on communist propaganda. after that, the use of u.s. jazz musicians to foster diplomacy in africa. next, a panel of historians talk about the cold war supplements between the united states and ussr from 1985 to 1981, using classified docume documents, they explore american and soviet perspectives on arms limitations and diplomacy. they also debate when the cold war actually ended. the woodrow wilson center hosted this event. it's an hour and a half. >> i'm very glad to have the opportunity to introduce our two distinguished historians. skaya is director of russian programs and tom is the executive director at the national security archive at

gwu. they won the 2011 prize from the society for historians of american foreign relations for their book, "masterpieces of history, the peaceful end of the cold war in europe" 1989 publ h publishpublish ed by the european university press. they have co-authored more than three dozen electronic briefing books on cold war supplements, disside dissidents, flash points and lega legacies. svetlana graduated from moscow state university and earned her ph.d. at emory university. tom is a graduate of harvard university and won the 2004 emmy award for news and documentary research. i would just like to point out that this magnificent book, "the

last super power supplements" has absolutely beautiful color pla plates. this is impossible with american university presses, so go to hungary to have your book. >> i just want to say an informs thank you to eric and to roger and to the american historical association and to the wilson center. this is an alexander institution y'all have built over many many years, in a world that is struggling with its alternative facts, a forum that deals with historical context is needed now more than ever. i'm really proud to be here. i want to give kudos also to svetlana who really led this process of gathering data back to the early 1990s. in fact, svetlana brought our

pru manuscript up to 3,000 pages and then cut to a thousand or so due to herculean labors by our series editor, malcolm burns with us today and a huge thank you to central university press for letting us dig out the high-reslution photographs from the bush libraries and her own collection to tell the story into photo es. i should say that we're very much looking forward to the trump-putin supplements. this is not them but this is how the last two occupants thought about each other. we're betting about 140 characters per tweet, the book will be significantly shorter. our publishers will be happy about that. we're really here to talk about really two main points. the biggest theme of the book is really in the title, which is

"conversations that ended the cold war." we argue in the essays and head notes and i think the documents, we provide them to you so you can judge for yourself, bear this out, these meetings starting in geneva in 1985 and going all the way through to madrid in 1991, as the soviet union was about to collapse created an extraordinary learning process on both sides that dramatically ended everybody else's sense of threat and at the same time, ended the cold war. the other major thing of this book, the conversations featured so many cold war hangovers and suspicions and misconceptions, that a plethora of opportunities were missed that made our world more dangerous today. we lay out several categories, one major one, arms control. we argue in the book and showing

documents george bush came around to the arms race in reverse by 1971 but on the table as early as 1988. would have made it a lot shorter and the like. we argue there was an extraordinary partnership dealing with major crisis, not the least dealing with the first gulf war but settling regional conflicts. case number one has to be the ongoing war in afghanistan that led to 9/11. i think the third area of missed opportunity we highlight in the book and essays and documents, especially full of pathos, i think, about it, the missed opportunity to integrate a democratizing soviet union into europe and subsequently russia into europe. that was a missed opportunity with dire consequences for today. i'm going first, because in the

chronological biting off these supplements, i was ill informed enough to take on geneva and rakevic. then svetlana comes in and we will tag team the discussion. in this book, you will find extraordinary revelations. the first document in the book -- that's how we started in 1983. they were the men of the year, facing away from each other, an dr andropev and reagan and had they come together would there have been an end to the cold war? maybe not. the iron lady. the dinner at 10 downing street with margaret thatcher, go gorbachev and across from them are their respective spouses.

the first document of the book is maggie at camp david in december of 1984, telling reagan about this really interesting new soviet -- he wasn't yet the leader, ans a spir rant, calls him charming, a different kind of russian, not so sensitive the way the rest of them are about human rights. you can read the discussion for yourself. we posted it on the website as part of a web package celebra celebrating this event. a key moment happens between maggie at camp david and gosh chef as the leader. that's the death of constantine children n chernanko. he dies and there are his predecess predecessors, and they look at him and say, what are you doing

here? who's the new general secretary? >> well, of course -- >> gorbachev, who's supporting him? >> nobody. he can walk by himself. [ laughter ] >> state of affairs. in the book you will see at ronald reagan's letter at his funeral, let's get to work on our quote common goal elimina eliminating nuclear weapons, mash 11th, 19 -- march 11th, 1985, this theme. you will find reagan himself going into the geneva summit that fall. some people in my administration don't want any deal and some people would sign any deal they could get. i'll shine a deal if it's in our intere interests, i should remember, don't grand stand on human

rights. fascina fascinating, his own thoughts just declassified the last few years, an extraordinary insight into ray deagareagan's mind, th of many doonsebury comic strips. far more complex than many people give ray dan feagan for. the significance was that core statement they finally agreed on. reagan refused to do the unusual draft statements at the end and he wanted to talk to gorbachev. they agreed on a statement nuclear war can never be won, never be sought. theyed a been alarmed by the reagan rhetoric beforehand. the conversations and we give you soviet and american conversations practically verbatim, they eliminate this core divisive issue of the missile definition. it was a world in which nuclear weapons had been abolished, to

keep the mad men from blowing anything up. on gosh chef's side, it's his worst nightmare. they're laser beams from satelli satellites. both those visions had their issues. already, geneva agreed to disagree on that. not a way forward except this condemnation of war and a wonderful dinner toast we show. this is in geneva at the fire place at the mason fluordoe, set up by reagan's advance team. you can see a certain affability and charm, the first meeting scheduled for 15 minutes, meet and greet get the photo taken, stretched for an hour with the interpreters because they had a lot to say. and the aides paced up and down outside, what are they doing?

