policy issues that impact you. coming up saturday morning, roosevelt institute fellow discusses overhaul of the dodd frank regulation law. and on the supreme court's decision to hear a cell phone privacy case. and how the every student succeeds act is impacting the ability of states to identify ineffective teachers. watch c-span's washington journal live at 7:00 a.m. eastern saturday morning. join the discussion. the arms control association held its annual meeting earlier this month in washington, d.c. the event included a decision on the nuclear weapons nonproliferations treaty and its future. there was an awards presentation for the 2016 arms control person of the year. this portion is an hour and a

half. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. good morning and welcome to the 2017 arms control association annual meeting. i'm the executive director of the arms control association and as most of you know we're an independent nonpartisan membership organization established in 1971 and dedicated to reducing and eliminating the threats post by the world's most dangerous weapons which could, of course, be nuclear, biological as well as conventional weapon that is that pose particular waharm and risk to civilians. you can find out more about the arms control association, its history, ongoing work and to get more information about these

issues through our website, armscontrol.org and you can follow us on twitter on arms control now. the latest issue of our arms control today just went online, so you can check that out there and you can check out resources on our arms control app which is simply arms control on all of the app stores. we are very pleased to see so many of you here today, members, friends, colleagues from the diplomatic community and we welcome you those who are with us watching in on c-span and for those of you following on social media, the twitter handle for today's event to be part of the conversation is armscontrol17. so the theme of this year's arms control association annual meeting is arms control and nonproliferation restraint at risk and they are, we are facing serious and unprecedented challenges this year in ongoing

cast to reduce the nuclear danger. the bedrock of all nonproliferation efforts, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty faces implementation challenges. we have key commitments and nonproliferation obligations that are unfulfilled and that's led many of the world nonnuclear states to begin negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons and we'll talk about that later today. with the deterioration with the u.s.-russia relations, key arms control treaties including the new strategic arms treaty are at risk as well as the nuclear forces treaty and worst still all of the world's major nuclear arms states are either replacing, upgrading or in some cases, expanding their nuclear arsenals. and last but not least, unless we can work with our allies to engage north korea in talks to halt and reverse its nuclear

missile pursuits, its capabilities will become more dangerous in the years ahead. so how the united states will respond to these challenges and whether the united states continues to provide global leadership is not entirely clear and that's part of what we are going to be talking about today. president trump has made statements that concern key allies, he's made statements about expanding u.s. nuclear capabilities, he's been highly critical of some agreements like the new start treaty and the iran nuclear deal. we've got great line-up of speakers and experts and panelists to address these issues. we are specially happy to have later today senior white house adviser christopher ford, during lunch hour and the new u.n. high representative for disarmament who is going to be closing out the conference with perspectives from the international community and the united nations. but before we move to the first

part of the program, i want to give a brief bit of thanks and shout-out to individual members and contributors who made today's event possible. some of their names are on the tables here at the carnegie endowment for national peace. that's important because we are a small organization and we try to have a big impact and it means that your donations make a huge difference. and in response to these challenges we are really gratified that our members have responded over the last few months. we've seen an up tick in contributions at this very important time. so we are very happy to have several organizations and individuals help with contributions in this conference including colleague organization in the nuclear peace foundation, which is committed to world free of nuclear weapons, our partners at women's action for new directions, empowers women to be able to support peace. and our individual sponsors for

today's event. pierce gordon, andrew weber and two members of the arms control association who wish to remain anonymous. so thanks to you all and thanks to everyone who is here, we cannot do it without you. and we could also make -- cannot make progress on the issues without leaders in arms control and that's why ten years ago we launched the arms control person of the year award. we felt it was important to recognize the important work of key individuals who in various ways in different parts of the world have catalyzed awareness and action to deal with these weapons-related challenges. each year the staff and the board of directors nominate several individuals about 10 to a dozen who we think have provided notable leadership in the previous year and then we put it all to an online vote and the top vote getter becomes the arms control person of the year. so it's an imperfect process,

perhaps, but so far our elections have been free of any cyberhacking and we think it's a free and fair process that is about as democratic as it can be. and the republic of the marshal islands and former foreign minister of the marshal islands, tony debroom gathered the highest votes of 2016 and they are our arms control persons of the year. over 150 people from countries participated in the voting this year back in december and that is a record for this contest. our winners were nominated and are being recognized for pursuing a formal legal case in the international court of justice against the world's nuclear arms states for failing to meet their obligations to initiate nuclear disarmament negotiations. the people in the marshal islands were subjected to 67

u.s. atmospheric test explosions. so unfortunately tony who had accepted our invitation to come here to fly all the way from his home in the south pacific is unable to be with us due to health difficulties and the republic of marshal islands is out of washington today on official business. so we've asked john boros who is the executive director and a member of the legal team that brought the suit to aa few words about tony and the significance of the case in the larger scheme of things. john, thanks for being with us to explain the importance of this. [ applause ] >> thank you, darrell. in bringing the nuclear disarmament cases before the international court of justice, the marshal islands in then

foreign minister tony debroom showed courage and determination rooted in tragic experience. they also showed good faith in seeking law-guided solutions. tony and the marshal islands have shown similar courage and determination in confronting climate change. tony played a catalytic role at the negotiation that is yielded the paris climate agreement in december 2015. he helped to bring together a large coalition of nations the high ambition coalition that strengthened the agreement and perhaps even made it possible. so in light of developments yesterday, i think i should quote a couple of things that the marshal islands and the high ambition coalition has said. president hilda heine said yesterday that president trump's

