fourth sunset of the day. ♪ , a professor talks about the persuasive rhetoric of eight of hitler and franklin d roosevelt in the 1930's and 40's. he argues that both men led nations that had to be convinced to go to war. this is one hour and 45 minutes. is randalls speaker , who did his phd at northwestern university, has taught at the university of mines, calvin college in

michigan, and lcc international university in lithuania. he has written three books and articlesozen scholarly on aspects of notting propaganda -- not see propaganda -- nazi propaganda. a fascinating world. just google german propaganda german propaganda or not see propaganda. nancy -- notom the he --

mr. bytwerk: shortly afternoon 1939, herman goering introduced adolf hitler at the german reichstag. he was about to give what i think is the most widely anticipated and widely heard speech of the 20th century. that is a bit of a claim. and the back of your mines as i'm speaking you may see if you

can come up with a counter example. there are certainly a number of things one might consider. we are going to look at that speech this evening. are going towe look at the background of relations between adolf hitler and franklin roosevelt. we will consider the beginning of a rhetorical battle between the two which began with roosevelt's famous quarantine speech in september 1937. will spend a fair amount of time looking at the critical months of march and april 1939, when the rhetorical war between hitler and roosevelt intensified , and then we will spend a little bit of time looking at what happened afterwards. some things to keep in mind -- first, both people were far more persuasive heard than red. if you lessons -- and i suspect many of this audience has --

listened to roosevelt's fireside chats and heard that voice coming over, and then read the transcripts, something gets lost. the same is true of hitler. the man spoke at inordinate length. 2.5 hours was not unusual. if you read the transcripts, the text of the speech, you shake your head. in front of an audience, he was a spellbinder. second, fdr had much greater rhetorical challenges that hitler did. hitler had a controlled system. speech it wase a claimed to be a rhetorical masterpiece. nobody ever dared tell hitler he was not doing well. he had a press which did what he wanted. if they didn't, they got in a lot of trouble quickly. roosevelt had a much greater set

of problems. he had a democracy. a lot of people did not like him and were not afraid to say so. he had to deal with press. reporters liked roosevelt. he gave great press conferences. boy i wish i had been there. he joked. he knew them by name. they played games, if you will, and he usually gave them a great story. there are editors and owners did not like roosevelt nearly as much. and the republicans it make much of him either. roosevelt had a much tougher set of challenges to face. third, hitler could reach the united states much more easily than fdr could reach germany. the united states system is relatively open. his speeches were sometimes

printed at full length in american newspapers. the germans saw in their press only what the propaganda leadership wanted them to see. they could sometimes listen to shortwave, but that was not the easier way to do it. finally, we're looking at the rhetoric of the. -- the rhetoric of the period. there was all kinds of activity. lots of things were going on we are not looking at. you can't do everything. with that they said, let's turn to the initial relations between the two. they both took power within a month of each other in 1933. they both had similar problems. the economy was a catastrophe. the first few years working to strengthen out as much as they could. they didn't entirely ignore each other, but they did not have a lot to say about each other. when the germans talked about

roosevelt, they were relatively friendly. for example, the german press reelection treat the in 1936 in a friendly way. was told to say this. there was a press conference, sometimes two in berlin each day, which gave detailed instructions to the press about what to say. there are something like 15,000 of these things. if you weren't there, they were sent by teletype to newspapers all over germany. they did not have sensors that before publication, they just gave there a clear instructions. journalists knew if they did not do it the right way, their careers were going to be short. they were told to treat roosevelt election and a friendly way. they were told not to discuss the fact that he was a freemason -- although he was. that was part of the

international jewish conspiracy and was not something you could say about the united states, regardless of the fact it was true. editorial cartoons presented roosevelt in a relatively friendly way. whiche a 1934 cartoon in roosevelt is sweeping congress out the door telling them to take a vacation so he can get some work done. our expert back there can see if he can do something about that. behold,vent, low and roosevelt is presented in a somewhat friendly way. here is another cartoon from 1935. .t says roosevelt and communism you can't only grab the bull by the horns, you have to twist its neck. the interesting thing about these two cartoons is that roosevelt is not handicapped. right? he is a strong, sturdy,

relatively handsome guy. as a footnote, this changed. here is a cartoon from 1940. you have first of all -- was that looks really unpleasant. and it says that roosevelt's new deal has failed so he asked a new -- find new ways to support himself. and ishas crutches supported where he wanted to build military bases. into the 30's, roosevelt was being treated in a friendly way. the other thing that is interesting about the two gentlemen, is that they had very similar rhetorical problem. both were in charge of nathan's best nations that did not want war. both wanted to prepare those nations to wage war. both are two different reasons. hitler was trying to prepare his nation for war because he

intended to start that war. was concerned about those intentions and was trying to prepare the united states to wage war, but had in or is difficulty -- enormous difficulty. 95% of the american public wanted nothing to do with foreign wars. hitler had the same problem. germans did not want a war. when he succeeded in taking over sudetenland, he was very disappointed. german people were much more pleased that war had been averted them that he had won a great foreign policy triumph. neither country wanted war. we have good contemporary evidence of this. in 1937, roosevelt wrote his i ameadmaster and he said fighting against a public psychology of long-standing, a

psychology which comes very close to saying peace at any price. message,not a public and he would not have wanted it to be public, obviously. the point is roosevelt knew he did not have a nation very eager to fight. hitler has very much the same problem, although he was , heator and furor -- fuhrer always had to rely on public opinion. we know this because of a fascinating speech he gave in munich to a closed meeting of german journalists. for years, i spoke only of peace. now at his -- now it has become necessary to slowly prepare the german folk psychology for the fact that there are things that cannot be achieved by peaceful means. some goals can only be achieved through the use of force.