what are they saying, my gosh? another footnote, one-on-one sessions at the supplements, the photos are only of the two of them but they had interpreters and note takers. the final take away is a spark of trust between them became a key of gorbachev's abolition program in 1986 and led the road as gorbachev understand s if we disband tomorrow gorbachev would not attack. >> the other side won't attack, why do you need these bombs and missiles and even your own security system. that's the way.

that's dinner. you see nancy reagan and the deputy of staff and foreign policy. i think that might be richard pearl at the end down there and clinking glasses, a spark of trust. the beginning of the final moment. they go in full of hope. reagan stretched his plan longer than planned to make a deal. reagan says, i wouldn't mind if we eliminated all nuclear weapons. gorbachev says, sure, let's do it. we have a picture. gorbachev says, we can do that. let's do it. they come to an impasse.

the amazing thing was walking out, they were like that, look at the mad ronald reagan, mike, don't you want to make a deal here and looking on in the middle, mmm-mm, what's going on here? afterwards gorbachev said we're at a new higher level of discussion, getting close to aboli abolishing. it was only later as the iran contra affair took away some of the key reagan aides and his approval ratings in late 1986 and '87, gorbachev realizes we may have had a new higher level but that was as high as the americans were ever going to go. that put the challenge on the

soviet's side. >> after this enormous excitement, they felt they were stuck. to understand this relationship where we're trying to figure out and explain, looking at these conversations, it is important to understand how key, how crucial for both gorbachev and reagan the idea of nuclear abolition was. they believed it was possible. they truly believed it was possible. around them, very few key advisors who shared their views, but not the general administrations on either side. stepping one little step back in january, 1986, after gorbachev came back from geneva, he, for the first time, realized reagan might be open to the idea of a total abolition of nuclear

weapons. so he came up requewith a propoo abolish anywhere weapons in 10 years. it was a detailed three-step proposal. however, when the letter he sent was not answered for over a month, gorbachev came to the conclusion that the united states just dismissed -- did not even consider his proposal seriously, when we now know actually, reagan took it seriously from the very beginning. there was a comprehensive discussion within the administration. they sent high level envoys to european allies and to the asian aillie allies. after that discussion, they decided the administration was not ready to accept gorbachev's proposal. gorbachev kept pushing. as tom just talked about, this

was this fleeting moment, this major meeting of the minds where they came so so close to signing an actual abolition agreement and they were not able to make one final step. in a way, gorbachev had more to lose and he could have just say to reagan, okay, let's write it down, you can test your sdi and then deal with that. but for gorbachev, reykjavik was the next step and believed now they will push with new energy because reagan himself was committed to abolition, they could use reykjavik as a st stepping stone. it was as high as the american side would go.

with this profound sense of disappointment of almost major achievement and then failure, the soviets decided they would take a step the americans were sugge suggesting. they could delink the strategic arms control, the "star wars" discussion and intermediate nuclear weapons in europe. it was very difficult to do because the soviet union was committed to the linkage, a traditional soviet approach. in 1987, moving to washington summit, actually through all of 1987 they did not know yet if they would actually be able to

meet in washington in december and sign the inf. there were very intense negotiations several times. schultz pushed gorbachev for more and more concessions and specifically, he asked the soviets include the missile in which they deployed or sr23, which technically had the range of 400 kilometers was not required to be destroyed because they included missiles of 500 kilometer range. schultz said to gorbachev, if you do not include this in the treaty because we dispute its

test and range there would be no treaty. gorbachev complained he had to do all these concessions. the soviet as a result would have to cut twice more missiles than the united states to which schultz replied, i'm weeping for you. sngly gorbachev made that concession. he made it behind the back of the military. the military had to be persuaded or forced to accepting this soviet leadership for most of the year. by the independent of 1987, all the remaining treaties were resolved and gorbachev took his first trip to the united states. you can see this trip was an incredible experience. it was when america, for the first time, saw not just gorbachev but the top leadership of the soviet union. you can see here, nancy reagan

walking -- >> into the soviet. >> into the soviet embassy, even though the two women did not really like each other. [ laughter ] >> but two men at this moment, are really in awe of each other. thy thi thy -- they think they could reach a meeting of the minds and gorbachev for the first time was not defensive. he said we should not make public statements about it. it's in our interests to resolve our human rights problems. in the summit, they discussed and resolved a lot of issues on the human rights agenda. in regional conflicts, specifically afghanistan and central america. even here, gorbachev had to make major concessions. in afghanistan, the position

