artifacts that tell the world war i story. saturday, april 1, beginning at 10:30 a.m. eastern on "american history tv" on c-span3 tv. "american history tv" was at ford's theater in washington, d.c. today for the symposium by the abraham lincoln institute and the ford's theater society. speakers addressed topics covering is that lincoln's life, career, and legacy. it was there that actor john wilkes booth mortally wounded the 16th president on april 14, 1865 as the civil war was drawing to a close. coming up, all of today's symposium coverage. paul: good morning ladies and gentlemen. welcome to ford's theatre and the abraham lincoln institute annual symposium.

it is a great pleasure to have you all here this morning. i want to start by thanking the abraham lincoln institute, the illinois state society in washington, d.c., and all our presenters and speakers for making today possible. let's give them a round of applause. [applause] i am standing here on the set of our current production of ragtime -- of "ragtime," a musical based on the wonderful novel of the same name. on the inside of your program, there is a special discount code to be used for this evening's performance. if anyone would like to come and see the show, is at 7:30 this evening. if you can't make it tonight, the production is playing through may 20. it really is spectacular, and i hope you all come and see that.

the other side of what we do here at ford's theater. a few housekeeping things for the day. no food or drink in the theater. i think they allow bottle water and that is it. your wristband that you have on will serve as your ticket for the full day admission. it will also grant you admission to ford's theatre museum in the basement and the petersen house across the street. please keep it throughout the day. it will allow you to come back and forth today. be a time for questions after each presentation. noticed you may have c-span is filming the entire day's proceedings today. so we ask, if you are going to ask questions, to use the microphones that i think are in the well here so that folks listening on c-span can hear your questions. please use those. today,ach presentation

there will be a 20 minute break, see you can get up and stretch and get some coffee and refreshments at the gift shop. most important ligament during those breaks, the presenters will be signing books in the lobby. all books are able to be purchased at the gift shop throughout the day. all of our presenters will be signing books after their presentations in the lobby, with the exception of alan kelso, who is speaking just before lunch, and doug wilson, who is speaking at the end of the day. they will sign books prior to their presentations. assume those presentations are going to be brilliant, and he will want to have them sign your book before. i can guarantee that will be the case. beforell sign the books with the previous speakers. james conroy will sign copies of his books before the final talk of the day. there will be a lunch break today at 12:25 p.m. to 1:50.

please take all of your belongings with you. theaterave them in the during the lunch break. i think that is all my housekeeping. now my best task of the day is to introduce the president of michelleln institute, krowl. doctorate in history from the university of california berkeley, and is a civil war reconstruction specialist. she has been a terrific president for a ally -- four -- for ali. it is my pleasure to welcome michelle today. [applause] michelle: good morning. oh, you actually responded. we are going to have a great day. 18 47, abraham lincoln

arrived in washington, d.c. to begin his term in the united congress. singleh that respectable term may not be remembered as the pinnacle of his political career, lincoln's time in washington added luster to at least one of his ambitions. i have no honor so great as that as being esteemed by rendering myself worthy. congressman lincoln earned the esteem of many of his colleagues that would prove useful to him in the future. his arrival in washington prompted the formation of the abraham lincoln institute 150 years later. for the past 20 years, the mission of the abraham lincoln institute has been to promote research on the life and legacy of abraham lincoln. this all volunteer group organizes and funds an annual symposium that offers the latest in lincoln scholarship presented by the best scholars in the field and made available to the public free of charge. we also sponsor the abraham lincoln institute book award

and, in cooperation with the abraham lincoln association of we awardld, illinois, a dissertation prize to recognize promising collars in the field of lincoln studies. we cannot do this work alone, and we are reminded of lincoln's remarks that the better part of one's life consists of his friendship. the ali is dedicated to our good friends and before theatre society for making it possible to once again me in this historic theater. who would especially like to think colleen pryor, patrick pearson, allison, and lauren for their assistance. the staff had absolutely handled the complex logistics of the event, and i hope you will give -- help me in giving the ford's the of society a round of applause for their work. [applause] michelle: we also sincerely think the ford's theatre society contributions allow

