www.c-span.org/citiestour. all weekend every weekend on c-span3. this year marks the 75th anniversary of japan's 1941 attack on pearl harbor. thehotta, a fellow of graduate center for policy studies in tokyo talks about her countdown to941, infamy. it talks about the past and the japanese perspective. speaking with historian ian buruma, she talks about events that the to the attack and the political landscape that theuded two authorities, emperor and the civilian government. this was recorded in 2013 at the carnegie council for ethics and affairs in new york city. it is about 50 minutes. ian buruma: good evening, thank

you very much for coming. it is always somewhat artificial, two people that know each other well. to do an interview in public like this. why should i ask a question i can ask her over the breakfast table? on the other hand, one doesn't really normally discuss the japanese naval strategy in over 1941 the breakfast table. so it's as good as any opportunity as any to discuss this a little bit further. and one of the things that i find most interesting about the book, and revealing and possibly for many readers in this country also, is that it tackles a myth about pearl harbor. and one of the myths is, which was, of course, very much encouraged in the immediate postwar period, not only the japanese themselves but also by

the american administration, is that japan had been hijacked by by the militarists, by the military, and the civilians really were not to blame for what happened. it was a kind of militarist cue, -- coup, and the middle -- the japanese people and the emperor himself were really sort of duped by the militarist embarking on this reckless adventure. what would you say to that particular myth? eri hotta: that it was a very easy and convenient myth. because it disengaged quite a few people who were actually responsible in reality, and of course for the japanese nation as well, to think that the war could have been averted was too painful a question to ask, i think. and that was sort of self-perpetuating myth that the

japanese themselves to very easily to after the war after having lost so much. ian buruma: in your book, you also describe why it's wrong to think of it in term of the civilians being duped. because some of the civilians politicians, not least the prime minister so much of the time, the prince, was actually to a large extent responsible for what happened, even though he saw it would lead to a disaster. can you say something about that? eri hotta: right. the fact that the decision-making responsibility , was shared between civilians and the military is hard to sort of imagine. because people just take it for granted that the military took over. but it was not the the case. because the leaders actually met over 70 times in the one year up to the pacific war and discussed

the alternatives and different steps to be taken, and those conferences were called liaison conferences. and that was not for anything that was called because it was function was to civilian and military strategies and policies and create sort of a unified voice. so civilian politicians can't really say they didn't really have any say. because they did have equal say in those conferences. ian buruma: so they got along with it even though they had a great misgiving. eri hotta: they gradually diluted themselves into thinking, we can say this much, but then some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen, and it will sort of nullified all of the militaristic steps they were taking. when all of this is going on,

the military leaders had to put up a unified front to preserve their face and appease young officers who were strategizing and thinking always about expanding the field of influence. it was also dangerous with rivalry, the navy and the army were always fighting with each other for a bigger budget. army think the navy and within themselves were very much divided within clicks and sympathies. you can't talk about the military voice as one and militaristic, so that is another myth. ian buruma: which leads me to say, there is always tremendous content -- consent. on the one hand, on the surface, there's consensus. but actually behind the scenes , there was tremendous rivalry and his services -- and differences. eri hotta: it was power

bargaining. ian buruma: i am trying to think of it, it escapes me now. there's a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middle-ranking people who were more radical. japanese] [speaking ian buruma: yes. could you explain? eri hotta: i think the translation would be something like a retainers taking on the load. does that make sense? ian buruma: ok. relatively the lord complete authority and principle but actually weak and sort of driven in to a more radical position by hot heads who were in the middle ranks. eri hotta: it justifies our power as well by indicting we can need leaders as -- weak kneeded leaders as ineffective basically. so i think the young leaders, for the first half of the 1930's 36, theyruary 1963 --

were really driven by a desire to renovate the japanese policy and also to strengthen the imperial system and so on. everything was done in the name of salvaging the emperor, if influences that japan under -- put japan under tremendous economic strain and economic considerations cannot be separated in this period. like any other part of the world. so i think there were hot-blooded soldiers and officers who were ready to perceive -- to mobilize, so it was perceived by the leaders who had to be appeased. there was also a state of fear about what could happen to them as well. ian buruma: it is also again myth ofdestroys another japan as a sort of authoritarian society, which on one hand has

