merica," weon "reel a continue our look at the iran froma affair hearings 1987. in this 90-minute portion, colonel north begins with an opening statement. thes then questioned by council. >> the meeting will come to order. this morning the panel will resume the questioning of lieutenant colonel north. thatthe record indicates july 15, 1987, the house select committee received the opening statement of colonel north. this statement pursuant to the

rules has been examined and determined there are no inadvertent disclosures of classified material. further that we are satisfy the statement does not exceed the bounds set forth by the court and the grant of immunity, and although the statement obviously exceeds 10 minutes, we will not insist upon a summary of it. and if the colonel which is to present his opening statement at this time, he may do so in total. thank you, mr. chairman. >> please proceed. lt. col. north: as you on the by now, my name is oliver north. my best friend is my wife betsy, to whom i have been married 19 years, and with whom i have had

four wonderful children, aged 18, 16, 11, and six. i came to the national security council six years ago to work in the administration of a great president. as a staff member, i came to understand his goals and his desires. i admired his policies, his strength, and his ability to bring our country together. i observed the president to be a leader who cared deeply about people and believed the interest of our country was advanced in recognizing that ours was a nation at risk in a dangerous world. he succeeded in advancing the cause of world peace by country and byur having the courage to take decisive action when needed. i also believe that we must guard against a rather perverse side of american life, and that

launchtendency to vicious attacks against our elected officials. president reagan has made enormous contributions, and he deserves our respect and admiration. the national security council is, in essence, the president's staff. it helps to formulate and coordinate national security policy. some, perhaps on this committee, believe that the nsc was devoid of experienced leadership. i believe that is wrong. while at the nsc, i worked most closely with three people: mr. robert c: mcfarlane, admiral john poindexter, and cia director, william casey. bud mcfarlane is a man who devoted nearly thirty-year of his life to public service in a number of responsible positions. at the nsc, he worked long hours, made great contributions, and i admire him for those efforts. admiral poindexter is a

distinguished naval officer who served in a number of important positions of responsibility. he, too, was a tireless worker with a similar record of public service, and i, too, admire him greatly. william casey was a renowned lawyer, a war veteran of heroic proportions, and a former chairman of the sec. i understood that he was also a close personal friend and adviser to president reagan. there is a nearly a century of combined public service by these three men. as a member of the nsc staff, i knew that i held a position of responsibility. but i knew full well what my position was. i did not engage in fantasy that i was the president or vice president or cabinet member, or even director of the national security council. i was simply a staff member with a demonstrated ability to get the job done. over time, i was made responsible for managing a

number of complex and sensitive covert operations that we have discussed here to date. i reported directly to mr. mcfarlane and to admiral poindexter. i coordinated directly with others, including director casey. my authority to act always flowed, i believe, from my superiors. my military training inculcated in me a strong belief in the chain of command. and so far as i can recall, i always acted on major matter with specific approval, after informing my superiors of the facts, as i knew them, the risks, and the potential benefits. i readily admit that i was action-oriented, that i took

pride in the fact that i was counted upon as a man who got the job done. and i don't mean this by way of criticism, but there were occasions when my superiors, confronted with accomplishing goals or difficult tasks, would simply say, "fix it, ollie," or, "take care of it." since graduating from the naval academy in 1968, i have strived to be the best marine officer that one can be. in combat, my goal was always to understand the objective, follow orders, accomplish the mission, and to keep alive the men who served under me. one of the good things that has come from the last seven months of worldwide notoriety has been the renewed contact that i've had with some of the finest people in the world -- those with whom i served in vietnam. among the 50,000 or so messages of support that have arrived since i left the nsc are many from those who recount the horrors we lived through, and who now relate stories of their families and careers. after vietnam, i worked with my fellow officers to train good marines to be ready in case we were called upon elsewhere in the world, but at the same time to hope that we never were. i honestly believed that any soldier who has ever been to a war truly hopes he will never see one again. my marine corps career was untracked in 1981, when i was detailed to the national security council. i was uneasy at the beginning,

but i came to believe that it was important work, and as years passed and responsibilities grew, i got further from that which i loved, the marine corps and marines. during 1984, '85, and '86, there were periods of time when we worked two days in every one. my guess is that the average workday lasted at least 14 hours. to respond to various crises, the need for such was frequent, and we would often go without a night's sleep, hoping to recoup the next night or thereafter. if i had to estimate the number of meetings and discussions and phone calls over that five years, it would surely be in the tens of thousands. my only real regret is that i virtually abandoned my family for work during these years, and that work consisted of my first few years on the staff, as the

project officer for a highly classified and compartmented national security project, which is not a part of this inquiry. i worked hard on the political military strategy for restoring and sustaining democracy in central america, and in particular, el salvador. we sought to achieve the democratic outcome in nicaragua that this administration still supports, which involved keeping the contras together in both body and soul. we made efforts to open a new relationship with iran, and recover our hostages. we worked on the development of a concerted policy regarding terrorists and terrorism and a capability for dealing in a concerted manner with that threat. we worked on various crises, such as twa 847, the capture of achille lauro, the rescue of american students in grenada and the restoration of democracy on

that small island, and the us -- and the u.s. raid in libya in response to their terrorist attacks. and, as some may be willing to admit, there were efforts made to work with the congress on legislative programs. there were many problems. i believed that we worked as hard as we could to solve them, and sometimes we succeeded, and sometimes we failed, but at least we tried, and i want to tell you that i, for one, will never regret having tried. i believe that this is a strange process that you are putting me and others through. apparently, the president has chosen not to assert his prerogatives, and you have been permitted to make the rules. you called before you the officials of the executive branch.

