years, no one in nato, you would ask any expert the first time in article five, which is an attack against one is an attack against all, obligation was in support of the united states. that was unthought of, unheard of. and, yet, it was invoked and today nato forces, of which over a thousand nato forces have lost their lives in afghanistan, again, supporting u.s. activities and interests. then came 2014. and russian annexation of crimea and its incursion into eastern ukraine. this is where nato's founding principles, in 1949, became very clear in 2014 and continued to today. but this is not your grandfather's nato, this is a nato that's focusing on cyber security, on missile defense. on looking at hybrid activities, operations are in the gnc

helping to prevent accidents and see because of migration. it's got a very robust agenda materially. but i'll offer some notes of caution, i think, as mine did as well. this is not an easy alliance. it wasn't easy at 12. it sure is not easy at 28, soon to be 29. there are group dynamics in such a large alliance, that there is no shared threat assessment of perception. if you live on nato's eastern flame, you have one threat and that would be russia. if you live on nato's southern plank, you have one threat, that would be migration, isis, terrorism, the instability from the middle east. but miraculously, this large cumbersome alliance has found the balance and to be able to respond to the east, as well, as respond to the south. the problem with nato is that it's been so focused on 0

operational and the military, it's forgotten that it is a political military alliance. and my -- as we see a rise pop pallism and extreme that's as much as a threat to solidarity and unity as resurgent, russia or an attack by isis, that's what we have to start focusing on. it's shocking to me that after events on july 15 and turkey, there's been no discussion of the north atlantic council about the coup and what is happening and what is happening inside one of the most vibrant and vital members. it is surprising that at a very successful nato summit, president obama had to raise very uncomfortable questions about poland's constitutional

port. and what i find in the u.s., we talk about the united states and nato. no, it's a we. we are nato. the sailor, marine is a nato soldier sailor air force and marine. we have to start talking about alliance as it lives inside of us, as a british soldier, as nato soldier and et cetera. what i found so interesting in public support, i was involved at the state department during the 2002, 2004 nato enlargement

will be brought in seven countries of central and eastern europe we went across this country explaining why that was important to senate ratification of amended nato treaty. we need to do that every day. not just build out for when important ratification happened. we have to start talking to the american people about about why nato is important. its values, its role. because colleagues, it's role is as porcht today as it was in 1949 and mr. putin is reminding us of that every day. thank you. >> your seems relatively clean and easy compared to the middle east, relationships, quite frankly, we have had not the same kind of partnership that we've had in europe and same kind of partnership in asia. for half a millennial for 500 years and we have been the most

recent of them the u.s. came into the middle east after world war ii with a deep sense we'll do guaranteeing right. we would protect the region from communism. we eel do it in part, but encouraging the states to adopt more democratic modes of government. it's the anticommunism of 1950s, '60s, '70s and then it became the way we're fighting radicalism is by providing it. it's been this very difficult balance from a u.s. perspective of having guaranteed security to a place that doesn't do a good job promoting its own security. we have, for more than a half century, seen a governance component to that. it's always been an element of tension, because the fact very good relationships with virtually every government think about it. we have positive relationship

with every government obscuring any wrong. we're not protecting governance from each other, there are few bad actors in the region, for the most part we're trying to promote more security and in doing that we're getting into the domestic governance of all these countries and oftentimes not winning over the -- we're very popular among. it's a very strange situation we've gotten it into it. turkey is european. we have three different kind of alliance relationships in the middle east. on the one hand we have this relationship with israel, which is, in many ways, our closest

relationship but also most complicat complicated. we don't base in israel, we don't the extremist in its own situations israel hasn't take part of the regional alliances the u.s. has fallen. the u.s. supplies about 20, 25% of israel's defense budget, which for alliances, it's an interesting relationship. the u.s. is bound by law to ensure that israel obtains an edge over any potential enemy or collection of enemies in the region. so you could argue that this is a good relationship. you can argue that israel is milking the united states. i've heard both arguments, it seems to me this is a

complicated relationship which isn't replicated anywhere else in the world that is important part of u.s. develops alliance relationships in the middle east. we've have a lot of native allies in the middle east, most of them are distinguished by being very nature. really, you do have egypt, a big country but our major allies are not really major. major relationships are countries with whom we don't have formal alliance relationships military equipment, that 16 block 60s and

guided missiles. we have spent tens of billions of dollars. we have committed troops. we have done all kind of things, but it's not under the r ruberratic of the formal kind of relationships. . as commercial venture, this works. i mean, we sell tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment, our sales have kept help keep production lines for u.s. jets open, because we're not buying

so many jets ourselves but our gulf allies are. that keeps the other production lines open. but it also perpetuates a certain dependency that they rely on the united states to provide security. arguably, perpetuates conflict and people say, well all these states are armed to the tee, more u.s. weapons and troops and that the u.s., rather contributed to securities contributed to potential. new e kwily bree yum to be found

at all. they have tried to take what is principally set up bilateral relationships in the middle east and tried to make them more multi lateral. it it makes since to share all the information. they want a closed bilateral relationship with the united states. they don't want a broader multi lateral relationship where they think the united states will be less committed to them. i think that creates all kind of problems for the united states, for what should the u.s. commitment be, what does the u.s. cmitment need to be, how many u.s. troops in golf, is it what it was at the time we depose about the same.

is it what it was the -- i mean, what's the right level. and i think we have lost sight in the gulf state has lost sight on what the norm should be and that created a sense -- they can't avoid, giving them a sense of abandonment because we're diminishing the true presence. while president elect trump is coming and talking about the importance of burden ship, it's very unclear how burden sharing worked and i think it's especially complicated by what we've seen our partners and allies in the middle doing but they'll act in ways, using u.s. equipment, to which the u.s. is objected. how does the u.s. maintain leverage in this relationship.

do you want to maintain leverage, do you want to have responsibility? can you avoid having responsibility if the u.s. doesn't act itself, if u.s. does act itself, it's not in decision making world. if it doesn't act, then it is decisions of others in which the u.s. might not agree. -- i think we are going to have to find a way over the next 5 to 10 years to figure out what our new model relationship is going to be. the old model, it seems to me, is going to work but it's unclear what the new model is. is yemen new model. is yemen desirable new model. i think there are a whole series of questions about how we and our allies will try to come together to deal with the whole rave of challenges an threats posed by the government, which is going to make the issue of

alliances in the middle east one that will get more complicated not less than the years to come. >> thanks, john. >> thank you to andrew and mike for assembling this group. we are not only for, but we represent a range of political viewpoints. i'm sitting to the far left. i don't know that i represent the far left, but i think i represent the left of center, i aappreciate to be left on that. i was asked to speak to the military sh i think it hit the most important of those and many of the things i would talk about have been touched on, i'll try to hit a few points that i think either were overlooked or maybe require a foot stomp here and there. i think it's self et that they've had military alliances at the center of its military

strategi strategies. we have never fought truly alone since that period of time there is some debate, i think of late, as to whether that period of history has come to a close, maybe that was the aberration and the norm something that looks more to the united states. we will see. i will point out that the challenges of the world are actually getting more complicated and intraconnected and not less. it's no real well the future to reverse that and not argue in the future, by the way. it's really not able to manage the challenges we see, nuclear incorporation, terrorism, criminal network. cyber attacks. you cannot wall off literally a geographical location and stop the security threats we face. even if you thought we could, it's important to remember that