agreed earlier in 1985 at the beginning of the geneva negotiations in afghanistan was that as soon as the soviet withdraw the troops from afghanistan both sides would stop their funding for the mujahadeen. now, in 1987, knowing the sov t soviets already made the decision to withdraw from afghanistan reagan was not willing to honor that previous assurance. they signed the inf and both wanted to move quickly on start, their main desired achievement to cut strategic arms by 50% by the end of the reagan administration. they also discussed and made a lot of improvements signed. this is the reagan's four point agenda. in addition to the public relation s success gorbachev

achieved with the image of the soviet union in washington. he gets out of the car at the intersection of connecticut and l and his kgb escort leaves him behind. it's an amazing moment. gorbachev calls it in his mem r memoirs orks our invasion of washington. something really important happens during this visit. he gets to meet the vice president. he gets to meet the future president of the united states. on the drive to the airport of december 11th, they had a conversation became for both of

them, gorbachev called it the secret password or secret hand shake. they talked about what they are going to do together if bush is elected president of the united states which bush felt was very likely. this conversation is so candid that neither of the sides ever published it in full. we had to put together this conversation from different sources and piece it together and it's translated in the book. they discussed entire spectrums of conversation, where they talk about a really good leader of poland and what to do with north korea. the main thing bush told gorbachev, they would pick up very quickly, he is on the same wave length, if bush becomes president of the united states,

progress would be really quick on the same agenda they achieved with reagan, however, reagan is still president and they are still trying to achieve the start of the strategic arms control treaty while reagan is in office. reagan himself and secretary of state schultz, in the beginning of 1988, believed that the start treaty is achievable. that spring of 1988 was a flourishing of every possible ta contact between the soviet side and american side and the state department negotiations. the foreign ministry starts a special desk dealing with humanitarian issues in close cooperation with the united states. finally, reagan commits to come to moscow. initially, the idea was that reagan would come to moscow to sign the start treaty.

that did not work because the inf ratification in washington took much longer and was much more difficult for the ray dan administration to achieve. but they decided to have the summit anyway. reagan comes to moscow and according to reagan, it was his favorite summit. even though he felt not much of the substance was achieved, in terms of human factor, the summit was a success. again, they discussed regional issues, they discussed human rights. they negotiated on stark but both of them already underthat it would not be signed. reagan achieved issues, he achieved things that were very important for him.

those things were in the sphere of humanitarian issues. the summit that accomplished more than any other of human rights. during the summit, reagan met with regulation leligious leade to visit a monastery in moscow, where he had conversations with monks. he also met with dissidents. he and measures of his delegation had no -- he and members of his delegation had no restrictions at all, in terms of who they wanted to meet and where they wanted to go and what they wanted to do. probably a highlight of that summit is this picture where reagan is delivering a major speech, the best speech of the summit at moscow state university. right behind him is a huge bust of lennon. if you're looking right at reagan, there's lennon looking over him with approval obviously

or he would not be standing there because he speaks about friendship between people and democracy and human rights. i was very lucky to be in that audience, i'm sitting right there in the first row in a very light pink dress. [ laughter ] >> right in front of reagan. we were -- everybody who was there thought that the cold war was over. of course, it was over. we saw this elder statesman who spoke about things that were very clear to us and dear to us and part of the conversations that we were having. we thought a guy who's speaking now in front of us will never push the button. it was very clear. actually, reagan confirmed that our impressions were right because the next day on the red square, he proclaimed that cold war was another time, another

era. he said the credited for ending the cold war was gorbachev. reagan was euphoric in description of the supplements. gorbachev was a little frustrated. he felt, yes, this is all good and america saw the soviet union and american president saw the soviet people and met with them yet all the major goals were beyond reach. after the summit, when they looked back and analyzed the results the head of the institute in canada, a really major factor throughout the last 20 years on u.s. soviet relat n relations wrote gorbachev a long memo in which he said we can only achieve quick progress with the next administration. we cannot do anything else with this administration because of the electoral campaign in the

united states. but we could count on are quick progress with the next administration but only if we make a major new break through proposal on arms control. specifically, he suggests gorbachev should come up with a breakthrough people including unilateral concessions on conventional arms in europe. >> that's the basis that gorbachev comes to new york, right after he gave a speech to the nations announcing 500 troops coming out of europe and unilateral cuts and applause by senator morn ny ham, and what's interesting is reagan and bush

seem not to have noticed. in the transcripts, you have bush saying to gorbachev, gosh, the room was full at the u.n. i saw a picture of it on tv. the room was full. you got great applause. that was it. gorbachev is doing, according to the notes of his preparatory meetings what he was trying to do at that speech was make an anti-fulton speech, referring back to winston churchill's great cold war speech. fulton in reverse. he wanted to show cold war is over, arms race is in reverse, we're there to meet you halfway. we'll take care of those conventional forces that make you so worried in europe. we can do that. the transcript says they didn't really notice. bush himself holds back, here at the luncheon at the commandant's house on governor's island. we have photographs that shows