some truth. on the other hand the , authorities were often not really in control. coupentioned the 1936 which may not be immediately clear to everybody. it all, a number of ranking officers often from the was particularly hit by depression, and that is where people are often really hungry and the daughters had to be sold into prostitution and that sort of thing. the military officers at the time, they were not unique in this in the world, believed the people responsible for this plight were the capitalists, the bankers, the elite, the establishment. and they wanted to, they were radicals of the right. they wanted to stage a coup to make the emperor into a kind of dictator which he wasn't, and set up a fascist state.

even though a lot of people, the admirals and joe -- and so on pleased them and admired the sincerity and so one, for the more conservative members of the establishment including the imperial household, i am told they went too far. , they didn't disagree with the aims necessarily, but didn't like the means. and so this was a clear case of young people in the middle ranks driving the people in authority into positions they may not have wanted to be. eri hotta: right. i think the fact that the emperor was so affected by the experience of the failed coup which nearly toppled him is important too. hisuse that affected passiveness and perhaps diffidence in putting his foot down in 1941.

he talks about it after the war that he thought that if he had tried to veto the war decision, he might be -- japan would have 1936, i'etat, which in didn't say anything. factt also speaks for the that he thought this was possible, which is in the constitution as clear as he claims. ian buruma: the idea would have been, they could have made a case if he was badly advised, they would have replaced him with his -- eri hotta: one of the brothers. ian buruma: younger brother who was much more radical. eri hotta: yes, he was popular. he was an army officer. ian buruma: what about the other myth, which is the japanese people were duped by the militarists is the sort of

mainstream myth. the right-wing nationalist, which is still here, is that japan was trapped, sort of forced in to attacking pearl harbor. they were surrounded by western colonial powers. the a, b, c, d, my country, we're involved in this. america, britain -- eri hotta: china. ian buruma: china and the netherlands. japan asserts its right to defend its interests in east asia, and that included spreading into china and so on, and they were surrounded by western powers who did not want japan to have its moment in the sun. they were drifting with economic boycotts and that sort of thing. they had no sort of choice. they had to do it. you can also talk about that. the americans -- this is the myth again -- the americans forced their hand by the famous [indiscernible] abc, thereright, the

is sort of a classic explanation for many of the more origins there. i think heiser germany, they complained about encirclement, and that was very much on the japanese mind as well. the fact that the wartime government made use of that the prime minister gave a speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan was reluctant. eri hotta: -- ian buruma: the prime minister. eri hotta: he was. japan entered the war. reluctantly despite all the nation's past efforts of trying to achieve peace in east asia. it went hand-in-hand with this larger regional asian peace, the cause of the japanese taken sort of by in the end, and in effect, abused, but it was quite useful at the time as well. and useful to make them believe themselves they were fight

fighting -- they were fighting for the right cause too. i think the marriage was quite strong. who would really want to die for the wrong cause? you want to believe that, and it you are ordinary citizens did not have much access to real information about the china role or about japanese imperialism, i don't think it's hard to imagine how appealing that narrative might have been. ian buruma: it had a kernel of truth too of course. it's true, unlike nazi germany, japan was fighting a war against other imperial powers. and george kennedy, the one person who actually criticized the u.s. diplomacy in retrospect and said they should have recognized japanese interests more than they did, and you could -- the whole problem stems from the fact since the middle

of the 19th century, japan was rather forced to be open up by american business people. the japanese saw it as their only chance to survive as an independent nation and not be colonized by western powers. that meant having their own empire, but it was late in the game. understand sort of why it was felt that they had their right to an empire just as the europeans had their empire. it,hotta: i can understand it is understandable, but it is not an excuse either. and had relative peace democratic experiment in the 1930's. this wholehearted attraction to liberal internationalism, the league of nations, which japanese more than anybody took seriously, i think it is a shame it had to go down that way.