us to meet in this space, and we thank our friends at the illinois state society of washington with easy for the support. finally we thank you come our friends in the audience. your online and in person financial contributions to the abraham lincoln institute help fund the symposium that you enjoy, and we hope you will give generously again today. just as important, your attendance at and enthusiasm for the symposium year after year not only validates our efforts, but also demonstrates that abraham lincoln's ambition for the esteem of his fellow man and women has been achieved beyond all of his expectations. on behalf of the board of directors of the abraham lincoln and student, i welcome you to our 20th annual symposium. whether you are with us in person or watching the program from elsewhere around the country or the world, we trust that you'll find yourself at the end of the day having been informed, inspire, enlightened,

and entertained by our at standing -- by our outstanding speakers. we join me in welcoming my esteemed colleague william c harris, who introduce our first speaker. [applause] william: good morning. >> good morning. william: it is a bit intimidating to stand on this stage and look around and see where the good and great man --eon welles characterized good and great man, as gideon welles characterized him, sat in his theater. is a professor emeritus of history at the college of new jersey and author of a number of important books.

in 1989, professor crofts wrote "reluctant confederates." it brought him to the forefront of historians seeking to understand the reaction to lincoln's election and futile attempts to prevent secession and war. the book has stood the test of time as a standard account of north carolina, virginia, and tennessee in the secession period and lead into war. book, professor crofts skillfully demonstrated combined efforts of upper south unionists and northern republicans william h. seward to prefer -- to preserve the union. -- recent book which his presentation today is based on his account of the

attempts attempt to pass and ratify the original 14th amendment as a part of the compromise to save the union in early 1861. lincoln went along with the proposed amendment designed to prevent federal intervention of slavery and the southern states, though he probably believed it was redundant and did not need to be enshrined in the constitution. croftscantly, compellingly challenging interpretations of some recent scholars that link and the white house with a determination to end slavery. his presentation today, which is entitled "the paradoxical emancipator, abraham lincoln and the other 13 the minute," is based on this book. amendment,"ther 13 is based on this book. professor daniel crofts. [applause]

daniel: i think bill harris for that generous introduction. i am delighted to be in such select company. only two people in the world know the lincoln story in deep inail, while also knowing deep detail what happened in the reach assertion -- in the reconstruction south after his death. bill harris is one of these two remarkable scholars. and that is not all. bill has just published two more books. the first is "lincoln in congress." the second is "two against lincoln, champions of the loyal opposition." should causetivity envy among those who are half his age. he deserves around applause. [applause] daniel: all of us on today's

program write nonfiction, even though fiction appears to be the new trend in civil war era books. that ancrowd suggests audience still remains for engaging directly with the past rather than trying to fancy it up by allowing our imaginations to run free. i welcome your eagerness to deal with facts, especially at such a prompt our on the weekend. my focus this morning will be the faithful series of immense -- the faithful series of events in 1860 and 1861 on a presidential election triggered a grave crisis, and before long, a civil war. more of this in a moment. you first,nd however, that we are today in the midst of the second grave crisis in american history, triggered by a presidential election. once again, the fate of democratic government itself hangs in the balance.

but this time, we do not know the outcome of the crisis because we are living it from day-to-day. of 1860 andwinter 1861. i will organize my talk into four main topics. first, abraham lincoln and the republican party. i will pose several key questions. what did lincoln and the republicans stand for in 1860, and what did they hope to do? did they intend to abolish southern slavery, or was the republican anti-slavery program mostly wishful thinking about the distant future? second, the slaveholding south. wentl ask why the south off the rails after lincoln's election. was the slave system in peril, or did white southerners overreact and transform the distant danger into a deadly and immediate threat? third, the book i've just

written revisits the actual situation at the time. it shows how political leaders and ordinary people both north and south trying to figure out what was happening and how they expected evidence to unfold. and forth, i will finish it some thought about the tension between myth and history. why does a mythic version of history often dominate our historical memory? why does feel good folklore often overshadow demonstrable fact? what can we learn by taking a fresh look at the crisis that led to the civil war? first, let's start with abraham lincoln. in november, 1863, when he spoke so memorably at gettysburg about a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, lincoln was looking toward a hoped-for future rather than accurately describing the american past. a growing shells of modern

scholarship challenges lincoln's understanding of history. yes, some founding fathers wanted to curb or restrict slaveowning, but they had a far stronger desire to create a federal union that possessed sufficient power to govern economy. lincoln thought the founders expected slavery disappear, but the constitution gave slavery protections. it made the slaveholding south an equal partner as the united states first took shape. lincoln lived in a country where the slave system was deeply rooted at spreading rapidly across the lower mississippi valley. lincoln didn't like it, and thinking about it makes them miserable. he convinced himself that the founding fathers really had wanted something better. but lincoln and most other anti-slavery northerners also wanted it preserved.

