>> the -- essentially the problem you're talking about is described as passage of lines. actually, i do think that certain armies are much better at it than others. i think the army of the cumberland, because they use this casey's formation and regularly drild in the formation of regiments in and out of formations was very good at it. they did it all the time in the battles at stone's river, chickamauga. they do it very frequently. and almost never have tactical problems. never fall into disarray or lose ground. there are exceptions. if they get hit right in the middle of a passage of lines, get flarchg nked, it's a proble. then it would be a problem anyway. other armies, it all depends on the drill and the real -- how realistic those drills are.

not to put too much on the army of the potomac or the confederate armies, but i don't see a lot of sort of -- well, in the summer of 1862, the union armies and confessed rderate ar are fighting all the time. they don't have the luxury of time quite the same way the army of the cumberland had between january 1863 and june when they kick off their first major offensive of 1863. they have almost six months where they do nothing but drill. they learn the new drill manuals. they learn those steps from the bottom up and they become very, very proficient at it. so some armies do it better than others maybe is the short answer. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. [ applause ]

wednesday, morning history tv in primetime continues with emerging civil war blogs conference on great attacks of the civil war. at 8:00 p.m., john bell hood's assault at atlanta. at 8:45, the army evof tennesses assault at franklin. at 9:45, the federal breakthrough at petersburg. at 10:45 p.m., four influential civil war military wives. great attacks of the civil war, 8:00 p.m. eastern wednesday here on c-span3. this week is author's week on "washington journal" featuring live one-four segmentes with a new author each day at 8:30 a.m. eastern. carol anderson will talk about "white rage" the unspoken truth of our racial divide. thursday, author james kitfield with "twilight warriors."

the soldiers, spies for revolutionizing the american war. also kathy kramer with "the politics of resentment." rural consciousness in wisconsin and the rise of scott walker. saturday, two authors, tom gjelten with "a nation of nations" and robert jones with "the end of white christian america." and author tevi troy with "shall we wake the president." two centuries of disaster management from the oval office. watch authors week on "washington journal" beginning at 8:30 a.m. eastern. this weekend on american history tv on c-span3 -- saturday afternoon, just before 5:00 eastern, architectural historian barry lewis talks about the construction of the brooklyn bridge and how transportation in the city changed at the turn of the twintth century. >> when the brooklyn bridge was

open it did not put the ferries out of business. the ferries were still running at capacity. all through the 1880s and '90ss because by the mid-1890s, it had reached 1 million people. >> at 8:00 on lectures in history -- >> and that's the real sort of interesting thing about country music is that it's the music of poor white people. people who are privileged to be white and i'll talk about that in a second but also people who are underprivileged in terms of their class identity and economic opportunities. >> dickinson college professor on the emerging defernitions of whiteness and blackness in colonial america and how it impacted the origins of country music. then sunday afternoon at 4:00 on reel america -- >> the cautious congress, budget cutbacks and a tangle of state and local administrative

problems on the new year's horizon created evidence this crusade may be slowed or at worst may level off and fade. this was the climate, the land and the unfinished task that faced lyndon johnson on the 1st of december, 1966. >> the film "the president december 1966" documents the final month of the year of president lyndon b. johnson. his meet with mexico's president. awarding the medal of thohonor a marine in who fought in vietnam. and at 8:00 on the presidency, william hazelgrove, author of "madam president." the secret precedency of edith wilson. she buffer access to the president as he recovered from a massive stroke in 1919. for our complete american history tv schedule, go to c-span.org. the september 1863 battle of

chickamauga is considered one of the union army's worst defeats in the civil war's western theater and ranks second only to gettysburg in total casualties. next, historian james ogden talks about the battle and the actions of confederate general james longstreet who led the assault. this talk is part of the event hosted by the emerging civil war blog focussing on great attacks of the civil war. it's an hour and ten minutes. >> at this time it's my pleasure to introduce to you, i'm not even sure if you remember this story. i first met jim years ago attending a civil war journalism conference at the university of tennessee at chattanooga. fantastic event they put on every year. jim was one of the organizers of that event. he very patiently asked questions from a young journal ift answered questions from a