and of course, in understanding the broader frame of mind, it is useful to look at racism, colonial imperialism. those are not triggering postwar or even medium-term causes of war. the causes for the war had more to do with japanese ambitions in east asia, rivalries for the control of china with, you know, competing against the united states and the russians as well. and the idea that, the fact that they had been quite lucky in the past war probably affected the military mindset. perhaps this reckless war too could somehow be won. and japan's past wars had been applauded by the west. in fact, teddy roosevelt, when

the japanese into the russians, talked about the plucky japanese, and so did the british. it could be seen as a kind of, not a dress rehearsal, because it was the real thing. it was a kind of pearl harbor at that time, and it succeeded admirably. eri hotta: the americans said that. ian buruma: the americans better than the russians. eri hotta: the fact that operation or barroso was a -- barbara rosa was a surprise attack, but the freak nature, stealth nature of the attack had to do with the fact that it was so dramatic and the fact that the america was attacked on its soil, very heavily japanese populated island, ironically. i think that it just became part of the american psyche and the

collective historical narrative and became a symbol and sort of departed from it, real significance over time. ian buruma: so with the american othersjohn dowry amongst , he didn't necessarily condone the attack on pearl harbor. in fact, he said he didn't. but he his analysis is that one , of the reasons that the americans were so shocked by this event, and so outraged, the idea of infamy and so on, was that it played into -- you see it in so many western movies, the treacherous indians, who are always attacking from nowhere the brave pioneers. ,then suddenly these redskins screeching war cries, and i think his analysis, i think it was war without mercy, but i can remember. it is one explanation why the

americans -- white is still such a strong myth in america, this treacherous attack. was it meant to be treacherous? or was it a screwup? eri hotta: there is a huge debate about the delay in court and aiding the diplomacy to the white house -- in coordinating the diplomacy to the white house. but it was not a declaration of war, really. you can't really argue -- the stealth of the attack has ofained, and the sort treacherous nature, we have not been affected in his mind. the fact that they could do this and mobilize the nation, of course it had something to do with that legacy, but there is something to be said about this comparison to the indians were -- or the native americans,

shall i say. ian buruma: the redskins. [laughter] eri hotta: in movies. ian buruma: in movies. not the word we had would have used at the breakfast table. eri hotta: it speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the war that was being fought. and i think that's why after 9/11 it was tempting for people to use this analogy of the being much like pearl very under you know, resourced power could overtake a giant, however momentarily. i think that is another analogy. ian buruma: perhaps to carry on slightly from what we were talking about before, another analysis is this japanese

intellectual who is no longer with us, who started a communist and ended up ultra right-wing nationalist. but his phrase was the 100 year war, and that pearl harbor was part of a war that actually started in the 1860s when japan was opened up by commodore perry and his gunships. ever since, even though there were periods of peace and truth, ever since, japan has been fighting back against western dominance. is there some truth to that? eri hotta: yes, if you look at the whole history in terms of civilization crash -- clash, that is very tempting and easy to attempt to explain all the political events that took place.

in the meantime, reduce everything to these worldviews. of course these things affect , one's thinking and act as part of the mind. but you can't really say japan went to war because of the racism. of course, we can disquiet individual beliefs and how people might have reacted to different situations differently , or even certain leaders might have held onto certain beliefs more strongly than the others. it just doesn't explain the whole picture efficiently in my eyes. i can see how it could be tempting. ian buruma: my role here is to be the right wing japanese nationalists. [speaking simultaneously] did they doso why this? why did they think it would work? why did they hope -- even with the mastermind of the attack on pearl harbor, admiral mia moto yamoto, who had been a

harvard and the u.s. embassy in washington, he knew the west very well, and he was a very sophisticated man who warned the government it was reckless to do it. i know that he was a gambling man, and he was probably vain enough to think he was the man to do it if anyone. but what did they hope to get out of that? eri hotta: i think in the end it was a gamble. but they felt they had been cornered into the situation, they justified it in terms of the possibility that something diplomatic could be worked out after infecting a great deal of damage on the pacific fleet of the united states. but even though the war was being declared in the name of the failure of diplomacy, the expected the american side to approach japan with diplomatic solutions.