lincoln was committed to values that cannot logically be , as the great historian david potter once wrote. lincoln and the republican party's mainstream market -- mainstream moderate hopes slavery would eventually end, but had no blueprint to get from here to there. they read the constitution to mean they had no power to get slavery in the states where it already exist. instead, he counted on white southerners to realize at some point in the future that free labor would create a more prosperous and productive society that slave labor. republicans had no plan to fight a war that would revolutionize southern society. so what did lincoln actually propose to do? he and his republican friends leave the south will do too much power -- friends believed the south wielded too much power. they challenged what his supporters call the slave power. republicans vowed to enable the free white men of the north to

gain the political clout to which their numbers and titles of -- their numbers in title to them -- their numbers entitled them.once in power, republicans promised they would stop the spread of slavery to the territories. what they called free soil would become national policy. some republicans want to do more. they demanded a more aggressive plan to do nationalize slavery. giddingsressman joshua said the federal government should do nothing to uphold or sustain the slave system. he called for much more than territorial restriction. he and his allies wanted to abolish slavery in the district of columbia, to restrict or interstate -- to restrict the interstate slave trade, from repealing the fugitive slave act, a law that made it easier

to recapture slays that has escaped in the north. the rallying cry for hard-line republicans like giddings was freedom national. the state assumed by the republican party and its victorious 1860 campaign gave short shrift to freedom national absolutes. mainstream republican leaders led by lincoln emphasized that they opposed -- that they posed no threat to slavery in the states. they focused on the territories thatn the long run hope white southerners might reconsider their addiction to forced slavery. have republicans embraced the hard-line plan to do nationalize slavery, lincoln suspected they would lose the north swing voters. if republicans donated repeal of the fugitive slave act, it might wreck the party. i confess, i hate to see the poor creatures hunted down and caught and carried back to their stripes in unreported toils, he

once told a friend, "but i bite my lip and keep quiet." republican party managers nevertheless needed votes from northern whites who saw slavery as a moral problem. party promoters endlessly promised their enlightened moral minority that territorial containment was the first step on the road to abolition. but they never identified the second step. lincoln carefully calibrated his words so they would appeal both to hardliners and moderates. next topic,ow to my the south on leave of the war -- south on the eve of the war. by any reasonable standard, southern slaveholders have little to worry about. if they faced any danger at all, it was in the distant future. but the republican party's qualified anti-slavery stance offended the white south, and guidance back up -- and got it back up.

, most ofy absolutists whom were militant southern democrats, blasted the republican party as a deadly menace that would deny the south access to the territories, and then attack slavery in the states where it existed. throughout the 1860 presidential campaign, southern alarmist charged repeatedly that republicans were abolitionists in the skies who plotted to unleash slave rebels and myrtle right women and children -- and murder white women and children. rival partisans in the south regularly sought to identify threats to southern white. they smeared their opponents for displaying insufficient zeal in blocking such threats or for insidiously collaborating with the cell -- with the south enemies.

these accusations lightly hit home because white southerners depended on a system of forced labor, even while they pretended black slaves were happy and content. endless affirmations for slavery was a positive good for everyone --olved never quite vanished never quite banished the fear that ferocious rebels might lurk behind inscrutable black masks. white southerners were predisposed to be suspicious. it became a staple of the 1860 campaign and the south that republicans were allies of the abolitionist john brown, who led an aborted operation in harper's ferry, virginia in 1859. lincoln tried to quiet the white south hysteria. speech in new york city and early 1860's explicitly condemned the harpers ferry raid

and insisted that john brown was no republican. lincoln did his best to show republicans were not abolitionists. he likewise dismissed the possibility of slave insurrection. his reassurances never found an audience in the white south. lincoln won the 1860 presidential election because he carried every free state except for a divided electoral vote in new jersey. he compiled a clear majority in the electoral college. keep in mind, as we just been reminded, it is electoral votes that count. lincoln also amassed far more popular votes than any of the other three candidates. of the victoryty gained him only 40% of the nationwide popular vote. he got no electoral votes and hardly any popular votes in the south. few among lincoln's supporters were outright abolitionist. -- as wee seen and

