nearly all members of congress feel a responsibility when it comes to national security. >> i agree with that. they absolutely do. >> but as you're right, it is in many ways, not something that many of them are used to dealing with. except we do have some key veterans who have been elected and they bring their perspective. >> i don't want to overstate. >> but i think you're right. i think there is a hunger for members to understand better what's happening in the world about our military capability and so part of our job is to help provide the information, but also just the understanding. >> the framework of how that works. >> the rest of the story is i don't want to just explain to them how this very complicated bureaucratic system works. part of our job is to reform

this very complicated bureaucratic system and streamline it. and so the bill we're going to vote on reduces some of the bureaucracy and reorganizes some of the functions at the pentagon. my friend senator mccain says the most extensive reorganization since goldwater/nichols in '86. >> which he remembers. >> but we're not done. >> i am going to be a little more disciplined than you probably expected and i'm going to stop and take questions. do i just call on people? is that what you want me to do? okay. so i think this hand went up first. >> reporter: hi, i'm pat host, with "defense daily." i understand that you take the position and it's basically

split up in two, you have a chief technology officer and undersecretary for engineering. how is that going to improve the speed of which you get new technologies into the field if you take one decision maker's position and make it into two decision maker's positions? >> the concern is that we have put too much under at&l. and whatever i say is no criticism of frank kendall who i think has done a very good job. but i'm persuaded by those people who say that it is essentially impossible to make the person who is responsible for buying things efficiently as the chief innovation officer, as well as many of his other duties. the senate bill had a very significant reorganization. what we have agreed upon for

this year is to separate out some of these functions, but also delay implementation to allow the new administration to look at it. but also to allow us to study more carefully what the right way is and what the implications are. part of the challenge with all these reform efforts is you can't take a break and rearrange things and start again in two weeks. you have to do the job every single day. so you still have to make sure the rifle gets to the guy in afghanistan tomorrow while you are trying to improve innovation and reform acquisition and so forth. so this is a first step in recognition that we have lost something on innovation. it's probably not the final answer. >> you're satisfied so far with

the compromise on at&l? >> i think it's the right thing for now. but it will continue to be -- as i said, we're not done. on organizational reform, acquisition reform, on some of the personnel reform issues. so i think this is a good step for now. there's more work to be done. >> this gentleman here. >> chairman thornberry, you spoke about the need for new aircraft. the f-35, which the program has been delayed for a long period of time and gone over budget. can you speak about how the u.s. government could inquire acquire new assets without that happening again, without going over budget or without being delayed by that significant period of time.

>> part of what we have tried to think about over the last really which started this in november 2013, is to understand the problems for the f-35, for the air carrier, for future combat systems. we have had some problems in the past. and one of the things i think we can learn is that when you define requirements at the beginning, it's a very important thing and you really need to make it difficult to change those requirements. you try to put too much innovation into a new platform it will inevitably delay its fielding and increase the cost. and i just had a member last night on the floor talk about

visiting some of the bases for the f-35. problems are being worked through. the computer issues they have had, helmet issues, they are working through them. but you're right. it's over budget, too long. if it takes 20 years to field the next aircraft, we're going to be in real trouble. so that's part of the reason, this year's bill, we focus on incremental improvement and not committing to buy 1,000 of something until we know it works, and have a separate funding stream for some experimentation. we need to experiment. but you can't experiment as you're building a program of record. so trying to learn the lessons of the problems we've had in the past is important.

the answer is not to not build another airplane. the answer is to make these gradual. >> can i just add one thing. i'll stick up a little for the department. i say this as a person who has been writing about acquisition reform, as you know, and when i was there. part of this is the result of when you know you're not going to have the money to buy all the platforms you're going to need, so you're going to get one plane, so the pressure to put as much as you can in that plane becomes very strong. yes, i think i'm not trying to say that's the only reason, i think that hurts future combat systems. >> you're right. >> we have this one thing, so we have to do everything we want to do. >> and i was there, you were there. when we started f-35 the idea of

having a common platform that then would be adapted for different services, that could work. but it was much more complicated than anybody realized. >> we can do a whole hour on that idea and how that's affected -- as you know. i'm going back to that gentleman who has been waving his hand. i think we're going to get a real good question here. >> reporter: "inside defense," representing the noble defense trade press. hello. for chairman thornberry, in the compromised version of the authorization bill, you ended up halting the strength decreases but billions got stripped out and planned weapons increases for f-35s, lcs, everything else. my question is do you plan to come back for those in the next legislative cycle. do you think those remain high priorities and you're trying to get them authorized for next year. senator talent, you praised the incoming administration, having any

discussions playing a role in that administration, maybe a building with five sides? >> you want to go first? >> i'm just happy you get a question like that. my hope is that the new administration will come to us with the supplemental request as soon as they get their feet on the ground. it was disappointing that in order to get this bill done now and to stop the in-strength hemorrhaging that we were not able to have as much funding as the house had originally had. as i mentioned before, the only way you are going to fix some of these old airplanes is to build a new airplane. that's part of what we had. my hope is, and i think across the aisle, recognition of the fact that sequestration, 21% cut over four years in the defense budget, as well as the pace of operations has taken its toll.

so there is, i think, interest to try to make up some of that ground and what i hope is the new administration will come with a supplemental and that we can put back, and for me, the top of the list would be the things that had to drop out now and then, of course, go to next year's budget as well. >> i would love to see a supplemental too. i really love the president-elect's defense speech when i read it. i love the tone. i love the issues he took on and the way he took on. i'm going to support that, whether inside or outside of government. i would be very interested in doing something inside of government. we have had some discussions with the transition. i also know enough about cabinet building, having watched it in a number of instances that he has to pick the people that fit, that he feels the most comfortable with and also fit

the overall pattern. they are working their way through that and making a lot of progress. i've been watching and pleased with the appointments i've seen so far. so they are going to work it out. i am going to support that plan inside or outside of government. because there isn't anything more important to america's national security or i would also argue to donald trump's domestic agenda of regrowing the manufacturing base in this country. i think it's been an untold story. he is starting to tell it. one of the reasons we have lost a lot of manufacturing capacities is because we have underfunded these procurement programs over time. >> yes, sir. then i'll go back over here. >> peter humphrey, an intel analyst and a former diplomat. i'm wondering about two things. in what fantasy world did preparation for two major regional conflicts disappear?

secondarily, the future is made of swarms of small things. how do we get the pentagon to realize you want to buy 1,000 toyotas instead of one lexus? they keep missing the boat on that and creating giant aircraft carriers, one torpedo takes out a huge amount of our capability. that's crazy. >> well, both good questions. i've already forgot the first one. i'm sorry. oh, yes. this year's defense bill will abolish the qdrs. too much time, effort for nothing. part of our frustration is, it became a budget justification document, not really a strategy document. that gets to what you are talking about.

we have adjusted the 2mc kind of approach just based on the budgets, rather than the other way around, rather than looking at the world trying to see what sizing construct makes sense for the world we're facing and then develop the budgets to support them. so we have provided a different system of kind of thinking about the world with an outside group at the beginning and, you know, not trying to recreate the qdr but trying to do this differently. that has definitely not been successful. i think there are people in the pentagon who are very interested in this swarming idea. i certainly am. i have had a number of folks that have provided me with some material to read and help think about this, whether we are talking satellites or whether we are talking other sorts of capability.

but you get to the heart of an issue, you can think about and say, okay, that makes sense but still you have cultural bias in a certain direction within the institution. i think part of our job in congress is to break through some of this cultural bias that prevents us from looking at these different options. i don't mean mini, small is always the answer to everything. but we have to look in that direction, just cost benefit ratio for a host of reasons. so i think that concept as well as others is maturing. it is involved in some of the third offset stuff. again, part of our job is to nurture that, even when the institutional interests are to squish it. >> that's a great answer. if i can just add one thing on

that. i think you are so correct. it is a balance that you need. we were talking before about the perceptions of congress as an institution, the larger body of people outside of the committees who have a role to play in this decision-making. this is what i think the building needs to understand, is that those people like to see tangible things for the dollars that they spend. right? they are not all that up necessarily on all the gradations and differences. when you spend a lot of money on planes, you like to see planes. if the pentagon understood that that's the way to make everybody feel as if we are getting value for dollars, there is going to be a little less pressure on some of the bigger programs to produce quickly. there is a perception issue involved here, too, as well as with fore structures. let's take one more, which i'll

let the chairman answer rather than sticking my nose in. i said i'll come back over here. we'll get this gentlemen right here. >> thank you. congressman, i have a question about technological superiority. specifically with regards to russia. when it comes to russian's capabilities, we haven't seen it in a peer to peer scenario in quite a while. given the dubious nature of the t-14 tank and the new fighter jet it wants to field and with regards to the industrial base of russia, is it possible we're overestimating russian capabilities with regard to a military scenario with the usa? and if we reorient ourselves, will -- with a peer to peer scenario, will we lose out on the capability to wage the wars we usually do with technologically inferior enemies? thank you. >> i think the point is we have to be prepared for the range of

contingencies. so there are folks who say okay, counterterrorism and current insurgency is behind us, we need to focus on the high-end threats. we don't have that luxury. we have this huge array from sophisticated to less sophisticated threats around the world and we have to be ready for them all and maintain competency for them all. but it is true that the 15 years of where we have focused on counterterrorism have meant that we have neglected training and other things for the high-end sorts of threats. i think we're pretty clear-eyed about the threat that russia presents. i don't think anybody says their military has as much capability as ours.