intention to withdraw from the paris agreement she said this, well, today's decision will have grave impacts, we must not give up hope. the high ambition coalition convened by marshal islands as released a statement for people around world most vulnerable to climate change, the paris agreement represents the best hope for survival. the arms control persons of the year award, of course, was about arms control, so let me return to that. we were, of course, very disappointed that last fall by the narrowest of margins the international court of justice decided not to adjudicate the nuclear disarmament cases on the merits, however, simply bringing the cases raised the world attention the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill the obligation to negotiate and

reach the global elimination of nuclear weapons. that was what the court said in its 1996 advisory opinion unanimously, that's what the court said the obligation is. for those of you who like to dig into things, the marshal islands pleadings are also a rich resource for the development of political and legal arguments for disarmament. in the uk memorial, in the uk case, the international legal team argued the merits because that's just the way the case unfolded. so as darrell mentioned from 1946 to 1958 the u.s. conducted 67 atmospheric tests. in the marshal islands at the atolls at bikini. they included the first hydrogen bomb test, m.i.k.e. in 1952 and

the infamous bravo test in 1954, 15 mega tons, 1,000 times the size of the hiroshima and nagasaki bombs. up tony debroom was a young child fishing with his father when he witnessed the test. the sky bled red, he told in march 2016, the marshal islands cases before the international court of justice were not about compensation for the effects of testing. when the cases were filed in april 2014, tony said, our people have suffered the catastrophic and irreparable damage of these weapons and we vow to fight so that no one else on earth will ever again experience these atrocities. tony also said in accepting the

2015 right livelihood award, i have seen with my very own eyes nuclear devastation and know with conviction that nuclear weapons must never again be visited upon humanity. this is not just an issue of treaty commitments or international law, though it is that, and not just an issue of ethics or morality, though it is that too, but this is an issue of common sense. how could any one common person walking down the road, street, ever permit the possession or use of such weapons. so i think that the marshal islands and tony debroom richly deserve this award and i thank darrell and the arms control association very much for arranging it. [ applause ]

>> it's an actual award. i want to ask you, john, to help us get this to the marshal islands to tony. thanks a lot. all right, and thank you, john, for helping to explain and to remind us about humanitarian impacts of the work that we are discussing here today and the interconnectedness of these issues for all of the earth's inhabitants. now it's time to turn to the first panel of the day which is the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the nuclear weapon ban talks, a status report. and i'd like to ask our three panelists to come up to the podium. we are going to make a quick transition here. they're already miked up. as they come up to the stage our moderator is ambassador susan burke. susan along with a panelist were selected to join the arms

control association board of directors and susan among other career accomplishments was the head of the u.s. delegation to the successful 2010 nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conference. so with that, susan, the floor is yours and we are going to begin. thank you. >> okay. thank you. good morning. is that the feedback? our first panel today is going tackle the challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as it approaches 50th anniversary of the entry into force. it'll be in 2020, the review conference and in particular the panel is going to address the efforts that are currently under way under u.n. usaupises.

challenges are not new and in pursuit of measures to strengthen implementation is ongoing. the negotiations on a ban treaty are the results of growing international frustration over the pace of progress on nuclear disarmaments and new to articles and this frustration has fueled deepening concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use among many nations and civil society. now, supporters of the ban treaty believe that it will fill a legal gap in the mpt and give a boost to disarmament in a way that complements the npt, not competes with the npt. another group of states including ntp weapon states are insisting that they are a step-by-step or progressive approach to nuclear disarmament has been and remains a proven way to reduce existing arsenals. now, this morning we will hear

from two experienced diplomats and experts on this subject. there's a brief biography of each gentleman in the program. tom countryman, career member of the senior foreign service achieving the rank of minister councillor and he served as the acting undersecretary for arms control and international security and simultaneously as the assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation where i had the honor of working for him for about a year. ambassador jan kick earth is an ambassador in austria's permanent representative in new york. he was the director general for political affairs in the austrian minister foreign affairs and also served in government positions. his government as many of you know has been among the leaders in the humanitarian consequences movement. now we will start with ambassador kikert who is prepared to address the goals, value and the possible shape of a new prohibition or ban treaty. then we will have mr. countryman focus comments on the convention, on what the convention needs to contain, what its sponsors need to do to

make progress towards its goals and hopefully to address the intersection of the ban and the npt. after about 15 minutes of remarks by each, whether he open the floor to your questions and so without further ado i will start off with ambassador kikert. >> thank you very much. i don't think i'll need the 15 minutes for introductions. >> okay. >> but rather save time for the q & as. i also have to say i am not a disarmament specialist. i am a diplomat for decades and i also deal with disarmament. i'm not the peace negotiator for the peace meeting which is going to be started 15 june at the

united nations with the view of hopefully concluding such a treaty by the end of the three week span beginning in july. i just wanted to explain a little bit to you how did we come here? you said the role of austria in disarmament, it's not only nuclear disarmament, you would have always found austria at the core group, the van guard of any initiative. so because we believe that a world with less weapons, especially deadly weapons, is a safer one and not vice versa. this is our general approach to it. and being here i want to give you a little bit of perspective of those countries who are behind the prohibition. i have a feeling that the united states discussed among

themselves, maybe also with other nuclear weapon states but don't hear so much what you mentioned, the frustration of all those involved parties to the nonproliferation treaty because it has really built up this frustration. if i want to very, very sharp in saying, of being cheated. the npt said out a set of commitments and nonnuclear weapon states, they are sticking to that commitment of not acquiring a nuclear weapon on the other hand, some do not stick to their commitment. so the whole result of this treaty is the result of this frustration and the feeling that there needs to be some added

