this weekend, c-span cities tour along with our cox communications cable partners will explore the literary life and history of scottsdale, arizona. nicknamed the west's most western town. on book tv on c-span 2, hear about life on route 66. known as america's mother road. route 66 was one of the original u.s. highways between illinois and southern california. in his book, the 66 kid, raised on the mother road, author bob bows bell recalls his life in kingman, arizona, located on route 66. and the many things he observed while helping his father run a gas station.

>> about ten years ago i got a call from a writer and he said, i read about your article on your father's gas station in arizona highways and i would like to interview you. i said, sure. he goes, his first question, the very first thing he asks me is, what was it like growing up in such a historic place. >> and visit guidon books which specializes in civil war history and western americana. >> my father was a great custer collector. my mother loved the civil war but was also very enamored with the women in the west. i'm sure they came up with guidon books, it fits american military. >> then, hear about the founding of scottsdale from arizona state historian marshal tremble. mr. tremble shares the story of wilson scott, a civil war hero who saw potential in the arizona salt river valley. >> he just graduated from seminary school and was assigned a church when the civil war

broke out and lincoln called for volunteers. and he really wanted to get into it. so he went back to his hometown in new york there and little tiny town, and he started recruiting and raising his own company of soldiers. and i think he recruited about 33 of his own cousins. and his bible study class. and he even recruited the town band. >> and we will visit the winter home of architect frank lloyd wright. >> really an example of how to live in the desert southwest. it was a building that frank lloyd wright used as a laboratory. wright was working to create a new kind of architecture for america. >> the c-span cities tour, saturday at noon eastern on c-span 2's book tv and sunday afternoon at 2:00 on american history tv on c-span 3. working with our cable afailates and visiting cities across the country.

>> 5g wireless service is expected to connect billions of machines, kitchen appliances, medical devices and automobiles to one another and the web. at noon eastern, here on c-span 3, a discussion about the future of 5g. next we'll hear about body cameras, facial recognition technology and law enforcement agencies using social media as part of a discussion on countering violent treeksism. this is a day-long conference hosted by thecato institut cato. >> good afternoon, once again. as i said previously, i'm policy analyst in civil liberty and homeland security here at cato institute. i want to welcome all of you here in the auditorium as well as all of our folk watching

on-line on c-span or direct webcast. appreciate that. what we're going to be dealing with this afternoon on this panel, is an issue that has become a genuine political plflh point, both domestically and the interna intersnagsly. this is known as counter violent extremism, cve or short. this has been dealt with since the arrive of the ku klux klan and aftermath of the civil war. in some case the domestic political radicals have been real and lethal. president mckinley was assassinated be assassinated by an anarchist extremist. this led to a crack down on anyone professing to anarchist beliefs, whether or not they represented a threat to the public.

[ inaudible ] in many cases the employment of the coercive power of the united states military and federal law enforcement backed by legislation and the courts, to harass, jail and even kill domestic political activists deemed to be extremists, violent or otherwise. during world war ii an estimated 120,000 of our fellow citizens were rounded up and placed in concentration camp oents orders of franklin delaware roosevelt friktly because they shared a heritage with the people who attacked us on december 7, 1941 and despite the fact not any japanese americans had any involvement or in any way facilitated the attack on pearl harbor. during the cold war the list of sub versive activity control board and incredibly named house in american activities committee

where infamous committees engaged in political witch hunts and personal and professional harm they caused to literally thousands of innocent americans is inc is incalculable. there was domestic surveillance and political depression in the 20th century. many of this was the subject of the kmur much committee investigation over 40 years ago. i think some of the previous panels at least alluded it that at least discussed some of the specifics and still others, uncovered in the 1980s under then chairman john kerry. while it would be comforting to believe that such episodes are a thing of the past confined to an earlier darker era of american history, recent event have demonstrated that this is unfortunately not the case. in a post 9/11 era, it is primarily muslim american communities that have faced

scrutiny by federal, state and local authority. that is overt and covert as well as various issued billed as community outreach experts. carried out by the offices of justice and homeland security. entity that will soon receive tens of millions of dollars of taxpayer funding as a result of recent congressional decisions. now we all know that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks individuals inspired by the philosophies of the terrorist groups like isis and al qaeda committed horrific acts of violence. from boston to chattanooga, to san bernardino and orlando. should those acts by specific individuals lead to the surveillance and scrutiny of enti entire ethnic or religious communities. are there discrete indicators of radicalization that we can use to identify those at risk in engaging terrorism.

and how have the governmental policies whether outreach or covert surveillance impact communities with ethnic religious or family links to the middle east or south asia in these questions have taken on a heightened sense of important in line of the stated views of president-elect trump, several members of his transition team and number of his cabinet level national security sector nominees. over the next hour our panelists drawing on their own experience and research will examine these questions. and we have what i think is an absolute outstanding group of folks joining us today who kind of come from a cross the political spectrum in some respects. and who have a wide variety of experience. starting to my immediate right is my friend mike german. former fbi agent of 16 years and currently a fellow at brennan centers liberty and national security program where his work focuses on law enforcement as well as intelligence oversight we form. seated to my left is assistant

chief luther reynolds in the montgomery county police department. where he has been a 26-year veteran of law enforcement and involved in a number of relatively high profile response incidents here in the d.c. metro area. seated to his left is the director of law and policy at the sikh coalition and like me, a georgetown alum. i didn't like plan on packing this panel with alum but somehow i managed to do it. seated next to arjun is a georgetown law graduate and practicing attorney in the oregon department of justice in civil litigation division and finally my friend mike berry from the arab-american institute. thank you all for being here. i want to make it very clear that the views that are expressed by the panelist are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the respective organizations, unless

otherwise explicitly stated. in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, federal authorities rounded up arab and muslim men in immigration enforcement sleeps as way to identify sleeper cells and some cases are still working their way through courts unless i'm badly mistaken. and i've read myself some of the department of justice inspector general report on those incidents and they in essence admitted that ethnic and religious bias helped to drive those roundups and activities. and that mentality unfortunately helped to ensnare the family of one of our panelist and in this case, sha rya mayfield. she and her father, brandon, have written a book about the experience. can's called "improbable cause the war on the bill of rights." we happen to have a few copies of it available. it is $15 cash or check. she will autograph during the break for those interested. we have here out here in the

hallway. i have the kindle version. it is great read. the floor is yours. >> thank you. it is great to be here among panelists who have experience and knowledge. i feel like i'm the youngest one here but i also have a unique experience that i want it share. i will reiterate that these views are my own and do not represent the oregon department of justice or any past employer. i did work for senator biden for a couple of years as well and gained a lot of experience through that. for those of you that don't know about my father's case, brandon mayfield, back in 2004, in may of 2004, he was arrested in connection to the madrid train bombings that happened a couple months prior. these madrid train bombings were perhaps the biggest take that spain ever experienced and would be equal to our 9/11 for them.

and he was connected to this train attack by a 100% or allegedly 100% fingerprint match that was a faulty fingerprint match. and throughout this experience, of being targeted, because that's strongly what i believe happened, my family is muslim, muslim american. my father is a convert. he goes to the mosque regularly. we all go fairly regularly but especially him. he is also a lawyer. he represents client or was representing client previously in the portland 7. i don't know if you know of those people. but those were alleged terrorists who wanted to go to afghanistan to fight there and my dad represented one of those individuals in a custody case because he did a lot of family law. so you start to build this network of folks that you

associate with, speespecially an attorney, i'm also an attorney, you have associations with people that aren't so good. i strongly believe that due process needs to be afforded to everyone, even the most heinous of individuals. so to think that you could be implicated in some sort of network because you happen to represent bad people is very chilling on the practice of law, freedom of association. and that's something that i strongly would speak out against. so back to 2004, may 6, 2004, pli dad was at his office practicing law. two fbi agent came to the door, arrested him. he had no idea what was going on. we had no idea, as family, what was going on. i came home from school that day. i was picked up from school very urgently. first thing i thought is this is a big joke, big mistake. oh, the fbi, federal government

is out to get my dad. like one of those 007. movies, it seemed so surreal at the time. but after just even a few days of learning about the allegations which eventually we did learn of the allegations and hearing over and over that it's a 100% fingerprint match, it became very dire, very serious and very scary. that's an understatement. i'm now 12 years detached from that moment and it still is very haroing as my dad describes it, to think about coming back that day and not seeing my dad. and told by lawyers that at best, even if he is innocent, it'll take eight months or more just to litigate and at worst, he could be deemed an enemy combatant, sent to guantanamo bay, face the death penalty. very serious allegations here. but there's a lot of stuff happening behind the scenes. how could my dad be implicated in a terrorist attack that had

nothing to do with. he had never been to spain. his passport was i think over ten years expired. he was very patriotic. served in the military. practicing law. upstanding citizen. very nonviolent. he once -- we had chickens at one time and he slaughtered one he he was so upset about that that he said would he never do it again. i was also upset. and now i'm vegetarian. so he is a very nonviolent person. and none of it made sense. so when we heard about all of the allegations, we were very scared. we started learning more especially after he was in there for a while, we started going through everything, going through the legal bases on which he was arrested. fisa. and you guys have heard from fellow panelists about fisa and about section 702. hopefully about section 215. freedom act and so on. fisa and i think patrick was talking about this briefly but

during the mccarthy era when that was passed, it was better than it was today, i would say. you could get a warrant if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intelligence. now, all you need is saying purpose. if you look at congressional liftry on what that actually means in practice you can listen to senator hatch i think in 2002 after the change in the law had occurred in 2001 after 9/11, he made it clear that even if your primary purpose was to do a criminal investigation so long as its significant purpose was to gather foreign intelligence, that's okay. that's exactly what the fisa warrants were not supposed to do. they were supposed to be focused only on situations where a criminal investigation wouldn't work, where you are targeting foreign folks with foreign intelligence and now it's being used against u.s. citizens for

potentially criminal investigations or primarily criminal investigations. that's very dangerous. so my dad was released after two weeks, as we say thanks to god and the spanish police. the spanish police did their own investigation and were pushing back against this 100% fingerprint match since months before since they got the print off the blue bag of detonators in spain. they said, not only did they say that they had some thoughts that it may not be match, they said it was negative. it wasn't a match. and federal law enforcement did not mention this to the courts. in fact they said after meeting with the spanish police they thought that spanish police was satisfied with their findings. but when you actually listen to or read the interviews of the spanish police, and the spanish forensic folks they were saying, no, that's not the case. they were out to get my dad.