so japan did not have any exit plans. ian buruma: shock and awe? eri hotta: shock and awe. right. the russo japanese war, japan also did not have an exit plan their either. it was because of theodore roosevelt's intervention and his intervention in peacemaking efforts, they just got away winning it. it was not a straightforward thing. ian buruma: japan almost and grabbed. they were bailed out by a banker in new york who had escaped this russiamitic attack in and was no friend of the russians. and white russian officers who were then taken prisoner by the japanese introduced the japanese to the protocols of [indiscernible] this -- they put two and two together and said, we have got

to keep jews on our side, it was the conclusion, which is why the japanese during world war ii refused to hand over them to the nazis. but i think we are getting close to question time. the last question perhaps i , think i'm right in saying that in america, pearl harbor has become this sort of mythical occasion which is used over and and, not least after 9/11 so on. but in japan, when people think of world war ii, pearl harbor is not the first thing that comes to mind. eri hotta: no, it would be the bombings of hiroshima and august i that come tok mind. which tends a lot to be forgotten or not discussed.

but it has been almost 70 years, nearly 70 years since the end of the war, and that sort of collective experience is becoming thinner and thinner. so i don't really say they have this strong attachment to any of the bombings, including a-bombing, despite that they get taught in school much more effectively than they are about japan's role. not really we have discussed that. it is why so many japanese intellectuals, often people are , not fascists or militarists, applauded the attack on pearl harbor in 1941. decemberpartly because it came as relief. they had been fighting china. even though the official propaganda was they were liberating asia, they were

getting deeper and deeper into what is known as the quagmire. people felt shamed and embarrassed about it i think. now, more people know if they think about world war ii at all in japan, they know more about the atrocities committed against the chinese then they know about pearl harbor. so a lot of intellectuals in 1941 felt at last we are giving the west a bloody news -- bloody nose. this is the proper war. this is the worker should have been fighting to begin with and not our fellow agents. eri hotta: that is right. quite a few of them had first-hand experience, and that is why we have this complex. they have this ingrained inferiority complex more than others. ian buruma: those are always the worst. eri hotta: yes, tends to be. ian buruma: this is an argument against issues for people to study abroad.

[laughter] ian buruma: it is a bit like, what is his name, daniel ortega, who picked up anti-american rhetoric in berkeley, california. i think it is 6:00, so perhaps we could open it up to questions. and i will field the questions. shall i do it? >> if you don't mind. we have microphones set up on either side. i just asked when i call on you you proceeded to the microphone and please identify yourself. iancan address eri or in -- with your question. we'll start with the gentleman over here. hi, i am noah smith from stony brook university and the worst dressed person in the room. i actually had a couple of questions, but one of my questions is one things you guys

, didn't discuss was in 1939, japan tried attacking the soviet union, and it was a lot bigger of an operation than most people realize. they were soundly defeated. the soviets sent in a bunch of tanks and creamed them. did news of that not get out? i mean, i know that this shows -- i know that news of that experience deeply shook a lot of people and some are , really freaked out by that. but did not give them pause two or did no one really know about that? eri hotta: it was hushed up. the newspapers to not really report it in full details, but the army leadership was of course shaken. and that is why they decided they couldn't really fight the chance -- soviet union when the chance arose after june 22, 1941. and that was very much in their minds. they cannot really afford to fight the soviet union.

they reached neutrality in the spring, so we will keep things quiet, keep fighting china, going into china, so that they can sort of sustained that warring position in china. ian buruma: ok let's attack , another giant. ian buruma: it was also the inter-services rivalry between the army and the navy, wasn't it? who waske faction largely army wanted to go for the soviet union, but the faction who was naval, because they needed the resources, wanted to fight the war in southeast asia. and the debacle in mongolia where these battles were fought against them, that meant the end of the strike north faction. >> right. can i get a second question? >> we can come back to you.

