all right. hearing of the foreign relations committee will come to order. i want to thank our witnesses for being here today and sitting through all of that. and both of you have outlined tangible policy options in your written testimony to help us address the threat of iranian proxies apart from efforts to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. iranian proxies remain a direct threat to the united states and our allies today as your

testimony -- it is. are you good now? c can you hear me? thank you, sir. can you hear that? thank you. i'd like to thank our witnesses for testifying today. both of you outlined tangible policy options in your written testimony to help us address the threat of iranian proxies. apart from the efforts to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, iranian proxies remain a direct threat to the united states and our allies today. currently lebanese hezbollah has 100,000 missiles and rockets threatening israel. threat to our long-term interests in iraq and a threat to american forces currently deployed there. in this past october iranian backed houthi militia fired

cruise missiles at u.s. navy ships. saudi arabia -- is that working for you, sir? saudi arabia continues to feel the effect of iran proxies and partners as the houthis attack across the border to saudi cities, launch ballistic missiles that can only be deployed with outside help. rece outlines the destabilizing role played by iran highlighting three separate at-sea interdictions of iranian-supplied weapons bound for yemen and somalia. at the same time lebanese hezbollah continues to play a decisive role in syria while iran has demonstrated an amazing capability to deploy shia militias from around the world to the fight. there's no doubt that the next administration will face a range of threats from the more traditional threats in the strait of hormuz to newfound spheres of iranian influence

like yemen. one reason i proposed the deal is that i feared that it it would be our de facto middle east policy and countering iran's regional efforts would take second fiddle, if you will. the current administration has not pushed back in a meaningful way against the islamic republic's destabling actions in the region. i hope both of you can help us consider new ways to stem the threat of iranian weapons, terrorism and dangerous ideology. i want to thank you both for being here for sitting through our business meeting, sharing your intellect, and with that i'd like to turn to our distinguished member and my friend, ranking member ben cardin. >> mr. chairman, thank you for calling this meeting on defeating iran's threat network. options for countering iranian proxies. as you know, mr. chairman, i did not support the jcpoa as it was negotiating. one of my greatest concerns was the universe of issues that the

jcpoa did not address. iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its continued ballistic missile testing, its work with russia to hold, to shield bashar al assad and its deplorable human rights record. these are issues that i have long believed need to be given equal weight and consideration as we contemplate u.s. policy in the middle east. iran's state sponsorship of terrorism and violent proxies across the middle east is important for our security and that of our allies and partners as the iran nuclear program. indeed, american citizens, uniformed and civilians have been victims of iranian terror. iran sponsored, directed, trained and equipped proxy groups are a threat to u.s. forces and american citizens today. this is a problem that directly threatens u.s. security. in my consultations with leaders in the region, it's crystal clear the iranian terrorism is on equal grounds with the nuclear threat in governments'

prioritizations to threats of their security. in iraq where we're partnering with the iraqi government to defeat isil, iran is directing militias that engaged in sectarian violence and clenszing putting at risk the stability of iraq. in syria, iran is sending shia militia to defend a dictator guilty of crimes against humanity. in his violent suppression of millions of innocent syrians. in yemen, iran and lebanese hezbollah are working with the houthi rebels to threaten saudi arabia and jeopardize broader gulf security. in lebanon, hezbollah's intransient held hostage the process of forming a government for over two years and iran continues to transfer sophisticated weapons that threaten israel's security. i'll stop listing the examples but it's clear if you don't have to work hard to identify the fingerprints of iranian terror across the region. for iran's leaders and the irgc, investment in this type of unconventional warfare is just

enough to keep the region off balance and more than enough to ensure a constant state of instability and unpredictability. iran's threat network is a shared challenge and reviewing our options for counting iran proxies, i believe we must look at the shared solutions. the united states cannot go it alone and eliminate iran's proxies. there's no unilateral solution. so our approach must take into account the requirement of international cooperation and coordination. in the region, that means intelligence sharing and security cooperation with our partners. outside the region, that means ensuring the sanctions on iran for its use of terrorism have meaningful impact to accomplish the coordinated, multilateral approach to countering iran's proxies and dismantling the iran threat network, our partners must trust us and want to work with us. there must be a baseline confidence and fundamental commitment to their security. they cannot question the american leaders may one day get frustrated and walk away from

bilateral security assurances on multilateral agreements. this brings me back to the jcpoa. as now that we're in two years of the agreement's implementation, we cannot just walk away without risking the credibility of u.s. commitments. the u.s. leadership role in enforcing sanctions in the security of our partners. i fear that walking away from pt jcpoa now amplifies the prospects of war in iran, while leaving the united states isolated. iran could rush for the nuclear finish line. there would be no more intrusive inspections by the iaea and if the united states lapses in its jcpoa obligations the rest of the world is not going to follow us with more sanctions. i hope to work with my cle colleagues on both sides of the aisle next year on legislation that sets the foundations for the next chapter of the iran policy. the signal we must send with this legislation is we are committed to the jcpoa and

congress will conduct oversight on the enforcement while maintaining credible, deterrent, snapback legislation. mr. chairman, i was pleased to see the unanimous support in the united states senate for the passage of the iran sanction act extension that was an important step that we took. on the nonnuclear issues, congress must continue sanctions, iranian entities and individuals engaged in ballistic or cruise missile proliferation, and terrorism or human rights violations and ensure expedited considerations of new sanctions if iran directs or conducts an act of terrorism against the united states or substantially increases its operational or financial support for terrorist organizations that threaten u.s. interests or allies. i've introduced legislation that i think would help move that along with many of our colleagues. i look forward with working with the chairman on how we can increase our responsibilities in congress, oversight, iran's compliance with the iran nuclear agreement but also to deal with their other activities and i think this discussion today will help us in that work.

>> thank you very much for those comments, and since you brought up the extension, i think we all owe a huge debt of gratitude to senator menendez for his leadership on that issue. i'm glad that they're extended, and thank you for that very much. the first witness is mr. matthew mcinnis. mr. mcinnis previously served as senior analyst for the u.s. department of defense. thank you so much for being here. our second witness is miss melissa dalton, senior fellow and chief of staff for the international security program at the center for strategic and international studies. previously miss dalton served at the department of defense. thank you, both. i think you'll understand, we appreciate it if you summarize in five minutes. without objection, your written testimony will be written into the record. if you'd just begin in the order of introduction, i would appreciate it. thank you.

>> thank you, chairman corker, cardin. thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing on the iran support and hearing and proxies. i will focus my comments on how the support fits into iran's strategic priorities and how u.s. policy can best counter it. please note while this testimony constitutes my own research and analysis, it draws as well on discussions conducted as part of a working group at the center for strategic and international studies with miss dalton which aims to analyze potential opportunities to deter iran after the nuclear deal. i want to stress that at the end of 2016, we are at an inflection point in iran's strategy in the middle east. the nuclear deal has given the islamic republic new resources and has freed tehran to focus on building its conventional military capacity to compete with its regional rivals more directly. iran is also sensing finally some form of victory in the wars in syria and iraq. in the aftermath of these conflicts, the iranian leadership will be left with an enormous degree of influence stretching from beirut and beyond. led by its islamic revolutionary

guard corps, irgc, tehran will have at its dispose l a transnational proxy army of shia militia units with at least a couple hundred thousand personnel. many with new hybrid warfare capabilities. this will pose significant challenges to us and our friends in the region. our traditional approaches to combatting iran's proxies through financial sanctions, weapons shipment, interdictions and occasional counterterrorism operations are well intended and still needed. these types of action can mitigate, perhaps contain or roll back their capabilities. they will not likely defeat or eliminate the threat posed by these types of iranian-backed groups especially well established ones like hezbollah. how should we tailor or approach? how iran fits into the overall military strategy. iran establishes its proxies first to execute unconventional warfare and spread its

ideological and political influence, these groups often become essential parts of iran's frontline deterrence strategy once established. this deterrence exists via two layers. first, retaliatory deterrence. the ability to instill fear of significant casualties, destruction of critical infrastructure, or economic destruction to dissuade tehran's more powerful enemies such as israel or the u.s. this draws from what leaders have described, threat, in response to threat doctrines. proxies also give plausible deniability to help iran manage escalation in retaliation. since iran, for example, cannot strike the u.s. homeland conventionally, it tries to threaten through terrorism to balance the deterrence equation. the second layer is through passive deterrence which is more latent which involves states such as its ability to build proxies in iraq, syria and lebanon that are already within iran's sphere of influence. these are groups such as the popular mobilization forces in iraq and national defense forces