the huge mob of press, famous photos of the three of them in front of the statute of liberty and so forth. we love this picture because gorbachev is trying to engage george bush, elected president, reaching across the table, weigh in here and bush, no, wouldn't be prudent, and he doesn't engage. it's an amazing scene because gorbachev had come with that speech to shake things up to get a roaring start with the new administration. he discovers something. he discovers we have a series of docume documents, meetings between top gorbachev advisors and ambassadors matt. in 1989. we described this at more length in our book "master pieces of history in 1989." the basics are straightforward. the bush administration was a hostile takeover from the reagan administration. they threw out the pryors and

brought in brent scowcroft who thought reagan had gone too far. one of scowcroft's earliest m o memos, the title is, getting ahead of gorbachev. the entire memo is how the rest of the world thinks he's out way ahead of us and he's more popular than we are. gorbachev mania. and make the image of u.s. policy different that it's based on long-term objectives. the sense of anxiety and security, pause. not until bush goes to eastern europe in the summer of 1989. polish elections have already happened. solidarity swept, they're about to have a coalition government. they already have taken down barbed wire on the border, an extraordinary moment in time,

not until he's already met with them, they say, meet with gorbachev, meet with gorbachev. the dissidents say it. finally on the airplane back, bush writes gorbachev a letter, we have it in the book, inviting him to a summit. things could get out of hand with these meetings and changes and we should talk about how to make things calm. they can't get to it scheduled until december and by that time the entire stalin system in eastern europe has practically van anywhere inned. we show in the summit's book the pause created a vacuum between the super powers, there wasn't a lot going on. in rushed the anyones, the dissidents and solidarity. that was probably a good thing. that brings us to the meeting they did have at malta.

in the book we have a photograph of what the arrangement was going to be like. soviet cruiser and american cruiser. they go back and forth. bush was a navy guy. except the winter storms played havoc and forced them to the ship tied to the dock, the soviet cruise liner. and this was the stateroom where they had all their meetings including press conferences and owl of the bush aides were we wearing the seasickness patch. the fascinating thing about malta, in the american accounts this was the end of the cold war. the supplements documents show it ended at least a year earlier. at malta, bush finally realized the war is over. he meets him first hand and they have an series of conversations, what struck us was the missed opportunity theme, everything on the table. the soviets said, let's get rid of tactical weapons on navy

ships. they had a memo from the general, don't even raise nuclear arms control. it's off the table. several years we would be rai raising it because it's in our intere interests. the beginning of american diplomacy on germany unification. you see bush speaking in double negatives to gorbachev, you cannot expect us of disapprove of german reunification. it's not until after malta that he decides to get on the train. coal is there because he sees the east german collapsing. we published them to the assurances of soviets and gorbachev all through the spring and summer of 1990 and reunification of germ 234i,

about nato not 1 inch eastward, see the documents here. the helsinki document for the new structure or europe. we will do nothing to jeopardize soviet security interests, we will not take advantage of these changes, nor should you. owl of these are effective whether jo get them in writing. they had the desired effect and reassured the soviets during the year of dramatic change and h p helped coleman cole, who he says has deep pockets. he says to george, you need to give aid to the soviet union and they need help and gorbachev needs shoring up. >> no sxwlchlt we have a fam -- no. we have a tight family here.

>> as we move to the washington summit, i think captured by the golf cart episode at camp david. bush is trying to teach him how to drive the golf cart and you can see the interpreter, his expression of great concern in the back seat there. this was goshby's first time at the wheel of the putt-putt. we should say the washington summit had its moments. it wasn't the turning point in germany that would come later in the summer. washington summit had its own drama. gorbachev wanted to have the trade deal but on the first day, bush says, no, we can't give you most favored nations. this is may, june, 1990. the utter hypocrisy of this to china despite what happened and we're not going to give it to

gorbachev and the disparity was informs a enormous and he gets bush to understand they have to do something. and finally, he says, okay, we'll do the trade deal. captured in this picture, you may notice the interpreter has stuck his notebook behind his belt in his back. this is the bioweapons demarch. we have versions of this. a lot of follow-up in this book, but no notes were taken at this moment, bush telling gorbachev, you've got bioweapons, either you're lying to us or your people are lying to you. actually a lot of evidence his people were lying to him and we published that in supplements elsewhere. great moment, very tense moment. the core, i think, of the dynamic going forward, it wasn't

the key to unification. by having the soviet accounts and american accounts you see this extraordinary interactive quality and no longer will one side's hugely negative account carry the day. we have both hands clapping. after the washington summit, though, that summer, everything changed. and that's the end game. i'll turn it over. >> as we know, in early august, 1990, saddam hussein invaded kuwait. on that day, they were meeting. when the first news reached the secretary of state and soviet foreign minister, they were in it der disbelief.