have seen, and articulate minority of republicans considered slavery a problem. lincoln showed that he shared antislavery values, but he and other mainstream republican moderates always said that slavery in the states was beyond their reach. lincoln's victory shocked the white south. throughout the summer and fall, southern political orators warned of catastrophe if he was elected. a symbolic humiliation added to southern distress. the south contended for a supposedly constitutional right, to theht to take slaves territories. hardly any slaveholders was to exercise that right, but it was endlessly reiterated, closing off the territories to slavery would deny southern equality in the union and put the country on the high road towards abolition. a spasm of panic and indignant outrage swept the south,

especially the house -- especially the deep south, and the weeks after the election. his was the only time in american history when the losers in a presidential election refused to accept the verdict of the voters. southern secessionists instead took the sick faithful -- took the day. but trying to establish and independent country. supposedly responsible southern leaders fueled the uproar that rapid deep south extremists fan into a raging fire. georgia's howell cobb you had powerower -- yielded more then perhaps anyone else. he grossly exaggerated the south danger. he warned that republicans were committed to immediate and unconditional abolition in every state, and that lincoln plans to build up a party in the south to

promote insidious warfare upon our family fireside. kolb certainly knew better -- cobb certainly knew better. leadersther southern apparently decided they could do nothing to deflect the panic among ordinary southern white, and they chose to instead amplify it. by the three most powerful southern democrats in the senate, robert toombs, benjamin of louisiana, and jefferson davis of mississippi. before the election, republicans assumed that secession threats were a harmless charade, a mixture of bravado and posture. in the weeks after the election, most republicans refused to take seriously an outburst based upon what they considered ludicrous and can seemingly deliberate misconceptions. they described the crisis is artificial. it had been whipped up by the

south, republicans insisted, and can only be resolved when the south climbed off its high horse. let me shift now to my third topic. a quick glimpse at my new book. it is called lincoln and the politics of slavery. it is called "lincoln and the politics of slavery, the other 13th amendment." this is not a book about the real 13th amendment that abolished slavery, the one that was featured in steven spielberg's film "lincoln" a few years ago. his book is about an entirely different amendment, indeed its polar opposite, that was proposed four years earlier. hindsight of scares the would be 1861 amendment. the other 13th amendment was the handiwork of william henry seward and thomas carmen, to federal republicans who

masterminded its passage in the house and senate the week before lincoln's inauguration. seward, a u.s. senator from new york, and formerly the governor, had expected the republican presidential nomination in 1860. but the great prize slips away from him. congressmand ohio and u.s. senator and secretary of treasury, had been a fixture in national politics for 30 years. appointed seward his secretary of state and carwyn ambassador to mexico. unlike most republicans, they feared that southern secession created a grave crisis and imminent peril of war. they recognized an urgent date to conciliate urban or's and white southerners. the urged to make the

constitution what most assumed was implicit there, and they persuaded lincoln to get behind the amendment. abraham lincoln's first denied that hess or the republican party intended to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. lincoln then announced he could accept the constitutional amendment just to prove by two thirds majority in both a house in the senate. behind-the-scenes, lincoln quietly told his political allies in congress to vote for the amendment. the man destined to become the great emancipator thus sounded an entirely different note as he took office. abolitionists such as lucretia mott and started douglas condemned -- and frederick douglass condemned lincoln. he pleaded with white southerners to stop and think

and reconsider and stay in the union. when lincoln offered these reassurances, seven states in the lower south had seceded from the union, and had begun to organize a separate government, the confederate states of america. but eight slave states home to 2/3 of white southerners remained uneasily in the union, and no shots have yet been exchanged. lincoln hopes to contain and ultimately reverse the secession movement. above all, notes to preserve the peace -- he helped to preserve the peace. "we are not enemies, but at the moment lincoln was inaugurated, virginia was still in the union. by decisive two to one margin, it's voters just a month before had rejected secession. robert e lee, stonewall jackson, and jeb stuart were not fighting

in a war because no war was taking place. a delegate to the convention of virginia where he repeatedly warned against following the deep south's reckless lead. we know, of course, that lincoln proved unable to prevent war. six weeks after his proved unable to prevent war. inauguration, southern confederates opened fire on fort sumter in the harbor of charleston, south carolina. lincoln responded by calling for troops. rival waves of patriotic fervor swept both the north and the south. in the north, many democrats joined hands with republicans to uphold the flag and restore the union. stephen a douglas, lincoln's longtime illinois rival, announced that every man must be for the united states or against it. there could be no neutrals in this war, only patriots or traitors.