in syria we have seen in recent years. these are built to basically solidify iran's influence in these states and dissuade any future militaries such as ours or others or perhaps even russia's from potentially trying to pull these states out of iran's influence or sphere of influence. these are something that could potentially threaten, you know, the u.s.' military -- the future u.s. military presence in the country. the second key is being able to distinguish iran's true proxies from those groups that are only partners or in the process of becoming proxies such as yemen's houthis. the main distinguisher is whether an organization adheres to iran's revolutionary ideology or guardianship of the jurisprudence that recognizes iran's supreme leader as its ultimate religious and political authority. groups that do not acknowledge that authority such as the followers of iraqi shia cleric muqtada al sadr, houthis, or

hamas, still enjoy significant support from iran and cooperate with iran's foreign policies. however, iran cannot reliably depend on organizations to form the front lines of its retaliatory deterrence against adversaries or consistently execute iran's leadership directives. so looking to u.s. policy recommendations, as long as iran continues to ideologically oppose the united states and sees washington as the threat to its existence, it will seek deterrence through its proxies, unconventional weapons or whatever feasible means it can support. however, the united states can take steps to mitigate and disrupt the deterrent effect of its proxies. four principles in such an approach include demystifying the psychological foundations of the proxies' deterrent strength. greater efforts by the u.s. to name and shame iranian-backed groups, front companies and financial activities could erode the psychological foundation of tehran's deterrent strength. second, contain and push back

operations, support of u.s. proxies. third, divide and undermine local support to proxies. iran's heavy-handed approach frequently stokes nationalist resentment that we can take advantage of. fourth, stem proxy formation, help shape the governing environment where we can. this is particularly important in places like yemen where the proxies are not yet quite there an fully supported and fully adhered to iranian ideology. we can prevent the houthis from becoming fully part of iran's operations. fifth and finally, we should support full whole of government approaches such as supported in the countering iran act of 2016, legislations such as that recognizes that need. the bottom line, the u.s. cannot alter the fundamental logic for iran's creation of proxies to counter and deter the conventional advantage, power advantage, the u.s. and its allies without fundamental changes in tehran's threat perceptions or real and

ideological changes in the leadership. in the interim, we can, however, mitigate the growth of iran's proxies and undermine the real and effective psychological power that they have. with that, i conclude my statement. thank you. >> chairman corker, ranking member cardin, distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor to testify before you today with my excellent colleague, matthew mcinnis, on options for countering iranian proxies. this testimony draws from a forthcoming csis report on deterring iran. i will focus my remarks on three topics today. iran's strategic approach, building a u.s. deterrence strategy, and recommendations for the new congress and next administration. iran is a revisionist power that seeks to fulfill a number of goals to change the status quo. these objectives include ensuring survival of the islamic republic, deterring adversaries, enhancing its regional power and influence and securing a place of political and economic importance within the international community. iran is aware of its

conventional military inferiority versus its adversaries. it leverages a range of unconventional and conventional capabilities and concepts of operation including proxy forces to achieve its objectives. this approach also encompasses other activities including missile development, engaging in provocative maritime operations, exploiting cyber vulnerabilities and employing information operations. it ensures that any escalations against the united states and its regional partners fall short of large-scale warfare. through this approach, iran can pursue its goals while avoiding kinetic consequences, enjoy plausible deniability by using proxies, subvert regional rivals and deter them from taking actions that could trigger a potential backlash from the proxy groups and infiltrate and influence state institutions incrementally in countries with weak governance. moreover, the wars in syria and iraq have provided fertile ground for the growth of iranian

proxies in supported groups. this approach also disadvantages iran. through its destabilizing regional activity, iran's image as an international pariah remains in many ways the same, impairing its economic development. iran is also hindered by a principle agent problem versus its proxies which do not always act in accordance with iranian interests. the u.s. approach to iran has deterred significantly forward in iranian activities and capability development. yet the united states has largely been unable to deter iran's incremental extension of regional power and threshold testing across a range of military and paramilitary activities. indeed, in the last five years iran's threat network has grown. regional partners doubt u.s. sincerity in pressing back against iran's destabilizing activities. the next congress and administration have an opportunity to chart a pathway forward vis-a-vis iran that protects u.s. interests,

strengthens deterrence, and sets the conditions for changing iran's behavior. the united states may choose to elevate its counterterrorism objectives in its approach to iran, given the unique challenges that iran's threat network presents. this strategy will have its limits. absent ideological changes in the iranian government, the united states will not be able to change iran's reasoning for supporting proxy groups. it may prompt iran to reassess its commitment to the jcpoa especially if the united states imposes new terrorism-related sanctions that mimic nuclear ones. in u.s. sanction is not calibrated, iran is likely to respond with kinetic attacks, information operations and cyber attacks. working in close coordination with allies and partners, the united states can take a number of steps to limit the reach of iranian proxy activities and stem further growth of proxies in the region. these measures include ratchet up direct and indirect operations to disrupt irgc

activity and interdict support for proxies calibrated for u.s. and iranian red lines. conduct cyber disruption of iranian proxy activities. activ. avoid inflating capabilities and intentions. expose iranian backed groups front companies and financial activities jous the borders to discourage interference, exploit nature of sentiment in the region through amplified operations, sustain financial pressure on the proxies and minimize the space that they can exploit in the region by building the capabilities of regional partner security forces and supporting governance initiatives in countries vulnerable to penetration. even a u.s. strategy that seeks the amplify pressure on iran cannot be purely punitive or it

will prove escalating. the united states should link possible incentives to changes that iran makes such that they are synchronized as one move. congress and the new u.s. administration have an opportunity to chart a path way forward on iran policy. i hope that today's hearing can inform that process. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. i'll just ask one question is that keep my remaining time for enter jections. when it was being negotiated, some of us were in the switzerland of this deal wherele of the meetings took place. one of the things they would say is that the revolution is over. the revolution is over. iran is a different place. the reason you have proxies is to further the revolution. i wonder if you distinguish witnesses, could just very briefly, yes or no, do you

believe the revolution is over or not? >> certainly for the current leadership it is not. what i usually argue is that for the, for this particular leadership, that the revolution is the political infrastructure that allows them to retain power. and they can change the ideology if they want to but they haven't figured out what it would look like for them on maintain power. i think everyone who follows the region, in academia and around the world, ask that question. are they going to have that moment? are they going to have a gorbachev moment where they'll change ideology? and the iranians worry about. that they debate that internally. i think they're scared that it will happen. some of them are scared that it

will happen and they'll all go through an early 1970s gang of four purges. everyone dies when that happens. and for right now, the revolution still matters. and it is what keeps them in power. >> i heartily agree with his characterization. i would only add that there has been tensions. the pull of ideology which still is quite strong today but also, a dose of pragmatism in terms of economic development and a desire to have that. you see iran over time trying to balance those two elements of their policy. and there's a push and pull that occurs in the leadership. in trying to strike that balance.

it is a manifestation of iran's ideology, the potential of the pragmatism. >> thank you. senator? you want to go ahead? thank you to our witnesses. mr. chairman, for a couple of decades now, iran has sought to extend the brand of governing through terror and intimidation throughout the region. and i know that champions of the jcpoa insisted with a hold on iran's nuclear program, that we would be able to expand our resources. and i was looking forward to doing that. but however the past two years since the agreement, we have seen iran test us in a variety of ways. even the production of heavy

water in violation of the agreement is the ability to produce that much heavy water. yes, once they bought it, now they transfer it to the second case. the reality is it is a violation of the agreement. beyond that in a more conventional way, their engage ballistic missile technology. their engagement in iraq and syria and yemen are tremendously challenging in terms of our national that interests as well as partners in the region. so it just seems to me that i hope that in the next congress,

colleagues who have been rhett sinlt will be willing to be engaged in that in a way that i think can be incredibly important to our national security. i think it shows that iran might walk away from the agreement if writ extended. it is very interesting that notwithstanding all the blustering, the sanctions have not moved away. that brings no what is it we do as it relates to all the actions? you mentioned the counter iran's act that senator corker and i introduced in this congress.