because their security services assured them on both sides, this was not going to happen. that was very un-likely to happen. the day they made the joint statement, u.s.-soviet joint statement condemning the invasion and demanding saddam withdraws his troops from kuwait was the day baker says in his memo memoirs, the day the cold war ended. we have several dates for the end of the cold war. i would still quo wigo with may '88, but baker was august 30, 1990, the day the cold war ended because the united states decided to back against its ally in the middle east, a very important ally. one of the few third world ally paying its debts and actually

employs about 5,000 splts, middle and civilian. it was very difficult for them to actually commit to support the united states. the foreign minister was in uproar. the soviet union had an established respect and cohort on arabics who say if you're going against the united states against iraq in this area, we will loose every peps of last influence we have in the middle east. you will be squeezed out and never play an important role. there were a couple things very important for gorbachev. no using -- use of force in international relations. he was committed deeply in his soul to no use of force

domestically or internationally. as along as he could be assured force will not be used or they would try to arrive at the resolution without the use of force, he was willing to back the united states. he saw this joint eslution and joint act as punishing the use of force in the middle east committed by saddam. the second concern gorbachev had was out of this crisis, if the super powers worked together, worked cooperately, and brought their allies to the table, they could in some long-term achieve a comprehensive solution for the middle east. for gorbachev, it was coming to a possibilitiy to achieve a

comprehensive solution not just between iraq and kuwa bait but arabs and israel. the third priority played a very important role during negotiations around the iraqi invasion with kuwait was the partnership and this probably made gorbachev decide against his own arab specialist he will support to the united states. this period of time from august from the invasion through the beginning of the aerial campaign and the ground war is a unique moment where you can see how real partnership could have emerged but did not emerge to the extent the soviets wanted it

or believed was possible. when bush and gorbachev meet at a very brief meeting, brief summit in 19 o90, bush uses eve possible assurance and piece of leverage to tell gorbachev if only you help us in the persian gulf a lot of major big things are possible. a new world of partnerships. now, to put all my cards on the table, i would like to say the following. for a long time during the cold war the u.s. policy was the soviet union should not play any role in the middle east. he says to gorbachev, i want to assure you the former u.s. position on the soviet union's involvement in the middle east

affairs has changed now. the new order i hope can be completed pre-poses the united states and soviet union will pursue collaborative efforts in the middle east. the talk of partnership is amazing, coming mainly out of the mouth of the united states president as well as numerous assurances to gorbachev, that bush is not willing to use force, does not want to use force, that the goal of the united states is not to use force, but to resolve this conflict collaboratively with all the sides and exactly that the soviet participation in this effort would allow them to reach a peaceful resolution through the united nations. he also difference a lot of

assurances about the future trade relations and the soviet union and the united states. and says, partnership partnership partnership all the time. gorbachev does not just take it and believe it as it was said. he had his doubts because a lot of his advisors were saying, really? the united states is considering the use of force. we should not just take their word for it. he sends his own envoy to the middle east, who was hissed a advisor in the future, became foreign minister of russia but he was a careerarabist. gorbachev goes to europe and trying to build a coalition to get saddam to withdraw troops from kuwait but without the use of force. here is one little analogy to

what happens, i think, on negotiations on later expansions. there are lots of assurances given orally you can see in the transcripts about non-use of force and future partnerships in the middle east and future northeast conference. the american side is not willing to put any of them on paper but the conversation is such a level of cordiality, it's hard for gorbachev to say, i guess, this sounds very nice, write it down. this will be the official agreement we publish. that never happens. we see in bush memoirs early in the administration, president bush was considering force from the very first day.

in his own memoirs, i was ready to use force and i was impatient. from day one i believed this situation will not be resolved without the use of force. in one way to describe this in the middle east as a true partnership and the revision of the entire experience of the cold war, where the two sides tried to push the other out of the middle east and now they both want to resolve this problem and the united states realize they could not resolve it without the soviet union. on the other hand, there is clearly manipulation because the united states needed the soviet union to achieve the passage of the anesthetize resolution in 678. now we come to the summit that gorbachev probably wanted most. this is the summit in paris

that launched the charter in europe and led to the institutionization of osc. going to the summit, the idea that gosh chef promoted -- gorbachev promoted and different leaders were committed to this idea. the idea of european coming home and idea of building new security structures on the basis of nato and the warsaw pack by kind of blending these security structures into a completely new european collective security framework that would fully integrate russia. however, by the time they get to the russia. by the time they get there, g m germany is no longer an idea that's acceptable to washington. now they are thinking about

deeper european integration, vertical integration. at the summit, a lot was said about the future of europe, the key discussions centered around the persian gulf. the conversation that both sides did not publish completely and we had to find ways to find parts of the conversation, bush makes a private plea to gorbachev saying that if we commitment to this we don't have to infer our press about it. he say i need your help. i need you're help on this. he said i need your help on this issue we must push for u.s. resolution. un resolution ie use of force. i do not want to use force we need resolution to put pressure

on saddam. gorbachev agrees. again against domestic resistance. from november 19 until the beginning there are no more conversation between them. the previous months there was contact now that gorbachev gave commitment and resolution was passed he was no longer needed and he still tried even in januaja january 1991, he tried to negotiate for iraq to withdraw that would not require the use of force but united states was building colation in europe which accepted the use of force and the necessity of the use of force and gorbachev's efforts

