive lives with less visibility over lower costs. >> i'm excited to see what the

government of ethiopia is doing with citizens of ethiopia in a low-cost, front line health care worker using vaccination, nutrition, well baby care, really classic things that they know have a profound impact. with relatively low education, because human resources are a big issue, they have a plan to transform the health in their entire country in a very, very poor area. people talk about rwanda. it's a small country, and so the scale of what ethiopia is contemplating has already made progress on and has plans for the future, is really exciting to see. >> thank you so much. plaus laws. tonight a discussion on school segregation throughout history with investigative journalist nicole hannah jones. she claims racial segregation in the u.s. is currently maintained by official action and policy,

an event hosted by the columbia journalism school airs tonight at 8:00 east earn on c-span. also this evening, a panel looks at how the trump administration could approach biomedical innovation, health care issues and drug pricing, that event hosted by the milliken institute in new york. you can see it starting at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. >> this weekend on american history on c-span3, saturday at 7:00 a.m. eastern, from president lincoln's cottage in bd, we'll have a conversation with candace shy hooper about four women who influenced the civil war for boughter or for worse. >> you can see, too, that women have a means of reinforcing either the best in their husbands and the worst. that's what this study is. >> at 10:00 on real america, the

1953 film american frontier. >> they flash the world from the field to the production office at williston and from there to the central office in oklahoma. day and night our little telephone board was lit up like a christmas tree. calls from new york, california, houston. bit by bit we began to realize how big a thing this was. >> the film promoted the financial been fits of farmers for leasing land for oil exploration and was funded by the american petroleum institute. sunday morning at 11:00, panelists discuss the life and legacy of social activist jack london and how his novel "the call of the wild" influenced generations of western novelists and writers. >> he always looked back to the natural land, to his ranch, the beautiful scenery in californian elsewhere in the south pacific to center himself and to find release and relief from the

rigors and the depredations of the cities. >> at :00 eastern, we visit the military aviation museum in virginia beach. >> this airplane, among a couple other types, basically taught all the military aviators, army air core and navy how to fly. many guys never saw an ir plane coming from the farms and anywhere you can think of. the first airplane they saw was the boeing steerman. >> for a complete "american history tv" schedule, go to c-span.org. here are some of our featured programs thursday, thanksgiving day on c-span. after 11:00 a.m. eastern, nebraska senate ton ben sasse on american values, the founding fathers and the purpose of government. >> there's a huge civic mindedness in american history, but it's not compelled by the

government. >> followed at noon with former senator tom harkin on healthy food and the rise of childhood obesity in the u.s. >> for everything from monster thick burgers with 1420 calories and 107 grams of fat to 20 ounce cokes and pepsis, 12 to 15 teaspoons of sugar, feeding an epidemic of childhood obese tis. >> at 3:30, wikipedia founder jimmy wales talks about the challenge of providing global access to information. >> once there's a thousand entries, i know there's a small community there, five to ten really active users, another 20 to 30 that they know a little bit. >> a little after 7:00 eastern, an inside look at the year's long effort to repair and restore the capitol dope.

justice elena kagan. >> it taught me what it was like to be a serious historian and to sit in archives all day every day. and i realized it wasn't for me. >> followed by justice clarence thomas at 9:00. >> genius is not putting a $2 idea in a $20 steps. it's putting a $20 idea in a $2 sentence without any loss of meaning. >> just after 10:00, at an exclusive ceremony in the white house, president obama will present the medal of freedom, our nation's highest civilian award to 21 recipients including nba starjordan, singer bruce springsteen. watch on c-span or c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app.

>> robert gal luch chi, the former chief negotiator discussed the nuclear threat north korea poses to the asian pacific and the world. >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for joining us today, and i know we are competing with election day, and i'm impressed that we have a good turnout and thank you. and thank you for your vote for ambassador gallucci. i'm synja kim, president of ics and i'd like to welcome all of you to the ics fall symposium 2016. it is wonderful to have ambassador gallucci here with us again today, since he last spoke at the ics spring symposium about korean peninsula issues in may of 2006, that is ten years ago, right in this room kennedy caucus and welcome back ambassador. many things happened since then

in and around the korean peninsula for the last ten years, and many ideas and theories have continued to flood in the way of possible resolution for the korean peninsula issues, yet no promising signs have yet to be formulated. then the most recent development in kuala lumpur had captured much of our attention on the informal dialogue between the u.s. team led by ambassador gallucci, one of our most highly respected diplomats in north korea experts for the last quarter century, and as the chief architect of the 1994 agreed framework. for the north korea side, deputy foreign minister han sun the highest ranking north korea official engaged in such track

to dialogue. today we are delighted and privileged that ambassador gallucci has generously accepted our invitation joining us and he will share with us his insights and experience from the meeting and his vision towards the peace in the korean peninsula and the region at the dawn of the new administration in the united states. as far as the format of the proceeding today, after the presentation of the ambassador, there will be a q&a session between the ambassador and the discussants and then the floor will be open to the audience for your q&a. they're all ics fellows, joseph vosco, non-resident, senior associate ics, william brown, who may be standing in line at the voting booth at the moment,

he is adjunct professor georgetown university, peter huessy, president, geo, strategic analysis senior director, strategic studies, mitchell institute, and tong kim, who is also will be joining us a little later, washington correspondent and columnist of "korea times" in seoul, korea, and larry niksch, senior associate csis. with that i hope you enjoy the program and let's welcome ambassador gallucci. >> she is a ninth grader, this is how we do it. >> thank you, dr. kim, for this great opportunity to introduce the honorable robert gallucci. ambassador gallucci served as dean of the school of foreign service for 13 years until he left in july 2009 to become

president of john d. and katherine d. macarthur foundation. bob was appointed dean in 1996 after 21 years of distinguished service in a variety of government positions focusing on international security. as ambassador at large and special envoy for the u.s. department of state, he dealt with the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. bob was chief u.s. negotiator during the north korean nuclear crisis of 1994, and served as assistant secretary of state for political military affairs and also as deputy executive chairman of the union special commission overseeing the disarmament of iraq following the first gulf war. he earned his bachelor's degree at the state university of new york at stonybrook and his masters and doctoral degrees at brandeis university. ladies and gentlemen, please

join me welcoming the honorable robert gallucci. [ applause ] >> thanks, lena. good afternoon, everybody. i am pleased and honored with this invitation, happy to be with you, as was noted, it's en ten years. i wished i would say it was ten years of progress, but i don't think that would be exactly appropriate, under the circumstances. i am, not withstanding the title, sang ju titled this and i didn't stop him, i am going to