what elements of that particularly do you see helpful to the goal and what can we do with our international partners to affectively enforce the un sanctions? >> well, thank you and in particular, i always supported taking a very comprehensive look at what iran is doing. i mean from the conventional efforts and the you support for terrorism and then the nuclear program itself and then the entire field and i think in particular in the 2016 updates to the bill, and i personally advocated for a comprehensive strategy and for the u.s. government to pursue that and the defense state and treasury and then the dni or producing a well according strategy and when nifs the government, it was very

difficult frankly to have, you know, where we really did not have that sense of all of the different elements of the u.s. national power and then even if you could not necessarily have a fully coordinating effort, at least all of the sides were taking to each other and recognizing what we're doing on the terrorism and counter and working well with the diplomatic efforts and that would be a huge help. when it comes and then that's the nuclear program and one thing if i can be a little provocative here, what it took to effect the nuclear program, and our efforts on the sanctions and the pressure that we also brought there on the diplomatic front and on the military front

to bring iran to the table and let's be honest there was also incentives involved. we conceded on enrichment. we could see it and, you know, all of that when you look at to bring along and to negotiate, that was fundamentally a program that was not to iran it was important to iran and extremely important to them, but they did not have a nuclear weapon yet and so therefore the nuclear weapon was not part of the deterrence strategy yet. therefore it was something that could be traded away at the table and it was something that could be negotiated. the reason that i focus and try to convince in the testimony of the importance of the issues where as something like proxies

have become existential to iran. will he be knees is to iran to detour iran. blilss are something they already have. therefore to pressure iran to restrain themselves on the conventional missile program or on something like this is going to require an effort with us and the allies frankly and a much greater effort. not to be such a pessimist about it but it's something to remind that it's an enormous challenge for us that does not mean that we don't have to do it. it's just that it is -- it's so important to remember that when you're faced with something like

the missiles, it's essential to understand how important it is to iran and if you have to do it, we have to bring a force of to bear or incentives to bear which is other question. >> the time has expired. i appreciate the naming and shaming but i have to be honest with you. i don't get the sense there they're going to stop and that's the desire that they need and the naming and shaming is going to stop them. when we talk about incentives and i read in the testimony that you suggested the possibility of including iran. international organizations and i just am anot sure that a country that violating just about every international norm should be invited to an international organization

because that doesn't mean they change attitudes. russia and they violated international norms and they're in syria and supporting a dick ray or the shop that bombs to some people. i'm not sure that the invoir dire nation is to the organization is the greatest in the world. i do think pursuing the course of money is incredibly important. thank you. >> senator rubio? >> thank you. i think we were all happy earlier this year to see american citizens that have been unjustly held by iran returned, irrespective of the circumstances under which that happened which were less than ideal. but one of them was not robert levinson. he's an american other has been missing a very long time. we've seen in february that iran arrested a person whose son was arrested on october of 2015. my question iran using unjust arrests of american citizens as a tool of state craft to assure

it gets benefits in the future? if so, was that incentivized surrounding the releases we saw earlier in the year? >> i think iran sees the detention, persistent detention of u.s. citizens and its own citizens at times as definitely a source of leverage to achieve a broad set of objectives. at the same time, there is, as i mentioned earlier, a dose of pragmatism in the regime such that there is the possibility to broker negotiations, to secure the release of our citizens. but ensuring those negotiations happen systematically and are synchronized in such a way that we are not rewarding the bad behavior but justly seeking the

release of our citizens in accordance with international law, and rules of the road. >> yeah. i would certainly agree that iran has a very, very long history of taking our citizens as well as citizens from a number of other countries as leverage points, and it is frankly part of their state craft since material 1980s. certainly we have seen that increase since the nuclear deal, in my opinion. the dual nationals in particular have been a target and that's something i anticipated. that iran after the nuclear zeal particularly worried that the opening up, because they're afraid of president obama's, from their perspective, the implicit part of the deal, that

including iran in the international community will start a slow change inside the regime. and the supreme leader is very concerned that that may actually happen. so therefore, he is clamping down even hard order human rights, as well as using, threatening international iranian dual national businessmen, holding more americans that visit as hostages as leverage chips. they're trying to ensure they have as much leverage as possible. >> let me ask about one more thing we all saw the sale of aircraft to iran. i find that to be extremely troubling. it is important to remember that iran air was designated for providing support and services to the irgc and the ministry of

defense. when they were designated. they occasionally take control of flights carrying special islamic revolutionary guard corps cargo. we've seen others. we've got no indications that they have changed their activities. we have no insurance that's iran won't use these boeing planes in the same way they used other aircraft. i understand some would say when would be the reason the violate the contract? i guess given your back ground on iran, when they receive this aircraft from boeing, is it your view, and again, i would ask both of you, that we should expect to see the likelihood that they will be used the same way aircraft have been used in the past? by iran air and by others to assist the irgc and other designated entities? >> i would expect, given iran's history with such aircraft,

there will be some used in that manner and some used for commercial purposes. iran has a very long use of all capabilities that it acquires. i would be surprised if they don't. >> i think this really charts a holistic approach the today iran such that we can sequence the moves we would like to make in shoring up our deterrence, while at the same time, incent vicing behavior changes such that they are synchronized. you can evaluate the risk that's you are highlighting. if we are to consider certain incentives.

can they lead to iran using the products in bases are contrary to u.s. interests? perhaps in the greater strategy, that does not make sense. so i would encourage them to evaluate programming that we already have underway. initiatives that we have already started. but in the context of a grander strategy that seeks to strengthen our deterrence, secure our interests and protect our allies and partners. >> well thank you both for your testimony. one of the areas that concerns me with regard to the oversight by congress of the nuclear agreement was expressed in legislation that i referred to earlier that is co-sponsored by many of my colleagues. that is for congress to understand where the sanction

relief resources are being used by the iranians. if they're used to enhance their economic fairness tots citizens, i think all of us would say that is well, we should well support that type of efforts. but if it is used to enhance their support for terrorism, or to use it to advance the ballistic missile program, that's a different story. so can you share with us how you believe the sanction relief resources have been used by the iranians and whether you've seen any uptick or not in their other activities? >> well, i think still most analysts would agree that the majority of the sanctions relief in a broader sense, specially incoming, say, for example, oil sales, in a broad sense, it is a

nonterrorism, nonproxy, nonirgc related activities. what we're seeing is less than 10% will be dedicated to their activities. we've sustain direct transfers. >> any type of incoming deals that iran is striking with foreign companies. auto, air, energy sector that they are looking for the cut. that it is going to get a certain cut of that. >> that comes from the iranians or from the investor?

>> that would come from whatever the deal is signed. 10% of it would go into the irgc funding somewhere within the budgetary system. they have all sorts of gray budget capacity on fun money within the system. that's still being argued. there is a lot of back and forth happening in the iranian budget about who would get what from coming out -- >> in fact, had they gotten their cut? >> i don't know if they've actually vinylized. weng we know the transfers of money coming in, essential it was implemented, have kind of doubles the military's budget for like a one-year term because of the transfers that have come in from the one time deals. whether that will continue into

subsequent years is undetermined. so the irgc is getting a one-year bump. this year. it is quite significant. whether that will continue into the out years is uncertain. so we are seeing a very significant influx. a lot of that, of course, is going into sustaining -- what you would consider oco funding that would go into sustaining operations in syria and iraq. how that will flow into -- for example, are they going to rebuild a air force, or build new proxies, you know, in the arabian peninsula or africa in south asia, those are questions -- >> i think we would all acknowledge that prior to the agreement -- nuclear agreement, iran's economy was in pretty bad shape. >> yes. >> serious recession. >> sanctions were having a major impact.

we can also acknowledge iran has been actively engaged in its proxy activities, and whether they could have done that with or without these resources we don't know, but they're actively engaged in proxy campaigns. how can we learn the lesson how we impose sanctions for their nuclear activities and figure out a way we can make sanctions regimes on ballistic missiles and human rights violations to be more consequential to behave change in iran? >> thank you, senator. great question. i think that we can certainly extract lessons learned from how iran is leveraging the funding from the sanctions relief, and apply it to future cases of sanctions. perhaps building in off-ramps. or learning from the snapback effects that were used in the nuclear negotiations, and resulting sanctions, to better

understand first how money flows and operates in the iranian system, and then basically create trigger mechanisms, indicators that we can look for such that if sanctions relief, or sanctions are put in place for future missile development, future proxy activities, that action can be taken to revoke any sort of relief if iran goes down a certain pathway. so i think building that into the system up front as we design a holistic approach would be wise. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up on the money. we had a hearing last week where we talked about that. but i want to talk about the connection between irgc and the money trail. we had a question earlier, revolution dead.