element so that we will fulfill. the npt in its entirety. so how did this come to today? it all started out with the initiative based on a speech of then president of the international -- in february of 2010. and this was taken also to be -- in 2010 and there was also a mention then of the humanitarian consequences. and built on that we have three conferences in mexico and vienna to just go in depth and ask experts about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. and actually this was an

extremely sobering experience. i was there in vienna. and to be honest, i was shocked to learn that the dangers of nuclear weapons are so much graver than we -- i was aware of. and i think we all are aware of. and that somehow, this was shoved under the carpet. the huge danger nuclear weapons pose to each and everyone on this planet, be it in the nuclear weapons states, be it those who just happen to be those, like austria. we are situated not so far away from -- the air base there where we think there are nuclear weapons. if anything happens, we will

hear -- we will feel the consequences like the italians as much as them. and so it was shocking details and one of them, i'd like to cite because of the huge potential impact of nuclear weapons, some -- [ inaudible ] math the danger for our children to die from a nuclear incident is actually higher than from a car accident because if something happens it will be so devastating that the numbers are so huge that those who die from car accidents the danger is smaller.

everything about the human kind and we were just damn lucky that nothing has happened until today, accident, human error. nothing has ever happened. this is a wonder. we are playing russian roulette here and why would we want to continue that? so this was the not vegas why we pushed and this was not by coincidence before the 2015 npt press conference which unfortunately yielded no results. there is no, from our point of view no willingness of the -- from the nuclear weapons state to disarm, to fulfill their

obligation under article 6:00 v the npt. and yes, it is the nuclear weapon state you have to and can turn around, working for nuclear disarmament that's also an obligation for nonnuclear weapon states to help fulfill which has the overwhelming support of the international community. the general assembly resolution was -- are against this process are the nuclear weapons states, the umbrella states and those countri countries in formal or formal alliances with the nuclear weapon states and we were actually astonished also to see the -- of working against,

lobbying against our prohibition treaty which we -- as you said in the beginning, are complement for the -- for us, the nonproliferation treaty is and stays the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. but as the word cornerstone already says this is not the whole building. and we have had other instruments to complement the npt, the comprehensive test ban treaty is another example of that. treaty is an example of that. we also see how important it is to have more and more weapons of nuclear -- and maybe one day we will have a material cutoff treaty. these are complementary to the goal. we have all committed ourselves, namely getting rid of all nuclear weapons. and i like to remind everybody

also that the first general assembly resolution after the foundation of the united nations was exactly on the issue of getting rid of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and we believe that the proponents of the prohibition treaty that it is a good instrument to go ahead to create a legal norm prohibiting it as we have with the biologic and chemical yeah, biological and technical prohibition treaties were also not universal at the beginning. mpt was not universal. and so we believe that our endeavor could add a very important element to our common

goal of ridding the planet of -- >> thank you very much. >> okay. microphone good? well, thanks, susan, ambassador kike are. t. it's an honor to be here with you. it's an honor to be here for the annual meeting. among many of the public issues that the american people have to be ready to discuss and to raise their own consciousness, arms control threats have to be near top. so it's important for all of us in this room to go beyond and do further public outreach on these issues. as i started jot doing ideas a

couple weeks ago they were fairly incouate and i read an article about the draft convention to prohibit nuclear weaponance if you have 15 minutes it is probably better spent reading the article than listening to me. but you are already seated and i'm already seated so we'll plow right ahead. just a few words first about the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which as ambassador kikert said is the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. there is widespread, as he said, frustration, disappointment that the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty have not been achieved. and that frustration merits analysis. it merits discourse. it merits even pressure upon the nuclear weapon states to move

faster, to realize the commitments that they've made in article vi. what is not sensible is to doubt the treaty itself. what makes no sense is to say that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is the problem. that's absolutely aiming at the wrong target. and i think that the current review process for the npt, the treaty, is always at risk of being confused with the treaty itself. there is no question that the five-year review cycle is a matter of great frustration to diplomats whose professional specialization is disarmament and nonproliferation. it is very difficult to get 180 some countries to come to consensus on a final document.

and that frustrates those who see that there ought to be progress, that there ought to be better reports on commitments made by both nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states on the progress that they've made. but a couple of quick points about the nonproliferation treaty process. an unhealthy process, and overly complex, overly ambitious and overly contentious review process is one thing. it does not mean that the treaty itself is failing, or even that it is sick. the treaty continues to be, in my view, the single treaty that in the history of the world has done more to contribute to the security of every nation in the world by greatly restricting

what could have been an unbounded nuclear arms race. and even those countries that are frustrated continue to benefit from the essential agreement at the core of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. no other treaty has done as much for the security of nonnuclear weapon states, as well as nuclear weapon states. so this leads to just one point of connection between the npt and the convention that is currently under discussion in new york. and that is the single strongest recommendation i have for those who are drafting the treaty is to make explicit that membership and adherence to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is a precondition for adherence to the convention on the

prohibition of nuclear weapons. there is no inconsistency at all between the goals and what is likely to be the final language of the convention on prohibition of nuclear weapons. i have heard the concerns by some about what they would call forum shopping. that is, that there may be countries that for political reasons are tempted to embrace the convention, the new convention but then to withdraw from the npt. it doesn't sound very logical, and yet i've done enough in the nonproliferation field to know that logic does not always win over politics. and it is possible to envision a situation in which, for political, tactical reasons, a country like iran or egypt, could make that choice. why create an issue?