you put them under oath for what must be collectively thousands of hours of testimony. you dissect that testimony to find inconsistencies and declare some to be truthful and others to be liars. you make the rulings as to what is proper and what is not proper. you put the testimony which you think is helpful to your goals up before the people and leave others out. it's sort of like a baseball game in which you are both the player and the umpire. it's a game in which you call the balls and strikes and where you determine who is out and who is safe. and in the end you determine the score and declare yourselves the winner. from where i sit, it is not the fairest process. one thing is, i think, for certain -- that you will not investigate yourselves in this matter. there is not much chance that you will conclude at the end of these hearings that the boland amendments and the frequent policy changes therefore were unwise or that your restrictions should not have been imposed on the executive branch. you are not likely to conclude that the administration acted

properly by trying to sustain the freedom fighters in nicaragua when they were abandoned, and you are not likely to conclude by commending the president of the united states who tried valiantly to recover our citizens and achieve an opening with strategically vital iran. i would not be frank with you if i did not admit that the last several months have been difficult for me and my family. it has-been difficult to be on -- it has been difficult to be on the front pages of every newspaper in the land day after day, to be the lead story on national television day after day, to be photographed thousands of times by bands of photographers who chase us around since november just because my name arose at the hearings. it is difficult to be caught in the middle of a constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative branches over

who will formulate and direct the foreign policy of this nation. it is difficult to be vilified by people in and out of this body, some who have proclaimed that i am guilty of criminal conduct even before they heard me. others have said that i would not tell the truth when i came here to testify, and one member asked a person testifying before this body whether he would believe me under oath. i asked when i got here -- if you don't believe me, why call me at all. it has been difficult to see questions raised about my character and morality, my honesty, because only partial evidence was provided. and, as i indicated yesterday, i think it was insensitive of this committee to place before the cameras my home address at a time when my family and i are under 24-hour armed guard by

over a dozen government agents of the naval investigative service because of fear that terrorists will seek revenge for my official acts and carry out their announced intentions to kill me. it is also difficult to comprehend that my work at the nsc -- all of which was approved and carried out in the best interests of our country -- has led to two massive parallel investigations staffed by over 200 people. it is mind-boggling to me that one of those investigations is criminal and that some here have attempted to criminalize policy differences between co-equal branches of government and the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. i believe it is inevitable that the congress will in the end blame the executive branch, but i suggest to you that it is the congress which must accept at least some of the blame in the nicaraguan freedom fighters' matter. plain and simple, the congress is to blame because of the fickle, vacillating,

unpredictable, on-again off-again policy toward the nicaraguan democratic resistance -- these-called contras. i do not believe that the support of the nicaraguan freedom fighters can be treated as the passage of a budget. i suppose that if the budget doesn't get passed on time again this year, it will be inevitably another extension of another month or two. but, the contras, the nicaraguan freedom fighters are people -- living, breathing, young men and women who have had to suffer a desperate struggle for liberty with sporadic and confusing support from the united states of america. armies need food and consistent help. they need a flow of money, of arms, clothing and medical supplies. the congress of the united states allowed the executive to encourage them, to do battle, and then abandoned them. the congress of the united

states left soldiers in the field unsupported and vulnerable to their communist enemies. when the executive branch did everything possible within the law to prevent them from being wiped out by moscow's surrogates in havana and managua, you then had this investigation to blame the problem on the executive branch. it does not make sense to me. in my opinion, these hearings have caused serious damage to our national interests. our adversaries laugh at us, and our friends recoil in horror. i suppose it would be one thing if the intelligence committees wanted to hear all of this in private and thereafter pass laws which in the view of congress

make for better policies or better functioning government. but, to hold them publicly for the whole world to see strikes me as very harmful. not only does it embarrass our friends and allies with whom we have worked, many of whom have helped us in various programs, but it must also make them very wary of helping us again. i believe that these hearings, perhaps unintentionally so, have revealed matters of great secrecy in the operation of our government. and sources and methods of intelligence activities have clearly been revealed to the detriment of our security. as a result of rumor and speculation and innuendo, i have been accused of almost every crime imaginable. wild rumors have abounded. some media reports have suggested that i was guilty of espionage for the way i handled u.s. intelligence. some have said that i was guilty of treason, and suggested in front of my 11 year old daughter, that i should be given the death penalty.

some said i stole 10 million dollars. some said i was second only in power to the president of the united states, and others that i condoned drug-trafficking to generate funds for the contras, or that i personally ordered assassinations, or that i was conducting my own foreign policy. it has even been suggested that i was the personal confidant of the president of the united states. these and many other stories are patently untrue. i don't mind telling you that i'm angry that what some have attempted to do to me and my family. i believe that these committee hearing will show that you have struck some blows. but, i am going to walk from here with my head high and my shoulders straight because i am proud of what we accomplished. i am proud of the efforts that we made, and i am proud of the fight that we fought. i am proud of serving the administration of a great president. i am not ashamed of anything in my professional or personal conduct. as we go through this process i ask that you continue to please keep an open mind. please be open minded, and able to admit that, perhaps, your

preliminary conclusions about me were wrong. and please, also, do not mistake my attitude for lack of respect. i am in awe of this great institution just as i am in awe of the presidency. both are equal branches of government with separate areas of responsibility under the constitution that i have taken an oath to support and defend, and i have done so, as many of you have. and although i do not agree with what you are doing, or the way that it is being done, i do understand your interest in obtaining the facts and i have taken an oath to tell the truth and helping you to do so. in closing, mr. chairman, and i thank you for this opportunity, i would just simply like to thank the tens of thousands of americans who have communicated their support, encouragement and prayers for me and my family in this difficult time.