mention kuala lumpur. there was a small group of us, four of us who traveled the 20 hours or so to meet with north korean delegation for a couple of days, and that was just about three weeks ago. a word about that. for the dprk side in that meeting, i think one of the main things they wanted to do was to explain to us why they were concerned about u.s. policy, and specifically why we were there, which is to say that they did not wish to meet with the u.s. government. that's why we were meeting in as i'm sure you know the trap two mode rather than gov-gov track one. for our side, we explained what

we understood to be the washington perspective these days on north korea, north korean policy. we focused particularly on the dangers, the threats that we could see, threats or dangers to the region, and to the united states. we did not represent anyone except ourselves, so we didn't issue any warnings, only observations. the key question i think on the minds of the representatives led, as i think sang ju said by vice foreign minister ahn, the key discussion what should both

sides, in this discussion, the u.s. and dprk, what should they expect and what should they want to happen early in next year, with the new administration in washington? i think we should, could usefully talk about that. you have a distinguished panel here. you all are, it's clear to me, been around the block on this issue. this is not your first rodeo, as they say, with north korea, so we can have a useful discussion about that. what i want to do with my time this afternoon is lay out what i think are six key questions that are, for me at least, the most important, the most timely for consideration, and all the questions i want to ask are framed in terms of what does t dprk actually believe, and then i'll give the subjects. so let's try this out and see if

this works, if this is useful. first question, does the dprk believe its own narrative on recent history? in other words, what do they think caused the collapse of the agreed framework of 1994, and brought us to the events that began in 2002. they have a narrative. what do they think led to the failure to implement the agreement of 2005 and 2007 and '08, what happened? what do they believe was the role, if any, of the dprk in the construction of a plutonium production reactor in syria, which was destroyed by the israelis in 2007.

what is their explanation for the failure of the leap day agreement, the events of 2011 and 2012? now, the question i ask is, does the dprk believe its own narrative on this recent history. my answer to that is incredibly, yes. let me be clear about this, i have no doubt that the dprk acted inconsistently with the terms of the agreed framework or to put it in the vernacular, cheated on the agreed framework with their deal to accept uranium enrichment gas centrifuge technology and

equipment from pakistan during the middle to late '90s and then into the next decade. i have no doubt that the agreed framework excluded this through the reference to the north/south declaration on denuclearization. that's not their view. that's my view. so i'm asking, do they believe their own view as they present it? i'm saying i think they do, incredibly. i have no doubt that it was north korea who built i don't know bong at al queue bar in syria. they say it wasn't us. they say it was them. do they, some of them believe that north korea is innocent of that? i believe that some of them actually think they didn't do it. i have no doubt they did. i have no doubt that, over the last decade or so, since i last

spoke here, the dprk bears the principal responsibility for both sides adopting postures that both have characterized as strategic patience, in other words, i believe they bear most of the responsibility for the failure for engagement to succeed between the dprk and the u.s. side. but for whatever it's worth to you all, i believe also that some in the dprk believe their own rhetoric on recent history. they believe they have wronged, wronged by the united states of america. what i'm trying to say here is on the first point, there's room for possible misunderstanding between the dprk and the u.s. side.

one of my favorite movies is "cool hand luke" and there's a line in that movie where the bad guy says to the good guy, "what we have here is a failure to communicate." this is supposed to be irony. because it wasn't a failure to communicate. i am not telling you that all that's going on between the dprk and the united states of america and the republic of korea is a failure to communicate. i am not saying that. i'm saying that in this interpretation of recent history, there's room for misunderstanding, and i think there is some. that's one of the things i conclude. second question, does the dprk believe that when it achieves the capability of mating an icbm with a nuclear weapon that could reach the continental united states, it will change everything.

answer? i think dangerously, yes, they do think that. they think everything will change when they can threaten the united states, continental united states with an icbm with a nuclear warhead. i note here that some in the u.s. defense community would agree. they think u.s. vulnerability to a new third country with nuclear weapons will alter our relationship in fundamental ways. i don't. they do. i believe the u.s. deterrent will remain credible vis-a-vis the dprk, just as it has been vis-a-vis russia and china. i believe that the u.s. extended

deterrent to its allies in northeast asia, seoul, tokyo, will remain credible just as our extended deterrent in nato has remained credible vis-a-vis russia and before that, the soviet union. but here comes the interesting part. but what will change is the dprk's vulnerability. ladies and gentlemen, even those of us who are opposed to preventive war would support, indeed insist on a preemptive strike, a preemptive strike, if we judged a north korean strike against the rok, japan, or the

united states as being imminent. do you see what i'm saying here? preventive war? no. preemptive strike, yes. and what the north koreans will achieve is that they will create a vulnerability that they do not now have when they get that capability. so i'm arguing here that the dprk's security may be fatally compromised rather than enhanced by this capability that they are so dedicated to achieving. the third question, does the dprk think that its current nuclear weapons capability, the ability to strike the republic of korea and japan with ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear weapons will deter the

united states and its allies from responding to provocations in the dmz or at sea? the answer to that question, i think, possibly yes, they do think their nuclear weapons capability gives them this deterrent. i believe they are wrong, if they believe that, but i think they may believe it. the united states and russia have long experienced going back to the time of the united states and the soviet union with nuclear weapons and with deterrents, but we know mistakes are still possible between us. the question here that i'm posing is what does the dprk think nuclear weapons are good

for besides deterring an enemy attacking them with nuclear weapons? or, to put it differently, when is the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons by a state credible, particularly when that state is dealing with another nuclear weapons state? what good are nuclear weapons to the dprk, is the question? my answer is that they're only relevant, they're only useful when national survival is at risk. they're certainly not useful for small gains. they're not credible. they're not useful to protect them against a retaliation for incidents at the dmz or at sea.

but as it turns out, my answer really isn't very important. kim jong-un's answer is very important and i worry that he may expect more of his nuclear weapons capability than a good appreciation for deterrence would warrant. fourth question. does the dprk think that if a new administration in washington, and we're going to get one, begins by proposing talks about talks, negotiations, rather than immediately seeking tougher sanctions, do they believe that would be a sign of weakness? answer? i think maybe.

let me be clear about my own view here. i would like to see the new administration in the united states that takes office in january 2017 in consultation with the roc and japan, i would like to see that new administration pretty early on, maybe after a policy review, seek talks about talks with the dprk, with only one condition, and that is that while they're talking, there be no tests of nuclear missiles or nuclear weapons even at the very preliminary stage. those of you who are very attentive on this issue will note that one of the candidates, secretary clinton, is being quoted as saying that's not what

she would do, and i know some who advise her believe a different course would be more prudent, something i would call the iranian model, where instead of seeking talks early on, you immediately seek tougher sanctions earlier on in order to create the right state of mind in pyongyang. show your toughness first, so that talks would be a way of releasing that pressure. so that is an alternative view. it's not mine. i told you what mine would be, but this question is on the minds of those who will be in the next administration, and i believe it deserves thought and discussion, and i hope we can have some here.

