where you have removals and we have project managers at the epa who do that for a living. they're very much involved in trying to control costs, not so much on the remedial project managers on superfund cleanups. so there needs to be a dialogue and a plan to work together on how contractors and epa in the states can look at reducing costs of the construction of the remedy and the long-term o & m. >> before my questions, ranking member carper had to leave for another hearing but ask -- we are about to join an event at the middle east institute in washington, d.c. right now there's a panel discussion on the conditions in the gaza strip. this is live coverage on cspan 3.

>> good afternoon, everyone, i'll be the moderator on today's discussions, on the politics, the daily life and the challenges relating to the gaza strip. this event is the latest in mei's george and rhonda salem. we are not relatives, although we're both salems, but we're distant cousins perhaps. this event today is being live stream streamed on our website and i think cspan3 is covering it as well. and there will be a live podcast as well. and because it's being reported and just for general decor.

if you are to tweet, we hope that you'll connect regularly with mei on twitter and facebook and our website. we have a lot of articles, graphics and videos for understanding the region and policies to the region, we also just published a new book. we're also entitled to chaos. this building is part of our temporary site as we build on

the corner on n street. it's a rapid-- there are pledges like this that are available where you signed in. we're looking today at the critical, political and humanitarian situation in gaza. a lot going on in and around the gaza issue. tensions between palestinian authority in hamas, infighting within sort of the fatah movement itself, its shifts in the gulf, positively impacting the situation in gaza. gaza has been under a blockade for almost a decade now, things have recently gotten worse as the palestinian authority also is reducing salary payments, and asking that electricity get in,

as the gaza strip is very dire in this situation. part of our discussion today is not only to ask how the international community can help mitigate the current suffering, but how can we bring gaza back into regional and international deliberations into some kind of political process. and how does one avoid dynamics that some similars even on this panel are warning could raise the risk of war again, after the last war in 2014, which was very, very devastating on the gaza strip, also that the loss of life among the israelis, we want to avoid another con flag ration of that kind. . we're very pleased to have our panel with us today. we have their full bios that was handed out to you.

immediately to my right is a policy fellow, he's currently based in new york. it's a palestinian policy network, who's thinking is without borders to foster public debate on palestinian human rights of determination within the frame work of international law. to my extreme left is laura freedman, president of the organization for mid east peace, u.s. executive branch to israel and palestine. she previously was for americans with peace now and was an american force services offer. to my immediate left is mr. christopher mccgrath. he's part of an organization

that has approximately 12,500 on staff. social health, relief and microcredit and emergency assistance to persons in the gaza strip and elsewhere. to my immediate right is a member of the brookings university. he is currently writing a book on israeli grand strategy and it's domestic origins. i will engage my panelists in discussion for a while and leave ample time for discussions from you, the audience and we will close promptly at 1:30 today. chris let me start with you, if you could paint a picture of the current humanitarian and perhaps economic situation on the ground in gaza and also paint a picture

of what are the aid flows which are obstructed which are proceeding, and how would you e describe the situation since sort of the conflict of 2014, i know there's been a u.n. report, gaza 2020, and amendments to that. just start us off with a picture of how you see things there. >> thanks to mei for hosting this today. as you mentioned in 2012, the u.n. released a report caused gaza 2020, a livable place? by the year 2020, the population of gaza will increase to 2.1 million, we're already at that number and it's only 2017. water and sanitation and social services is struggling to keep pace with the growing population. by 2020, electricity provisions will need to double to meet the

demand. and hundreds of new schools will be needed for an overwhelmingly young population. since 2012, there's been continued development in # the gaza strip and there's been conflict in 2014. during that 2014 conflict, we had 2,096 civilians sheltering in schools. tens of thousands of people still remain displaced from that. in addition to that there was severe psychosocial distress particularly on the children. when we reopened the schools, we found that virtually 100% of our students showed signs of ptsd. and there's been a significant d-development, rather than development, going the wrong direction. we see a lot more donkey carts on the streets instead of cars

and trucks so people are going backward as you can see. unemployment is 37.4% for men and perhaps for troubling, unemployment for youth 20 to 25 is 60%. there's a shortage of drugs and electricity. just on the current electricity crisis. bla blackouts are running about 20 to 22 hours a day. what we see is families getting up at all hours of the day wherever they do have electricity, to scramble to get everything done that they need electricity for. about 90% of the tap water are unfit for humans. and the desalination plants are

about 50% of capacity. there's about four olympic sized swimming pool it of raw sewage going into the ocean. i want to read a portion of a report that underscores most of the projections for 2020 have deteriorated further and faster in 2012. provision of health services has continued to decline and demand for additional health clinics, doctors and hospital beds has not been met. gaza has maintained high education standards, but average daily class time for students remains as low as 4 hours per day. gaza's only water source is predicted to be depleted by 2020. the conflict of 2014, demanded

increased imports to gaza. to allow the economy and basic services to recover and expand has remained highly restricted. so the question that has to be asked how can this trend be reversioned. we're asking the international community to invest in the sustainable investment community. to revitalize the economy and more importantly to have free movement of people and products. the alternative will be a gaza that is more isolated and more desperate. the threat of a renewed, more devastating escalation will increase and the process for palestinian-israeli peace will continue. >> let me ask you a number of follow-up questions.

