then you're actually see the original war tent, the field headquarters of general washington that is >> president franklin d roosevelt and the partnership against the active power and the wind of world war ii. churchill, roosevelt and company,'s teddies in character. he spoke at the new york historical society where he is also a member of the board of trustees. this is just under one hour. >> we are thrilled to welcome

noted scholar lewis lehrman back to our stage. a member of our board of trustees since 2003, lewis lehrman was instrumental in our 2008 exhibition on alexander hamilton, the man who made modern america. his vision of our institution as the destination for american history has guided us over the past 14 years with the most recent fruits of his initiative and extraordinary exhibition focused on dolly madison and the women of the early american republic. together with another, lewis lehrman established a collection of original matrix and documents here at york historical society. his institute for american history has developed a highly acclaimed national program for teaching american history in high schools and colleges throughout the united states. lewis lehrman also created the lincoln prize and the center for the study of slavery,

resistance, and abolition at yale university which awards the frederick douglass prize for the best work of the year on slavery, resistance, and abolition. for all of this tremendous work in american history, lewis lehrman was presented with the national humanities medal at the white house in 2005. lewis lehrman he is the author of several books, including his latest "churchill, roosevelt & company: studies in character and statecraft." in a highly, the mentoring review this past march, "the wall street journal" noted, the book is packed with fascinating detail and illuminates not only the past, but challenges of the present day. the subtitle, studies in character and statecraft, he makes it weird that in geopolitics, the two go

together. before i welcome him to the stage, i will ask everyone to check their cell phones and anything else that makes a nose -- noise or a bus, turn them off. now it is my great pleasure to welcome mr. lewis lehrman. [applause] lewis: madam chairman, thank you so much for the introduction. even after so long, one needs distinguished trustees, members, and guests, we are gathered in this hall tonight to contemplate the most colossal war of human

history. to focus especially upon the anglo american alliance in world war ii. at the onset of war, angle phobia was commonplace among civilian and military leaders in washington. more than one century of anglo american opposition had led to mutual distrust. not to mention, the revolutionary separation from the mother country and the humiliating war of 1812. bad blood, they followed the disappointments of world war one. not least, britain's failure to repay its war decks to america. in britain, condescension toward its former colonials still prevailed among the british elites.

depression at home and revolution abroad, appeasement and isolationism preoccupied both countries. now some american politicians believe that sophisticated british leaders such as winston churchill and john later teens might be a slippery budget would please america in order to keep the british empire in tact. one british officer would write, some americans are curiously liable to suspect that they are going to be outsmarted by the subtle british because we british sometimes do such stupid things that the americans cannot take them at face you. they suspect them of being part of some dark design. churchill himself never doubted that the full support of the

united states was necessary to defeat hitler's bid for mastery of the european continent. after a desperate courtship of fdr by the prime minister in 1940 and 1941, president roosevelt was still not consent to marriage in the war against nazi germany. the cautious fdr would wait until pearl harbor in december 1941. whereupon a shotgun wedding would be declared, nearly 18 months after the fall of france. during those fateful months, fdr had escalated u.s. cooperation with churchill -- and none too soon. by the time of pearl harbor, german troops had arrived at the gates of moscow.

let us pause for a moment to consider the provenance of these two titans of the anglo-american alliance. educated by tutors at home, fdr as a very young man followed the path of the rich and the wellpoint. churchill at seven years of age was sent off to a harsh boarding school. after his years there, he would struggle to pass the examination to enter the royal military academy. roosevelt would go to harvard. there he had some success, but he was mortified to be rejected by the socially or stages club to which is father had belonged. young winston upon graduation from sandhurst would see the world as a junior army officer

in the cavalry, and at the same time as a highly paid war correspondent, a most irregular role for a british army officer. eight years older than at dr, churchill would become world-famous by the time roosevelt entered harvard. as a british army officer, churchill proved intrepid in battle. in cuba, india, the sudan, and south africa, he would attain the world-renowned he acclaimed as a vehicle to enter parliament. at that time the future prime minister thought himself unique. i think it is fair to say that he always thought himself unique. at that time, he would confide