light necessary to shed on certain events abroad in such a manner that the and her voice of the german oak naturally cried out for the application of force. buildings planning public support of the war he intended to wage. this will be familiar with the timescale. , the occupation of the rhineland. he invaded ethiopia, and spanish civil easier -- spanish civil war. roosevelt in 1936 has won reelection. he is feeling a little more confident, and he knows he has to shift public opinion. roosevelt was something of a turtle. he had a fine sense of public opinion. he knew he could not make fast changes.

he stated review of stick his head up a little bit and try something. if it did not work, the head would be back in. every now and then, he missed. in 1937, he misjudged. in a constitution day speech which is primarily aimed at his domestic opponents. he touched on international affairs. thatlked about governments were maintained by fear at the expense of liberty and individual rights. he did not mention japan by name. he did not mention germany by name. the germans knew he was talking about them. the press was instructed to take careful note of this. the nazi party daily newspaper they snappy intensified by demagogue slogans and hostile statements.

methods look rather like a dictatorship, he wants at least to prove to his democratic credentials and polemics against other dictators. this was much more direct an attack that had been made by the german press before. he really stuck his neck out a couple weeks later in chicago. bad time for a foreign-policy speech. this was a dedication of a bridge in chicago. that is the speech in which he made his famous quarantine metaphor. he said when an epidemic of physical disease starts to joins in a community quarantine of the patient in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of disease. nobody knew what he meant by that. roosevelt probably did not know exactly what he meant by that.

as cordell hull said, the reaction was quick and violent. public opinion across the board was highly unhappy. it was mostly vehemently negative. roosevelt knew he had stuck his neck out too far and put back in. he refused to say anything. you and say no, and. he was only willing to make some very vague and loose comments absolutely free from being attributed to him. he realized he was ahead of public opinion. and the next year and a half, he does not say much except the journalists knew that he was a bad guy. they went after him with fervor. instructed not to let this one pass. hitler himself commented to one of his aides this is a turning

point. the united states was clearly in his mind against germany. at the press conference in berlin that evening, the german press was given its marching orders. they were in his mind against germany. told they are hypocrites. roosevelt is suggesting that somehow we are wrong. if he were to look at the exports of his armaments industry, he would conclude there is a contradiction between his speech and the millions and armaments proper mitts -- profits. they went on in some detail. roosevelt realized he was ahead of public opinion. for the next nine months, he did not really say very much. the state of the union address -- january 1938 made a very passing mention. heardil, he said he'd

good things about german youth dance. he asked his ambassador to look into what was going on. the german press was told to say this -- since we do not want to suggest that the german public is incensed by roosevelt, ignore it and don't mention it. we don't want to give any indication that we think there is some good thing about roosevelt. 1938. roosevelt was willing to stick his neck out a little more again. slowly, public opinion was beginning to move. he gave a speech at queens university in canada. said i givech, he that the people of the united states will not if the domination of the canadian union is threatened by any other empire.

remember the monroe doctrine was specifically assigned to central and south america. canada was part of the british empire. the germans instantly reacted to this. they did not like this at all. a typical german newspaper .eadline said dangerous gains the significance of results page. it is characterized by crude attacks against nondemocratic forms of government that accuse ofre were dreams -- regimes unrestrained brutality against helpless people. across the board in german press, this is the kind of thing germans were reading. it was clear to any german who read the newspaper that roosevelt was not a friend. the next on september 1938, a fateful month. the month of munich.

tensions were building. germans were accusing the czechs of threatening the germans in that part of czechoslovakia. they were building up a campaign in germany to suggest that awful things have to be matched by military force. those of us who remember the bay of pigs -- and i know this audience, a lot of us do. we will never the feeling of standing near the edge of the of this. war might break out at any point. how europe was feeling in september 1938. roosevelt at that point stuck his enterprising efforts into it again. he sent the first of five public messages indexed year, trying to secure peace. he said the message in september, just before munich, calling for international conferences.

he could kind of be the postmaster getting information from one side to the other. he was on the side of public opinion on this. although the american public did not want to get involved in any military activities, they were willing to talk about it at least. domestically this work quite nicely. the germans were not at all. hitler was hoping for a nice war against czechoslovakia. the last thing he wanted was roosevelt getting in a way. the germans had to decide what to do. the german press was told not to say anything until the fuhrer speaks. hitler followed with a message. was to roosevelt. he says i fully appreciate the lofty attempt best intent on which your remarks are based.

however, i canada must refuse all responsibility if further developments, contrary to all my efforts up to the present, should lead to the outbreak of hostilities. to arrive at a fair judgment regarding the sudeten german toblem, it is indispensable consider the incidents, in which, indian us analysis of the origin of this problem and it dangers has its cause. he is a he is doing everything i can, but it is not his fault. roosevelt responded the next day with another message. he said you typed but the past, but this is about the future, let's worry about that. the germans ignored that, because the other leaders in europe were flying to munich to give hitler what he wanted. since he got everything he wanted, he didn't have an for throwing his desk and excuse for throwing his military into the picture.