but you need -- we have to be realistic about where they are putting their time, effort, and money. so, for example, they continue to crank out new nuclear weapons every year. we don't. we haven't built a new nuclear weapon since about 1990. we are trying to keep these old machines safe and reliable. but russia is putting a fair amount of effort into that. you have read what they say about the tactical use of nukes to make up for conventional inferiority. we know what they are capable or at least their level of sophistication in cyber. they have had some demonstrations, i believe, for our benefit, in syria. so they can't match us but they don't have to. if you see some of the recent press reporting about deployments they have made in

kaliningrad, it is concerning. part of it is to effect a political purpose, especially in eastern europe. and we have to deal with that. >> i want to be sensitive to your time, chairman. and keep the day on schedule. so thank you, chairman thornberry, you have been if fine fettle today and i'm sure you are read for the new congress. tonight, veterans stories, featuring medal of honor recipients, silver star recipients, and military women. it all starts at 8:00 p.m. eastern. we have more now from this recent conference on foreign policy and defense with national security experts talking about

innovation and cyber security challenges. welcome back. my name, again, is chris griffin, executive director at the foreign policy initiative. i ask that you kindly make your way back to your seats. once again, as i courtesy i ask that please make sure you put your cellphones in silent mode for the courtesy of those around you and of course for our speakers. the next panel discussion will be on opportunities and challenges for defense innovation and reform. this really will continue on some of the threads that came up in our first discussion between chairman thornberry and senator talent, which should be no surprise. the major topics they discussed

were immediate challenges to defense readiness today and the points that chairman thornberry raised, as he described it, the eroding technological advantage enjoyed by united states forces going forward. our group will be moderated by dr. thomas mahnken, the chairman and ceo for the chairman of senior and budgetary perspectives. ben fitzgerald is with the center for a new american security, if i can get that correct. rebeccah heinrichs with the hudson institute. and last on the panel is mr. rob weiss who leads the skunk works team at lockheed martin. i greatly look forward to your comments. thanks for joining us. i ask you to join me in thanking them for joining us today. [ applause ]

>> thanks, chris. the panel's topic or charge is a very apropos one, not just as was brought up by chain thornberry and senator talent this morning. at least since world war ii, the united states has sought to maintain a qualitative advantage over prospective competitors and adversaries. that was the focus of a lot of effort during the cold war. over the last quarter century, the u.s. has enjoyed unquestioned dominance, at least from a qualitative standpoint. in the 1990s, as charles krauthammer famously dubbed the unipolar moment. and then over the last 15 years, the focus of defense has been quite, quite rightly, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

but now, you know, we face the reemergence of competition and increasing possibility or probability of great power conflict, whether because of russia's aggression in eastern europe, china's assertiveness in maritime asia. and so i think it's quite appropriate, as we close out the obama administration and look to the trump administration, we kind of take stock of where we are and where we need to be. so certainly in recent years, the obama defense department has placed emphasis on the so-called third offset strategy, the defense innovation initiative. and as we approach the end of the obama administration, i wanted to ask our panel, you know, how they would take stock of those efforts from their -- you know, from their standpoint, whether it's running a science

and technology program at a think tank, focusing on missile defense and other areas, or from defense industry. where do we stand with the third offset strategy and whatever it will become in future months and years? >> so there's a lot to unpack in there. and i think sort of my bottom line up front would be, i think that leadership in the pentagon and also frankly on the hill have created a window of opportunity for some fairly significant change. we're going to see i think at noon today more details of the ndaa for 2017. but we already have seen some fairly significant structural changes. and also under the leadership of secretary carter and deputy secretary work, we've seen a focus on the need to improve our military technical advantage. that's great. it's unclear to me if that's

actually going to move forward or what it's going to look like. while it's great that we all have a common understanding that we need to improve, how we get there is not clear. the third offset strategy i think is important, and helps us address one very particular problem, which is our ability to continue to project power, conventional military power. that's one thing that's separate from in some ways all this other innovation conversation. a lot of those actions have been very good. the daf instantiation has been great. those have been innovations sort of outside the bureaucracy, around the bureaucracy, we're going to create a new office. what we haven't seen is a fundamentally different approach to how we generate technical military advantage and how we pair that military, that technology, with new concepts of operation. and i think that that's what we need. i'm happy to unpack that in detail but i don't want to monopolize the whole conversation. >> rebeccah?

>> happy to be here. if i could go back a little bit to 2014, when then secretary of defense hegel introduced the third offset strategy, he talked about what the threats were and why we needed this third offset strategy. some of the things he talked about were that sort of less sophisticated actors like al qaeda and hezbollah were beginning to challenge the united states in ways we haven't seen before. then of course on the higher end, near peer competitors china and russia were advancing in military modernization programs in ways the united states hadn't seen in decades. and then he listed some specific technologies that they were spending a lot of time and resources and energy in. they were in areas in which they saw a vulnerability that the united states had so they were taking advantage of that vulnerability and exploiting it.

and so they were developing new missile technologies. advanced aircraft, submarines, longer range, more accurate missiles. he mentioned missiles multitimes. the undersecretary i think has been one of the most helpful administration officials in laying out specifically where we are get behind. and i like specificity. and i think in the age of trump we're going to have more specificity and less vagueness, which i'm excited about. that will i think do a lot to help us move forward so we know what we're talking about here, so we're not just talking about things in vague terms. undersecretary kendall mentioned in a memo he sent over to congress that the united states was getting behind in missile technology, that he specifically mentioned china, but then made clear he wasn't only talking about china, but china and russia were challenging the united states in space. and that posed a unique problem,

because everything else we do in the pentagon depends on what we do in space. space is unprotected or does have vulnerabilities or getting behind or others are challenging us in this particular domain, that portends very, very bad things for the united states across the rest of the pentagon. and so i think that is going to be, if i had my way, i think that we're going to be focusing more on space, what we do in space, national security space, surveillance in space. i think that, you know, president-elect trump is a new kind of president-elect, will be a new kind of president. sorts of things -- we sort of have gotten used inside the beltway and inside the pentagon, we sort of know what each other means when we say very vague terms and phraseology where the new president is going to want to be convinced and persuaded. everything is going to have to start doing their homework when

we talk about what we want the administration to do, and that's a very good thing. it will have to make sense, it will have to be the most cost effective way to do it. things like oh, we just don't put kinetic kill capabilities in space because it might be provocative, i think you're going to have to make your case if that's what you think. i take another perspective and say, we can't just have passive space capabilities, we're going to have to have more active defense capabilities in space. and so i think that's going to be the next phase in our ballistic missile defense capabilities in addition to directed energy technologies. the mokv we're putting on the gmd system to protect the united states homeland. i think we're going to see more investments in that. and so all of this means that we've just -- we've taken too long to come to this place where it's no longer a matter of should we do it some day. it's that we have to do that, there are variations thadversar

challenging us in those ways and we have to do that. my last point on this, when we began to talk about the think tank world and inside the pentagon, how we're going to pay for this new offset strategy, a lot of people talk about legacy systems, we'll build legacy systems. but now we see, oh, no, we're still fighting wars in which we need these legacy systems, the f-35 isn't quite ready so we're keeping the a-10 now, which i'm very excited about because i love that airplane and so does john mccain. so it's going to be around longer, we need it, we're using it. so now where are we going to get this money? that means of course we'll have to increase the top line. i'm optimistic that with the new administration we will be increasing the top line and we won't just be bill paying with legacy systems for advanced technologies, we'll have to do both. that means getting ready of the bca, which i think is the direction that we're headed. >> thanks, rerebeccah.

rob, where do you think we stand with defense innovation more broadly? >> thanks, tom, great to be here this morning representing the defense industry and conversation. i would like to begin by talking about where we are in the nation from my point of view. one of the great things in my job, i get to go out and interface with many of our young women and men who are defending the nation. and i would contend that we remain to have the best fighting force across the globe, bar none. we have the best people. they're well-trained. and they frankly have the best equipment compared to any other nation in the world. that said, there's real challenges, many of which we talked about earlier this morning by chairman thornberry. we're spread too thin. we have a readiness decline, and we have an acquisition system that needs to be more agile.