the fifth question, does the dprk believe it can keep its nuclear weapons program, it can keep its nuclear weapons program and still negotiate a peace treaty, the end of the u.s./rok exercises and sanctions relief? in other words, does the dprk believe it can take its nuclear weapons program off any negotiating table? i believe it isn't sure whether it could do that. i would note that some who are in this administration now certainly believe they will,

they, meaning the dprk, will never give up their nuclear weapons program. if we went around and we asked everybody here to comment on that, i dare say at least half of you would say they'll never give up their nuclear weapons program. i believe by saying that, you give the dprk hope that they can keep it. my view is that we should destroy that hope. explicitly we should not, repeat not settle for a freeze on their nuclear weapons program, unless the freeze were simply a step to denuclearization. to put this another way, i'm posed to talks with the dprk if they take their nuclear weapons program off the table. i believe to engage in talks

when they cannot by agreement ahead of time produce the denuclearization would legitimize the dprk's nuclear weapons and eye am opposed to that. sixth and final question, does the dprk believe it can resist international pressure to improve its human rights behavior? as with the previous question, i believe the dprk isn't sure it can get away with that. i can tell you from firsthand experience that they are concerned that the phrase "improving human rights behavior" is code for ending the kim regime.

our position, i believe, should be the following, that we cannot address legitimate dprk security concerns unless we ultimately reach a political settlement with the dprk and probably one that includes a treaty of peace, and since i believe that, i do not think, therefore, that a political settlement of that type, of that weight, is possible unless the dprk adopts basic internationally accepted standards on human rights. this is not mean. they have to accept an american-style liberal

democracy. it does not mean the end of their whole system. it does mean over a period of time, substantial changes domestically. but i think that's the ohm way out of our situation, by negotiation. ladies and gentlemen, i am going to stop right there and assume that you all now will carry the weight. thank you very much. >> thank you. [ applause ] i'm going to do that. >> ladies and gentlemen, we're going to get into q&a session. please where is the microphone? okay, hold onto this. there was quite a succinct question, number six through the

other way around one. now first craig. >> thank you, dr. kim, for hosting this program particularly with the honorable ambassador, who was my dean at school of foreign service and it's an honor to participate in a program with bob gallucci. despite the fact that he raised very, very perceptive and disturbing questions for those of us who don't live with this issue day after day, i found the answer to your first question, bob, the most disturbing one, because it affects all the others, that is their perception of reality. it's one thing for regimes to disagree on motivations, ideology, that type of thing, but when we get down to raw facts, and your impression is they actually believe that certain facts did not occur when the rest of the world knows they did occur that means their grasp

on reality is highly suspect, and therefore their motivation and their actions in the other context of the questions you raised is quite seems unpredictable and unbelievably dangerous. so given the fact you say they have this detachment from reality how can we rely on expectations in any of the other areas when they don't see the world as the world is, not just the way as we see it but the way it objectively is? >> joe, i don't dissent from your drawing that conclusion from my comment, right? in other words, i think this is not good news that their perception of reality is so much different from our perception of

reality. i was really driving that question towards one sentence, and that they believe that they have been mistreated, they've been wronged by us over these years, so their characterization of this captures that, of the agrieved party. i presented my own view so you didn't confuse me with the dprk. i don't share their view, but after having listened to them, and we didn't, by the way, spend a lot of time on history because i didn't think it would be functional, useful, but we spent enough time in kuala lumpur that i got the message, and you may know that three years ago steve

bosworth and i met with them, with the new foreign minister in berlin, so, and for a two-day session and i had the same impression then that they're, as we say they're smoking their own stuff here. they really believe the characterization of history. what that should tell us is not, in my view, not that we should not still try to engage them, but that we need to understand the many opportunities for misunderstanding for purposeful misunderstanding, to be sure, al misunderstanding, to be sure, at some point, but for honest misunderstandings, too, and we need to be careful about that. if i didn't, don't get another chance i'm going to say that when we shouldn't, with the dprk or a country like that in which

we have a history that is fraught, i don't think that the idea of trust makes a lot of sense for quite a long time, so if we make any kind of agreement, even tentative ones of some kind, we should be planning on monitoring and verifying and we shouldn't not simply enter into any understanding with an expectation that everything will be fine. everything between us and the dprk will not naturally be fine. it's going to have to be made that way, so you took this as making the idea of, joe, the idea of engaging the north with this background as being especially challenging, and i think you're exactly correct.

>> thanks, always love to engage the ambassador on agreed framework. i love to debate that issue. but in your talk i must say i agree with almost everything you say here. i would put it a little bit differently especially this last conversation. to me the north koreans, over this long period, have been very objective, very rational, very organized, very deliberate from going from point "a" in 1984 to now, this long, long period of developing an impossible thing, in a nuclear weapon, under the constraint of u.s., the world, out to get them, and they're so close to doing that, maybe they've done it. they haven't really demonstrated quite yet enough, so i'm thinking it's critical for us to see this short gap in which maybe a year or two or five years they, for themselves, need

to convince themselves first, and then the south, and then us that they've got this capability. at that point, then i think you're right. they think that the game changes. not quite yet though. so i think we have a little bit of room to maneuver. my main concern though is, my main question on north korea that you really didn't address, i think you and a lot of people here, we look at u.s./north korea. i think that's fundamentally a mistake to look at it that way. i think we fundamentally have to look at north and south korea, and what are north korea's objectives toward south korea? i don't think they've given up yet. maybe they have, i don't know that. if they haven't given up, we've got a really big problem, because that's where what you call the deterrence effect of the nuclear weapons plays a really big role, and you correctly put that. you didn't know. you said you don't know what

they're thinking on that. i think that's what we need to figure out and convince them very quickly that south korea is against seoul, before we really ramped up to challenge that, they were doing all kinds of mischief in south korea, if you all remember. and they were not getting punished for it. later on in the '80s, we showed that we could punish them for it and they stopped. for the last 25 years, they have not monkeyed around in south korea. i'm very afraid that once they get the nuclear deterrence they don't want to use nuclear weapons. they never will. but i can imagine the south and us being a lot more nervous pricking at them if they have nuclear weapons behind them f. they're still thinking of the south, what i mean is unifying