the german people saw that a great dramatic triumph had been one. the next few months, roosevelt was 1 -- was relatively quiet. he did comment that he could not imagine if something happened in a civilized country. the good -- the germans kind of ignored it. they went to focus their propaganda on those things. roosevelt and his aides were also getting involved in -- involved. people at the secretary of interior were beginning to make nasty statements. germans were mad at him because he had banned exports. for instance, he criticized bloomberg and henry ford for accepting metals from germany.

again, the germans started to go after him. germans by the end of 1938 decided that roosevelt is not their friend. information their is pretty good. they have discovered that in the state of the union address for 1939, he is going to say that. they decide to beat him to the punch. on december 31, 1938, german newspapers print the heavens attacks on roosevelt and his administration. the jews are behind it all, they are controlling it, so forth. the typical sort of nazi propaganda kind of material. they put a lot of energy into it. and it turns out that they were right. -- state of the

unit address said that in reporting the state of the union , he had occasion to advise congress of disturbances abroad . the germans were prepared, and they've responded with indoor miss energy -- indoor miss energy -- enormous energy. -- art time the neutrality act got a lot of attention in the domestic press.

the press was told to save the jews were behind it. they were told to say he is trying to deal with domestic opposition. he is trying to prepare for a third term. this is an argument that was repeatedly made, it is the new 14 points of wilson. just like woodrow wilson. so rosales trying to drew up -- to draw up a new 14 points to deceive germany with provinces of peace. and then they have to promises of peace. and what a doing talking about us anyway? we solved unemployment. people are starving in the streets of the u.s.. he has his own problems. all of this went on at some length. a week later, fdr asked congress for $525 million for american armament.

germans responded that this was a nation ablated invasions from mars. hitler made two references to the war on the world's show and how gullible the americans were. the germans said to relatively little in the press after that because hitler was going to speak shortly. germanys a firm rule in that you could not comment on foreign policy until he had made that policy clear. on january 30 1938 -- january 30, 1939, hitler gave one of his more significant ages.

speeches.cant he said if international financial jews succeed once again and plunging the people's into a world war, it will not be a victory of the jews but a destruction of the jewish race in europe. is that ineresting january 19 39, nobody thought he meant the holocaust. attentionot get much as other parts of the speech. later hitler said that europe would solve the problem of jews the same way germany had -- five propaganda. thousands of posters all over germany. this came out august 1941 after the invasion. this was when the holocaust was gearing up to it meant something different.

there was that. hitler also spoke about how germany needed its colonies. was worried if he about colonies, he would not invade his neighbors in the future. these are journalists and statesmen around the world are saying nasty things about germany. something must be done about it. it is necessary for our press to immediately respond. men areknow who these who so desperately seek to provoke war. roosevelt,mention but he did mention some of his aides. it set a propaganda directive.

february 1939, roosevelt testifies to a closed session of the senate military affairs committee. it is leaked that he says america's borders are on the line. roosevelt vehemently denies he says that. however, he apparently said something relatively close. responded as you would expect. giving was apparently military guarantees to france and england. the response was absolutely enthusiastic. he was called world peace enemy number one. and one of the benefits of controlling press is that you can control what gets printed where. one of the standard features of

press was what the press in berlin and london were saying. you can pick it up the street corner. propaganda ministries conference, the press were told that to berlin papers were supposed to give for collins on the front page for this. mns on the front page this. they put it in the papers they new form correspondents would read and get the message across -- foreign correspondents would read and get the message across to the rest of the world. another aspect of the nazi system which was relatively invisible -- the foreign correspondent. the propaganda with the state ministry in berlin. they also have the party propaganda department raised in munich. goebbels was also the head of that.

was thatdifference berlin, the government handled things like press, culture, major issues. the party propaganda office ,ealt with the speaker system person-to-person propaganda, organization of meetings all over the country, things like that. they had thousands of speakers. they did major meetings with tens of thousands of people. they also have speakers which went to every corner of germany speaking to an audience of 10 people in a small village. largelylargely in -- invisible to foreign correspondents. early april 1949 -- 1939, the propaganda speakers get detailed aboutction on what to say the united states and about roosevelt.

today, a man stands at the head of the nation to be called wilson the second. again, it went on in considerable detail. this is the kind of thing people would read, study and use to give hour-long talks. sometimes a community of the press. a lot of the kind of thing was going on in visible to foreign correspondents. countrythe period of a that only has access to what the newspapers are saying. early march 1938, hitler

takes over the rest of czechoslovakia. in the end of march coming he gives the ultimatum to lithuania to returning district which had been given over as part of the treaty of versailles. in early april, mussolini decides to invade albania. it seems like a country a week was falling. stage, roosevelt was thinking he had to do more. he first of all gave a speech which was lunch or than the past. it was an annual event. in it he spoke about huns and vandals. the germans had a good idea he was talking about them. they responded in ways i don't need to repeat here. roosevelt said

something which caught everybody by surprise, largely on his own initiative, without consulting .ardly anybody, --that message to hitler actually it wasn't directed to muesli me a, it was directed to the king of italy. the king of italy was the head of state as was hitler. both of them got the message. in that message, he said he realize i'm sure throughout the world, hundreds of millions of human beings are living in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars. he then urged international conference. he offered to help. he asked the access to promise not to attack a list of 31 named countries.

there are some odd inclusions and omissions. he did not include islands. -- did not include iron land -- ireland. he added the message by saying leaders cannot fail to hear the avoid war.peoples to history will hold them accountable for the happiness and lives of all even unto the least. in any event, this caught everybody by surprise. nobody knew this was coming. it was greeted in the non-axis world with tremendous enthusiasm. a period in which the world felt it was standing on the abyss.

