from members when i say we wish them the very, very best of luck. >> that is all. we look forward to seeing you next time with the next session of the australian parliament. ♪ about 30 years ago, july 7, 1987, lieutenant colonel oliver north, a marine and vietnam veteran, of here before the hassle it committees investigating the iran-contra affair. of severale first days of testimony about his involvement in secret arms sales to iran and subsequent illegal diversion of money to the contras, armed rebels aimed at overthrowing the government of nicaragua. ofnext, a half-hour portion oliver north's first day of testimony.

german in only -- chairman inouye: before proceeding, the member of the panel presiding has and will continue to preside, act, and make rulings in behalf of both committees. colonel north, please rise. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god?

col. north: i do. chairman inouye: you may not, sir. mr.nields.

mr. nields: colonel north, were you involved in the use of the proceeds of sales of weapons to iran for the purpose of assisting the contras in nicaragua? col. north: on advice of counsel, i respectfully decline to answer the question based on my constitutional fifth amendment rights. chairman inouye: colonel north, you're appearing here today pursuant to subpoenas issued on behalf of the senate and house select committees. i hereby communicate to you orders issued by the united states district court for the district of columbia at the request of the committees providing that you may not refuse to provide any evidence to these committees on the basis of your privilege against self-incrimination and providing further that no evidence or other information obtained under the oath or any information directly or indirectly derived from such evidence may be used against you in any criminal proceeding. i, therefore, pursuant to such orders, direct you to answer the questions put to you. mr. hamilton: colonel north, i communicate a similar order obtained by the house select committee which is also at the witness table, and i too direct you to answer the questions put to you. mr. sullivan: we understand that colonel north is here pursuant to compulsion of subpoenas issued by both the house and the senate. is that correct, sir? chairman inouye: you are

correct, sir. mr. nields: proceed. mr. nields: colonel north, you were involved in two operations of great significance to the people of this country. is that correct? col. north: at least two, yes sir. mr. nields: and one of them involved the support of the contras during the time the boland amendment was in effect, and another one involved the sale of arms to iran. is that correct? col. north: yes, it also involved support for the democratic outcome in the nicaragua vote before and after the boland amendment was in effect. mr. nields: and these operations. they were covert operations? lt. col. north: yes, they were. that is correct. mr. nields: and covert operations are designed to be secrets from our enemies? but these operations were designed to be secrets from the american people? lt. col north: mr. nields, i'm at a loss as to how we could announce it to the american people and not have the soviets know about it. and i'm not trying to be flippant, but i just don't see how you could possibly do it. mr. nields: well, in fact, col. north, you believed that the soviets were aware of our sale of arms to iran, weren't you? lt. col. north: we came to a point in time when we were

concerned about that. mr. nields: but it was designed to be kept a secret from the american people? lt. col. north: i think what is important, mr. nields, is tha t we somehow arrive at some kind of an understanding right here and now as to what a covert operation is. if we could a way to insulate with a bubble over these hearings that are being broadcast in moscow, and talk about covert operations to the american people without it getting into the hands of our adversaries, i'm sure we would do that. but we haven't found the way to do it. mr. nields: but you put it somewhat differently to the iranians with whom you were negotiating on the 8th and 9th of october in frankfort, germany, didn't you? you said to them that secretary of defense weinberger in our last session with the president said, i don't think we should send one more screw, talking about the hawk parts, until we

have our americans back from beirut, because when the american people find out that this has happened, they'll impeach you, referring to the president. mr. sullivan: objection. apparently, counsel is reading from a transcript of a tape recording, mr. chairman, which col. north may have caused to be made. we have not been provided with a copy of that material, and i think it's inappropriate for questions to be asked of the colonel when counsel has a copy of the tape, but we do not have it. thank you, sir. mr. nields: col. north does has a copy of it. it was sent to him. chairman inouye: the objection is overruled. mr. nields: it was sent to him over the weekend, and it's in a notebook in front of counsel. mr. sullivan: well, fine. thank you, mr. nields. mr. nields: entitled second channel. mr. sullivan: as i walked in the door at 5:00 minutes after, i was handed all these notebooks which i'm now looking at for the first time. do you want to direct my attention to where it is, sir,

which book and what page? mr. nields: the notebook titled second channel transcripts, at tab 5. i believe it's the top notebook that you put your paperson top of. mr. sullivan: tab 5, sir? mr. nields: tab 5. mr. sullivan: and, what page sir? mr. nields: it's right at tab 5, on that page. mr. sullivan: well, would you

give us a moment to read it, sir? mr. nields: yes. mr. sullivan: could you help us out, mr. nields? do i begin the reading right on tab 5, or the page behind it? mr. nields: right on tab 5, and my question is simple. did you tell the iranians with whom you were negotiating on october 8 and 9th that the secretary of defense had told the president at his most recent meeting, when the american people find out that this has happened, they'll impeach him? that's the entire question. did you say that to the iranians? lt. col. north: does it say that on this page, sir? mr. nields: yes, at the very top.