young journalism professor there just full of golly gee whiz. and he is easily one of the most patient question answerers i've ever met in all my years i've talked with historians. jim's graciousness and patience many years ago made a profound impact on me as i was getting started with writing -- researching about the civil war history. i owe a great deal of personal gratitude and debt to james. and jim spent some time here at spotsylvania national military park. he lived at the caretaker's cottage once upon a time in his many stations during his tenure with the park service. he's also spent some time as an historian of point lookout and he's been with the park service since 1982. but in 1988 he landed at chickamauga, chattanooga where

he's the staff historian ever since. he's given more than 400 staff rides. he has spent many years tutoring and mentoring generations of civil war buffs. and i don't say that to make you sound as though you were seas seasonseason ed. but very few of us working in the field know of anyone who has made a greater impact than jim ogden in his various tenure with the park service. it's my distinct pleasure to introduce to you a man who is truly a legend among park service employees, jim ogden. >> hear, hear! [ applause ] >> thank you, chris. and i think i'm going to have to start off by getting out of your sight for a minute.

ah-ha. the owner of the computer is here. that will save me having to learn another one. chris, thank you for the introduction and thanks everybody involved with emerging civil war for having me up to speak. i'm glad to be able to do it. thank all of you all for coming out and participating in this symposium and to look at these issues with the war. i hope that most of you all have had a chance to visit chickamauga and chattanooga

military park at one time or another. there's a lot to see there, and if you haven't visited in recent years, thanks to the assistance of several conservation organizations, the trust for public lands and civil war trust in particular, some additional areas of the battlefields there have been preserved. not all of that ground is yet open. and some of it that has been preserved in the last 15 or 20 years has only limited access to it. but if you have your hiking boots on and pick the right time of the year, there's some more parts of the battlefields in the chattanooga areas you can get on now and consider the actions on the ground where they actually occurred. if you have spent much time at the chickamauga battlefield, you certainly know part of the story

and kind of the deciding moment in the battle. notice i did not use the term decisive. and maybe later i'll define what i mean deciding versus decisive. but the -- you may well be familiar with this first quote that i'll start with. our lines now emerge from the forest into the open ground and the border of long, open fileds over which the enemy we're retreating, under the cover of several batteries which were arranged along the krefcrest of ridge on our right and front running up to the corn of a stubblefield and one battery on our left in front posted on an elevation in the edge of the woods just as the corner of a field near a peach orchard and someone southwest of dire's house. the scene now presented was unspeakably grand. the resolute and impettuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out of the

shadow and gloom of the forest into the open field flooded with sunlight. the glitter of arms, onward dash of artillery and men. the retreat of the foe. the shouts of the host of our army. the dust, the noise, the smoke of firearms of whistling balls and grape shot and a bursting shell made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur. here general hood gave me the last order i received from him on the field. go ahead and keep ahead of everything. how this order was made will be best determined by those who investigate all the details of this battle. that quote comes from bush rod russ johnson. brigadier general commanding the provisional division that led in the end what is longstreet's grand charge at chickamauga. it is, as i said, the deciding

moment really in the -- determining the outcome of the battle to determining chickamauga as a tactical victory for the confederates. but there's a lot more to that story. and that's what i want to spend a few minutes on tonight. there are many james longstreet fans out there who want to have james longstreet almost looking into the future and seeing exactly what was going to happen in just the next few hours or minutes, if we were on the battlefield standing at the point of the breakthrough. i might even motion towards the large pine tree on the east side of the lafayette road and say the james longstreet fans would like to have all the peeking around moving out around the battle line. many of us will be familiar --

many of us will be familiar with that formation for longstreet's attack. one of the maps out of dave powell's very useful, very valuable maps of chickamauga. and when you come down to spend your several weeks walking and studying the battle field you should have a copy of that along with you. but on that map there is this formation right there in the center. hood's formation on september the 20th. those troops stacked in that column formation that dave talked of a minute ago. and on most maps, static because of the necessity to print them. you have this nice neat

formation depicted for longstreet's formation just minutes before he will send the troops forward. that was not what he had originally intended or even what he really wound up with on that morning of september the 20th. of course, the decision had been made in early september as a result of william stark rose's approach to chattanooga. that important gateway to the south industrial heartland and braxton braggs' cries for reinforcements as a result of rosecran's approach. they made the decision to not only reinforce bragg's army with large numbers of troops from mississippi and also from east tennessee but eventually to send two divisions of the first corps of the army in northern virginia