first of all, what is your current underfunding situation, given that you're probably the main source there. secondly, qatar used to be, and maybe that's changing, has been a contributor and so on. and the europeans, i'm talking humanitarian. and what are the current pathways, there used to be a lot of products that came through the tunnels. what is getting through? and so three questions, if i may. >> sure, i'll take them in order i think. the funding situation, as you know, enra always had a major funding problem. this year we're facing a deficit of 106.5 million, on a budget of $750 million per year, so it's quite substantial. we are working to make that budget deficit up.

and we are expected the next several years to have similar deficits. we have calculated that we have a $1 million structural deficit that we face each year. and as you know, the united states is the largest contributor to enra. providing 42% of funding for the agency. we do have support from the european union. the european union itself is the number two contributor, and the european countries direct to unrwa is the additional 25%. to answer a third question here, the imports, as you noted, there used to be quite a big tunnel economy, most of those have been closed. the u.n. never engaged in any tunnel economy, none of the procurement was done in the tunnels. we have a very coordinated role

with the israeli government. so the materials that we need to business in for construction or food items, we have a very sophisticated system that we work with the israelis on. but for the average person, there is a dual use list, some things that could have a second dare use are not able to come in. exports again is the major hindrance here, gaza a manufacturing economy, and they export their goods, furniture, clothing, whatever it may be, fruit, vegetables, so without being able to export those goods, the jobs just aren't there anymore. and the crucial markets have been on the west coast.

>> you answered as to other donors, but does qatar or turkey or anyone else have their own programs that they typically provide to gaza outside unrwa? >> it's not just unrwa just happens to be the biggest, but the u.n. and qatar give assistance to the people. and some also support, as you know, the defactor government there as well. >> help us understand the very complicated current politics within fatah itself or different wings of fault that, and now recently meetings. walk us through what's going on politically. why is abbas doing the things

he's doing? is he now shifting? and how does this play out politically. >> i'll try to go through a chronological order of how things have been happening over the past six months or so to try to give some context to where we are today. >> bring your microphone closer. >> i'm sorry, can everyone hear me? so a great deal of attention was give on to gaza after that electricity crisis that happened about a month ago. but that was the result of a decision that had been taken by president mahmoud abbas in the west coast bank around april and it followed from a number of decisions that president habas took since the beginning of the year. cutting all of the salaries of pa employees, so employees of

the palestinian authority that are present and living in the gaza strip rather than the west bank. part of the decision by mahmoud abbas were primarily because of budget tear constraints and saying that it has a bulling constraint. but the fact that the policies that president abbas was taking was focused on the gaza strip, showing there was a concerted effort on his part to increase isolation in the area. the third step that president abbas took, was to ask real to -- or said that he would stop making payments for the electricity supply that israel gives to the gaza strip.

this led to a considerable humanitarian crisis in the gaza strip. there are a number of factors, there are local dynamics and there are regional dynamics and international dynamics that have been increasing for the last four years, but most notably since 2014 and the end of the 2014 war between hamas and israel. in sort of immediate context is the election of president trump. president trump already showed signs of wanting to have policies that would produce the ultimate deal between israel and the palestinians. and was positioning himself as someone who could provide that deal. there was also a sense coming from the american administration coming into office that there would be some regional dynamics that would resolve or change,

and noticeably between americ s e's allies, quote, unquote and islamic extremists that support islamic extremists that support hamas. with american policy shifting under the trump administration, president abbas wants to position himself as someone who is able to implement the trump administration's agenda on the ground as someone who's able to unify the palestinian territories and present a single palestinian voice to the trump administration and as someone who's able to take strong policies toward the hamas government in the gaza strip, so all of that probably formed the backdrop of president hamas's decision to start escalating towards the gaza strip. so that's the international

context from which things started happening. and from there things started e expanding. on the one hand, the hamas government in the gaza strip was quite isolated. in the past few years, the tunnel economy had been severely impacted. which meant that there were no taxes collected on goods coming through the tunnels and iran and saudi arabia were on the rocks and the emergence of the cici regime in egypt, which meant that the -- all these factors together resulted in a situation where the hamas government was quite isolated. so this presented an opportunity for presidential habas.

