people on who he thought should be his vice president. so gerald ford does list, he gives four choices which you can see here. president nixon ended up taking for it anyway. -- ford anyway. >> learn more about this exhibit and the constitution by visiting -america.gov/amending or you can download a free e-book companion to the exhibit. >> american history tv, a panel of historians talk about the cold war summit between the united states and the ussr, from 1985 using declassified documents, they explore american and soviet perspectives on arms limitation and diplomacy, and debate when the cold war truly

ended. woodrow wilson center in washington, d.c. posted this event. it's about 90 minutes. i'm glad to have the opportunity to introduce our distinguished historians. programstor of russian , and executive director after the national security archives. they won the 2011 prize from the society for historians of american foreign relations, or relations for their book, master thesis of history, the peaceful end of the cold war in europe, 1989, by the central european university press. they have co-authored more than three dozen electronic briefing books cold war summit.

legacy.a flashpoint and she earned her phd at emory university. tom is a graduate of harvard university and won the 2004 emmy award for news and documentary research. i would like to point out that this magnificent book, the last hasrpower summit, absolutely beautiful color plates. this is impossible with american university presses, so go to hungary to have your book. >> i just want to say an enormous thank you to eric and the american historical association and the wilson center. this is an extraordinary and to show that you all have built over many years and had a world that was struggling with his alternative facts.

a forum that deals with historical context is needed now more than ever. i'm really proud to be here. svetlana give kudos to , who led this entire process of gathering data and back to the early 1990's. the manuscript was brought up to 3000 pages. it was then cut down to a near 1000 or so, and i was due to herculean labors by our amazing series editor who is here with us today. i thank you to the european press helping us take out the high resolution photos from the administrations. we are looking forward to the trump, putin summits.

is not them, but this is how the last two occupants thought about each other. we are betting that about 140 characters per tweet, the book will be significantly shorter. our publishers will be happy about that. we are really here to talk about two main points. the biggest theme of the book is really in the title, which is conversations that ended the cold war, that we argue in the essays and in the head notes, and i and the documents, we provide them so you can judge himself. these meetings, starting in geneva in 1980 i've been going in 1991 as the soviet union was about to collapse, really created an extraordinary learning process on both sides, that dramatically reduced everybody's sense of we argue, and the cold war. at the same time -- this is the

other major theme i think of this book, that the conversations featured so many cold war hangovers and ,uspicions, and misconceptions that a plethora of opportunities were missed that made our world more dangerous today. and we lay out several categories, one major one, arms control. we argue in the book and show and documents that george bush came around to the arms race in reverse by september of 1991, but it was on the table as early as 1988. would have made the world a lot safer. we argue there was an extraordinary partnership in dealing with major crises. but there were many other opportunities for cooperation and settling in regional conflicts. case number one in this has to be the ongoing war in afghanistan. the third area of missed opportunity that we highlight in

the book in our essays and documents, are especially full of pathos, a missed opportunity to integrate a democratizing soviet union into europe and subsequently russia into europe. that was a missed opportunity with dire consequences for today. said lana comes in, and we will tag team the discussion. in this book we will find some extraordinary revolutions. very first document in the book -- that's how we started 1983. they were the men of the year, facing away from each other and drop-off in reagan. said lana come. question,

the first document in the book has the iron lady at the center of it and this is a dinner party at 10 downing street with margaret thatcher, gorbachev. at the far end, roger braithwaite was going to be ambassador, across from gorbachev and maggie are their respective houses -- spouses. calls him charming, a different kind of russian. really interesting discussion. you can read it for yourself, we've also posted on the website today as part of a web package celebrating this event. but a key moment happens between maggie at camp david, and

gorbachev as the leader. of -- manythe death of you have heard the great soviet joke, he dies, he goes to heaven. there is an interminable meeting. in the front row are his predecessors. they look at him and say, what are you doing here? who is the new general secretary? gorbachev? who is supporting him? nobody. you can walk by himself. -- he can walk by himself. you see ronald reagan's first gorbachev,etter to he has this wonderful phrase, common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. march 11, 1985.

from the beginning, this extraordinary theme. in our book we will find reag an's memo to himself going into the geneva summit that fall. some people would sign a deal they can get. how fine a deal if it's in our interest? it's his own thoughts to himself. it is just been to classify the last few years. it is an extraordinary insight into reagan's mind. for more complex than i think people will give reagan credit for. the geneva summit, the significance really was that court statement that they finally agreed on. reagan had refused to do the usual draft statement beforehand. he wanted to talk to gorbachev. at the end they agree on a statement, nuclear war can never be one, should never be fought.