specifically regarding the third offset, we are investing in virtually every technology that's highlighted in the third offset. hypersonics, big data analytics, open system architectures, autonomy, big energy, on and on. and we're demonstrating a lot of those technologies right now, our competitors and teammates across the defense industry. i believe we have a qualitative advantage in the technology today. the question is how do we field it more quickly, i believe. and when we look at the adversaries we face around the globe, a lot of this is presence. we're talking about western pacific, eastern europe. in order to enable that presence we do need substantial force structure that has been on the decline for many years now. and i think that's one of the

big challenges, is transitioning this technology to a larger force structure as we move forward. that will in my view enable us to maintain the qualitative advantage across the globe. >> a response to that. i think while we're sitting here, we have a fundamentally like strategic problem. while i'm very sympathetic about the need for acquisition reform, i believe the need for that, we've seen some positive steps in the last couple of years, we've had an acquisition stop that hasn'tably like the 1970s, were able to maintain qualitative advantages. what's changed? we've seen in the latter part of the 20th industry we still had a neat strategic alignment between our strategic needs, which was really until the fall -- until the end of the cold war, containment. we had a fairly finite set of technologies we needed to invest in. we had very clear business

models in terms of requirements defining threats out of the defense industry and lock that in with export controls. none of those things pertain today. we have a range of threats from terrorism to cyber threats to great power competition. we have shown no appetite to pick which ones of those we're going to try to address, we want to do everything. to your point, we still need to maintain legacy systems, we can't walk away from that. we want all of those things as well. yet we're still trying to using the same business models. it doesn't add up. that's what we need to look at, not just acquisition reform or the top line. what's our approach, how are we going to make those choices? we have not yet had the conversation. >> that's a topic i want us to address in a minute. but before we get there, i want to pick up on something a couple of you mentioned, which is, yeah, we can't do it all. so what are the areas -- and rebeccah addressed this a little bit, but what are the areas that

are particularly promising in your view as we think about innovation and we think about maintaining an advantage going forward? again, i'll be kind of straightforward about this and i'll go back down this way. >> i'll answer quickly, given that i just started monologuing spontaneously. i'm increasingly skeptical of trying to pick technology winners. i don't think we can do that. things change too rapidly. we need to maintain a broader portfolio of investments in a range of technologies and figure out internal methods where we can be more agile in deciding, based on the threat environment we're going to put these things forward or leave these things bad. we need to take things from prototyping and move them forward quickly. i'm more interested in that type of innovation. like lasers, i know they've been five years away since 1972. are they really only five years away? i don't know. and i don't know if we'll be facing an enemy that addresses that. the one gap that i see in what

we do is the ability to incorporate commercial technology and adapt it for military purposes. that's where we have the most opportunity to move forward. it's great to see that there's commercial technology and they're moving ahead. we have no process for actually adapting that for truly military purposes and to generate unique military advantage from commercial technology. >> rebeccah, you mentioned space and missile defense. would you add to that? >> sure. again, i'm encouraged and optimistic by the new opportunities that this administration means for the pentagon, because we get to sort of take a fresh look at where these vulnerabilities are, where is the united states being targeted. again, i talked about this is the new missile age. i talk about missiles a lot, not because i randomly selected them of all the different threats, but because that is becoming how, all the way from north korea on the low end to china on the high end, that is how they

they're investing in these technologies in order to coerce and deter and dissuade the united states from doing things in the region. several months ago i had the privilege of authoring a report that had a senior review board including the former director of the missile defense agency, former administrator of nasa, so a whole slew of people who were very familiar with the high end threats, the missile threats, the acquisition process and what would need to be done in order to close these gaps. they all agreed with the findings and recommendations in the study. what we found was that the united states, it's not a matter of can the united states -- are our engineers smart enough to come up with technologies that can close these gaps. of course they are. of course they are. it really is, if you go back to what is the problem, what is the hindrance in order to move forward with some of these more advanced technologies. and it's been policy. the united states has been intentionally holding back in

particular areas of advanced technologies for fear of becoming provocative or of trailblazing in a particular area or of weaponizing space, some of these buzz phrases we've heard for many decades because they simply don't make sense anymore, which is where the chinese are going, the iranians, et cetera. some of these challenges get to the resources, there are problems with resources, but i think that's a shorter hurdle that i think we can clear. i think some of the bigger problems have been a matter of policy. and so i'm excited about the opportunity that we can have in terms of changing those policies and actually we talk about america's technological edge or advantage. i like to just say american primaricy. once you sort of say that go committee is that out of the way, that's what we're doing, we're moving forward in that way. we're not going to maintain peer status with china and russia.

we're moving forward, we're plowing ahead. and then i really do think the sky is the limit. it comes down to where are we going to get some of the money. the budget control act has always been confusing to me because nobody wants it, the congress doesn't want it are are the president doesn't want it, yet here we are, we have it, the president threatens to veto bills that go above the budget control act even though he says he doesn't want it. the conference report that was just settled, i don't know if these figures are official but this is what the media is reporting now, it's $3.2 billion above the pb. so congress is excited about spending more money on the pentagon, which it should, if we're going to spend money anywhere, it's on american security. so i think we'll see what happens with president obama in his last few weeks here and what he decides to do with this bill and if we can pass it. i do think it means we're sort of headed in a different direction. >> rob, how about you? >> well, i think rebeccah made several good points there about

maintaining an american primacy. going back to your point, ben, about the expansive tasks we're asking our military to do today, i don't see it changing. i think we're going to have to maintain a capability against near peer threats, major regional actors, and counterterrorism. and so we've got to be able to address all of them. and i think the priorities and what we invest in as a nation to address those priorities are very important. so clarity in the national military strategic i think is something that is going to be key. then we're going to have to budget accordingly, to rebeccah's point. that will enable us to do wharf need to do around the globe. i think the other points have been made, we are invest in these technologies, as i mentioned earlier. we are prototyping and proving out these technologies. we're seeing mature capabilities that now need to transition to

programs of record so that we can in fact bring about the force we need. i can tell a lot of stories of skunk works, one that just pops into my head, i think the f-1/17, when it was fielded as the first stealth fighter, it came out in desert storm in the early '90s, and a tremendous capability that demonstrated something the united states had that no adversary had at the time. but it began with a program that many of you may not know called have blue, that was the prototype. and it proved that we could actually fly this hopeless diamond, as it was called. we proved that out. and then it transitioned to a program of record. and i think that's what's going to be key going forward, is we prove out these technologies, that they actually transition and move forward quickly. >> and there is a challenge there, right? so the challenge of being in an

era of budgetary constraints on the one hand, there's a lot of reluctance to transition to programs of record. on the other hand, there's a different set of challenges coming with opening up the budgetary spigot, right? the tendency is, well, if you have a lot of money, just keep doing more of the same, perhaps less urgency for doing things differently. so -- and maybe we'll start with rob and come back this way. talk about a little more about the budgetary dimension of all this. you know, how big a constraint is the budget right now? and, you know, what's the best way to move forward sensibly? >> well, i think i might start by answering your question, we talked about a little bit about f-35 earlier today, and if we

think about just in the air dominance spectrum, for example, so we have a program that the nation has invested considerably in over the last decade, the f-35. it is now, we recognize it's had some challenges along the way. it's now a mature, capable system. but the rate that we're buying airplane is insufficient. all the services are ready for new equipment. and so we should start by buying the leading edge technologies that are already available to us today, because that will not only provide us more capability, but it's going to get us out of these older airplanes that are costing a substantial amount of money to maintain and are insufficient against future threats. so i could begin there. and again, speaking in the air dominance arena, the next step is to modernize these airplanes. over the life cycle of all

aircraft, all assumption aircraft programs have had robust modernization, continue to add capability over its life cycle. we need to be doing that with our more advanced systems as well, not just airplanes but everything we've flexinvested i. again, coming back to air dominance, we're investing in those technologies today. someday we will field another fighter. but right now we should buy the one that's available to us and get on an aggressive modernization path. so the budget is not there to do that today. and frankly, coming back to the f-35, it becomes the bill payer for everything else we want to do. then it is t that's not the best way to go about an acquisition. >> rebeccah, you pointed out quite right that dca makes no sense other than the fact that it's the law of the land. assuming, and i think it is an

assumption, but assuming that that changes, how do we go about spending money the most effective way, the most responsible way, but also the way that gives us the greatest advantage? >> sure. every time i talk about wanting to get rid of the dca and talk about how we need to increase the defense budget, people immediately think i don't care about waste, i don't care about defense waste, i don't care about acquisition costs. that's not true, we can do both. we have been planning and spending money in ways that don't make sense at all in the pentagon. i think everybody in the room would agree with that. some of the things we can do differently is buy more of a particular item at once. this sort of buying a couple of items, procuring a couple of them and then buying a couple of more when we need them and letting production lines go cold, having to restart them and finding the people to build them and the expertise to build them, that is incredibly expensive.