in the south, the new confederate nations suddenly became far more formidable. most white southerners decided to fight for independence. four additional slave states, virginia, north carolina, tennessee, and arkansas, sided with the deep south and doubled the new nation's military manpower. a great many virginians who rejected secession in february decided in april the question had changed entirely. the new question was, which side are you on in a war? both sides mobilized vast armies and both stumbled into a war that proved more bloody and protracted than anyone expected when it first started. secession was the most calamitous example of bad judgment in all of american history. this outrageous leap into the unknown was designed to counteract a supposed threat to slavery, even though lincoln and his fellow republicans vowed

they would not touch slavery where it already existed. but when southern secessionists fractured the union and started a war, they removed their states from the protection of the constitution. they also killed the seward-corwin effort to amend the constitution and make slaveholders feel more secure. instead, the hard spectacle of bloodshed and death and injury and disease prompted more and more white northerners to demand a war against slavery, the apparent taproot of the rebellion. a war originally waged to restore the old union as it was gradually was transformed into a war to create a new union in which slavery had no place. just after lincoln issued his preliminary emancipation proclamation in september 1862, his secretary of the treasury marveled at the greatest

collective insanity the world had ever seen. had the slaveholders stayed in the union, chase reflected, they might have kept slavery for many years to come. no party or public feeling in the north could have touched them. but instead, they had madly placed slavery on the very path of destruction. in the end, secession destroyed slavery. the actual 13th amendment specified the5 opposite of the original version. the two 13th amendments, the one that did not become part of the constitution in 1861, and the one that did in 1865, bookend up the four most critical years in american history. so my book tackles an important subject that has long been hidden in plain sight. it cuts against the grain of what we think we know about the civil war era.

i turn now to my fourth and final topic. what we can learn about american history more broadly by taking a fresh look at the crisis that led to the civil war. there is a tension between history as it actually unfolded and history as it is remembered. americans with liberal values tend to read back into history what we would like to find there, a nation conceived in liberty where slavery never really belonged. an underground railroad that liberated vast numbers of slaves, even before the war started. a lincoln who was elected to abolish slavery in the civil -- and a civil rights movement in the 1950's and 1960's that decisively ended racial americanation and made practices align with american ideals.

by sugarcoating a more troubled reality, we downplay the cancer of racial assumptions and practices that has so interwoven with our national history.by sud reality, we downplay the cancer and we trivialize the bravery and dedication of those who did challenge the status quo. a history that we can feel good about often substitutes fancy for fact. americans today find it difficult to realize that slavery once was considered normal and taken for granted. and we trivialize the bravery we thereby fail to see our country as it was. we pay little attention to the hard fact that far more slaves were sold and bought than ever escaped. at least 100,000 african-americans each year in the mid-19th century were sold like merchandise or draft animals. in southern cities, richmond, montgomery, new orleans, slave trading was a big, well-organized business. slaves were a key form of liquid capital for settling debts, dividing up estates and so on.

montgomery, alabama, the first capital of the confederacy, has lots of confederate monuments. but just a few years ago, a group called the equal justice initiative erected something different, a historical marker entitled "warehouses used in the slave trade." it reminds us what the confederate states of america really was about. the domestic slave trade was a far -- was far bigger than the legendary underground railroad. each year during the 1850's, no more than 1000 to 2000 slaves successfully followed the north star to freedom. during that same year, however, 100,000 slaves or more were sold and bought across the south. but we choose instead to emphasize the upside, and so we celebrate the underground railroad and we put harriet tubman on the $20 bill. my book raises questions about

uplifting national mythology. it also runs contrary to conventional wisdom as defined by many of my professional colleagues, some of whom are here today. they see a north that did endanger the south, a south that knew it was in danger and reacted rationally, and runaway slaves who did much to bring the sectional crisis to a boil. i think the supposed northern threat to the south has been much exaggerated, that secession threatened the south far more than did lincoln or the republican party, and that white southerners had many more much exaggerated, that secession nightmares about slave rebels and they did about runaway slaves. in the deep south, where 60% of american slaves lived by 1860, and where the secession movement was centered, escape was effectively impossible. read solomon wrote a memoir of