newspapers called roosevelt the greatest man of the world. tremendous enthusiasm for what he said. ,he germans had a problem because his message seems to give hitler what he already had. it did say give czechoslovakia back. .e seemed to grant and to the german public, this was a wonderful thing. peace might in fact be assured. they didn't do gallup poll's, but they did in turtle pulls. -- internal. had a gooddemocrats system of internal communication. they had informants all over the place. they reported to prague headquarters that germans like this. what you do about that?

had to think hard. the press conference said he can -- if this.hat respond to it with the greatest possible vehemence. it says another 14 points. roosevelt was trying to reduce the risk of war for which he was responsible. it was his fault, not adolf hitler's. he was trying to divert world opinion from the fact that england and france were trying to encircle germany. one paper said it is astounding that the head of a major nation would lower themselves to sending such a shabby propaganda pamphlet disguised as a note to another head of state.

a shabby propaganda pamphlet. but they know roosevelt had the initiative. hitler had had centerstage. everybody was looking at hitler trying to figure out what to do. suddenly roosevelt had grabbed centerstage and the germans did not like that. toy had to figure out a way get the spotlight of history focused back on them and on health hitler. does on adolf hitler. you had curtains like this. this one says a peculiar plant. you have roosevelt growing out of a bubbling swap. one phase is spewing out armaments, planks, -- tanks, planes. they had to do more than that. germans liked what they heard. later, hitler got

together with his foreign minister and came up with a brilliant propaganda strategy. hitler announced he would answer roosevelt message in 10 days. there are reasons for that. first, hitler's birthday was coming up. april 20. that was a major holiday in germany. this was big in germany. furthermore, it was his 50th birthday. nothing could be allowed to get in the way of that. what happened was by saying he was going to answer but it would take about 10 days, suddenly everybody found themselves speculating what hitler was going to say. he had the state back again. an american newspaper got it exactly right. the milwaukee journal wrote the head of the greatest democracy of the world has put up to hitler the question of war and peace.

the world is to have 10 days guessing what the answer will be. for wheel orwell, president roosevelt has given adolf hitler the spotlight of history. a couple days, roosevelt had held centerstage. now, everybody throughout the world was wondering what was hitler going to say. he had a lot of help. states, you had a variety of people giving him advice. johnson was a syndicated correspondent, widely publicized. he actually gave hitler advice. washingtonembassy in reported they were getting a flood of comments, letters, telegrams from american, mostly well-meaning, with suggestions about what hitler could say.

everybody was saying what would happen? and nobody could say anything, because who could predict? so, on april 28, at noon, the reichstag gathered. it wasn't very significant, but it made a great backdrop. hermann goering introduced hitler. the world stopped. in germany, streets were empty. loudspeakers were set up all over the place. not only in germany. to speech was broadcast live 50 countries around the world, including the united states. bachet think of another's that was -- another speech that was as anticipated and broadcast live to 50 countries around the planet. everybody was curious.

except franklin roosevelt, who knew enough german to follow it, but he slept through it. he read the text eventually. about not as impressed adolf hitler apparently has the rest of the world. what happened to the united states and other countries was they did something that does not work well called interpolated translation. let's listen to the american introduction to what americans heard about six brca and eastern time coming of the airwaves -- 6:00 a.m. eastern time coming over the airwaves. by shortwave, direct from germany, we now bring you the address delivered by chancellor adolf hitler before a special session of the reichstag. the chancellor's address will be

a reply to the message of peace sent racy to other countries by president roosevelt. while the chancellor is speaking, there will be a running translation in english. at the conclusion of the event, if time permits, a famous for correspondent and news corp. news will prevent a net -- commentator. mr. bytwerk: how did hitler begin? this will be does this will give you an idea of the interpolated translation as well. this will be the translation. you will hear hitler's voice and then the translation. >> your now listened to the

voice of chancellor hitler. [speaking german]

>> chancellor hitler has just referred to present hitler's that president roosevelt's message, which he describes as a clever piece of work. mr. bytwerk: sorry about that. you hear the voice. what happens is you get a brief with all the nuance and all of the sarcasm taken out. the audience chuckles. he gets in the end. what he says at the tail end is .e will present his response the audience burst out into laughter. the reichstag rejecting the furor -- fuhrer?

it was ludicrous to them and they laughed. that was lost in the enter belated translation. -- interpolated translation. they missed the sarcasm. it sounded more reasonable than in fact was. what does hitler do? this is a two-hour 20 minute speech he gets. not unusual for hitler. we have heard the introduction. he spends about 18 minutes making the standard german objection to the treaty of versailles. then he spends half an hour on austria, bohemia, and arabia. our, andrting in nothing new has that he has been talking for an hour and nothing has been said.

now something interesting comes along. after an hour, he surprises everybody and says england has been say nasty things about is lately, and they don't seem to trust us very much. out of courtesy to them, i will annul these anglo german naval pacts that we have. you can't expect england to follow them if they do not believe us. he had already broken them. the british did not know that yet. he abolishes them. then he goes on to talk about the glorious return of the baltic states area. poland, he says there is little to be said on the topic of german polish relation. except there was. he says we have this nonaggression pact with poland. they have gotten guarantees to england and france.

this seems to be in violation of the pact. unilaterally,as null and void. roosevelt had asked him not to attack 31 countries. he so far canceled three international treaties and has not even gotten to roosevelt yet. now he gets to roosevelt. 90 minutes into the speech. he turns to roosevelt. he spent the next hour or so going after that. we can go to the speech in an ornate detail, but we will not do that to. first, he went back to that argument of the 14 points, the treated of -- the treaty of versailles that germans objected to. by dividing results messaging to