we give you soviet and american versions of these conversations and practically verbatim, they divisive this core issue of strategic missile defense. it was reagan's dream, a shield, insurance policy enrolled in which nuclear weapons has been abolished to keep the mad men from blowing anything up to her but shortsighted it was his worst nightmare, first strike from space. that hands are things coming over the border except they are laser beams from satellites. theirhose visions had issues. but that's what they came to, i kind of -- already at geneva, that. to disagree on not really a way for it except this condemnation of nuclear war

and a wonderful dinner toast we show. this is in geneva at the fireplace, the great fireplace, set up by that. not really a reagan's advanced team. can see a certain affability and charm, the first meeting they had at geneva was scheduled for 15 minutes. an hour, with just the interpreters because they each had a lot to say. they had a lot to say and the eight spaced up and down outside. aides paced up and down outside. they had interpreters, no takers. genevaal take away from is in stark of trust flashed between them. it became a key entrances from gorbachev's abolition program. it led the road to reykjavik. if wehev understands even

disarm tomorrow, those guys wouldn't attack. reagan wouldn't push the button. he is an abolitionist. this is the reduction of the sense of threat. the other side will not attack. why do you need all the bombs and missiles and defenses and even your own security system? .hat's the way to reykjavik that's dinner at geneva. you can see nancy sitting over there, done reagan the chief of staff, the deputy foreign minister. that might even be richard perle at the end. a spark of trust. here at reykjavik, the beginning of the final session. this is the moment gorbachev later describes, full of shakespearean passions. they go in full of hope, reagan stretched his trip longer than planned, to let's maybe make a deal. reaganthis session,

says, i when his mind if we eliminated all nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapons. scholz says, let's do it. gorbachev says, let's do it. we have a picture in this book of that left session. gorbachev says, we can do that. let's do it. then they come to an impasse over defense, strategic defense initiative. the amazing thing at reykjavik, reykjavik. of they were feeling like that. look at the man ronald reagan. come on, don't you want -- don't you want to make a deal here? reykjavik. they were feeling like that. looking on in the middle, what's going on here? gorbachev came to realize -- first he said, we are at a higher level of discussion. we are at a higher level. we're getting close. but it was only later when the contractor took away some of the and reagan'sdes

own approval ratings, gorbachev begins to realize that in fact we may have been in a new higher level and reykjavik but that was as high as the americans were going to go. and so that's sort of put the challenge back onto the soviet side. so there is this enormous excitement inside. reykjavik. they felt they were stuck. to understand this relationship that we are trying to figure out and explain, looking at these conversations, it is important crucial thed how idea of nuclear abolition was. they believed it was possible.

and around them, very few key advisors who shared their views. another general administrations on -- but not the general administrations on either side. he for the first time realized that reagan might be open to the idea of a total abolition of nuclear weapons. so he came up with a proposal to a polish nuclear weapons in 10 years -- abolish nuclear weapons in 10 years. the letter that he said was not answered for over a month. came to the conclusion that the united states had dismissed, not even consider his proposal seriously. reagan took itt

beginning.rom the there is a comprehensive discussion within the administration. they sent high-level envoys to european allies and asian allies, and after that discussion, they decided the administration simply was not ready to accept gorbachev's proposal. gorbachev kept pushing. as tom just talked about reykjavik, this was the fleeting moment, this major meeting of where they came so close to signing an actual , and theyagreements were not able to make one final step. in a way, gorbachev had more to have justhe couldn't said to reagan, ok, let's write it down. child, reykjavik was

just the next step. coming back home, he believed now they will push with new energy. and because reagan himself was committed to abolition, they could use reykjavik as a stepping stone. as high as the american side would go. and with this profound disappointment, with this profound sense of almost achievement, but then major failure, the soviets decided that they would take a step that the americans were suggesting. it would separate the package. they would de-link the strategic arms control, strategic defenses, the star wars discussion, and inf, intermediate nuclear weapons in europe.

it was very difficult to do wasuse the soviet military very committed to this linkage. it was a traditional soviet approach. and yet, during 1987, moving to washington -- through all 1987, they did not know yet if they would be able to meet in washington in december and sign it. there were very intense negotiations. during the key negotiations in april, schultz pushed gorbachev for more and more concessions. specifically he asked that the soviets include new, highly technological missiles that the military were very proud of, and was just recently deployed.

it was not required to be destroyed because the treaty would cover the missiles starting with 500 kilometers. scholz basically said to gorbachev that if you do not include dismissal in the treaty, because we dispute its range, there would be no treaty. gorbachev complained that he had to do all these concessions, that the soviets as a result have to cut twice more missiles than the united states, to which scholz replied, i'm waiting for you. but essentially gorbachev made that concession. he made it behind the back of the military. the military had to be persuaded , or forced into accepting this treaty. the soviet leadership most of the year.

finally, by the end of the whole 1987, all the remaining treaties were resolved, and gorbachev took his first trip to the united states. trip was anthe incredible experience. it was a miracle for the first just gorbachev, but top leadership. you can see here walking into the soviet embassy, even though two women did not really like each other, but to man at this moment are really in all of each other. they think they reached the meeting of the minds. they could negotiate on the most difficult issues. a reagan started with human rights and gorbachev for the first time was not defensive. he just said that we should not

make public statements about it. it's in our interests to resolve our human rights. they discussed and resolved a lot of issues on the human rights agenda. in regional conflicts, specifically afghanistan and central america. but even here, or which have had to make major concession. for example, on afghanistan, the position agreed earlier in 1985 at the beginning of the geneva negotiations on afghanistan was that as soon as the soviets withdraw the troops from afghanistan, both sides would stop their funding. knowing the soviets already made the decision to withdraw from afghanistan, reagan was not willing to honor that previous assurance. they discussed arms control. they signed the inf. they both wanted to move or a