and so i attribute to being muslim-american. i think the situation has been very depressing since th9/11 fo muslim-americans and for muslim americans around the world for being surveilled for the laws. think the counter extreme you will hear about, i'm very skeptical. i think there is damage done in muslim communities for being targeted even when you are a completely law-abiding citizen and it repair this will take a lot of work. i haven't seen much on the part of federal law enforcement to repair the dam an done to the muslim community, the lack of trust in portland, oregon we had the mohamed case, tree bombing case in 2010. and while i that i that individual obviously had some evil in him to even, you know, think that idea would be a good idea to blow up a christmas tree with people surrounding it, i also think the way the federal law enforcement, fbi handled the

situation, was very badly. the dad reached out to them in trust about kens of hconcerns o son. you are told, if you see something, say something. now your kid is facing 25 years in prison when i think that situation could have been avoided if he wasn't provided that fake bomb. which is what the fbi had done. and it took them a couple years of talking to him and coaching h coaxing him to get him to that situation. i hope you will think of the negative impact that these surveillance lawes have on muslim-americans. and not just muslim-americans. especially in light of our new president-elect things could get very bad very fast. even worse than they are. the japanese internment camps are an example. i would like to remind that you

the supreme court never overruled that decision, i think that is a total cop-out. it is completely contrary to our constitutional rights and it is disgusting that something like that might recur. potentially in the next few years. so i will leave it on that note. only a few books in the hallway, hopefully you will buy them. mostly because i don't want to carry them back into the airport. hopefully that gives you context around my views, on the situation and on the situation that i experienced with my dad. i also hope that for the people that are looking into forensic science, or that work in forensic science, you look towards blind testing and eliminating cognitive and confirmation bias in that field as well. because bias exists there as well. not just in law enforcement agencies but in the lab possess. that's huge problem as well. >> thank you. i should note that when the department of justice

ultimately, inspector general department of justice, ultimately issued their report on the fbis mishandling of the mayfield case, one of the things that they explicitly acknowledged in there that was bias did in fact play a role. i think was the decisive role, quite frankly. but played a role in the very thing that happened for brandon mayfield and to sharia. which is why i think this work she is trying to do in the area of forensic says so important. my friend mike german, as i said, sent 16 years at the fbi. i don't expect him to defend the fbi today. but what i would like for you to do is since you have dealt with terrorism yourself, you worked undercover for almost two years, penetrating right wing, essentially white supremacist organizations in this country, looking at those groups and their activity and potential threat that they posed. you say that there is a right way and a wrong way to do this

essentially. can you kind of walk us through your world view on this in terms of how we approach this threat. we have a lot of folks in this country as all of us are aware who are deeply concerned about this terrorism threat. it is real. we have seen it happen. so we don't want to, at the end of the day, none of us want it minimize the idea that there is no threat. there is. we have seen it. americans have suffered from it. but at the same time, least in your view i think, a right way and wrong way to go about this. so give us your perspective on that. >> so i think if we could imagine a perfect world, what we would want is all of our security resources focused on people who are doing harm with none of the impact affecting anybody doing anything. i think that my former colleagues in law enforcement and my kcolleagues in the civil

liberties would agree on that. we want it catch tto catch the and let the innocent go about their business without interference. the question is, how do you achieve that goal. and i think my biggest problem with the counter violence extremism program is that it is based on a flawed premise that people move from adopting bad ideas to becoming violent. and there are any number of studies now of actual terrorist of people who have committed violent acts in the name of a particular political cause or other reason. wha and what it shows is that they are not very typical. i was undercover in neonazi groups, militia groups, prepare ford cases in other groups as well. what i found is that the people who were committing the criminality and acts of violence did not really appreciate the people who were writing the

books. and the manifestos and hosting the on-line forums. that stuff was illegitimate to them. it was a waste of time. what we needed to do is take action. the idea we are taking this programming and focussing it on the expression of idea, of ideas and ideologies is misdirecting resources. we should be focused where there is actual evidence of criminality. and unfortunately, what has happened is the government has taken this theoretical model of radicalization that positive that people move in a very linear pathway from adopting bad ideas, expressing bad ideas to becoming a terrorist to justifying the surveillance of entire community based on their ideology. and we have seen that taking place in any number of contacts throughout history. none of this is new. the fbi's radicalization or

radicalist division was formed in the early 1900s, led by a young hoover. if we suppress the bad ideas we don't like, somehow the violence will result, there's no evidence of that. in fact i would argue the evidence shows the opposite if by trying to suppress ideas you actually open up that argument for somebody who wants to commit an act of violence. >> and to kind of build on that point briefly from a historical standpoint, i use the asass nag of the late president william kinley as an example of someone with a particular ideology. ultimately turning violent and acting that out on the president of the united states. in the wake of that, as i mengd, y mentioned, saw you this crack down nationally. then the passage in 1903 called the anarchist exclusion, which

basically said if you are an immigrant, and you want to come to this country but you have expressed support for an irkist views, you are a self declared anarchist, et cetera, we won't let you into the united states. the reason i bring that up is that our president-elect during the course of the campaign had talked about this ban essentially on folks, you know, coming from countries out of a fear of the particular ideas that they might necessarily bring here. of course, the problem today is the same as the problem then. even though our technology in 1903 wasn't quite as sophisticated as it is today, you still had the telegraph, still had newspapers. after a few years of the an irkist law being passed, you saw telephones government and elsewhere. and of course it did not stop an are a kiss em in the united states. i would argue that that ban and the government's attempt to

suppress the idea actually made it kind of a sexy forbidden fruit from a political stand point. you saw a second wave of bombs in the 1920 period. when we start talking about some of these laws and ideas but suppressing speech and ideas and things of that nature our own history tells us that's not exactly ultimately the way to go. and correct me if i'm wrong, but i could swear that britain's mi-5 and even the fbi itself have done their own surveys on this particular topic in which they found that when they looked at all these past cases, that there was, there was actually no identifiable pattern, am i right on that? >> right. i think virtually every imper il examination of terrorism concluded there no profile, no pattern, no clear indicators of

who's going to commit harm for, you know, for every person who commits an act of violence, there are 10,000 people who have that same ideology, who behave in the same way, having the same sort of behaviors that are -- that in these radicalization models are identified as what to look for. and the problem is, there are a lot of bad ideas out there. and the government tends to, once this model is allowed, expand out. it started with anarchists, but those labor organizers were kind of expressing similar ideas. so let's go ahead and suppress them through surveillance. and by the way, a lot of labor organizers resting under these programs are defended by civil liberty lawyers who must share the same ideas so we will suppress them as well.

and so you know, if we stay with this model that the problem is extreme beliefs rather than terrorist violence, it's going to justify the violence or the aggressive law enforcement activity targeting communities because of what they believe or because of the political opinions they express. >> and that's a terrific segue. because earlier this year, you had a sensational piece in "politico" magazine itself. talking about your own experience and discoveries with respect to the fbi's so-called shared responsibility of committees. can you go into that? can you help kind of educate us on exactly what srcs are supposed to be. how you came into possession of the data and so on? >> sure. i was invited by the fbi to preview a counting bomb

extremism program called a shared responsibility committee. typically when these meetings happen, they are confidential. what ended up happening later was that an anonymous official from the department of homeland security gave quotes to "politico" magazine about shared responsibility committees. and specifically disclosed that srcs, abbreviation, have been beta tested across the country so i took that anonymous disclosure to mean that i had the authority to talk about the program, and thus i wrote that essay or to"politico" magazine. so shared responsibility committees are fbi, organized committees, that consist of, for example, a law enforcement official, a religious leader, maybe a youth coach, mental health professional, social worker, who assembles and

convened for the purpose of helping a muslim american who the fbi determined is at risk of becoming a violent extremist. right? so the idea is the fbi identifyes a youth who may one day become a violent extremist and they convene local committees consisting of the various types of professionals i just described. in an effort to stop this youth from one day becoming, a, violent extremists. three critiques. first, the fbi never disclosed the criteria for determining that a muslim american youth is at risk of becoming a violent extremist. so for example, is it based upon things like protected speech, right? are they trying to convene committees because a muslim american youth expressed a newfound interest in religious

osity? posted a controversial article on facebook? this isn't far-fetched. according to government documents, the types of indicators they are looking for are things like becoming confrontational at home. i deal logical differences. second, we know based on other programs and i think it's important to look at the intersection of cve with other overreaching, overinclusive law enforcement programs, national security programs as well. so for example, we know under the suspicious activity reporting program, which asked local law enforcement to report activity that they believe are indicative of preterrorism planning, that muslim americans who have visited costco and purchased large palettes of water, muslim americans who search for video games on-line, muslim-americans who have placed large purchase orders for home commuters at best buy, have been visited by the fbi.

we also know it is something like the watch list program. you can be branded a terrorist based on a single social media post. that's past. it leeds to the intersect a couple years ago. again within that we know that dearborn michigan, a city with less than 100,000 residents has more watch list residents than any other city in the country except for new york. that's the first, that fbi never specified the criteria for determining the muslim-american will one day be at risk of becoming a violent extremist. second, they never specified actual techniques that they use to determine the muslim-american will one day become a violent extremist. so for example looking at the doj profiling guide, in 2014 the justice department specifically

layed out rules and circumstances under which local and state law enforcement can profile on the basis of anything. gender, sexual orientation, faith, race. and they specifically in that document allow for the tsa, allow for customs and boarder control, to profile on the basis of anything they see fit. and custom and boarder patrol their jurisdiction is 100 miles inwards and they are the largest law enforcement agency in the country by far. this guidance also allows for law enforcement to use confidential informants absent any kind of suspicion. it also sanctions intelligence gathering programs like the nypd demographics program, that some say has been disbanded but i will leave that to another discussion another time. so it is also a point to be thinking about the techniques that are used to determine that a muslim-american is at some

point in the future, becoming a violent extremist and just like with respect to the firsting a umt argument i made, that techniques used are extraordinarily overinclusive. even in the event they might find a muslim-american who might at one day be at risk of this, techniques don't justify the end. the only other point i will make is regarding the actual committees. i would just say they're flawed in general. that's because the fbi under these committees, there is no protections from disclosure for mental health professionals. for lawyers. they can later be called, so if a member of an src helps an individual and that individual is later charged, private confidential notes that a mental health professional has with

this particular individual could be subpoenaed. this mental health professional on this committee could later be called to testify. so could the lawyer. furthermore the fbi said that if a committee determines that a youth is no longer at risk of becoming a violent extremist, the fbi can still investigate them. they can still monitor them. right? so there's no point for a committee to be convened if the fbi can continue to monitor that individual while the committee is working with them and even after the committee has made the determination that this individual is no longer a risk and becoming a violent extremist. so sue fis it to say i was critical of the program, remain very critical of the program. it is not clear where it stand now. there was this disclosure they were being beta tested. there were semi private con v conversations in which the fbi says srcs have been

discontinued. i'm skeptical. i think we will get to this soon, but there are state analogs to these programs that are being developed, that are being used. i would submit that they are very likely coming to a city near you. >> thank you. by heard sharia's personal experience. maya, is the executive director of the urban american institute, your organization represent thousands of arab and muslim and muslim-americans around country. i know your organization has had issues with a lot of these kind of government surveillance programs going back into the 1970s when the palestinian student movement really started to take off. and palestinian-american, like the late dr. edward saeed at