on the other hand there was also an increasing effort on president haba s's rifle to come through the gaza strip. so there were negotiations that were happening with the powers within gaza with the backing of the uae and egypt. so both the threat of the hanan coming into power, the hamas in egypt, and possibly an american administration that would be supportive of the actions president habas was taking, all culminated in efforts that would weaken hamas. and of course what we saw in the gulf crisis with saudi arab

arabia's -- a country that was accused of supporting terrorist organizations, that is reflected within some of the dynamics that are happening in the gaza strip. and qatar, the challenge for qatar now to show that it isn't supporting organizations such as hamas is only playing into or hands in terms of further weakening hamas. of course it was a flawed decision for several reasons, which i can talk about now and it actually resulted in, and they were entirely counter productive and they have backfired and the situation we see on the ground now is one where hamas is actually moved much closer to hamas. and there is a knnew alliance that's forming with a significant threat to president

habas. and there now there's a policy being considered. >> who's backing, if anybody, president abbas, with the situation in egypt have been close to hamas, what was he counting on in terms of support. >> i think that -- i mean i wouldn't be able to directly say, but i think my reading of the situation and my assessment of the situation is that there was a calculus made by president abbas, that if he was able to present himself as the secular palestinian authority and was able to take control of the gaza strip and the west bank, that he was able to enhance the support of countries such as saudi arabia. and even egypt and the uae might fall into step if he was able to present a strong hand and

demonstrate that he's actually able to take control of the gaza strip. that calculus has backfired. what has resulted instead was the uae continuing to support hanan as a possible successor to president habas. so i think egypt was probably seen as a country that could fall either way and it's now come out very clearly as the country that is supportive of hanan coming back into power. but what's important in deciding to further increase gaza's it isolation, he bought into the idea of the blockade, which is that you can increase the pressure on a population of close to 2 million people in order to weaken a political faction, or in this case, a

running government, which is hamas's government in gaza. it's more reprehensible because it's using more of a -- it has also proven to be flawed, hamas has been weakened several times, but rather than collapse, and having the pe coming back into the gaza strip, we have seen several escalations between turf wars in the gaza strip. and it is a misreading from the israeli side as well which it has benefitted from the separation of the gaza strip from hamas. and from meeting as a government in gaza that's able to adm administer the -- so there are a

number of conditions here that have been misread. >> maybe a few words about how you would think the latest troubles on temple mount and that area played into politics, how the different groups tried to take advantage of it on the palestinian side. and maybe a few words about how you see about the -- and so and hamas, and different factions and how you see the future there in terms of palestinian politics. >> in terms of the first question, in terms of how ill lit links into what's happening in jerusalem. going back to the days of 2014, just before the last flare up between gaza and israel. the tensions escalated the situation on the ground between hamas and gaza.

it was open to a reconciliation agreement then, as president abbas hoped it would be earlier this year. and there was tension that happened in jerusalem with the abduction and murder of the three israeli teenagers. the same recipes, the same elements that paved the way for the escalation in 2014 are very much present today, hamas gets a lot of legitimacy as a -- protecting the temple mount in ju jerusalem. so it is a government that can take advantage of what's happening in jerusalem now. i think if the crisis wasn't immediately averted last month with egyptian fuel shipments coming into the gaza strip, that

probably would have been the point where the next war would have escalated. so i don't think we can separate what's happening in jerusalem, i think they're very connected. hamas is very concerned with how it positions itself as the final front line of resistance as they seek to take over jerusalem and the west coast bank. so that's its connection to the west bank. in terms of the hanan, i think it's an ironic twist of fate to see hamas now in some form of alliance, hamas is an organization and hanan are bitter enemies, because of hanan's commitment to security which goes back to the 1990s, and under his leadership there was a significant amount of repression that the hamas leaders felt in plalestine, and

particularly the gaza strip. and h there are responsibilities that hamas has been trying to shed for years. but right now it's continuing in the gaza strip and controlled there. and hanan benefits by getting another political industry point into the political establishment. even though his entry point is through gaza, gaza continues to be a critical element of the -- somehow marginalized.

f completely incapable of getting any kind of help from the -- as someone who has political power. my guess is that he would be able to get political support in the west bank as well. having said that, there are likely to be other contenders, none have come to mind as ones that could be as powerful as dehaan. >> thank you very much. >> what are the currently israelis debate about changing developments in gaza, the gaza,

that the area withdrew from dufblt ha doesn't have centers there. what are the current debates regarding whether it's the palestinian authority standoff and the dehaan situation and the uae's role in egypt and some kind of dynamic, what is the thinking there and the risk of war discussion? >> thank you, and it's a pleasure to be here, this is temporary, then i look forward to seeing what's permanent. on the extreme right will be disappointed, but i'll try and represent the second half. we heard from chris earlier as we have all seen is terrible. it's terrible for the people inside gaza, but for many israelis, the thinking for decades is that it's a very bad weigh, so there may be -- the three wars with gaza have been very damaging with israel as

well. and the various palestinian leaders were very keen on avoiding it. especially then, previous ones may be less. so there is a growing recognition of the status quo, the long standing recognition that the status quo is very bad. so we see a debate inside israel about how to deal with this. on the one hand, there's a widespread desire to sort of solve what israelis see as the basic problem, which is a state neighboring israel, who is at war with a vastly powerful neighbor, it has no one gun with the pa, and no matter where it would be, if it was on the mexican-american border, anywhere, you would have extreme instability on the border. but you would necessarily have a very, very difficult situation