the country, it's a rivalry. i don't think the peninsula can tolerate two different regimes on the same peninsula. that rivalry, until that is defanged i think requires much more aggressive standpoint from our side. your last point on the engagement part, i quite agree. i think we should engage them right up front with this but not on sanctions. i think the sanctions -- i'm an economist. i've been watching these sanctions. frankly, they don't work. the north koreans know that. they probably want more sanctions. that's what they have seen coming at them forever. i would change tactics. i would say you're in danger. your regime is in danger. we're not going to overthrow you but you are in danger of being overthrown. we need a preemptive, different kind of military in south korea that can hit them really quick,

really fast and pinpoint not a massive nuclear attack on them. but they need to learn that we mean business. and i'm afraid this 25 years, we have never shot at them, we have never done anything top to them and they've gotten inured to that. it seems to me we can get much more up front, much more provocative, show if they are thinking of south korea is, it's not going to work. >> thank you. bill? >> so there's a lot there. just a couple of points. the sort of strategic objectives of the dprk. i have assumed, and i can't defend this assumption. but i have assumed that the long-term objective is the unification of the korean peninsula under a regime centered in pyongyang.

i assume that's their strategic long-term objective. in the middle to short term, they would like sanctions lifted. i'm pretty sure even though i probably am very close to our position on the impact of sanctions in terms of their, quote, economy, but i think they would like sanctions lifted. i'm certain they would like u.s. r.o.k. u.s. military exercises first tuned down and then stopped. i know that, that they would like that. i think they would like to drive a wedge between seoul and washington, is what we called it. they would like to loosen the alliance, if they could.

and i think that, you know, the question about how we should deal with the north under these circumstances, i came out in my remarks in favor of an early effort at engagement. but a fair question that comes from your comments is if that doesn't the work, then what? then i don't have a good answer to that other than containment. there are other words but that means maintain a sanctions regime of some kind, keep the dialogue with beijing operating so that you get some support for the implementation of that sanctions regime. continue the exercises. make sure that alliances between -- mutual security treaty

between japan and the united states and the alliance bilateral alliance between the rok and the united states are strong and viable and do that through intensified consultations to deal with contingencies that may arise. that's the kind of thing i would imagine. i'm just saying i would like to try engagement initially and see whether it could go anywhere. >> it is good to hear dr. gallucci. it's been a long time since geneva 1949. i'm sorry, '94. it is fascinating to listen to your analysis and assessment of what north korea might do, what their perceptions are, what can be done about them. but coming down to a specific

area of talking the talks is, beginning with the next administration will be installed in january. what specific steps, what types of talks would you foresee or recommend for the new people to follow in line with some of the things you have listed? that's what i hear about. as you pointed out, there are some views who might say a new administration might harden sanctions right off the beginning of the administration. we talk to north koreans and in their view, that is not the way to go. you discussed that. but to capture the momentum of opening dialogue with north

korea to eventually go down to say dismantlement over nuclear weapons and the korean peninsula. i agree when you said someone like james clyburn said it is a lost cause of the nuclear program. or he's also right, though when he said north koreans and you sort of agreed to his view, that north korea has to keep nuclear weapons as the key to survival. it is survival. so i see these things. of course you effect all of your experiences and your insights

from talking with the north koreans, from kuala lumpur, berlin and other things. but i want to just mention one thing about the south korean factor and this whole occasion. i don't think north korea believes it can unify korean peninsula under its own terms, forcefully. i remember when kim jong il said in 2000, and told secretary albright that he is -- north korea would be opposing to any unification either by south korean terms or north korean terms. there has been a lot of evidence that, number one, i think because they know they cannot unify south korea -- i mean, korea under its own terms, as long as

there is an alliance with the united states and also it's too much a different system. it is going to be long term, passed to unification if you will. and commitment to peace on both sides and exchanges and mutual cooperation, what have you. the sort of things that they agreed to but during the administration of south korea under kim jong un. we heard the report and your team is writing up a report on the result of your talks as a recommendation to incoming administration -- or a transition team. and how is that coming along also?

and what would you be, your specific recommendation, for the next administration to follow. we don't know about if there is a view if clinton gets elected tonight, then she is going to take a harder -- ironically, not like her husband when he was in the white house. everything proceeded very well. if there was no quarrel, he would have gone to pyongyang. and sherman who turned out a hard line now. but one more thing. i think it is also important to discuss the china factor. joe bosco is here. but i think some -- it is going to be the korean peninsula. and the real problem u.s. foreign policy will face will be how we are going to deal with china regarding the north korean situation.

>> so a couple of things from your comments. and thank you for them. i have a tendency to want to warn about expectations for beijing's role in solving this problem. and my concern is twofold. one, that the chinese have up to now figured out that while they are not pleased with everything that pyongyang does, they are not sufficiently displeased that they are prepared to support sanctions which might in fact, cause such pain that it would destabilize the regime. so there is kind of a thermostat operating here on the role that the chinese will play.

and it seemed to me from as far back as 1993 and '94 when i was sent to beijing a number of times with the task of enlisting the chinese to use their influence in pyongyang. the second reason why i'm a little hesitant, there is a phrase that is in my mind and that is we should not take the biggest, arguably the biggest and most important international security issue in the asia-pacific region and subcontract it to our major rival in the asia-pacific region. in other words, we should take the leadership on this and not the chinese. we will not do ourselves proud. we americans will not certainly

with our allies if we defer to the chinese to manage this. getting their help, i like if we get more of their help i would like it better. but there is a limit to how far i wish to go in that direction. that's the first point. second, i think i caught the question in there from kuala lumpur. is there a connection to the new administration. we promised the representatives from the dprk that we would come back and talk to people in washington and share whatever we thought we had learned in terms of insights about the dprk, that the dprk wished us to take away. and we have been doing that. lee segal, who lives and works in new york city and set the logistics for this meeting and put them in place, did do some writing and has shared that

writing with various people. i have done some oral debriefing. and so we're trying to be good to our word that we gave in kuala lumpur. so i don't want to overstate anything we might have accomplished. remember, this was sharing views and insights and not more than that. but whatever it's worth, for whatever it's worth, we have done that. >> thank you. >> thank you, kim. mr. ambassador, thank you for your remarks. it is very useful to hear what does north korea actually believe, instead of what we see rhetorically and in terms of their actions. i'm going to continue and ask you what you think north korea thinks about some additional things. and i take them from the current news, which i think is important.