>> since you are standing there -- >> i am also kind of interested [indiscernible] to what extent was he trying to write hurt on these actions and move japan being more centralized, less factious system? him i have read about indicated that he was trying to be more -- japan was a very factionalized place. to what extent was he trying to change that? eri hotta: he was into efficiency. he was unable graduate. >> able bureaucrat. eri hotta: very able bureaucrat with individual notes about people he dealt with every day of his life, held grudge against certain people, they were

punished and so forth. i think he did try to centralized and also, i think his father primary motive -- i think his primary motive was to help the emperor, because he was a very devoted servant of the imperial institution. when he was appointed prime minister in october of 1941, the first thing he tried to do was to upper war, try to -- avert war, try to discuss alternative scenarios, which goes against openlyea of him being bellicose, which is not true. he was a bit more complex, simpleminded. his position was a bit more complex. thank you. >> jeff lorenzi. ian had mentioned the china

quagmire at the end of your dialogue. i'm wondering if you could explore for us to what extent was china and the china quagmire itself perhaps the main driver of japanese war and diplomatic policy. that is, the attack on the u.s. in the sense, if you have a problem you can't solve, make it bigger, and then maybe you will be able to have new opportunities? and to what extent were they talking about peace fielders or some kind of accommodation, or was that entirely off the table for china? what were their war aims in china at that point? with japan's partners in the tripartite pact, and their actions in europe, was it an inducement to, we can do more, look, the germans are at the gates of moscow. to what extent are they looking to their axis partners in europe as they model further incitement

for thinking big? eri hotta: thank you. i think the china war was central, and they did discuss this. but it was essential for them to end the china war somehow. to end meant to exit honorably, in richard nixon. well, maybe, with peace terms that were favorable. they had set up this puppet occupied, andhey they wanted the americans to recognize that regime as well and to have two nationalist regimes in china, which did not make sense for the americans. they had no inkling to recognize them. that tookotiations place in washington between the japanese ambassador nomura and roosevelt, since april 1941,

china was always there. china issue was always there. discussed,o, it was and it became really a sticking point of the negotiation that military,n't -- the especially the army could not openly say, we are going to withdraw if we lift, lifted sanctions or, you know, some kind of bargaining. struck, but they could not have openly discussed these things. the militarists in japan were depending on civilian leaders to reach a diplomatic breakthrough. konoe thought he could pull off a diplomatic since -- solution if you melt -- if you met roosevelt in person. so you can prepare for, in the meantime, because you never know , but you have to allow me to see roosevelt and in hawaii or

alaska. he thought that would happen september, late, mid-september, even early october. and then they sort of noticed the americans are not going to come to the negotiating table. they panicked and left. so china was central, and they knew it. your second question is about try part -- tripartite impact and how -- >> [indiscernible] eri hotta: i think they were mesmerized by the germans, not as the dangerous and legal aspect of not see ontology -- ideology, because the japanese were really second-class citizens. the japanese themselves wanted to believe that, but those who

knew the original german knew word --h of hitler's aim. so that was not so much embracing the ideology, but the marshall aspect of their success -- martial aspect of their success. the shock factors in europe, that people were just, the japanese casually thought, ok southeast asia is really ripe , for plucking. nobody is looking at it. and if we could push the regime to hand it over peaceably with the present force, the rest of the power will come because it is so far away. big mistake, i think. that was what triggered this total embargo and de facto embargo on petroleum and

freezing the japanese assets as -- by allied powers. ian buruma: and they didn't just see operation barbarossa as an impact opportunity, because they thought with the russians out of the way, europe would go. eri hotta: the card is -- the hardest call it military strategy. it was not mainstream because they were not thinking in times -- terms of war at all in 1941 in july, at all. they were more concerned about power struggle at home. the eccentric foreign minister saw the cabinet needed to be undermined, and he was saying, just show the jester to the -- gesture to the allies, ally germany, and quickly, so that we can claim to have participated