and probably war. so the situation from the israeli perspective. would be the authority controlling the gaza strip. an end to the renegade controlling gaza strip. we never assumed that hamas might actually do this, that hamas might actually say, we won't have a separate military, we won't have a renegade state. unfortunately, i think that's true, hamas is not going to give up its separate power, no matter what the damage is to the gaza strip, which is morally reprehensible. but is a fact. then the question arises what to do. sometimes you can hear on the extreme right in extremely, the calls to conquer the palestinian authority, no matter what costs, it's better than going to war

every few years. the cost to the gaza strip would be horrendous, but it would be even worse than it was in previous rounds to the population. the last war the damage in gaza was far worse than it was in israel. but people in israel too were running to the hishelters in th middle of the night, et cetera. but that's not a situation that's tolerable in israel. then there's this desire, even now with a request, a demand from abbas to cut the electricity support. from the minister of energy, said we should not exacerbate the situation even in abbas does this, we are not beholden to abbas. but in the end, the israeli feeling by and large is that they're not going to be more pro hamas than fatah is, and this is

the policy issue that the palestinians need to solve. i'm assured that the result is that israel then finds itself by choice reverting to this same basic strategy, trying to pressure hamas. as of the last war in 2013, there was a marked loosening of the blockade. i was talking about exactly the noose around hamas and the need not to pressure too hard because then you get into a war you don't want, like in 2014. so after 2014, the data from a very impressive organization, following exactly the real situation in gaza. there was a marked easing of things, still far from lifting the blockade and the situation in gaza is terrible and has gotten worse recently.

but by and large the basic israeli response has been keep the blockade. the irony is the ones that are more hopeful about peace, two-state solution down the road someday, the ones who are more prone to mahmoud abbas, trying to cooperate with the pa, those are the ones that are more hawkish on the gaza strip. that a separate palestinian state risks the whole project of trying to achieve reconciliation or some kind of two-state arrangement. the ones that have no hope or desire of a two-state solution with abbas, are now opposed. speaking about a very different position towards the gaza strip. i mentioned a man who sees himself a successor to president

abbas. of building an artificial island off the gaza strip, to allow gaza to have an outlet to the world. so the irony is sometimes the right wing is talking about easing and accepting the status quo, because hamas is not really -- in this loop of do you try to get out of a status quo, which leads you back to that somehow hamas will be brought back into the fold. and then you have abbas, trying to push farther trying to resolve this problem from the core, you're risking war, every time you pressure hamas, you get closer to war because it cares more about itself than the gazas. this is a terrible status quo, which is not static, and right now the centers of power are --

the conditions we heard about on the ground are horrendous. the water that you swim in this tel aviv, comes off the coast, the act wh aqua fur is the same gaza strip, a terrible -- and the solution, they don't have one. so then comes up this -- so that's abbas. then comes up this possibility of main the hun. thehun, is someone that the palestines know. the israelis know them. and the egyptians fighting some of the same enemies, and he's backed by the uae.

which is maybe israelis favorite. some of this looks like an appealing situation. let me just conclude by saying there's a very difficult dilemma here, i don't think it's that simple. in the long-term, the solution would be to bring gaza into the fold. but in the short-term, what you really need to do is to try to alleviate a terrible situation in the gaza strip of and try to deter a much more terrible situation which is war. i think to my mind the possibility of another conflict in gaza and the current situation is -- but i will point out, it's not a simple thing, simply jettisoning, that hamas

does not care about the people of gaza. >> i'm going to ask a couple of sort of follow-up questions, on the short-term issue, why hasn't israel sort of gotten the short-term balance right between hamas, okay, it's in gaza for now, but what the future holds now, we do not know. but it doesn't necessarily have an interest in launching israel in the world. except as it's really squeezed as it has been several times in the past. and in some ways, hamas, you know, manages some aspect, you know, the islamic jihad groups and others, so it plays a little bit of a partner role, indirectly, perhaps, in containing or managing a situation, why haven't israel and hamas found sort of a livable balance, you know, called it a long-term truce or something that would seem to be in the interest of both at least in the short-term, since none of

the long-term goals seem achievable. why is it that it's gone to the brink so many times and to war. one question i wanted to ask is a question on turkey, turkish-israelly relations have gone up and down. just a few comments about where that relationship stands and does it relate to gaza at all? >> so to the first question, that's a good question, and i think it -- why haven't they reached some kind of agreement where they despise each other across an open border. there was a deal brokered by the europeans to allow the crossings. the problem is it wasn't stable.