much of economy depends on u.s. companies and institutions being overseas. we tend to think of the u.s. as here and others as there, it turns out a lot of u.s. citizens are there and a lot of u.s. companies are there. . i think this is a truth that this administration that's coming in will learn, just like every other has learned even if they don't enjoy it, i point to andrew's mention, he clearly does not enjoy being reminded routinely of the importance of these partnerships and allies abroad. i think the real question is how will that reality dawn upon the next administration, will it come with low pain threshold or

high pain threshold on the way. let's talk a little bit about the roles of military allies. obviously, the person, the most well considered and thought through and the first to come to people's mind, is that our allies fight alongside us. afghanistan was an obvious example of that, post 9/11, article nine is declared first and last time in nato history. declared usual defense of the united states and it was undertaken vis-a-vis action inside afghanistan and that continues on. if you look at how we think about partners and allies fighting alongside. we might be talking about afghanistan, in terms of partners, allies we think often they're fighting with the united states and defense of south kor korea. we think about the east european countries fighting alongside us in defense of nato territory,

should that occur. but in addition to that very direct way in which we think about allies fighting next to us, we think about the roles in which they play in terms of providing capacity, just depth of capacity often, but not always we're talking about ground force capacity. there are specific capabilities with the u.s. is essentially hedged by virtue of having less investment, but it is relied on ally who is have stayed investments in certain areas. one obvious example bridge who nvrsed with u.s. largely divested itself. there are cases where we need allies and particular kind of and then, perhaps, quite obvious is the location aspect of the here and the there. if we want to be able to provide efficient way and effective way.

we have to, at times, be close enough to the place we want to fight to make that possible. that means those bases and places where they maintain relationships in order to be as effective as we can be in execution of our common defense. the last thing i'll point out, really under played as the intelligence aspect. i think many americans do not realize how dependent we are on intelligence that's provided by joint partners and by allies. and the u.s. really cannot, at least today, substitute for that huge batch global network that we're able to tap into. and pretty uniquely tap into, frankly, among nations. there's also the nontraditional spheres in which allies have become important in the military sense. certainly intelligence, as i said, is one that crosses over. but things like governance, the ability to help build out

long-term institutional capacity and countries, a place like jordan where we want to make sure that there is security over the long term, requires investment and not just military capability, but the institutions of government, that's true in a variety of other locations. a local knowledge, culture, language, where there's a unique advantage that a military ally can provide with u.s. justice experience aptitude. as i said, the world that we look in the future, but from the security initiative from bush administration on the high seas to the counter isil efforts today, we really need to have our allies to look at thing like, again, today, fighter clothes, nuclear the flow of

funds across borders and through cyber states, those sorts of security threats rely on alliances. and then, finally, probably under stated today, but i know true for all of my copanelists is the view that every administration that i know of has looked to allies as a source of legitimacy in the international environment, that can change. we can have united states no longer cares about the rule of law, but the fact that -- of the matter is historically, and i think it's hard to imagine the united states will not have at the center of its foreign picy and national security interest as it has had for the 20th century forward and the minimum. let's talk a little bit about adaptation and some examples i've had has been mentioned. i'll simply say we have a lot of work to do across security relationships formal alliances to less formal partnerships and

it is a tending the guard approach where we have a constant effort to undertake and the value is there to undertake them. i think sometimes americans live up to our reputation for impatience, we tend to think of others as being slower than we are and, i'll want to give you a couple of examples to reflect, we're not maybe so good, we tend to talk about others. so first of all, the u.s. government's approach to cyber security, i think many people don't see that today as a wild success. yet, when we think for instance, nato, where they quickly moved to adopting cyber security as inherent part of article five, there's a lot of work to do to figure out how to implement that. and another example might be the approach to the north korean nuclear challenge where the u.s. along with -- behind the terms

and less approached to nuclear and and then as john mentioned, we think about the missiles about iran, where reflective that the should have required the series of data -- and the u.s. doesn't like to share a lot of its missile data, again, there are places, which is small examples, where we should look inward as well as outward, because are problems, but they are not going to need the problems of the structure.

the last thing andrew asked me to talk a little bit about, the administration, which is a challenging topic. . i think there's a potential for little bit of back to the future for alliances, as we head secretary rums field. i was in the pentagon then and his approach to u.s. posture and allies was very much a power projection approach. i think that is possible that there will be a view that you can bring home assets and project from the u.s. as was pointed out. that will run smack into the ally of budget implications, if you want to be able to use that force. if you don't want to be able to use that force, you can put it and park in nebraska, you're okay. if you need to project it, say, into asia, if you need to

project it into eastern europe, and routinely do so, that is going to be a very costly approach. i think many allies inside u.s. understand the connection between the economy and defense, so how the u.s. increases defense spending, means how much deficit spends, i think will become very important and what, if anything, it ends up having to sacrifice in terms of other investment areas. . i do think, really quickly, my analogy has extreme limits in the sense of ct was not foremost in his mind and do think that is

the center for challenge, motivating incoming trump administration, how long it will stay, sort of, the core challenge that they look at, particularly isis, versus a broad array of challenges that they book part on how they encounter the environment, how the environment will encounter in terms of actions that others might take, others, early on in the administration. i do think they'll be heavy scrutiny, as there is in usual many administrations on combined activities and exercises. the extent to which and how well you can quantify and link the values of what we often will here in washington -- here in washington called the partnership capacity. i think those efforts will be scrutinized. i think there are big questions about defense trade policy. yes, you have a relatively protectionist administration, we think, coming in.

but as husband pointed out, foreign military sales have incredible important to the health of the u.s. industry, whose stocks are currently doing very well with trump president elect. and their ability to export effectively depends in part on the relationship coming back the other way, in terms of the trade back and forth, offsets in foreign countries, et cetera. and i think the last thing, i will say, as we open up this issue set, that if the next administration opens up this issue set of alliances and the terms, if you will, of the deal that we've gotten, i think there is a strong risk that others are already looking at how to make their end of the deal better and i think we should not assume that we would get the better end of a follow on renegotiation an terms of various alliances, so we should keep that in mind going forward and how that will effect the defense, both the

alliances and, again, the sector more generally in terms of capabilities and capacity that currently exist for us, i think is a big question. let me just end by saying, thursday we have our global security forum and there will be a panel there that's focused entirely on u.s. public opinion and a lead opinion, goes beyond alliances to just generally talk about foreign and security policy and there will be representatives there, if you will, all the way through sort of your standard csis bullish alliance folks like we are here. i hope you can join us online, if not in person for that. thanks. thanks for giving us texture and heading expert complexity and relay, i think, making problem more real. i'm going to open it up to the audience. before i do, i just want to come

back to something and that's the question of whether it is the west and if it's not the west, i guess, my question, perhaps started before generally the panel, it's not the west, what is kind of organizing construct, given some of the complexities that john talked about in the middle east. i getuess, you know, if you can wave your wand and change to the institutions in a particular region or more broadly, you know, what changes would you make? >> well, the west, as i said, is more complicated. now, if you look at the distribution, economic power among democracies, real democracies unlike, say, the early period that will include

korea, you have to include india, and at the end of the world war ii, australia and new zealand were the democracies on the other side of the pacific. today almost all the in the wesc are democratic. not without their flaws, but frankly, who are we right now to insist on perfection? that was a bipartisan statement, by the way. there's been declining american faith in our own democracy and polls for several years now. i think you also have to embrace a certain diversity, as i said. you don't want to define the global network of alliances and the core protectors of our way of life and our values, our rules, so rigidly that you lose the diversity. and american foreign policy, it's been a challenge for a long time. john foster dulles had a rigid approach. john f. kennedy said we need to make the world safe not only against communism, but for diversity. i think kennedy was probably