lt. col. north: mr. nields, this is apparently one of the transcripts of tape recordings that i caused to be made of my discussions with the iranians. i would like to note that for every conversation, whenever it was possible, i asked for the assistance of our intelligence services to trans -- to tape record and transcribe every single session, so that when i returned there would be no doubt as to what i said. i am the one who created these tapes, plus the 7 hours of tape recordings that your committee found yesterday, because i knew where they were, and i kept trying to alert you to them, and i am the one who created those tapes so there would never be any doubt in the minds of my superiors as to what i had said, or why i had said it. that is a bald-faced lie, told to the iranians, and i will tell you right now, i'd have offered the iranians a free trip to disneyland if we could have gotten americans home for it.

mr. nields: question was, did you say it? lt. col. north: i absolutely said it. i said a lot of other things to the iranians, to get -- mr. nields: and, when the hasenfus plane went down in nicaragua, the united states government told the american people that the united states government had no connection whatsoever with that airplane. is that also true? lt. col. north: i, i, when i, when the hasenfus airplane went down, i was in the air headed for europe, so i do not know what the initial statements were, and i couldn't comment on them. mr. sullivan: but who in the government, and when, sir? are you asking him generally did someone in the government make the statement? i think we've made -- mr. nields: we've had testimony that elliott abrams, chairman hamilton -- mr. sullivan: yes, sir. i think that we'd perhaps make more progress if he asked what the colonel did, what he said, what he heard, with respect to his actions. a statement indicating that what someone in the american had said

seems to me to be a little farafield, sir. that's my only comment. thank you. chairman inouye: mr. nields, proceed. mr. nields: that was not true, was it, colonel north? lt. col. north: which was not true, mr. neilds? mr. nields: it was not true that the united states government had no connection with mr. hasenfus, the airplane that went down in nicaragua. lt. col. north: no, it was not true. mr. nields: in certain communist countries, the government's activities are kept secret from the people. but that's not the way we do things in america, is it? lt. col. north: counsel, i would like to go back to what i said just a few moments ago. i think it is very important for the american people to

understand that this is a dangerous world, that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world. and that they ought not to be lead to believe, as a consequence of these hearings, that this nation cannot or should not conduct covert operations. by their very nature covert operations or special activities are a lie. there is great deceit, deception practiced in the conduct of covert operation. they are at essence a lie. we make every effort to deceive the enemy as to our intent, our conduct and to deny the association of the united states with those activities. the intelligence committees hold hearings on all kinds of these activities conducted by our intelligence service. the american people ought not to be lead to believe by the way you're asking that question that we intentionally deceived the american people, or had that intent to begin with. the effort to conduct these covert operations was made in

such a way that our adversaries would not have knowledge of them, or that we could deny american association with it, or association of this government with those activities. and that isnot wrong. mr. nields: the american people were told by this governmentthat our government had nothing to do with the hasenfus airplane, and that was false. and it is a principal purpose of these hearings to replace secrecy and deception with disclosure and truth. and that's one of the reasons we have called you here, sir. and one question the american people would like to know the answer to is what did the president know about the diversion of the proceeds of iranian arms sales to the contras. can you tell us what you

know about that, sir? lt. col. north: you just took a a long leap from mr. hasenfus's airplane. as i told this committee several days ago, and if you'llindulge me, counsel in a brief summary of what i said, i never personally discussed the use of the residuals orprofits from the sale of us weapons to iran for the purpose of supporting the nicaraguan resistance with the president. i never raised it with him and he never raised it with me during my entire tenure at the national security council staff. throughout theconduct of my entire tenure at the national security council, i assumed that the president was aware of what i was doing and had, through my

superiors approved it. i sought approval of my superiors for every one of my actionsand it is well-documented. i assumed when i had approval to proceed from either judge clarke, bud mcfarlane or admiral poindexter, that they had indeed solicited and obtained the approval of the president. to my recollection, admiral poindexter never told me that he met with the president on the issue of using residuals from the iranian sales to support the nicaraguan resistance or that he discussed the residuals or profits for use by the contras with the president or that he got the president's specific approval. nor didhe tell me that the president had approved such a transaction.