to a lady friend, "we are all worms, but i do believe that i am a glow worm." fdr would marry his cousin, eleanor, in 1905 in the wedding presided over by her uncle, the then president of the united states. churchill was grandson of the due in 1908. before and during 1901 churchill would serve in the cap as first lord of the admiralty. roosevelt himself would never serve in the armed forces, but he would follow the example of his famous cousin teddy as assistant secretary of the navy in world war i under woodrow wilson. in may 1940 when winston

churchill became prime minister, great britain would undergo one of the greatest crises of her long national history. a mortal threat to the very survival of the nation itself. indeed, at the end of 1940, britain was insolvent. isolated by the fall of france, the u.k. fought the massive german armed forces alone. to prevail, the prime minister knew he needed an american alliance. as he said, "i will drag america in." but in fact it would be japan and germany on december seventh 1941 to a drag america into world war two. some distrust between america and britain never dissipated during world war ii, the president and his secretary of

state presented churchill's determination to maintain a british empire and its imperial trading preferences. the prime minister would defiantly respond, "i have not become the kings prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the british empire." working under the prime minister and the president were many levels of military and civilian leaders, some home did embrace the spirit necessary for victory. but on neither side of the atlantic was team spirit pervasive. for example, secretary of state, the secretary of the treasury, and their deputies among others

shed their angle phobia reluctantly. the chief of naval operations would never stop pulling the lion's tail. u.s. army chief of staff george marshall, the supreme commander in europe dwight eisenhower eisenhower, would make the alliance effective. among important civilian officials in the alliance to indent teamwork were a few officials. hopkins would become the defective national security counselor. an unlikely achievement for a former social worker from a small town in iowa. above all, hopkins would gain the trust of the prime minister.

even that of the standoffish members. on his second trip to london in july 1941, harry hopkins would take a navy seaplane across the arctic to moscow where he met with joseph stalin. for three days he reported that stalin welcomed him with a few blunt russian words, "it was like talking to a perfectly coordinated machine." joseph stalin knew exactly what he wanted, new what russia needed, and he assumed that you

knew too. stalin made the case to hopkins that russia would survive, an argument that would lead to the allies giving aid to russia. historians tend to emphasize that's churchill, roosevelt, and company won the war in the west and the pacific -- all true. but less egg knowledge is the fact that it was a soviet army that destroyed the bulk of the german armed forces in the east. 80%, four out of every five german soldiers killed in battle died fighting the russians on the eastern front. let us consider the character and the personality of the

commanders in chief of the anglo-american alliance. churchill and roosevelt themselves were patricians of great talent and ambition. inspired by their elite families and their famous forebears. roosevelt, a democrat, would prove a much better grassroots politician, having the political skill to build a loyal opposition in the republican hudson valley. fdr would enter new york politics when the progressive republican theodore roosevelt was the most famous american in the world. politics was different for roosevelt. and for churchill. churchill's heart beat to the rhythm of debate in parliament. not to the noise of grassroots politics. after his heroic struggle to

overcome polio and paralysis, fdr would become the people's politician. much more attuned than churchill to public opinion. but even in early 1941, after three presidential victories, fdr did not reside over decisive congressional majority, not least because of the isolationism in both the democrat and republican parties. churchill on the other hand govern a large majority coalition throughout the war. fdr would have to fight to campaigns for the presidency during the war, 1940 and 1944. the prime minister would face no parliamentary general election until july 1945 at the end of the war. whereupon he was dismissed from

office by the british voters, one of the great ironies of the war. churchill's character was more straightforward than that of roosevelt. fdr was practiced at deception, as he himself readily egg knowledge. he told the secretary of the treasury, "i am a juggler and i never let my left hand know what my right hand does." the secretary of the interior was a tube roosevelt, "you won't even talk frankly with people who are loyal to you, the loyalty of whom you are only convinced." roosevelt's devoted speechwriter wrote, "if either the president or the prime minister could be

called a student of machiavelli, it was surely franklin roosevelt." however, the emotional prime minister was a complex mixture of actor and warrior. churchill's true feelings tended to show through. he rarely bother to hide them. he did not hold back tears, even sobbing in public. fdr was much more circumspect, more tightly wound. churchill would not rest while prosecuting the war. nor could he relax as fdr did with his stamp collection and his naval encyclopedias. the prime minister was all in for war, all the time.