more right on that one. we want to make the world safe for countries to develop better norms and governance and democracy, but we want to be doing it in a way that our number one priority is making sure that states are not coerced from outside, and that sort of is the first priority. then we work on improving governments and democracy. so that would to me suggest a greater core fction for perhaps the g7, but i think more likely, a core group of like-minded states that care about global rules and norms in a broad sense, and that's a sort of nfc type of initiative. then i think on some of the challenges we face with respect to gray zone or hybrid warfare coercion, frankly, this is a discussion that japan, korea, nato, the gulf states should be having maybe through the pentagon and maybe in other ways, because although it's little green men in russia and

little blue ships in the western pacific, the questions we face are similar. and kath and i have a piece coming out on this in about a month to take a stab at it. so it's not a one size fits all. >> so, it's a great question, sort of what is our new organizing principle? we've been in search of one, to be honest with you. after 9/11, it was sort of the global war on terror, and that had very different manifestations. president obama sort of said don't do stupid stuff and, you know, stay out of things more than getting yourself involved in them and reaching out to adversaries to try to bring them back into a tent. so, this is sort of the question. so, what is the new organizing principle? and for me, it's sort of, so, who's going to enforce all of these international laws we think are great and we think are stabilizing and we think are important? but if you don't have an enforcement mechanism, if you don't have a military power with

the military will to enforce or to punish, whether that's sanctions or military action, that's the conundrum. we can sit back and watch and say, boy, that's a terrible thing to happen, but that's not in our interest, or we aren't affected by that, or we could wait until we are affected by that, until our national interests are. and i think that to me is sort of the overarching question that we really haven't had a lot of deep thinking about. we react to events, but we don't put forward that vision. truman doctrine was a containment, it was a vision about the world and how we would use it. that's sort of what we need. and i feel now from a leadership perspective, we're sort of less able to articulate it. and i would argue, mike, you know, the west is not a geographic location, it's an idea. it's an ideal. it's an aspiration. it's what we've been imperfectly trying to work at. but to me, it gets back to, you know what, international law is great, but when it is broken,

who gets to -- who's enforcing those rules? and if no one's interested in doing that, we have a very different organizing principle. >> thanks, heather. johnny, the ultimate doctrine? >> just very briefly, we don't have alliances in the middle east like we have in the pacific and europe. we have extra security, but we do it on behalf of our alliances in europe and asia. and if we don't play that role, that has consequences for how our allies see us and the role we play in the world. i had a very interesting discussion this morning with some scholars from china who are interested in what the future of u.s. policy is in the middle east. and one of the questions they ask is, does this mean that the u.s. wants china to play a greater role in security in the middle east? and i can't tell you what the trump administration's view on that's going to be, but i can tell you that it will be consequential for the united states as well as for the middle east, as well as for china.

>> i think that what i would say is that there are some constants thematically, and they are the ability to deal with fluidity across multiple types of challenges, probably multiple regions, and that includes the fluidity across different kinds of alliance relationships. i think you already see a lot of that, where we use the construct that's most useful to the most important players at the time, whether it's nato or the eu or u.s./japan alliance or trilateral or we talk sometimes about a quadrilateral. i think that's good. i think it's good to have that fluidity and flexibility because the challenges that we face will require it. i also think that they require it because that bilateral construct, that cold war-era construct is broken down to the point where there can be, you know, partnerships of

convenience on different issues at different times. that's not necessarily ideal for the u.s., but it's the reality. you can call it the rise of multipolarity or talk about it in terms of the loosening of the strictures on security that binds countries into one of two camps. now, that may be a temporary period of time to be followed by a new surity arrangement, but i do think we are in that fluid period, possibly waiting until, or leading to a new set of arrangements, either that are caused by u.s. decision-making along with that of others or by more longer-term demographic, technological and other trends. >> all right, thanks, kath. now i'd like to open it up to the audience. there's a question up the back there. >> thank you. i'm rafi danziger, an adviser to

apac. and since jon said turkey's in heather's lap, i'll ask heather the question. you said there was no consultation in nato about the effects to nato if there were consultation today. if you were there, what would you advise nato to do? easy question. >> oh, thank you, raffi. well, first and foremost, i think the turkish government should formally talk to its allies about what happened, and particularly its operations in syria as well as in iraq. this is a nato ally that has now entered a very complex operation of which another nato member is also involved. and so, i think,again, the alliance has worked itself into a habit of not talking about what the alliance and its members are thinking and doing. it's easier to talk about a military operation perhaps in

afghanistan to have a very honest and candid reflection about what is going on inside our own countries. so first and foremost, it would just be an example of doing a briefing, whether i'm sure many members around the north atlantic council table would not absolutely agree with the presentation that is offered, but it is to hear the government's formal position and to also understand what future is going to happen, particularly, i'm a little concerned about the future of the turkish general staff and particularly their general officers, 200 of whom are in jail right now, and what does that mean about military leadership moving forward within turkey. the changes that are undertaken right now within turkey require a very intense dialogue, military to military, but also politically. and i'm certainly hopeful that

we can achieve that. nato has -- it just dances around the issues. i would like them to focus on them square on and deal with them very forthrightly. i think it's also very important as well for other nato members, particularly as we are getting towards a very important election season within europe, french elections, german elections, to make sure members are fully aware of the implications and policy and european defense spending and nato operations and russia policy. that is also equally important. so, i think my message is nato has to focus as much internally as it does on external threats. >> thanks, heather. sorry, just down here at the front. >> thank you. japan native, u.s. citizen, member of the reagan foundations.

i have a hypothetical question, and that is -- how can i put it? now that new president is coming in, expecting asian countries to be more independent. that's what i hear. my question is, what if japan and south korea go nuclear? should we support it, or would we support it? that's a hypothetical question. >> sounds like one for you. >> i won't speak for myself when i say it's probably not in our interests for japan and korea to go nuclear. it's not in japan or korea's interests. but several speakers have made the point now that the north korean nuclear capability is going to put pressure on the credibility of our extended deterrent, of our nuclear umbrella. and it's one of the many areas

where, frankly, our alliance dialogue has not kept up with the realities we now face. and i think if we have a serious dialogue with seoul and tokyo about how we maintain the credibility of our extended deterrent -- one problem we've had is that too many people in washington forget that extended deterrents is defined by the deterred, but also the people who are being protected. and if our allies don't think it's credible, even if the reasons aren't good, we have to take that very, very seriously. and washington has often been too dismissive of korean or japanese concerns. so i think we need to have a serious dialogue. and i think if we do, 90% to 95%, the answer will be steps we can take to reinforce confidence in our extended deterrent. and even if either japan or korea started moving in the direction of nuclear weapons, it would go through the interim step of some kind of jointly controlled system, like we've

had in the past with germany or with britain, some kind of joint command and control or jointly combined, but even that i think is a very remote possibility, very remote possibility, if we're serious about dialogue with our allies. and this is a megatheme for all of us and this project. alliances are not about telling allies what to do. to make them work, we'll also have to listen. they're going to have demands on us. i think the administration will find that, and that allies are talking to each other about how to get more out of us, and that's a whole dimension to this dynamic that people haven't really thought about. >> just the other aspect is i think it's important to note the connections between asia and the middle east. when president obama talked about how deterring governments' use of chemical weapons would be a red line in syria and then decide not to go to war in syria, it was noted closely in asia as here's the demonstration case of what the united states does when a country violates a red line. i think if we're looking at what happens with north korea,

everybody in the middle east will look at that, what does that mean about iran? and everybody in asia will look at how the u.s. deals with iran to see how the u.s. will deal with north korea. there is a certain way in which our allies look to other u.s. alliance relationships to understand more about the nature of their own alliance relationships with the united states. i think there's a connection there which they certainly see and which we don't see, because mike's on a whole different floor with me. it's impossible to have a conversation! and there's not that -- >> we do watch you. >> up the back there, please. >> i am with united states of africa 2017 project task force. i'm from africa originally. i'm 73 years old, so i'm usually very sensitive when i hear people talking about what was created after world war ii, this american leadership in the world and the international liberal order, international order.