under james longstreet to virginia. of course, we could have another symposium some time in the future to talk about the important rail moves of the war and this one by longstreet's force is one that is commonly used to illustrate the use of that new transportation medium in the war. longstreet's command wound its way. the route through the eastern carolinas and into georgia, to atlanta and then northward to join braggs' army, arriving in almost dribs and drabs beginning on september the 15th. as a result of the distance, the number of rail lines that were necessary to make that move and the deteriorating condition of the confederate rail system. james longstreet himself and

part of his staff did not arrive in the area of braggs' army until about 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of september the 19th. they'll arrive at the platform on the western atlantic railroad. a stop on that railroad just a little bit south, although technically just east of ringgold, georgia. a platform that had been developed by the railroad as a place for those visiting the mineral springs at catusa springs to get off the western atlantic railroad and take carriages to those mineral springs. those mineral springs, the resort facilities at the mineral springs served as confederate hospitals in 1862 and into the summer of 1863. in fact, the very ill braxton

bragg and his ill wife elise had soaked their bones in the mineral springs at cherokee springs in the -- in july and august of 1863. in fact, that's where braxton bragg was on the day that the union began -- bombardment of chattanooga to announce rosecranes' approach. the longstreet will embark there in the area of catusa platform. not at the platform itself but in the area of catusa platform because the destruction of bridges on the western atlantic railroad as briggs army retreated south out of chattanooga on september 9th, 10s, and 11th. thealry screening that withdrawal in that area had burned a number of railroad

bridges on the western atlantic railroad. as a result, the railroad did not operate beyond catusa platform. there is good evidence that no train could actually reach the platform itself. none of the staff will indicate exactly how they got their horses off of the train when the train carrying those horses arrived later on. but john bell hood, who had arrived the day before, said that to get his horse off of the train, they had to jump the horse off of the box car that it was in. in addition, the reason that they weren't unloading right at the platform itself and then also why longstreet and his staff had to wait almost two hours for the train carrying their horses was that to

accommodate the number of troops that were being moved, the railroad was being operated in section. and this was actually a common form of railroad operation at that >> they had an elaborate system of being able to operate one locomotive a string of cars. another locomotive a string of cars. they could do this, two, three, four train sets. a series of flags indicating whether they were following trains or not and apparently on the ride up from atlanta one of the trains in this section, further back and will break down and hence having to wait the additional two hours for the arrival of their horses.

and pulled up and they'll get their horses and peyton manning will set at four. and the distance. often criticized for not having anyone there at the platform to meet james longstreet and while he could certainly have been a better commander i will defend him here. it is not his responsibility to have somebody there at the railroad to meet him.

since 3:00 a.m. on the morning of september 17th, another of james longstreet's staff officers has been at brag's headquaters. why wasn't he himself or someone that he had arranged at the railroad to meet long street and long street and small party will set out toward the battle roaring in the distance and they will work their way using the sound of battle as a guide. they are almost captured after dark when they almost ride into union line along the creek at some point. the exact route of longstreet's travel toward the battlefield is

not known. however in his memoire he writes as they move toward the sound of the battle and he is moving westward having passed through taylor's ridge after leaving the platfo platform and after the early riding into union lines and as he said making a sharp right about and they will gallop away

longstreet and his party will not reach headquaters until as longstreet says near 11:00 at night. it may have been midnight before they found headquaters located at or near there. they found him asleep in an ambulance and after brag is awakened long street will join brag and there will be a private conversation between bragg and

longstreet. and improvised division under general johnson and consisting of stewards in the division. the artillery consisted of battalions of majors williams, robertson and liden together with some other batteries attached to brigades. it indicates the reorganization and the organization number 11 in the 14 daytime period that's going to end for september 20th. and reorganizing almost in their

careers. and the reorganization of the army into the left and right wing was something that he had begun even by late morning. take command of troops. and streams between look out mountain and the river. and a general description of our position. on this screen it's not possible

to see all of the details of the map, at a scale of two miles to the inch and but it is not likely that longstreet received a copy of this entire map. more probably he received almost literally just a strip map. a portion of it. he says he was given a map showing the roads and streams between look out mountain here on the western or left edge of the map and the river or creek here and more probably something just like this. in the lafayette mcwallace players at university of north carolina chapel hill there are a series of essentially these little strip maps or snippets

off of this or very similar confederate maps and that's probably what longstreet was given. the army in tennessee in particular has a very difficult time reproducing maps of any size and you can find in a number of surviving collections almost like the old aaa trip maps or strip maps, you know and if you turn left and right off of the route you're probably not going to know where you're going and they received an order.