columbia, came under surveillance. give us, if you will, a historical perspective from the arab-american community about what we have seen and with the hopes we have going forward. >> well, thank you very much both to you patrick and cato, very grateful for it. i apologize in advance if that i have prepared remarks because i'm sensitive to time and how much i wanted to conclude so i will try to be concise. i appreciate the way you have opened the conversation on this. as patrick said, we are a community not unfamiliar with the idea that unpopular political speech end up in a problem with government interaction and you correctly noted, dr. edward saeed, the president of our association, were among pemt the people that pro filed them. we were established in 1985

specifically to deal with a history of political exclusion. so it is in some way a foundation yl reas foundational reason for why we are here today. so the arab-american institute is an american empowerment enterprise. we represent arab-americans, potentially 35% of whom are american-muslims. but the question would be why we would be engaged on cde is a logical. we represent domestic foreign policies of our community. so why this was an issue we decided to engage on. before the terror attacks of 9/11 i was engaged on a variety of concerns, via old 1950s immigration law and its application in immigration proceedings to caps automated passenger profiling system. we have demanded that our government strike a better balance between our national security and civil liberties. basically keeping us both safe

and free. we do not believe that obama administration programs have done that. that is one of the reasons, princip principal reasons, for why we engage on issue. two things to highlight before i really get into it, is that our government should not con flight counterterrorism policy with quote countering violent extremism policy and i certainly don't intend to do that in my comment today. further the nature of the threat or efficiency or cve programs internationally are not my focus. my comments are strictly limited to the concerns about do mystic counter violent extremism programs. so the question is how did we get here. in 2011, the document with the strategic implementation plan with empowering locals for violent extremism in the united states, end quote. the plan was introduced as domestic counterterrorism strategy in response to the recruitment efforts like al qaeda and isil. this report became the

foundation are for the government's counter violent extremism programs and while the movement effort were challenged within policy makers, to kind of slow the pace of the development of these programs to be perhaps more critical of what had been done in place, for example white house summit scheduled for october 2014 was delayed. there was additional examination of and i would say sort of critical thinking applied to programs like the uk model prevent which we haven't gotten into yet but is important for the same reason that note the srcps. they i think there was an effort to say to examine these programs more critically. let's decide whether or not there is a scientific evidence to suggest one could step in and prevent an act of terror from taking place. on january 7 of 2015 horrific attacks of charlie hab dough

occurred. and the summit is the following month in february of 2015. there is an increase of experience in communities and to describe the process of radicalization of violence. mike talked a bit about that but i want to say more because i think it helps understand and frame this as civil rights issue that i think that it is. our framework is modelled after the controversial and highly prevent program in 2010. if you this to an obama administration official, they are just so upset saying you don't understand this. this is not based on prevent. what is the difference in the government we are doing is government-led. take government resources and dollars and give them to organizations and say we aren't doing prevent. there has not been an investigation into why prevent did not work. we have several examples that

show this is not a community-led program. it is conceived in an echo chamber and deployed frankly without community buy-in. the mantra may be community led and community designed but claiming that is support for effort is misleading narrative and complaining that it is a community-led is fiction. i will defer to my colleagues on the rich scholarship that gift. but exist. domestic terrorism comes from many sources including groups of violent antigovernment and racist agendas. mike's experience shows for years in undercover area. we know there a problem proportional lit small within the landscape of domestic terror. not min liesing, putting it into proper context before we decide it launch millions and millions worth of expenditures that violate and cde programs are

disproven theories of radicalization that suggest there is an identifiable path on the road to becoming an extremist and ultimately committing an act of violence. we are told there are indicators like grievances with foreign policy. that's often an indicator we so that our government tells us indicators are not used. having observed those indicators we look for what they call offramps. we can do something to prevent an act of violence from taking care. unsound theory feeding what used to be a cottage industry now operates with the weight of the white house. magic over think tanks. leading university and price tag of unknown millions of taxpayer funded grants. i do say unknown not because i did the research it find out but because it is very difficult to determine how much is spend on contracts. congress stepped in algating 1 million one year, $10 million another -- sorry, 49 million and 10 million is made for community

engagement grant that are just getting ready to be awarded. we will hear about them so. there is a particular problem in my community that must be addressed. these programs secure the relationship between arab-americans and american-muslims and their government and as such are unproductive. when secretary johnson visits local mosque after local mosque to talk about community resilience while in dhs market such visits with dms and the wonderful city of dearborn, michigan. and second only to new york city in terms of the number of people on the watch list, a city of roughly 90,000 people. it is clear to us these programs view our community as a specific unique and domestic territory. this is from the highest level of our government because while there have regrettably been some

people traveling for isil these are limited in number and cannot justify a community-wide approach. a secure advertised relationship pursues a divisive and unproven counterterrorism program and we must demand better accountability from federal, state and local municipality. suspicion of arab-americanes a and american-muslims. we should be particularly concerned about this in light of the most recent surge we have seen in hate crimes and discrimination. on the most basic level programming should at least adopt a policy of do no harm. because if treating an entire community as suspect these programs run the possibility of alienating the very young people in our community that their cast is different or exposten shl other by their own government. the president of our institute

is fond of saying we have a successful cve program, it's called the american experience. it is the reason we're not having the same experience as france and other countries in europe. with cve, kids who have not ever seen themselves as anything other than american are asking th themselves to be. the members of congress have began to look at these issuees a provide some oversight. the government accounting offices is conducting a current review with the report expected to be out in the spring. attempting to figure out what actually is happening. we're leased to see that role that congress will play in this area is being stepped up. and i just want to, i want to mention this with regard to srcs, because in some ways it is like the point about the prevent program, we were told srcs and i

think they said that publicly have been disbanded. fbi will not be engaged with srcs any more. like just like we are told this is not in our program. this is a program in los angeles exactly looking like what srcs has been described to be. but because it is not federally led, it is different. the pivot end still need to be resolved. i think that is meningococcal to be concerned about. i started by asking you or telling you about cve. i want to close with what you two engage on the issue. the reason why is i think you should oppose it for the fact that it is profiling and discrimination. government waste and inefficiency. dism dishonest. violation of privacy. it has had a negative impact on people in my community.

we happening to the canary in the coal mine. there are reasons why every american should be concerned with what our government is nothing this regard. >> maya, thank you. you know, in my high school class, four of my cleeseclosest went into enforcement. all missouri state highway patrolmen. day goes by that i don't think about them and worry about them because they have to deal with the public. which if you spent any time in law enforcement can be a challenge, i know. we ask our folks in law enforcement essentially to kind of walk this very fine line between protecting us from the murderers and rapists and thieves and other criminals in our midst on the one hand, and on the other hand, we expect them to constantly keep our rights in mind and not violate our right and all of the rest of that. that is attention that we deal with law enforcement deals with

on a day in aep day ond day out. there is nothing easy about that job and i'm personally grateful to my friends in high school who have committed the better part of their public lives to law enforcement in that respect. and i'm very grateful for what you do over in montgomery county. it is obvious that leadership in the mcgovern county is very concerned about this problem. they have invested time, money and resources in a concern about extremism within the government county and what it might lead to. we would be very grateful if you could give us the law enforcement point of view is on this. what you are all trying to achieve right now. >> i just want to thank the cato institute for including me and law enforcement in this discussion. as i look around this diverse panel, and i hear the discourse and debate and zvzvs

we need to protect the people in our ÷úcommunities. and so, as i think mike said in the very beginning, how do we do that. how do we do that while we÷ú create no harm. i like the way he said that.

we should not create harm when we're done. leadership i think is better than how you÷ú found it. so i like that. i'll take that away from today. we don't -- we shouldn't create harm. i've heard over the years that there has been harm created on federal, state and local level and there's very significant concern today more than ever about that particularly post election. one of the things that's mentioned early on and something that i actually thought about and before today is the trial is on going with dylann roof. i hate to say hisym name becausi think that there's just the element of evil there and what happened and how it happened. one of the things that we know are -- and a lot of these events that occur, active shooter, other things like that, there other things like that, there are warninga

and after the fact, a neighbor, a teacher, a coach, a parent, a sibling will say, you know what, i saw the person was more increasing isolated. i thought these notes that were threatening in nature. i saw a lot of changes and their approach to things. i saw things on social media. you know, i saw them going to the hardware store. i saw on his facebook page he was÷ú buying guns and ammunitio and he was increasingly agitated and -- so we know that there are some things that we can learn after thesep events occur. and so the idea to see something say something to me is really over simplifying. it's almost like in the old days, say no to drugs. that's great. i agree with that. that doesn't really address the very complex, very÷ú difficult challenging problem, right. so the same thing with see something say something, that sounds great, if you see

something say something, how do you structure that conversation? to start with it's got to be trust. think about that. that's pretty powerful light, the communities that need us the most, trust us the least. we have recruited --ym created pretty significant challenge to over come. many of the communities that because of the country of their origin where they came from, maybe because of experiences they've had. we need p w(le to engage with us to be able to report crimes, to prevent -- provide information so that we can do a better job in protecting their communities and protecting them. so a lot of communities are very under served and there's a couple of myths that i thought of a@$÷ i've heard today and tht is that radicalization and

violent extremism, one of the myths that i would say are not muslims century, and somehow in our country, that has been the narrative and it continues to be and that's not our narrati%1jñ can assure you. we're brothers and sisters in our community. i couldn't more strongly say we're with you,ym we're togethe in this effort, in this initiative. it has to be that way. it's not us and them and if it becomes that, we're not going to to some degree that has occurred. how do we over come that, how do we build trust, how do we build relationships, easier said than done. how do we find ways to build the ties with our community that really need us. and so a lot of what you've heard today is part of our model, building and i'm going to go over these slides very quickly.