21 points. roosevelt had not divided his message into points. rooseveltsted that was even worse than wilson. wilson only had 14 points. this new wilson has 21 points. 14 of those 21 points that he divides the speech into, he raises the issue of wilson and versailles. over and over again. second, and agent is points, he makes the point that roosevelt is a hypocrite. he says he is encouraging negotiation and is including international agreements and so forth. what about the league of nations? the united states got going and had nothing to do with it. what about the civil war?

was that solved around the negotiating table? what about all the wars? germany has not been involved in any wars since 1918. the united states has been involved in a bunch of them. he went on in a norma's detail into this. -- in enormous detail. one spoke moreo eloquently of peace than adolf hitler. he was great at declaring his great and tremendous love of peace. he did that repeatedly in this section. there was a tremendous amount of sarcasm. again, lost in translation. throughout the speech, the reichstag laughed enthusiastically at a number of points.

particularly good digs that roosevelt. fact of theas the fundamental mendacity of the speech. hitler was good at propaganda. he realized that blatant lies, unless they are too big to be discovered, did not work very well. half-truths were much more effective. a great deal of what hitler set of the surface sounded possible. it is only when you look beneath -- and most people can't do that because they're are listening to the speech or don't know the details -- but he included all kinds of fascinating details. he said germany has not been involved in any wars since 1918. literally speaking, that was true. however, how did he get austria?

he basically said invite me in or i am coming in any way. how did he get sudetenland? he said give it to me rl's -- or else. you give us the district in lithuania or a member what happened to czechoslovakia. he is using half-truths. best thing about half-truths that they can be very credible on the surface. the problem with half-truths is that they do not add up. to half-truths do not make a full truth. the point is, what hitler set on the surface and to a german audience sounded absolutely persuasive. let's look at a more detailed part of one section of the speech. that is a response to

roosevelt's request not to attack those 31 countries. this is a clip that most of you will have seen. [speaking german] [laughter] mr. bytwerk: again, the audience response with uproarious laughter he goes through the list. he actually invaded quite a few of those 31.

this seemed at the time ridiculous. let's look to be extended argument referring to roosevelt's message. he says first after he has gone heough this message that would ask whether roosevelt angry was initiated by them or whether there is further consent in this. the responses obtained were negative throughout, in part even marked by outright indignation. again, this is a great example for how truths -- for half-truths. if you asked if you are afraid of hitler in 1938? of course not. anyway, the point is he does that. then he says however, a number of the states could not afford the response to us, because like syria, they are not currently in

possession of their liberty since their territories are occupied by the military forces of the democratic states which have robbed them of all their rights. a possible half-truths. syria was in fact under french occupation. they do not have freedom of action. this, the beyond states have received many binding assurances that mr. roosevelt requested in his peculiar telegram. this is true. he had made all kinds of wonderful statements. he did not mean them, but he had made them. he goes on to say that he had done this, but should there be a question as to the value of these general and specific statements which he repeatedly made to president roosevelt, the equally worthless? in other words, if you do not

believe everything i have said so far, what is the point of saying anything further? there is a sufficient possibility to what he is saying there. also some of the rest of the world. then we get to this. fifth, he gives some lessons to roosevelt. i must get point out to mr. roosevelt a few additional mistaken notions of history. for instance, he mentions island and request a statement that germany not attack island. now i have just read a speech by the irish prime minister in which contrary to the opinion of mr. roosevelt, he oddly enough does not accuse germany of a pressing ireland and instead reproaches england. continues equally, palestine

is not occupied by german troops, but english ones who are robbing the palestinians of in favor of jewish intruders. it was a fairly extended response. did not knowle enough to raise questions. it sounded convincing. as he goes along, he finishes the speech speaking eloquently of peace. vastness of your country allows you to have the time and leisure to attend to the problems of universal nature. you could conceive of the world is so small a place that you can intervene beneficially and effectively wherever this might be required. in this sense, your concerns and suggestions can be far more

sweeping than mine. is a world in which providence has put me, and in which i am responsible. it is a much smaller world. i do believe i am thereby in a better position to serve the and closer to the hearts of all of welfare,tice, progress, and peace for the entire community of mankind. in reichstag broke out convulsions of clause -- applause. when he is finished, the world breathes a collective sigh of relief. nobody had known what hitler was going to say. maybe he was going to declare war. maybe he was going to make an

ultimatum. a typical response is what americans heard from a -- nbc broadcasting from berlin. you will hear what max jordan told americans. we will get there. >> made here by observers and commentators on the scene. confirm that to sne main point that hitler' -- waswas ace beach that helps carry on

from the german angle. mr. bytwerk: this response was widespread. at least there wasn't going to be a war. states, coverage varied. most newspapers figured out what was up. heller talks roosevelt -- hitler taunts roosevelt. most newspapers were over critical -- were not ever critical and work sympathetic to roosevelt. but someone who was not a great

friend of the new deal printed this cartoon. playing catch with a hand grenade. there is hitler sitting in the trenches and both sides are accusing each other of war. know, there were some newspapers that responded that way. even some friendly newspapers thought hitler got the better part of the deal. one -- probably won. there was an initial expectation that roosevelt with respond -- would respond. he thought about it and concluded there is no point. he had other things to do and most americans had drawn a

conclusion about hitler after this. said, as the issue becomes clear, the public opinion in your country and mine will be helped. theermany, the germans in united states wanted to ensure everyone got a copy. they printed a huge addition of this. speak -- thehe speech was viewed -- well, in germany every speech by hitler was a masterpiece. they said it was really, really the best beach -- the best speech he ever gave.