while endeavoring to get in line for battle. it had been merely skirmishing. it had been a pretty costly fight but that statement probably says something about the condition and state of the army and also braggs long held belief of how the battle would be unfolding and only here does he begin to change that idea. he goes on to say and inform me that the battle was for daylight

the next morning. the action to be brought on upon our right and be taken up to the left. to be an extreme left as a pivot. what longstreet was referring to and bragg had ordered was bragg had essentially wanted all ten of the then available divisions within his army and north and south all ten divisions and at day dawn the first bit of daylight, the northern most division, right division and the right wing was to jump off.

and as each division and was an effort to get coordination and s achieved over the last couple and so long street learned that night that the battle was expected to begin on the right at daylight the next morning and be taken up successfully by the division southward and essentially if things went correctly driving the union line

back and they talked with a subordinate and relayed to hood at least the general outline of the plan for september 20th. this will come into play because there's some evidence that hood may have delayed some of his ideas down the chain within his command late on the 19th or early on the 20th even before longstreet had arrived. also unsaid, about the brief

meeting is whether or not the longstreet staff officer joined him at that point or not until the next morning and also when longstreet got the one company of the first louisiana cavalry that will be assigned to him and also when the soldier of the first infantry, the son of the family that will be a landmark for long street's actions on september 20th. >> it is possible he was already playing that role on september 19th and even 18th.

a number of soldiers had been detailed a couple of days before bragg executed the plan so installed possible he was serving on the 18th and or 19th and then he becomes associated on the morning of the 20th. after this brief conference with bragg, bragg will return to sleep and longstreet and his small staff will also lay down to get some rest. we all took for some sleep against the work before us. no mention here of sending any

messages out to now the five or six divisions he is to command the next morning at day dawn to make preparations soon after daylight. if his plan goes off as he desires but after the long train ride you can certainly see the need for longstreet and his staff to get some rest against the world before us. there might have been some others before dawn but the next morning and his command.

of the five or six that are present only five are his own troops that are coming from virginia as reinforcements for bragg's army. the other 12s are regular parts of the army of tennessee or regular reinforcements sent from mississippi or east tennessee and when he rides into the sector of now his left wing of the army of tennessee he will find a situation very different than the nice, neat, orderly formation of the earlier man. he will say the line is arranged from right to left as follows.

hood's division of which only three brigades were up was some what in the rear of johnsons. they were ordered forward the night before but were not yet up. they have not arrived from richmond. most of the confederate junts had been engaged in late afternoon or evening would pull back just a little ways and simply on the ground where they had ended up. when the fighting in their sector ended darkness putting an end to that fighting. one of the divisions commanded

and marched on to the battlefield on the 19th and left briefly engaged and after dark pulled back to the east, several hundred yards and perhaps in a column of battalion formation similar to what david described earlier as one of the examples. the situation that longstreet finds, that morning at dawn will necessitate a fair amount of work. two of his divisions, johnsons and william preston hearsay both

spent time building port fireworks kagss in their sectors. fearful that they're going to attack them. at right angles. as i said early on the evening of the 19th he had paid a visit to brag's headquaters and had received at least a general idea of what was expected on september 20th and there is some possibility that they have sent

out orders to at least two divisions he had commanded on september 19th or the division. some of those troops report moving right at daylight on the morning of september 20th and before any evidence that james longstreet himself had done anything to make some movement within those formations. this is particularly the case with hood's own division or laws division. his three brigades. the texas brigade and the georgia brigade and own alabama brigade which had been under sheffield and will soon be under

william perry and getting hose two brigades back with the alabama brigade so it is possible that either hood or law put them in motion before long street began to exert any influence on the scene but when long street arrived and found hood's division under law in a position behind alexander peter stewards division longstreet about daylight road to alexander peter stewart to issue and learn

there were none up to 800 yards. half a mile or so distance and long street learning this and wishing to both close on the left and right wing and also wanting to get the division in the front line or stewart's division to shift to the right. this graphic, what long street found the description of johnson and preston in the front with the division behind or in the second line, when long street found this situation, what he will then attempt to achieve is

this formation where he wants to shift stewart's division to the right to get hood's division or laws on the front line with the intention that they will join hood or laws division there toward the center. longstreet would keep -- well, basically would have a formation of four divisions along the front and also ordered that each of the divisions must form with two brigades up and one brigade