quickly on start, which was there may idea, maine desired to a strategic arms by 50%. they also discussed and made a lot of improvements. four-point reagan's agenda. in addition to the public relations success the gorbachev promoting real opening of this image of the soviet he gets outhington, of the car and the folks at the of connected to talk to people on the street. moment.amazing gorbachev calls it in his invasion of

washington. but something else that's incredibly important that happens during this visit. he gets tobut something else t's incredibly important that happens during meet the future president of the united states. and on the drive to the airport on december 11, they had a conversation, which for both of them became, as gorbachev called it, the secret password, or secret handshake. themthey talked about what theye going to do together if bush is elected president of the united states, which bush felt was very likely. this conversation is so candid that neither of the sides ever published it in full. we have to put together this conversation from different sources, piece it together and translate it in the book. they discussed entire spectrum of questions, our central, eeting wheresh's m

he says, he's a really good leader of poland. what to do with north korea. toldain thing that bush gorbachev was that he would pick up quickly, he's on the same wavelength that gave gorbachev the impression, that if bush becomes president of the united states, progress would be really quick on the same agenda that they achieve. however, reagan is still president. achieve still trying to the start of the strategic arms control treaty well reagan is in office. reagan have elf and secretary of thee scholz believed that treaty was achievable. that spring of 1988 is a wonderful flourishing of every possible contact between the soviet side and american side. it is the military to military

negotiation. starts ainistry special desk, opens a special desk going with human rights and humanitarian issues in close cooperation with the united states. finally, reagan convinced to come to moscow. initially, the idea was that reagan would come to moscow to sign the start treaty, that did not work because the inf ratification in washington took much longer and was much more difficult for the reagan administration to achieve. but, they decided to have the summit anyway. reagan comes to moscow, and according to reagan, it was his favorite summit. even though not much of the substance was achieved, in terms of human factor, the

summit was a success. again, they discussed regional issues. they discussed human rights. start, butated on both of them already understood it would not be signed. if reagan achieved issues, he achieved things that were very important for him. and those things were in the sphere of humanitarian issues. and probably the summit accomplished probably more than any other summit in terms of human rights. reagan metsummit, with religious leaders and was ine to visit a monastery moscow where he had conversations with monks. he also met with dissidents. -- he and members of his delegation had no restrictions at all in terms of who they wanted to meet, where they wanted to go, what they

wanted to do, and probably a highlight of that summit is the picture where reagan is thevering a major speech, best speech of the summit, at moscow's state university. right behind him is a huge bust of lenin. if you are looking at reagan, there is lenin looking over him. with approval,moscow's state un. right behind him obviously. [laughter] he speaks about friendship between people, he speaks about democracy, he sees about human rights. i was actually very lucky to be in that audience. i'm sitting right there, the first row in a very light pink dress. right in front of reagan. we were -- everybody who was there fell the cold war was over. of course it was over. we saw this elder statesman who spoke about things that were very clear to us, and dear to

us, and we were part of the conversation that we were having. we thought a guy who is speaking in front of us will never push the button. it was very clear. confirmed that our impressions were right, because the next day on the red square, he confirmed that our impressions proclaimed the colds another time, another era. and he said that the credit for ending the cold war belongs to gorbachev. reagan was euphoric in his descriptions of the moscow summit. and gorbachev was a little frustrated. because he felt that this is all good and america saw the soviet union and american presidents, the soviet people -- and yet all the major goals were beyond reach. and after the summit, when they looked back and analyze the results, a head of the institute

of u.s. and canada, a real major factor throughout the last 20 years, wrote gorbachev a long memo in which it said, we can only achieve progress with the next administration. we cannot do anything else with this administration because of the electoral campaign in the united states. but, we can count on very quick progress with the next administration. but, only if we make a major new breakthrough proposal on arms control. is adjustedally that gorbachev should come up with a breakthrough proposal, including unilateral concessions unconventional arms in europe. -- on conventional arms in europe. >> that's the basis that gorbachev comes to new york for what was the shortest of the summits, the governors island

summit, right after he gave a speech at the united nations announcing 500,000 troops coming out of europe, unilateral cuts, foreign policy not based on the class struggle anymore. byeted with applause everyone at "the new york times." signagling the end of the cold war. what's amazing about the governors island summit transcripts is that reagan and bush seemed not to have notice. in the transcripts, you have bush saying to gorbachev, gosh, the room was full at the u.n. the room was full. you got great applause. that was it. gorbachev's doing, according to the notes of his preparatory was trying tohe do at that speech was to create, make an anti-fulton speech. wanted to show, cold war is

over, arms race in reverse. we will take care of those conventional forces that make you so worried in europe. we can do that. and the transcripts of governors island show they didn't really know this. and bush himself holds back. here at the luncheon, at the comment that house on governor's island -- we have a bunch of other photographs that show the huge mob the huge mambo press, the three famous photos of them in front of the statue of liberty and so forth. but we love this picture because here's gorbachev trying to engage george bush. he has been elected president. he saying, come on come away in here. and bush wouldn't -- endless, nope. wouldn't be pretty. and he doesn't engage. and bush, nope. wouldn't be prudent. he doesn't engage.