thank you, sir. chairman inouye: thank you very much, colonel north. i wish the record to show that the panel did not amend, delete or strike out any word, or words -- or phrases from this opening statement. furthermore, we did not put on testimony words which we thought were helpful to our goals and leave the rest out. i am certain you will agree with me, colonel, that every word you wanted to present to the people of the united states was presented. isn't that correct, sir? lt. col. north: yes, mr. chairman it was, and i was not referring to my testimony but that which preceded me, sir -- about me. chairman inouye: and secondly, you have suggested that these hearings have disclosed matters of great secrecy in the operation of our government and

sources and methods of intelligence activities have clearly been revealed to the detriment of our national security. may i, once again, advise you that according to the director of the national security agency, general odom, not a single bit of classified material has been leaked by activities of this joint panel. questioning will be resumed by -- >> did you read your steno books in the last six months? lt. col. north: i did review them in counsel. >> did you find any conversations you had with admiral poindexter? lt. col. north: i do not recall. >> your counsel referred to the

fact that you provided some 20 books to us. the fact of the matter is those 20 did not include the five or six diversion memos you had written in the course of 1986. is that correct? lt. col. north: memos were contained in documents on a typewriter. there were no typewritten pages in the books i gave you. lt. col. north: --, and you decide -- and you try to destroy them all? -- >> and you tried to destroy them all? you believed in good faith that you had gotten rid of a memorandum that you referred to. is that so? lt. col. north: that is correct. and to amplify that the two

could have well been destroyed at that time. what ims saying is the very most that may have been left in the waning days of my 10 year may well have been just of three. that is why when the question was asked yesterday or the day before about how many memos i destroyed in those closing days i couldn't tell you because i honestly don't remember. >> there were five memos, and what you are saying now is two may have in destroyed at the time of those transactions and occur and the other three would have been destroyed later. >> the one memo that you do have was a transaction that did go through. if we had done something or prepared a memo on some thing that was not done, i would destroy that memo at time the decision was made not to proceed. obviously there was still a memo remaining in the files that

pertain to a transaction which did not occur. it referred to an april plan those never implemented. >> there were three other transactions that did go through, of which there are no memorandum that you are aware of. and those are the ones that have been destroyed. at the time that you gave admiral poindexter this assurance you believe in good faith that no record existed of the diversion you had written, is that correct? >> i assured him that all references to the sale of arms

as it related to the nicaraguan resistance had been destroyed, and i was wrong. >> you believed that your actions had been authorized by your superiors. that is the way you believed and thought, correct? and i alsorth: yes, believed all of the notes, which are now in stacks all over wash them have also been destroyed. >> after you were dismissed, did admiral poindexter call you and say to you that he confirmed he would give you authority? lt. col. north: i honestly don't recall a conversation with admiral poindexter when i was. -- after i was dismissed. he may have called. i don't remember. >> did you recall any conversation with him in which he said, colonel north, don't worry. even if you destroy all the documents i will stand up and say i approved it?

lt. col. north: no, i recall no such conversation. >> once the documents were destroyed you were out there without any kind of assurance that anyone would stand behind you? is that fair to say? lt. col. north: that was the plan. it was planned that i would be out there. and everything had gone according to plan up until 12:05 in the afternoon the next day or several days thereafter. >> when the plan changed is when you had the criminal investigation announced. lt. col. north: i don't know in who else's mind the plan changed. i know when i heard the words criminal investigation or criminal behavior in a press conference or shortly thereafter was certainly profound, that my mind that changed considerably. -- that my mindset changed

considerably. i think if you will indulge me for a second, over the 5.5 years i served on the staff, i hope as i test i'm hear today i saw -- as i hope i have testified here today, saw every possible means to do what needed to be done within the law. we had gone in extremis to run -- to find a way to live within the constraints. and i sought a means in 1985 and working -- in working with various lawyers and various counsel to find a way to implement a policy that started without my acquiescence or support or direction or anything else and work very, very hard to find legal ways to carry out the policy of the president. and there was probably not another person on the planet who

was as shocked as i was to hear that someone thought it was criminal. i can tell you that shock was compounded when i heard later there was to be an independent counsel. and further compounded when i was the only name in the appointment order for that counsel. the only person on the planet earth named in that appointment order counsel. >> colonel, if the investigation by the council had not been instituted, if you hadn't heard the words criminal, would you still be sticking by the cover story? >> it's -- >> i will not press it, it is hypothetical. >> i'm glad you recognize it. we don't have to get the chair involved. >> now, you have already

testified -- lt. col. north: which is this? >> the direction? lt. col. north: i consulted very carefully with director casey. i don't know if approved is the right word. director casey was very enthusiastic about the whole program. and advocated it. on the afternoon of the 23rd of november, he has to about the diversion. >> cs may specifically about that memorandum. >> and is it true that he asked you who knew about the fact that proceeds from the sale of iranian arms would be used to support the contras?

lt. col. north: i think he may well have. i'm not entirely clear. i was up until very early in the morning. i've had a meeting with mr. mcfarland on it. i suppose he may well have. i do not have detail specific of that. i took no notes during that meeting. >> do you recall if you told them if admiral poindexter new. -- admiral poindexter knew. knew?at mr. mcfarland lt. col. north: that sounds right. >> do you recall that you did not tell the attorney general of the united states that director casey knew. lt. col. north: i don't recall that i didn't.