i always wonder, people who don't look like me and people in the rest of the world don't look like you, five up there and most in here. they do get their authority, their consent with the referendum that you should be doing this. i see this project as an attempt to continue the european domination of the world, and we are not going to have it. you'd better scrap it, okay? >> thank you for that view. i've got time i think for one more question. >> thank you. reporter from "voice of america." i have two related questions. i wonder whether the panelists would like to comment on the president-elect trump's peace through strength strategy and also the surge into asia. thank you. >> sorry, could you repeat the second part of the question?

[ inaudible ] >> japan/u.s. >> yeah, into asia. >> so, i can't resist the earlier question which i think is a fair question from the gentleman in the 2017 hat. one of the strengths we have is that this system of rules and norms broadly is now embraced in my part of the world, basically, from the south asian continent to hawaii. that's billions of people. it's contested, it's debated. is there anti-americanism in places? definitely. do we make mistakes and make people mad for a long time? definitely. i hear about it all the time. but as i was saying earlier, this may have been a british and an anglo american and then

nato-centered and then broadened, but it's a model that i think many parts of the world, certainly in my part of the world in asia, people prefer. and we've seen that clearly in opinion polls. but it does, i think, reinforce the point that we need to reflect, as i said, the diversity of alliances and actors and players who have a stake in the system and listen to them. on the peace through strength, it's a great line. i think reagan used it. probably eisenhower. probably john quincy adams. look, i mean, the odds are very high that the defense budget and the supplemental will go up $50 or $60 billion. one of my criticisms of the rebalance, which is the right strategy, is that it wasn't resourced enough, so i see some silver lining in that. there's going to potentially be some resources. i don't think the name pivot or rebalance will get much play. i think that's a fair bet. but the impulse for it was not a

purely democratic or purely obama administration impulse. it was built during the bush years and the clinton years and the george herbert walker bush years and reflects the fact that over half of americans say asia's the most important region to us, it's the fastest, most dynamic growing region of the world. so you know, governors care, state legislators care, companies care, small and medium-sized enterprises care. you know, soybean growers in ohio care. this thing just has momentum. the question is, sort of as heather said, how quickly a new administration sort out the priorities and strategy and the framing? look, every new administration since the cold war has declared its number one threat and its number one priority, and none of them have followed through on it. clinton was global challenges, but he mostly had to deal with geopolitics. bush was geopolitics and we had to deal with 9/11. obama was climate change and they had to deal with geopolitics. one thing you can bet on is

however this is framed in the campaign, therand strategy that evolves in six months or a year or two or three is going to be based around a different reality. and i think asia, i'm quite confident -- and i think our alliances are going to be part of that -- but we've hit some fundamental questions here that really merit addressing in terms of political support at home, but also how do we make our alliances more effective than they've been? >> well, thanks, mike. that's really brought u full circle, and it just remains to me to thank everyone very much for coming today. if you would like to follow the project, you can do that on our web page, on the csis website. and finally, i'd like you to join me, please in thanking admiral raoufead for his speech today, and also the panel.

so, i decided to spend much more time on the young grant. i spent a week at west point, trying to understand how this man could finish 21st out of 39 at west point, and therefore, sometimes viewed as these biographers as a historical intellectual lightweight. and yet, he said of himself, "i must apologize, i spent all my time reading novels." sunday night on "q&a," historian ronald c. white talks about the life and career of the 18th u.s. president in his latest book "american ulysses: a life of ulysses s. grant." >> in his presidency, it can be a meeting one day of african-american leaders in the white house. and he said to them, you know, he said i look forward to the day when you can ride on a railroad car, when you can eat in a restaurant, when you can do

so along with every other person, regardless of their race. that day must come. it took 90 years for that day to come. grant was the last american president to hold those kind of crews. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span's "q&a." sunday on book tv's "in depth," we're hosting a discussion on the december 1941 attack on pearl harbor on the eve of the 75th anniversary. on the program, steve toomey, author of "countdown to pearl harbor: the 12 days to the attack," eri hoda, author of "japan 1941: countdown to ifny" and craig nelson and "pearl harbor: from infamy to greatness," followed by an interview with paul stratton, pearl harbor survivor and author of "all the gallant men," a firsthand count of pearl harbor. we're taking your e-mails and tweets live. go to booktv.org for the

complete weekend schedule. a panel of legal analysts looked at constitutional issues facing a trump administration. topics included the use of executive orders, repealing federal regulations, relations with congress and judicial appointments. this event was hosted by the heritage foundation and the american enterprise institute. this is an hour and 15 minutes. >> good afternoon. it's my pleasure to welcome everyone to our douglas and sarah alison auditorium, to welcome those who are joining us on the heritage.org website, those who are also joining us on c-span tv. we remind everyone in house, if you'll be so kind to check that

mobile devices have been silenced or turned off as we prepare to begin. it is always appreciated. for those watching online, you're welcome to send questions or comments at any time. simply e-mail speak speaker @heritage.org. and we, of course, will post today's program on the heritage home page for everyone's future reference as well. it is also my privilege at this time to introduce the one gentleman at heritage who probably needs no introduction, and we are so pleased to have president jim demint to open this program, so please join me in welcoming senator jim demint. >> thank you, john! well, thank all of you for participating, all our panelists, those who are joining us via c-span. what a great event. i think it's the -- john malcolm, i commend you and ed meese. this preserve the constitution series that has gone on for several weeks now with great events, such as the event with

justice thomas, the opportunity to talk about our constitutional republic and the things that make this country great. it's really been a great series. today's the wrap-up, and i'm just kind of the warm-up act for that. i won't pretend to get into all of the intellectual discussions that our distinguished panelists will be talking about, but i did want to talk a little bit about a perspective that comes from someone who's actually been in the house, in the senate, with the purpose of applying constitution constitutional principles to law making. i frankly think that what just happened in this election may have preserved our constitutional republic. we know the intent of ms. clinton, and she talked a lot about it and what her belief was about a constitution. and we know donald trump has talked about the importance of the constitution and the list of supreme court justices that he released gave us at least some

positive indication that it was his intent to select justices that would actually carry out the original intent of the constitution. there are a lot of ways to talk about the constitution, and you'll hear a lot of that today. we look at what the constitution actually says, what it means, what it originally meant. that's an important discussion. you'll hear a lot today about, okay, how do you take those ideas, those principles, and apply them to lawmaking, to regulation, to civil society as a whole? but there's another layer of discussion that i hope james will get into somewhat today. it's why do we need a constitution at all? why do we need a thick set of principles, predetermined set of principles? this may seem so basic, and we