failed. to him it was bitter because he felt that this experience of new partnership in building a new world begin with the collective use of force exactly what he was hoping would not be part of this new world. we have little time left. we have moving to the end of our book. to the end of our summits. -- actually -- okay. in 1991, after the persian gulf crisis was resolved and germ me was unified and the pack broke apart, the situation in which they find themselves have changed so dramatically. of course, both bush and gorbachev realize the cold war

ended. they reached level of trust where on the u.s. side where like, tom was saying, the cold war type kept living much longer than they needed to, even on the u.s. side there's understanding now on the part of top leaders in the u.s. administration that gorbachev is for real. that a lot of things could be accomplished with the current leadership in the soviet union but the time is running out because on the one hand gorbachev and the soviet leadership were willing to go far in arms control the human rights agenda was resolved. they were willing to cooperate on conflicts. one of the big dreams was to resolve u.s. conflict with cuba. he was trying to become

interlocker between them. on the one hand you have willingness to partner in practi practicely any resolution. on the other hand you have gorbachev declining ability to deliver because the soviet economy is beginning to tail spin the winter of 1991 was the worst winter in terms of the food situation, and the only people who were willing to provide real assistance were the germans. they were grateful. gorbachev kept asking bush to help him create a major financial package to negotiate with other europeans and to ask

for loans and joining financial institution during the summit of big 7 in summer of 1991. while we have all this interaction between bush and go gorbachev, and expectation on the part of the soviet, now they done all of these changes, they pass every sing reform that the united states suggested or said this would be evidence that you are changing your countries seriously, this would be the conditions for us to providing you any loans. so the soviet kept doing all the things, immigration law, reelectioned happened in march 1989, serious reform package, they did not go far enough.

in the judgment of the u.s. side. and the u.s. economy was not doing great. as tom mentioned, u.s. economy going into recession and country become more inward looking in 1992, bush knew the next election was coming and foreign aide was notice popular subject. in summer of 1991, rather than providing them with loans, he actually trying to work against a possibility of a financial package at g 7 in london. he is talking about the european leaders saying this is premature. we should not rush and over soviet financial package been

they reform economy as free market economy. on the soviet part they saw it as they could not reform their economy without major financial assist in the form of loans from the west, especially from the united states. so gorbachev went to the summit in london in july 1991 with saying we need assistance now. we are reforming the soviet union, the soviet union is different entity. we have these very comprehensive reform plans. he brought his economist with him. he reformed foreign policy. we have been -- arms control. we need your help now. he m cos home empty handed.

within the discussions that are available, they are not in the book, we have them in the archive, it shows that the french, british and can germans were in favor of giving gorbachev aid but bush new he was not able to deliver and he did not want the united states to look behind the europeans on helping the soviet therefore the package never realized. the summit, super power summit happened in end of july of 1991. and the major result of that summit is that finally the united states and soviet union signed the star agreement. and they conversations of that

summit, when bush m comes to moscow, the quality of those conversations are incomparable. they talk like old friends, they talk like partners. they address global issues and regional issues. the soviet again raise issue of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. c c conventional weapons. they talk about united states would be guarantors for it's entire world, but at the same time the soviet union itself is in a very precarious state. gorbachev, the day before,

finished negotiating the new union treaty and it was supposed to be signed on august 19. you can see from the conversations that the u.s. delegation all of them, were very strongly in favor of keeping the soviet union together. bush and skoe kroft agreed that if the soviet union decent grate you have you slough ya -- their concern was a security of nuclear weapons, possibility of civil war between republics, it was a dangerous situation. in addition to that they looked at nationalist movement in the

republic and those movements did not look like the most democratic movement you want to imagine. here on the other hand was tested and proven gorbachev trying to transform his country in a new voluntary association of states based on democratic elections and based on no use of force. in the way the summit finally achieved what they wanted to achieve from the beginning the deep reduction in strategic armed forces. and when american delegation leave and go to keefe, the speech is not so bad. if it you look at it now, it warns against suicidal -- he was

speaking about jordan when he used those words. right after gorbachev goes on vacation and comes back the conservative coup happens on august 18, the day before signing of the treaty. the people whom gorbachev brought to power are trying to depose him. his ryal yell son, comes to lead -- throughout the country if you look ad that, people were not sure on which side they were. moscow were appalled by this attempt to take power, take power aware from gorbachev and restore a more authoritarian

system. this coup undermines any lost hope gorbachev had to create the new union treaty. and of course, if you look at the fall of 1991, there are still achievements that take place, like the human tarian conference which the soviet were trying to put together beginning in 1986, there's the much awaited conference in the middle east where gorbachev meets with bush for the last time and now they look at what they accomplished together in the missed opportunities. again, this incredible meeting of the minds. but at this point, the movements lead in every republic except for baltics, but not the

genuine -- they grab the power. in december of 1991, yelt sen and three leaders get together and dissolve the soviet union. and we will end this talk with the last phone call we wrote and published the last phone call between gorbachev and bush in the "new york times" and look at the sense of accomplishment, closeness, partnership, missed opportunities that in that phone call. one of the reasons we called our book the last super power summit

because there's no super power any more. reading these conversations we have a feeling these are the conversations of that kind, the last experience of this incredible -- even unfulfilled but incredible partnership between united states and russia. and i guess, there are lessons we would like it to learn from that. >> all right. thank you, very much. [ applause ] i would like to ask a preliminary question. >> all right. >> just a word, brief word. on the evidence i know this is -- subject for entirely different lecture, the difficult part in piecing together the evidence. >> the evidence had to come from both sides.