why create a circumstance in which the nuclear weapons states you are trying to convince have an argument about inconsistency between the most important treaty we have now and this new convention? just avoid the argument by including a specific recommendation, a specific requirement for npt membership in the krchl p -- cpnw and don't hide behind frustration that we are not happy with how that treaty has been implemented. and just one very small point, ambassador, believe me, the frustration expressed by austria and other leaders of this effort has been heard in washington. whether it's being heard today, i am less qualified to judge.

all right, let me talk a little bit about the process so far. first i want to express my great respect for what's been accomplished so far in the draft of the convention. it's at the upper end of what i thought achievable in the first session of the negotiation. and i think it is in the direction of what ambassador kikert said is the task, what can nonnuclear weapon states do to help to fulfill article vi of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty? the requirement fully accepted by the u.s. and all the other nuclear powers to work towards nuclear disarmament. it is a contribution in that regard. what is crucial and what i'll talk about more is what can be done in the next negotiating session. within the text and in the statements that states make

outside of the negotiation that actually moves us closer, makes a contribution to the very long-term undertaking of achieving it purpose. so here, as you draft, i've been in enough of these things to know that a draft, especially if it is going to take the form of a treaty, is going to have some incoherence because it represents compromises among different states or groups of states. i hope that the drafters seek to avoid that incoherence by focusing on what is the ultimate goal. and the. you goal is to persuade nuclear weapon states that they can go

to complete nuclear disarmament without damaging their own security. much of the argument on the margins of the convention negotiation is not about security. it is rather about political pressure, which matters, about morality, about establishing norms. all of those are important. none of those are going to win the argument. the argument will be about security. so just a few free points of advice. you don't have to pay for them, honest. first, during the negotiation and afterwards, stay on the high road. staying on the high road does not mean assuming an air of moral superiority. it does not mean giving lectures

to nuclear weapon states. it does not mean taking a disdainful attitude or accusing them of bad faith, even if that's what you believe. and i'm very conscience of the need to avoid giving lectures, even at a time when we have a president who likes to lecture our closest allies. but don't reciprocate that urge to be hectoring and lecturing. rather, take seriously the real security dilemmas that both nuclear weapon states and those states that you referred to as umbrella states, i prefer the term those who enjoy extended deterrence, take seriously their security issues. second, pick carefully the targets that you want to persuade. and by that i mean, above all don't delay, don't avoid

choosing the hard targets. again, as george perkovich points out in his article, it's natural with a movement that depends largely upon civil societies, upon ngos in democratic societies to start seeking to persuade democracies. and to lead aside those nuclear weapon states, russia, china, and above all, north korea, that are impervious to any kind of outside rational argument. but to focus only on the democratic states that are part of the western alliance or the asian states that are under extended der deterrence, risks being perceived as a

discriminatory movement, and it risks having that used against the movement. that used against the movement. it will be easy for people not only in the city but elsewhere to say that this is a one-sided movement, that seeks to damage western national security without addressing what is happening in, other nuclear policies of nondemocratic countries. and, in fact, again, i think perkovich makes this point well. it actually risks emboldening the nuclear posture and the doctrine of use of those nondemocratic countries. how do you persuade those countries? well, i know anything anybody who has worked in arms control as a diplomat knows that one of the building frustrations is that the issues that we care passionately about and that we get immersed in and become

expert in, seldom rise to the level of our presidents or our prime ministers. president obama was an exception in terms of the time and serious thought and study that he gave to these issues. but in most countries, no matter how deeply the director general for arms control feels about the issue, it is unlikely that the president or prime minister is going to raise that or make that subject a primary topic of conversation with other world leaders, particularly, with the leaders of nuclear weapon states. so there's a need not only to make sure that your national leadership cares about this issue as deeply as you do, but also cares about it enough to apply equally the outreach to all the nuclear weapon states.

now, it's not only the five recognized nuclear weapon states and the others who are outside of the npt but it's clear from the discussions in new york that civil society intends to focus on those allies in nato and in asia who are covered by extended deterrence or as you say, a nuclear umbrella. and that's understandable. but just a word about the practical effects that you're likely to get in europe. you should not expect great results. whether -- within nato -- whether the goal is the removal of a small number of tactical nuclear weapons that the u.s. has pre-positioned in a few european states or whether it's convincing nato to change its self-definition as a nuclear alliance. it is for me very difficult to

see any of these governments changing fundamentals of their security policy at a time when there is a genuine threat of aggression, when, in fact, european countries are occupied by their neighbor, and that there is a willingness to use both conventional and non-conventional means of warfare to destabilize nato members. indeed, i think a lot of european countries, members of nato, would see a change in that policy as inviting additional aggression, whether overt or covert. but again, i'd like to warn the advocates of the convention against giving lectures. i know i'm giving a lecture. i got the irony. a nato ally for the republic of

korea or japan facing a genuine security threat will not take well a lesson about their defensive policy from a state that is unwilling to give the same lecture, or even condemnation, or even condemnation backed by painful action against those who perpetrate aggression, whether it's in pyongyang or in moscow. just a further point on europe and nato, even if one ally or five allies decides that they would like the u.s. to remove these tactical p-61 bombs, it is a limited step and it doesn't fundamentally change. it's an important change but it doesn't fundamentally change nato's security policy, nor does it fundamentally change united