general hastings, military aides, liaisons would joke about the prime minister. churchill is the great military genius of history, he can use one division on three fronts at the same time. still on strategy churchill almost always consulted his war cabinet. during the war, fdr paid little attention to his cap. his attitude toward the state department bordering on contact. for example the secretary of state was not in washington when the president would soon department the summit conference with the prime minister in 1941.

roosevelt invited the number two man at state. like fdr, he was a harvard educated member of the eastern establishment. fdr himself was far more comfortable with the number two man than with the secretary of state. eleanor roosevelt with observed, "franklin is not at ease with people not of his own class." at this summit near newfoundland, roosevelt and churchill this added to send a small delegation to moscow to the side what military resources should be shipped to russia. fdr would choose the man who had been managing the american side of langley's, in britain another man. if i may, harriman was the not

so rare american in london to embraced the prime minister's. or in law. edward r. murrow was another. no more locker room talk tonight. going with harriman to russia was controversial. a canadian who had served with churchill in world war i cap. indeed, the self-confident prime minister would choose beaverbrook for his first cabinet in 1940 over the doubts and hesitations of king george the sixth. beaverbrook could and did stand up to the prime minister, but he would later complain that eating, drinking, and arguing

with the prime minister, "nearly killed me, almost made me a drunkard." not every man could drink 20,000 bottles of champagne in a single lifetime. fdr was like churchill, a man of intuition and impulse. his inner life was opaque, even to those who knew him best. his speechwriter wrote, "i tried continually to study fdr. to try to look the on his charming and am using and warmly affection into his heavily for student interior. fdr's own daughter would say "no

one truly new fdr," even members of his own family. but in this vision fdr would choose wisely his leaders from the armed forces. men such as general marshall and general eisenhower. so to, his senior admirals. fdr would often this missed details with a cavalier wave of the hand. fdr was the supreme improviser. quoting a friend, fdr's favorite technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain, charters overlap.

the result of this competitive theory of administration was often confusion and exasperation. to his diary, the secretary of war confided that fdr was the poorest administrator i have ever worked under with respect to the orderly procedure and routine of his performance. in addition to joseph kennedy, lord beaverbrook, and a few others, i do focus not only on other major civilian and military leaders, but on dozens of key figures not so well-known. among a few of these leaders i should like to name them, the super spies.

some ambassadors and some lords. general burns, and also john maynard teens and harry dexter white. the chief deputy at the u.s. treasury department. it was harry dexter white that was totally in charge of the bretton woods conference in 1944 which established the postwar international monetary and financial system. but i shall tell you only a little more about these fascinating characters, maybe you will then want to buy the book. alone among the big three, churchill, roosevelt, and stalin -- the prime minister would make

the great travel to keep the allies together. i trying to produce misunderstandings by speaking directly with his american and russian allies. the prime minister's travel astonished his colleagues. the tireless churchill would meet roosevelt 11 times during the war. always in north america, except that casablanca, cairo, tehran, in yalta. the prime minister's courageous and constant travel by air and ship into the war zone, general douglas macarthur would write, "foreign and hostile lands may be the duty of young pilots, but for a statesman burdened by the world's care, it is an act of inspiring gallantry and valor. macarthur would say no one of

those who wears it deserves to where it more than churchill, when speaking of the british medal of honor. it is true that by early 1941 before pearl harbor, key american cabinet members did favor u.s. entry into the war against hitler's, including the navy secretary and the secretary of war. they were ahead of the president, and ahead of public opinion. fdr was the consummate master of both of those, but there were distractions which made him very cautious, despite his landslide victory in november 1940, the president would always remember his campaign pledge to american mothers not to send their sons to war again.