back. and the idea of troops on the second line and giving flexibility to shift troops left or right to conduct forward passage of lines or relief as ne needed that is what he begins to communicate to his new subordinates on the morning of the 20th. stewart's division will shift to the right. they will move northward along the ground where they are located. they will move only about 400 yards. because overnight about 1200 yards north of where stewart

started out, someone else began to occupy that same rise aground. and stewart is only able to shift about 400 yards to the north or right and will by necessity actually have to band his right front brigade or william bates brigade back to guard against the union troops a little bit further to the north. and shifts it to the right. he did essentially what he had been told the evening before and that was maintain his connection with the troops on the right. johnson shifted to the right as

well. and no space opened for the division and it had fallen back overnight and will move forward and on johnson's left. so in the end with the arrival of kershaw what he wound up with, what he had to accept is not the formation that he desired having the divisions online two up and one back and instead three divisions across the top, two others stacked behind that center division with one division held in reserve. there is evidence that neither longstreet or hood ever realized that laws division had not

gotten on the front line. by the time they will actually move forward with the assault, it is possible that longstreet was not even aware of this actual formation. so that nice grand column, that appeared on that earlier map which is so recognized by longstreet's action was not at all what he had intended. it was essentially the circumstances encountered there in the woods on that frog gi morning of sunday september 20th. as far as this stack of three divisions, 8 brigades and five lines, what becomes longstreet's grand column as it is called, a little closer up here and i know

the size of this graphic not everybody can read all the formation but johnson's division is formed with two brigades on the front line and part of his third brigade with the rest of that third brigade in a second line and then hood's division is formed in two lines. one brigade up and two brigades back. that's another indication that longstreet may not have ever be aware and not able to get what he desired two up and one back and then most maps, you know, have to show this in some form for understanding but you have the two brigades and they're

going to become the fifth line of the assault column and they are only actually arriving. do they receive orders to move near alexander bridge and they're marching into position when longstreet will send this formation forward. and made these shifts in the formation that morning in his effort to get laws division on the front line and also to reduce the space between his right and polks left. longstreet will actually shift troops over in front of some of his troops.

the and you literally wind up with the circumstances with these two wings of bragg's armies overlapping one another and when the attacks finally did begin not at day dawn as bragg had hoped and desired but because of the communications problems which so badly plagued bragg's army not until after 9:30. the attack on dh hill's troops and you will get an

intermingling of commands. longstreet will work on getting the formation as desired and before he had -- had solved that in fighting on the right will begin. long street will say that as soon as he heard that fighting he sent a messenger suggesting he order his division to move forward with the attack since time had been lost that morning but he learned that he had essentially thrown his hands up with the command situation. having struggled over the last nearly ten days now to get his

orders out, about the time he launched his assault he turned to one of his trusted staff officers and ordered lee to ride down the line and order every division commander into action immediately. and giving up on his command structure. lee will begin riding out and he will reach alexander peter stewart's digs. being a regular part of bragg's army and hearing this directive from one of bragg's trusted staff officers follows lee's

directive and stewart's division jumped off under this direction from braxton bragg and so long street's orderly formation of three divisions across the front and two others stacked behind the center will be disrupted an the attacks on the directive from lee. fearing that lee is going to disrupt the rest of his formation and they'll issue an order for a forward movement. in this directive will put hood's column of three divisions and heinmann's division in motion. and of course this the battle.

the first line of johnson's division and the first line of it will step off raising the rebel yell and it has been pushed back by a very aggressive union line so aggressive that some confederate commanders said before the order to advance they themselves had been attacked and to repulse this union attack several of the artillery batteries along that confederate line have opened fire and now the order to advance is given and the brigades will all step

off. after they progressed about 200 yards the second line moved forward. mentioned the relative spacing in a column formation. you had to have the proper distance between the lines. so that formation while awaiting the assault was formed with 50 or 75 yards between the line. now has to uncoil as it moves forward in the assault so that there would be enough room for those troops in as it turns out the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, line to maneuver left or right as needed. the second line began to move and the third line did not move until another 100 or 200 yards

of distance have been gained and then the fourth line and the fifth line. in some ways it was like a spring slowly uncompressing as the lines move forward. what makes this attack by long street so successful. at least in helping to decide the battle is when johnson's troops go forward what do they find in their front? they happen to strike the sector of the union line when he has ordered a division to move to fill a gap that he believed existed further to the north. so as jonathan's man came out of the wood they found in their