his life as a louisiana slave. so i come back to where i started. to abraham lincoln. he, george washington, and franklin d roosevelt, were the three most consequential presidents in american history. lincoln faced extraordinary challenges. every day he was in office, the nation itself hung in the balance. instead of being overwhelmed, he grew. lincoln brought to his duties certain traits that are in notably short supply today. a workhorse rather than a show horse, he did not preen or strut or call attention to himself. his command of the language was impeccable. both when speaking and writing, he used words with great care and his word was his bond. he did not tweet. [laughter] mr. crofts: but, i resist the nightmares about slave rebels

modern tendency to make lincoln someone he wasn't. i reject the idea lincoln was a prewar radical bent on destroying the slave system. we now honor lincoln as the great emancipator, but during the months that followed his election as president, he was totally preoccupied by other matters. he faced the greatest political crisis ever to confront a new president, and he could not have spared a moment to think about the long run future of slavery or the many indignities and hardships suffered by an american slaves. that changed and lincoln played a large role in advancing the change. the war forced the issue of slavery from the margins to the center of attention. it made slavery vulnerable in ways that never could have happened in peacetime. quite suddenly, those white americans who knew slavery sabotaged american ideals were in a position to start doing something about it. and they had increasing motive to do so because black americans modern tendency to make lincoln

were eager to support the union cause and fight in the union army. the arithmetic of the situation was clear. slaves liberated from confederate captivity could be transformed into assets that enhanced the union war effort. lincoln spelled this out to disgruntled northern whites who complained about emancipation. to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, he reasoned, to that extent it weakens the enemy in his resistance to you. and, whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, lincoln added, leaves us so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the union. abraham lincoln reminds us that moral complexity lies at the heart of the american experience. his career highlights tensions for which there were no easy answers. he weighed between conscience and law, but he said the fugitive slave law must be were eager to support the union

obeyed. he knew that black people in america were treated unfairly but he dared not come out squarely for equal rights. he always had been appalled by disorder and violence and bloodshed, but as president, he commanded enormous armies and hoped the ends would justify the terrible means. lincoln's two towering achievements, restoring the union and ending slavery, made it possible to build a new nation that did more closely reflect the nation's highest ideals. the constitution was amended three times between 1865 and 1870 to abolish slavery, to provide an expansive new definition of citizenship, to insist that states must treat all citizens equally, and to specify that neither the federal government nor a state government could deny voting rights for reasons of race, color or previous condition of servitude. obeyed. but the new constitution, to

make a long story short, was shelved for the next 100 years. racial stigmas, the perverted stepchild of slavery, poisoned the bold democratic initiatives of reconstruction. during the long jim crow era that followed, the supreme court twisted the three postwar constitutional amendments into irrelevance. the most hideous form of racial oppression was lynching, which claimed over 4000 victims between 1880 and 1940. terrorism in the united states did not begin on 9/11. and we are still far from repairing the damage. let me mention again, the equal justice initiative and its founder brian stevenson, who

wrote the widely read memoir wrote the widely read memoir "just mercy." the equal justice initiative is building a museum in montgomery wrote the widely read memoir "just mercy." the equal justice initiative is building a museum in montgomery to call attention to the tragic history of lynching, and it plans to erect 4000 historicalws

doing pretty darn well.

it was successful. lots of profits. there really wasn't much motive for the people who are benefiting from it to give it up. even though republicans believed free labor would work better, that was a kind of theoretical argument and the actual reality down on the ground in the south was that large slaveholders were doing fine with the slave system. so i cannot come up with -- you want a number. i cannot give you a number. it somehow seems unlikely that slavery would have continued indefinitely, but i sure don't see any short-term way, nor did -- i quoted salmon chase who was no doubt about it antislavery republican of a more deep dyed than lincoln himself. at least his antecedents were more in the free soil liberty party than lincoln. but chase, you know, says

straight out, it would have lasted for many years. which i think is true. >> thank you. >> good morning. i know most historians don't questions, but i'm going to give you one anyway. my question is this, what if john wilkes booth had never happened? and lincoln had survived and continued with his presidency, perhaps for another two terms? how do you think that would have affected reconstruction as well as jim crow? lincoln,proviso that of course, unless he changed, which i don't know he did, had rather harsh provisions of the african-americans as a race. can you answer that, please? prof. crofts: ok, for starters, we would not be here in the