subject expert, to help montgomery county develop some of these conversations, engage a lot of different people, particularly, in the safe community and not just muslim community, but all of the we have a very diverse community. engaged very large number of people. another myth is like law enforcement eccentric. and i think there's a lot of pros and cons to it. we would -- i would say very strongly that ours is a community led initiative. it's notzv government led. we don't have these committees and panels. we don't have surveillance efforts, a lot of things that have been referenced at the federal level andym some real examples of abuse and mistakes and hurt around arm that have occurred, we're trying not to do any of those ÷úthings. so that the effort involving a lot of different people in the community. this is reference jay johnson and some of his visits. this is actually a visitp where

there was a large gathering of people in our community and just some of the areas that we may pillars, if you will,sfocused on very similar community policing and engagement, education, training, very specific, referralzv process, interventio and the example that i like to give, we're not qualified to do that. i've heard that. i'm not a hippa expert, i'm certainly not a mental health expert. i'm not a psychologist, i'm not the appropriate person to do a lot ofht intervention, there ar examples of people and this happens almost daily in our schools, throughout the country and locally in montgomery county where there's an opportunity where there's trust, where there's a relationship, where we can do intervention. when i say intervention. we can -- because there's that trust, we can maybe get some help who is suicidal. maybe somebody who is violent. maybe a kid who wants to harm

somebody and has taken additional steps tozv do that. so how can we be effective in navigating through those things but we're not the primary ones that's a challenging thing, to be able to intervene and to deal with these things effectively in a way that we prevent violent acts and the way we may be prevent somebody from going to prison, the example that was given earlier, i thought that was a great example. that case, something that has been done earlier on, maybe that individual did not have to go to prison for 25 years, maybe there's something that could have been done todeal with that in a different way. and so, again, this kind of another dripterñú about the montgomery county model and there's others in our region who have an interest, again, it's very community policing trust in relationships with our

community and the university of maryland is actually the administratojm of the program ad there is some grant money that have funded this and it does involve hhs, involves theht chaplain. it involves the ngo community. it involves a large swap of the community. and we're one of many many partners and we'reg# a peace, we're not the main piece. and the idea is that we will have ombudsman, we there are some of those more challenging hippa type situations where somebody needs to have more training, more exsppertise more- so that does a seg way, at least, into our efforts to try and navigate this in a way we're not creating harm÷ú and a way actually we do it right, we're doing a better job than protecting the vulnerable community that is we have. we're doing a better job of

developing trust which i think is -- as stated today, in disrepair to a large degree in our country, particularly post election and finding that balance. the last thing i'll say, is as i was listenjsv i've been to the holocaust museum many times, there's a quote that says, evil prevails when g9/k men remain silent. there's evil in this world. dylann roof, in my opinion, is evil. what he did, i just can't --÷ú it's hard for me to fathom. even having been in law enforcement almost my entire career. people like that should be dealo with. those people that we were successful, maybe, maybe in the future will survive that and maybe that event doesn't occur. we have an obligation to do what we can, to focus on and use our resources in a positive way, not create harm, but to keep our community safe.

it's a vmrx very difficult time to do that. >> thanks so much for that overview, i'm going to invest privilege here to asksthe first question. when a program gets started, there's some sort of cat áá in that. are you familiar with background where this÷ú came from. where there's something specific that happened that made folks in the county government and police department and maybe even in the community kind of say, you know, maybe we need to take a look at this, maybe we need to take a look at this. was there a cataloging event. .> i think more from a leadership perspective there's recognition, being in the national capital region, knowing that terrorism was a real concern. knowing that violence extremism

on a whole lot of different levels was a nbconcern, also, t whole division was among the community. we have a population of montgomery county, and there's a ear, i'll tell you, anecdotely, i've heard a little bit today, one of the things that is really touched my heart more than zvanything, is childr now are fearful post election. children are being bullied. there's all kind of things that are going on just because of the very fact that they're÷ú muslim. and so i think to answer your question, what was the catalyst, it was more general, it wasn't a reaction to a singular big event. it was more a leadership recognition and a lot of this comes from the top down, kocve aside, how can we build bridges with all of our communities. actually funded a position in his cabinet for somebody to actually kind of collaborate and

coalesce with the bigzv communi to have a greater recognition and hear them and actually have meetings with them fairly regularly, to hear how we can do better. the police are one of many many service providers in montgomery county. we hurt. very loud and clear that there's a ÷úgap. there are lots of needs and we can do better. >> mike, did you have -- >> mike, did you have -- >> so one thing i wanta address is this concept of learning -- warning signs. it comes up over and over again in this context. unfortunatelywhat we find there is this spot in hindsight. they're not predict tif, v:righ. there are plenty of alien yated people out there. there are plenty of people with ideas, i find, you know,÷ú like

the premises, vast majority of which will never harm a fly. so it's tryi predictability on to something where there isn't one. perfect example is the fbi, with all of its intelligence school- capabilities, all of its analytical capabilities, they're starting it for 90 days. they investigated it. they investigated all month. they investigated it. and they didn't forget that these individuals are going to go out and commitviolent acts sochlt if the fbi, with all of this tool and apparently, it must have these warning signs, can't predict who is going to bú violent. how does this program suppose that some layperson is going to be able to predict who is going to be violent in the first place look at the models that have been promoted like the fbi model which said, oncezv indicator

potential is growing here.zv it's also indicator of dangerous. which hilarious.÷ú >> the national counter terrorism center leaked÷ú documents for that with the practitioner's guide. workers are suppose to evaluate, whether there was sufficient parent child bonded. now, first of all, i'm not aware of anyv: studies that suggest tt terrorist don't bond well with their parents or do bond well,

i'm not sure whether five was going to be good in one. all of these things are out there. if lay people are going to try to apply these sorts of indicators to people they think are dangerous, they're going to be misidentifying÷ú people and misdirecting resources, reporting to wrong people to law enforcement that can cause all kind of harm like the sting people who are identified by law enforcement and potential extremist. so you know, it's easy to say that in hindsight, oh, yeah, we knew there was a problem there. but it's not easy to say, we know this person who÷ú is alien ated is going to commit a crime. i like the framing that you had aboutht from the beginning when

the white house started talking about this. a bunch of our colleagues in the civil liberties community, went to the white house and went to focus on terrorism. don't focus this on one community, broaden it out, look at all problems and thezrefused to take it out of department of homeland security. so it is a law enforcement program and it is only focused on one very narrow violence that effects our society while enjoying the others, and the only third thing, let me conclude withym this, i think is crucially important that the community leasing habit and that you have strong relationships with the community, but it should be about understanding for the community what their÷ú problems are and not telling them what the problem is and to respond. we have been engaged in a campaign trying to get information from these programs, including montgomery county c

program and it's pulling teeth to get information. you would think if somebody has warning signs that they would be published broadly, but they hide them because they know they won't withstand publish review. >> how does it work with gangs. ms 13 or, you know, any of thesb other kind of violent organizations that we think about. how does that contrast, essentially, with thisym proble. how does it experience, how does american law enforcement experience in dealing with the gang problem? is there anything to draw upon÷ whetherym it's. >> first of all, it's an evolution and there are a lot of lessons learned, whether the

desire occurred. i know a lot have occurred there have been a lot of mistakes made and i think a lot of what you describe, many would say, is accurate and we need to do things differently. r(t&háhp &hc% education, prevention, building relationships, having the ability to communicate most people are good people, right. and some -- very small number of people in certain communities are committing crimes that are violent. so we should be focused on that small number. not everybody and we shouldn't be creating harm and havoc in our communities just because of those people, we should not be violating people's rights, et cetera, et cetera, good old fashion police work, talking to people, making sure that people reporting when they're victimized. the communities that i described

earlier, there's a lot of communities that are afraid to report they've beenym kozvu!vic. we need our community. we're not -- we have a komillio almost 1 million, 100,000 people in montgomery county and we have

less than 1,300 cops. of that, eight or nine hundred in patrol. we have almost 500 square miles. do the math on that on any gerch day we have six districts. there's not a lot of cops in the community. a lot of them÷ú are in the cour they're doing investigation. we don't have some huge number of people to resolve many of these really serious complex challenging issues. 3uz to rely on the community.z to rely on the we can't do it by ourselves. we only have so many eyeballs we only have so many eyeballs and we'lla i think the old school policing police thought they knew what they were doing all the time. we recognize that's not the case. we have to partner with the community to be successful. >> i think we have time for maybe two or three times at the outset of this program.

>> steven, retired state ÷ú department, even though kato is in the state department. i've had a beard for ages. this is a certain extent dire directed to pyou, anyone else wo wants to comment on it. i was listening to you talking for example about the children and how they're being÷ú traumatized by people i think a lot of what you're talking about goes way beyond, at least what i expect from the police department. i not only think the police department can deal with the whole range of÷ú issues in our society. and when we talk about preventing violence, you know, to what extent do we start :ñ more in the direction of big brother which is i think some of the others have been talking about.

wouldn't it really be better to focus your resourcessmore on traditional policing, looking for individuals who we have a reason to believe we're doing to commit a÷ú crime or go after th or people who have already committed a crime rather than sort of going in this type way where we're really going after entire groups. the fact that you'reym reaching out may make them feel stigmatized. the best intent. they have the opposite effect. >> great ÷úquestion. one out come. i can't tell you how many meals i've shared over the last five or six years, how many celebrations i've been a part of. how many people i've been welcomed into their mosque and

their i see that as a huge positive. i'm fairly ignorant to some things, even though i'vezv beenn policing most of my v:life. the police are some overwhelming force that are pushing into space we're not really qualified for and really shouldn't be and i don't disagree with that. i don't think we're doing that. i think we're trying in montgomery county, at least. aslot of the things that i've heard today that have occurred around the country, i hope we're not doing in montgomery county. i can assure you,we shouldn't be doing some of these things. it's not apart of our approach or our program. i will say we have to find a balance, that's our ÷úchallenge. and i don't disagree with what

you just ÷úsaid.ym >> you mention that the fbi had investigated folks like,÷. has there been an indication over the years about how they might be changing the way that now, react to or the way that prepare for these kind of events. it seems like, to the public, layperson in public. it seems like a÷ú black box ande discussed these issues. have you seen any indication that they're changing things in a more productive way or acknowledging when certain things have worked.

>> concern for the next administration might try to expand the fbi's investigative authorities. under theht 2008 guidelines tha michael mccasey put into place, the fbi was given the authority to do the type of investigation they call assessment, which/+ allow the use of recruiting and tasking informants. it allows covert interviews. it allows av: lot of intrusive surveillance, not electronic surveillance. but the standard for that is guidelines, no factual predicate necessary. no factual predicate necessary. you need no facts to suggest the person you want to investigate has done anything wrong or anybody else has done anything wrong. all you need is subjective opinion that what you're doing is for the good for god and and that gives you the ymp

authority. >> i have been arguing before those guidelines were put in place, reducing the guidelines just÷ú increasing the flood of information and that's what's happening is that these agencies are being so flooded withmy information see something say something where they feel they have to go out and respond to these silly, you know, buying a pallet of water. in middle eastern we bought a pallet of water, we better go interview, kind of nonsense work that's being done it's like having false agq&5m going off constantly. and we don't allow you to pull

the fire alarm in the building without a fire because we knowk that response. evidence of harm, right, because you know, unfortunately, i wish it was true that there were warning signs. i wishpá the fbi, when i joined, gave me a gun and a badge and a crystal ball. but they don't and their ability to predict is no÷ú better than anybody else's, what they need to do is focus on facts, not these debungt theories like radicalization and certainlyz &t chasing every silly thing that somebody has said, just because they said it. with that, we are concluded for this panel. this panel. let's givea m

. >> as this panel madesfairly clear, surveillance is not÷ú ju it's also increasing technical sophistication, something that localht police forces -- to cov that in another block of flash ú talk, we have constitution project -- can i have the folks

take conversationszv on ÷ústage. we'll talk about the ways that force increasingly turning to monitoring a social media to mlevel.