nevertheless, roosevelt truly raised the temperature of american belligerence in 1940 and 1941 with fdr's approval and began actively planning for war, even in late 1940. that is one year before pearl harbor. it was then that the admiral produced the famous dog memo on war strategy on a global aces. it led to the war planning conference of early 1941 in washington. there the conference would confirm a germany first strategy in the event of war. this was almost one year before the japanese attack at pearl harbor. with the benefit of hindsight, a great advantage for historians, we are now able to see that the first week of december 1941 was

an early turning point of world war ii. it was at the beginning of december 1941 that the german invasion forces were turned back at the gates of moscow by a russian counterattack in temperatures that reached 22 30 degrees below zero. then the japanese attacked pearl harbor, uniting the former isolationist america behind a congressional declaration of war. prime minister churchill, as he wrote in his memoirs, would go to bed and sleep the sleep of the saved. however, it must be said that all the members of the grand alliance, britain, russia, and the united states had been

unready for world war ii despite transparent warnings and obvious threats. the british and the french, at war since september of 1939, had been unready for the german blitzkrieg of may 1940. despite authentic warnings, stalin had been caught unprepared for the german invasion of june 1941, not least because russia had been germany's former ally in a cynical, fascist, communist partnership created in the hitler's solid impact of august 1939. even the u.s. government was not fully prepared or war with japan, a war that fdr did expect. things would change in the

balance wheel of the alliance as the years went by. it was in late 1943 that churchill and roosevelt honeymooning would deteriorate along with the help of oatman. there were sincere policy differences as well, confirming the rule that statecraft and nations have no permanent friends, only vital interests. the clash of strong personalities could also divide the anglo-american leaders long before victory was assured. for example, the army chief of staff never really forgave churchill for convincing roosevelt during the summer of 1942 to delay marshals thoughtful but premature strategic plan for a cross channel invasion of europe. this he proposed for the autumn

of 1942 even though america had entered the war only in december of 1941. instead, the prime minister persuaded fdr to invade north africa, namely the amphibious operation torch, of which eisenhower would become the supreme commander, this assignment being the general's launching pad to the supreme commander and overlord on d-day. this remarkable cross channel invasion of normandy finally got underway on june 6, 1944. that was two years after marshall had made plans for it. along the road to allied victory, there are plenty of grievous this judgment. for example in the 1930's as an early advocate of british air

force expansion, churchill would declare "an airplane cannot sink a battleship because the armor is too thick." and in 1938, "the air menace against properly armed and protected ships of war will not be of decisive character." tell that to the japanese navy in 1942. devastating era tax on the british navy with shock churchill. in the spring of 1941, stalin refused to believe sources that a german invasion of russia was imminent. that was despite the obvious fact that hidden or had mobilized 3 million german

soldiers near the border for the invasion. stallings hearty myopia would cause disaster and death to strike millions of the russian people gratuitously. here's the best one of all, a u.s. admiral and chief of staff to fdr and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff would say, the atomic bomb will never go off, and i speak as an expert on explosives. the ironies of the war. in the end the character and the statecraft of the supreme allied commander of the d-day invasion, general eisenhower, cannot be underestimated. he proved that an american general can manage american

officers and british commanders. his low-key ability to inspire. his sheer likability overcoming insurmountable allied challenges. the british admiral wrote, "from the very beginning eisenhower said anglo american unity and friendship as a primary purpose. the staffs work closely integrated. it was not long before the british and americans ceased to look at each other like warring tomcats and came to discover that nationals of both countries had brains, ideas, and drive." thus it is fitting that we now listen to general eisenhower's major tribute to the

anglo-american victory given that the hall in london on june 12, 1945. i quote the general, "no one could alone have brought about this result. had i possessed the military skill of a marble, the wisdom of solomon, the understanding of lincoln, i would been helpless without the loyalty, the vision, the generosity of thousands of british and americans. some of them were my companions in my command. many were enlisted men and junior officers that carried the fears brunt of the battle in the field. many others were back to the united states and here in great britain.

they were our great national war leaders." civil and military staff supported us through every trial, every test. the whole was one great team. thank you very much. [applause] the first question is why did the british populace turn against churchill after the war?