>> was it part of the plan of that stage that you would not name director casey? lt. col. north: it had always been part of the plan director casey would know nothing of the support to the nicaraguan resistance. >> and who else was part of the plan that did not know any income about the support to the nicaraguan resistance? lt. col. north: other cabinet officers who had to testify. it was a very closed circle of people who knew. >> which other cabinet offices? lt. col. north: the people who didn't know. it was just a matter -- i told you who i thought knew and i

told you -- you have seen who i sent memorandum to and you know the record of communications i had with various is. i don't know who else knew. >> you testified a moment ago, unless you misunderstood the question -- >> council, i think you are missing each other. >> we will soon see -- that it was always part of the plan that director casey would not know. isn't that in essence what you said? lt. col. north: if you mean like the plan, the fall guy plan, then yes. >> even though casey knew, you would not finger him to use a colloquial expression.

lt. col. north: your expression, not mine. >> but you wouldn't name him. lt. col. north: that is correct. >> the next question i would ask is whether other people who knew things that you are also supposed to not name? lt. col. north: not that i know of. i know of no other people who actually knew. i have testified as to who i knew. i have testified as to who i knew knew. i testified as to who i can actually confirm knowledge in the memorandum i created.

the conversations we had in the record you see before you. i specifically talked to the admiral and i could well have said to the attorney general. on the 23rd i guess it was sunday that oh by the way the president knows. but i asked the admiral if the president knew and admiral told me no. in the and multiple me about the president, i told him no. >> is it a fact that you told the attorney general whether not you didn't know. lt. col. north: i think the discussion was perhaps -- >> the one where he called you from london, when he asked you what the attorney general had said. let's go back, colonel. did you not talk to mr. mcfarlane after your conversation with the attorney

general? lt. col. north: i believe i spoke to mr. mcfarlane and admiral poindexter. this is after the attorney general. >> when you talk to mr. mcfarland after you have met with the attorney general, did he ask you what happened at that meeting? lt. col. north: i suppose he did, or i volunteered it -- one or the other. >> do you recall telling mr. mcfarland about the fact that they had found the memoranda? lt. col. north: yes, i did. >> do you remember telling him that you were asked about who knew? lt. col. north: i don't remember that part. it was a profoundly difficult time because that memorandum was not supposed to exist.

>> did i understand you to say a moment ago that if admiral poindexter had not told you on friday that he had not told the president, you may well have told the attorney general that the president did know? >> that is a very confusing question, mr. chairman. could you restate it, sir? >> did you just testify a few moments ago that had admiral poindexter not told you on that friday that the president was unaware of the diversion, you might well have told the attorney general on that sunday that the president knew. is that what you said? lt. col. north: let me cast this the right way. i don't want to leave any false impressions. in the conversations that i had

with the admiral on friday, all of which related to my departure, the safety of the hostages, the second channel, the cleanup of the files -- and that is an acceptable way of putting it. i asked the admiral that day, did the president -- or does the president know about the fact that we used these moneys to support the resistance. he told me, no. i think that is the last conversation i ever had with the admiral about that aspect of it. having assumed all along that those things which require presidential approval indeed had them. i think i conveyed to the attorney general on sunday those sentiments. my recollection of it is, when he asked me if the president approved these, i told him, i

guess he didn't, or he didn't, or something like that. that is what the admiral told me on friday. >> so what i think you were trying to say is that you had assumed for nine months that the president of the united states knew and approved of this? lt. col. north: i assume from the day i took my post of the national security council that those things which required the approval of the president, and i sent forward memoranda soliciting that approval, and i got the authority to proceed on various initiatives, that it did receive the approval of the president. i testified to that. >> so it wasn't until poindexter answered your question that you assumption was shaken? he simplyorth: implied the president did not know. >> did you ask him, admiral poindexter, did you not discuss this with the president?

lt. col. north: no. >> why not. lt. col. north: first of all i'm , not in the habit of questioning my superiors. he deemed it not appropriate to ask the question, and i saluted smartly and charged up the hill, that is what lieutenant colonels are supposed to do. i have no problem with that. i believe that nothing that we did was wrong or illegal. i thought it was a good idea to begin with. i still think it was a good idea. >> had you wondered, why, if it was a good idea, that the president of the united states dismissed you because of it? lt. col. north: let me make one thing clear. this lieutenant colonel is not going to challenge a decision of the commander and chief for whom i still work. i am proud to work for the commander in chief. and if that commander in chief tells a lieutenant colonel to go in the corner and sit on his head, i will do so. if the commander and chief the

decides to dismiss me from the staff, i will salute and say thank you for the opportunity to have served and go. i am not going to criticize his decision, no matter how he relieves me, sir. >> has anyone given you a -- -- an explanation, colonel north, on behalf of the president, of why he did not think it was a good idea and dismissed you? lt. col. north: the president of the united states saw fit to call me later the same day, and in the course of that call, which was also intensely personal, he told me words to the effect, i just didn't know. i've no reason to disbelieve but -- what the commander in chief told me, sir. >> did you say to him that i received approval from admiral poindexter and director casey? lt. col. north: i did not say those words to the commander in chief.

i expressed my thanks for being able to serve them for the last 5.5 years. and my regrets that my service had brought forth a political firestorm and difficulties when all i saw to do was to help, but what i may have done was to hurt him. >> and when you were speaking to the attorney general on the 23rd, you understood that the attorney general was not just the chief legal officer of the united states, but he was a confidant and friend of the president, correct? he was an advisor of the president?

lt. col. north: would you please repeat the question? >> you understood that the attorney general was an advisor of the president? lt. col. north: yes, i did. >> why didn't you tell the attorney general that director casey knew? lt. col. north: i don't know that i did and i don't know that i didn't. i don't recall that conversation in any detail. it was consistent with a long pattern that director casey did not know about any support outside of that provided by the cia for the nicaraguan resistance. this was part of that.