it is a -- it's incredibly short sided. it's not thinking through in the long run how the country can spend money more efficiently. if this is how families ran their own personal budgets, we would, you know, see a lot of bankrupt people. so we need to start thinking about how do we spend, how do we plan, how do we prioritize. we talked about the f-35 a little bit. but i also heard, as we put the together the new budget, as the air force was considering major big-ticket items, i heard that -- and these were just people thinking out loud, but maybe we should kick the new icbm down the road, the gbsd down the road, because we need to pay for the f-35 now. why in the world is the f-35 competing with our nuclear triad? that doesn't make sense. we need to have the f-35 fighter jet. in no reality does it make sense to punt on what i would argue is quite possibly the backbone of

our nuclear triad, something that we abilities need and we can't afford to kick it down to the right. we need to prioritize programs, figure out what the united states is going to prioritize, what we need, what we can no longer afford to punt on. then we need to figure out how many of these items we can buy at once so we're not having this trickle effect and just creating a lot of extra cost on that end as well. i'll leave it at that. i've got more ideas but -- >> okay. >> so i'm not sure about that. yes, we want efficiency in the programs that we do, but we've seen certainly since the end of the cold war this push towards efficiency, a sort of putative efficiency, we'll have a single role aircraft, and that's less expensive. i'm not sure that turns out to be the case. not criticizing the good work done by lockheed martin, but from a dod perspective, was that

the right approach. if you have an aircraft that has a cost per hour flight of $40,000, and we're going to potentially be rowlilling that to people in $10,000 trucks, that's not a or cost imposing on the energy but cost imposed. we're really good at running them ourselves, other people i question it. i agree bca is irresponsible. we need to think about what is an actual portfolio investment strategy across this range of things and what are the ways to buy down risk depending how you count it. since early 1990s, tax payer funds with zero capability, look at cost overrubs.

i don't think we're starving for dollars but i don't think we have the right approach. how do we have a more diverse mix so we don't get into mono cultures where we're putting in platforms that assume efficiencies over 50, 60 year life cycles. we don't know what's going to happen next year. we are completely surprised in the environment and need a portfolio that allows to you respond to that. it's going to be expensive and less efficient as we go but less likelihood of massive, multi-billion dollar failures or strategic failures in the future. >> okay. we have about 15 minutes left for this session. if previous sessions are a clue, you probably have lots of questions to ask our catalyst. sco we've got microphones out here. sir, in the front row center. >> my name is dick kaufman, former cia officer, u.s. marine.

i've been in the private sector. y'all are very smart but i haven't heard one word about the ground forces who do 80% of the fighting, 80% of the dying and get 1% of the budget. 1%. our guys out there are still using the same family of infantry weapons that i used in vietnam. i'm hearing about icbms, f-35s. we have to put more attention and energy and resources into the people that are doing the fighting. thank you. '6. >> responses? >> i don't think you'll find anybody here that disagrees with you. i think your point is well taken. that's right. one of the best ways to increase

moral of troops is give them newer stuff, better stuff. make shur they are protected and cared for. i don't disagree with you at all and i think your point is well taken. >> we've actually been investing a lot in the army and a lot in the marine corps but for a particular type of war, the wars we've been fighting, right? i've done this a couple of times in a couple of contexts. take a picture of a soldier in 2001 and compare that with a soldier in 2016 and you'll actually see a lot of change. i know the army likes to -- and marine corps also -- i say that as proud son of a marine, but technology does matter in ground

combat we've invested in some areas of technology. body armor airman and marines and soldiers is much better than it was 15 years ago. tactical awareness, commanding control, all that is much better than it was 15 years ago. but other areas that could be crucial or decisive in a high-intensity conflict against a capable adversary, things like electronic warfare. because we've been developing other technology, those areas have been deferred. we retrained whole artillery units away from artillery because of the exigentseys of iraq and afghanistan. now we're entering artillery.

i don't know it's lack of investment. we've invested for a set of wars we've been fighting. i think the challenge for the army and marine corps, requirements in the future likely to look much different. >> i will say this, though, if look at percentage of cost, indicative of cost. not getting everything they need but the point is well taken, the army tends not to. i will say some of the things i mentioned specifically, our dependency on space. who is dependent on space? the army is dependent on space. you want to take care of our guys, they need to see. they need to see where the enemy is moving and what they are doing. you have to make sure the army has access to great technologies

that might end up in the budget of the air force, for instance. >> guys on the ground needs situational awareness -- [ inaudible ]. >> that's exactly right. >> not surprised by a affirm bush of 17 raggedy taliban. >> structural differences, structural changes we have to figure out as we advance in these technologies. we have to make sure people that need them the most have access to them. >> two important points. our conversation has been self-deterministic if the united states does these things then we'll win. we're also engaged in a multi-party conflict here where other people get a vote. we're seeing advance of commercial technology has really enabled nonstate actors in the ground domain. it's not that hard for our adversaries to have encrypted

combs, their own satellite imaging. that's available now. they have moved ahead relative to us more than we've seen in other domains. the other thing we'll hear from the general later today who will disagrees with what i'm about to say. the army is its own worse energy right now. the army doesn't have a clear vision of what it needs to do in the future. it hasn't started vehicle modernization program. it's not that there's not money for it, they don't know what's there to do, that's fundamentally problematic. the army today is where the marine corps was in 2010. the marine corps has done great work 2010 to 2014 figuring out here is what the marine corps needs to do, the army is less cle clear. the frustrating thing, in

eastern europe, they can articulate that vision and hopefully will come good capability. >> did you want to weigh in? >> quickly. first of all, thank you for your service and thank you for recognizing our country army and navy, marine corps and ground. we talked a lot about airplanes. technologies across surface, subsurface army, open system architectures, communications. we've done a number of demonstrations where it's all about communicating, what we're seeing in space, air, and putting that information in the hands of the men and women on the ground. that's key. we're going to continue to do that, those types -- advance those types of technologies.

so i think we are addressing this. the other thing i would say, many of the things i'm doing are related to special forces. not everything we can talk about in this particular form but there's a lot going on behind the scenes. >> thank you. like to move onto our next question. gentleman in the back on the far, far right. hold on. you've got a mic coming. >> nicholas romero. my question is about protection against compromise of technologies. something that's probably not seen so much but is incredibly important to prevent bandwagoning from near peers. i'm wondering if you believe we're spending enough on that to prevent reverse engineering, compromise, we're seeing a lot of news about infiltrators. there was news yesterday about a german intelligence officer who was exposed in the domestic

intelligence agency over there. and we've had very recent revelations of information breaches the national security agency. i'm wondering if you see that the prevention of compromise and reverse engineering as a focus area or something we should spend more time on. >> i'm actually going to go to rob first from an industry perspective. i'll give you the first crack at it. if anybody else wants to weigh in briefly, happy to as well. >> great. i'll be quick. cyber security is a top priority and security across the board for that matter. cyber is one of the big issues we are paying a lot of attention to. it's a continuous challenge, because the enemy gets better, we've got to get better. they get better, we've got to get better. we are continuing to try to keep that advantage versus what our adversaries are doing to

basically steal our technology. so it's at the forefront of what we're doing every day. i would also say that there's an element of taking the fight to the enemy, if you will, that offensive cyber. so you don't want to just be playing defense all the time. there are things that are happening that will keep them playing some defense. i'll leave it at that. but great question. at the top of the list for things we're paying attention to. >> do you want -- >> i think very briefly, i agree with everything rob said. also, we need to assume these things are going to keep happening. even if they aren't happening from espionage, people will figure out technology or something similar. we can't let the features of capability be the key gifrtiator for our advantage. we need more diversity and pair with new and innovative concepts of operation. even if the adversary can reverse technology, we can still kill them 2 different ways.