by definition, the irgc, it is in their name. their existence depends on this being an exportable revolution. just like the pla years ago, used to have a significant portion of china's economy. irgc has up to 30% of iran's economy. they have an ongoing source of revenue to export in support of terrorism around the world. we know from the treasury department's own report of weapons of mass destruction support, support for terrorism, hezbollah, bashar al assad, militia, the shiite militia just in iraq since 2005 killed more than 500 u.s. soldiers. the list goes on and on. boko haram. across the entire region. we know the irgc plays an important role. the question is, how can we in a post-deal environment use our economic sanctioning ability and

our financial ability to get at the flow of money through the irgc to these terrorists? the reason i'm asking that is that the money flow, mr. mcinnis, we know they have assets in other countries. the $3 billion in cash and gold, yes, they will get a bump this year. they will get spendable money into their nefarious activities. so my question to both of you is, how would you advise the next administration with the irgc in the money flows, and the releasing of sanctions, and the opening up of business over there, what's our role? how can we play a hindrance? how can we hinder their ability

to further support terrorism around the world? >> i think what you get to, and you're absolutely right, this one-time bump is a one-time event that they'll certainly continue on. thinking about the last question, i think what we're looking for is how do you create an iran that is certainly going to go through a degree of economic expansion over the next few years, at least according to most are estimates. you know, but how do you create a recession in the irgc's economy. how do you separate that out. >> i'm sorry to interrupt, but even before they even have an economic renaissance, just releasing their assets with other countries means there's a flow of cash immediately, independent of whether their economy grows, is that correct? >> yes. >> okay. >> and the issue, i think, one of the things -- and your right to bring up the pla. prior to doing the middle east for a number of years, i worked on china's security issues and the whole issue with the pla business model concerns. in that process of getting the pla out of business, iran may at some point in time go through the same process. they're running into some of the

same problems that china did. i think that the iranians, there's a recognition that over time, you know, it is going to become a problem for the irgc to play the -- if it's going to actually have this type of, you know, dynamic economy for the rest of the world, the irgc is eventually going to have to take probably a lesser role. but i think that the key for that is whether -- the problem with the nuclear deal that many of us talk about, there are many problems with it, but one of the biggest problems is that it's front-loaded to iran's favor. in that they get most of the benefits up front. we get the benefits if they don't actually build a bomb throughout the entire period. but part of the reason, what you can change in that equation is

if the front-loading doesn't actually happen at all in the front where the business climate is not completely favorable at the beginning. that's where you change this dynamic that happened in the last 12 months or so, where we go out there and we're encouraging the international community to invest in iran, and we relax the issues of using dollars for business transactions for foreign companies. we do all these things to make it easier to invest in iran. we make it so it's not so problematic with a u.s. company with a foreign subsidiary does business with guys in that company has irgc guys in the back room or somewhere on their corporate board. we've relaxed a lot of those rules recently. all those rules, with the incoming administration, or rules coming from this body, some of that stuff can be reversed. you can change the

front-loading. you can make it more conditional, that business climate, and that money flow, particularly place the burden back on iranian business that the irgc's role, that the business related to the irgc, that they become a business, you know, burden, that is something you can change that equation, i believe. and focus on that. and create -- and make those businesses recessionary. that is something that i think could be looked at and focused on. >> mr. chairman, i'm out of time. but could i ask your forbearance in asking ms. dalton? >> absolutely. >> thank you very much. i think in addition to what mr. mcinnis laid out, harnessing the coalition that was used to broker the jcpoa on approach to iran going forward is going to be of paramount importance. there are limits to what the united states can do vis-a-vis the irgc. but leveraging the coalition of p 5-plus one, perhaps some asian allies and partners would be a broader and more holistic approach to addressing this

problem set. and i think that another dimension of this could be thinking of creative ways to offset the irgc over the long term. and put something a little provocative on the table that was in my written testimony, would be welcome further discussion on it. but something my colleagues and i have been discussing is over the long term, at the end of the jcpoa period in 2020, the sanctions on an international ban on conventional arms sales to tehran will be lifted. there are future scenarios in which -- >> that's five years, right? >> yes. in 2020. >> right. >> is there a future scenario in which iran is able to divert funds to its conventional arms capability, and away from the irgc.

as matt has pointed out, the irgc is front and center of the regime. in terms of iran's pragmatic interests in the region, its power projection, its desire to have a political and strategic role in the region, that often can come from a conventional capability. so, you know, it's an issue in which the united states perhaps doesn't want to be forward leaning on. but is it possible for -- for the united states to tacitly allow for, over time, the development of iran's conventional capability to offset iranian investments in the irgc which have historically run up against, and threatened the interests of the united states and its allies and partners. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for being here this afternoon.

you both talked about iran's operations in syria. but i don't think i heard you talk about how they view the islamic state. and i wonder if each of you could characterize how you believe iran views the islamic state. >> iran, overall iran views the islamic state as certainly a very significant dire and theoretically at least existential threat. i think they certainly do not view it right now as an imminent threat. given its current state of military weakness. but they certainly view it as an extension of efforts from saudi arabia.

they blame both us and saudi arabia for creating isis. and for, you know, and they see isis as behind terrorist cells and activities inside their own country. they have a growing fear of isis inside afghanistan. and they are building -- they're trying to build up their own security forces and new proxy forces and capabilities inside afghanistan to deal with isis there. which is an interesting kind of side theater that's developing. in syria, of course, it's been a different story. because to president assad, they

have cynically used isis as a good excuse to fight the rebel opposition, and lumping all those as terrorists, and isis was -- they didn't go up against isis much during the civil war over the last few years. but they certainly look at isis as a real -- in 2014, it was a very clear threat. and they are the ones that, frankly, if it was not for the iranian intervention on the ground in june 2014, it is likely isis could have made it into the outskirts of baghdad and the iranian government knows that. >> so excuse me for interrupting. but my time is unaring. miss dalton, do you agree with that? and given that, what are the relationship with iran with respect to isis? >> i think that iran definitely used isis as a significant threat to its interests in the region. manifestation of sunni extremism that is highly destabilizing. i think iran ideally enjoys a degree of instability in the region. it's through that level of instability and chaos that it is able to use its asymmetric influence and capabilities most

effectively. but it is not in the long term iranian interests to have the level of instability and disorder that isis has been sowing. i think the end game for iran in both syria and iraq is a pliable government that is sympathetic to iranian interests, that is going to push back against isis and likeminded groups. but its hedge in that, of course, is the defendant of shia militias in the countries. while there is short-term convergence with the united states in countering isis over the long term, i think iran and the united states are going to be at loggerheads at the long-term trajectory for both countries.

>> so we shouldn't view their efforts in iraq, for example, to fight isis as beneficial to our efforts as well? >> i think that there may be short-term convergence of interests, but i don't think that it should be part of the long-term strategic planning for either iraq or syria. >> i think, misdalton, it was you who mentioned that we should have amplified information operations against iran. i wonder if you could elaborate on what that means? >> there's a number of ways to take this. there's kind of the posture that seeks to unveil iran's, at times inflated capabilities and influence in the region, and really expose it for what it is. the iranians are quite

influential and powerful in some ways. but they also use their own io to project their power and influence. kind of knit together all of their capabilities, whether it's proxies, missile capability, to really project their influence. and so there's a counter io strategy that the united states could take to unmask what iranian intentions and capabilities truly are. acknowledge their significance and push back against them. but at the same time diminish any sort of inflation that is occurring. i think also there's more of a proactive approach that the united states could take to harness some of the nationalist sunni arab sentiment that are both at the government level and popular level that are very concerned about the increasing

reach of iran in the region, and to try to mobilize some of the support from the population, from the government, in support of a strategy that presses back against iran. so that the io is kind of a connective tissue, if you will, for a deterrence approach that the united states might take going forward. >> can i ask just a follow-up question on that? >> sure. >> so do you envision, and mr. mcinnis, i would ask you to jump in on this as well, do you envision a radio-free europe kind of operation? or are you thinking more of a social media campaign? or what? because clearly getting information out to the people who would want to influence is challenging. >> i think there are certainly overt and covert elements to

this. there is never really a question of how credible some of the overt mechanisms can be. if it's coming from -- directly from the united states. so i think third parties in the region that share a similar mind-set are probably the best overt forms. and there are covert forms as well that i think we could bolster. >> i agree with almost of all of what miss dalton was saying. i think for the iranians, they are voracious consumers of all sorts of media. they have extremely creative ways to get around pretty much anything that the government throws up at them. so i think that there are certainly ways that we can get through to the iranians. at the same time, the iranians be being increasingly clever at getting around that. it's a fascinating environment to work with. but i do think that the iranians are very keen to hear from us. i think the iranian people are. so i think that it's still fertile, is my opinion. >> thank you both very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator cain? >> thank you, chair.