one, josh rogan writes in "the post" this morning that any attempt to dramatically increase sanctions, i will say i don't think the sanctions are as bad as they are against iran, or were. he said the chinese will push back on that very hard and it will get nowhere. i'm curious what, again, what do you think the north thinks about that? second, the u.s./china commission will be issuing its report soon. the congressional/chinese commission. and they say that the chinese modernization of its military is increasing much faster than what had been predicted by either our intelligence communities or our allies in east asia. and my interest is we rarely hear this. does north korea see itself as part of that effort to enhance

and cooperate with china in terms of its military objectives? third, mr. carlin of sais writes that there have been enormous number of what he calls missed opportunities between north korea and the united states since the agreed framework was put together in 1994. and he particularly chastises the bush administration for failing to understand what north korea was trying to achieve. and i'm curious, the extent to which i know north korea feels they have been aggrieved. part of it is we didn't build the two power plants. 20 years down the road, where are they? i wonder do you think north korea believes it doesn't have the ability to put a war head over the united states when it is now putting two satellites in

over the united states, including one right over the super bowl. second, a surreptitious attack from a submarine or a freighter which is not identifiable as to who did it, means the deterrent like in an emp attack from a frighter kind of goes away. i'm curious whether you think the emp commission said that the russians had given, and the chinese had given north koreans very significant help in developing emp capabilities. and so that to me is very critical. the next thing is to what extent does the missile defenses, whether it's t.h.a.a.d. or aegis or ground base intercepters deployed in conus, have an

impact on the north koreans? i know what the rhetoric is. i find it fascinating, the chinese are upset. they have frozen military relations in south korea over the deployment of t.h.a.a.d. why would they want to give north korean unimpeded shot with a nuclear armed or nonnuclear armed weapon? the t.h.a.a.d. doesn't have any impact on the strategic systems. they know it. they don't say so. i'm curious to the extent -- what do you think internally of north korea if they saw robust -- saying hey let's get this done as soon as possible and get going. finally, my friend mike dunn was my boss at ndu and afa. and he made a point in interviewing the former tutor of kim jong-il in seoul and asked him why he thought the north

koreans had nuclear weapons. the individual was quite shocked and said, don't you understand? and general dunn said tell me from your perspective as having been very close but being a defector, why. he said it's very true. they want to see the united states military withdraw from the peninsula. then they'll use nuclear forces to defend south korea should north koreans decide at that time to unify the peninsula with force, which this gentleman said he thought was their goal. i'm curious, does north korea still believe that? because i thought that explains, it's not just the exercises, and splitting the iraq and u.s. alliance. i think their fundamental objective, and they say it often in a lot of communiques and statements, always kind of at

the end. and of course the united states should withdraw their military forces from the peninsula. >> peter, that was at least seven questions. >> you're right. i miscounted, i thought it was six. >> i scrupulously avoided taking notes. so i'm going to skip around here, because that's the way my mind works, and you just cue me on the ones i've missed. one of the first questions went to the chinese calculation. i don't have any special insight to that calculation these days, other than the evidence, which a number of people have written about, that the chinese -- that one of the reasons if not the chief reason for the sanctions

that have been applied to the dprk not having the impact, causing the pain that sanctions advocates might want, is because the chinese have not allowed those sanctions to work, and indeed have provided the means by which the sanctions can be circumvented. and if any of you have been to the dprk recently, i have never been, but for some reason people think it's useful to send me an he' e-mail when they come back to tell me what they've seen. they describe a capital city that is unlike what it's looked like before, which is to say there is traffic, there are restaurants, there are construction cranes. it is looking like almost any other asian city from 30,000 feet. now, is it the only place in the

dprk that appears to be thriving? the proposition is, not the only place, but maybe the principal place. this would not all be possible without beijing. so i take from that that we have work to do in beijing, even if you take my view that there's a limit to what we can accomplish, there's still work to be done. the second question, i thought, was the one that went to, do the chinese view the dprk's military capability and maybe particularly its nuclear weapons capability as part of its own modernization. and i would say absolutely not. i think that if the dprk could wave a magic wand and have -- excuse me, if the chinese could wave a magic wand and have the dprk's nuclear weapons program disappear from the planet, they would wave that wand. that program is a potential source of catastrophe for the

chinese because it could end up bringing the united states of america and its military and naval forces right to its doorstep. the last thing the chinese want. and if you look at the rationale, as the chinese have offered, for their modernization program, both for the blue water navy, for what they've done with their strategic systems, the increase in numbers, increase in mobility, that this has got nothing in my view to do with the dprk, really. it has everything to do with, ironically, the american deemphasis on nuclear weapons that we have asserted, but in favor of conventional forces, both our conventional prompt strike and our multilayered, as they see it, ballistic missile defense, which goes to another one of your points, what are the chinese worried about?

they're worried about our radars, to begin with. they understand that the system is limited. they may think it is less limited than we claim it is against sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles that have reentry speeds of the kind that they will have that have multiple targeted reentry vehicles, et cetera. but they're still worried that this is a system that can be upgrad upgraded. it's comparable to the russian worry about what's happening in europe. they don't take any comfort in hearing president obama talk about the deemphasis on nuclear weapons, because they look at the words surrounding conventional strike, forgetting we don't actually have the capability, and they worry about the viability of their strategic systems, particularly when compar combined with our ballistic

missile defense because this puts at risk their deterrent, their second strike capability. for me that explains a lot of what the chinese are about and how they could have, if you pardon this expression, the chutzpah to complain to us about offering ballistic missile defense to our ally after the dprk launches a ballistic missile. instead of complaining to us about that, they might use their influence in pyongyang so there will be fewer missile tests. but be that as it may. the idea that the pulse from a nuclear weapon is something else the dprk is interested in is actually not something i have thought about. but i don't think it figures prominently, and i would be surprised if emp is high on the

list of weapons effects that are in the minds of the technologists of the dprk. when they think about nuclear weapons, i don't think that's what they're about. it may be what we think about, but intt's not on their list. when it comes to getting the united states off the peninsula, i want to say, if it wasn't clear in my remarks, that i don't believe that american political decisionmakers in the past or in the future will be deterred from executing their alliance responsibilities, because the dprk has nuclear weapons. the question about whether it could deliver nuclear weapons now with its mrbm capability to the republic of korea and japan,

let's for the sake of discussion here this afternoon stipulate, as lawyers like to say, that they can. i think that we will not be -- we, the united states of america, will not be dissuaded from executing our alliance responsibilities. and i would want every bit of signaling that we could to go to pyongyang so they don't misconstrue, and that's what i was talking about, they're misconstruing the effectiveness and what they could accomplish with nuclear weapons. y'all may remember that when we first had nuclear weapons in the early '50s, we had delusions of grandeur too. we had massive retaliation enunciated by john forest dustes with the thought that we could deter everything with these nuclear weapons. and it turned out we couldn't.