assume it, but i can tell you one of the big problems in our country today is that those who make the laws and many who vote on those who make the laws do not understand the need for a fixed set of principles that drives a rule of law nation. one of the great ironies of freedom is that you have to be willing to obey the rules in order to have it. and if we do not have a republic that is made up of a constituencies who willingly follow the laws, no laws can constrain them. but we also need lawmakers who understand the importance of operating from a thick set of principles, particularly in our case where the constitution is to limit what the federal government can do. i found a very disturbing situation in the house, in the senate, that our own oath of office when we come in is to protect and defend the

constitution. we don't make any oath to bring money back to our states, to do what's best for our states. all we do is commit to defend that constitution. yet, when you leave the room after that original oath, it is rarely mentioned again. if you stand up even in a republican conference, and we're talking about a bill, and you say, this is not constitutional. it violates the enumerated powers. you're going to get people look at you like you're crazy. yet, that shouldn't be, if our purpose of being there is to act and defend that constitution itself. so i hope these panelists, as they look at this new administration, will talk about how we can use this teachable moment for our new president trump and the country as a whole to remind them why this country is based on a constitution that's predetermined, that

allows us to willingly build a constitutional republic on those basic ideas and what it means, how we can apply it in a new administration, because i believe this is an opportunity of a lifetime for us to reassert the importance and the need of a constitution in this country. so, i challenge this panel. james, as you set about this tod tod today, is not just talk about how things should be, but the way things are and how we move from way things are in congress in america back to a constitutional republic that limits what the federal government can do. let me introduce james, who will be moderating today. james swanson is a legal scholar at the ed meese center at the heritage foundation. at the cato center, he was a senior fellow and founding editor in chief of the "cato supreme court review." he is the edgar award-winning author of the "the new york

times" best-seller "manhunt: the 12-day chase for lincoln's killer," which i understand is being developed into a nine-part television series. he's a graduate of the university of chicago and the ucla school of law. during the administration of president ronald reagan, he clerked on the u.s. court of appeals for the d.c. circuit, served as a legal adviser to the chairman of the u.s. international trade commission, and served in the office of legal counsel at the u.s. department of justice, where he worked on supreme court nominations, which we will desperately need now. we need you back there. thank you, james. thanks for moderating. thanks again for the panel. [ applause ] >> thank you, senator demint. your comments reminded me of something once said by chief justice john marshall, and he said, "the opinions of the united states supreme court should be understandable to the average educated america."

and how many hundreds of years ago did the court abandon that rule? perhaps they abandoned it at the outset. we have a great all-star panel today, and i'll begin by introducing them. michael mukasey, served as the 81st attorney general of the united states, the chief law enforcement officer of the nation, an appointee of president bush. he served from november 2007 to january 2009. and during that time, he oversaw domestic international law. and prior to that, he practiced law in new york for 20 years, and for 4 years he served as an assistant u.s. attorney. and from 1988 to 2006, he served as a district judge on the united states circuit court of appeals for new york, becoming chief judge in 2000. he is currently in private practice in new york city and received his ba from columbia and from yale law school. >> llb. >> llb from yale.

they have that rule. >> there are still some purists. >> yeah. and as we introduce the 81st attorney general, i want to make note that we have another attorney general here. we're honored by the presence of ed meese, ronald reagan's attorney general, the 75th attorney general of the united states. [ applause ] byron york is the chief political correspondent for "the washington examiner" and a fox news contributor. now finishing up coverage of the presidential race, he's written on nearly every aspect of the obama administration and the presidential campaigns of 2016, 2012, 2008, 2004 and 2000. is that enough? >> '96. >> he's author of "the vast left wing conspiracy" activism and the 2004 election. former white house correspondent for "the national review," his work has appeared in the "wall street journal," "the washington post," "atlantic monthly," "foreign affairs" and "the new

republic." he's a graduate of alabama and university of chicago and he now lives in washington, d.c. jonah goldberg is a fellow with the american ept prize instute and senior editor at "national review." a best-selling author, his nationally syndicated column appears regularly in over 100 newspapers across the united states. he's also a weekly columnist for "the l.a. times" and is a member of board of contributors to "usa today" and a fox news contributor and also on "fox all-stars" on "special report with bret baier." he's the founding editor of national review online and "atlantic monthly" magazine identified him as one of the top 50 political commentators in america. among his awards, he was named the robert novak journalist of the year of the conservative political action conference. he's written on politics, media and culture for a wide variety of leading publications and has appeared on numerous tv and radio programs, and he's the author two of "the new york times" best-sellers -- "the tyranny of cliches" and "liberal

fascism." john yoo is a professor of law at the university of california at berkeley and a visiting scholar at the american enterprise institute and the enemy of my law school, ucla. >> not at football, apparently. >> we had the better team. his most recent book is the edited volume "liberty's nemesis: the overexpansion of the state." his next book on military technologies and the future of war will be published in 2017. his other books include "point of attack," "taming globalizati globalization," "confronting terror crisis, command war by other means." he's published articles in america's top law journals and contributes regularly to "wall street journal," "the new york times," "post" and other newspapers. john has served in all branches of government. he was an official at the office of legal counsel at the u.s. department of justice. he served as general counsel of the u.s. senate judiciary

committee under chairman orrin hatch and was a law clerk to justice clarence thomas on the supreme court and judge silverman for the d.c. circuit court of appeals. john graduated from yale law school, where he was articles editor -- >> jd. [ laughter ] >> and from harvard with a degree in american history. and so, i'll pose this question, then i'll join the panel. we've decided beforehand, they're not going to make five-minute presentations. we're going to get right into the conversation. so just set the stage for that. does donald trump's victory represent a victory for the constitution? and what will his presidency mean for the rule of law with respect to federalism, civil rights, criminal justice, environmental law, labor law, foreign affairs and the president's war-making powers? and what about the first amendment and free speech and the power of the administrative and regulatory state?

what will trump's presidency mean for the commerce clause of the constitution, which a liberal interpretation causes a wellspring of much of the power of the federal government? and what will donald trump's presidency mean for the supreme court of the united states? and i'm going to join the panel now and we'll start with that. if hillary clinton had won this election, her supporters had hoped that her first appointment to the court would allow her to transform the court, by replacing justice scalia. she could have brought the conservative era to an end and sought to reverse several decisions most hated by the left, including heller, the second amendment case, citizens united, the free speech case. mr. trump's victory puts an end to those plans. but what can we expect? how will he fill the scalia vacancy?