of documentedries meetings. the basics are pretty straightforward. the bush administration was a hostile takeover from the reagan administration. they throughout the priors. they brought in people who thought reagan had gone way too far with this arms-control star -- stuff and the embrace of gorbachev. one of the first must do president bush is "getting ahead of gorbachev." whole thing is about how the rest of the world thinks that he is way ahead of us. even here in america, there is bgorbie mania.

the sense of anxiety and insecurity, the cause in early 1989, it isn't until bush goes to eastern europe in the summer of 1989, polish elections have already happened. there are about to have a coalition government. the hungarians are in negotiations. .he already took down barb wire it's an extra nearing moment in time. but it is until he is meeting with these folks and he's telling them meet with gorbachev . finally on the airplane back, bush right gorbachev a letter. we have it in the book and inviting him to a summit because things could get out of hand with all these changes. we should meet and talk about how to make things calm. but they can't get it scheduled until december. by that time, the entire stalinist system in eastern europe as practically vanished. we argue in masterpieces and we

can show more evidence here that come in effect, the pause created a vacuum between the superpowers. it wasn't a lot going on. and into this vacuum rushed the eastern europeans. that was probably a good thing. that brings us to the meeting they finally did have, which is at malta. it's fascinating. we have a picture of what the arrangement was going to be like. a soviet cruiser and an american cruiser. bush was a navy guy. go back-and-forth. except the winter storms played havoc and forced them to the ship that was tied to the dock, which was the soviet cruise liner. had all theirhey meetings, including their press conferences and all of bush's aides were worrying the sea sickness patch. the fascinating thing about -- in-- and this is where

the american accounts, this is the end of the cold war. . bush finally realizes that the war is over and he meets go rich of firsthand -- meets gorbachev firsthand. again, going to the missed opportunities thing was everything was on the table. the soviets said let's get rid of tactical weapons on navy ships. a memo sayinghad don't even raise nuclear arms control. that's totally off the table. by 1991, we would be desperately raising new bear arms because it is in our national security interests. many examples at malta. there is a myth that multi-was the beginning of brilliant on german youth occasion. you can't expect us to disrepute german to disapprove of

unification. there are a lot of promises. we publish them in masterpieces and here. the assurances for the soviets and gorbachev through the spring of 1990 and all the way to the unification of human -- of .ermany you can see the documents here. the helsinki process will be the key of a new structure for europe. you can see the documents here. we will do nothing that will jeopardize soviet security interests. we will not take advantage of these changes, nor should you. all of these were in effect informal promises, whether or not gorbachev got them in writing. they had the desired effect. a really reassure the soviets during a time of dramatic change , who hadhelmet coal

the deep pockets. mut says to george, you need to give financial aid to the soviet union. it may be the best thing you can do. no, we have a little recession happening here. besides, you've got the deep pockets. the drama towards a washington summit is captured by the episode at camp david were bush is tried to teach gorbachev to drive the golf cart. you see the expression of the great concern in the backseat. as is gorby's first time at the wheel. the washington summit had its moments. it was the turning point on germany. that would come later in the summer. the washington summit had its

own drama because here was this -- gore shot of 1 -- gorbachev wanted the trade deal but bush said we can't give you most favored nations. this is may-june, 1990. the hypocrisy is that we kept most favored nations for china despite tenements where -- .espite tiananmen square toally, gorbachev gets bush understand that he's got to come back with something and bush says, ok, we will do the trade deal. the other piece of the drama was -- it's captured in this picture, which is -- you may notice the interpreter has stuck his notebook behind his belt in his back. this is the bio weapons demarche. we have a lot of the follow-up that is in this book. but no notes were taken on this moment, but it is bush telling gorbachev you go bio weapons.

either you are young -- it are you are lying to us or your people are lying to you. great moment. very tense moment. think, of the dynamic at the washington summit going forward, it wasn't the key to german unification. the by having both a soviet accounts and the american accounts, you see this extraordinary interactive quality. now we have both hands clapping. after the washington summit though, that summer, everything changed. and that is the endgame. as we know, in early august,

1990, saddam hussein invaded kuwait. , -- n baker at -- and baker were meeting in the [indiscernible] when the first news reached the soviet foreign minister in the secretary of state, they were a nut or disbelieve. there security services assured them on both sides that this was not going to happen. that it was very unlikely to happen. they made theen joint statement, the u.s.-soviet joint statement, condemning the invasion and demanding that saddam withdraw his shoes from kuwait, was the day that baker "to the daymemoirs the cold war ended." i would still go with may 1,

1988. calls this the day the cold war ended. because the soviet union decided to back of the united states against its ally in the middle , one a very important ally of the few third world allies that was paying its debts and was actually employing about 5000 socially -- 5000 civilian soviet specialists. it was difficult for gorbachev to actually commit to support the united states. the foreign minister was in an upper or. the soviet union had an cohortshed, respected who are saying, if you're going to go with the united states against iraq in this area, we will lose every piece of lasting influence we have in the middle east.