headline, fuhrer warns about chatter. newspapers after that were told, ok, the fuhrer dispatched roosevelt, don't risk -- don't desecrate his corpse. they printed cartoons like this suggesting the rest of the world was impressed. april, these diplomats are saying, what do you say when someone speaks reasonably. apparently the british were impressed.

eleanor roosevelt is holding on to roosevelt who is beating the antifascist drum, bring back the 14 points. he was the comparison of the hitler to the dwarf in the west. it says the democracies and little viewpoint. it is saying, you're measuring stick is too small. there were more cartoons like this. the propaganda system got directed to keep it up. this was a cover to a monthly magazine of propaganda. in 1939 it printed a discussion called the evils of roosevelt.

the message is that american president roosevelt burdened both adolph hitler and mussolini with was the of the time of insolence. mr. roosevelt seems possessed by hissame aside complex that predecessor mr. woodrow wilson had. mr. roosevelt -- germans hold this all over the place -- germans heard this all over the place. germans didn't entirely for, they were gearing up the battle with france and england. they kind of ignored roosevelt. roosevelt made two more attempts. the first one said basically, don't attack poland.

the germans responded and then ignored the second. from their point of view, they didn't have to pay roosevelt much attention. they focused to their propaganda on the real enemy. of course, roosevelt in the next month attempted to shift public opinion. but the war of words was pretty much over except hitler could not resist. germany declared war on the united states on december 11. the did not have to. the treaty obligated them to attack only if they were attacked. but hitler thought hey, why not. in middle of his long speech to reigtstag, he said, you

remember, my deputies, that i gave this impertinent determine a response that was as polite as it was definite and which stop to the torrent of words from this worthy warmonger for a few months at least. of course, by then, not too many in america were interested in what adolph hitler had to say. the war of words was replaced by the work of weapons. think -- this is an audience that would the familiar with strategy and tactics. i think that hillary was often the better rhetorical technician. he won the rhetorical battle. even a variety of americans

thought he did a better job. but roosevelt was thinking long-term. he was thinking strategically. he was shifting gradually the american opinion and there was still a long way together. he was making progress. battle yeah, he won the -- tactics when the battle and win the battle but strategy wins the war. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for an excellent talk. pointed to take your last

and wonder if it isn't the actions of both roosevelt and hitler that ultimately decided things and not the rhetoric? poland, butinvades once his actions in the sudetenland and taking temples the -- -- tickle for isn't that what drove america to axis.the >> in 1937, roosevelt did not know with the years would bring. what he was trying to do was shift american opinion. it was a lot easier after pearl harbor and he did not have to declare war on hiller because hitler's satan the trouble --

declare war on hitler, because hitler satan the trouble. trouble.him the >> i think you made a good point about that beach -- about that speech being the most importantly expected speech in he 21st century. comedo you think may have comecond, and what made it in second. that is not nice at

all. does anyone have a speech that was less anticipated and less widely heard? little checking. i asked a scholar in presidential rhetoric and he did not think that one had the reach either. if anything came close, that may have been it. that was fascinating for us, but i don't think the world have the interest that we did. would any of how these states or leaders have countered what was going on and what hitler was doing and what systemthe nazi

doing? >> i think it is widely agreed that hitler could have been stopped at a number of points along the way. when he launched into the rhineland, his staff said, if they resist, we will have to withdraw. hitler said they will not resist. case, if there had been fortitude in the sudetenland. ,t is easy to look in hindsight but the solution would have been a little more active but. -- look at itay this way, hitler did not have a lot of respect for the other european leaders.

when he was planning the campaign against poland, his generals were nervous. when they warned that they would have to react, he looked them in the eye and said, i met our enemies in munich and they are worms. it is not a good answer to the question, but i simply don't have the ability to say this action at this point would have stopped it. >> thank you, very much. can you tell us who were the advisors that roosevelt relied on? the various people he consulted and moved this issue forward? >> of course it will depend on what he was a doing. this piece the message called everybody by surprise, -- this called -- caught everyone by surprise.

roosevelt was pretty good at talking to people and giving advice. he had a variety of good speech writers who helped about. you cannot write speeches for roosevelt. you give him advice, but when it was done it long to roosevelt rather than the speech writer. gedwhen it was done, it belon to roosevelt rather than the speech writer. >> as you know germans are faithful in their oath of office. the elephant that seems to be missing from the rim is the british empire. in 1935, both france and poland wanted to jump on germany for trying to break the treaty. in the united states, we take an oath to a constitution. in the british empire, if you want to be a citizen you have to

take an oath to the queen. roosevelt could have rejected the treaty of versailles and said you germans have taken an oath to the weimar republic. that could have been a very powerful counter to what hitler was doing and could of had a counter for poland and france as he could've pushed the british to support it. it could've been a turning point. what is your view? >> my greatest area of expertise is the german and, less the allied end. roosevelt had to be careful.