front essentially no federal force. some of the federal skirmishers were still there. some of those skirmishers men of the 100th illinois under their commander would take shelter among the buildings in an effort to resist the confederate advance but they will, many of them will be captured much to the delight of some of the tennessee of fulton's brigade of johnson's division. just in the last couple of weeks before the battle there had been some new men elected to the grade of second lieutenant and they had not yet had an opportunity to acquire the proper symbols of authority for a second lieutenant. a waste belt, a sword and pistol but as they capture men of the 100th illinois around the

buildings there are a number of company grade officers from the 100th illinois. proper symbols of authority for a company officer and when moments later fulton's men continued on westward. second lieutenants from tennessee are wearing the proper symbols of authority from the battlefield. dashing forward with this first line are several confederate batteries hoping to blow a hole in the union line but there was no need for them because johnson's troops will pull through the line in an hours

time and suggest that the confederates will penetrate the union line and the southern half of the union line and as the union troops flea this assault they will turn northward toward chattanooga. some of them rallying to make a stand on a series of wooded hills. part of the eastern most portion of the complex. longstreet had ridden forward with probably the -- between the fourth and fifth line as it turned out on the assault column. as the troops had gone forward as they charged out into the

fields. and would be wounded. you know that the hood will lose his right leg thanks to the work of steven hood in recent years. locating in another branch of the family. some documents and is now a lot more of the detail of hood's wounding are known. the path of the bullet through the middle third of his right femur which will shatter it very badly and the amputation of his leg a couple of inches below the hip. with hood's wounding the command of his formation will

essentially come to the end. and in the end it doesn't matter as the command structure essentially will dissent grate and longstreet was trying to keep track of the nature of the formation and follow the column forward and himself wheeled to the right and as he road along trying to judge the action he realized it was now near noon. it is also now, what time of day? it is time for lunch. he ordered his lunch brought forward while he scouted just a

little bit and then shortly there after, probably after 1:00 longstreet and his staff sat down to a lunch. probably not at the farm as was parked more probably on the brotherton farm but they will sit down and enjoy nassau bacon and sweet potatoes during which one of his staff officers, manning, will be wounded when he is struck by a small fragment of shell he had the natural reaction of a human. he gasp. just after he had taken a big bite of sweet potato. and sit quickly noticed that he can't breathe and they proceed to get a knife and pry the chunk

of sweet potato out of his wind pipe. he is carried on to the rear to be cared for and during this break and will also have an order issue to distribute some of the captured artillery pieces. he is not exercising direct control of the situation on the battlefield. particularly how he carried to the rear. this and a brief meeting shortly there after with braxton bragg, where bragg won at long street to send some of his troops will largely take longstreet out of control of the situation through

the afternoon and that's how you wind up with a series of assaults against snodgrass hill. longstreet's attack on september 20th will result in the collapse of the right of the union line largely because of the situation and the condition of the union line and they found it at the particular moment and it will decide the tact car length battle but it was not quite the grand assault that james longstreet is often credited for. it comes out of the circumstances he found there on that morning of september 20th, 18el 63. thank you.

>> it seemed like from what you described longstreet was a confederate that debuted tactics. >> well, column formations are included in scotts tactics. they're just not -- the fault is scott's tactics and all units online, the line formation is the default in scott. but column formations are in scott's tactics. longstreet if you look at his formations on other battlefields and other assaults does have some depth to his formation.

two brigades up or two brigades back or multiple lines of troops and that's what he is doing here. as i said, there is some evidence that he was not aware of the fact that the depth of his formation wound up to be those five lines. he was intending to have a formation of two brigades up and two brigades back. in his report divisions are to be formed one brigades up and there were more than three in the division and they were to be formed. all of the divisions in his wing had three brigades accept one division that had two brigades so why longstreet would say that

knowing essentially that they were three brigades formations. he did want some depth so that you had that versatility and flexibility to react to situatio situations. >> they had delayed getting out of virginia and had a ride

earlier or didn't have troops and didn't have artillery. if they had been there earlier that might have made a difference. that is very difficult to judge. they judge correctly the potential difficulties of shifting any sizable body of troops. any distance. several times during the war lee had resisted the idea of sending troops from his army to anywhere else saying by the time they get there the situation will be changed. they could be of greater value where they are to do something to try to change the course of the war. if the decision had been made a few days