states nuclear posture. while i'm sure it would be welcome by advocates of the convention as an important step forward, it's important to be aware of how limited that would be. it's a huge step from discussing or changing policy on tactical weapons to questioning what not only the u.s. but other nuclear weapon states have defined as the central purpose of possessing nuclear weapons, which is to deter anyone else using them. so to try to sum up, what can you do to make this current effort to negotiate a convention on prohibition live up to its potential? well, a couple things that are in the treaty that need attention and one i think others

can talk about, which is to strengthen and make specific what kind of safeguards regime would be necessary for adherence to the convention. and as i mentioned my very strong recommendation to link this to the nonproliferation treaty by making mandatory membership as a prerequisite. second, i hope that the advocates of the convention, both in the next month and afterwards, will do all they can to elaborate a verification mechanism that would give confidence to actual declarations of non-possession. here again, george perkovich has some good ideas. i would add that the non-nuclear weapon states would be smart, work hard on initiatives such as

the international partnership for nuclear disarmament verification. it is a concrete area in which nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states can work together towards a specific goal. third and very difficult, requiring long-term work is to elaborate what would be the actual process of disarmament. it is not something that you can dictate to the nuclear weapon states, but it is something where you can give serious thought to how to get step-by-step -- i know people don't like that phrase -- you'd like it better if you wrote some of the steps yourself, and it would add credibility to the movement itself. and finally, on suggestions, once this convention is drafted i would hope that the excellent

diplomats who worked on it put their attention not just on public opinion, on propagating the text, but on working with diplomats and military officials who are experts not just on negotiation but on real-world security challenges. what can be done? what would you do if you were in the position of london or paris or beijing or washington? what are the security challenges that could be addressed that would give those states confidence in building down and building towards zero? and i would even suggest something that i think is of enormous practical value, which is a very extensive simulations of such discussions. if the u.s. and russia are having a hard time talking to

each other about their strategic stability challenges, i think we could learn something from diplomats, from mexico, from austria and elsewhere, playing the role of washington and moscow and talking to each other. and last point, this is what i would hope would be the u.s. position, and i hope we will hear it from dr. ford today and i think it's very well summarized in an article on the same topic by michael cre be. on and just to summarize his summary, i hope the u.s. will express understanding of the sincere motives of those who are pushing for these convention. i hope that the u.s. will offer motives of those who are pushing for these convention. i hope that the u.s. will offer respectfully specific concerns about the text and about what comes after. that the u.s. can articulate in

detail the circumstances under which it will be possible to build down and to move to zero. and most concretely, i hope to see the u.s. agree with russia on the extension of the you? s.t.a.r.t. treaty and reassert its commitment to further streenl ar strategic arms reductions. a lot of this is very ambitious. i think it's no more ambitious than the convention itself. i hope that the sponsors will keep their eye on the long-term calendar, not just to get through june, with a text that elicits champagne and hugs, but a strategy that actually addresses the real-world concerns of those who feel that nuclear weapons offer them security and that can lay the basis for a very respectful

partnership between the non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear weapon states. thank you. [ applause ] you. >> i want to thank you both for bringing up this issue in such a substantive and creative way. and ambition these days is something we all ought to strive for, and positive energy. i want to open up one question before we open up the floor. you both focus on the ban negotiation ands ban treaty. think we have a lot of great food for thought here and can have a conversation. looking ahead to 2020 and the npt, if the negotiations are completed this year or next, the question i would have, if i were active duty, would be will the nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapons states be able to agree to disagree on this issue whether they convene

for the mpt review conference and be prepared to move on to find common ground and also constructive discussion of how do they ease the growing tensions between the states? i mean there's serious questions about security instability. tom, you made some clear references to that. can we move with this now beyond that to again come together in a create of search for common ground. >> narrator: auspices of the npt? i open it up to both of you. >> again, from more political and less of a specialist point of view, yes, i think we can. thank you very much, tom. i think that was extremely constructive. and, yes, we also are used to being lectured. so we can take that. and it was very constructive proposals. i think there we found a lot of common ground.

for us and others who are the core group driving this process like ireland which is at the outset, we would do nothing to the contrary. the suggestions you made and also the safeguards and verification are well taken. this is also our intention. the big question is how do we integrate the nuclear weapons state at some stage? and we're not naive. we also understand the security dilemmas and discussion. and we want to keep that treaty open. and we do not -- and that's maybe where we disagree a bit. we don't want to prescribe anything in this treaty to the nuclear weapons states. but once they would come in

together with them to find the circumstances and select a landing zone. maybe we can make progress there. the issue in 2015 was that we looked at it and said what was fulfilled there? so i think this is not a competition. i think that's the most important, what we want to stress. nothing to undermine the mpt, but something to add to it. you have proponents that we have to work together for security for all. and we can have discussions now on security but i think we need

to acknowledge our approach was always that we want security for all, also for those in the nuclear weapon states not just the 2020 review conference. i mean a couple of things. first, we have a pattern through several review conferences at which there is broad, painful consensus sometimes on an important advances, sometimes on minor advances. that is then taken hostage to the issue of establishment of a wmd free zone in the middle east. and that is what caused the last

review conference two years ago. not to fail. it didn't reach a consensus document. the more that we obsess about how crucial it is that we avoid another such outcome in 2020, if we label the failure to get a consensus document as a failure of the treaty, what we are doing is raising the leverage that the states that are obsessing about the middle east zone have and raising the likelihood that we would fail to have an agreement. that's been -- so that's the first sense in which i say obsession is the enemy of focus.