how should he approach this? his first appointment will not be as transformational as hillary clinton's first appointment could have been. his appointment will now return the court to its traditional 5-4 split. but how might he transform the supreme court with additional appointments? can we expect liberal decisions to be overturned during the trump presidency? so i'll ask general mukasey to lead off. and let's talk about the supreme court and what might happen under president trump. >> well, i have one serious occupational defect that is shared by everybody here, which is i've never been a supreme court justice, so i can't really tell you how it is they're going to be deciding cases after the election of president trump. however, i think it's pretty clear that from the list of people that he has already

proffered, that we are going to have in the foreseeable future and perhaps even beyond a return to the notion of a constitution with a meaning, with a definite meaning, with the meaning that was put there originally. that's not going to be scrapped with the criticism that, well, the constitution is old and short, and therefore, you know, we have to get on with something else because society is much more complex now and the founders could never have envisioned the internet or jet planes or television or any of the other wonderful things that we have, and the real function of it, which was pointed out before, is to -- i mean, take it at its word -- it's a form of a more perfect union to establish justice and to ensure the common -- ensure kind of

tranquility so that people can exercise the freedom that they have to develop in their own way and according to their own lives. i think we're going to see much more emphasis on that than we will on a so-called living constitution that essentially means whatever it is that a justice says it means because the criticism of the constitution being old and short carries the day. >> jonah? were you surprised at how much the constitution and the issue of the court figured in the election? have we seen a presidential election like this before, where so many people were talking about the supreme court? >> i do think -- first of all, delighted to be here. [ laughter ] as an ai guy, i'm always shocked at how rarely i get beaten up in the bathroom here and all that kind of stuff. it never happens, but it's brief

and merciful. >> we can take care of that for you -- >> yeah, i'm going to push back a tiny bit. i absolutely agree that the supreme court in the sense of the scalia seat loomed very, very large, particularly on the right among people who were skeptical of trump or even harsher, as i was, that the court overpowered all other considerations for a lot of people. and i think whether that was always the intent of mitch mcconnell to sort of turn this into a referendum on a court appointment or not, it basically worked out that way. and so, in that sense, i think trump's election is great news and that i think that at the very least, he -- even i, who is very much a trump skeptic, am

confident that he will honor his first promise, to make the first appointment as a conservative. i think he has to do that. i think all hell would break loose if he didn't. but on the broader question of whether or not this begins -- it's absolutely true that hillary was a grave threat to the constitution, grave threat to the court. it is not the opposite -- the opposite is not necessarily true about donald trump. his commitment to the constitution rhetorically has been quite good as a matter of campaign boiler plate, but he also said there were 12 articles to the constitution, so i don't know that he is deeply enamored with the text. he also has views on things like eminent domain that a lot of people in this room i think are nervous about. he also has views on the first amendment that i think a lot of people in this room either are nervous about or should be nervous about. and so, i think that the question before, sort of among

conservatives and constitutionalists isn't so much of what's in donald trump's heart. that remains to be seen. what really matters is surrounding him and creating the incentive structure whereby the information flow, the political decision-making process all point him in the right direction. and this brings up sort of a larger point that senator demint was getting at. i agree with him entirely. it is infuriating to me -- and maybe the lawyers here -- you know, i am not a lawyer for reasons out of deference to my internal soul. but it infuriates me that we've come to the point where we think the supreme court is the only guardian of the constitution. it is a guardian of the constitution. and in certain formalistic situations, it is the last guardian of the constitution. but anyone who swears an oath to uphold the constitution is a guardian of the constitution. and the citizens from whom the

constitution derives its authority are guardians of the constitution. and we've gotten to this place where we just basically say anything goes, unless the supreme court, le a hockey goalie, stopped it. and that is something that i think the conservative movement, places like heritage foundation, magazines like "national review" do a much better job at in terms of creating the incentive structure for politicians, right? the whole point of the conservative movement is not just to elect politicians, it is to mov the popular understanding of the issues so that it is in politicians' interests to do the right thing. and i think that is the first task for donald trump, for the conservative movement, is to make sure that the arguments that he's hearing and the incentives he has push him in the right direction. i certainly think he's open to it and i certainly think he's made promises that commit him to it. >> byron, can you speak to that? >> first of all, i don't think this is something that donald

trump has thought about a whole lot. it was not a big deal in his life. the only principle i think in the constitution that he really delved into was eminent domain because it played into his role as a real estate developer every now and then. but i think the roots of his approach to this go back to the early days of the republican primary, where he's trying to consolidate the support of conservatives. and he's got ted cruz, who's argued a bunch of cases before the supreme court, he's got governors, he's got a lot of people who have a lot of experience in government and the law running against him, and trump is extremely sensitive to the reaction of audiences. he loves the rallies. he really notices, do they go for this, do they not go for this? everybody sat on their hands when i talked about this, they went crazy when i talked about that. he saw, i think, the interest that conservatives in a

republican primary electorate, not the general election, the republican primary, had in the supreme court. and he saw the questions that conservative organizations, publications like "national review" had about him. so, the way that he consolidated support was to actually release this list of justices, or of judges that he said i'm going to appoint one of these people to the supreme court. and it was uniformly well received, because it was a great list. and the objection of the never trumpers was, yeah, it's a great list, but he might not actually do this. i don't trust him to do it. the other thing to remember about trump and him not really thinking about these issues through is perhaps his key supporter is senator jeff sessions. jeff sessions being the first senator who comes out in support of trump, kind of legitimizes the campaign, almost.

sessions has one of the great living well is best revenge stories ever, because as a u.s. attorney in alabama, he was appointed, or nominated to a u.s. district court position. and thanks to the kindness of joe biden and ted kennedy, he is turned down by the senate, who accuse him of being a racist, goes back to alabama, gets elected to the senate and takes his seat on the judiciary committee alongside ted kennedy and joe biden. so he is advising trump, and trump also hired steven miller, a top aide of jeff sessions, jeff sessions' chief of staff, rick dearborn, has done a lot of work, so the sessions office and sort of its approach to nominating judges kind of moves into the trump campaign. so, i think all of that is probably very good news for conservatives who want to see

him go in the right direction, not just for the supreme court but for all of those circuit court nominations that make a huge difference. >> john, can you talk about this? >> yeah. first i want to also thank you and senator demint for putting this panel together and inviting me. i'm surprised there's so many people here because i thought everyone at heritage was working over at the transition headquarters already. in fact, there's a big difference. you know, when i got to the airport, i asked the taxicab driver to take me to trump transition headquarters, and he dropped me off here instead. [ laughter ] it's also very nice to participate in a panel for a center named after general meese. i think along with general mukasey, one of the most consequential attorney generals we've had in the last 50 years. and it goes to jonah's point and to byron's point, which is, that's not just supreme court justices who are important, it's also who the attorney general

is, how the trump administration is going to interpret and enforce federal law in some ways is going to have much more immediate importance about the constitution than who he appoints to the supreme court. if you remember general meese when he was attorney general gave a famous speech at tulane law school where he called for a jurisprudence of original intent, which was seen as a radical concept back in the late '80s. i did a study a few years ago to try to gueimate the effects of this speech. and so, after general meese gave his speech, although there was wide criticism from my colleagues in the academy and their colleagues in journalism -- i don't know if they want to claim their colleagues are in journalism. and citations to the federalist papers at the supreme court and supreme court opinions in the following five years went up 500% than before. that is in my mind would be just as consequential and the impact on the supreme court as actually being nominated there. so i wanted to recognize general meese for that, and i think that's what we can hope for from

the trump administration is that -- yeah. [ applause ] the supreme court nominee is important. and i actually -- the proposal i had was that if trump really wanted to shore up his support amongst conservative constitutionalists and the conservative party, if i were him, i would nominate a supreme court -- i would pick a supreme court nominee now before he takes office and say, you know, this -- and if i were him, i would pick someone who would be easily confirmed. so, i agree with byron. i know a lot of the judges who are on that list, the first 10, then the 20, they would all be great justices. it shows what a deep bench, actually, and how much george w. bush cared and reagan and bush cared, seating the bench with all these great lower court judges. but if he were i think paying attention to politics, he would probably want to nominate a senator, because only one senator i think has ever been turned down for confirmation for any job, which was john tower. if he wanted to appoint senator mike lee, for example, to the