so part of the answer is ramallah, why hasn't israel -- amount of the payments, hamas doesn't way, and ramallah pays for it. so that's not a viable solution. every time there's been an easing of the blockade and there has been in very recent years, very dramatic changes, israeli intelligence is preparing for the next round. we don't see gaza flourishing. even the blockade, the early stages of the blockade, the blockade really comes after the coup and hamas takes over the gaza strip. when pa romano was still in charge of the gaza strip, and it led to the kidnapping or capture of an israeli soldier from the israeli territory from a tunnel inside gaza. so in short, the israeli mistrust of hamas intentions is

profound. so why can't they find a modus operandi, it's simply because they feel they're emboldening hamas for the second round. it's not completely clear that hamas doesn't speak with the same voice. there have been calls for a long time for a cease fire in israel. but even in 2014 when we saw vary heavy israeli hand in the west bank, contributed dramatically to the war breaking out. we saw both parties not wanting war. n they didn't have effective authority over them militarily. so even then citing a modus operandi is very important. and then the dynamic is very

important. hamas has spies across the region, remember, hamas has a border with egypt, not just by israel. and egypt, of course, it's first priority is perhaps a war against what it sees as a general islamist kind of group. and so from the israeli perspective, one, i think especially on the right wing, it's an appealing alternative. maybe it's an egyptian problem, let the egyptians solve it. why should there be a blockade? and second they don't want to annoy cici. and concessions so hamas, while cici is supporting the palestine thunderstorm. a -- authority. turkey, has outliars in the

region. and the situation with turkey is very complicated. i have a piece by my colleague just on that. israeli-turkish relations have come under some kind of normalcy. turkey still wants to play an active role, has a lot more affinity towards hamas than any of the other regions. the relations between hamas and turkey, even though they were bad, trade relations were gad and they were growing. now the political thing is off the map. jerusalem also complicates things, but by and large what we're seeing is an agreement to continue what is normal, relations, full political relations. but what we're seeing now is -- in short, the israelis with turkey, there's not much trust of erdogan. there's certainly no affinity toward erdogan. there's not a hope that he will definitively change his posture.

but there's certainly the relationship between turkey and israel is positive in itself. >> your views on is there an israeli long-term strategy, i mean the kind that describes many elements of it? what's your view of that. and in this administration, where does gaza, does it appear on their awareness radar and what is the approach. you know, there's feeble attempts at reviving the peace process. and do you see in gaza, an opportunity for diplomacy or for progress where it might be more difficult even on the west bank? >> sure. and thanks meu for organizing this. as i was preparing my thoughts for this event, it occurs to me this is the first event i can recall on gaza in washington in

a very long time. which is actually a very telling fact. gaza is off everybody's screen until we start having more discussion about, wow, are we about to have another war? which is kind of striking. i'm old enough to remember a lot of wars in gaza. everyone in this room has probably been through periods of a lot of wars in gaza. and it's sort of each time like there's a car accident in slow it motion, and everyone acts as if no one has agency to do anything but watch these cars collide, or his cars drive into a wall. i think the title of this event says a lot. is gaza reaching a boiling point, as a friend of might have been in israel said, gaza is not a pot of water, it's also not a lawn that grows up and needs to be mowed. it's also not a person who needs to worry about their weight. so the caloric intake is a

question. my friend who runs gisha i talked to her before today, and she said, i'm paraphrasing, we have turned gaza into the largest controlled experiment with human beings in history. testing what is the behavior and breaking point of 2 million people as pressure increases over time. and that is a fundamental challenge for everyone in this room. and sometimes we need to think about resolving it before we think about, hey, are we about to have another war? i want to start with something that's sort of positive and it links to how you opened the question which is is there an israeli strategy. when you look at the israeli approach on this for years, it's really tactical, not strategic,

partly because no one has an idea of how you end this in a way that it has no affect on israel's border, which is an absolute, legitimate concern. because right now we're still framing humanitarian projects in israel and gaza, which means if you help one, you hurt the other. and that's fundamentally wrong. i think a lot of that intervention should be changing that calculus. israel doesn't have strategic objectives in the gaza strip in the way it does in the west bank, the settlers are gone, they have given up, they're gone, they don't see the recidivist stendency. there's none of this we have to keep this much land for the settlers. and that represents a ray of

hope that there are pragmatic solutions that we can work on that are available in gaza that are much harder in the west bank if one were looking for those. at we're talking a tactical approach and the international community including the united states has acquiesced to that and in that sense we are all complicity and we are all enablers in a situation where we can see at any given moment that the situation in gaza and the horror show in gaza has many, many authors, let's be clear. over arching authority and responsibility is israel and i began with natan, israel has a complicated set of issues to balance, but israel turned off the electricity which that is a moral choice and there are arguments for why dealing with fatah, hamas, all of this, everyone bears responsibility and that leads to there are obligations on all sides, but as we look towards the next gaza