you will be squeezed out of the middle east and you will never play an important role again. but there were a couple of things that were very important for gorbachev. force in was no use of international relations. he was committed deeply in his soul to no use of force. use of force is not a resolution domestically or international. so as long as he could be assured that force will not be try to arriveould at a resolution without the use of force, he was willing to back the united states. also, he saw this joint resolution and joint action with the united states as punishing the use of force in the middle east. of course, submitted by saddam hussein. the second concern the gorbachev was that, out of this

crisis, if the superpowers worked together, worked cooperatively and brought their allies to the table, they could in some low to medium term received -- developed a solution for the middle east. so it was coming to a assibility to achieve conference of solution, not just in iraq and co. eight, but kuwait arabs -- iraq and , but between arabs and israel. third priority, which played a very important role during negotiations during the iraqi invasion of kuwait was the cooperation with the united states. it finally made gorbachev decide against his own specialists that he would support the united states.

fromperiod of time, august, from the invasion through the beginning of the aerial campaign and on the is a unique moment where you can see where real partnership could have emerged. but it did not emerge to the extent that did the soviets wanted it or believed was possible. when bush and gore start -- oh, yeah, right here. for bush and gorbachev meet a very brief meeting, a brief summit in september 1990, bush assurance,possible every possible kind of piece of gorbachev ifell only you help us here in the persian gulf, then a lot of major, big, new things are

possible. a totally new world is possible to a world of partnership. and now to put all my cards on the table, i would like to say the following. the coldg time during war, the u.s. policy was that the soviet union should not play any role in the united -- in the middle east. he says to gorbachev i want to assure you that the former u.s. position of the soviet union's position in the middle east has changed. the order i hope can be created after this possibility presupposes that there would be more cooperative efforts in the middle east. the talk of partnership is the mouthainly out of asthe united states presence well as numerous assurances to gorbachev that bush is not willing to use force, does not want to use force, that the goal

of the united states is to not to use force, but to resolve this conflict collaboratively and exactly sides that the soviet participation in this effort would allow them to reach a peaceful resolution through the united nations. he also gives a lot of assurances about the future trade relations between the soviet union and the united partnership,ys partnership, partnership, partnership all the time. take itv does not just and believes it. he has his doubts because a lot of his advisers were saying, really, the united states is considering these of force and we should not just take their word for it. envoy to theis own middle east, his advisor in the future, who became foreign

minister of russia. but he was a career arabist. gorbachev goes to europe to try to build a coalition to get saddam to withdraw troops from kuwait, but without the use of force. here is one little analogy to what happens, i think, on on nato extensions. there are lots of assurances given orally. you can see them in the transcripts of their conversation about nonuse of force, about future partnership in the middle east, about the -- middledle list east conference. the american side is unwilling to put any of them on paper. but the conversation is at such a level of cordiality that it's hard for gover job -- for gorbachev to say this sounds

very nice, let's write it down and this will be the official agreement that will be published. that never happened. memoirs and early internal discussions in the administration that president bush was considering the use of force from the very first day. and in his own memoirs, he says i was ready to use force. i was impatient. from day one, i believe this situation would not be resolved without the use of force during in one way you can describe the cooperation in the middle east as a true partnership and revision of the entire experience of the cold war where the two sides tried to push the other out of the middle east. now they wanted both to resolve this problem. the united states realized they could not resolve it without the soviet union. hand, there is

clearly another -- and element of manipulation because the united states needed the soviet the passage ofe the use of force resolution in the united states -- united 678.ns resolution now we come to a gorbachev probably wanted most. this is the summit that launch the charter of europe, which led to institutionalization of osc. going to the summit, the idea and atrbachev promoted different points, different european leaders were really committed to this idea. coming european home, the idea of building new security structures on the bases bynato and the warsaw pact blending these security structures into a completely new

european selected security framework that would fully integrate russia. however, by the time they get a genesee death germany is unify and it is unified in nato and you european coming home is no longer an idea that is acceptable to washington, but even to the europeans because thethey are thinking about deeper european integration, vertical integration, rather than bringing in the so you union. lothe summit, even though a less said about the future of europe, the key discussion centered around the persian gulf. in dixie conversation -- in a key conversation we are publishing in our book, one that did not publish completely and we had to find ways to find parts of this conversation, bush makes essentially a private plea

to gorbachev, even saying, you know, if we commit to this, we don't have to inform our press about it. . need your help he says i need your help on this issue. we must push for u.s. -- you and resolution, which would sanction necessary measures, i.e. use of force, so we can persuade saddam hussein that he must comply. i don't want use of force, we just need the resolution to put pressure on saddam hussein. what's interesting, november 19 until the beginning of the aerial container, there are no more conversation between them. even though the previous two months, they were in constant contact and there were all kinds of envoys going back-and-forth. gave hisorbachev commitment and the resolution was passed, he felt he was no longer needed. in januaryy, even

1991 to still negotiate some outcome for iraq to withdraw forces over a period of time that would not require a use of force. but the united states was successful in building the coalition in europe, which andpted the use of force gorbachev efforts to him was very bitter because he felt this experience of new partnership and building a new world began ,ith a collective use of force exactly what he was hoping would not be part of this new world. we have very little time left. we are moving to the end of our book. in the end of their summit.