the second is a new convention on prohibition of nuclear weapons that will already be in force by that point. if that convention is tightly linked that the nonproliferation treaty along the lines i suggested, and if building out from adoption of that convention, there has been a sincere effort by its advocates to engage with nuclear weapons states and the beneficiaries of extended deterence in the ways that i suggested, there's no reason for that to become an obstacle to a meaningful conclusion at the 2020 review conference. if the mpt process itself is

used as a lever or as a shaming tool in a way similar to what egypt does with the middle east zone but in this case with regard to the convention itself, it will be defeating to both purposes. the nuclear weapons states that will have to one day change the policy if this effort is to succeed are not going to be moved by a deadlock and hand ringing over a deadlock at a conference in new york. they're going to be moved by concrete actions and assistance in solving persistent security dilemmas. if we don't overthink it, question actually have a more beneficial outcome in 2020 that

squares well with the purposes of this convention. >> all right. thank you. great answers. we're going to open it up to questions s there someone with a microphone? so when you ask your question, please identify yourself and to whom you're directing your question. front row. >> thank you very much. i'm with the organization, mayors for peace. susan, i would like to ask you -- wait a minute, i'm a moderator. >> if i can draw upon your vast professional experience.

and comment on the lack of any infrastructure in the government for disarmament. there are no disarmament agencies in any of states that possess nuclear weapons. when the arms control and disarmament agency was abolished, the disarmament term even disappeared from the business cards and the organization charts in the state department. there's very little sign of institutional support for disarmament in the government. what extent this a problem, barrier, on stick toll future process? and to tom, i'd like to ask him. so back in 1960s, the lyndon johnson administration was faced with the problem of whether nonproliferation should be a goal of the u.s. policy. they created the gillpatrick commission that produced this consensus report that should not be nondiscriminatory. now we hear there is a nuclear posture review where disarmament

is being assessed as to whether it should be a goal of policy. what do you think will be the outcome of this assessment and what will be the effects if this goal is abandoned? thank you. >> very quickly. i'm not answering the questions. the arms control agency was abolished on april fool's day, 1999. woi i won't say anything further. we always had a robust arms control, safeguards, nonproliferation bureaucracy and in contrast to many other countries that do not, i think that gave us the opportunity to -- we had a responsibility to do more work interacting with our foreign partners through diplomacy, engaging with foreign partners, educating. because we have this large bureaucracy, we could do that if we wanted to do that. i can't comment on today because i've been retired now for 4 1/2 years. but tom can address that issue.

>> the first question for susan, what concerns me is not the absence of the word disarmament, what concerns me me is the absence of officials who are charged with implementing a coherent policy. looking forward to chris ford speaking us to at lunch time. he's well qualified and he leads this effort at the white house. but to actually move something ahead, you could have an undersecretary and assistant secretaries in these fields and the department of state has shown unprecedented latitude in nominating anybody for any positions. very good, fantastic well qualified career professionals acting in those slots. but they are not in a position to move ahead on policy

objectives. now the nuclear posture review that the administration is undertaking and to which it is assigned lead responsibility to the department of defense is supposed to be completed by the end of the year. i do have concerns about it. i have no idea how it's going. i would love to be reassured by mr. ford today that in fact not only the department of defense but the department of state and department of energy are deeply involved in the discussion. that would be reassuring. the part that concerns you, concerns me a little bit as well that last time this nuclear posture review was undertaken at the beginning of the obama administration, nobody was putting on the table the idea that we need more nuclear

weapons and more diverse types of nuclear weapons. some people -- some ngos are putting that on the table this time. and completely unable to gauge their influence or the likely outcome. now i know that, for example, on climate change you can give a speech that says i love the environment. the environment is huge. it's a great thing. but i am breaking a commitment that we've made. the effect is even more serious if the nuclear posture review were to conclude what you suggested. that disarmament is not a goal. that would be breaking not just a commitment to an agreement but a binding ratified commitment to a treaty that the united states

is upheld for nearly 50 years. and that would be an extremely serious step. let me not alarm you by speculating on how likely it s. >> okay. now that we're all depressed over there. >> thank you, richard fieldhouse. i'm an independent consultant. i worked on plenty of the issues. i'm sorry to say i'm not going cheer up the crowd, perhaps with, my question. but tom, i want to xsh. >> no. i'm just warning you, lowering expectations. tom, twib tommy want to explore what you were suggesting about trying to do things in a way that is constructive that won't undermine the mpt through this process. do you see a risk to the mpt or the possibility of undermining

fit the wise, constructive steps are not taken? could there actually be a result that would undermine the treaty commitment to it, et cetera. >> i'm not very concerned about that. to be honest. a few of my colleagues in the u.s. government last year and some of my colleagues in the governments of other nuclear weapon states said that this effort would undermine the mpt. that's hard for me to see. as i noted, there are definitely colleagues from some foreign ministries for whom disarmament is a tactic rather than a goal or a pursuit.