>> next question, gentleman with the glasses. >> we've heard today quite a bit about acquisitions and engineering, but one of the other things dod does is research. i want to ask the role of research and mixture of funding and especially the new administration, i'm speaking about basic research, aims to yield, capabilities 10 to 20 years down the line. >> well -- >> basic research by definition occurs in academia and outside of industry. >> i think it's balance. does need obviously to be funding in basic research, which is going on. some of it in the skunk words and advanced programs alike. we do some network. we tend to be in more six two,

six three arena versus earlier technologies. there are parts of our corporation that are doing it as well as the rest of industry. but what we're trying to figure out is, you know, limited resources is where is the balance. when you invest in these early technologies, you want to see them mature. as the mature technologies are available, you want to transition those into the program of record. the way i have our organization set up, we have a technology arm, we have a program record arm. i'm always looking for challenging the technology arm on how we're going to advance it to the programs of record. so great point. i think we're -- again, comes to finding that right balance of resources. we definitely need to continue to invest in basic research. >> the only thing that i would add is for the last several years, we have a lot of technologies that have been sort of in limbo in research and development that really, again, are ready to move beyond.

so though i'm a huge proponent of investing in research for the next generation because you have to continually look ahead, we've got plenty of really good stuff. we talked about lasers, directed technology. but we always talk about how it's five years away, get some people who are serious about it for a matter of policy and get some money behind it and see what happens to these programs that really have been five years away and we'll start seeing them up close. remember airborne laser program. right before it was cut up into many pieces and sent away it shot down a missile. conops people had problems, directed energy on 747, had some questions about the concept of operati operatio operations but we proved technology was doing what we wanted it to do, looking at it on a more usable platform. that's just one example that we really are ready to go with some of these technologies we've been

sitting on for a while. >> i'll just say that the united states basic research capability, especially through the dod lab network is one of our key differentiators. and i worry over four to eight years stuff we can have, eating our own seed corn. we do need better methods which we can harvest things done and moving forward but shouldn't be at the expense of fundamental research. other people can't do it the way we can. >> the sign of any good panel is we leave questions on the table. i see a number of hands up. in the interest of keeping us unscheduled, that will have to be the last question. i want to ask you to join me in thanking our panelists and thank you for the discussion. [ applause ]

this week on c-span, tonight states count electors votes for president of the united states. coverage in illinois, pennsylvania, michigan, and virginia at 8:00 p.m. eastern. tuesday night at 8:00, jerry greenfield, co-founder of ben & jerry's ice cream talk about creative and responsible business practices. >> the idea that we couldn't sell enough ice cream in the summer in vermont to stay in business, that forced us to look for other markets. >> wednesday night former vice president dick cheney and defense secretary leon panetta under the future of the defense department under president-elect donald trump. >> i think the challenges are very great. i think we have unfortunately over the course of many years done serious damage to our capabilities to be able to meet those threats. >> living in that period where there are a lot of flash points.

a new administration is going to have to look at that kind of world and obviously define policy that we need in order to deal with that. but then develop the defense policy to confront that work. >> thursday 8:00 p.m. eastern, a look at the career of vice president mike pence. >> amidst shifting sands of contemporary culture and law we have stood without apology for the sanctity of life, the importance of marriage, and the freedom of religion. >> friday night at 8:00 fairwell speeches to several outgoing senators including harry reid, barbara boxer, kelly ayotte. this week on prime time on c-span. central command chief commander joseph votel, iranian

nuclear deal and u.s. relations with egypt and turkey. >> my name is chris griffin with foreign policy initiative. i ask that you kindly return to your seats so we can begin our next conversation featuring general joseph votel, who is the commander of the united states central command and moderated by michael o'hanlon of the brookings institution. we'll give folks a couple of minutes to take your seats a couple of courtesy reminders before you get there. kindly make sure your phones are set to silent. however, do not necessarily turn your phones off. feel free to join the conversation on twitter, hashtag

fpiforum. more than welcome to do so. if you're perhaps watching on tv, feel free to visit our website www.foreignpolicyi.org. a pleasure to welcome general votel on crisis and challenge in the east and excellent moderator, senior fellow at the brookings institution and co-director on 21st century intelligence there. he's the author of too many books to list in the time we have available but most recently would want to emphasize $650 bargain, the case for moderate growth in america's defense budget which i highly recommend to you. michael, thank you for moderating the conversation today and ask you to please join me in welcoming general votel. [ applause ]

>> well, thank you, chris, and good afternoon everyone. it's a real honor to be with general joseph votel, give a brief introduction. i think many are familiar with great work around the country and world when he was in uniform he was commissioned in 1980 after growing up in st. paul, minnesota, went to west point. spent a lot of time in various ranger units and activities early in his career and thereafter. also a lot of time with the 82nd airborne division, time in europe in sarajevo, bosnia, backdrop and kinds of missions slightly foreshadowed by that particular set of operations in the balkans we've seen him be preoccupied by in the 21st century with a lot of activity in iraq, afghanistan. elsewhere combatant commander special operations command, now combatant kplander at central command. a real privilege. general votel, as you surely know, you are widely respected and admired and therefore we're

looking to you for a lot of good wisdom in this key transition moment, not only in the middle east but our own country. i think many of you know general votel has countries to worry about in central command. that's a smaller number than average command but an average higher headache ratio per country. therefore, it adds up to a pretty robust portfolio. i thought if we can, general, maybe begin with a few words on a number of countries, maybe in this case working west to east, if we could. starting with egypt. so luckily we get to hear from you when you testify in other forms. i just want to have a very focused particular question on egypt. i know you've had a lot of important counter-terrorism collaboration in egypt, they are an important partner. it also strikes me as a country we as a nation, a dilemma in our relationship because, of course, the leader is essentially there by virtue of a coup. we're in this uneasy position of not knowing how to relate to his government, how to influence his

government. i would just ask, how do you think through this issue of how to make the egypt under president sisi a full partner not only specific counter-terrorism missions but more strategically and broadly at a time when they are in such flux themselves. >> thank you for the question. interestingly when i came into this position, i took the opportunity to reach out to a number of officers who had been the centcom commander to get their advice. one of the common themes from that, the importance of the role of egypt in the region. the strong encouragement from awful them to make sure egypt was one of the first cubs we visited, and it was. it was one of the countries we went to first as on the first trip i made in this position. so you know, i think the importance of egypt, i think certainly there are some challenges you have highlighted here. i think the way that i am trying

to think about egypt is through a longer term relationship with them and what they have meant to us over a lengthy period of time. you know, there certainly are some challenges that president al sisi and his team are dealing with on a regular basis there, economically, with security wise challenges. so what i've tried to do is when we go there, first of all, listen to what they are telling us and try to hear them. i do hear a concern from them about ensuring that they are stable. they have established stability within the security environment there. i think that weighs very, very heavily on them. i think that is a priority for them and i think it's something we have to recognize. he is very concerned making sure the country is stable and has a

stable security environment. and then i think we have to look at the relationship with egypt not just through the lens of just the last couple of years but over a period of time. what it's meant to us in the past, now, and what it will be to us in the future. one of the things i was quickly reminded of, the important role egypt plays in just the facilitation throughout the middle east. suez canal, support we get from them for our commerce and ships is extraordinary. we get what i would describe as premium service, head of the line privileges, if you will, in some cases to move our resources through. that's a key aspect. so i think what we have to do is we have to take a longer term look at egypt. we have to recognize the

importance they play in the religion, the relationship we've had with them in the past. we have to continue to work through the current political challenges that we're dealing with here and look long-term with them. they are an important player in the region. they have been. they will continue to be. they are the most populous country in the region. we have to recognize that. and they sit at a very critical point. so looking for ways to cooperate with them, looking for opportunities, big and small, where we can work with them is extraordinarily important. i think as we've looked at things like our presence in the sinai as part of the multinational force there, i think we've been able to do some things with them that have helped ensure the stability and security of that mission, that critically important mission in the sinai. so i think we have to continue to stay engaged with them. we have to look for opportunities to move forward

with them and we have to weather through the political waves that do take place. >> one or two follow-ups on each if i could before i swing over to the arabian peninsula, of course we had a complicated period dealing with egypt 2011 through 2013. everything from the slightly confusing signals about when president mubarak should step down and president morsey his period, president sisi and the way he's pushed back very hard into the muslim brotherhood. some getting into the relationship but in some ways you're the highest level american official dealing with egypt and therefore i know all these issues are on your mind. so the follow-up question would be have you seen consequences, fallout that affects the relationship between united states and egypt from that 2011 to 2013 period in a harmful way that pushed them away from us,

therefore not as much trust as there might have been. >> russia lately. that's some concern for us, certainly something we ought to take notice of here and look at what that means to us long-term. i don't know that is particularly helpful to the things we're trying to accomplish in the region to push them into the arms of others here. so i think we do have to pay attention.ic those are good examples of something we've seen most recently. >> one last question and the rest of my focus will be more specifically military and other countries. on the issue of egypt, one thing i noticed, president al sisi seemed to soften a little in some of his crackdown on the brotherhood. at least he's taken president morrissey off death row, an important step, a bit overdue. how do these issues affect you and the way you deal with egypt?