>> he was beaten by man who one an 8% popular majority margin, a decisive defeat of churchill. the british voter in 1945 begins really in the 1930's in the early 1940's. the british people have been impoverished by world war i and the depression of the 1930's. as a result, socialism had become a powerful force in britain. indeed, communism was a strong force in britain. there is a great deal of sympathy for the soviets. churchill and roosevelt were very much aware of this in britain at the time. the soviet union is sought to be

in some places, not least the universities, to be the wave of the future. in britain, a plan was concocted by the labour party for what they called a new jerusalem. this new jerusalem was to provide every british family a proper home, proper food, proper health, proper security. of course, a worthy job. this program was something that churchill himself could not endorse. in fact, he hated communism from its very inception. he opposed the bolshevik revolution. churchill, though he was not a

conservative in the classical sense of it, he would not accept the socializing of england. during the campaign he referred to the possibility that the socialists united kingdom would have a gestapo like a fact. that word alone probably lost in a large percentage of the margin of victory. we have a british electorate divided between the hope for the future, the new jerusalem -- a form of socialism, and churchill who resisted. even the soldiers voted against churchill. britain was ready for a completely new social regime. i might add, this persisted

until margaret thatcher. domestically, why was the socialistic instruction of roosevelt's new deal ever allowed to happen with his republican constituents in the hudson valley? and were there reverberations into the 1950's? i have to say, i might get to that in another book. it is a very good question. a quick way to answer it this is say that i was born and raised

in central pennsylvania, republican territory. my father and my grandfather were lincoln republicans. a both voted for roosevelt. which you describe the relationship between churchill and joseph kennedy? you must buy my book. fdr and kennedy? joseph kennedy we probably know, was very ambitious politically. he planned on running for the presidency, but decided to wait for jack and joe. he was the leading democrat politician in massachusetts. he aspired to high office,

specially secretary of the treasury. roosevelt was reluctant to appoint him. in 1938 after being head of the sec, he accepted employment and wanted it as ambassador to the court of st. james in england. their joseph kennedy ruined the reputation he had been building all of his life and business. he continually in public used the word after 1940 -- 1939-1940, that britain was finished. it was not that he was sympathetic to hitler's, he just believed that hitler's was going to prevail and dominate the continent. that was the policy he wanted to pursue. he wanted accommodation with

hibbler on the continent. churchill would have none of this. therefore, his relationship with churchill was never hostile in the active political sense. churchill was a diplomat, even the joe kennedy was not. however, it was a relationship which existed. similarly, with fdr, he knew how ambitious joseph kennedy was. he tended to condescend toward joseph kennedy. kennedy never really liked roosevelt. roosevelt never really liked kennedy. however, politicians and politics make strange bedfellows.

kennedy was very important in the election of roosevelt. he had lots of money to invest and lots of constituents which would support him. in sum, one has to say that his relationship with churchill was very strange, to the point of breaking at times. his relationship with fdr was strained to the breaking point as well. to read the story about how roosevelt got rid of kennedy shows how deft a politician roosevelt was. kennedy was out of the court of st. james by the beginning of 1941. roosevelt was happy to be rid of him.

here is another book length question. what can our current leaders learn from the examples of fdr and churchill? in the case of fdr, certainly personal courage. his triumph over polio was astonishing. his more leadership in the major decisions is an example that you don't have to be full-time on the job to make important strategic decisions which work out. in the case of churchill, there is no more heroic example of a war of national survival thing presided over by a prime minister who would never give in. one of his great speeches was never give in.

if guts and glory go together, churchill gets most of the glory because he had most of the guts. this question is a good one. it talks about trump, prime minister may, and putin. there is enough controversy in world war ii -- [applause] lewis: i hope you will forgive me for passing it. this is a complicated question.