war which for months now i remember people six months ago saying are we going to have another war in the summer. my goodness, if we think there's going to be another war in the summer why don't we try to avert it instead of watching the tea leaves. seeing things in jerusalem popping up as other people in the panel said. you know, you can see how these things evolve. the u.s. deserves enormous credit, i believe, and this is something chris talked about for not backing away from the humanitarian side of this. our continued support for an ra is something for which we deserve credit, i'm not sure everyone understands how large it is and i don't know if everyone understands how much political pressure there is against it in terms of congress. you have a constituency in congress and in the jewish community particularly which says the way to solve the refugee issue, because there is no -- there is really no palestinian refugee issue they've been gone so long from their homes the way to solve it

is just to get rid of anra. if the u.n. stops calling them refugees they will stop calling themselves refugees. it's an attractive situation if you want to get rid of a permanent status issue. it's also total crap. but that has been constant pressure for more than a decade and the aide has continued, the american people are committed in a way which i think is quite laudable, but this is not simply a humanitarian crisis and simply bandaging it is not a u.s. policy. it's as much a tactical approach as the israeli approach and it's getting worse and worse and worse, which is where we are today as we talk about when will be the next gaza war. i think, you know, i was thinking about what i would want to talk about here because, again, it's been a very long time since anyone has asked me to talk about gaza and we are sort of in this box when we talk about gaza. i was there i want to say two years ago and i visited anra

facilities. i'm one of the only people i know who doesn't work for a humanitarian organization who goes to gaza. it was a sobering experience. coming back i talked to people, i went up to the hill and talked to people about what i saw in gaza and the response i got was, wow, that's terrible. well, until hamas is gone there's nothing we can do. which i found very predictable and very troubling response in terms of, yes, here is what children are going through, here is what people are going through, here is the security implications of a gaza who is on the verge of breaking down, here is the environmental risks for israel. doesn't matter. we've put ourselves in this box. for me when i talk about this today, and most people know me for the work i do really on settlements in jerusalem, i have concluded today that gaza is no longer a separate issue -- no

longer part of peace process, it is a separate issue and needs to be create l treated as one. it has been isolated and separated for so long, it is no less of a permanent status issue than jerusalem or settlements or refugees. it needs as much attention as those. and for those of you who for years said, listen, gaza will be resolved in the context of a conflict-ending agreement and that will wrap it up and then whatever -- i don't believe that anymore. i don't think anyone can believe that anymore and there is no solution without gaza. so for the israeli right to gives up on the two state solution it doesn't surprise me we are hearing more pragmatic talk. for people who believe somehow gaza solves the west bank by alleviating the demographic pressures on israel, again, i'm going to say that's crap. a technical political term i've coined in this venue. you do not get a peace agreement with the palestinians without

gaza and you do not get a peace agreement on gaza until you start dealing with the realities and that means first and foremost the humanitarian realities, yes, but it also means no longer as an international community as the united states acquiescing to the calculus that's been imposed by the parties, by israel, by fatah, by hamas. this is bigger than them. for years people have said we can't want peace with more than the parties. i have said for a very long time i suspect the international community wants peace more than a lot of the parties, maybe all of them at any given moment, and i suspect that without the pressures and help from the international community they are not going to get past their objections to dealing with each other. and i don't actually know of any other regional conflict in the world where people have said, do you know what, bosnia, row wanda, we can't want peace more than the parties. so the humanitarian side, sorry, it's awful what's happened but as long as you can't put

yourselves together we can't do anything. this has to be done. and whether you're coming at it from a perspective of u.s. national security interest, whether you're concerned about gaza's sinai, the stability of egypt and isis and all of that, whether you're concerned strictly about the israel security, environmental national security stuff, whatever it is, you still get to the same question which is allowing gaza to simmer, whatever you want to do, until we get to the next war is morally abhorrent, it is politically nonsensical and from a security standpoint it is self-defeating. >> thank you very much. i will come back to the question i asked you. this administration, what are you seeing, what are you -- what are the tea leaves on this administration and what are the tea leaves on other diplomatic channels that may or may not exist that relate to gaza or gaza as part of the broader

process? >> sure. so i said to someone recently they asked me what is the trump administration thinking on x and i said anyone who tells you they know what the trump administration is thinking on x is lying to you. i used to say they're lying to themselves, too, now they're just flat outlying. nobody knows and there isn't a single voice. i could say, well, i talked to this one person, political or actually, you know, it can be someone political or bureaucratic and i have no idea. i can say that i think we are continuing our commitment on the humanitarian side and that is laudable and that actually is an expenditure of political capital for which this administration deserves credit. i will say something here as someone who is not a great fan of this administration for a lot of issues or in general, i will say something to give them some credit which is on this they are not that much different on gaza than the obama administration. nobody wants to pay attention to gaza. this is a sink hole for people politically. there are no easy answers available.