they still don't serve all purposes because they're not credible. might they be credible if we were launching regime change against the dprk? yes, they might. but my point is, at levels lower than that, they're not credible, not to us. but the question is, what do they think? and i don't know. >> thank you. larry? >> ambassador gallucci gave everyone a lot of food for thought. i have noted your comment on points 2, 4, 6, and 3. so i will try to be brief in terms of my comments, and also a couple of questions. now, ambassador gallucci correctly stated that north korea has borne the major responsibility for what he described as the failure of engagement with the united

states. that is correct. but i would add a caveat that the united states also bears some of the responsibilities for failure to realize u.s. objectives in negotiations. we have been un-smart in many instances in how we have negotiated with the dprk. a naive assumption going back to the 1990s behind our negotiating strategy, that north korea would soon collapse or that there would soon be regime change. listening too much to the chinese, when the chinese would advise us to ease off on ensuring that the north koreans

comply with the agreements they have made with us, 2005, 2007. going into negotiations with the north and agreeing to two unwritten, handshake agreements, october 2008 and february 2012? how naive can you get, when you make a handshake agreement, unwritten, with the north koreans, which of course they disavowed any knowledge of within a few weeks after our diplomats told us they had made these handshake agreements. so there is some blame to go around. and there are some other mistakes we have made as well. now, i want to comment on the preemptive strike issue, because

this is being talked about in both the u.s. and south korea. i'm not advocating a preemptive strike. but i will say this. the time, if you're going to do it, for a preemptive strike, is probably now, and within the next year or so. a strike against their nuclear and missile test facilities, to put those out of action and to buy us much greater time before the north could achieve that icbm nuclear warhead capability. the situation that ambassador gallucci describes, i don't believe, if it came about, would prevent north korea after a u.s. preemptive strike, from hitting us back with nuclear weapons,

because frankly, i think at a time when we would pick up, perhaps, legitimate perceptions that they were going to strike us with nuclear weapons, when that time comes, the north is going to have multiple delivery systems, both on land and at sea, that no preemptive strike would be able to take out. and a preemptive strike under those circumstances also means an all-out war. you're going to accomplish nothing by hitting just a couple of command and control centers, in a preemptive strike. the stakes are much, much higher than that.

now, these are my questions. this is about the sanctions issue. and generally it's along the lines that ambassador gallucci has laid out with regard to china. there are only really two avenues, viable avenues to toughen sanctions that might cause the north koreans to begin to bend in negotiations about their nuclear and missile issues. one is sanctioning chinese banks. many chinese banks allow the north koreans to move money back and forth to support these programs. and any toughening of sanctions i think would require the united states to do that, to start sanctioning an array of chinese

banks that we know are engaged in this kind of collaboration with north korea. the second option, and this is what i have written about, is to lay a resolution in the security council calling on all u.n. member states, i.e. china, to cut off oil shipments to north korea which i believe would be the toughest sanction and where i think with a sophisticated public strategy could put some real pressure on china, and at least spark a much more open debate within china about china's policies toward north korea. besides those two options, is there another option, ambassador gallucci, that you can think of

to pressure the chinese, other than those two options with regard to sanctions? and finally, i'll make a quick last point. when the north koreans had that capability to hit all of our basis in the pacific, and the u.s. west coast, they're going to want to negotiate at that point. they're going to sit down and look us across the table, and they're going to say, are you americans going to be willing to jeopardize san francisco so you can defend seoul? and i think the american response right now is in the realm of the uncertain, when we get into the early 2020s, about what that answer would be. in terms of what they would lay on the table to us, what did the north koreans specifically say

in equkuala lumpur about the pe treaty, did they lay out who they want negotiating with them, did they give you any real details about this? and also the priority to the peace treaty and any new round of negotiations between the u.s. and pyongyang. >> larry, thank you. i want to respond to some of these things. but one thing principally, and i would like your attention. i was thinking of jumping up and run to go the back of the room and locking the door before anybody left, because i wanted to get this out, and i wanted to make sure nobody left here not understanding what i wanted to convey, because i wasn't good enough at conveying it. so let me try it again. there are two different words.

one is preventive strike, preventive war. the other is preemptive strike. when the united states of america in 2003 moved into iraq, that was a preventive war. the administration at the time used the word "preemptive." it did, because the word "preemptive" has standing both in terms of international law and in terms of just war theory, the ethics. you are allowed under international law and under laws of ethics, you are allowed, if your enemy is on your border and about to attack, you are allowed to attack him first. you don't have to wait and

suffer that strike. that's preemption, if you are about to be attacked. if you get up one morning and look at trend lines in another country and say, in five or ten years, that country is going to be our enemy still, but a lot stronger, let's go to war now, that's not a preemptive strike. that's a preventive war. what i wanted to say and thought i said, but maybe not clearly enough, is i am opposed to preventive war, opposed to preventive war with north korea. i am not opposed, indeed i would insist that my government, as a citizen, launch a preemptive strike against north korea if it came to the confident and serious judgment that north

korea was about to attack the united states of america or one of its treaty allies. there is no reason to wait until tokyo is destroyed or seoul is destroyed or san francisco is destroyed if it's about to happen. ethically, morally, and legally, we can strike then. that's why i said the north koreans are creating a vulnerability that they do not now have. did i share this view with them? yes. i hope they get the right distinction here between preemption and preventive war. right now i'm not worried about them. i'm worried about you. i want to make sure you got this right. i don't mean you have to agree with me about preventive war and preemption. the distinction is a real one, and governments have reasons why they blur the two, right?

so i'm not for preventive war with north korea. i am for preemption, if they are about to attack. unlock the door. now, what is it that i feel comfortable saying about what the north koreans, the dprk, said to us in kuala lumpur? i think i am comfortable saying that i was asked rhetorically, how could we trust you? you want us to give up our nuclear weapons. how could we trust you not to launch regime change? look what you did in iraq. look what you did in libya. look what you talked about doing in iran. how could we trust you?

so two things were in my mind. one was, how could they trust us. the other was, what were we thinking back all those years when we were negotiating the agreed framework? which was, as far as we knew or at least i knew, was going to stop their nuclear weapons program, because i didn't know they would engage with the pakistanis for an enrichment program based on highly flip end uranium. i knew about the plutonium program and we were going to stop that sucker. why would they trust us? because we would develop after the framework was signed, a political relationship. we would open liaison offices in pyongyang, they would open one in washington, we would develop cultural ties, political ties. the situation would warm between

north and south, et cetera, et cetera. i have the same answer now. and i said, the only way i can conceive of you trusting us is in the context of a political settlement that includes a peace treaty to replace the armistice. that's how i got to the human rights thing. how could we do that? we could do that if you move to accept international standards that transcend sovereign borders for the way governments treat their own people. that had not mean you have to give up your regime. so we had that kind of a discussion. and i would say we had a discussion that went into some of the questions that i put here in a little bit of depth, but i don't feel comfortable trying to capture their words to me that were said in private.