>> colonel north, as late as november 23, where you still -- were you still prepared to conceal from the attorney general facts relating to director casey? lt. col. north: i was prepared at that point to continue not to reveal the version as you put it -- the diversion, as you put it, occurred. remove those files, his people had been going through them that day. i thought i had gotten them all. >> who were you protecting? lt. col. north: i was protecting the lives and the safety of the people who were engaged in the operation. >> explain to us how telling the attorney general of the united states that director casey approved a diversion would jeopardize lives other than wraps put him in jeopardy of

-- perhaps put him in jeopardy of the kind of investigation that you have been through? lt. col. north: i don't know other than the fact that this investigation could result in lives being put in jeopardy. i don't think that a specific thought went through my mind on that issue. >> it was just instinctive that you don't mention the name of the director when you're talking to the attorney general about knowledge of support for the contras. lt. col. north: it was instinctive, counsel, from my earliest days of contact with the director, that our -- his relationship and mine not be something that was publicly bandied about. until these hearings, i don't know that the people in washington know that the director and i communed as often as we did. >> how often did you commune?

lt. col. north: several times a week. >> where? lt. col. north: mostly on the telephone. sometimes we would meet in one of our offices. sometimes at the intelligence community building across the street. i can recall meetings at his home. i recall writing in the car with -- riding in the car with him an airplane trips with him. we have enough to be able to coordinate sufficiently and i could seek his guidance on a number of things. >> he was a person who you could confide in? lt. col. north: i did. >> you valued his advice? lt. col. north: interestingly. -- in estimate will he be -- in

estimately. >> are you on a first name basis? lt. col. north: i called him mr. casey to his face. i occasionally called him bill. when my father died, there were three people in the government of the united states who expressed their condolences. admiral poindexter, the vice president of the united states, and bill casey. bill casey was for me a man of immense proportions and a man whose advice i valued greatly, and a man whose concerns for this country and the future of this land were on the right track. i may be wrong, but i don't think history will bear that out.

i took his advice to heart. >> did you look upon him in a way as a boss? lt. col. north: i have heard that said, i don't think so much as a boss, but i know who my superiors are and i know the chain of command. he wasn't a boss so much as he was a personal friend and an advisor and a person with whom i could consult and gave good solid advice and someone i could turn to for support. >> when you briefed him on what you were doing to keep the contras alive, did he express his approval to you?

lt. col. north: he never once that i can recall in any way disagreed with any of the things that i was doing. in fact, he gave me a number of ideas of how they might be done better. i don't recall him ever -- i don't recall that he ever said, don't do something you are doing. he often with suggest ways to do it better. >> do you think he discussed the president's views with you from time to time? lt. col. north: not on areas bearing on this investigation. >> the president's commitment to the contras? lt. col. north: in general terms. director casey was the one who formulated and laid out for the first time publicly what has come to be called the reagan doctrine.

i think he had a very clear understanding of what the president's views work. he was able to formulate some of those as a public policy position. >> did you talk to director casey about the financial needs of the contras? lt. col. north: he probably knew more about it than i did because he was getting the raw intelligence. yes we did. >> you told director casey about the fact that the ayatollah would be paid for those needs? lt. col. north: yes i did. >> that matter had a double irony in the sense that the iranian government had been providing arms to the sandinistas.

lt. col. north: you have been reading my papers, haven't you? that's right. they tried, and they also provided oil on credit. about $100 million worth over several years. >> and indeed, one of the points that the president approved in terms of reference where mcfarland talked to the government representatives about is that they should not give the support to the sandinistas, right? lt. col. north: that is correct. >> a staff member of the nsc succeeded in reversing it all,

getting the money for the contras. correct? lt. col. north: we did. >> that was something that director casey must have been admired very much. lt. col. north: he did. to put it mildly. >> and it was something that you were proud of? lt. col. north: i didn't say i was proud of it. i said it was a neat idea. >> did director casey ever tell you that this is something you must never mention to any of your colleagues at the nsc? lt. col. north: i'm sorry would

you please -- >> did you discuss with director casey that the use of the proceeds was a matter that could be a political bombshell? lt. col. north: i think we probably did at a number of points. certainly, we discussed that very clearly toward the end of my tenure. i think it actually came down to detailed discussions of that. once he was aware that there were outside -- there was outside intelligence on it.

i'm focusing specifically on a friend of his that had approached him and told him that he, the friends, new about the use of the funds. >> and that was in the fall of 1986? >> and you testified to the fact that as a result of those statements to the director, the director asked you to clean up your files? lt. col. north: that is correct. it was not that one singular event. things were unraveling rather quickly. we had the aircraft shutdown. we had the investigation of southern transport, innocent as far as i can determine. that was followed by the revelations and pamphlets in iran.