95% of the american public wanted nothing to do with conflict. been tooelt had explicit in 1935 along those lines, he would have taken his head back into the turtle shell. the british and french may have liked it, but he did not get voted for by the british and the french. >> what about loyalty to the constitution? >> but by then hiller -- but by then hitler was in charge and the wife our constitution was a ar constitution was a jewish institution. laughed.d have

>> could this have been a legal removal? can say words, hitler i'm not going to invade such and such country, but when you ask , and youect question say, ok, you have said this, are you going to do it or not? then it puts them in a situation where they either have to be evasive or answer the question directly. if they break any of those things, you can say we asked him directly and he answered directly. --re is nowhere question there is no more question. he has broken his own. could it have been roosevelt saying, look, let's put a direct

question to him. he can answer directly and be held responsible. >> when would he have done that? --winwood who have done that when would who have done that? >> when he communicates with hitler and he is saying that, then roosevelt can say --hitler could have answered him and given assurances. roosevelt does not care at that point. he may not care about national opinion. you may be saying, look, we laid it out to him and he gave us a direct answer. there is no gray area. >> that is part of what he said afterward to the promised her of canada. if it is rejected, it will at least clarify public opinion.

that is what -- that is what he said afterward to the prime minister of canada. hitler was very good at saying heeat things, but he was -- once said in a different context , a private conversation with his buddies during the war. at one point he is talking about what is going on in russia and he says, who today's ekes of the armenian -- who today speaks of the armenians. succeed will if we be forgotten.

tactically, he was really quite good. he did say what had to be said with effect at the time with confidence that 10 years later people would not question it. said here is a list of 31 countries, pledge not to attack a surely hitler gave response. he was hard to pin down. >> when you listen to as ifelt's words speaking the united states was a great military world power. in reality, most of us don't think of it that way. no standing army, the air force was in its infancy, there was a

neutrality act. it was not speak softly and carry a big stick. the question is, how seriously did the european governments understand the potential of the united states to rapidly become a great world power and why did world war ii so seriously? >> because they remembered world war i. the european powers are somewhat exhausted by that stage but the united states still ships a surprising number of troops and equipment to europe rather quickly. the germans remembered that well. in 1937, the united states was a negligible military power. a speaker a couple of

years back on the -- forget his name, the german economist. i listened to that speech and he talks about the fact that the german generals were petrified by what they knew the united states could do if it was motivated. but heew it wouldn't be, talks about the plan was they had to win the war before they ran out of resources or places like the united states could hear up. as a postscript to that, it was a general yamamoto who talked about how japan would be couldg wild until america mobilize. my question is about -- what you are referencing is this megaphone interaction between hitler and roosevelt.

was there any attempt to speak directly to the german people or the american people for the germans through circuits in the united states and the americans in some other way -- through in the nine states -- the united states? >> roosevelt did not have direct connection with germany and less the germans gave it to him. -- connection with the germany unless the germans gave it to him. theevelt could not claim stage in germany, whereas hitler could get printed in american newspapers. in one of his letters, he says,

wilson was able to speak to the germans. the 14 points got across. he said, i cannot do that anymore. he would have had more difficulty getting that access. the germans would not give it to him in less it was to their advantage. -- the germans would not give it ss it was to their advantage. >> very interesting talk. press -- in free 1937, roosevelt was concerned about hitler, but he certainly didn't know what hitler was going to do. not even churchill knew what

hitler was going to do. he knew he wanted a military buildup. statesman are not gifted with the ability to foresee accurately the future. >> i think we should consider the great deference in the audience to which the two speakers spoke. confronted with a vitriolic group of people here in the united states. walter windchill, the whole midwest, if you mentioned the midwestevelt, went into a swimming. swoo midwest went to a

-- swoon. if he had indulged in a half-truth, they would have picked him a part. -- picked him apart. >> hitler did not have an entirely free hand because he had to have the masses with him. informants all over the place. knew what public opinion was. even during the war, germans and germans delayed production for fear of public distress.

could not, i mean, hitler say anything he wanted and it could be reported in the way he wanted, but he knew there were still undercurrents in the german population that were nervous and not entirely on his side. in 1914, the germans were cheering in berlin. in 1939, they are not cheering in berlin. tremendous distress because they had very good memories of what had happened. as gobbels said in his 1934 lecture at the nuremberg rally, they may be good at power based on bayonets, but they will be happier to assess the souls and hearts of

the people. were doing their best to build popular support. hitler could not ignore public opinion. >> you spoke about how hitler and the german press initially treated roosevelt favorably and how hitler and his pressstration swayed the in its reporting of roosevelt. but you did not talk about how the american press initially treated hitler and whether the roosevelt administration swayed the american press in its treatment of hitler. also you talked about hitler thinking tactically, whereas thought strategically.

about when you think that starts to happen and when does roosevelt have a plan for the? -- a plan for that. >> the first question i'm going to duck because i don't know enough. there are other people in this group who could say something. know anybody's mind, but it is clear to say that by 1937, roosevelt is out to shift public opinion. he had been watching what was going on in china and spain and europe. i think he was clearly out to

shift public opinion because he figured he would have to lead a nation in war. but the exact eight, dachshund date, i don't know. and the second question, i'm just ducking. >> how did the soviets view the exchange between roosevelt and hitler's? they ended up doing the heavy lifting in world war ii. what lessons did they take away from what they said? >> i don't know. again, it's something i simply don't know enough to comment intelligently on. >> professor, thank you for this fascinating talk. since you are an expert on the german press during this time and the german propaganda organ, have you ever been consulted by