do you think churchill and roosevelt should be held accountable for their knowledge of concentration camps and rampant jewish oppression and their failure to do anything about it? permit me to contest the implication of the question. they did not do nothing about it. most of you might remember from history books and high school or college when of the acts of 1924 which limited immigration very strictly in all of america, especially in the countries of western europe and eastern europe.

roosevelt decided to combine the quotas that were spelled out in the act for austria and germany and permit only jewish refugees to take those places. that was a small fraction of the jews in germany, not to mention eastern europe, but he did what the law permitted him to do. there is of course the question about the ship st. louis which was turned back with jewish refugees. that is a very sad tale and is hard to explain other than to say that there was in the state department and assistant secretary of state, it is transparently the case, it is a matter of fact that he was not

sympathetic to the jewish refugee problem even though there was a limited amount that franklin roosevelt was able to do. in the case of churchill, i would have to call churchill the opposite of an anti-semi. he always endorsed the declaration which the british foreign minister had espoused for a jewish homeland in palestine. churchill was always in the right place for the right time for the jewish homeland. in world war ii, it was claimed that there was an appeal to bomb the rail lines near auschwitz.

there was a sincere and serious debate over whether or not the rail lines into auschwitz could be accurately bombed. the bombs being dropped by airplanes over germany were quite inaccurate. just to give you an example, 47% of the pilots who flew british and american air force missions over germany did not return. very often killed by bombs going off in their own aircraft. that is the way young joe kennedy, the son of the ambassador died. they referred to the war as aerial bombing. as the war went on, the bombing got more accurate. the aerial bombing was just opening up the bottom of the airplane and jumping the bombs

out on cities and incinerating whole cities like dresden so the argument that we could have successfully -- or the anglos american alliance could have successfully bombed the rail lines into auschwitz is a debatable question at best. i conclude that churchill and roosevelt should not be held responsible. it was manifestly the work of hibbler, the nazi party, and their allies in eastern europe. i deal with this one in my book as well. forgive me. why did marshall and eisenhower seagate cross channel invasion was militarily possible? it was primarily general

marshall whose plan it was. eisenhower was director of plans, he did what marshall told him to do. it is true that eisenhower had a very positive attitude towards the plan. this was his very own plan that he delivered to general marshall. there is a confidence in the american military. you won't forget that in world war i, the arrival of one million american troops in the spring and fall of 1917 in europe turned the balance of the war. the americans, although suffering major casualties, acquitted themselves

brilliantly. the american army was very confident that they could bring together the same kind of intervention or force and cross the channel. it was churchill who believe that it was possible, but that it was premature. churchill's strategy was collect all the american soldiers in great britain, primarily in england, to train them for two years and then to attempt to cross channel invasion, not to mention that in 1942 we didn't even have a landing craft. we didn't have the landing craft to lend the troops on the normandy beaches arrive or in france they decided to land them. it was one of those aggressive inspirations of general marshall

to get american troops into action in france. you will remember that general marshall was the adjutant for general pershing in the american expeditionary force in 1917. he had memories, and he wanted to acquitted the american army as quickly as possible. and then fdr support of churchill who decided to delay the cross channel invasion. the preparations for june 6, 1944 when on daily. of course it was a success, but there is no guarantee of success. anyone who read the story of the weather and the crossing on june 6 which was very doubtful knows how likely failure could have resulted.

do i believe that stalin and negotiated fdr at yalta? i have a full chapter in my book on yalta. i think it is fair to say that stalin did get the best deal at yalta. did he out negotiate roosevelt? he had the obligation to fulfill woodrow wilson's league of nations. the second was to get russia into the war against japan. remember, more in europe was

over may 10. the war in japan was not over until we dropped the atomic bomb. i know that date because it is my birthday, august 15, 1945. so that roosevelt did not know that they were going to drop the atomic bomb. he might have come if you lived, might have given the order. he did not know then. getting russia into the war was important to him in order to save as a many american lives as possible. with the benefit of hindsight, we can all say that stalin got the best deal at yalta, but it doesn't take into account all the considerations which

president roosevelt had in mind at yalta at that time. there are a couple of other wonderful questions here. forgive me for not answering. i thank you very much. [applause]