but again, i wish to reiterate that throughout, i believed that the president had indeed authorized such activity. no other person with whom i was in contact with during mytenure at the white house told me that he or she ever discussed the issue of the residuals or profits with the president. in late november, two other things occurred which relate to this issue. on or about friday, november 21st, i asked admiral poindexter directly, does the president know? he told me he did not. and on november 25th, the day i was reassigned back to the united states marine corps for service, the president of the united states called me. in the course of that call, the president said to me words to theeffect that, i just didn't know.

those are the facts, as i know mr. nields. i was gladthat when you introduced this, you said that you wanted to hear thetruth. i came here to tell you the truth, the good, the bad, andthe ugly. i am here to tell it all, pleasant and unpleasant, and iam here to accept responsibility for that which i did. i will not accept responsibility for that which i did not do. chairman inouye: before proceeding, may i make an inquiry of the witness? was that response from a written text? lt. col. north: those are from notes that i made in preparation for this session, sir. chairman inouye: it is not a verbatim written text? lt. col. north: no, sir, it is not. chairman inouye: mr. nields? mr. nields: colonel north, you left something out, didn't you?

mr. sullivan: what is it, counsel? mr. nields: you testified that you assumed that the president hadn't authorized the diversion. lieutenant colonels in the marine corps do not divert millions of dollars from arms sales to iran for the benefit of the contras based on assumptions, do they? you had a basis for your assumption. lt. col. north: i had the approval of my superiors. as i did for all the other things that i did, mr. nields. mr. nields: you had something else, didn't you, sir? you had a specific reason for believing that the president had

approved. you wrote memoranda, did you not, seeking the president's approval for the diversion? lt. col. north: i did. mr. nields: and indeed, you wrote more than one of them. lt. col. north: i did. mr. nields: how many did you write? lt. col. north: again, i will estimate that there may havebeen as many as five. mr. nields: now we have, lt. col. north: again, i'm trying to recall without access tothose particular documents. you may have six, and i'm not trying to dissemble at all with you. mr. nields: and these five were written, i take it, on

each occasion where there was a proposed sale of arms to the iranians that you felt had reached sufficiently final form to seek the president's approval? lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: and the first on was in february or january of1986, is that correct? lt. col. north: as i recall, it was. mr. nields: now exhibit 1, in the notebook, i believe, tomr. sullivan's left. mr. sullivan: which book, sir? book 1? exhibit 1? mr. nields: book 1, exhibit 1. that is a draft, is it not, of the kind ofdocument you were just referring to? lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: and, on page 5, at the end of that draft, there isa line heading recommendation, and the recommendation is that

the president approve the structure depicted above under current situation and the terms of reference at tab a. and it has a line for approved and a place to check, and a line for disapproved and a place to check, is that correct? lt. col. north: that's correct. mr. nields: and that's the kind of memorandum, again, that you just testified about? lt. col. north: yes, it is. mr. nields: this is a draft. but i think you just testifiedthat on five diferent occasions, you put one of these drafts infinal form? lt. col. north: it is my recollection that each we prepared to conduct one of those transactions, and not all of them went through to fruition. there were only 3 that actually transpired during the time that

i was supervising this activity. but it's my recollection that there were probably five times, total, that weactually got to a point where we thought, one, that the sale would take place, and number two, that we would have the hostages released and a dialogue with the iranians, as a consequence. mr. nields: and you sent those memoranda up the line? lt. col. north: it is my recollection that i sent each one of those up the line, and that on the 3 where i had approval to proceed, i thought that i had received authority from the president. i want to make it very clear that no memorandum ever came back to me with the president's initials on it, or the president's name on it, or a note from the president on it, none of these memoranda. i do have, as you know, in the

files that you now have of mine, many, many of memoranda have the president's initials on it. but none of these had the president's initials on it. mr. nields: well, we'll get back to that in a minute, col. north. my question right now is, you sent these memoranda up to the national security advisor, is that correct? lt. col. north: that is correct. mr. nields: for him to obtain the president's approval? lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: frequently, you would send memoranda to the national security advisor seeking his approval for something, is that correct? lt. col. north: judging by the pile of paper you just sent me, i obviously sent too many. but, yes, i did send memoranda to my boss. mr. nields: seeking his approval?