we couldn't rely on one side. and you would see if you compare the soviet and the american documents that were lots of part of those conversations that at least one did not want to become public one to the other side for the missing parts or we have a document on one side and bring it to the reagan library or bush library to say we have this document from soviet side -- >> it took ten years. >> we did the same with gorbachev foundation. we were lucky because the closest national security adviser gave us full access for a long time, forever to all the collection on the gorbachev foundation and were able to compare and translate. >> one caveat, one of the things

that's remarkable about having both version of the conversation is how congrew it. there are moments where they get it wrong. there's a moment at malta where condo leez sa rice get it wrong. the bush years is when you move to the one-on-one, the note taker would be brent skoe kroft. you can go look at skroe kroft have been turned into minimal minimum cons and you put them side by side in paragraphs there's not a contradiction, it's just historians will find much more to work with than out of -- >> also, fun part when you

compare which paragraphs are redacted one of my favorite examples summit in 1991 in moscow where gorbachev brings republics in and bush talks with him and parts are redacted b 1 national security. with can we make deal on chef ran and the russian transcript it has it all. it's b 1 redacted. >> this is before rex tillerson. >> if if you can bring into sharp focus the ways in which these documents and your analysis of them changed our current understanding of this period, so frame this historic

graphley where do you overlap and where do you break with our basic understanding. >> we're going to have another sections. >> two minutes. >> the simplest way to put it, we have outpouring of literature in this country that was extraordinarily interesting. we were -- as if we were the once who wisely saw that we should pull tactical weapons off our ships in 1991. the book restores agencies to other side in interactive way to say this was on the table years earlier. addressing the history graphy, a store this is extraordinary --

the question is getting this down from 1,050 page to 140 characters. at larger level we fit into more comp complicated picture of gorbachev betray betrayed navy or the iron fist or the velvet glove. it's a complicated vision. i think for both reagan and bush, we are hard on bush because he comes late to the arms race in reverse. we tend to be more appreciative of reagan because he was a --

abolishes. >> wait for the microphone, and use it when you get it. >> diane, thank you for sa superb hour. i must confess i have relied on history consistently over the last year. you emphasize gorbachev rejection of violence and you chose not to talk about the batt baltics. you will recall intend to have a summit which is doesn't take place because of. would you explain for us this mystery about gorbachev and

valance. >> use of. >> it's a great question. and specifically -- let start with general statement. gorbachev very consistently throughout every document domestic conversations we have a lot discussion with closest supporters or conversations with international leaders abhors violence and is against it. on the baltics, the violence in georgia in april of 1989. in april of 1989 gorbachev was out of the country and it's demonstrated that it was done in the wait to get it done before he comes back to the country. on the baltics is more

complicated question. you have to look at context in 1990, after given a warning to bush saying i'm going to do some harsh administrative measure. he pushes away including people like he trained influence of the military in the military, the kgb relies on intelligence that gorbachev give to closest people. so in this context, you have several instances of use of violence in the baltics. as far as i can see from the document i have seen and i have not seen all of them, but i have seen a lot, there's not an

instance, not even the hard liners ever showed proof that gorbachev approved the take over. there's -- even though who are saying we culted with him, they never showed proof. his fault was after violence was used, he did not immediately publicly fire them. and disassociate himself from that. to me the proof that works for me, i know when he found out about january events, he wrote a resignation letter to gorbachev and said i'm ashamed. i cannot believe you allow to do it. he said in memory, he said after talking to people who knew how things were developing, he was

eventual eventually convinced that gorbachev did not approve it. his mistake was not to denounce it immediately. but i don't think that -- >> hand over here. on the left side. >> thank you. jim from george washington university. after talking about the events, it's going to be fantastic to chew through your analysis on the records. i have a question about something you talked about ten or 20 years ago. you did not mention in the presentation. this is for both tom and --

because one thing you didn't mention that i have always been struck by from the moment it took place, is that at reykjavik, gorbachev reversed 40 years of policy going back to objections to the plan 1947 and un debate over control. in terms of objecting to intruive investigation on soviet territory. so my question is did you gain any insight into how the soviet, was it a top town gorbachev decision to decided to make such a crucial change in decades of soviet policy that was prerequisite for the subsequent progress. for tom, did americans understand that was going to be happening at reykjavik because they were blind sided and you

had military figures, the american started pulling back. what have you learned about that issue which is so crucial to what happened afterwards? >> on this particular issue, i think we have a chief of general staff he believed in inspection pretty much any time anywhere on short notice. he was proponent within military establishment. at that time, you were talking late 1986, early 1987, the military were strongly behind gorbachev. they did not have experience which is where the split happened. the formal change comes in march