in 1991, after the persian gulf crisis was resolved and germany was unified and the warsaw pact broke apart, the situation under which both countries find themselves has changed so dramatically. ofh bush and the rich realize the cold -- both bush and gorbachev realize the cold war has ended. say, the cold war stereotypes kept living probably to. longer than they needed even on the u.s. side, there is understanding now on the part of top leaders in the u.s. administration that gorbachev that a lot could be accomplished with the soviet union. but time is running out.

on the one hand, gorbachev and the soviet leadership were willing to go very far in arms control with the human rights agenda. by the time it was already resolved, they were willing to corporate with the united states on every regional conflict there was. dreams was toev's resolve the u.s. conflict with cuba. he wanted to become an interlocutory between castro and bush. the one hand, you have this willingness to partner and practically in any resolution on any major issues in international relations. on the other hand, you have gorbachev declining ability to deliver because the soviet now beginning the tailspin. the winter of 1991 was the worst winter in terms of the food situation.

and the only people willing to provide assistance with the germans. the germans were very grateful. a major european pack is with loans to join financial institutions during the summit of the big seven in london in the summer of 1991. only will will will

this would be the condition for us, providing you any loans series of economic reform packages, financial reform. but of course, they did not go far enough in the judgment of the us side. in the u.s. economy was not doing great. it was going into recession in the country was becoming more and more inward looking. and guess what, in 1992, bush knew that the next election was coming and four aid was not a popular subject. of 1991, early summer providing the soviets with loans or negotiating with the europeans,

he is actually trying to work against the possibility of a financial package at g7 in london. he is speaking with european leaders saying this is premature. we should not rush and offer the soviets any financial package before they reform their economy as a free market economy. they soughtt part, as they could really not reform their economy without major financial assistance in form of loans they were willing to repeat in the west. in london, they said we need assistance now.

we are reforming the soviet union. is a different entity. we have these comprehensive reform plans. he brought his economists with him. ,e reformed our foreign policy partnering with the west and the united states and all these issues, including arms control. we need your help now. and he comes home empty-handed. are you and you behind the europeans on helping the soviets and therefore the package never so the last formal

superpower summit happens at the end of july of 1991. and the major result of that summit is finally the united states and the soviet union sign the spartan agreement -- the smart agreement. the direction, the conversations of that agreement, when bush comes to moscow, where he then proceeds to key of destiny key kiev.proceeds to partners talk like about global issues and regional issues. they look at the next resin of arms control. the soviets raise the issue of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, naval arms control, conventional weapons.

they talk about creating structures for the new world where the united states and the soviet union would be security guarantors for the entire world. but at the same time, the soviet very itself is in a precarious state. day before bush comes to moscow, finish union treatyhe new and it was supposed to be signed on august 19. you can see from the conversations that the u.s. wereations, all of them, strongly in favor of keeping the soviet union together. and schoolcraft agreed that, if the soviet union starts disintegrating, you can have a yugoslavia across 11 time zones with nuclear weapons. was security of

nuclear weapons, possibility of , 14l war between republics of which had tactical nuclear weapons and for which had weapons. nuclear it was a danger situation. in addition to that, they looked at the nationalist movements in the republic. those nationalist movements often did not look like the most democratic movements you wanted to imagine. here, on the other hand, was tested and proven gorbachev who is trying to transform his country and a new voluntary association of states based on democratic elections and based on no use of force internally. finallyway, the summit achieved what reagan anger butchart -- reagan and gorbachev wanted to achieve from the very beginning.

when the american delegation leaves and they go to kiev, and we all remember the chicken kiev speeds, but try reading the speech. the speech is not so bad if you look at it now. against inciting nationalism. georgia, notng of ukraine, when he used those words. gorbachevr the son of goes on vacation, and when he comes back, the conservative coup happens on august 18, the day before signing of the union treaty, the people whom gorbachev brought to power himself are trying to depose him . for chili for him, his rival, , comes to lead the

democratic resistance in moscow, mainly in moscow. because throughout the country, if you looked at that, people were not sure on which side they were. but moscow and major cities were of course appalled by this attempt to take power away from the more and restore this coupian system undermines any last hope that gorbachev had to create this new union treaty. of course, if you look at the fall of 1991, there are still take place, that like the humanitarian conference in moscow, which the soviets were trying to put together beginning in 1986. awaited the much

conference in the middle east bush gorbachev meets with for the last time. and then they look at what they accomplish together and the missed opportunities. again, this incredible meeting of the minds. but at this point, the nationalist movement in every republicled in every except for care to stand and the stan ---- in character rgystan and the baltics. .hey gain momentum in the power in the beginning of december 1991, yeltsin and three litters -- three leaders of the slavic republics get together near minsk and dissolved soviet union. this talk with this last phone call.