in other words, internal governance. >> they are helpful to us. frankly, i think the military and military relationship and certainly like all relationships has its highs and has its lows, but i think it's remained pretty steady. so i talk to the general on a regular basis. we visited back and forth several times just in relatively short period we've been here, but things like that i think help give us space to develop the relationship and to move forward and look for opportunities to move forward and to try to capitalize on. i know as i work with their military leaders, mostly through chief of defense there, i think he agrees with that. so we are. one thing we are trying to do, we are trying to get our exercise program back in place. as many of you recall, we've had an exercise program called bright star that's long baseball a staple of security cooperation in the region. we stopped doing it back in

about 2009 timeframe largely due to the tempo of what's going on. we've been challenged to get it started. but they agree, we agree this is something we ought to investigate, so we are. we're looking for those type of opportunities where we can capitalize. >> i know before i get to the arabian peninsula, by the way, the format here i get to have the fun. i can ask questions for an hour and 15 minutes and then you. that's the game plan. please be preparing your questions in addition to what i cover here. as we think about one more country in that general neck of the woods, i know libya is not within your command. however, obviously thinking a lot about egypt, you are a key observer and participant in all things libya i'm sure. as a new administration prepares to come in in washington, is there any advice -- if you were asked, for example, how well are centcom and european command working together on the libya

problemsish is there any need for new kind of mechanism, new collaborative vehicle, or is the system in institutional terms more or less working. would you have any thoughts there to share? >> i think you're hitting on an extraordinarily important point. i come to the centcom job having been the so com commander and we think more globally. i don't think that as a critique of my partners out there but we do have an approach that had soft forces around the world. i think the thing that is important to recognize for me as centcom commander is that i'm not in this by myself. the seams around centcom as you point out, libya, turkey, russia, india, sudan, horn of africa as just some examples. these are areas that have challenges as well. so we have to think trans regional. we have to look at the threats

that transcend across these. i think when we limit ourselves, we limit our thinking, limit operations, limit how we organize to bureaucratic boundaries, we limit our options to address the threats we have. i think there's been some very good work done, largely through the leadership of the chairman to develop a national military strategy that capitalizes on the trans regional aspect of our threats. trans regional multi-functional, multi-domain aspect of all of our threats. it is going to begin to change how we think about command and control and how we think about relationships between the various combatant commanders. my advice to incoming administration is build on that i think it's the right direction for us to move here in the future. >> thank you. let me now go to arabian peninsula and start and work northward over to iran and

afghanistan and pakistan. i wanted to ask briefly about yemen, which, of course, has been an extraordinarily complicated project itself. saudi friends struggled and learn what we learned historically hoping war power -- i don't want to put words in your mouth but curious how you would see evolution of the war in yemen. again, in broad terms evolution in the united states, it's good to think about the big story on yemen. where is this conflict in its long-standing history and what opportunities do we have now to influence it. >> it remains military conflict between saudi-led air coalition and houthi supported by iran and former regime elements there. it unfortunately remains military conflict. my personal opinion is there is

an area where the solution at a particular point. i think what we're finding, we're finding both sides trying to use military means to gain leverage to support their positions in political negotiations. unfortunately that's sometimes a protracted process. that's kind of how i view the situation right now. it's a struggle for leverage between both sides to try to gain a leg up in any kind of political negotiations that will ultimately address real problems here. >> is this a country where the united states should think about doing more? when i say that i'm using that in a vague, broad sense. more could be more things of the special operations variety or could be more efforts to influence saudi arabia's behavior, or more diplomatic flexibility at the negotiating table, maybe thinking about

confederation instead of one new central government. is there a case, at least as an option, to think about doing a lot more? >> i think we are doing a lot in all three of the areas you just highlighted. certainly our excellent diplomats are well engaged in hostility discussions and continue to provide a leadership role in that. we've seen that play out with secretary of state and ambassadors in the region very, very engaged, remain fully engaged in that. long-term ct interesting here in yemen. i would just remind you that one of the most capable franchises of al qaeda still remains there. al qaeda in the wrabian peninsupen -- rabbian peninsula. this is an organization that has demonstrated capability to come after us in the homeland. certainly ongoing capability has

been a challenge for us, ongoing presence on the ground as before. i think we'll begin to address that. certainly our strike program, other things continues to move forward in that. i know we continue to keep pressure on that. we're working with a variety of other partners. as many of you know we worked closely with uae a few months ago on an praegs focused on al qaeda down in the mccullough area of yemen. that was very, very successful. i think this is a good example of the approach we're going to have to take and have to leverage here. we look for opportunities. we try to capitalize on that. by doing those, capitalizing we prevail, support our interest as we move forward. then certainly working with the arab coalition we obviously are not providing intelligence support. we're not ticking targets for

them. we do continue to work with saudi arabia and other partners here to help improve their processes and the way they go about this in providing some training advice of some of their general security operations. i don't know that we necessarily need to be involved in the civil conflict that's taking place there but i think all the three areas that you touched on are the areas in which we're focused on, we have to continue to look for opportunities to continue to push the gas plgts on all of those areas as they present themselves. >> so if i could now turn to iraq and syria, i want to ask you about sort of the broader strategies in both places. first i wanted to see if you wanted to share tactical updates from the fight itself, battlefield. i'm not asking you for a full, classified briefing, but if there's anything specific you want to mention that you think recently is worth highlighting, just be curious about that before getting to the broader.

>> here is the big idea. here is the big idea how we're trying to approach the campaign in iraq and syria, that is great momentum and pressure. to do it in a variety of different ways. certainly on the ground with our partners, through our targeting of key leaders in the islamic state network through our targeting of threat -- of financial resources, looking at how we improve our capabilities to address ideology and narrative, toxic narrative that comes out of here and how we enable partners in the area to do this. so what we are trying to achieve, essentially, against -- in a broad sense, we are trying to present islamic state with a lot of dilemmas they have to deal with simultaneously. that strategy in very broad terms, military separate by i think is working. i think it is beginning to expose the cracks and helping us

with reducing the size of the physical caliphate. there's also virtual caliphate that goes along with this that has to be addressed. we are doing that and will continue in the future. that's kind of the idea. as many are tracking in iraq, the main focus is on mosul. iraq security forces under leadership of the prime minister working in very close coordination with the kurdish regional government, they have put together a plan and executing with the support of the coalition. it's not a perfect plan. it's their plan. we have figured out ways to bring our coalition capabilities to move them forward. they are on track with where they need to be. it will be a long fight in mosul. i would remind you if you look at the town in syria, it took us 71 days with our indigenous

forces to take that area. raqqah, three times the size of that. mosul, three times the size of that. this is a huge urban area. islamic state has had a couple years to prepare their defenses. it's not going to be a cake walk. we don't want to give the impression it is. iraquis, pretty good plan, executing it, making adjustments to it. and we are making adjustments as well with our support. so that will be -- that's the main focus and that's what we're trying to keep the focus on here right now. generally on track, a hard fight in front of us in mosul. in syria, we have now begun, seeing make of the isolation of the town of raqqah, there is an element of trying to synchronize both these things while our partners on the ground, iraqi security forces and indigenous partners in syria may not be

self-synchronizing between them the coalition is trying to do that. it is important to provide pressure on the town of raqqah, at the same time we're putting pressure on the town of mosul. they don't have the ability to move back and forth. i think we're seeing good effects with that. that will be a long fight as well. i would just highlight to you we've got two different forces we're working with. in iraq, we've got the iraqi army. the iraqi army. a well developed special operations capability in the form of iraqi counter-terrorism services. you've got federal police and a variety of other things there that look similar to what we have. in syria we're working with much more of an indigenous force that picks up partners on the go and requires a different way of working with them. so these are not equal forces here. they each have their advantages and disadvantages each way. what we're trying to do is make

sure coalition ability matched to coalition partners and continuing to focus on this idea of momentum and pressure, momentum and pressure in the islamic state in as many different as we can. >> one specific follow-up before we ask broader strategic question about both those countries. it sounds like, if i heard you right, you would not want us to think in terms of predicted date by which the mosul operation will be concluded. you might want to encourage us to stay open minded it might be all winter, 71 days times three is much of 2017 theoretically. could this be months more time required to liberate mosul. >> i think it could be. i think it could be a couple more months. again, we'll see. the islamic state is fighting hard right now. again, you have to look at the wear and tear that they are absorbing with this. the continued strikes, pressure putting on, the inability for

them to move forces between two major concentrations here and ultimately i think that will have ansell rating effect and allow us to move a little faster. yes, i'm not in the business of giving dates for this. we're going to move at the pace of our partners and continue to kind of keep the momentum going. >> broader question about iraq before asking one on syria would be of course a lot of people have said, as tough as the fight is in mosul and you've underscored seriousness and difficulty, the number of people losing their lives, it's a serious business no doubt but people have said that's in a way the more manageable proposition compared to what follows and the day after. everyone from my colleagues, general petraeus, many others have argued it's really building that enduring multi-sectarian consensus that's going to be the challenge. and i realize that's a job for a lot of people, mostly iraquis. within the u.s. government, not just you. one part that probably is within