?ilmmakers in germany has anybody ever put together a film focusing on just that, the propaganda effort as opposed to the military effort and its effect on civilians, which is what they normally do? >> there's a bunch of it out there. the germans have done a variety of documentaries. canadian broadcasting corporation did a multipart series on propaganda during the peter -- period. there are a fair amount of films on the. if youy regularly -- look over my propaganda archives, which you won't have trouble finding, i get a lot of requests from filmmakers and so forth who need this image or that image or whatever. i'm kind of a one-stop shop. there are thousands of images. there is a fair amount on the propaganda asked -- aspect. curious, i've got a

list on my website. go to amazon and do a search for nazi propaganda. there will be a bunch of books out there. >> [inaudible] they are always about the military. >> i don't know of any feature films. i've seen a lot of documentaries, but not feature films. --favorite story on films this is irrelevant to the discussion, but i like it. film wasic american showed to the propaganda ministry staff in charge of film. he looked at him and said, "why can't you do anything that good?" and if you've seen the film, you will know why. i don't think there was a dry eye in any theater in the united states after seeing that film.

"i'm not trying to ignore you. i'm told to follow the mic. it --ler's was audited at it was an autodidact. wrotee saying that he these very subtle -- >> yeah. >> and also he was a trained demagogue, apparently. whether or not he was a master demagogue is another question. you get to the point -- was this written by him, or was this a creation of the propaganda department? because the way you are pressing it is that he did this entirely on his own and that he is a genius at countering roosevelt. on the other hand, if you actually pass this speech being made, it is odd that, at the

same time he is negotiating for a nonaggressive pact with the soviet union, none of that is -- >> of course not. >> wait a minute. you would prepare your people for this pro-bolshevik thing in this kind of a speech, and it's not there at all. there's two questions here. do you honestly believe that hitler's rope this entirely by himself? this byhitler wrote himself? and why is he so un-subtle about what's going on? >> nobody could write for hitler's. -- hitler. even as close -- his closest aide did not know what he was going to say until he said it. it was his stuff. he did not use speechwriters. the point is that, there's a tendency -- the problem with a lot of americans, they've seen hitler

-- [gibberish] and it looks like the guy is a raving lunatic. the point is, when he spoke for two and a half hours, people listened with rapt attention. he was quite capable of making careful, nicely worked out articles. there is his famous speech, the duesseldorf industrial, before he takes power. to these industrialists, he's giving them a very long and detailed argument about why national socialism is there sure defense surest marxism - is their defense against marxism. it's an argument that is mendacious, fallacious,, but sounds very good and helps, to persuade some, so he was an extraordinarily gifted persuader. no doubt about that. that's not anything to say about

his ethical practices, honesty, or truthfulness, but he was good. there are all kinds of contemporary accounts of people meeting hitler and being blown away by him. person-to-person, too, not only a mass audience. he could take people and leave them tremendously impressed. , as icond point is, yes said, all kinds of other things are going on. again, remember, he is speaking tactfully. he really didn't have to worry about what was down the pike. the propaganda system was very good. did a 180 public degree switch.

first the russians and the marxists were the source of all people. then they had a packed. they dropped from the propaganda system. there are some advantages to having almost complete control over the mass media. kittler was not worried about six months down the pike. he was worried about immediate response. talk.derful a formalisthave definition of propaganda in the past. is that true? you sort of defined it, i guess. today, is there a sense of propagandizing? do you have a sense of propaganda as being somewhat more subtle these days or nonexistent? >> we are in the middle of election campaign. [laughter]

>> let me give you a little better answer to that question. if you watch what i think is the best modern book on propaganda, by a french writer, he also wrote stuff for the technological society. it's an absolutely brilliant book. i think it's the best book on propaganda. it would take me a long time to discuss it. his basic argument is that propaganda has become part and parcel of the whole modern which wen a way in can't get rid of it anymore. very brief example. let's assume we want to get rid of silicon chips. could we do it? couldn't do it. we are stuck with them. propaganda is a kind of silicon chip. it's so much embedded in media, society, politics, so forth. but that's an argument i can't begin to get into now. france. published in

it is a book that scares me every time i read it. part advertising. the best propaganda is propaganda that does not hit you over the head. wham, the big bump grows out of your head. the best propaganda is propaganda you don't even realize is propaganda. read it. it'll scare you. >> thank you, professor, for the presentation. you mentioned lindberg. talk about the german propaganda machines ability to use western figures, allied figures in their propaganda, the former british king. and another topic that would take a long time. we saw the topic. one of my colleagues said, "oh,

he's going to talk about roosevelt and unconditional surrender." there were other things that roosevelt said that were later used in the war. perhaps talk about allied propaganda figures used by the germans and later things said by allies that the german propaganda machine could also use. i know it's a broad topic. >> that's another lecture. --brief, i mean, they liked any society likes that likes to have friends on the other side. the germans liked henry ford particularly. they liked lindbergh. there were a variety of republicans who they cited at great length. the anti-roosevelt republicans quite often got cited. ex-president hoover got cited a number of times. they were very happy to use -- it's much more credible. you figure the germans might say next he things about roosevelt, but if americans say nasty thin

gs, it has much more credibility. your second question, there are all kinds of things. there's a stack of that stuff in my propaganda archive. if you're curious about one thing using allied statements in german propaganda, i have a variety of world war ii pamphlets transfer -- translated, and my favorite is one called "never," published in fall of 1944, about 40 pages of detailed discussions, statements by roosevelt, churchill, newspapers, you name it, all threatening to destroy and wipe out germany. but that's another lecture. i could easily give a lecture on what happened during the war. but, you know, there's only so much we can talk about. but look up that. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

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