one that will continue to become more and more in the future and that's police body cameras and, specifically, how police bz used eras c! in conjunction with facial recognition technology. so body cameras are a technology that's being rapidly deployed across the country÷ú over the lt couple of years we've had a very meaningful debate about whether body cameras are good, bad, whether we want them in our commujáy. the fact seems to be at this point that body cameras are coming, recent survey police force found as many as 95% of our law enforcaq't agencies have either already begun to incorporate body camera technology into their police forces or have committed to doing so in the myfuture. so whether like it or not, body cameras are coming to a, you

know, police department near you and we need to start to get ready to figure out how we want these devices to be used. the purpose of body cameras is to increase accountability, to make sure that police are acting figure out what actually happened. without the proper rules and regulations how they should and must be used, they should also be coopted for surveillance purposes. in order to make sure we're using body cameras for the unrestricted manner for÷e latter, we need guidelines and rules for how that can be used. >> thould use them to make sure they preserve accountability without becoming a surveillance tool. this is from our committee on policing zvreforms which is bas

on -- just composed on civil liberties and law enforcement. so the report canko help guide departments providing some uzlution i want to talk about one specific area that we look at in the report, how should we use body cameras with facial recognition. we reck that it should be required for the use of official recognition with body cameras and that police department should also strongly consider limiting the set of crimes that they -- you might be asking how big of a risk do we need tov: think about this recognition with body cameras or is this sort of risk of and i think the o, body camera÷ús

strategic alliance. -- they boast that when he walks around, and he's wearing a body camera, and he's walking past the ceo announced plan tob incorporate facial recognition into all their body cameras into the future. at the point whezí they have built in recognition, you can count on the fact that most use body cameras will have facialg# recognition. it seems like a real future when they promised that in the future one -- their technology will make every cop, robo cop. what i want to talk about in examining this, is how exactly how facial recognition be used

q manners. what are the risks that ÷úd8pro. the policev: that you scan out try to find some sm one in place. facial recognition doesn't seem like a÷ú huge stretch. it's fairly consistent with the right we have for privacy. so having a situation where you can readily feed in emergency face print into body cameras seems fairly reasonable from a

privacy kostandpoint. police could develop a face print of the fugitive, send that to bodymy camerasu! you can jus have the body camera doing all the work for them, automated process notifies them whenym the is a match this seems like a fairly proper use for this type of second nolg and combination. what seems pretty common sense pkere in terms of facial

recognition of body cameras. this is far more likely to occur with minorities. it cannb happen to very high extent. in terms of misidentified individuals. you don't want them attacking someone who they think is a dangerous fugitive. so in those cases we should have independent verification that much power. the reason for this, cities have a disproportion number of arrest warrants for minor crimes. prime example of this, the doj

report found 16,000 different arrest warrants for individuals in a city with 21,000 people, that's a huge portion of the population. that means if all crimes were included in terms of body cameras with facial recognition for active arrest warrants, officers could have arrests that willym have authority. or target at someone that an officer has a bad interaction with. so in those casesy3jeñ seems th there is large separation limit the use of facial recognition to serious violent offenses÷ú rath than petty. the next issue more troubling for privacy, using it for real time location identification withúimentification and tracking. the tracking has become a fairly common police tactic, in general, at a minimum it requires reasonable suspicion where many states now require probable cause warrant for

tbmjzpefully that will continue increase in the future. body cameras with facial recognition could offer a new unchecked means of automated ym tracking. without new rules could occur entirely without judicial over site or suspicion, we have to look at the scale that body cameras introduce.zv . let's compare that to the that's widely deployed a system throughout the city. they have only have 13 per square mile. when we're talking about changing to a system where -- surveillance that like this the

current they won't be known in a location, they will be mobile. combine this with facial recognitionht and you could dramatically increase the ability to tag the location identified and even track specific individuals. youzv put into the algorithmism. you want to track and let body cams and do the rest in t-$wj of and necessary step if we're going to allow any type of location tracking per body cams. we shouldg# require this will ge

it. but it will ensure if you're doing it. you're doing it in a manner that's directed that's in response to the cause and that isn't subject to abuse you might have the police have a free hand for this type ofp technology to track whoever they want. now the final area i want to talk about is identification÷ú you have police officers who on the beat with body camera can have facial recognition with that÷ú camera. logged67)u$ the department. now police could easily take footage from body camera and run that against existing database to discover a target's identity on any point they see throughout the footage of their zvshift.

and a lot with the hope deem them later or maybe voting a future events. in the scene of the crime. you can use facial recognition from a footage to identify them. but you can also use this to monitor engage in actives like protests or religious ceremonies and that's where it becomes very very÷ú problematiczv samep type

identification on a mass scale. in recent years particular have targeted surveillance at protesters and muslim communities. the scale of cataloging individuals engaged in the actives to a truly unprecedented scale. police on the beat outside religious ceremony. at a protest once the footage i% recorded it can be. >> it could send officers with the goal of recording individual lift. you could have a sort of digital version of a hoover style enemy list by sending cost and location such as protest, religious ceremonies, and thinking about the type of surveillance we've seen in the past decade that has been most objectionable survey rens÷ú of

we don't have this type of future where these groups become targeted.ym the do you see a police officer there, their goal is to keep the piece, make sure everything works right. the purpose of that body camera is to make sure that their ak accountable for everything they do. thç fact that you're at a protest and then to use that information by law enforcementy. it's based on probable cause and it should be individualized so you can have proper uses for this type of technology at the same time you can prevent the

misuse that would be directed and novelist actives and would be directed at surveillance that has tried to in sometimesd8 foc on vulnerable groups. i hope you'll give a look into our full report and many other issue that is's available. we have a bunch of copies outside when i talk about a topic like this. i like to leave car tune on lighter note. tur so much for your time and i hope you enjoy the rest of your

conference. >> we've been doing a fair amount of work on what the landscape is and raising issues and that's whey want to talk with you through today. i am seeing this on this in front of me but not up here. what am i doing wrong? is there somebody who can answer dy.t question, anybody, a, there we gochlt okay. thank you for bearing with me. okay. so about three to four weeks ign, i want to say, the center released a mat, which is online on our web site. what it looks at is now 155 jurisdictions across the country. that's cities, counties, police department that use some kind of social media second nolg in

someway, this is theone that spent at least $10,000 or more looking from 2010 until now. the way we found this information with using a database ofzv procurement order we have a subscription to it. so we were able to do searches for a bunch of the companies that wep know which means being able to look at social media in a whole variety of ways.ht we we broke them down into kind of spending bands to see who was spending less and more and who was using, we looked at eight differentht companies will be adding more and adding more but breaking down what those r. so if you click on a local,v: thent pops up information about what the company is, where it's

based, what kind of uses we might know about in that city and how muchv: they spent and ao link to the procurement orders for that particular city, so you can kind of dive down into that. 155 jurisdiction since 2010,s collectively spent almost $5 million on social media monitoring. the highest amount by a single injury diction, the florida department of lawsenforcement almost $200,000. you can see they're mostly kind of large jurisdictions, so county of l.a. where dallas is. a county in michigan and then the virginia department of emergency manhood. they've spent a fair amount of money to be able to÷ú monitor social media. we know that they're using this to monitor what people are saying on twitter about ex.

we know they're buying a service that as one of its sort of main functions provides to law enforcement. . maybe they're buying a few at once to tryym them out. at the same time very few of them have publicly available policies about how this information is used sochlt a number of them have policies on how they use social media. so if you're a police officer and you want to know how can i put out there on twitter orko o instagram, an invitation to a block party that we're cohosting or pictures from our latest toy drive. that if what you want to know is how can i track a particular suspect or interest, how can i

use undercover account. how can i apply this technology to figure out pdisconnected wit each other. there is very little transparency about how these services are being used and how that impactsht civilians we do know -- so it could be community out reach and engagement. it could be countering antigovernment messages online that's often more likely to be on the federal mylevel.

>> could be nvkting groups and there are a couple of slides i'm going to show in a minute that dig into that in a little more hashtags. to see who is connected to each other, so the international association of chief of police, there's a survey, now every nb year, this is a regular survey that they send out to hundreds of police departments around the country asking how they use so the 2015 report, which was the last one that's out, there was 500 law enforcement agencies d they said yes we

us!'=%1 immediate y in someway. so that could be public out reach or a variety of other things. if you can see the type a little small, almost 90% and use it for criminal investigation, over half use it for listening or mon minoring and threeu! quarters u it for intelligence, quite a number of law enforcement agency are using it not to put out with specifics how to use it. we know that a÷ú number of themo buy ways to facilitate and over 92% could review social media profile of suspect.ym one of the areas where i think there's more concern or

additional concern is in terms of thinking about ymprotesters activists. this is an e-mail that was of how these tools are being used and es essential sli this used and es essential sli this isa off if yo and two other companies on snap chat, they're no longer allowed access to the kind of data that was allowing them to market themselves as we can see everything and we can help you track down anything you want. there are a few interesting things that come outp of this. we cover ferguson andym mike brn

nationally with great success. in order to see the private u! user. there's no limit. and this is an area as well where there's very little that's a functionality that's available to law enforcement and to emphasize, this is another from nor+q+%ez california, from a representative saying what does it mean to monitoring activists who are often engage and first amendment protected activity and there's one more piece of that. this is a funding request from this was attained by the daily dot and the one interesting piece i just wanted to identify

here. which could assist in the investigation of a terrorist threat or act. it says this is successfully done after the boston marathon. on the one hand it's a perfectly legitimate point, this might be a legitimate way to÷ú find witnesses that's often kind of the terminology and the frame that's used to roll out more and more of these monitoring kotool. i know we're just about out of time. a couple of different actual uses that we've seen social media monitoring. there are a few examples of,÷ú u know, of÷ú himself wrapping abo murdering somebody of the victim and he posted that publicly on

socialzv ÷úmedia.÷ú in toemp that implicate the sort of monitoring of plo testers, but also concerns about even -- protesters butym also concerns about even targeting individuals and what it means. so the open california and oregon police department monitored blacklives matters protest, including the head of the oregon department of justice department. spent time, two years in reichers, including solitary, due in part liked things on÷ú facebook and the conclusion that he was part of a gang. he was friends with people, but

he was not evidently involved in gang ak tiffty. that was used as part of the indictment. the drug enforcement agency which used the picture of suspect in another case on facebook but used it to createz account as bait. pictures of her children. they ultimate lissetteled with her for over $100,000 for that. so that is a very÷ú quick overvw of the issue we're seeing with social media monitoring. we'll be keeping up and gathering more information on this and also very much thinking about issues related to good policies, transparency and principles to help ym÷ú÷ú featu

fine g. this weekend on american history tv on c-span three saturday evening before 7:00 eastern, the college professor and author of the book the land delunged in blood, is the slave rebellion that he lead and the con vision and uncertainty. >> the clash between the slave and the free black exit artists inbounded the dramatic differences that existed in the black community and some artists decided to support the revolt and while others elected to support the whites. >> then at 8:00 on lectures in history, the university of maryland's king on advertising and marketing in the profession and how consumer experiences changed during this time. >> instead of selling an

automobile in immediates of transportation, you can sell a car as presteejed. >> and just before 9:00, is the post world war ii career of the editorial cartoonist who was a cartoonist during the war for the u.s. armies and stripes. >> while over seas, he had avoided the outbursts and he never allowed the politics and back home however, he jumped into the political frame with both feet. >> and sunday at 6:00 p.m. on american artifacts. >> one of my favorite documents in the gallery is a draft version on what is the bill of rights. we refer to this as the senate mark up. that's the 17 aamendments in the house and changed them into 12 and then after a committee it was 12 and then it was to the

