c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. the senate judiciary committee is meeting today to debate and vote on president trump's supreme court nominee. members are discussing the qualifications of judge neil gore shusuch and c-span2 has li

coverage. members are expected to vote on recommendation for the full senate today. judge neil gorsuch would take the seat formerly held by antonin scalia who died last february. majority leader mitch mcconnell has announced he plans to hold the final confirmation vote on judge gorsuch on friday. watch it on c-span2. today the white house released the official portrait of first lady melania trump. the picture was taken in the white house. tonight on the communicators, u.s. telecom president and ceo jonathan spalter talks about the internet and telecom landscape as congress takes steps to roll back privacy rules adopted by the fcc last october. he's interviewed by reuters tech and telecom reporter david shepherdson. >> the house voted 250-205 to reverse those broadband privacy rules that the fcc under chairman wheeler had adopted in october. never went into effect.

what are the protections you see consumers have in the wake of that vote? >> already our consumers, both yesterday and today, have strong privacy protections that ensure that the integrity of their sensitive data. our companies are aligned in ensuring that sensitive data, our social security numbers an other deeply sensitive aspects of our personal lives, need not and should not be actually transacted or shared on our networks. we're all committed to that. there is also very good news that the current chairman of the fcc and current interim chairman of the ftc have joined together in a common voice to say that as we move forward to evolving the frameworks for private of the future, trying to make them more consistent and harmonized, they will be acting together and in partnership to ensure that our consumers receive the kinds of privacy protections that they require. >> watch "the communicators" tonight at 8:00 eastern on

c-span2. the acting inspector general of the defense department, general glen fein, testified on allegations that u.s. central command altered intelligence related to combating isis. we also hear from the intelligence director of central command, officials from the defense department and defense intelligence agency, and others. this house armed services subcommittee hearing ran just under an hour. i'm delighted to convene the first oversight investigation subcommittee hearing for the 115th congress. before turning to the topic for today's hearing and introducing our witnesses, i want our new ranking member and others joining the subcommittee for the first time who will be coming shortly. in recent years this subcommittee has been engaged in

a wide variety of important national security topics. i'm eager to work with all of you to ensure we continue to exercise our constitutional responsibilities to help to oversee the department of defense. i'm happy to have mr. molton as the subcommittee's ranking member and look forward to his contributions to our work. i'm also pleased we are joint this year by mr. gates, mr. banks, miss cheney, mr. ohall ran and miss swazi. they are new to this committee. returning members, mr. conway and mr. scott. so i look forward to their keen insights. for today's hearing we are also joined by -- or will be joined by one or more committee members not members of the subcommittee. for any members of the full committee who are not members of the subcommittee, i ask unanimous consent they be permitted to participate in the hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee.

without objection with be so ordered. today's hearing topic is especially timely. three weeks ago the department of defense inspector general released a report about allegations that leadership within u.s. central command improperly manipulated intelligence products that led to an inaccurate understanding of the u.s. campaign against isis. as a consequence, 30 professionals in the inspector general's office undertook an inquiry into this matter. they conducted 152 interviews at centcom and reviewed thousands of pages of materials over the course of many months. although the report did not find systemic or intentional distortion of intelligence, or evidence of misconduct, the igd did conclude that centcom intelligence products could have and should have been better. the report also found a very challenging command climate at centcom and identified several process and procedural issues

which the ig believed impeded the intelligence analysis process. the inspector g pro authored 29 specific recommendations for improvements and discussed the need to implement corrective action. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning about the changes that have been made in response to the report, and the progress we can expect. i look forward to discussing these issues with the two panels today. before i introduce our first witness, i turn to oversight investigation subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that he would like to make. >> thank you, chairwoman hartzler. i would like to just take a quick moment to also recognize a couple new democratic members on the oversight investigation

subcommittee, tom ohall r hao'hd tom s wazi. i make sure congress never flinch wlz it comes to the difficult questions of ensuring our national security. i believe we'll doen a excellent job working together in that spirit and in the bipartisan tradition of this committee. in the united states, our policymakers and service members rely on intelligence analysis to make critical strategic operational and tactical decisions every day. some life or death. so it is imperative that we have adequate safeguards in place to ensure they receive objective, empirically based reporting on which it is ground truth. for that reason, when allegations arose last year about manipulation of intelligence at united states central command, congress encouraged the dod inspector general to conduct a thorough investigation and report back