anything you do is going to miss off israel, it's going to pisss off fatah, it's going to piss off congress -- >> is that another technical term? >> i'm sorry. you do this for enough years it's like you are just going to say what you think. we have set it up that gaza has no -- there is no point of entry from a policy basis for gaza. we set that up as soon as we put the rules on hamas. you know, the nose you can't deal with hamas until hamas essentially reforms itself. it's simply not possible. if the rules of engagement will not engage until the people in charge lock up, leave and say we're sorry and put themselves in jail you're saying there there is no place to engage. okay. fine. you try that. you tried it for a lot of years. it didn't work. when i hear discussion on thi wl us trees panel about the calculations people are making

about what is going to weaken who i harken back to a decade ago sitting in a conference in beirut where fatah and hamas was debating who was going to wait longer and who was going to be in a better position when the other guy was weaker. we have had this game playing for a decade. i was just in ram la and i asked somebody about the electricity issue and they weren't defending it, this is someone on the inside but they were saying it's basically a failed policy. if we were going to do it we should have done it ten years ago. now it's a failed policy. maybe. it still would have been immoral ten years ago, but at this point we've been down this road over and over there's always a little bit of difference on the margin. is dalan and the emirates going to turn this if you have that the fatah hamas calculations fundamentally change and suddenly one person gets to be in charge and we have a new point of entry? i guess we can hope for it. as an analyst i find it extremely improbable that

outside some serious intervention from the outside world saying you will move this direction there is a benefit to you if you do, there is a cost to you if you don't. i think we're just same war different day with slightly different effects and the same horrific impacts on the ground. >> thank you very much. let me now turn to the audience for questions. there are roving microphones, raise your hand so i can see. the gentleman in the far back, introduce yourselves -- introduce yourself and ask your lajaffe, i used to travel to gaza regularly in 2013 and '14 for news reports. my question is about hamas as a terrorist group. the eu has recently ruled to keep hamas on the terror list and there's no possibility that the united states is going to

drop hamas off the list in the near future. so my question is to end the gaza blockade is there any specific step like is this a prerequisite to at least for the world to recognize hamas is not a terrorist group? we know that things are -- the two things are related, but how close -- how closely are the two things related? >> thank you. there's a gentleman right next to you, since the microphone is already in that neighborhood. and then i will come over here. >> my name is [ inaudible ] i teach at george washington university. i have a quick question. how will the situation impact the palestinian issue considering you have russian troops, american troops, kurdish troops [ inaudible ]. >> thank you. over here the gentleman in the second row. two gentlemen in the second row:

gentlemen in the red shirt first. the panelists take night of the questions, we will come back to you. >> i'm adviser to apac and my question is the security corporation between idf and security forces of course we know that hamas [ inaudible ] for a while [ inaudible ], but how secure is [ inaudible ] corporation if there are more crisis like the one we had [ inaudible ]. >> gentleman on the second road as well. >> i just came from karim shalom and there is no blockade. i think it's a myth. which means everything that the gazaen wants the gaz zanen get through israel. there is a situation where we have 1,000 trucks every day with everything that they need,

israel only looks at the military stuff and very small stuff. if they want to have electronic system for missiles, no, but if you want to have juice, eggs, whatever you want. so there is a myth. if tomorrow israel opens the borders or egypt opens the borders the situation will not change. the blockade is not a problem. >> thank you. the lady in the third row. >> i'm from the d.c. justice for muslims coalition. i have a question on the definition of a renegade state that was referred to as hamas. i'm wondering what exactly that definition is because when we think of israel, a country that continuously violates international law, destroys the infrastructure of gaza, kills civilians, et cetera, i think we have to think about what the construction is of renegade state.

secondly, i'm a little surprised in this panel that it seems like we're talking about palestine and israel as if they're equal parties in the conflict and it's clearly the case obviously that israel has the power to sort of mitigate the conditions that palestinians are facing. i'm kind of curious as to why the comments were kind of tilted in that regard because i think that that's a huge oversight. and with regards to, you know, the u.s.'s role in funding underlaw, for example, while you said it was laudable i also wonder how does that then work out with the billions of dollars of military foreign aid that the u.s. provides israel with, that seems rather counterproductive. and then lastly in terms of, you know, thinking about gaz sfwla as a humanitarian crisis, we are not talking about gaza there is a hurricane that went through gaza, we are talking about a humanitarian crisis caused by state violence. so i'm hoping that i can hear from you all as to how we

address a humanitarian crisis in that regard. >> thank you. let's go to our panel. lada, we will start with you. choose any questions you want to respond to. >> unfortunately i can't read my handwriting on the questions that i just wrote down. so first of all i actually want to start in the back because i think it's a key question, the question of hamas as a terrorist group and other people can talk about, you know -- i think chris can probably address the whole issue of the mechanism for reconstruction and the limits that are put on dealing with gaza because hamas is in charge. i mean, hamas is a terror organization because they engage in terrorism. whatever you believe, i mean, in terms of israel's relationship with hamas and what it should be and the fact is israel does deal with hamas and gaza, let's not pretend they don't, it's the united states and the international community that says zero, zero, zero contact,