i want to say one other thing here while i've got the floor. and that is that while we were very focused in kuala lumpur on the election today and a new government, which that moment i didn't know who was going to win, and i don't sitting in front of you now, but i observed that there was another election that was going to take place towards the end of 2017 in the republic of korea, and that was going to be important too. and that i could not imagine any sustained and serious engagement of the united states with the dprk that was not done with the concurren concurrence, and dare i say enthusiasm, of the government in seoul. we would also want tokyo to be

aboard to those discussions too. so i haven't emphasized the role of the republic of korea this afternoon. but i don't believe what i have talked about as engagement is plausible if a government is elected in seoul that doesn't favor engagement. our alliance comes first. and i think we will take care of that alliance. another one of your points, larry, was about how you get the chinese to do what we want the chinese to do. and i don't have any keys to that. i think that what i worry about is the reverse of that, in a way. anybody who has been in government knows that governments do not stay in lane. so we might want to talk to the chinese about the north koreans. and they might want to talk to us about taiwan. we don't want to talk about taiwan, right? not particularly.

not the way they want to talk about taiwan. nor do we want to talk about the south china sea at the same time as we're asking for something in northeast asia. so in a way, i worry about the obverse or whatever that is of your question, how do you influence the chinese. well, you can do linkage politics. but they can do it too. you have to think that one through before you start doing that, otherwise you can end up with the short end of the stick rather than the long end of the stick, and that's not too good. >> okay. i will open to the floor. any questions from the floor? would you please come to the microphone, the roving microphone. leena, over there in the back. >> thank you very much.

i'm from nhk. i have a question. this year, many senior diplomats and officers defected from north korea. and it would suggest that inner politics is drastically changing within north korea, maybe less stable, their direction. did you feel any -- anything which changed compared to before at the conversation at kuala lumpur? and if the situation is changing within north korea, less stable or more vulnerable situation,

what do you think the probability they're going to run into dangerous adventure is increasing or decreasing? >> it's not a bad question. i'm just not up to the answer, which is to say i don't have much to base an answer on in terms of engagement or even reading tea leaves from the news. i don't sense a particular vulnerability of the regime right now. i mean, what i've heard about the economic activity, at least in pyongyang, it sounds as though -- i don't know want to say that dprk is thriving under international sanctions, but it is not apparently suffering as much as some might have anticipated, or those

particularly who hoped that the iran model might be applied to the dprk. it doesn't appear that it could be. so i see nothing in all of that that would suggest a particular vulnerability or instability right now. i just don't. >> thank you. >> i'm grace khan with north korean refugees in the united states. thank you so much for your very insightful comments, ambassador gallucci. i just have a question on a very out of the box idea. it's a way to greatly increase diplomatic, political, and legal pressure on the regime and china

without being threatening militarily, and that is to have the international community adopt a "one korea" policy. you mentioned taiwan, and history shows that it is possible to recognize a different china than what was originally in the u.n. and it was done through action in the general assembly. and i'm just wondering if the legitimacy of the dprk could be raised as an issue in the general assembly. and as year after year passes, could political will be built up enough, with all the countries of the world, instead of only

focusing on china or the usual states, to get the world to accept a "one korea" policy based on the fact that the general assembly, after the end of world war ii, stated that korea needed to be independent from japan and united. so this is a way to address this unanswered korea question while putting a lot more diplomatic and political pressure on north korea and china. >> thank you. >> thank you. so the closest i've seen to that, an idea like that, which would, as i understand it, delegitimize the government in pyongyang as a representative of korean people on the korean peninsula, is the idea that was

floated in the council of foreign relations report, and i've seen it elsewhere, which is to consider, in a sense, if all else fails, denying the dprk membership in the united nations and the general assembly, to sort of delegitimize the government but have the international community do it instead of one country denying recognition. so i suppose that can be thought about. right now, i would like -- i would like generally people who think about policy to be thinking about ways of getting engagement to proceed in a reasonable way rather than disengagement. if you think about delegitimizing the dprk, that's not way far away from where they are now. they are the pariah state in the

international community at this moment, and they know it, and they are thriving. if you don't do anything in terms of impacting their life, and their life goes on because essentially beijing ensures it does, i'm not sure how much one would have accomplished. but it still is a possibility. >> thank you. peter, you have the microphone here, please. >> i would like to raise a little different issue. recently korea is going through a kind of a turmoil as a result of a lady spreading influence

including tremendous financial problems. and the opposition parties are telling park geun-hye to resign. i want to hear about the relationship between u.s. policy toward north korea and you mentioned briefly about the next two years' election, but we have a much more urgent issue with us n now. if a leftist government comes out, it might accomplish what

they tried to make korea together with north korean leaders, together a government. i can't think of the right word right now. so are we going to pursue, with the president park geun-hye, who has been singing the same song as president obama, but we are concerned, we are getting into a real difficulty, depending on what happens in the next couple of months. thank you very much, i would like to hear your comment. >> thank you. i think prudence and wisdom on my part is to stay far away from domestic politics in the rok right now. i would say that i absolutely do believe, however, that the ultimate election in the rok

will bear in a very substantial way, the outcome of that election, on what sorts of policies can be pursued to deal with the dprk. so i think that connection is real. what is happening now and the difficulties that the president is having in the rok is not something i think i can usefully comment on, so i'm going to let it go. >> ambassador gallucci, i was sort of astound to know you did not know anything about the program while you were negotiating the framework. i don't remember you mentioning -- but in that connection, you also mentioned mistrust, the degree of -- extent of distrust between dprk

and u.s. is so high that they still do not really trust or take whatever washington says, they won't take at its face value. now, with respect to tpursuing the path of developing nuclear weapons by way of enrichment, which administration later claimed covered all kinds of programs, although it did not specify the term heu program in that sense. my point is, whether or not north koreans still could not trust the united states, even after they signed the agreed framework, which they liked it and you became a hero as a