with recommendations. the inspector general conducted an exhaustive investigation involving 152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions of e-mails, 425,000 documents and 140 finished intelligence products. in its final report they did not find evidence that intelligence was falsified or intentionally distorted, or that intelligence processes resulted in false narrative or systemic distortion. however, the ig did find evidence of issues that are concerning to the committee, including some that the chairwoman already mentioned. these include a poor command climate, low morale and ineffective if communication that suggested the integrity of the process was questionable. these findings demonstrate how it is paramount that we ensure the climate at centcom is improved and that better safeguards are in place. i believe these are exactly the types of issues that require serious scrutiny from the

oversight committee and i'd like to thank the chairwoman again for her leadership and interest in delving into this important topic today. >> thank you, appreciate your comments. i'm pleased to recognize the witness on our first panel, the honorable glen fein, acting inspector general for the department of defense. thank you for being here today. we welcome your opening statement. >> good afternoon. thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the investigation by the department of defense office of inspector general into allegations that senior officials at cent com falsified, distorted, delayed or suppressed intelligence products related to its efforts to degrade and destroy isil. these were very serious and troubling allegations, and we devote a significant resources to investigating them. we assembled a multi-disciplinary team of more nan 30 dod oig employees to handle the investigation. our team conducted over 150

interviews of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside of cent com. we examined in detail the specific intelligence products that were raised by the complainants and witnesses. in addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft and final intelligence products and e-mails produced by centcom. we also interviewed intelligence officials in the dod and the intelligence community for their assessments of centcom's intelligence products. we did not stop there. we conducted an analytical review of a random sample of 140 products to continue if there were changes to the ed ditz of these products and if such changes indicated any trend in pattern or distortion with regard to the portrayal of isis and the iraqi security forces as stronger or weaker. we also interviewed witnesses about the command climate in centcom's intelligence directorate and reviewed command climate surveys. finally we examined in detail

the management processes for introducing intelligence products in centcom to determine if there were inefficiencies or weaknesses in need of improvement. our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-page classified report of investigation which we have provided to this and other congressional committees. in addition, we prepared a 190-page unclassified report of investigation which we publicly released. in short, our investigation did not substantiate the most serious allegation that intelligence was falsified. similarly, we did not find systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence by centcom's senior leaders or that the leaders suppressed or delayed intelligence products. however, we did find a troubling and widespread perception among many intelligence analysts that their leaders were attempting to distort the intelligence products. we also identified specific weaknesses and flaws in the centcom management processes for creating intelligence products. we believe these deficiencies

such as ineffective communication and guidance, lack of adequate feedback, uncertainty about various policies, and the ambiguous status of dia analysts assigned to centcom hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of centcom intelligence processes and it affected the morale of the analytical workforce. we concluded that these practices related to intelligence products in centcom could have, and should have, been better. and that further improvements can be made. we therefore made 29 recommendations that relate to the issues we investigated. some of the most important recommendations or that centcom should improve feedback, communication, and guidance between its leaders and the intelligence workforce. centcom should update and maintain its standard operating procedures related to intelligence production. the relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that apply to dia analysts should be

detailed and clarified in writing, and centcom leaders should require that intelligence products consider analysis of alternatives. we also recommended that senior leaders in the responsible organizations review the report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described. we believe that all 29 recommendations are important, and that they provide a useful road map for improving intelligence processes, not only in centcom, but throughout other combatant commands in the dod. we also note that many of our recommendations are consistent with what the house of representatives task force recommended. we therefore urge the dod, dia, and centcom to take these recommendations seriously and to fully implement corrective action in response to the recommendations or to explain in detail why such corrective action is not necessary or warranted. we believe that such actions can further improve intelligence processes and reduce the risk that allegations such as the

ones at issue in this report will arise in the future. thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation with the subcommittee. that concludes my statements. i would be glad to's a answer a questions. >> thank you very much, mr. fine. i appreciate your very good work. this is the unclassified version, and then with another 500-page classified, you really have put a lot of effort into this. there is a lot of things in here that we can learn from. i guess that's my first question because i have seen in other instances the excellent work that's done by the dodig or the cigar offices. but the story seems to never continue after the report is issued. so can you please tell me your responsibilities after you release your report, and is there any one that ensures your recommendations are implemented? >> yes. we typically take follow-up action to inquire from the responsible organizations what they intend to do with regard to our recommendations.