central command's pr purview, the issue of working with sunni citizens, sunni tribes to build up tribal forces, police forces or national guard of some type that will give sunnis more a sense of controlling their own fate, protecting their own people. do you see any headway in that general proposition that will help us after the fight, not just during a fight. >> i do. admittedly, it's come a little bit late here in terms of this, but i do see some decisions taken by the prime minister lately that have provided the means to develop those sunni tribal elements to basically hold and then be part of the security plan afterwards. i do see some progress. that's certainly something we're going to have to keep our eye on and encourage moving forward. i absolutely agree with that. as we approach the plan for mosul, it wasn't about military plan. it was about military plan,

political, human aid plan. in the months leading up to this, common mantra with the coalition and our discussions with iraq and other partners here that all three of these things needed to be addressed at the same time. and while we'll continue to work on all of these, we can't -- one is not independent of the others. they are all very, very alike. i think we've tried to do as good a job as we can to link that. i'm particularly proud of the job united nations and others have done on the humanitarian side. they are handling what they are dealing with right now. certainly again i knocked on wood here. i don't want to jinx myself. it will become more challenging as we get more into the city. they are handling it right now. they have got the right -- i will tell you there's been extraordinary level of cooperation between kurdistan and government of iraq both

militarily and i would say politically. they are talking. they are talking on a regular basis. they recognize this same concern about what happens next that we do. it's not something that's unique to us. they recognize that and they are with the help of our diplomats are continuing to address that. >> there is no progress on iraqi national guard. the progress you're talking about is primarily about police or tribal. >> yes. >> in syria, i wanted to ask about two things. i'll put them together. one al nusra, front for conquest, however it redefined itself and renamed itself. a lot of people are concerned even as isis is holding shrink, the only progress against al nusra is evicting it from poor neighborhoods of aleppo being bombarded. otherwise it remains a formidable force. especially in the absence of a plan or promising plan from my point of view to share power with sunnis in syria. looks like president assad is

trying to hold onto power, russians, bosnia on his side. it doesn't seem likely he's sincere talking about a political transition. at least i don't detect any sincerity. i've worried about the world in which we've made headway against isis but the entire sunni world enraged against assad. maybe by that point donald trump said things that made us seem complicit. how does that war end without constantly giving al nusra and others an opportunity to regroup. >> i think you're correctly identifying key challenge for upcoming administration as we look at this. in terms of al nusra to get to your question, i would agree, this is an organization we should be concerned about. this is al qaeda. they have long-term designs. so we have to be very, very concerned about that.

to the extent we can, we have been addressing al nusra, principally trying to interrupt their network through leadership interdictions and addressing some of their key capabilities that contribute to that. i think we've been, i would say, moderately successful addressing some of that. that said these are resilient organizations. we should executive they will respond to this. the idea of constant pressure is important, and i would just kind of bring you back to my first comment. this an organization we have to be concerned about long-term and how we address that. taking care of the islamic state is necessary, but it's not sufficient to the challenges we're facing in syria. >> i realize that president-elect trump is not yet in the white house. certainly the first advice you give him will be private, not in front of us. nonetheless, let me ask, is there a way to sustain at least some support for those moderate

insurgent groups in syria that have been our important allies, that we feel a certain, you know, commitment, loyalty, promise to, who have helped stabilize jordanian bored, done other things that however modest and local have nonetheless been important contributions and we don't want to desert because we decide to focus onlike a laser beam on al qaeda and nusra. is there a way ratcheting back, should that be administration policy, ratchet back for more questionable groups but stay local to the ones that have been good friends. >> i certainly hope so. i can think of a number of groups we are working with who have been very, very good partners to us and have done our biding with our support, with our coalition support. i think we should look to do that. i hope that we will find a way to continue to do that. >> moving right onto iran briefly, and then we'll finish up in south asia before we go to

your questions. i want to ask a broad question about iran. any particular updates you want to give this kind of group? seems like people obviously debating joint comprehensive plan of action. a technical level, most people who watch it say it's being implemented reasonably well whether you like the deal or not, it's at least being complied with more or less. both sides complained about the other on specific details. anything you want to add to that overall assessment? >> i would share your assessment, from our -- not necessarily my job to monitor that, but i think it is being implemented appropriately and i think it has addressed one of the threats that we needed to be concerned about. the bigger concern for me is jcpoa has not changed iranian behavior. it certainly hasn't change regime behavior in terms of things they are doing. the other concerns we have with broader iranian threat problem

remain, whether cyber activities, use of surrogates, whether it's their facilitation of lethal aid, build up of military capability, access in the region or whether it's their unprofessional and aggressive activities in the persian gulf. these are all things that remain very, very concerning to me. one of the principle interests we have in the area is choke points. the criticality of those. certainly we've been -- strait under close watch of iran as it spreads to other areas and what that might mean to us in the future. so i am concerned about the continued malign activity of

iran across the region. >> would you describe that level of malign activity as relatively steady since signing and initial implementation of joint comprehensive plan of action or uptick -- sounds like you haven't seen downtick, are you seen uptick as iran gets more resources and can sell more mischief. >> we've seen them intervene in yemen. in the country of iraq, we look at 100,000 plus shia militia group members there. i think iran has had some role in raising and developing. i think i would probably see it as a little bit of an uptick. >> let me ask about afghanistan and pakistan and open things up to others as well. on afghanistan, president obama decided to hold force level steady at roughly 8400. again, a few of us at brookings with a few predecessors and

friends did a paper over the summer. we suggested there should be a broad range of options considered by a new administration that could even imagine a few thousand more forces from the united states and coalition as well as maybe expanded authorities in the use of air power. i don't know if you want to comment on whether we should have a broad review of that type that would consider multiple different options or a steady path you're comfortable with. any broad comment on the strategy. >> nothing on cruise control in centcom. we should also be looking at what's happening and for opportunities to change the footprint whether increasing or decreasing the activities they are doing. in general we should always be looking at what's happening and assessing that. i think the president's decisions have been very fortuitous to us. the decisions stay as opposed to going down to 5500, which is where we would generally be right now, keeping much higher level. around 8400 was a very wise one

and i think it spent a strong message to coalition and certainly sent a strong message to the afghan forces and people of afghanistan and likewise additional authorities granted to us i think have helped us immensely and helped us help the afghans immensely. i'm very keen to keep that going into the future as we kind of continue to assess the environment and other things we might need to do to keep the afghans going. i think afghanistan is a country worth fighting for. as a military member who went with the first wave of forces in october 2001, i remain very hopeful about it. i know it's a very challenging environment. there's a lot of things to address there. i think it's important for us to see this through. >> how would you describe where where we are battle friends in afghanistan specifically last one to two years.

there was a concern taliban occupied kunduz and made way in helmand province, some areas of the middle east always in flux but at this juncture. i haven't detected a systemic collapse. maybe 5 to 10% of the country shifted hands in terms of population and territory. i don't know if that's a fair assessment or any way you would describe last two years. >> i would describe it as equilibrium in favor of the government right now. as you point out, there's been a number of attempts here by the taliban. it's been part of their strategy to try to seize a population center, certainly attempted serve or eight times since august. while they may have gained some initial success and foothold, the afghan forces with support of the coalitionic has been

successful in addressing that and bringing back control of the government. i am concern about the casualty rates afghans are taking and we are addressing that. i think as we look now to move from one season to another here, we will -- john nicholson has done an excellent job on how we refit and address these challenges with our capabilities to keep afghans moving forward. so i think they are holding their own. as president ghani described to me, it was a year of survival. this has been a year of solidifying that a little more. there's a challenging situation out there. i agree with you, that does fluctuate back 5 or 6% a little either way but better part of 60% is under the control of the government of of afghanistan.