a lot of great questions that have been asked that i won't repeat. i'll get into two that i'm interested in. miss dalton, you said a minute ago that we need to think of a holistic approach to tehran. the areas we challenge as we work together, how do you push, and not push too far. and i'm really grappling with the holistic approach to the region. i'm struck -- we'll have separate hearings on sunni and isis. i'll put these together a little bit. when i am in the region and i talk to lebanese or syrians in southern turkey or others, they often talk about their own feeling that they are in -- they're being crushed in a proxy war. but they talk about being crushed in a proxy war between iran and syria.

and they view it somewhat as a war of two nations. and they view it somewhat as sunni and shia, and they view it somewhat as arab and persian, and they view it somewhat as economic competition and they view it somewhat as monarchy versus revolutionary guard. but they personify it in a proxy war between these two countries, both of which are going to be there for a very long time. you used a phrase a second ago, is there a way that we could use sunni nationalist sentiment against iran. but i would worry that might continue to escalate the probability of this proxy war. we didn't start the proxy war. we can't solve the proxy war. there's a proxy war.

the region is going to be very unstable as long as there's a proxy war between the saudis and iran. what are the prospects, if any, for using american influence to try to, if not make it warm and fuzzy, at least to ratchet down the proxy war as a way of promoting more stability in the region? >> i think that's the million-dollar question. i think that starting with the basics, you know, in a new administration, a new congress, have that political leverage and opportunity to do that, to engage allies and partners not just in the region, but in europe and asia in terms of what really matters, and what it is that we want to accomplish. what are the outcomes that we want to achieve. and how best we can get there. and then working through, you know, perhaps through some scenario based planning, scenario based exercises, how we can all leverage our comparative advantages to achieve those outcomes. and the united states historically has been a great convener, a great mobilizer for

those kind of conversations, even if it's not at the end of the day, you know, primarily u.s. resources that are committed. so i do think there's an opportunity there to have a fresh conversation despite all the multi-layered challenges that you have laid out. and an opportunity for the u.s. to exert some leadership. but i do think that the stakes are stacked pretty high against us in terms of this cycle of escalation amongst folks in the region, the sunni dimension, the saudi-iran regional balance. and i think it's trying to bring them to the table to look at the primarily iraq, syria and yemen, and how we can get to a sustainable enduring outcome for those conflicts at the political level, but also at the military level.

and it's going to involve tradeoffs. but i think that having that sort of holistic approach, leveraging u.s. leadership to bring everyone to the table is very important. >> let me ask a question question and i'll have mr. mcinnis tackle that first. but if you want to add in something in the proxy war, i would appreciate it. iran let to conduct bombing operations in support of the syrian government. traditionally there's been some wariness, suspicion to hostility between iran and russia. are you worried at all about an iran and russia growing into a more cooperative military partnership? or do you think that would be an unlikely think to have to worry

about much? >> i'll tackle that one first. i think the iranians and russians have an enormously difficult history. deeply suspicious of each other. at the same time, there's a certain marriage of convenience that is useful for them strategically right now. i think they're both very worried about the other selling each other out at the end. i think that there is, in syria being the obvious case for that, i think that the idea that the russians may cut a deal with us, or with some other power, that puts them at a disadvantage. at the same time as i was

mentioning in my testimony, that iran has spent a lot of time in syria in the last few years. iranianizing the state. building this iran version of syria with this national defense forces, recreating parts of the intelligence structures in syria, that it used to only have one guy in syria, and that was assad. it didn't have anything else. now it has a lot of the state. not all of it. but it has large portions of the state that are really under iranian influence. to the -- on the ground, which russia really doesn't have. russia has a lot of conventional power on top. but iran has built kind of a deep state. like it's doing in iraq for a few years. so you have this very weird russian-iran veto over each other that's really kind of interesting. so i think at the same time, russia doesn't necessarily want to manage all the middle east. iran has bigger plans for the middle east than russia does. so i think this is where you end up in situation where i'm very

concerned about where russia wants to go in the region. i don't know how russia's now going to factor into iran's deterrent strategy, i.e., does any type of confrontation we or the saudis or the israelis have with iran in the future, does that implicitly mean that russia is going to come in and back up iran? does that trigger a russian intervention, or russian threat of force if we or the saudis or israelis get into it with the iranians? i don't know. that's a very big question. >> and my time is expired. so i think i should defer now. thank you. >> thank you. i want to follow up on senate cain. you know, the great fear obviously that israel has is that there's going to be from tehran through baghdad through damascus into lebanon and

hezbollah this greater threat to israel which is going to be created. the sunni, the saudi arabia, they have a fear that through baghdad, through tehran, through damascus is going to be a greater threat to them. so we have this thing that's developing. it can be dealt with realistically, or we can just step back and wait for the whole dynamic to unfold. we have a choice here as americans to kind of anticipate the inevitable, and try to get into this underlying pathology with an intervention in a timely fashion. so we know that going back to the early '80s, that the iranians and the russians were the partners of assad's father, because the naval base was up in their hometown. the assad hometown.

so we know that's going to be a driving force for the russians, and for the syrians. and we can see that until it's completed, the russians and iranians will partner with hezbollah to help assad finish the job, not just in aleppo, but in the other cities where the sunni moderates remain. and that it's more likely than not that they will be successful in accomplishing that. so i guess my question to you is, knowing that, or anticipating that, and knowing that it's highly unlikely that assad is going to go to the international criminal court, and that we have to just deal with this realistically, what would you now say to american policy makers about what the united states should be specifically saying to the russians at this point before the mission is completed for the shia inside of syria? what would you say the words should be spoken to russia that looks like an understanding that we can reach that kind of de-escalates before there's a

rapid escalation that allows the sunni-shia rivalry to just spiral out of control? >> i think to first narrowly address the problem of the iranian proxy influence in syria, and more broadly in the threats it presents to israel and the united states and then more broadly looking at the syrian problem, i think when it comes to what specific steps the united states and its allies and partners can do, i think at a military operational level, doing more to interdict and constrict supply lines, to irgc backed groups in the region, the israelis are obviously closely tracking this. but the more that we can do to work together with other partners in the region as well. >> to interdict -- >> the supply lines to irgc backed groups that are operating in syria and more broadly in the region. i think we can step up our efforts to do that, such that it

undermines the potential for there to be a long-standing -- >> do you think that could be successful? what do you think the probability of that being successful in the future is? >> i think that it's likely more could be done -- >> i'm asking, what is the likelihood of it being successful at the end of the day? >> i think that there is likely to be some continuing presence as a hedge and as a protective force for assad, in a form of irgc backed groups. i think we could mitigate the reach and power of the groups by interdicting and cutting off some supply lines. >> do you see a negotiation that begins?

when did that begin in your mind? or does it begin? >> there's the military dimensional things that we can do, i think at the political and diplomatic level, that there are markers that the united states should set down very clearly in terms of the outcome and end state for syria that limits the influence and long-term presence of irgc backed groups in syria. >> okay. mr. mcinnis, how would you deal with this in a way that anticipates what looks like it's emboldening to me. and when do you stop the process of trying to negotiate protections for the sunnis, politically, inside of that country, as the shia continue their inexorable march? when do you begin the process of protection for the sunni? >> well, i would think this is in some ways, there's a lot of parallels at this stage, in a more condensed time frame, to

what's been happening in iraq over the last 10 to 15 years, where i think you're going to be dealing with a situation where protecting areas of -- where the -- what has happened with the irgc, and building up these capabilities, like the ndf, and in some ways there's a certain degree of -- i won't say quite sectarian cleansing going on in syria, but creating what people expect to be these zones of control, or zones of influence that will probably be some form of whatever settlement if we ever get to that point. but i think that that the iranians have really staked a lot of their hope, or what they're going to fight for in any type of settlement, that they're able to contain these new forces that they have built as part of the government's apparatus. i'm not sure how you unhinge that, how you leverage that out.