you can expect them to at least be tempted by that idea that if i have two different treaties to demonstrate what a great world citizen i am, i'm going to pick the less restrictive one. i think it's possible. i think it's unlikely. it depends very much on things i mentioned. if it's explicit that everybody that is signing this convention loves the mpt and wants to push forward the golds of the mpt with the new convention and you make that not just a preample clause but a requirement in the new convention, i think you minimized that danger. anden that secondly, the other thing that could create or increase what is a small risk is

what i think is a very unfortunate trend among some who advocate, who portray themselves as great advocates of disarmament which is to say we can't do any more steps on nonproliferation no matter how rational they are, no matter how much they contribute to global security until the nuclear weapons states do more on disarmament. you know, it's this vision of hostage taking, and it really makes no sense. so if states that advocate this convention, begin with obstacles on improving safeguard system and improving the nonproliferation system then they will be doing the work of undermining the mpt. there are possibility, but i am really not that worried about it. any fundamental inconsistency

between the mpt and the new convention. >> we'll give out tom's contact information so you can get in touch with him whenever you're worried and he'll give you a comforting pep talk. back there. alex? >> this is for ambassador kicker. i have heard some say that when they talk to the chinese about abolishing nuclear weapons, the u.s. will be, by far the superior military power because of this conventional superiority. what can you do to convince countries like china and others? obviously, this is not something that will happen tomorrow, but what can you do to convince countries like that, that this is not what's going to happen that their security is preserved even in a world without nuclear weapons? >> i mean, i personally would

not be considering china considering their conventional weaponry, but on china, i find it interesting that they have limited themselves in the amount of nuclear weapons. my perception is that they didn't expand to a degree where russia is and the united states. so i think they're quite happy to have this -- this necessary from their point of view limited amount of tactical nuclear weapons and don't expand further. let's not forget 90% of the the nuclear weapons are in the possession of the u.s. and russia still. so it is still those two countries who have the key to press forward the nuclear disarmament agenda. china, i think is conventionally beefing up. so i don't see china as an obstacle for the abolishment. they were a little more engaged

than other nuclear weapon states. you had total disengagement by russia. china was at least now at the first phase also there as an observer. there was a conference on the humanitarian consequences. i think it even abstained the general assembly when they voted on going down this prohibition path. so i'm not so concerneded that china is the biggest obstacle at the end of the day. will. >> that's actually a concern or comment i've heard more often from russian colleagues than chinese colleagues and first, neither of them take very seriously the near-term prospect of going to zero, but secondly, of course, china is a global power for a number of reasons. for russia, there are only two things that make russia a global

power and that is nuclear weapons and innovative computer programming. >> ambassador kennedy? >> thank you. laura kennedy and like tom and susan, i was proud to represent the obama administration in this area in both geneva and vienna and also honored to join the board today along with them. i wanted to pick up on a point that tom made about the importance of the nuclear ban proponents lobbying equally the non-democracy as well as democracies and specifically, i wanted to ask about north korea. my understanding is that they are in, you know, part of the process, and if that's the case, how do you deal with that. theoretically, if you pick up on tom's point on making mpt membership, you could say, gee, that would bring them in.

don't you run the risk of having them part of the process conceivably and either allow them to discount the pressure to deal with a very real international security threat? or conceivably bring, frankly, some -- undermine the arms control process by having, say, a north korea part of it whereas the uk, the france, the japans, the australians not part of it? thank you very much. >> i recollect north korea voted in favor of the ga resolution, but they are on eye haven't seen them. i was not there the whole time, just sneaking in and out and participated and one important aspect we implemented in the rules of procedure is that we be a majority vote and not consensus so that those who participate in there cannot block a decision by the same

majority. it was interestingly enough proposed by some countries who want top have it exactly their way. it was egypt, iran, but this was thwarted. so this, again, i don't want see north korea playing any role in there. the north korea dilemma is a different issue, and i think it will be discussed in the next session. >> thank you, susan. darryl kimball. i wanted to note that in the carnage of arms control today there are two in-depth articles on the issues considering the prohibition treaty and verification that are worth a look as we support a subject. i wanteded to come back to one of the questions that was raised about the relationship that one way to deal with this would be to have obligations and all of

the -- the prohibition treaty. that might be problematic for india, pakistan and israel by the mpt which is one of the problems with -- one other approach, and i want to get your reaction by the states that are already members of the mpt to remain other approach that leaves you open to those countries that -- and also, you brought this up a couple of times and talked about what a successful. i've always argued that the real threat to the mpt is not -- other than the u.s. and russia -- by that -- [ no audio ] >> by the conference which is a litmus test. [ no audio ] >> okay. well, on the first point, not to be flippant about it, but the problem with india, pakistan and

israel is not a closet treaty. it's a lot more fundamental and if we were ever to get to a point where those countries are seriously considering joining this convention it it will not be a decision based upon whether or not that mpt membership clause is in the convention. it would be a decision based upon fundamental changes in their national security perceptions, and that's very long term. it's not going to happen soon, and i think that the advocates of this convention would do a disservice by not making that linkage and thus opening

themselves up to the criticism that they have created an alternative pathway to the nonproliferation treaty. so, yes, you're right in the technical sense. i don't think it's a terribly important factor in my

productive life time. on the new start treaty, as you all know the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty negotiated between the u.s. and russia went into effect in 2011. it lasts for ten years and has a clause for automatic extension by an additional five years until 2026 if both parties agreed. president putin has already indicated -- has already suggested this extension. president trump, by contrast, has said as he has said about anything that the previous administration has done, it's a poorly negotiated deal, and has so far refused to consider it. i would hope that for all the right reasons, the united states comes around in the very near future to agreeing with russia

on this automatic five-year extension. it costs nothing. it prevents, at least for the moment, an escalation, an arms race in the number of weapons that both countries possess. it preserves important capabilities that cannot be replaced for verification and monitoring of the deal, and it would be the single easiest and most visible step for the united states to address the legitimate concerns of countries all around the world about our actual commitment to disarmament. so -- >> thank you. okay. other questions? in the back, right in the middle of the lady there. sorry. can't see that far. >> thank you. diane pearlman, george mason school for conflict analysis and resolution.