ford's theatre. [laughter] saycontinuing, i would there is abundant evidence that lincoln was an extremely skilled politician. it was his calling card. he had built from the ground up a republican party in illinois, have brought together a whole bunch of disparate elements. he made himself the leader of the party and one of those three key states in the lower north, illinois, indiana, and sylvania, that republicans today needed to win in order to carry the 1860 election. and he ever so deliberately and carefully made himself the candidate in 1860. so his political skills are we --ear, his success for successor andrew johnson, have political skills that are way down there. johnson in an incredibly inept exultant -- exhibition of

lyrical full hardiness, estranged himself from the party -- to be sure, johnson was not a republican. you been up prewar democrat. he was officially part of what they call the union party in 1864. but to do what he did and to not justrly alienate the radicals of the party, but the moderates of the party -- which is what he did in 1866 -- i can't imagine lincoln going that way. i think lincoln in 1866 would i figured out a way to work with people like william penn thus in and one of the leaders of the moderate senate and come up with something that would have been, you know, kind of building on the civil rights act of 1866. where he would have ended up, i'm not sure. lincoln, i'm sure, was aware this was not going to be easy. but certainly am a by keeping the republican party together and avoiding this karen does split between president and

congress, it would have been different. some historians take the view, well, we have johnson to thank for the fact we got the constitutional amendments -- well, the 14th and 15th. because without his hand handedness, that would not have happened. maybe that is true. jujitsu anderse johnson may be did not get what he wanted and got the reverse of what he wanted, but certainly, johnson's polarizing policies and writing off the whole republican party was just political insanity. and what we call radical reconstruction was the result. i will go to the site now. >> a quick comment. my, is about the purpose of national myths. they sometimes have great value in unifying the country, creating a national identity and aspirational, an

goal. i think it is fine for wise men and women to realize how far our society is from the myth. it is still good to have them i believe. my question has to do with the the -- what did you call it, the freedom nationalists? when lincoln's outreach to the south in his first inaugural address failed. what was their response to him? prof. crofts: ok, first, on the question of myths. yes, i think we need myths. i was confessing in the end, in my own ambivalent way, i honored these myths that the arc of bends in the right direction. i really want to believe it. and yet there is contrary evidence. on the question of the actual card-carrying members of the republican party and their response to lincoln's inaugural address, there wasn't much

pushback. i mean, lincoln -- the election of lincoln is what they have been working for you for many of them, for decades. so somebody like giddings was no longer a member of congress, but people like him and the more far right republicans, that if stevens, lovejoy, they probably would have said, he is saying what yes to say. we think he is with us. we're glad he is president. but the out and out abolitionists -- wendell phillips i did not mention, i did mention frederick douglass. they were furious at lincoln. they consider this a betrayal when lincoln gave this sort of, ok, if you want the amendment, you know, it says what i've always assumed was implicit, you can make it explicit, no problem. the abolitionists hated that. >> thank you. with the dred scott decision, would it have been possible to

prevent the spread of slavery? >> well, the question of the spread of slavery is much discussed. my point would be that the territories that were then owned by the united states were not simple dish suitable for slavery as it was practiced in the south. it did not rain much out in arizona and new mexico. there were not slaveholders standing in line who wanted to take their slaves out there. if you owned a valuable slave, you wanted that sleep working for know, and mississippi or louisiana or east texas where you could get a good return on your investment. there's also this question of the future of slavery, the possibility of expanding. many historians, some probably in the room today, would say, hey, this is a big deal. the south was desperate to expand in the caribbean, and this is really what the fuss was about in 1860 and 1861. i don't think so. south,te an independent

the confederate states of america, you immediately give up and renounce any chance for expansion into cuba or the caribbean. and they seemed to have done that without camino, without a twitch. so i think the whole argument of the need to expand slavery has been greatly overplayed. you have a kind of mirror image situation where the republicans are saying, we want to stop slavery in the territories and we want, by the way, our radical so let hear us say that them feel, hey, this is the first step in the right direction. but the way it worked in mirror image reverse is that southern slaveholders and southern politicians could then say, these republicans want to stop slavery in the territories and they say, well, they knew how to say, but we know this is just the first step and soon it will be coming after slavery in the