and i think really -- >> is it better done sooner than later? >> it's certainly better done sooner than later. the irany is that you end up in a situation similar to what we deal in the iraqi dynamic, where you find, as horrible as it sounds, you find yourself that the syrian government would rather not have to depend on all these iranian capacities. and i think that any efforts that can be done, as you start forming some type of new reconciliation government, if you could call it that, that does not depend so much on the new capabilities that iran has built -- >> do you think that's likely? >> i think it's going to be very tough. >> then let's talk about that context, if you could, just so that -- >> say that again? >> let's deal with it in the context of what's likely to

happen. it's always better in life to try to start out where you're going to be forced to wind up anyway. because it gets prettier that way. you can try to work it through, and just try to be realistic about what is going to happen, rather than -- >> you know, i think as much as you can build whatever international support for whatever settlement is there, that it's dependent as much as possible on local groups, local forces that are syrian based, and minimize as much as possible what is coming in, you know, that are internationally sponsored. basically not foreign sponsored groups and militias operating as much as you can do that. that would be the best i could hope for. >> my hope would be that the sooner we can start being realistic about what's going to be needed to help the sunni population in that country, so that they're given places where they can return from lebanon, return from jordan, where they

can be given some guarantees of being able to co-exist under, you know, some tension-packed relationships, but what's going on in some of the cities in iraq right now, so that we're beginning to think in those terms rather than allowing for a blood letting to just continue on indefinitely where we're contributing to the refugee and the internally displaced person problem without having really anticipated what is -- what looks like is unfolding, okay? if you agree with that, then my time is expired, but i thank you both for your expert advice. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator carden, thank you for a very productive two hours. i think we've had a good closing out of witnesses. we thank you for your testimony today. we hope that we'll continue to have written questions through the close of business friday, if

you could fairly promptly respond to those, with ewould appreciate it. thank you for your service to the country and helping us with this and being here today. with that, the meeting is adjourned.

president-elect donald trump today announced he is appointing ryan zinke for interior secretary. mr. zinke served on the natural resources community which has oversight of the department. earlier this year he asked the current interior secretary sally jewel about the department's priorities. >> i'm sure we all agree on the importance of the parks. we all know you're behind. i just got finished talking to the summit of yellowstone. i know how important it is. i grew up in their backyard. in your budget, it doesn't seem like you prioritize the infrastructure. so if it is so important, why isn't it at the top of the list as far as national parks? >> infrastructure and beginning to deal with the backlog is a

very high priority in our budget. knits there in the recommendations for the centennial initiative which would clear out the high priority over ten years. >> would you say it's a top priority? as you look through it there are a lot of other programs in there, it should be infrastructure first i would think before other education programs, some that are less on the list. >> in the centennial year, visitor experience also is very important. >> president-elect donald trump holds more victory recaallies. he heads to hershey, pennsylvania and you will be able to watch that live on cspan. the victory tour continues in florida and then saturday president-elect holds a rally in mow beebl, alabama. all three rallies live on consider span. monday, lech tors will be meeting in the state capitals, c

span will have live coverage as electors cast their ballot for president and vice president, beginning at 11:00 a.m. eastern, we'll have live coverage from illinois, michigan, and ri richmond, virginia. >> abigail fill more was the first first lady to work outside the home. teaching in a private school. miss eisenhower created fashion sen shagss, it was marketeds a a color and stores sold clip on bingz. jacqueline kennedy responsible for the creation of the white house historical association and nancy reagan as a young actress saw her name on the black list of sympathizers, she appealed to the guild head, ronald reagan for help and later became his wife. these stories are featured in

the book "first ladies." the book makes a great gift for the holidays. giving reeders a look into the personal lives of every first lady in american history. stories of fascinating women and how their legacies resonate today. share the stories of america's first ladies for the holidays. in paper back, published by public affairs is now available at your favorite book seller and also as an e book. >> the foreign policy initiative recently held a forum on national security. one speaker at the gathering was lieutenant general h.r. mcmaster who discussed technologies with military history. this is an hour and 10 minutes.

>> good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. if i could kindly ask you to move towards your seats for what will be the final time this afternoon. it's always a pleasure to reach the culminating discussion of the day. and our fbi forum will be a wonderful conversation between mcmaster and our fellow and the director of our center on military and diplomatic history, mark moyer. before we get started and you will forgive me taking the moment, i want to use a quick opportunity to say thank you to a few members of the fbi team before we wrap up and when folks head toward the exists, but in particular, elaine stern, lindsey mark kel, government relations team at the fbi, very little would happen if it were

not for them and daniel bar row, our operations director. the three of them in particular have done much of the great work that is made today happen. i'm very grateful to the three of them and very grateful to mark for everything that he has done standing up, cmdh, since july of this year, it's a new effort. mark arrived at fbi in the summer of 2015. after he came to us from joint special operations university. prior to that, he had been in the structure at marine corps university, the frequency with which he is publishing books is really quite stunning. he has a forthcoming history of special operations forces coming out next year. and at the end of the 2018, he will have a sequel to his very well known and truly excellent book, "triumph forsake even, the vietnam war, 1964 to 196 a ".

we look forward to the conversation he will be having to do with general mcmaster. thank you. >> thanks to you for all your hard work that's gone into this event. i'm dr. mark moyer, the director the our newly formed center for military and diplomatic history and we've heard a bit today about some of the reasons why we actually need a center like this. there is problems on both the supply side and the demand side. the supply side, military and diplomatic history are really out of fashion at civilian universities, which is why you have someone like a ben sass or a lot of other ph.d. historians here who are not teaching at universities where they would, under normal circumstances be teaching. on the demand side there is i think a deficit of knowledge about history here in the policy world and also to some extent a lack of interest.

so we're trying to readdress both of those problems. now, social scientists, will often tell you historians don't know how to do anything except tell stories which is about as silly thing, fidel castro doesn't do anything except provide health to the needy. the -- but i am going to start with a story because it is a very ee eke five way of getting people's attention, after a day of being bombarded with speeches and us being the last place, i thought it would hopefully help us provide a point of departure. eight years ago in the same town there was a lot of talk about a new idea called smart power, if you remember that. and one of the key elements of smart power was using non military means to alleviate conflict and it was said that under the bush administration there had been this alliance on

the military instrument of power, so we are going to now use the non military instruments of power because these problems have root causes that are non military in nature, things like human rights violation, poverty, and so we're going to have those whole of government approaches where we have the civilian agencies taking on more of the work and the military is going to be doing less. and in theory, it sounded pretty appealing in a number of respect ds. we then saw this put into practice in a number of places, i will talk about one example. afghanistan. so the obama administration decided to increase the development aid in afghanistan from 1.2 to $4.1 billion. they undertook a civilian surge, which went about 500 civilians in afghanistan to 1,300 civilians, and they set about trying to actually implement

this sort of smart power approach in afghanistan. unfortunately the results did not live up to the billing. some of you here, i think saw this firsthand, but for one thing we saw the state department, u.s. aid could not get their experienced people to go to these countries so they had to bring in contractors and temporary employees. and the vast majority of those people never actually got out into the country side because it was dangerous there and civilian unions didn't feel they were obliged to go there. we then did not have over sight of where the huge amount of cash was going and they often ended up in the hands of the enemy or corrupt officials so the eu ex as -- if you wanted to do aid projects, the taliban was there and they were going to kill your aid workers and governors, there was counterinsurgency gains but

it didn't have to do with smart power and everything to do with military power because it was basically where the u.s. military went into those areas, brought the afghan government officials with them. i would argue that this huge waste of resources could have been avoided if we had actually paid some attention to history. if the obama administration had looked back, they didn't have to look back far, you could go to the clinton administration to find the same ideas. if you think columbia in the 1990s, we heard a lot of the same ideas, we were going to use non military power, we are not going to give money to columbia's military, to law enforcement we were going to do crop substitution programs, but what happened, same things that happened in afghanistan. too insecure to go into these areas, people getting killed and ultimately it wasn't until the governments in both countries decided to put a heavy emphasis

on the security side that you actually made progress. i think this is just one example where there is some pretty clear indications from history that a different policy should be reviewed. now, history is oftentimes not so straightforward. what we often see is a situation where there are multiple precedents you could look for. classic case would be iraq in 2003. after we took down shugh sane, e focused heavily on nazi germ knee. and i would argue in hindsight we actually probably should have looked at other cases, why not look at japan in 1945 or say the reconstruction, the american south after the civil war. we actually could have learned a lot from there. history does not -- is not going to necessarily fall into your lap. it requires a lot of serious