in their war, and you know, maybe take some possessions. but everyone, including the army been, seenditionally the soviet union as their hypothetical enemy opposed this. ,it was partly because of the had thate that nomura told them otherwise. konoe wanted him to leave his cabinet without him having to dirty his own hands. >> -- ian buruma: the axis powers did not really trust one another. of question, the issue wanting to have the jews on their side is one of this. then you see per -- german businessman who visit japan and think when they are drunk in the

evening by the ginza, that it would please their west german colleagues if they, over their steins of beer, started [indiscernible] which was not the thing to do to ingratiate themselves. maybe some, but they would not have admitted it. >> george pearlstein. i am afraid part of this question has been taken up. i was interested in whether germany was instrumental in urging japan to enter the war, and did they know the detainees were going to attack -- japanese were going to attack? after the attack, america declared war, but not against germany. there was a period five days or so when it wasn't clear what was going to happen, and there were even some who thought that it might be beneficial for hitler not to declare war and see what

happens. do you know the details of those few days, and did the germans urged japan to do this? ian buruma: not as far as i know, and i doubt if they knew. at all. one of the mysteries of world war ii is why heather decided to declare war on the united states, which he didn't actually have to do. maybe hitler was an honorable man. [laughter] ian buruma: thank goodness he day, because that made it easy for roosevelt to get into the european war. when churchill was given the news over dinner, where he was, he said it was the first time he's -- he wasn't the first time he slept very well, but he slept very well. eri hotta: what the germans were keen for the japanese to do in the middle of 1941 was to attack

singapore, so they could help the war cause in the soviet most --ring the hitler was obsessed with this britain.aking over so he probably thought the japanese could be used that way more effectively by way of attacking. ian buruma: there was actually very little communication, wasn't there, during the war, between the axis powers. >> don simmons is my name. a different topic, for several decades after the world war, both germany and japan did all they could to reintroduce themselves and re-ingratiate themselves with the rest of the

world. subdued military policy with the case of japan, generally trying to create, contribute to as much of the common good as they could. in the case of germany, within 20 or 25 years, their relations with their neighbors, and very much the occupied countries, ranged somewhere from commercial warm.m -- cordial to that still has not happened with japan. and i'm just curious about the difference on that. eri hotta: you have written a book about that. maybe -- [laughter] ian buruma: there is a very long answer to that and a short one, one being they have very different neighbors. germany is in the middle of europe, and its neighbors to the west were western democracies and tied to west germany and the glittery alliances, citizens unifying europe. that was a very different

composition to being surrounded -- japan's immediate neighbors were communist china and then south korea, which was a kind of ally. and then there was north korea, so there was not an east asian alliance in any way comparable to the european community or nato. that is one reason. i think the other reason is, and also, one must not overstate the relations between germany and its immediate neighbors, no, 9088 in 1974 -- when my own country the , netherlands, beat germany and more people went into the streets to celebrate than in may 1945 at the end of the war. having said that, there were very from wars, and there were two germany's, that is the other thing west germany and east , germany and i had very they had --

east germany. they had very different ideas about the outside world. people rarely talk about the invasion of norway. they talk about hong kong. that is very specific crime committed by a criminal regime. japan did not have a criminal regime. they were the same people who were in power, had been in power before the war. and there wasn't an equivalent to the holocaust in defense that, the ideological war to exterminate a particular people because they did not have the right to exist. so for all these reasons, i think, relations with the outside world -- and there are other reasons as well, the composition, the fact that wartime history became a very political issue in japan, and a very polarized one, unlike the history of the third reich in germany, which is not a

particularly good issue. -- polarizing issue. there are a number of reasons. none of them have to do with the essential aspects of the japanese character or anything like that. i hope that answers it for you. eri hotta: can i share something to that? >> over here. soft question. >> could you introduce yourself? >> matthew olson. i had a very soft question. i had a very good question that you had raised. and i will start with a hard question. i had read about islands in the neighborhood of indonesia where entire populations were wiped out. i have never forgotten my reading of [indiscernible] about theen you talk difference between what the

nazis were doing -- and i understand it was pretty awful -- and what the japanese were ,oing, there is a difference they were both wiping out people. second question, if you can starting with grade school when , i first started reading history, they talked about the warm relations between the united states after the opening of japan, and that warm relation was supposed to have continued until the start of the japanese russo peace brokered by roosevelt. and the explanation i was given -- i have never read a contradiction to this since -- that was the beginning of the japanese-u.s. friendship, because the japanese resented the fact that they didn't get more out of the peace than they thought they should have gotten