result of that, and i heard a lot of commendations from north korean officials afterwards. now, was it because they still could not trust the united states and they could not rely on the terms provided, for example targeted completion of the light water reactor projects, and they said, you've got to be done in 2003, and you have not done anything, and they were complaining and complaining about that. and chuck explained to them, you have to remember, this is the target date, we tried to do it by that time but we didn't promise you we were going to do it by that time. that's one question. another thing is, you mentioned preempti preemption. it's international law and all that. but the problem with that is not

only the incomplete capability of taking out all the nuclear arsenals in north korea, but more than that, how are you going to judge, you're going to need clear evidence that they are about to attack you with their nuclear weapons. so how are you going to get that? and how will you depend on it? another thing is, the consequences of a preemption in terms of damage to south korea and even to the united states, do you consider that also when you do it? lastly, i'm coming back to your point of needing for the next administration to start seeki seeking -- talking the talks. again, washington's atmosphere has been for the past 20 years, especially after what it

perceived the north korea breakdown away or unkept promises that they made in terms of denuclearzation. there is no atmosphere, no support in this town, either it comes in the media or politicians or general people, population, that would support the kind of dialogue that you and some of the people, it's really great to have someone like you keep engaged in this issue, very important, because people learn from your experience. and how is it going to turn around and, again, when you make a recommendation to the next administration, you're going to make a different set of recommendations depending on who gets elected tonight, one for clinton, one for trump?

what kind of barrier does that present? >> thank you. so on the first question, you were apparently shocked or stunned that when i was negotia with the north koreans in 1993 and '94 that i did not know that they were at the same time negotiating with islamabad or at least with aq khan for uranium enrichment, centrifuge, gas centrifuge technology. right at this moment, i still don't know that. in other words, what i'm telling you is there came a time when i did discover from our intelligence community that there was this ongoing exchange and transfer from islamabad to

the dprk. but that, for me, came -- and by though way, never gave up my security clearances. i kept them. so this is based even with full access. i did not know this until -- i think the safe thing for me to say is after 1996 and the agreed framework was 1994. not only did i not know about it, but i'm virtually certain neither did anybody else within the morn administration. know about it in 1994. if you were to tell me that you had evidence the contacts were happening then, i could easily believe you and say, well, we missed it. woou wouldn't be the first time that we've missed something.

on the deterrence question and preemption question, and how can we be confident that we knew -- that we know we're going to be attacked. how could there be the adequate basis for preemption? well, it's a very high bar, right? it's very hard, especially when you're talking about nuclear weapons. this is not a bunch of militia on your border and the question is, do you call in an air strike. this is the proposition here, the scenario we're talking about is that the -- a country, the dprk is going to launch a nuclear strike with missiles at the united states of america or its allies -- republic of korea and japan, and we are going to launch an attack on them in advance to decrease the damage that they would do by such a

strike. well, it's hard to get that information in advance. not impossible knowing something about the american intelligence community after over 20 years of being in the u.s. government. but it's hard. and we are capable of getting it wrong. and i have been part of getting it wrong more than once. so i don't say this easily, though. you know, when you take a job in the administration, and i've done this a number of times, raised my hand and took an old, you swear to protect the united states of america from enemies, foreign and domest ic. so you take an oath. i said a few minutes ooh not only would i support, i would expect, i would insist on preemption if we had that high confidence. if you don't, then it's not a

good idea. it occurs to me that larry's questioned whether we could actually succeed in a preemptive strike. your capability is aimed at reducing the enemy's capability. it doesn't mean that you completely are confident you're going to hit every mobile missile, every submarine they may have been able to deploy you may not. but if you think you're going to be struck, you can do serious damage. and unlike other people here, and i think there are people in this room who do not believe the american assurance once we are vulnerable to attack by the north koreans. the assurance that we give in our extended deterrent assurance in our alliance context to japan or the republic of korea. i spent over 21 years in the u.s. government, and i believe us.

i believe we will fulfill our alliance responsibilities. we know what's at risk here. remember, and i know joe at least remembers, when the chinese said you won't trade los angeles for taipei, well, yes, we will. i'm not enthusiastic about the prospect. i have family there. but that is what we sign up for. so those who would question this, i warn them to be careful and don't assume, don't ever assume that the united states will fail to fulfill its obligations. it would be a mistake, in my view. >> well, ladies and gentlemen, let's give ambassador gallucci a round of applause. [ applause ]

>> thank you so much. >> spelling is correct. and this is -- tennis. >> i do tennis. >> doesn't he look great? >> thank you. >> great session. thank you. >> the meeting adjourned.

this weekend on american history tv on c-span3 -- saturday evening at 7:00 eastern, from president lincoln's cottage in washington, d.c., we'll have a conversation with candice shy hoover about her book "lincoln's general's wives." four women who influenced the civil war for better and for worse. >> so you can see, too, that women have -- have a means of reinforcing either the best in their husbands or the worst. and that's what this study is. >> then at 10:00 on "reel america," the 1953 film "american frontier." >> they flash the word from the

field to the production office in williston and there to the central office in oklahoma. day and night, our little telephone board was lit up like a christmas tree. calls from new york, california, houston. bit by bit, we began to realize how big a thing this was. >> the film promoted the financial benefits for farmers of leasing land for oil exploration and was funded by the american petroleum institute. sunday at 11 clrks panelists discuss the life and legacy of novelist, journalist, photographer and social activist jack london and how his novel "the call of the wild" influenced generations of western novelists and writers. >> he always looked back to the natural land, to his ranch, to the beautiful scenery in california and elsewhere in the south pacific. to center himself and to find release and relief from the

rigors and the degradations of the cities. >> at 6:00 eastern on "american artifacts," we visit the military aviation museum. >> basically taught all the military aviateors, army, air corps and navy how to fly. many guys never even saw an airplane coming from the farms and anywhere you can think of. and the first airplane they saw was the boeing steerman. >> for our complete american history tv schedule go to c-span.org. sunday, december 4th obook tv's in depth, we're hosting a discussion on the december 1941 attack on pearl harbor on the eve of the 75th anniversary. on the program, steve twomy, author of "countdown to pearl harbor." eri hotta and craig nelson with his book "pearl harbor from

infamy to greatness" followed by an interview with donald stratton, pearl harbor survivor and co-author of "all the gallant men," an american sailor's firsthand account of pearl harbor. we're taking your phone calls, e-mails and tweets live. go to booktv.org for the complete weekend schedule. coming up on c-span3, prime minister's question time in the british house of commons. then representatives from the u.s. and china speak after the annual joint commission on commerce and trade meetings. after that, the supreme court oral argument in two cases of miami suing banks for discriminatory mortgages. later, a forum on the middle east and issues impacting palestinians. now this week's question time in the british house of commons. prime minister theresa may was questioned on funding for the