thought. i would add we can't just ignore it even though it's difficult because the times we've tried to do foreign policy without any history at all has led to disaster because it's based on unfounded assumptions. we do need to be aware that history is going to be used and so the question is how do we use it effectively. history i think is also important because it gives us familiarization, it gives us context so that if you are confronting a counternarcotic situation, it would be useful if you had spent time studying five or ten actual historical cases, when you go to the next one, you will at least know what questions are going to be asked, you can have an idea of what solutions might actually work. now, our center is doing a variety of events to try to bring historians from around the country here to interact with the policy community and we're

doing a number of venues, some public events this being the largest we've done so far. some that are specifically targeted private government audiences so we're going to the pentagon, capitol hill, foggy bottom, places like that. we don't expect that we're going to fundamentally change u.s. foreign policy doing this, but we do think there is a lot of value to getting historians and the best historians to talk to people who are making decisions today and we think also that by beating the drum on history, that we will get people in the national security community to spend more time looking at history, to think historically, you don't have to have a ph.d. in history to think historically. we are fortunate today to have somebody who i think is perhaps the best possible person to convey this message. sitting next to me, lieutenant

j.r. mcmaster, he has a ph.d. in history and is at the same time incredibly distinguished practitioner. he came to public attention during the gulf war in 1991, when he commanded an armored cal vary copy at the battle of '73 easting, where he routed a much larger iraqi tank force and this became textbook study in new forms of armored warfare. 1997 he pushed a book that was based on his ph.d. dissertation called "der reliks of duty." 2004 he was the commander of u.s. forces in iraq where he was able to achieve success against insurgents at a time where very few americans were actually succeeded in that regard. he spent time in afghanistan,

2010, took charge of the international coalition, anti-corruption task force and he's now at the army capabilities integration center where he is in charge of planning army capabilities for future conflict as we go forward. he's done a lot of other great things, in the interest of time i'll leave it at that summary. i would like to introduce, turn it over to lieutenant general mcmaster. >> what a privilege it is to be with all of you. how many history majors are here? i want to know -- there is still some people to convert maybe. i thought maybe it was just going to be an audience of fellow historians, all of whom are talking about how underappreciated we are, you know. but i think this is such a great idea. i mean, the idea of a center for military and diplomatic history, for all the reasons that mark identified, so what i thought i might do is talk about how i

think the center can really help us, make us better, better at defending our nation in particular, better at anticipating, the demands of national security and then crafting a national security strategy to address really threats that we see or that are growing. threats that are growing to our nation, and i think all civilized people's today. so i will try to be super brief here. what i would really like to do is see where you want to take the discussion and hear your ideas and thoughts as well. but this is important, right. this is an important center, and from our perspective in the army, in the joint force in our military, because thinking clearly about diplomacy and security is fundamental, not only to protecting our vital interests and conflict, but also ensuring that our military is prepared, prepared to respond to threats to national and international security. and to be able to, as mark alluded to already, to resolve crises at the lowest possible

cost. in lives and blood and treasure. thinking about future war is often neglected. or it's just done superficially. remember the orthodoxy of the revolution in military affairs in the 1990s, a lot of you are probably too young for that. in the 1990s, it became conventional wisdom, future war was going to be great, cheap, efficient. wage war like the george -- leave on a high note after doing really cool military stuff. so it didn't acknowledge wars enduring political nature. the fact that people fight for the same reasons, 2500 years ago, fear, hon are and interest. it didn't acknowledge wars interactive nature, zlfr the interrent uncertainty of war. remember the language dominant battle space knowledge, you could find it on the internet, it has its own wikipedia page.

shock and awe, read the four conditions we were going to be able to achieve in future war. one was total control of everything. and so it didn't even acknowledge any kind of agency or control over the future course of events by one's enemies or adversaries. our ability to prevail, strategically and at peace in war in particular depends on as you heard from the senator, knowing who we are, right. and knowing our values. so some particularly in ack dame i can't don't want to study war, in part because they confuse the study of war with advocacy of it. what we ought to do is think about, i was thinking about war and conflict the way that raymond bradbury thought about it. when he finished writing this novel, he was interviewed and

the interviewer said to him, are you trying to predict the future? he said, no, i'm trying to prevent it. so unless we can think clearly about future war, we'll be unable to deter conflict. but others neglect, as i mentioned, continuity in the nature of war and focus almost exclusively on social or tech any logical -- it's the neglect of diplomatic and military history that per petiates deficiencies and understanding which in turn then can make war more likely. so what is lacking sorely today i believe, is depth of understanding. we achieve new heights of superficial, in our discussion of what is going on in the world and what we might do about it. in recent years many of the difficulties encountered in strategy i can -- have stemmed

from shallow or thawed thinking, enabled by the abject neglect of history. i hope this center will help policymakers and civilian and military leaders overcome the tyranny of the daily crisis, when you are thinking about and reading history you are freeing your mind from the day to day chores and engaging a subject more deeply. but i also think it will help serve as a corrective to wishful thinking that makes the future appear much easier, and fundamentally different from the past. so what the center will help us do is to go beyond what we should think about particular issues, but i think with a huge contribution is going to be helping us understand better how to think. and so what can the center do in particular in terms of how to think about problems.

and i think that first of all, to -- it will help us understand better how to do what was suggested we do. take what seems fused, big problems and then break them down into their constituent elements, to engage problems we're dealing with now, right. dice for isis or terrorists and engage it on its own terms and recognize the complexity of these problem sets. also just how to ask the right questions. asking first order questions, sometimes we got to skip that stage, you know. let's do bombing, this or that, right we confuse activity with progress, because we don't properly frame the problem. what is the nature or character of this conflict. what is driving the conflict. who are our enemies and add very rares, what is their strategy.

i mean, sometimes we skip right in, what is the enemy organization, how are they disposed and how do we go after them, for example. how to understand events and circumstances on their own terms, how to trace events. how to apply inner disciplinary approach that includes an throw apology, literature, fillis fee and science. and then as mark mentioned how to think in time, consistent with the historian carl becker's observation, that the memory of the past and anticipation of the future should go hand in hand in a friendly way. without disputing over priority and leadership. so whenever somebody taubz to you about the deep future or leap ahead capabilities run for the exits. something crazy is coming right after that. you know. and i think what we really need is a grounded projections into

the near future, a focus on solving real problems, addressing real threats. real add ser varryes in real geo graphic areas. we learn the military countries that are prepared to either prevent or respond to crisis are those who think clearly about the problem in future war in that grounded war. who think about it as the ancient greeks said, think about ourself as walking backward into it, paying attention to what is going on today and what has gone on in the past as a way to think about the future. so without the depth of understanding that history provides, the center will help provide, we'll remain vulnerable to what we have to always quote whenever we can, the 19th century philosopher of war warned against, the tendency to regard war as something autonomous rather than an instrument of policy. misunderstanding the kind of war in which we're embarking and turn it into something that is

alien to war's very nature. in short, this center, and the history that the center promotes is important because i think it can provide a strong anecdote to future folly. so this is why historians have to make a special effort. i think be unabashed about connecting historical knowledge and understanding to contemporary strategy i can and operational problems. we have to be humble about that. historians should be particularly humble about that and qualify analogies, we must not he help think about concrete contemporary or emerging problems. so applying history to understanding the problems of today and tomorrow is just as important for citizens, though, as it is for diplomats and offense officials x i'm glad this is a public forum, i think that the center reaching out to

our citizens is going to be particularly important because citizens have to possess a fundamental understanding of war, and of warriors if they're to remain connected to those who fight in their name and if they're to hold our governments, our governments accountable for decisions involving killing and the prospect of death. and if society is disconnected from an understanding of war or is disconnected from that society's warriors, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain just the fundamental requirements of military effectiveness. or to recruit young men and women into military service. so the connection between our military and our society is something that we might focus on as well. as necessary to preserve the -- that permits service men and woman that see themselves as part of a community, and a covenant that biends them to one

another and binds them to the society that they serve. absent a fundamental understanding of war and what it takes to fight it, popular culture cheapens. it further separates warriors, often portrayed as flawed, fragile or traumatized human beings from their fellow citizens. the historian and the sensitivity to the limits of reasoning by historical analogy are important to preserve. historians must engage on contemporary issues. so this conference, the work of this center is important because unless we access history in a purposeful way, it's lessons will, as the great historian becker warned, lay inert in unread books. i'm looking forward to see where you would like to take the conversation, what a privilege it is to be with you. thanks. >> well, thank you, h.r. for those terrific remarks, a few