supreme court now, i would imagine he would get readily confirmed. it wouldn't lose a republican seat in the senate, and he could keep his promise, essentially, to the conservative wing of the republican party. but the important thing is, also as you said, this is not going to change anything. that's just going to keep the status quo on the supreme court, you rightly said, jim. the 5-4 decisions that conservatives have been losing on gay marriage, abortion, obamacare, go on and on, will still be there because of justice kennedy providing the fifth vote with the liberals. so, what you have to also look at is who does president trump pick to be attorney general, white house counsel, the deputy white house counsel is in charge of judicial selection. because the real important fight is going to be when the next justice retires. and if you look at the age ranges, i'm a lawyer, not an insurance actuarial scientist, but if you look at the ages, justice ginsburg i think is 82, justice kennedy is 80, justice

briar's 78. you have to project out, how old are they going to be in four years, because that's how long they'll be on the court. is justice ginsburg going to stay to 86? justice kennedy to 84, 82? i don't think so. i think president trump will certainly have another pick, and that one will be the big fight. and so, if you care about -- i you're a conservative, you care about the constitution, you want to see who president trump's going to put into place to pick that seat. and there we don't know. >> john, that leads to an interesting question about the next one, after the scalia seat. recently, a "new york times" op ed accused conservatives of plotting what it called a coup against the supreme court, by scheming to obstruct all nominations that president clinton would have made to the supreme court. now, can we expect democratic senators to attempt the same sort of coup to attempt to block all supreme court nominations by president trump? and if that's attempted, what

will senate republicans do about it? judge mukasey, could you start with that? >> sure. i don't -- the democrats retained the filibuster for supreme court nominees, i think against just that possibility. but although it is certainly not unprecedented for a nominee not to be voted on when there is a change of administrations coming up, it is unusual, i think to the point of being unprecedented, for them to try to block any confirmation. and i think that would send an even -- i mean, that's a political loser from their standpoint, and i don't think they would do it. >> john? >> that's the short answer. >> if you were president trump or a new attorney general, i think you would hope that the democrats try to filibuster their appointment. and i think if you're -- look,

just to make a -- we also should just recognize that -- and i think the political journalists have even more comments about this. i think senator mcconnell pulled off one of the great political maneuvers of recent time in senate by not confirming merrick garland. that was -- i think at the time a lot of people thought this was a very low probability success of working out, and instead, he has really preserved the possibility, even, for us to have this discussion. >> but john, i think you have to take into account democratic anger over this, because the judicial wars since bourke have had kind of a ratcheting up effect. so you kill five of ours, we're going to kill ten of yours. and you've got this situation where democrats felt that republicans had just insulted the president, essentially. scalia dies in february, i think, and the seat is still open. so i would not be surprised if

democrats were inclined to try to block something, at least for some period of time, to get back at this, because if there's one thing that's true about the united states senate, it's what goes around comes around. >> one thing i would add -- i like your point about how senators tend to get confirmed. where i thought you were going to go is appointing ted cruz to the supreme court, which, first of all, would have an err of mag nimt magnanimity, the whole his father killing kennedy stuff. >> even an assassin's kid can get to the supreme court. [ laughter ] >> it would be an implied pardon, right? but there is also the fact that i think not only do senators get good treatment in the senate, but there are a lot of senators who would like to get ted cruz out of the senate and sort of on the same principle that the only reason why teddy roosevelt became vice president is that the new york political machines just wanted him out of new york. you could see how democrats will

be like, well, on the one hand, he's healthy and he's conservative like scalia. on the other hand, i won't see him in the cafeteria anymore. problem is, i don't think ted cruz wants it. mike lee might, and he would be great. >> i think you're also asking about the filibuster. i think the democrats would probably think about invoking the filibuster, which is still left for supreme court nominees. if i were a republican senator, i would say we should overrule the filibuster for supreme court nominees for the same number of years that democrats overruled the filibuster for judicial appointments, in the exact same amount of time. because otherwise, as you say, it's a ratcheting up effect. you'll never stop this derogation of the rules of the senate, and you have to restore order. the way to restore the filibuster is for both sides to show what would happen if it's not followed. and so -- but the other point -- already the filibuster doesn't apply to the lower court appointees, so trump will still be able to fill the bench with

not just the supreme court nominee, but he'll have other -- a lot of other people, too, who are also held, but the democrats in the senate weren't making a big stink about it. >> and the republicans will not want to go back on that and give democrats the power to stop their circuit court nominations. >> well, john, let me ask you this, and general mukasey, too. the filibuster's not part of the constitution. it's just a senate rule. and, you know, when the founders meant for there to be a supermajority to make something happen, pass a treaty, that sort of thing, they specified a supermajority. the rules of a nomination or confirmation are simple majority vote. so, is one question, can a minority of the senate prevent a simple majority from consenting to a judicial nomination? >> sure they can, and

particularly given the agenda that the courts have set for themselves with the complicity, the active complicity of the legislature, i think it's important to preserve that. you know, timewise, the confirmation hearings lasted less than an hour. that was a long time ago, to be sure, but i mean, it was considered -- in fact, it was considered insulting to put substantive questions to a nominee. all of that ended when the supreme court, again with the active cooperation of the legislature, started expanding the range of cases and the nature of cases that it would take, to the point where political issues, instead of being resolved within the legislature through compromise and back and forth were handed off to the courts. and the courts of course were, sure, bring us your biggest problems. we sit here to solve everybody's problems, you know.

no case too big or too small. in by 9:00, out by 5:00. and that trend has continued virtually uninterrupted. so, given that and given the fact that it's going to be a long time before we pay her back, the scope of cases and the nature of cases that the supreme court takes, it is going to matter who gets appointed. and as long as it matters who gets appointed, that decision given how long they sit has to be one that comes only after overcoming great obstacles, if necessary. >> john or anyone else? >> just a point i would make about the filibuster. it is not in the constitution. it's just up to the senate and senate rules, but what it represents and why it's important, i think, for conservatives to still support it, is that it's a symbol of the way federalism is hard-wired into the constitution. already the senate does not represent the population. it represents -- you know, it's

not proportional representation. each state has the same two votes. the filibuster in a way is a symbol of that. it's even taking it a little bit farther. and i think it's important to recognize that donald trump would not be president, or not going to become president, if it were not for federalism. the other place you see this is the electoral college, right? hillary clinton's going to win the popular vote. the only reason donald trump is president is because of the framers' original design. the electoral college gives states more of a say over the selection of the president than we would if we just had a simple majoritarian election simultaneously throughout the country in a plebiscite. and it's been the liberal project for over 100 years to get rid of everything in the constitution that limits direct democracy. so they've been against filibusters, they've attacked the senate, they're attacking the electoral college. so i think conservatives -- the original design of the constitution was that it was important not to have a direct democracy. we have a republican form of government to slow down the ability of the government to act rashly.