states and igniting all sorts of troubles in the south. thatn't dare of them take first step. i would say a great deal of political theaters involved more than tangible reality. this is my view. there are people in the audience who would disagree. >> you spoke about the white southern views prior to the secession and prior to the war. what the effect was among the non-slaveowning or , and why slaveowning first in the deep south in the upper south they, too, were drawn into that position of secession? prof. crofts: this has always been a question that is troubling. we note even in the deep south that a majority of white people were not slaveholders. and when you go to the uppers out, it becomes a relatively small minority. and you're never going to fill those confederate armies unless

you have lots and lots of white non-slaveholders who are ready to fight and die for the confederacy. i think the best way of resolving this paradox is to what the old south was actually like the local grassroots level. and what you find there are kind of clusters of kind of communities in which the big guy in the neighborhood exercises patron-client relationship with the ordinary people in the neighborhood. i have a particular jurist in political history. the political history. what you often see in southern never would is political unanimity or near unanimity. if the big guy the neighborhood is a democrat, the ordinary folk around there are democrats. it has to do also with the way in which the big i can provide them with benefits.

you have a small farm, you do a bale or two of cons, you don't have the means of affording a gin of your own. the big guy can help you out. t is done in a way that --written about this the way in which this sort of warmth of relationships the between white southerners who were humble and those who were privileged tended to kind of bring white southerners together as a band of brothers. i would also go back to debbie j cash whose book, now long ago, published the year i was born, i think also helps to elucidate this way in which the white southerners pulled together. through serendipity, this turns out to be a related question.

i read a paper recently in which the author said the south was quite wealthy, the plant talk received. so wealthy that only great britain was a richer country. i don't know if that is factual or not. but let's say it was. and was that enough, also, that plantocracy was the 1% of its day, and was that enough to give them the confidence to start a war and win it? prof. crofts: good question. if the question does assume an element of what you might call rationality that i find missing. i see the whole march toward secession as a kind of panic mobck in which a sort of

mentality sets in. the leaders might have known that they somehow persuaded themselves, hey, if a whole bunch of people heading up the same blind alley and were heading up together, there must be power in numbers and they deluded themselves into not really thinking seriously about where this might go. there was a great deal of unwarranted confidence, both north and south, in april and may 18th asked he won that this was going to be a short war, would be over soon. and the reason they felt that way was because each could see as i looked around the camino, ofd, either in wisconsin or down in alabama, a tremendous outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm and volunteering such as had never been seen before. it seemed reasonable to assume, hey, nobody could ever stand up to this huge groundswell we see building right in front of us.

were the planters 1%? there was a little more than that, especially in the deep south where plantation slavery was strongest and where the slave holdings were largest. but, yes, it is an example of how, you know, a relatively privileged minority that has all can kind ofages, push their agenda forward, but they're pushing it forward in the context of democratic politics. they have to get ordinary people to believe that this is theirs, too, and that they have a dog in this fight. >> thank you. lincolnu mentioned working with his allies in congress to get the first original 13thhe amendment passed through congress. was he drawing up plans to help get it through and ratified by the states?

if so, did he anticipate there being more or less difficulty than getting it passed through congress? lincoln and: well, seward somehow took time during the crazy chaotic weeks that thatwed to sign documents were sent out to the governors of each of the 34 states. i found there were copies of these documents down in the archives in north carolina, and they are in my book. so to that extent, lincoln and seward went through the proper procedures of notifying the government's, all of the states in the union, that is constitutional amendment or proposed amendment i just passed commerce by two thirds majorities and a way to the action of the states. but the whole thing was kind of cut off at the knees by the fighting at sumter six weeks later. it even then, a few states did ratify it.

away, and over the course of the next year, five other states ratified this would be amendment. it ceased to have any practical value as soon as the fighting started. it was devised as an effort to try to prevent fighting. what lincoln might have done with it is hard to say because everything was just up for grabs. i mean, you know, he gets through the inauguration and the long day involved and get up the next morning and here's the memo from robert anderson down in fort sumter saying he is running out of food. there is just no way to do more than just kind of grab at what is happening moment by moment. thank you. [applause]

on c-span3 "american history tv." >> >> the incoming president of the abraham lincoln institute has written a review of stephen's book for the journal of american history. let me quote. nation willo save a stand for years as the book on lincoln's relationship with governors. it is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand how the north mobilized to win the civil war." it