this is for tom. well, the logical implication of what you're talking about and the next stage for us to go to is what's known as second order change. the first order change is eliminating weapons and humanitarian consequences and how bad they are. second-order change is analyzing the underlying conflict and looking at the needs of the parties and challenging flaws and erasing flaws and deterrence theory, addressing spiral theory and the illusion of security and also looking at how to reduce tension and work on addressing the underlying conflicts of nuclear weapons or unnecessary or irrational -- and so, anyway, i would appreciate if you would address that. also, i registered -- i got three group accredited for the mediators beyond borders transcend psychologists for social responsibility.

i want to build some energy around addressing second-order change. >> um, okay. i have great respect for the academic work being done. i'm not an academic. i don't think in those terms. i think that the academic work could help to inform those who were trying to bring about what you term both the first order and the second-order change, but to be honest, i'm not sure how i would use that terminology or that typology to advance the subject. >> okay. more questions? ed? >> edward levine, center for arms control and nonproliferation. one of the recurrent problems under the mpt has been the feeling on the part of some states that the treaty allows

them to build up as much of a peaceful, nuclear infrastructure as they wish even if that brings them to the brink of nuclear weapons capability, and i wonder what the risks are that the convention would increase the pressure on the nuclear suppliers group to stand down and stop putting roadblocks in the way of what it sees as incipient nuclear proliferation. >> good question. i haven't thought about it. i think it would be tremendously counterproductive for the advocates of this prohibition to either promote or to tolerate effort of some non-nuclear weapon states claim to make the argument that you've made, that this allows us to develop nuclear capability right up to the edge of weaponization.

that would-be damning to credibility of the movement if that were tolerated. the nuclear suppliers group includes a number of countries not only nuclear weapon states and those underextended deterrents, but it also includes those who were advocates of this process, and i simply can't picture that the nuclear suppliers group would say this has changed the reality, and it allows us to have more confidence in iran's peaceful intentions because they signed a new convention. i don't see it happening that way. so it's an interesting risk, but i think a small one. >> okay. i think we have time for one

more question. larry? you get the last word. or the last question. >> larry ward. i'm old enough that i often think i'm in error, but i'm never wrong, and i've lived through 65 years of this business and i was asked by a group where i now reside to do a little talk on arms control, and i haven't finished preparing the talk, but i took time to go through the whole history, and i have a couple of things to add here, and that is if you look at where we are from the day when

we first announced the american plan to take care of nuclear weapons and look at what's been accomplished because it jerks and glides and jerks and glides and we didn't know what to do about dealing with the problem for a long time and then we started and we got some first steps and in thinking about why we move forward and why we stopped. in large part, there is a bit of

an accident involved and personalities are involved. we could have started long ago with harold stasson, but they thought the problem with germany is he had to start his program of negotiations. one little step, and there are three or four of them as they go down the line, but whenever you look at it, where we are today, with the test ban. we haven't ratified the full test ban, but basically, there is a test ban and basically, there's a cutoff, and basically, we've learned how to deal with a

lot of these problems and we dealt with the missile problem. what we have, and i could go on, we've got pretty much the first stage of the original and complete disarmament programs that people talked about in theory so don't give up. it's a long haul and we've really got stage one. we've got the cutoff. we've got all these other things so don't -- don't begrudge that we haven't gone all the way further. i have a question, however. >> okay, larry. >> my question is what is the difference -- what is the difference between the -- the new proposal and the effect of having nuclear-free zones all over the world? it's a simple question, but what's the difference in practical terms? >> from the perspective, is we don't have a weapons-free zone in europe and we have studied also this proposal. we're jealous about the other areas of the world where this happens. austria happens to be a neutral country, not in ending military alliance, and we're in the middle of this.

it's a competition, so if you would have nuclear weapons-free zones all over the world then we would have a nuclear-free world and we could continue that. if we expanded to europe we would be the first to be happy about it. >> that's essentially -- those countries that have formed nuclear weapons-free zones argue with great merit that they cannot fully enjoy the benefit of security and safety that comes from living in such a zone if nuclear conflict can occur anywhere in the world. we cannot isolate the nuclear weapons-free zones from a place where nuclear conflict could occur. they have a legitimate reason to raise that as a point in favor of a global ban. >> okay. i think we have to wrap up. i want to say that this group, i know some of you tend to focus on the challenges and the problems and we're all at

high-anxiety -- is that a mel brooks movie? but i think we're taking away, what i take away from this panel is we need to be -- is we need to be positive. we need to be creative. we need to keep our eyes focused on the big picture and the prize, and we can't afford to forget all of the accomplishments that we have over the years. larry summed it up. there is far more good things than there are -- and i would say we have to persist. so let's give our speakers a round of applause. [ applause ] >> thank you, susan. >> thank you very much. susan, ambassador kicker, tom countryman and thanks to all of you for participating in the discussion. i want to thank people like larry weiler who for those of you that don't know, yes, he's been working in the field for 65

years and one of the fathers of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and cares so much that he's here decades later. so we'll take a short break between our two panels. the next panel will be on one of the threats of the nonproliferation system. the north korea missile threat. we'll begin that in ten minutes and you have a chance to take a quick break. please find seats up front and we're briefly adjourned until 10:40. c-span where history unfolds daily. thanchts same vent also included a discussion on north korea and threats posed by the country's nuclear development program. this is an hour.