states for ratification and ten of those 12 were ratified by the states. >> both theaters take a tour of the national archives exhibits marking the 200 25th december 1. for a complete american history tv schedule, go to c-span.org. more now from the day long conference on government surveillance and privacy concerns by the cato institute. this is on u.s. intelligence gathering. it's just under two hours. i will go ahead and get started in the interest of encouraging everyone to congregate again. thanks to those of you that have stuck with us through a long and

fascinating day. our last pair of flash talks is going to focus on some of the global aspects of surveillance and with regards to the constitution, we tend to focus on the fourth amendment and domestic law and how it regulates surveillance to americans but the scope of american surveillance both law enforcement and intelligence purposes is global in scale. so as a result it has implications for, it enlightens people around the world but also political and diplomatic and economic relationships with other countries and particularly the economic interest of us companies that hope to do business around the globe there's two aspects of that and we have allen butler, a senior counsel with the information center who will talk about the trump case and the ways some us surveillance creates problems in

europe and professor jen daschle will talk about cross-border data exchange as it becomes closer to figuring out who is the jurisdiction of ties and investigations .>> thanks julian and decatur for having me. i'm happy to be here to speak with you about new international >> and decatur for having me. i'm happy to be here to speak with you about new international dimensions to this debate over us surveillance authority. as many of you know about the trial, the court adjustments last year, this decision upended the primary mechanism that was used by businesses to transfer personal data between the us and europe and also led to a major renegotiation between the two governments and it opened up new avenues to challenge surveillance activity. historically, the surveillance reform movement here is focused on statutory and constitutional limitations to domestic

surveillance and there's certainly been international groups who have been in very engaged on both these issues but these issues haven't necessarily played internationally a major role in congressional policymaking on surveillance. that opportunity in 2013 was a watershed and the us came under increasing scrutiny from other countries especially in the eu . in the eu in particular, a strong history of privacy protections and independent authority by regulators in each of the target countries and traditionally these authorities , focused a lot of their action on companies but the present program provided for the

europeans a clear link between the actions of companies that collect and transfer personal data and the surveillance activities of the us government. it certainly didn't help that section 702 under which it was authorized specifically ignored the private issues of foreign citizens in the us but at the time prior to the case, it was not clear what leverage eu would have two in a sense push back on the us for the surveillance being revealed. then an individual, and austrian law student filed with the data protection authority alleging that facebook had transmitted data to the us and exposed him to these activities. facebook as a major operation in other regions and the protection authority had the authority to bring claims against them for

violating this privacy directive under the eu charter. the privacy directive specifically applied to any company that processes personal data in europe and also its ability to transfer that data to other countries , in particular when those countries cannot provide adequate protections for their data, essentially equivalent protections for that data relative to what's provided in the eu. so that transfer of personal data between the eu and us specifically has historically been authorized under an

agreement in 2000 called safe harbor, basically they created a safe harbor of principles that countries could sign on to and agree to and therefore enter data freely without fear of violating the directive. and this was called into question on insurance issues because it was alleged to the data protection authority a spike in the agreement was violating the directive and violating the directive under the charter and exposing them to us surveillance. these protections in ireland, that was initially not founded and could not bring action against facebook because it could not provide safe partner. ultimately the data protection authority, a question was certified to the higher court and that question was whether the update on the agreement itself was valid or whether that violated the fundamental rights in the eu and the state privacy directive and ultimately, the court of justice did find that the state department was invalid, this was sort of the bombshell that dropped on the us, eu privacy board last year. and crucial to

this case was the surveillance complaints revealed between the us companies and us surveillance activities and ultimately what the court found was that the safe harbor agreements was something more essential than an agreement between the us and eu , that in itself provides for that adequate protection under the directive. this has been hard to understand how much of a fundamental shift it was in the relations between the us and eu since before , it's really created an entirely new dimension to the debate over surveillance activity and how there are all of these companies that engage in these practices of data every day and there's lots of money at stake and now

that they have safe harbor, the court has really put a lot of uncertainty and a lot of risk toward companies transferring data and there are concerns now that there will be major acts brought against them, suits violating the directive and the deal that's been negotiated in the terms that came down is that is not at all clear that it would be upheld by the court of justice either because the court of justice ultimately focused on the limited scope of us privacy protections and redressed citizens for us surveillance activities. so with those two sort of looming questions there about the new case being brought again in ireland, again related

to the complaint this time by the irish data protection authority itself, this case was likely to go back up that it has to do with the alternative mechanism at the moment that was put into place to transfer data and these are contractual agreements between the eu and us that are also provided the mechanism so here the company essentially was under a privacy agreement that is defined by the european commission as adequately protecting personal data but the same fundamental protection is an issue which is that a company in the eu is transferring all its communication's for something that the us is therefore imposing those new individuals

to surveillance activities under the us government without providing for adequate redress. so really, it puts real money at stake in the debate over these surveillance protections and i think it raises a lot of fundamental questions about how privacy law will be structured in the us. one of coming up for the next 12 months is that too authority so another issue that we're going to see in the next few months and certainly within the next 12 months is whether a new administration will carry forward some of the legacy provisions adopted by the obama administration and about how protective or not the provision may be but one of the vent fundamental flaws i think that

he is likely to recognize in relying on executive orders for example is that they don't exist permanently or have permanently in law so it will be a real test in these new cases and real measurement of the new administration for europe to be able to watch as privacy law changes in real time in the us and react to that and it adds a new dimension to have an outside view of what's happening with us surveillance authorities going forward. so that's a short 15 minute version, there's going to be a lot more issues they're moving forward . it's going to continue these cases , several now will continue to have really fundamental questions about how the us structures, especially grant protections to persons abroad. [applause]

>> so first i'd like to thank to cato institute for putting on this fantastic conference and for me being here. i want to talk about what i see as two sides of the same coin. the us data that happens to be located outside the territorial boundaries of the united states for governments who need to access data that happens to be within the territorial boundaries of the united states. i'll give you the punch line concept. in my view, the current set of rules are setting arbitrary limits on law enforcement's ability to access data based on where that data happens to be held. it's my opinion to blithely transpose rules that apply to other property onto data without recognizing the unique and different features of data including its mobility, visibility and perhaps

for these purposes the practice to control the fact that something like facebook, microsoft, google, tend to control where data is located without us as the user having any say in that fact area these together make location and ask increasingly arbitrary and normatively unsound basis for limiting law enforcement jurisdiction. since these limitations are often described as privacy protections, they are actually undercutting privacy as well as security and economic growth and innovation. let me start with the problem of us law enforcement access to data under borders which includes the issue that was decided this summer by the second district on the entitlement case, i'm sure everyone here is familiar with the case in 2013 when the us gave one pursuant to the electronic privacy and microsoft

seeking data associated with a particular account. microsoft o seeking data associated with a particular account. microsofn m seeking data associated with a particular account. microsoft turned over the noncontent data, things like names, ip address, billing information and refused to turn over the content of communications, incorporated those were stored in ireland and that the united states jurisdiction only extend to the territorial boundaries of the united states and therefore the suit was invalid. the government fought back as the government put it and lower court agreed this would not be a traditional search warrant that in involved us law enforcement officials crossing in ireland territory and seizing property there. rather it was directed at microsoft, requiring that microsoft sees the communication. the data was in ireland but microsoft employees were in redmond washington could access the data without ever leaving the territory of the united states so it was a territorial, not an

extraterritorial charge and compelled a disclosure issue . the second circuit reversed, ultimately siding with microsoft and concluding the relevant steps about disclosure was a territorial surge and the united states lacked the authority to pursue only to data physically located in the united states territory. this case has sense and during litigation been dismissed, the ruling has been described as a privacy ring by many. i'm not so sure this is true. first, remember that here the government not a warrant without probable cause. there is no question that it would have been able to access that data had the data been located within the united states and there would be no privacy violation if everything was fine with the warrant. it doesn't become a

privacy violation just because the data is moved outside the territorial borders. in fact, this case is arguably bad for privacy unless one assumes any obstacle in the way of law enforcement is a good thing. the end result means that if the united states law enforcement officials seek data that happens to be outside our borders, it now needs to navigate mutual legal assistance to that data and the foreign government should choose to respond according to its own standards . and many i would say, most situations, those standards are lower, less protective and warrant based on probable cause overseen by an independent . and second, even if this case is about privacy, it's not at all obvious that the second court concluded the intrusion occurred in island. microsoft already had access to the data at their

fingers and moved it around without notice to the user. any additional privacy intrusion it seems takes place not when microsoft moves the data which is moved anyway but when that data is turned over to the us government. that happens in the united states , not ireland. this also has a number of potentially political implications for the us ability to data's access data lawfully even when the targets is a us citizen and the government has probable cause . this happens for at least three reasons, first the slowness of the legal assistance process can be too long to be useful. second, the united states only has legal assistance treaties for about a third of the world's countries. it may not have a workable means of accessing government together and third, not all companies are structured like microsoft which has a relatively location driven approach to how it accesses data. companies like google and facebook are constantly moving data around and make it sometimes hard to ascertain

where particular data is located at the particular moment a warrant was served or importantly, a company like google or example has trusted its operations so that it's data can only be accessed by law enforcement teams in the united states. let's assume the united states government serves a warrant on google for data associated with accounts. if some or all that data is outside the united states, facebook can respond under the second circuit court ruling. the government then goes to that foreign jurisdiction , the foreign government says we love to help you but we can. we don't have jurisdiction over the people that can access that data, you do. and the practical result is it means there's no way for law enforcement to access that data pursuant to lawrence on probable cause. so a big company like google can be structured to resolve these problems but in

the short term, i think this result has to concerning side effects. first, the day location is a means of ensuring access to data. this isn't so much a trend in the united states but rulings like the microsoft ireland case devise foreign jurisdictions to mandate that data is held there in part to protect against how it's perceived as a boundary . the reality is however that in many cases the standards that those foreign governments require would be less expensive than the standards that apply in the united states. and second, i think the reality is that powerful governments will find a way to access data if there is a sufficient need and my fear is ruling like this, if surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing data

surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing dah surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing dai surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing daf surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing dat surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more surreptitious to accessing das surveillance efforts leave us less accountable, more united states that access out independently oversight by a judge. the government's appealing this ruling but i also think there's problems with the governance submission as well and that the ideal solution is for congress to step in and get involved area i encourage everyone to solicit radical, excellent concurrence opinion in the circuit on this point and in my view, an ideal amendment would submit the

united states to access to communications , content on its targets pursuant to lawrence in the investigation for serious crimes without regard to location of data but also require the government and the court to take into account prevailing factors like legality and location of the target . like the laws of other nations and the potential conflict for nations so as to help protect against the situation in which the united states claims access to data anywhere and everywhere without regard to providence. now i'll briefly turn to the converse problem, foreign governments having access to data located within the united states borders. the same statute that is at issue in the microsoft hiring phase also precludes companies from turning over data to foreign-based companies. so think about the same problem from the government perspective. law enforcement is investigating a london order, the target of the witness in london thinks if the alleged perpetrator reusing a uk-based provider, the uk law enforcement could go to that provider and get access to that data within days if not sooner. if instead

the alleged perpetrator is using email and the uk law enforcement officials go to google, google says go seek legal assistance. the treaty process takes an average of 10 months her response to be sent back to the uk and the us law enforcement officials are frustrated by the microsoft decision, those two are foreign governments as a result of their inability to access data that happens under us control. this is also in my view leading to a number of responses to encourage data localization mandates which break governments to access data according to their own standards of the united states. these kind of mandates are also affecting the efficiency of the internet and potentially shut out

startups from entering into the market because they cannot comply with the cost of data systems. we are seeing governments increasingly stripped of territorial jurisdiction without regard to the cause which is not just an academic hypothetical problem . in 2015 there was a microsoft executive arrested in brazil , facebook face to several problem as well and has already said they are further incentivizing searches by surreptitious means and accessing data so we need a solution. and i think we have a chance to design a solution that yields a race to the top or at least the raising of baseline procedural sections across the board rather than erasing the bottom for every nation giving data based on their own rules without regard to nationality and location of the target and in many cases aced on rules that are not based on territory.