>> colonel, in november of 1986, after the iranian venture had been publicized in lebanon and in papers all over the world, did you discuss this with director casey? lt. col. north: sure. >> tell us about that -- whatever you can recall. lt. col. north: we had several discussions about it. my recollection is that director casey agreed with my assessment at the time. when it came time for someone to take the fall, he quite frankly did not think that i was senior enough to do that.

he suggested -- i'm trying to recall, that suggested it would probably go up the line or something like that. >> did he suggest who else could take the hit? lt. col. north: he suggested it might be admiral poindexter. >> because next up in the line it would be admiral poindexter on this matter? lt. col. north: that is correct. there was a nominal deputy who would've been aware of some of this. >> did you discuss blaming it on him after his death? lt. col. north: it would be hard to blame something that was going on in november on somebody who died in the summer. >> the original approval? lt. col. north: no.

>> so director casey discuss with you the fact that it just might not be credible for you to take the hit and that it might have to be admiral poindexter? lt. col. north: words to that effect. >> did he discuss anyone else that would have to take the hit? lt. col. north: he was concerned that the president not be damaged by it, and i shared that belief. >> these conversations took place before november 21, correct? lt. col. north: i would guess so, yes. i spent the first part in december -- november in very heavy travel, and so did the director.

my recollection is we had one conversation early in the month, perhaps during one of my layovers in washington. the next conversations were not until very much later in the month. >> at the time you had that conversation in early november, you had not yet been told by admiral poindexter that he had not told the president, correct? lt. col. north: i was not told that by admiral poindexter until the 21st. >> so you were still laboring under the assumption that the president of the united states knew, correct? lt. col. north: yes. >> and did director casey tell you that the president doesn't know? lt. col. north: no. >> and when you and director casey were talking about somebody having to take the hit,

why did you understand that it was necessary for someone to take the hit? lt. col. north: i think we could see that we would have a major international and domestic political drama on this thing. it would be helpful if someone were -- as we originally planned, when it comes time for this thing to go down the tubes, here is the guy who gets fingered for it. none of us, certainly not me or no when i ever talked to, ever imagined we had done anything criminally wrong. >> you have testified that the director was known to be a lawyer? lt. col. north: he was indeed. >> he had a reputation of being a very smart lawyer.

lt. col. north: he was indeed. it was not just his assessment of himself. >> you formed it from the relationship you had with him. but you saw how his mind operated. it was very quick. lt. col. north: it sure was. >> in these conversations that you were having with the director, it was clear to you that he was concerned about damage to the president? lt. col. north: i think it would be beyond comprehension that anyone who served the president -- any president, wasn't concerned about that. that is not from a republican, democratic, or partisan perspective, that is seeing the president as the commander in chief, chief executive, and head of state.

i think it is incumbent upon all servants in the executive branch to have that kind of a concern, not so much for the man necessarily, but for the institution of the president. i certainly had that. i know director casey had that. >> on the 25th of november, did you tell director casey that you were going to see the attorney general that sunday? lt. col. north: i had already seen him by the 25th of november. >> did you tell them before you saw the attorney general? lt. col. north: if i may -- >> are you looking at the schedule?

lt. col. north: i do not believe i talked to the director that day about that issue. >> what about the prior day? lt. col. north: i didn't know i was going to see him until the 21st. >> let's get the dates direct. you saw the attorney general on the 23rd. lt. col. north: sunday the 23rd, right. >> and you knew that he -- you were going to see him on the 22nd? lt. col. north: that is correct. >> did you speak to the director after the attorney general asked to see him? lt. col. north: i do not have a recollection of doing that, no. >> when you talked to the director in october after the

incident, and in november, did he ever ask you what the memorandum looked like that you had sent up a line and that you were either order to take care of or had taking care of? lt. col. north: i don't believe so, i think at least on one occasion i wrote the memorandum with the director. >> so he knew what it looked like? that one? lt. col. north: certainly. >> can you recall which transaction was reflected in the memorandum that you went over with with the director? lt. col. north: i have a sense it was probably the february one.

it was probably the february transaction. >> that involved 1000 hawks, correct? lt. col. north: correct. >> what occasions would you go over the memoranda with the director? lt. col. north: my recollection is -- and it is vague because it was a long time ago it seems -- i was pursuing getting a cia officer -- a particular cia officer engaged in the initiative. >> there is only one cia officer whose name we use with respect to this, mr. cave, is that the one? lt. col. north: yes. >> i would like you to complete your answer. lt. col. north: my sense is that what director casey and i started talking about was getting mr. cave because of his experience in that country and

his obvious language ability so he had a person besides myself who knew exactly what was being said and with whom i had absolute report. he chose to make some sort of arrangement to bring mr. cave back to the service. it is my recollection that we then -- it was right after the february transaction, at some point in that timeframe when i was trying to get him involved and i showed the director one of those memoranda.

>> colonel, was the memorandum you showed him the memorandum as it existed before you sent it up the line, or after it came back? lt. col. north: it was probably before. >> did the director in any way question you about not sending a memorandum that called for presidential approval? lt. col. north: i don't recall him ever doing that. >> is it fair to say that given your strong sense of command, your belief in director casey, that if he said you do not put the president's name on a memorandum, you would've done it?

lt. col. north: very true. >> but you put a reference in the memoranda that they should -- the president's name, in terms of having a reference in the memoranda that admiral poindexter should seek the approval of the president? lt. col. north: that is correct. if we could just go to that. >> i will come to it in more detail later. but if you want to say now, say it. lt. col. north: unkind. again, i would like to make the point that i did not, nor do i know that others did, highlight that aspect of it in those memoranda. if you will note that the one memorandum that still exists was drafted at some point in april, it is five pages long with a four-page attachment. there are only eight lines that refer in this many pages to that

specific part of the transaction. what is very important is the use -- and i know that is the focus of this investigation, but that the use of the funds derived as residuals was not viewed as preeminent activity ongoing. the preeminent activity was to establish a relationship with iran and all of the other things that would derive therefrom. and that we saw, as director casey put it, the ultimate irony in that as a part of this process we could continue to support that desperately needy nicaraguan resistance. >> you said that you didn't highlight it.