5 to 10% under direct control of taliban and the rest is contested territory that we're going to have to continue to work over. >> any impressions, i realize this may be getting into a detailed question best to ask general nicholson but i'm sure you thought, too, any change in trends in security forces. >> i think it is improving. i'm very encouraged by my interaction wall street chief of defense and minister of defense, who i think are serious individuals or well experienced and are looking at things not just from a good tactical sense but value sense. it's not just what you do but how you do things. so i'm very encouraged by that. i think the police are in an area where we will need to continue to look at. i'm encouraged by some of the things that the president is doing to address corruption in the ranks. there has been the removal of some corrupt military leaders in the past.

i think that's well received. i think it sends exactly the right message that needs to be sent. not only forces but those of us who are contributing to the effort. >> my last question will be on pakistan. it's a big country and a big challenge and just going to ask one big broad question. you can go wherever you wish with it, which is sort of overall trend in afghanistan. there's certainly hopeful elements it would seem in the sense of the transition in the military leadership that's been on schedule. there's been ongoing civilian leadership that hasn't been overturned by a coup. there's also continued pakistani tolerance or even support at times, as i understand it, for the taliban. of course in the east to finally extend your zone of immediate concern and responsibility but to go right up to the border with india, there is sort of a low grade ongoing skirmish with india right now. how would you describe overall trends in u.s. security

relations with pakistan at the moment. >> again, this is a relationship extraordinary and complex but one vital to us and has its ebbs and flows. we may be have been for the last couple of years in -- at a lower point than we've been at the past but i think this is a relationship we have to have and we have to maintain as we move forward. i'm encouraged by the transfer of leadership that's taken place here. i think it was good. again, there are a lot of potential ways that could have gone. i think it went the way we would hope it would have went. i look forward to talking to the general in the next couple of days and beginning to develop our relationship with him as we move forward. i think it's important with all of our partners across the region here that we take the time to talk with them and listen to what they are telling us and to make sure we understand the situation with granularity. we can't also look at things through our american eyes all the time. we have to understand what their

concerns are, what their interests are. we have to look at how we try to balance that. as you point out, it's a critical balance. they are very concerned about what is happening on their indian border and kashmir and certainly what's happening federal -- we're concerned about that. we have to look how we balance that back and forth with them. so it will remain a challenge, complex relationship but a vital relationship as we move forward. >> thank you. remarkable breadth of expertise. honored to have a chance to ask questions. start in the back. please wait for a mic and identify your self before asking general votel a question. >> with bloomberg news. what are the geo and political implications that u.s. abrogates iran and nuclear deal. >> tony, thanks for the question. i mean, i'm not sure what all

the ramifications of that are. as you know, that's an agreement that was put in place by a number of nations. so again, i won't mean, i don't know. i think it's addressing a concern right now. so, i don't know what that would mean and how it would be absorbed by iran if we do did that. so i think we'll just have to wait to see what the -- >> what is your -- [ inaudible ] >> i think we're always concerned about those types of things and not just in nuclear arms, but conventional arms and a race that is -- that is not helpful to anything that we're trying to do here. so, you know, this is something we'll, we'll continue to watch here as we move forward, but i,

i think we just have, i think -- we have to let the administration get in place here and get up to speed on what's actually happening. i'm confident that we have the ability to provide input to that. >> kevin. >> the incoming administration signalled it would work with russia to find a resolution to the conflict in syria. they have had professional military relations in the past. a lot of corporation. cross training. what would that sort of cooperation look like to -- could russian forces help deconflict assad's forces and could force irregulars and keep them apart from u.s. operations. could you give us an idea? >> the decon felix piece takes

place right now. we have a mechanism to do that and it is -- it supports our efforts. it's not coordination, it's not collaboration, it is decon felix. and it is about assuring safety aflight and of our coalition forces on the ground. and i think that, that works. i think that is working for us right now. we have to look at that and keep that properly updated. again, this is a political decision that may or may not be addressed. so, you know, as it saysing with military professional, we'll take a look at what, what happens here and we'll look at how we adjust to that particular situation. in terms of the decon felix stuff, that occurs right now.

>> it sure does, and in fact it is, it is, it's already a challenge for us. i mean, this is northern syria and air space over it is a congested area. and so we are finding our way through that right now. i again, this is something, we're very concerned about supporting our military objectives. we're also concerned about supporting and keeping our forces safe. and we'll look at how we do that if there are some changes in how we do this. >> go over here please and i'll go back there.

what are the plans of any to counter this advance? >> thanks. i would, i think that question is probably better answered by admiral -- our u.s. commander. but this i think highlights the concern about iran. and i think we have to look at -- we can't our look at iran through just the nuclear program or this or that. we have to look at what they're attempting to do. iran, iran has a place in the world, and iran has a place in the region. but, but when that plays out in malign ways, in ways that create friction, in ways that create conflict and add to instability, that's not helpful.

and we have to look at what that role is going forward. and that includes things that maybe taking place here in our own hemisphere. i think these are things to be concerned and certainly are things to be discussed. and so, i favor looking at the challenges and the threats we face out there in a more holistic fashion. that would include looking at what you suggest. >> in the back row here, please. >> laura jarrett, cnn. general, in paris, defense secretary carter spoke about the joint special operations command taking on an expanded role in fighting external isis threats. can you shed any light on what they will do or how it would help the fight and just what is the external isis threat these days. >> thanks. i hate to kind to give this thing again. that's a really great question for the commander.

and i would encourage when you have the opportunity to ask about that. but i think what the secretary talked about, there is, as we talked about a little bit earlier, the islamic state isn't just limited to iraq and syria. and most of these violate extremists organizations aren't just limited to specific geographic areas. they do have influence, they do use virtual means to put out a toxic narrative, to try to influence people, to try to, you know, create disruption and conflict in other areas. i think we have to look at the threats and we can't limit ourselves to specific areas. and i think what the secretary is talking about is making sure that we have a process both in the military and across the broader government that allows us to look at this much more hoe listically and to bring the power of all of our capabilities. our diplomatic power, our military power, our intelligence

community power. our informational power, our economic power to really address these issues. these aren't just military problems. these are half have to be addressed in a variety of different ways. seen, i think what the secretary is talking about is a process and a way of looking at these problems that brings it together and, you know, and one thing we have within the is the organization that looks at this particular problem. that has forces around the globe that is has capabilities and can be a leader in how we pull all of this together. >> eric, front row, please. sorry to get you your exercise. >> with the "new york times," thank you. on afghanistan, this 40% or so of the territory that's either

contested or held by the taliban. to what extent are you concerned that regional or international terrorist organizations are taking advantage of that contested space to take in al be it isis or some other groups. >> i'm very concerned. i think as you look at -- you look at the 98 violent extremist organizations that our department of state has identified and has designated terrorist organizations out there. and as you look into the afghanistan, pakistan region, you'll find 20 of them. 13 of them are specifically present in afghanistan. i think we have to be concerned about this. and the taliban pulling together and cooperating and collaborating with other terrorist organizations is something we should be -- we should be concerned about. i am concerned about that. i am concerned about how these voids are filled. and how we address and provide the pressure and incentives for them not to grow roots in these particular areas. and i think that's something

we'll have to continue to contend with here in places like afghanistan. >> we have about five more minutes. let's see if we can get a couple more questions in. we'll go here and then over there and finish up here if we have time for all three. >> general, i just have a question about to what extent are the battles in the middle east driven by the fact that we've had these terrorist incidents in europe. is there a coalition in the willing in iraq, we had the coalition, willing, afghanistan was obligated because that was article 5, what are the nato countries doing. >> yeah exactly. we have got a coalition of 52 countries here that are contributing on a regular basis to all of our operations in iraq and syria. supporting basin, some contribute by providing economic resources. some, you know, supportive by

providing military capabilities to this. i think as i look at -- excuse me, just a second. let me have a drink so i don't -- -- probably sounded bad, i need to have a drink here. thank you. but i think, i think the european nations understand this. you know, one of the things we've seen is this heavy movement of refugees that have moved from places like syria that have moved across southern europe and into the main area. they get that main aspect and they're concerned about it and they want to address it. what i found is our partners particularly are european partners have been extraordinary cooperative and collaborative in what they're doing and they are as concerned as we are. they have seen these attacks, whether they're directed, whether they're inspired, influenced, taking place in their capitals just like we've seen them taking place in some of our cities as well. so, they're very, very concerned

about that. and i think that will motivate them to continue to be contributing members of the coalition. and so, i think we'll continue to capitalize on that. >> right here, please in the front row. green shirt. thanks. >> hi, my name is alexa. how do you think the recent integration of the pmf into the iraqi army will affect the future of the u.s.'s ability to coordinate activities with the iraqi army? >> yeah, thanks. well, i think -- you know, it sounds like it on just on varnish here it sounds challenging here. it will increase obviously a lot of shia and potentially iranian influence over the government of iraq. and i think we have to be concerned about that. i'm not sure, however, that the last shoe has fallen on that. i think there is -- there are still discussions, there are certainly a lot that has to be dmoen terms of how that is implemented and as my reading of this, this isn't just limited to

shia, but it is shia sunni. and how that gets, gets put together by the government in iraq i think will be, will be very important thing for us to watch. so we are concerned about that. i think others in the region are concerned about that. but, i think we're going to have to work with our government of iraq partners in trying to shape that a little bit. >> very last question here. >> on with the hill. president-elect trump has said he would ask his generals for a plan to defeat isis within his first 30 days. that has planning begun and what might be done differently that's not already being done and where we might be in the fight when he does take office? thank you. >> again, president-elect has to be inaugurated. and then he becomes the president, then he'll give direction and we will do what he tells us to do. that's what we do. ag i