recognizing this problem , the department of justice submitted legislation in the spring blocked the provision in certain circumstances. specifically it would allow the executive branch to the executive agreement with other governments, allowing those governments content of communication from us providers so long as they were not hacking data of us citizens in order to be able to enter into this type of agreement, the attorney general and secretary of state certified that the country maxed that procedural protection for privacy and liberty with the request that they would also have to meet a number of requirements for the fact that they were particular eyes or term limited, that they were overseen by a judge or independent authority, that the

information was not used two minimization requirements, or data compliance reviews for the united states. these would also have to be receptacle and that the foreign government would have to commit to allow the united states to make foreign-based providers for data persons located in the united states. we can debate the specifics of these kinds of proposals and i think there's areas where i would suggest wounded but i would suggest this is the right approach and one that would if adopted raise baseline privacy protections as compared to the current situation where governments are

increasingly providing things like data localization. but the approach also reflects the general comment that the united states has a interest in the specific substantive and procedural rules that govern access to data for its citizens but does not have a similar specificity in proposing which specific rules they want to base on probable cause when a foreign government is seeking to access the data outside the data state so long as certain baseline protections are observed. notably, the us and uk held a draft agreement that would allow uk to do exactly what i'm talking about, to directly hold communications content from us providers in certain circumstances. but this can't happen without legislation . i know it's a hard time to predict what's going to happen in congress over the next few years but i would say that i think this is and should be an issue that crosses party lines , congress has an important chance to design a rational and comprehensive search for the question of law enforcement

access to data on borders, addressing both the question of us government reached and also ending its long to allow foreign governments to increase interest with usl data according to baseline privacy protections once they are met. in my view these jurisdictional rules should focus on things like location and the nationality of the target rather than the location of the data and that failure to take these steps could have negative consequences for our security, economy and our privacy. [applause] >> thanks so much. i'd like to wish everyone as you are headed to the reception for an excellent paper on this topic. i want to invite our final panelist who just got to the stage. last year, we started a tradition at the conference by having a prominent libertarian, in this case it was from the

frontier foundation to have an extended, not debate but dialogue with the intelligence community. in this case, i think it was rebecca monastery and we thought why not simply repeat the experiment, see what happens? so here's to people who care deeply about privacy, one by an external critic, one working within the intelligence community and what they think are the important issues of the day and of course to introduce our discussion and moderate that conversation with another surveillance conference

tradition of sorts, i think at each of these since all the surveillance conferences, we must note a full day conference on the national security agency, pulitzer prize winner charlie savage who is national security reporting for the us times and understand what's going on in the intelligence world and whose book power wars is an absolutely invaluable guide to a thorough, comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of why intelligence and security policy under the obama administration has emerged. i will turn it over to charlie. >> so here we are at the end of this conference, off the books. 3 and a half years now into the putin era . we've been living under the usa freedom act for 1 3 and a half years now into the putin era . we've been living under the usa freedom act for 18 months now, heading into another reauthorization year for the fisa amendment act and it's a great time to wrap up the day and the year to some extent with an overview of where we are and

where we might be going as far as the surveillance world. help me to do that, i have two big guests, one is our goal to my right here. he's of the office of civil liberties, privacy and transparency at the office of director of national intelligence. he's been here since 2005 when the office was set up. he began his career as a jag in the army after giving out in the military, you work in technology in the private sector and after 9/11 he decided to rejoin the government as a cia counsel. and i think we were talking with green room before, i asked him to tell me something about the people more than just

his resume item and he told me >> i swim everyday. >> how do you have time to swim a mile a day? >> we have to wake up early in the morning. get up at 5:30. primarily. >> why do you swim every day? >> it's good to stay in shape. the secret to keeping swimming, the swimming is a tremendous exercise. >> just briefly. >> one word. if you have a waterproof ipod. >> you are the last person standing in the odi in that role, the entire time? >> i haven't done a full audit. >> my other guest is jennifer granite, she is director of civil liberties at stanford and the internet society, internet

law and the law school. also served of the director of electronic or foundation or something 209. and you are also the author of the forthcoming from university press called american spies: modern surveillance, why should fear and what to do about it. when is that book coming out? >> it's going to be out the beginning of january and it's a book about surveillance policy for the general audience, so it's an effort to make it understandable and accurate and give people a framework for thinking about the surveillance policies today with a definite civil liberties slapped. >> and want to have to something about yourself you told me your something called tech in five? >> it's for those hand-to-hand, video games and they have a thing in san francisco where the video arcade that has only video games imported directly from japan so my daughter really likes it because there is a character that the kangaroo so she's always the kangaroo and

the kangaroo and i beat each other up so i think it's good therapy probably. >> what character do you play? >> i just throw around. i can tell you that my other daughter was playing her and she got this one character and my daughter said the women are always skillfully dressed in these things and the men look like demigods and my daughter beat the computer that was playing the really masculine looking guy and my other daughter said you are so good, you beat that guy and you're barely even wearing a shirt. >> all right. let's get into it. i think part of what this audience wants to walk away from this conference with and these guys have all kinds of different feeds but one of the reasons we are able to do the deep dives in a way that we want for people that have an annual conference

about surveillance is because we know so much more about what the government is capable of doing, what rules are being obeyed and so forth and how from your vantage point, as a transparency officer which is a role you've been in for two years ago, how has the odi and a csi in terms of its ability to limited to or seeing the value of talking to the public about what it does? >> so i've been in the community of secrecy and work to build secrecy, we hire people based on their perception of their ability and confidentiality of the information inside the government. we build secure systems, do a lot of training around these and that's important to our business because of course as i said in other contexts, only transparent intelligence would be full ineffective so our effectiveness

depends on the people, the adversary not knowing how it is that we are using different techniques sources to discover them and affect their activities. so when you come from that culture, it's very difficult to sort of get people thinking about more open public and transparent and i've been doing this as i pointed out since 2005 and never before have i experienced a community that is is engaged with the public as we are now. still have a ways to go. i think one of the lessons that certainly i learned and a lot of folks learned in the last four years is that you can have as much oversight as you can design and put in place, we can have all kind of different oversight structures. i call this the many layers with many players, we have an inspector general, lawyers, and my kind of office we also have oversight committees and the foreign intelligence surveillance court, the intelligence oversight board, all these entities have clear personnel that can see information in the classified

environment which is critical i think for our democracy to have people who are in an oversight capacity who have the clearance to see the things that we're doing in a classified manner. to have these rules, you can have oversight and that's necessary not sufficient. i think one of the lessons we've learned over the last few years is that you need to add an additional element which is transparency and it's not easy or the intelligence community to do it, to take a lot of time and effort and retention but i believe that this is an enduring value that we have learned in the last few years. you have to find ways to be more open about what you do. >> let me talk about that. i as a reporter who is covering things, asking questions, filing freedom of information act and so forth, those of us in the fbi and osi have the responsibility to be gradually more willing to

affirmatively say, to fight the case and say it's okay, you can have a document here and i appreciated that very much. i'm not sure that moment is going to endure the way you just suggested that it would. i certainly think other parts , correct me if you disagree, that other parts of the intelligence community that were not forcibly exposed like the surveillance world was as much as intelligence agencies never went through that cultural change. and i wonder, one of the things i was thinking about lately is that the usa freedom act, one of its provisions was that the intelligence court had to make public when it had made a novel and significant determination of surveillance law and the provision doesn't say going forward. it just says continuous, it says the government shall make public so it raises questions about other

fisa court opinions that were enacted between 1979 and 2015 must also now be made public in a summarized form. the obama administration takes the position in court that only provides and applies going forward if there's a new culture of transparency, what's the justification of rationale for not just saying yes, this is important and from 1988 you can have it from 2003 you can have it ? >> i won't get into the legal questions with regard to the interpretation and whatever it is it being discussed. i can say more generally it is in the act so that's something that is happening. whether or not it's a statutory requirements, it is something we are portraying

right now. one of the points that i was making in a different forum is when you look at transparency, there are different reasons to provide information to the public. some of those are in response to mandatory legal requirements. the usa freedom act. you must comply with the usa freedom act and that acts as a prioritization mechanism . another one is freedom of information so once the freedom of information act goes into litigation, you have to follow the litigation and there are going to be court deadlines and court orders and you have to comply with them. and under the executive order of classification for national security information in the us government, there are various processes that also require us to review processes of classified information, for example the 25 year automatic review. there are mandatory declassification reviews that are filed under that executive order. so all of these external, what i call the hard requirements, legal requirements necessarily drive a lot of the

machinery that has to be put in place to provide transparency, a lot of transparencies which can be easy and go line by line across the documents what information can be released and if there is a risk to national security, bring in the experts, etc. part of it is not only looking at, responding to those mandatory qualifications and disclosure requirements but also looking to be more proactive and saying what is it we can do to better explain ourselves and in that regard we have been engaging with civil society, getting their ideas and requests and trying to figure out what's in the public interest, what can we do to better inform public discussion and i don't think, i do think that's enduring but i do think that's something that no matter what agency you are, we've all experienced the last three years. we've all experienced significant and vibrant discussion and debate

about the legitimacy of certain policies and i think the intelligence agencies have all gotten the message that we have to figure out a way to be more proactive going forward with information by the public. >> when you think about going forward, the most significant event that we can see on the horizon for surveillance is the scheduled exploration of the fisa amendment act at the end of 2017. there's no expectation but it is an opportunity for amendment and extra provisions. what are some of the three big issues and takeaways that people should watch for as that debate unfolds? >> one thing that is in response to alex's comment is about transparency but i would put it a little more broadly which is accountability. and you know, i think that while the intelligence community has come a long way from where it once was, it has not come nearly far

enough in terms of revealing information to the public. there are secret interpretations of very important key terms in intelligence communities that the public doesn't really know what they mean or how they are being interpreted and it handers our ability to understand what kinds of surveillance are being conducted and whether we support that kind of surveillance and what the safeguards are adequate. >> we have an opportunity in the fisa act to do what to solve that problem? >> everything is up for negotiation once you go in and it takes fire so we can ask them more things. the fisa opinions, people want to know what the definition of the surveillance is, what is hostility? what is the target? what is the interpretation of the us

portion? what kind of materials accordingly does the government treat as tested by a reasonable expectation of privacy because all of the fisa surveillance definitions depend upon information to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy so we have this ongoing debate about very sensitive personal private information where the public doesn't really know exactly how the government treats it and if they treated as having an expectation of privacy or not. either another statue has to protect worth not something that falls outside the definition of electronic surveillance area just an example, email. we still don't really know one hundred percent sure that email is protected by the fourth amendment or what about documents that are stored in the cloud? we've got to know that. >> what you're saying is better implementation that could come out about how the government understands the power that it could enable substantive tools.