lt. col. north: yes, sir. mr. nields: with a line under the heading recommendation in which you sought his approval? lt. col. north: as i recall, yes. mr. nields: and, sometimes you sent memoranda up the line witha recommendation that he brief the president on something? and, occasionally you sent up a memorandum recommending that he obtain the president's approval? lt. col. north: that's correct. mr. nields: and, that's what you did in this case? lt. col. north: apparently so. those were the words that ihad typed on a piece of paper. mr. nields: because you specifically wanted before proceeding on a matter of this degree of importance to have the president's approval? lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: now, at any time did admiral poindexter tell you, don't send any more memos like

this? lt. col. north: i don't recall such an instruction, and if ihad been given it i would have followed it. there were times when wein both the case of admiral poindexter mr. mcfarlane decided nomore memoranda on certain subjects and they'd be handled with verbal briefings. mr. nields: but, that was not the case with respect to thesememoranda seeking approval of the diversions? lt. col. north: well, you, you insist on referring to it asdiversion. i -- my use of websterd does, leads me to believethat those were residuals and not diverted, the only thing wedid was divert money out of mr. ghorbanifar's pocket and put it to a better

use, but -- mr. nields: i'm not asking you about words, now, colonel. if i'm asking you whether you didn't continue to send memoranda seeking approval of diversions or residuals, whatever the word, for the benefit of the contras, up to the president for approval? lt. col. north: i did not send them to the president, mr. nields. this memorandum went to the national security adviser, seeking that he obtain the president's approval. there is a big difference. this is not a memorandum to the president. mr. nields: and, my question to you is, isn't it true thatyou continued to send them up to the national security adviserseeking the president's approval? lt. col. north: it is my recollection that i did, yes, sir. mr. nields: and, admiral poindexter never told you,

stop sending those memoranda? lt. col. north: i do not recall the admiral saying that. it is entirely possible, mr. nields: that that did happen. mr. nields: well, if it had happened, then you would have stopped sending them. isn't taht true? lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: but, you didn't stop sending them. you justtestified you sent them on five different occasions. lt. col. north: i testified that to my recollection, therewere about five times when we thought we had an arrangement thatwould result in the release of american hostages and the opening of a dialogue with iran, and that we thought the deal was sufficiently framed that we could proceed with it. and, that i thought, because i

don't have those records before me, that i had sent memoranda forward, as i always did, seeking approval. that's what i think, and that's what i recall. i'm not testifying to solid, on such and such a date, i did such and such a thing. mr. nields: and, was there ever a time when admiral poindexter said, don't send them up for the president's approval. lt. col. north: again, i don't recall such a conversation. mr. nields: well, in fact, isn't it true that it was admiral poindexter that wanted you to send these memoranda up for the president to approve? lt. col. north: i don't recall admiral poindexter instructingme to do that, either. mr. nields: well, would you turn to exhibit two? do you have that in front of you? lt. col. north: i have a, what appears to be a profs notefrom admiral poindexter.

mr. nields: and below that, is, there's a prof note fromoliver north. lt. col. north: yes. mr. nields: and that's to mr. mcfarlane? lt. col. north: i don't know how i can tell that, from whati'm looking at. mr. nields: well, if you look right up above the reply denoteof 4/7/86, it says, to rcm. lt. col. north: right. mr. nields: and it's dated the 7th of april, 1986. lt. col. north: right. mr. nields: and that's three days after the date of the termsof reference on exhibit one. you can check if you wish, or you can take my word for it. it's dated april 4. lt. col. north: will you take my word? mr. sullivan: what is your question? mr. nields: i haven't asked a question yet. i'm simply, well, the question is, isn't this 3 days after the date on theterm of reference on exhibit one?

lt. col. north: apparently it is. mr. nields: and this prof message makes reference to mr. ghorbanifar in the first line? lt. col. north: yes, it does. mr. nields: and it makes reference to the $15 million in line three? lt. col. north: that's correct. mr. nields: and then, in line six, it reads, per request of jmp, have prepared a paper for our boss, which lays arrangements. lt. col. north: that is what it says. mr. nields: and my question to you, sir, is, doesn't thatmean,e president's approval? this particular case, that is true and i have not said that admiral poindexter told me to stop. did i? >> where are these memoranda?

>> which memoranda? >> the memoranda that you sent up to admiral poindexter looking for the president's approval? >> if i try to guess, i am going to be wrong, but i think i shredded most of that. did i get them all? i'm not trying to be flippant. i'm just -- >> that was going to be my very next question. colonel north, is it true you shredded them. >> i believe i did. >> that would include the copies with the check mark where the line says "approve"? allhat would have included copies. i tried as i was departing the nsc, a process that began as early as october, to destroy all references to these covert operations. i willingly admit that.

merica," weon "reel a continue our look at the iran froma affair hearings 1987. in this 90-minute portion, colonel north begins with an opening statement. thes then questioned by council. >> the meeting will come to order. this morning the panel will resume the questioning of lieutenant colonel north. thatthe record indicates july 15, 1987, the house select committee received the opening statement of colonel north. this