it is also true that you did not conceal it in the memoranda. lt. col. north: i did not conceal from my superiors anything that i did. the record is very clear on the stacks of paper you have. >> the record is very clear in the memorandum that have survived that you did not conceal it. lt. col. north: i did not. >> in a very hurried inspection, brad reynolds spotted it very quickly. lt. col. north: i don't know how long it took them to find it. they spent many hours in my office that day. nor did they reveal it to me when they found it. >> they revealed it to you the next day. lt. col. north: they certainly did. >> the reason that director casey asked you after the incident to get rid of the memoranda because of the one paragraph that refer to diversion?

lt. col. north: i don't know if that was solely on his mind. i think the director was concerned -- and this was the mistake that i made, the operational mistake was to cross the two operations. in the person of this guy here and the others that were having to carry it out. operationally, if you have other alternatives, you do not do that. i didn't at the time have other alternatives. second, i think what director casey saw was that there would be a major unraveling of the activities.

for mark and the aircraft you down was part of it. we knew that leaflets were being handed out by another faction in the government of iran. the shootdown involves contra support. lt. col. north: true. >> for mark was complaining about the fact that investors had not gotten paid out of the proceeds of the sale, correct? lt. col. north: no. the problem with that revelation is that he told him as i remember it that somebody else had told to members of congress. -- two members of congress. that money from the sale of weapons to iran had been diverted.

those names are in the notebooks that i gave you, sir. >> you gave us a of notebooks. i have not seen those in the notebooks. i'm going to ask your counsel at a recess to point them out to us. you know what the names are? lt. col. north: i don't recall them, no. and i sure would not want to be inaccurate on that. [laughter] >> the director was talking about their version in terms of furmark. lt. col. north: the concerns that the director addressed to me was, you have the shootdown of the hostage airplane, that operation is in trouble. furmark has now come and told me that other people are very aware of the fact that the armed sales to iran have generated funds that have gone to support others, and it is getting out.

>> did he say that this had been called to members of congress who might start an investigation? lt. col. north: i don't recall that part of it. but apparently someone had claimed to furmark that members of congress were being made aware, or had been. >> so you were told to get rid of memoranda that would prevent that. lt. col. north: i was told to clean up the files. >> so that means to get rid of memoranda that reflected that. lt. col. north: anything to do with the residuals, as you call, diversions. >> and that means that you went through your files to make sure that you found the memoranda that referred to the residuals? as you call them. lt. col. north: yes. >> and when you went through the files, you recall how many you found?

lt. col. north: the specific memoranda seeking approval? >> yes. lt. col. north: no, i don't. what i probably found where dozens and dozens of memoranda relating to the residuals and the application to the contra, among other things. what i am saying is there are probably several copies of even the april one, which i thought i had gotten all of them. >> when you say that there were dozens -- lt. col. north: of the five that i sought approval for. >> so they were copies of the five? lt. col. north: exactly. >> did you look over them to see whose names were written on them? lt. col. north: we went through this once. >> you said you didn't recall, and i am asking if you looked. lt. col. north: i don't remember

looking. >> you said you did not look look. >> would you like to answer the questions for him, counsel? >> i would like him to keep his answers to the questions. >> they would have the question, please? >> did you look to see whose names were written on those memos? lt. col. north: i do not recall looking to see whose names were written on the memos. >> do you recall looking to see if they had checkmarks or initials? lt. col. north: i do not. >> is it fair to say that the steno books that you took home contain very sensitive information? lt. col. north: it is likely, with interpretation, that the steno books are sensitive, yes. >> part of the interpretation is

your handwriting. lt. col. north: certainly that. >> there are names in those books. lt. col. north: yes. >> and you uttered a prayer to the committee that we treat these books with sensitivity, and respect their security. you did that yesterday, correct? lt. col. north: i did. >> the home that you took these books to is a home that you had a great deal of concern about security for, correct? lt. col. north: yes.

>> and can you explain to me, someone who has never been in a position such as yours, as to why you would be concerned about the security of documents locked in an nsc office subject to all stores a security regulations and access restrictions, or not concerned about keeping them at home? lt. col. north: i may have had a few of them at home, i don't recall how many there were. i removed the rest of them on the 25th, along with several hundred pages of other documents. i did that for one purpose, to protect itself. after the press conference, my perspective changed.

it became one of protecting myself. that was the reason to remove those notebooks from the nsc and take those documents. i took the documents from the white house with me. >> when did you do your shredding before the 25th, the last preceding day in which he did shredding that was out of the ordinary? lt. col. north: it is entirely likely that i was shredding documents as late as the morning of the 25th. >> did the attorney general, when you met with him on the

23rd, ask you to preserve every single document? lt. col. north: no. >> when you returned from your meeting with the attorney general on the 23rd, did you go to your office and do shredding of documents that day? lt. col. north: i honestly don't remember, but i know i shredded documents after that fact. >> after your meeting with the attorney general where he confronted you with the divergent memo. lt. col. north: if i remember accurately, my recollection is i went to the white house to try to call admiral poindexter on the telephone. he had gone to the redskins game.