1987. they offer it as a possibly and they make proposal in 1987 and the table turn from that time on it's soviet that pushed americans on verification. was your earlier position a bluff. >> it was. there was a lot of offers the soviet union would never agree to such an intrusive inspection. the fact that the soviet agreed to do that, and the hold up on the start treaty was all about the u.s. navy refusing to let

soviets on board. at one point gorbachev says, is it because your a marine you're not going to let us on your navy ships. not trample. >> the on sight it's a a huge matter. the bottom line most interesting thing about reykjavik is the great what if. jack written about this. we have the documents there's wonderful we have called lessons v reykjavik. it's demonstrated how poor we are at guessing what the soviets would do. a ambition agreement need not

be -- if gorbachev had said, okay, you're serious about sharing your sdi. reagan says this to thatcher. i would never been infavor if i intend to share it. it's a global insurance policy. i'll share it with you. what if gorbachev say okay, sign this paper you're going to share and i'll sign to let it go forward. if it happened they would have struck a deal, but the stubbornness kept them from believing each other. there's a quote from the

reykjavik transcript. there's a -- imagine the what if. >> the real what if as we discussed was not share it with us, let's jointly develop it. >> reagan would have said, sure. >> that was the missed opportunity. >> right lehere in the front. >> marvin, wilson center. john's hop kins. different venue, different time, saddam hussein, invasion of kuwait, gulf war. gorbachev wants to see peaceful

outcomes. i would have thought there would have been pressure from within the soviet union to demand that soviet military participate and be part of any military outcome. was that ever part of the picture? >> it was the u.s. proposal. the united states proposed that the soviet union send own military to participate. the soviet were against the military and political leadership on the one hand there was strong commitment not to use force abroad. they just brought troops back from afghanistan. >> right up here. >> thank you. i was wondering the popular belief it it in country seems to

be the cold war ended because gorbachev was convinced that the soviet union could not compete with sdi and american military and such and gave up. i was wondering how we can get your alternative facts out to the public? >> we're trying. we don't exactly have the gift of conviction or -- i'm not sure this works for social media. i think in the scholarly community there's a lot of this v vermont going on. when jim started in -- but that's a long-term process. i think it -- in the textbooks today people will quote things when ronald reagan is asked so

who is responsible for these changes, and he says mr. gorbachev, of course. that's not there's a constructive myth in this country, no it was reagan. stephen colbert said to you in one segment. you put the evidence out there. people will make of it what they will. our job is to partly popularize it, publish it on the web, get it adopted at a book. for the paper back they are splitting it into two volumes. >> i want to briefly, in russia, still, the public and cthe elit

believe that the united states worked la worked hard and long to bring down the -- how do you brief evidence to say look, they tried to keep it together as much as they could. >> another question. >> okay. in the back there. >> gary, i work for u.s. a. id. i was in desert storm, and germany. i went from germany to desert storm. how much did afghanistan weigh on gorbachev's mind-set and the soviet union in general? >> emens burden. when gorbachev comes to power on list of priority is item number

one, bring back the troops. by president time he came to power it was clear to the p pregorbachev leadership they were not going to win the war. throughout the first years especially and until the withdrawal, it was one of the top three subjects on the bureau. incredible split in the country over what to do the mission of failure, how to integrate the soldiers coming back into russia. the entire use of force in foreign policy was affected by the experience of afghanistan. it's hard to underestimate the weight and time spend on that issue. >> one last question up here in the front.

>> ross johnson. back to evidence, is there anything what's missing? are there other documents that should exists that don't? it what's missing? you can never know what you don't know. of everything you know, what would you like to have had that you could no the find or could not reinstruct one way or the other? >> the intelligence reports. that are not declassified from the kgb or the cia. we know george w. bush was consumer loved morning briefings, that has changed. it would be interesting to see the parallel between what he told in the president's brief that morning what he says in the

summit meetings or in the phone call. there's more in the relationship there. on the soviet side, as gorbachev become depend, what was crew chef saying about international support or lack thereof. it made gorbachev a more suspicious person and less trusting of the people who had been key actors positively and key players. those are two big missing categories. we do include top aide memos. you can see the impact of a jim baker or a bush, or a g-- we hae amazing document from reykjavik

if we abolish -- they will be looking for billion dollar for conventional level, you can don't that. there are a few incredible moments in the conversations, the limo with bush from 1987, to recreate, a bush memory which had own fragment me wrote, but you put them together and you're close. there are moments like that. >> one question that is still a mystery to me, i would notable able to give an answer, by

logical weapons. >> on that note. i have to draw this to a close. please note this is only the first session. we have 13 more to go. that will take us through may. join us next week, mcdonald's and black america in most king years. my thanks for our participates today. >> thank you. [ applause ] this weekend on american history tv, this saturday morning, 9:30 eewe're live from all day come -- confederate

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