, and they thought the united states cheated us. and i am perfectly open to that hypothesis being questioned or denied. but this is my first opportunity to ask someone knowledgeable about it on the subject. eri hotta: the second question. ian buruma: i will take the first. eri hotta: i had not heard that narrative before. in japan, they concentrate on the failure of diplomats, or negotiators that didn't get russian indemnity in terms of peace, and there was a riot after the words. it was more perceived in japan as a failure of diplomacy. which sort of explains the popularity of very strong, who signeddiplomats the tripartite pact. you had this very clearheaded

diplomat who could stand up for japanese interests. he was incidentally the one who watched the delegation out of the legal -- league of nations after the manchurian crisis erupted. so i think it is more perceived, the russo japanese war and settlement, is perceived in terms of the failure of japanese diplomacy that it was american design. i have never heard it on the american side. if anything, it is sort of perpetuating the idea that america, the great power of accrued, can afford to be generous and a priest broker -- a peace broker that sort of , thing. the china war was not really going anywhere from the japanese perspective. the japanese kept asking americans to be the mediator changn john kai-shek --

kai-shek and the japanese. so there was this built-in expectation of the japanese that the united states was being some kind of policeman, standing up for japan which is self-serving, , of course. ian buruma: on the atrocities, of course it makes very little difference if you're the victim of someone torturing you or shooting you. it doesn't really make much difference who is doing it or for what reasons. but i think the military atrocities, and they were indeed terrible not just in china but manila and other places, which cannot be excused. faced.ould be they are horrifying, but there is a slight difference between military atrocities -- we can talk about why they happened --

and the government that has a program to exterminate a people for ideological reasons because they do not have the right to exist. there was never such a thing in the japanese war. in the japanese war, there were atrocities, and if you like, to be provocative about it, there is a psychology of nanjing which was like the vietnam war, but on a vast scale. there were a lot of soldiers in hostile territory who often could not see the difference between civilians and guerrilla fighters and so on. they were undisciplined, brutalized by their own officers , and were often often found , themselves in a position where the -- they thought the safest thing to do is to shoot everyone. and that can quickly escalate to -- orgies ofsus

violence. the senior officers are not really in control of the middle ranking ones, i think played a role in this as well. the image of the japanese army is entirely correct when it came to the rest of japanese war. the actually treated the uw's very well -- pow's very well, but it was a lot to be desired in the second world war. and so we did have these enormous massacres and raping and looting on a vast scale. but it's not quite the same thing. i mean, to be at, to be a victim of this is equally unpleasant, but it is not quite the same thing as gassing people or shooting people because they don't have the right to live. >> could you come down here, thank you. >> hi, i am richard katz.

i'll sort of fascinated by the degree of misperception in both tokyo and washington of the other. i have had conversations with people or descendents of some of the japanese leaders at the time who thought that they really believe that the united states could sort of be as their proposal for peace. the u.s. would actually accept the document that ratified japanese control over china. which of course, the u.s. did not do. but the fact they really thought the u.s. might do this is incredible -- to my mind misperception of everything to a , stunning degree. and then from the american side, from what i can see, there are -- there were two groups in the leadership who are kind of nuts about what they thought of japan. they are poor people.