you plug new york lawyers, i plug the redskins. as i recall, he was not yet home. it was probably then that i called mr. mcfarland. i called him probably, from this that room. -- from the sit room. i would guess that i went back to my office at that point and for some time continued to clean up the files. i will also point out to the committee that i destroyed documents that had absolutely nothing to do with either iran or the nicaraguan resistance that no longer with the applicable in the event that i was soon to be transferred. >> the recall that on monday morning, the 24th, the shredder was full and overflowing?

lt. col. north: i don't remember that it was monday, but i do remember that happen at some point. >> do remember shredding documents during the lunch hour on the 22nd when the representatives in the attorney general's office had left for their lunch? lt. col. north: i remember shredding documents when they were in their reading documents. -- in there reading documents. >> shredding in their presence? lt. col. north: they were sitting in my office and the shredder was in the hallway. so i was out there shredding and they were reading. they were sitting in my office reading. they would finish the document and say, we don't need that anymore. i would walk out and shredded. they could. the shredder was right outside the door. >> you would go up there and take documents that they had finished reading?

lt. col. north: no, i want to be very clear. i had my office, and you now have a diagram of this palatial basement office on the third floor. it was up on the wall here, somewhere. the desk that i had was in the corner of my office. then there was a table about this size. on that table was all of the iran documents. i was working at my desk and other things cleaning out files on lots of things. when i finished with a handful of documents i would turn the corner and drop them in. >> did anyone say to you, what are you doing? lt. col. north: no. i did not think anything of it either. what you have to understand is that i did not think i had done anything wrong.

>> i understand -- lt. col. north: i do not think that they necessarily thought i had done anything wrong. an officer that has a shredder in his office, ought to be -- if he is not reading or writing documents and needs to get rid of them, puts them in the shredder. lunch record is before hour, mr. reynolds found the diversion document -- >> but he didn't tell me. wait for the question, you will get your opportunity to answer. i'm not interrupting your answer. he found that documents. he attached significance to that document. what you are saying is that even after that, and this occurred before lunch, that you were

there taking batches of documents past the attorneys from the department of justice and shredding them. and they were not saying, stop, we would like to look, what are you doing, we are concerned -- none of that, right? lt. col. north: i'm not trying to leave the wrong impression. what i am saying is that i thought, and perhaps they thought, and i'm trying to be in several people's minds at once. they were looking for the backs -- the facts on what had transpired in september, october, and november of 1985. what i was told they were looking for i thought was in the files that i gave them. let me finish. i was also engaged in a number of other projects of national security importance.

the fact that i was shredding documents, i don't think would be unusual to them. i'm not trying to say that these guys were letting me willy-nilly shred documents. i had a shredder for that purpose. if i finish reading a top secret cable of intelligence value you , don't leave it sitting around your office, you destroy it after you read them. that is what i was doing. >> were you taking single documents over to the shredder, or were you taking files over to the shredder? lt. col. north: i was not taking files. i was sitting at my desk and they were working on their projects and i was working on mine. [laughter] >> i want to hear more about it. go ahead. lt. col. north: i don't think you have to accuse them of incompetence because they didn't stop a guy from doing a job. that is why the government of the united states gave me a shredder.

[laughter] >> but your job on that day was to get rid of files, wasn't it? lt. col. north: no, that isn't what i came in for. i was working desperately to -- i received a two or three phone calls on it -- to keep the hostages alive. we had had this stuff all over the newspapers. the israelis were calling me every half hour. i was working with those people. they heard me taking the phone calls. i was looking after several other action packages. that i had to move across the street. on totally unrelated issues. lt. col. north: was your work on the phone with the israelis leading you to shred documents? >> objection. lt. col. north: on occasion. >> weren't you going through your files to get rid of embarrassing documents? lt. col. north: embarrassing, no. documents that would compromise the national security of the united states, documents that would put lives at risk, documents that would demonstrate covert actions, yes.

i am not embarrassed to be here. >> are you saying -- are you saying that you thought that allowing the attorney general of the united states or his representatives to see documents that jeopardize -- would jeopardize lives? lt. col. north: no.

i'm saying that revelations regarding those documents would destroy lives. many of the documents that i destroyed that day, prior to that day, and after that day had no relationship with iranian activities. they had to do with nicaraguan resistance activities. they had to do with counterterrorist operations. just has this committee has a scope within which they operate, they were looking for specific iranian associated activities. if i had a file of matters pertaining to support for the internal opposition in nicaragua or people i had contacted in europe and with whom i had worked to get weapons for the nicaraguan resistance sitting

there at my desk, i would pull is out and look at them and say north if you're not here , tomorrow, this doesn't need to be found by anybody. i will take them over to the shredder and destroy them. that is what i'm saying. it was beyond the pale of their inquiry. >> those were files that were assembled over time? lt. col. north: five and one half years sir. , >> those were files that had remained secure for 5.5 years, correct? lt. col. north: correct. >> and you knew that whoever was selected to fill that office would be the national security advisor, correct? -- would be selected by the national security advisor, correct? lt. col. north: i did not know that the person who moved into the office which share the same responsibilities or have anything to do with the matters with which i had worked. the documents that existed as permanent files were all that were necessary to carry on. the activities i was engaged, and it was only a part of my

work in support of the nicaraguan resistance and support would be terminated. there was no need to retain those documents. >> do you deny that one of the reasons that you were shredding documents was to avoid the political embarrassment of having these documents be seen by the attorney general's staff? lt. col. north: i do not deny that. >> i think this is a good time for a break. >> the hearing will stay in recess for 10 minutes. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] >> this weekend on american history tv on c-span3, tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on lectures in history, appalachian state university professor jonathan browning