what's the substantive change to the rules that reformers want specifically that also could be part of the bill? >> there there's two big things. one is scope and the other is usage . so scope, 702 in the fisa amendment that house targeting of foreigners overseas or any foreign intelligence information. without a warrant, with a warrant for surveillance purposes of any foreign intelligence but the foreign intelligence is a very broad category. well beyond counterterrorism to anything that might be listed as a country so what that means is two things, number one, it means that in america, the foreigners who are of interest in these categories are communications or wiretaps as well and it means that foreigners who may be targets who we are talking about targets, they get tagged with these very broad categories

also. then there's international confirmation as people realize that our law is collecting them as targets without a warrant in this broad thing well beyond what their national human rights laws necessarily are proportionate tests on whether the surveillance meets human rights standards. >> are we talking about collection inside the united states? when the government goes to email or goes here and what is the lookout in the world based on these ? >> then maybe a broad gathering of foreigners. >> without license but this is where they go to us companies or doing surveillance on the internet backgrounds and the same to these beloved brand names give us your users and there's the economic problem is that people don't want to use companies that have to give over their information without a warrant to the government but

that's a problem for us and for americans as well. we have a vast amount of americans with private information that ends up in these databases. >> you would like to see the scope of surveillance under this law be changed in some way to what, what's the delta between how things are today counterterrorism. >> not economics? >> you think that's possible? >> i don't know. i don't live in dc. it's like a whole current world out there and i think that people tell me that there's less of a chance for surveillance reform now with the republican control of both houses of congress. i find that in some ways hard to believe. i think now is the time where people were paying attention are thinking quite the opposite, this is a time to restrain government expression and to

make sure that robust rules and checks and balances are in place more than ever before. >> the other thing is you should, people hear more about that. how is that prescribed coming up? >> once information is collected under section 702 from the company so under the section that expired from the company, without a warrant, that warrant was collected and the fbi which is a law enforcement and domestic agency has access to the raw data in that database and what they are allowed to do is search, they call it query because search is a specific term, is to search that database for information including looking for information about americans for criminal purposes. and this is called the sort of backdoor search loophole because in order to get access you would

have to go to the court, show probable cause, warrant, execute for little procedures and all that was happening here is the database of information as americans to medication from foreigners, then you have these databases that the fbi is allowed to go to so the users restriction would be either don't allow it at all, what we collect this information in the name of counterterrorism and national security, use it in that name and don't use it to do an end run around it or at the very least you have to go to court and get a warrant and show you have probable cause to look for this information as opposed to the way it is now which the fbi asked to be successful with its data fat-free. >> let me go back to alex. it's not a person but the government is a representative, can you issue a rebuttal, why has the government resisted the idea that at least in the criminal investigative world if the fbi agent wants to look into databases to see if a criminal ordinary criminal suspect has

already been collected, the government, the fbi just get a warrant before trying to pull that message out? >> i have to take a step back and address this more broadly. first of all, i agree with some of the points you make about the transparency of the legal ruling and legal definition of the priority, but in terms of the scope , the scope is foreign intelligence as defined and for intelligence, the actual conduct of the targeting of foreign intelligence for purposes in 702 is subject to a rigorous process. we have a priorities framework . >> let's assume i was communicating with a legitimate procedure foreign intelligence target. not a terrorist, just someone who knew about the theme area not targeting that. why shouldn't an fbi agent have to get a warrant to read my five messages if i'm the one interested in and i'm the one comparing.

>> i'm trying to lay the foundation for my argument. >> were going to move through many topics so i'm trying to get to the point. >> we believe the original collection is targeted area the collection is targeted at a legitimate foreign target. were not getting all of your emails, only the email communications of you and this carefully focused foreign intelligence party and if there is a vast break in the situation where we need to find out whether or not an american that's been involved in these activities within the united states is in communication with somebody that we already have collected on, that's the rationale. you need to move quickly, to identify whether we currently hold communications information that could help us prevent something from happening. >> that sounds like you're searching for the name of terrorists, not searching the names of americans. >> just an american who is involved in some terrorist activities within the united states and we want see if he's getting them abroad.

>> you think the government can live with a requirement as long as there's an institution for national security crisis? >> the government's position has been no known. >> and because, or is it just why should we consider these powers? there's never been a tradition of using data that was lost in gathering. >> it's essentially that you don't know when you might need to get it quickly, we don't want to train the intelligence services to be able to do that . but from a civil liberties and privacy perspective, i understand your concern and we tried to put in place a policy regarding oversight, document queries and presidential queries providing oversight for the department of justice on the queries and reporting in court so i understand the concern. we feel the structure is sufficient to address those concerns .

>> can i say something about that? >> sure. >> until we know how many of these facts the fbi conducts and how the volume of information they pulled out, there's no way that we can fast-break an internal assessment of the public and lawmakers need to know that answer in order to say we likwe this or we don't like it read they won't tell us. and the intelligence community won't tell us, they won't count. >> and it brings back results but that means what does that mean it? every single search in some ways count says say backdoor search. how.

>> that means a search in all-times is a back door search even if 99.9 percent never bring back anything. it's masz leading number. >> only certain fbi agents are allow to see the results. >> without getting permission. >> yeah. >> do you know if agents have asked permission and ever been denied? >> we're work through that.

the court is an opinion of november 2015 and the opinion on that and then it's posted and i see it on the record and address the issue and they argued that it was the process and they were in consistent of the constitution and the court held that it was consistent and then they decided to order fbi to count the number of times they return resulted in a query situation. so the fbi has been implementing that o order, and that's one of the thing that is we're working on. >> is that imminent? >> i hope so. >> all the back door searches? to make just the court order >> i don't know that internal architecture budget hawk in is not a big computer sciences

hurdle to say this is that many queries to come out to be treated as a surgeon way. >> have you seen that data? when it comes out, will people find it surprising. >> i will not speculate on that. [ laughter ] >> moving onto the world is of executive order. the internal executive branch rules hot are recollects were only one communication is domestic from fisa either from those fisa optic cables abroad. in the huge bond swap is not covered by fisa and the reason for that architecture for the phone

systems and net internet era and that last session high this down here all the time. and with that reform with the rise of the internet. one of the wrinkles is that is the awareness that agencies who were sharing a broad data with each other. they have not had privacy protections yet with irrelevant personal details. it used to be the some fbi would disseminate that elsewhere or a process that. after 9/11 there was a desire to tear down the barriers and that

would have the redacted so in the world of fisa there was an effort that is known to go to the four agencies of the national counterterrorism center and to talk publicly how there has also bent an effort for those procedures collected to share with the cia and fbi we don't know what those rules will be at but they said did in

february was imminent. what is the problem? do you think it's going to happen before the administration leaves >> i think we're on the road to getting something. >> the government takes time, but is there a issue, but what is holding it up? >> well, the government takes time. under section 2.3 of the executive order and the intelligence agencies and it says that intelligence agencies can share the information with each other because there's a guideline and designed to protect the u.s. person and information. approxima approximate. >> does it change what was put in 2008? >> well, from 1981 that the intelligence information cannot be shared. and to be disseminated in

report. offer this type of single intelligence information to be approved by the attorney general when but what you are talking about has been in the work for a large number of years. ebs it is going at the speed of government. but the single intelligence information can be shared as an elaborate process with the determination that they have a need for the information who and the structure will give that protection was that they provide under their rules.

>> so the big difference is that it's you low-cal one specific person for one specific reason then you are communicating so does that permit balkans collection? but with that back door urge search leopold. also does looking at me look at all of those key target savate reassuring constrained would not exist who so can you preview the big question with those criminal purposes.

>> so just to clarify if we are to do surveillance targeting to get that individualized court order. >> that's right. both collections that is a million of people. to the extent that the collection is not targeted, so this is where i wanted to step back and talk about the way that we do targeting. it's something that is specifically been described and then it also happens for 12333. there is a process by which intelligence agencies go through to identify the individual targets and to the extent that can happen on that basis and that's what happened. if we can get the information individually targeting the communication over seas, that's what happened. under the policy and directive

28, we put in place a process to limit the f use of information in bulk. so we can do the things in bulk. so it is the implementation but so they could narrow as much as they can. but if they do query of u.s. % the musket the approval of the u.s. attorney general. broadly speaking trying to make those other agencies comparable. >> bolster beckley to what i was

saying and the presidential policy directive to handle bulk collection some maybe criminal. so now we will turn back. >> the couple of things but what we already know about targets is a lot of people think of targeting a particular bad guy like a french government or doctors without borders so the

organizations that operate international they can be targeted for intelligence. i think it ends up collecting a lot of information because those that are not really for intelligence to end up being part of that and those rules don't protect them of that nature because it is so broad. so even under title one fisa to be at that head of prominent groups like care there is a lot of reasons to be concerned but one of the things to be extra concerned with the eagerness to ration they are executive branch formulated rules with executive

orders and they can be kept secret and don't have to go to congress. many people did not know what they were. but they need those targeting provisions but that ability is limited. >> ideal want to look forward. part of your critique is day nationalistic frame it is corrected so let's drop that frame for a moment and to think that they have privacy rights so

we mentioned earlier for those who are not familiar with that groundwork was from a global perspective. >> with that revelation of the international outcry for those who are not americans but are getting surveillance directed at them. so many people feel this was a major positive results of the disclosure of the policy directive in limits the use to

put that intelligence through those six major categories like counterterrorism, proliferat ion and it's still remains if you are targeting minnesota does that mean collecting duties and is that balkan wars that targeted at young men? -- yemen but if that is collected with the big national security. >> so what was signed president did greg. >> so prior the information that was collected. >> there was no sense that there was privacy interest protected by the rules. >> yeah, free expression

interest and the right to gather politically and freedom of religion and all of the interests that may have been protected or policy wise may have been protected for americans, there was nothing for foreigners. this was an effort to say to foreigners, you know, if we use your stuff, then it's going to be for a good reason.