so, i think we should be -- even though it may hurt us temporarily, picking a supreme court nominee or lower court nominees or moving through legislation, i think conservatives should be in favor of the checks on democracy, like the fill busters. i would return it back to lower court nominees and legislation after the same number of years that the democrats waived the filibuster rule. >> guys, anything more on that? >> i would just -- i would disagree -- i'm sure john doesn't disagree with me, but i would frame it a little differently. in terms of electoral issues, the progressives have always wanted more direct democracy, but that's a subset of their real approach to government, which is always to go wherever -- carry the ball wherever the field is open. so when congress was the best vehicle for achieving progressive ends, they emphasized -- woodrow wilson talked about how congress was going to be important, then when we realized he was going to be president, all of a sudden the presidency. and if you look -- the only

reason i bring it up is because if you look at things which are at stake in all of this, like the administrative state, there is nothing small "d" democratic about the administrative state. it is unaccountable, unconstitutional government. it violates the fundamental principle that defines conservatism, which is opposition to arbitrary power, and it's completely unaccountable. and progressives have no problem building that up. their relationship to direct democracy is entirely an argument about expediency and acquisition of power. and if direct democracy started working against them, they would stop being in favor of direct democracy. >> the last thing on this is that the judicial issue, the judges issue for trump politically brings the team together, just as it did back in the primaries, i was talking about earlier. now, you know, not every member of the house, not every member of the senate was that

enthusiastic about donald trump, but when it turns into a fight with a judge, with a nominee, the team is going to be on board. and obviously, the house doesn't have a role in that, but they're going to be rooting for it as well. so this is one area -- you know, obviously, trump has said lots of things that just kind of blew up conservative orthodoxy on things like trade or immigration or foreign entanglements. this is going to be one area where the team is really together. and that will be very useful for trump. >> well, let's move on from the courts to a couple other issues. presidential power and the regulatory state. during the campaign, donald trump criticized president obama for abusing his executive authority and ruling by fiat, often, through executive orders. can we expect president trump to overturn many of obama's executive orders on his first day in office? and if he does, does that suggest he will be more sensitive and self-restrained about using that power of

presidential power? >> those words are used all the time about him. [ laughter ] and as a corollary to that, it's been said that congress on bended knee has surrendered to excessive presidential authority. do you think congress, not as opposition to trump or rising up against trump -- do you think it's possible that congress might with a new president reassert its equal role in our divided government, not to thwart trump, to simply to say, we're back, we've been suppressed for eight years, and congress is important as the president? so first, executive authority of the president and what will trump do. and do you think congress is going to take this as an opportunity to reassert its role in government? >> well, i -- i mean, it's -- everybody who is going to be around the president will have a list of executive orders.

in fact, i'm sure they're going, part of what the transition team is doing now is going through the presidential executive orders and drawing up a list of those that will be written off on day one, and it's going to be a long list. that said, i don't have any evidence, and i don't know of any evidence -- i'd love to hear about some from people who have covered this -- that donald trump just thought on this issue, that is the issue of presidential power, the issues that are presented by the administrative state, at all. and so, it's going to depend largely on who the white house counsel is, who the attorney general is, who essentially surrounds him. for what we can expect later on. but as far as day one, the executive orders, those are going. i think that's fairly obvious. >> john?

>> i agree with what judge mukasey said. my proposal would be actually to reverse the presumption and not go through the list of executive orders to see which ones to remove. the president could simply issue an order repealing all executive orders from january 1st 2009, and then go through them and see which ones you might keep. i think he could go even farther and say that the president could also say all regulations enacted by the federal agencies since january 1st, 2009, are no longer to be enforced, and we will return all regulations to the state they were in at the end of the bush administration, and then we'll go back and see if there are any we want to keep. now, there will be a lot of people who would be upset about this and say, oh, the president's not enforcing the law, he's overstepping his bounds, but i think president trump has to use executive power in the same amount that president obama did just to restore us back to the proper path. so, the way i think about this is, you know, if you've got someone who's driving and he takes you ten miles and drives

you into a ditch, you still need a car to get back on to the road. so i have no problems with a president wanting to use executive power just to reverse the harm of the last eight years. so, one thing he could do that i think would be okay would be -- which i think a president can do under his executive powers, terminate the iran agreement on the first day of office. president obama made a serious mistake by not seeking congressional consent for the iranian agreement. in fact, the majority of the house and senate were against the iran agreement, so president trump can say he's actually doing what congress wanted. and since it's a sole executive agreement, the president can terminate it. i think he can also say i'm restoring immigration enforcement back to the normal amounts. he doesn't need to make a change from what it used to be. he just says i'm repealing the dapa dapa orders and restoring immigration enforcement to their normal priorities, which was focused on removing felons. and then i think he should restore normal criminal law enforcement. judge mukasey and i have this wild idea that he should pardon

hillary clinton from crimes that would put the past behind us but also make clear we think she committed crimes. >> interesting. if he did pardon her, she would have to accept the pardon for it to be effective. there was a go-round about that at the time that president ford pardoned president nixon. and i'm deadly serious about that. she would have to essentially acknowledge that crimes were committed. maybe if enough detail were recited in the pardon, what she was being pardoned for, it would save us all a lot of time and trouble that we would have to take to explore precisely what went on there. >> jonah or byron, let's hear from you on that. >> on the pardoning bit or -- >> on any of it. >> i think that on the pardon bit, you know, one of the promises donald trump made -- i don't think it's one that he actually has to stick to -- was that he's going to do a special prosecutor for hillary clinton.

it depends really on how bad you think the crimes that hillary clinton committed actually were and how implicated in them barack obama is. but there is a scenario in which you could imagine that that threat will force obama into pardoning hillary clinton so that we can move on, which has the same net effect of, you know, the pardon is in effect a brand, right? it's not quite walking through king's landing saying "shame, shame," but it's -- sorry. [ laughter ] "game of thrones" reference. but it would be a problem for you. politically, it would be kind of brilliant. in terms of the previous part about trump and the idea of his commitment to these issues. again, look, i mean, i am entirely open to giving donald trump the benefit of the doubt. the new trump thing is over by definition.

[ laughter ] >> i don't know if it's over for him, though. >> true. tell my wife i love her if i suddenly disappear. but the issue is, you've got to surround the guy with the right personnel, and most of these problems get solved that way. i still think -- look, i know this is a kumbaya moment for the right, but i was deeply, deeply troubled during the primaries, during that debate, when after months of donald trump talking about water boarding and worse, much worse, and not for interrogation purposes, just as a sort of, we're going to punish these guys because they're cutting off heads, so we're going to do really bad things too, which i did not think was an act of statesmanship on donald trump's part. when confronted about the fact that he would be asking his military to commit war crimes that have no statute of limitations, his instinctive response was to say, oh, they'll

follow my orders, and i do not like that instinct. i do not trust that instinct. and this gets us back to where i started. we're all guardians of the constitution. i do not like it when george w. bush said he thought parts of mccain feingold were unconstitutional but he signed that anyway. i thought that was a violation of his oath. he said the supreme court will work it out. and it really depends which donald trump shows up, but at some point, this is a guy who trusts his judgment and his instincts over everything else, and his commitment to constitutional norms, i think the most generous i'm willing to say is that they are notional. and that is going to require some strong will from people around him to stand up for principles that they believe in, even when the commander in chief is telling them something else. i hope it doesn't come to that, but i think a lot of the other stuff can be fixed through the bureaucracy, the staff. donald trump has told people he

won't be a hands-on, day-to-day guy. he's going to delegate, build a team. that's all great. but there's going to come a time when his commitment to these things is going to be tested, and it's going to require men and women of goodwill to do the right thing, and how that plays out, i don't know, but i think it's going to happen and we should be on guard for it. >> well, the nature of campaigning for president is not really consistent with the idea of limited executives, because the candidate gets up, says i'm going to do all this stuff. we're going to do this, this and this. and there's usually not talk about, if congress lets us do this, and if i can get over a filibuster in the senate and blah, blah, blah. with trump, that's a particular -- another issue, because he has actually been an executive in the business sense of executive. and there was a group of liberal billionaires who got together during the bush years to try to

create a new liberal group to funnel money into fighting bush. and they fired the executive director, the newly hired executive director, because she told a billionaire joke at their first meeting.