more points to my mind. you talked about taking a time to free your mind. that is kind of one of the things we're trying to do is just get in with a senior person, actually sort of a role model for our project is one of our board members, i met him in 2007, he was working on iraq and they had an idea that they were thinking of and it was in relation to what was going on in vietnam, they brought me into the pentagon to talk to him and other senior officials and i think it had some value to them and obviously i kouncount give all the answers, that was of value and it's easy to get caught up in the crisis of the day that it's valuable that way. you talked about complexity, i think that is one of the advantages of history and historians, i think the social sciences in many respects and not all of them, but many of

them, oversimplify things, especially when they try to quantify things or come up with grand theories and history makes you understand how complex things are that things are non linear, that you actually need to spend a lot of time studying something before you can really understand it. you also raise the point about inner disciplinary work and we do actually support things that are beyond pure history. i have actually written a couple books that are sort of in the political science realms. you are taking a subject, how -- you maybe take five different administration, look at their history for trends in certain areas. speaking of disciplinary, another thing came to mind, recently read a book "super forecasting." it's a pretty interesting book.

the book looks at forecasting and -- it grew out of an earlier work that found that experts you see on tv don't really predict anythings any better than anyone else, they just say things better. then they did this study to try to figure out if there is anyone that can predict these things, they found super forecasters, you give them a question like is ukraine going to lose another 100 killometers of territory, yes or no. for a long period of time, one of the most interesting things they found was that after about five years, the super forecasters were no better than anyone else. so it raises a question of can we -- how can we really think about the future if we're in -- in history indicates how often we get the future wrong. so how do we think about that. i was going to ask you a question. you talked a little about future, maybe if you could talk a little more how your

historical sense or historical knowledge makes you think about future, because you obviously in your position can't say we don't know anything. how do you think through that? >> thank you. so i think the first way that we think through it is we acknowledge the continuity in the nature of war, these are the continuities that make war that howard observed. wars resemble each other more than they resemble any other human activity. so if you acknowledge what makes war different, which is its for political outcomes, political nature, the human drivers of conflict, the interactive nature of war, it's a contest of wills for example, it helps you resist simplistic an al giz like some of those in the 1990s. some had to do with law and computing power equals fundamental change in war, for example. so it helps you understand

continuities. of course the character of war is always evolving and changing. so what we do is we really look at four key elements. we look through this four considerations as we look to future armed conflict. the first is threats, enemies and add very sars in the operating environment. to make a ground pd -- to see threats to national security. we don't have to be soup mer imagine thattive these days, unfortunately, so we're concerned obviously with the two powers on the land mass, russia and china, who are engaged in, you might say a form midtive war for collapsing the post world war ii order and replace it with one more sympathetic to their interests. they are pursuing a very sophisticated strategy that combines the use of unconventional force under the

cover of conventional sources and involves a -- economic actions and political subversion and so forth. so this is one threat set to look at. both of those militaries are modernizing their militaries and russia has been -- so we're watching that very carefully, we're looking at russian capabilities and emerging capabilities to see what our gaps are and understand better what our strengths are relative to them so we can preserve and accentuate those strengths. the threats -- i think we obviously look closely at north korea. it's difficult to overstate the threat from north korea. iran, whob waging a proxy war against us since 1979 and then terrorist protostate in the middle east is representative of

terrorist organizations striving to take control of resources, as we look at these, but also recognize that these problems are completely disconnected from each other. they'll continuously calculate their actions and pay attention to where they might see opportunities associated with the effect that others are having on us and our interests. but what is common across all of these conflicts that we see and potential conflicts is their about population and resources. we see common across these are potential enemies take four kind of, they do four things, that are common. first thing is they try to evade what they see as our strengths. we have to understand our enemies are not going to be the passive recipients of our military pro wes, they'll engage in counteractions traditional simple ones, they'll disrupt our

capabilities, come after what they see as our network capability with sophisticated cyber and warfare kale built, concerned about our air power, russia's established air supremacy over ukraine from the ground. so these are the kind of things common across different add ser varryes and enemies. the third is they will especially euiate. china engaged in intellectual threat in history. the most transfer able to our enemies, and finally expand on the other battlegrounds, propaganda, district information, political subversion, criminality and so forth. what we have to do to sure our interest. the third is technology, changes in technology, also

understanding from a historical measure there is countermeasures, sub marine, radar, machine gun tank, tank missile, understanding that interaction within technology, enemy technology, our technology to gain advantage. and finally the fourth lens we look at. we can learn so much obviously from what is going on today in conflicts we are still involved in. i was -- you hear this, what is it like to be in this post war period, man, what post war period you talking about. so we're learning a lot from -- french operations in -- or israeli combat operations in gaz i can't or lebanon in 2006, so learning from what is going on that we see around the world today is important. ukraine obviously is -- and russian operations in syria, things we're paying particular attention to. that is how we -- that's the framework we think through.

what we try to do is lay a strong conceptual foundation based on that thinking for modern i sags. based on that understanding, then we describe how army forces in the future will have to be prepared to fight or fight how they would fight to secure our nation and our vital interest as part of the joint force with multinational partners, with civilian agencies and others. so that is the description of how we have to fight in the future. that is in highly readable army concept. in time to take to the ski slopes with you. there is a whole family of consents soc waited with that foundation and the latest is something called multidomain battle. based on that conceptual foundation we have to identify what are the required capabilities and then we learn through seminars, experimentation, war gaming and we learn through a framework

called the war fighting challenges, these are 21st order questions, the answers to which will inform future force development. so it is an effort to learn in a focused, sustained and collaborative manner, not to learn, you know, repetitively or ep sod callie. in the army we get enthusiastic about things, what about robots man, if it's worth doing, it's worth overdoing in the army. so the problem is then we'll forget about that and go on to something else. like kids soccer, right. so counterusa. the key is we have to learn under this framework on a -- in a sustained manner and then we have to analyze what we're learning effectively and bridge an implementation. i think there's a role for history in each of these phases, right, so what do we read, well, we're reading history to understand better contemporary conflicts and the threats. you know, we're reading the history of technology and

interactions between technology and organizations and doctrine and so forth. so we have some work that is seminal in this area, the book that dealt with mcgrog other nox and -- lot of great literature on technology. a lot of literature on militaries that did innovate and learn effectively and those that didn't. there is work on comparing the french and ger mans. i could go on and on. the history of how we got weapon systems, the king of the killing fields. so we -- everything we do, we have wane lee from the university of north carolina coming to our organization tomorrow, to talk about history and history of the waging war and how to think about changes

in the character of warfare, so just a quick, it's not a quick synopsis. >> i will ask one more question then we'll open up to the audience. one of the first historians we had two months ago was brian lynn, he has a new book out "elvis army," in the book he looks at the army in the '50s and makes the point that a lot of the transformation that we hear now in the -- are actually similar to what was being said in the 1950s and they ran into a problem ultimately that tech nomgy they wanted to introduce surpassed the capabilities of the military because you did not have sufficiently educated work force within the military. there is certainly lots of talk these days about personnel especially trying to find innovative personnel. where would you say the army is right now in terms of human

resources and what further steps would you advice the army to make? >> so this is a big area of focus for us. and we say in the army operating concept, in appendix c, it's awesome, wait until you get to that. you will be like what is going to happen next, right. so we say our differential advantage comes from combinations of resilient well trained sold dwrerz and cohesive teams and adoptive leaders with technology. that's our differential advantages, we're at pages every day to say we don't man equipment, we equip the man or woman. so the key thing for us is from the beginning to be sure we're cognizant of how that technology actually applies to the problem of war and warfare, i think the warfare challenges help us do that and we also understand how

to integrate that into an organization that will apply it. we have a rigorous experimentation program, where we get that in the hands of soldiers very early. where there is one called the maneuver and fires experiment at fort sill there is a cyber equivalent we do in new jersey, so i think that getting that equipment in then allows soldiers to see how they would apply it and then it gets feedback to industry and it informs our requirements. for example, we're about to buy and field a unmanned system that is about this big, it fits in a pocket, and has a significant amount of rang so that before you cross the street in an urban area or where a machine gun might be covering,