we want specific details about whether they agree or disagree and whether they can concur with the recommendations or whether they tend to implement other things to address the intent of the . and in cases we go back and test to verify that they have done that. these are important recommendations. we intend to do that and we follow up with them and ensure that they take correct action. >> is the follow actions, is that made public, too? >> sometimes it is. it depends if we do a follow up report. often we provide in our semiannual reports of the status of our recommendations, we do that as well. sometimes we are happy to provide the committee with information of the status of recommendations as time goes on as well.

>> this report you issued january 31st, 2017, is that right? >> yes. >> when will you go back and check and see they are following up on the recommendations? >> we follow up after that as well. periodic time periods depending on the recommendation itself. >> how has centcom and other agencies responded to the report recommendations and do you assess they're willing and reluctant to issue the change that you suggest? >> when we issued the report, they thought it is a thorough report. in general, the reaction has been generally positive but the proof is in the pudding, we want

to see what they intend to do with regards to each recommendation. >> it is important to pursue the follow up and i look forward to you continued looking at this. turn to the ranking members, questions? >> thank you, madame chair. >> mr. fine, i share with chairman vie chairman's views of the quality of your report and the importance of it and gives us a lot of confidence of such good work are being done. recommendations are implemented so that is very important. sort of looking further into the future. if there were here or elsewhere of an act attempt to manipulate and intelligence analysis and sometimes in the future, do we have adequate protection in place to guard against that. >> i think we do. i think there are the opportunity to make those complaints known and there are entities within the department of defense that we'll look into that including us.

as you saw, we took these allegations seriously and a-- wo can be an advid for these kinds of concerns. i think there are opportunities and improvements. >> this issue with the dia analyst's role that you cite is a real issue here. can you give us an example or clarity to how that played out.

>> not knowing who exactly they work for and not knowing various operating procedures and what the reports were and what the intent of the reports were. it needs to be clarified exactly what kind of training they receive and who they are working for and what kind of certifications they need to have. what their exact relationship to the combatting command as well as dia. >> we found ambiguity about that. we talked to the senior leaders as well not knowing of the committee. that's concerning to us and there needs to be clarity in writing and documented including the standard operating procedures they have. that needs to be clarified. >> there are clearly process and improvements that need to be made. you address that in your report as well. have the ig received any similar

complaints of command climate issue or process issues at other cocome? >> we have never receive anything like this in terms of intensity and the number of concerns that we had. so this was unusual. it was very unusual. >> my final question is, do you have any plans to share the recommendations of your findings with others so this kind of things will not happen in the future. >> we have made the information known and gave them to the department and dia. the dia and as well as the department itself made sure that others are aware of this and they can provide this. >> a use for road map for others as well. >> that's one of the important things that need to be done and not solely on folks of centcom

but having folks to look at this as well to see of other improvement they make and as well as the die and dia. >> thank you very much. >> we are ready to vote right now. we are ready to recess here. i want to let everyone know that there are a second panel. we do have representatives of the dia and centcom and officers under secretary of defense and joint staff that'll be testifying next. i hope everyone will be able to come back and we'll finish our questioning with mr. fine. we'll get their response as well. i call us recess if after votes. thank you.

we'll reconvene, we appreciate your patience while we are voting. thank you very much for waiting. i know there are some other members here. i did have another question for you, before our second panel in your opening statement, you said that you did find they distorted the project. they did not falsify but you used the word "distorted." >> we found that they did not intentionally distort the product or suppress or delay. we found a perception of that. we found processes that needed improvements. we did not find systematic or intentional distortion. >> when you are conducting this