we wrote an op-ed. the last phone call between gorbachev and bush in "the new york times." the get a sense of accomplishment and closeness and missed opportunities in that phone call. one of the reasons we call the book the last superpower summit is basically because there is no superpower anymore. marineically because the these conversations, we have a feeling that these were the last kind, theons of that experience of this incredible, even unfulfilled, but still incredible partnership between the united states and russia. i guess there are lessons that we would like to learn from that. [laughter] >> right. thank you very much. [applause] a preliminaryo as

question. -- thebrief word evidence. perhaps just the most difficult part in piecing together the evidence. the evidence had to come from both sides. we couldn't just rely on one side. if you compare the soviet and the american documents, there were lots of parts of those conversations that at least one of the sides did not want to become public. and in that case, went to the other side for the missing part or we would have a document on one side and then bring it to, say, the reagan library or the bush library and say we have these documents on the soviet side and why don't you declassified? >>p it took 10 years. in theo the same thing

soviet union. we were very lucky because the fullity advisers gave us access for a long time to all the collections of the gorbachev foundation and we were able to compare and translate your best translate. >> one caveat on that point. one of the things most remarkable about having both versions of the conversations is how congruent -- there are very few moments were either side ever gets it wrong. there is a moment in malta where condoleezza rice is the notetaker and gets wrong what gorbachev is saying about national security. congruent.e very when you move to the one-on-one, the note taker would be brent stoke off. even go to the bush library and look at the yellow legal notes where his eligible scratches have been turned into minimal

than cons. you put that together with anatoly ciaran i have and there are allusions in the paragraphs. there's not a contradiction subsequently. but historians will find much che to work out out of skokov.han bush talks a little bit and ,he parts that are redacted bush comes back and says what about chevron? can't we make a deal? on chevron? course, it is always

redacted. [laughter] >> and this is before rex tillerson. [laughter] >> if you can bring to a sharp focus the way these documents and your analysis of them change our current understanding of this period. frame this historiographic way -- historiographically. >> we are going to have another session. >> two minutes. >> the simple as way to put it is we had an outpouring of triumphant literature in this country that was extraordinarily american centric. we were the heroes of german unification. as if we were the ones who wisely saw that we should all

tactical nuclear weapons off of our navy ships in september 91. what the book does is restores agency to the other side in that in an interactive way and says, no, wait a second, these things were on the table here, years earlier. i think addressing the historiography, there is the popular narrative and this is an extraordinary corrective because it removes that one-sided approach. the question is getting this down from 150 pages to 140 characters. [laughter] level, i thinker we fit into a more complicated and more nuanced take sure, for example, of gorbachev. he is either portrayed as the naive who bargained away the soviet empire or the iron fist in the iron glove. it's a very interesting and sophisticated vision. for both reagan and bush, we are

hard on bush because he comes laced -- late to the arms race in reverse. we tend to be may be more appreciative of reagan because he was an abolitionist from the get-go and this seems to have hadwe real impact on the soviet side, reducing some threat. but that's a different story, i think, than what even the scholars are telling about either reagan or bush. open this up.ill the rules are simple. wait for the microphone to reach you. please use the microphone when you get it. identify yourself as well. a hand appear on the right and then we will move to the other side. a hand up here on the right and then we will move to the other side. hour.nk you for a superb gorbachev'sed rejection of violence and you

chose not to talk about the baltics. combining those two in february 1991, you will recall the intent to have a summit, which doesn't take place. these, would you explain for us this mystery about gorbachev and violence. .> it's a great question let me start with a general statement that gorbachev consistently, throughout every document, domestic conversations, which we have a of discussions with his closest supporters or conversations with international leaders consistently, consistently, of course, violence and every point is against it. on the baltics and the other issue to mention is, of course, the violent suppression of

demonstrations in georgia in april 1989. gorbachev was out of the country. by now, it is more or less demonstrated that it was actually done in a way to get it done before he comes back to the country by the military. baltics, it is a more complicated question. you have to look at the context after actually giving a warning to bush, saying i'm going to do some harsh administrative measures. gorbachev brings the power conservatives and pushes away people like [indiscernible] strengthens the influence of the military and the decision-making. the kgb starts relying more on then given byce his closest people.

another resigns. so in this context, you have several interested -- several instances of use of violence in the baltics. as far as i can see from the documents i have seen and i have not seen all of them, but i've seen a lot, there is not an instance, not even the hardliners ever showed any proof that gorbachev actually approved the takeover. saying, oh,ho are of course, we consulted with him, they never showed a piece .f proof his fault, i think, after violence was used, he did not immediately, publicly fire them and dissociate itself from that. to me, the proof that works for of, whenw that turning

he found out about the january events, he rode a resignation letter to gorbachev. i am ashamed. i can't believe you are allowed to do it. memoirs and in his i interviewed him personally. he says after talking to people who actually knew how things he wasveloping, eventually convince the gorbachev did not approve it. he was faced with a fit of -- set upnd his au complit andt did not denounce it. >> it will be fantastic to chew through your analysis in these records. i have a specific question about

something we talked about 10 or 15 or 20 years ago but you did not mention in your presentation. this is for both of you. it goes back to reagan and a few weeks before. at a fewreykjavik weeks before. i was struck from the moment it took place, at reykjavik, gorbachev erased 40 years of soviet policy, going back to overt rejections to plan the european debate of national and true, objecting to intrusive inspection verification of soviet territory. this had been hinted at in negotiations at stockholm a few weeks earlier. so my question is did you gain any insight into how the soviets