you have the state department who knew japan very well and insisted japan would never go to war with the united states because they knew they were going to get smashed. and some diplomats in the embassies said out of sheer desperation, they might do it. when has a nation ever attacked out of sheer desperation? and let's take a hard line because that will force the japanese to back down, and they kept talking about it. and then you have the foreign ambassador who kept talking about these mythological moderates in tokyo that we dare not undermine by being too soft. he wanted to take a very soft line. and it seems to me that despite the issues of interest, the astonishing degree of misperception by, at least on the american side, people who showed they were at least uninformed of this information,

could you tell us what is the solution? what was going on that created this incredible degree of what i see is just people lying to themselves about this, the other side? ian buruma: [indiscernible] [laughter] >> well you see, that is the second question. i would like to speak about china, to tell you the truth. eri hotta: thank you. the perception of japan could be described as underestimation of the result or whatever. but then i think that the japanese themselves -- most leaders could not have seen this plan of attack had it not been for yamamoto. so i think it was an outlandish thing to do anyway. i think roosevelt was perhaps expecting some minor attack even , as late as december 1 or where

ever. he saw the troops mobilizing around taiwan, and he could have perceived this attack on pearl harbor, which really was a dramatic turn of events. so i don't think, and the japanese themselves were surprised by that too. i think there was an under estimation of what yamamoto sides almost.all that is my feeling about it. leaders, navy,y when hestaff, nagano, looked at the plans in the october, he said no way. we are not going to do it. it's too risky, we cannot win it anyway. why should we risk so much? we will lose all of our possessions. ian buruma: it is hard to underestimate the human capacity for self-delusion.

for example, there is a wonderful film made in japan in 1942. it came out in december 1942. it was commissioned by the imperial japanese navy to celebrate pearl harbor. they re-created the attack so well, it was one of the first films that used special effects so skillfully that it is still sometimes used in documentaries about pearl harbor because there is very little actual documentary footage on it. and one of the scenes shows the pilots and so on on these aircraft carriers on their way to pearl harbor, and they listen into the american radio on hawaii, and they hear jazz music, and dance. they all giggle and say, this is the americans and decadence, need americans. all they can do is dance and listen to this absurd sort of music.

once they get a taste of the real japanese martial spirit, they will cave in. and it's a common misperception of democracies held not just by the japanese but others as well. and then there were more idiotic misconceptions on both sides. i think on the japanese side, some people really believed that americans couldn't shoot straight because their noses were too big. they couldn't look past their noses. at the same time in america, there were ideas of the japanese that because of their oriental mongol eyes, they couldn't shoot straight and so on. the stupidity of people is usually boundless. japan-41 was maybe not the topic of your breakfast conversation, but you will talk about it at dinner. i want to thank you folks for being with us. our wonderful hesitation. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] inouncer 1: on "book tv'"

we discussed pearl harbor. we have the author of countdown to pearl harbor, 12 days to the attack. eri hotta, countdown to infamy, and pearl harbor, from if any to greatness. -- infamy to greatness. and all the gallant men, the sailors account of pearl harbor. we are taking your tweets and email questions from noon to 3:00 eastern. go to "book tv".org for the full schedule. this weekend on lectures in allity, patrick all it -- talks about the california gold rush of the mid-1800s. >> the economy of california has already been transformed. nobody wants to do any work

except dig for gold. ships arrive in san francisco. the cruise dessert because they want to go to the gold diggings. psychologists are interested in this. gold fever takes people over. and gold isn't really particularly useful. thisave not thought about much, but for today, it is possible in things like that i ,an doctors -- semiconductors but it is useful mainly for decoration. and also sometimes as a carrot see -- a currency, it does not rust. they make coins out of iron, the eventually rust away, but gold persists. it was nevertheless incredibly invaluable. it was so important to american history like gold and tobacco which are straightforward but not essential. you can watch the entire lecture at 8:00 p.m. and

midnight eastern tonight. "american history tv," only on c-span3. follow the transition of government on c-span as donald trump becomes the 45th president of the united states and republicans maintain control of the u.s. house and senate. we will take you to key events as they happen. watch live on c-span. watch on-demand on c-span.org. or free on our c-span radio app. >> coming up next on american fea posts isohn poses the-- fea question, was america founded as a christian nation? >> tonight we are lucky enough to have dr. john fea