-- and was in a top-down gorbachev decision -- decided to make such a crucial change in decades of soviet policy that was a prerequisite for all the subsequent progress. efforts on, did the americans understand that this is going to be happening at reykjavik? from all appearances, they were blindsided and suddenly you had military figures in, wait a accept if they requirements of inspecting them, they will want to inspect us. so the u.s. starts pulling back. on this particular issue, i think we have a [indiscernible] to think, the chief of general staff. inspection in anywhere and anytime without

notice. he was a proponent within the military establishment. , 1986-1997, --e 1986-1987, the military was behind gorbachev. the formal change of position only comes at the end of march 1987. son reykjavik -- so interactive in reykjavik, they have the possibility. then the tables turn completely. from that time on, it is the soviets a push americans on verification. at one point in 1988, gorbachev said we offered all this verification and we see so much resistance from you. was all of your insistence a bluff? >> and it was. [laughter]

expectations that the soviets would never agree to such invasive inspections. success of the -- the hold up on the start treaty was really all about the u.s. navy refusing to let soviets on board. soone point, gorbachev social sin early spring 1988, what, is it because you are a marine that you are not going to let us on your navy ships? i think is a huge matter. line moste interesting thing about reykjavik is what if? document about

reykjavik, about a page long. it shows how poor we are at ridiculous the service might do. [laughter] ambitious agreement. what's fascinating is the great what if. if gorbachev said, ok, ronnie, sharingserious about your sdi, i would not have been it -- have been in favor of star wars if i wouldn't share. what if gorbachev just said, ok, sign this little piece of paper. you're going to share sdi with this piece ofsign paper to allow testing on star wars. bothhe stubbornness going

ways cap of them from believing each other. there is a wonderful quote in the reykjavik transcript where reagan says it again, for the 20th time, and norwich have says , but you won't even share equipmentanaged dairy with us. how are you going to share this high tech stuff with us? [laughter] .ot quite they would have won the nobel prize and reagan might have been impeached. , but not by the democrats. [laughter] >> the real what if, as we was not, at the time ok share it with us. let's jointly develop it. would have said sure. >> that was the missed

opportunity. >> in front. different venue or different time, shot of lose a income of vision of kuwait, gulf war, peaceful wants to see outcomes. i would have thought there in thee ben pressure soviet usion to be a part of the military outcome. basel.as in the u.s. the united states proposed that the soviet union send its own military to the gulf of it as a bay. theets were against political leadership.

brought troopsst back from a skin a stand. they didn't want any more engagement. -- from afghanistan. they didn't want any more engagement. >> up here. you.ank the popular believe in this country is at the cold war ended because gorbachev was convinced that the soviet union could not compete with sdi and american military developments and such and basically gave up. i was wondering how we can get your alternative facts out to the public. [laughter] .> we're trying we don't have the gift of consision. in the scholarly community goings a lot of ferment

on. evien -- ringing evidence from the other side so we are not so blind center. in text books today, they quote things like who's responsible for these changes and reagan says gorbachev, of course. in this country, it's reagan. it's a long-term effort. theory as anntire organization is you put the evidence out there. people will make of it what they will. job is to partly popularize it, publish it on the web, get it out in academic context,

hopefully get it adopted as a book. our publisher has ari told us, for the paperback, they are splitting it into two volumes. [laughter] in the soviet union originally and now in russia, the public believe that the conspiracyes as a worked hard and long to bring down the soviet union, especially with the bush administration. evide tou bring thence public and say, look, they tried to keep it together as much as they could? the back. i'm a retired u.s. officer.

since we brought up afghanistan, how much did afghanistan weigh on lord's mindset and in the soviet union in general? >> immense burden. when the rich of comes the power on his little -- when gorbachev comes to power on his little list of priorities, number one was bring back the troops. theas clear even to pre-gorbachev -- leadership that they had to end the war. they were not going to win. it was one of the top three subject on the politburo. incredible split in the country over what to do, the admission of failure, how to integrate soldiers coming back into russia.

-- theire user force in entire use of force and foreign policy was impacted by afghanistan. estimate the weight on that issue. >> one more question. right in front. back to evidence, is there any -- what's missing? documents that don't exist but should? you can never know what you don't know. of everything you know, what have th himat to you couldn't find or reconstr

uct? the reports. was an avid consumer and he sent questions back and it would be interesting to see the he isels between what told in the presence brief that morning and what he says in the summit meetings or in the phone calls. my vet is there is far more in relationship there. on the soviet side, as gorbachev becomes more dependent on creech about, what was he saying either domestic opposition or international support or lack thereof? a's really made gorbachev more suspicious person and less trusting of the people. those are two big missing categories. we do include a lot of the top

aides' memos. bakern see the impact of chernayov on gorbachev. you have some fascinating dynamic at the aides leverl. -- level. there were a few incredible moments in these conversations, the limousine with bush in 1987 .hat she had to reconstruct

the put those together and you are pretty close. one question that is still a mystery to me and that i would not be able to give an answer is biological weapons. what did gorbachev know? who knew? note, i have to draw to a close. this is only the fist session. we have 13 more to go. week -- fast food, civil rights, the post king years. my thanks to our participants today. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute,

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