but the fact is hamas has supporting devastating terrorism inside israel and i would argue that shooting missiles, shooting rockets unaimed into civilian areas is definition alley terrorist activity. that is not resistance, that is not self defense. when you are just shooting things up and wondering where they will land and you're aiming them towards populated areas that is terrorism. that being said, the fact that the west bank -- the fact that gaza is under the control of hamas doesn't mean that the entire population of gaza is now guilty of being terrorists or that it is legitimate or legal or moral to inflict collective punishment. we've been having this discussion since the plc elections in mid 2000s. right? hamas won those elections fair and square. i was on the ground as an election observer. they won them fair and square and suddenly it became, well,

the palestinian people deserve whatever they get because hamas which by the way ran as the party of change and reform, correct, yes, change and reform, running against -- not running on islamic terrorists but running as the anti-corruption party. obviously they had another agenda as well. suddenly saying, well, 2 million people in gaza essentially the political horizon for them is erased because hamas is a terrorist organization and the world will basically, you know, throw a little bit here and there to try to keep them from really dying. this is a man made humanitarian crisis and it's just -- i'm not -- i'm not an expert on every conflict in the world, i cannot think of any conflict where the world has essentially said we hate the ruler so we are actually going to abandon the people completely or almost completely in a conflict where

we are actively supporting one side militarily and security perspective. it doesn't hold up as logic and it doesn't hold up as a national security construct for the u.s. >> thank you. chris, any comments, particularly maybe the issue of the blockade, you know, what impact does it have and also issues of you said there has been deed development since 14, could you say a bit more about that and how do you see potential reconstruction or development? >> sure. i would be happy to. you know, in the blockade i've been there as well and it is quite an impressive arrangement that they have there for impo s imports. the problem as mentioned in our earlier remarks it's not the ports that is fundamentally the problem, there are challenges and those are being worked through. there are items available for purchase. it's the exports and it's the economy. as i said, if you can't afford the products you can't buy them. just an example here, 2 million

people in the gaza strip, my organization feeds 1 million people in the gaza trip that's half of the population. wfp we only feed refugees. wfp needs another 250,000. so we are talking about 1.25 million people out of a population of 2 million that relies on u.n. food assistance. so it's not that there is nothing on the shelves. so -- and it's also not just the movement of goods but it's specifically even more important the movement of people. prior to tblockade there were 100,000 palestinians that worked in israel. if anybody has been in the border crossing it's evident that that was built with a view to having massive amounts of people crossing the border. it's an enormous place. every time i go there it's empty. it's barrel anybody there. but, you know, part of this is if the economy is going to

recover there needs to be this exchange or movement of not only goods or people and not only goods going in but goods going out. i think that's the critical component of this. in terms of the reconstruction we have a part of the role in the reconstruction of shelters, of housing in gaza. we don't have the full control of that system, the gaza reconstruction mechanism is overseen in part by the u.n. and it is a very tight regime, it's very strict on where the material goes, the arrangement we have with israel and importing concrete and other materials involves video cameras and watching the materials, we have to certify international staff members about where the material s photos of walls we've built with concrete matching that up with the amount of concrete we requested so that's a tight regime. those are all done for security reasons for israel, they don't want any of the materials used for construction to be diverted for other uses.

i think there's -- also we see while there are infrastructure projects taking place and we do quite a few of them, we even do some additional ones that aren't necessarily directly related to refugees in gaza, there's a hesitancy for many donors to invest heavily in infrastructure in gaza. who is going to control it? who is going to run it, operate it, ensure it's sustainable in the long run, what happens if there is another conflict, is it going to be destroyed and we will have to rebuild it again. there is hesitation on behalf of many in the international community to actually address the really underlying infrastructure problems. then you talk about the humanitarian issues and part of that is employment, but again there is no jobs and you can't just create jobs. we have the second largest -- we are the second largest employer in gaza. we represent about 11% of the gdp which is outrageous that a u.n. agency does that. so i think until those can be

systematically addressed it's not going to really solve the issue. >> thank you, chris. comments on some of the questions? >> yes, i'm going to try to comment on the questions sort of collectively and some of the things that were spoken about on this panel that, you know, give me a number of thoughts while everyone was speaking. i think it's really important to -- sorry. so i think it's really important here to take a step back and understanding the broader context in which all of this is happening. defining hamas as a terrorist organization whether you support that or you don't support that in my mind is a red herring because it has created a situation where everything that israel does towards the gaza strip is excused. it becomes excusable under the fight of terrorism or the fight against radical islamic groups or any kind of policy seen through the prism of fighting

terror becomes excusable. so before hamas and gaza being a terrorist haven there was a plo and it was a [ inaudible ] haven. when hamas was a terrorist organization it was also an islamic em rat and renegade state. there are all these terms that keep getting used that appear to justify a policy that's put in place to maintain gaza as a problematic enclave that is separate from the rest of the palestinian territories. so what that has created is a situation where we're not actually talking about conflict resolution. we're not talking about trying to resolve the political drivers of the cop flikt. we're talking about conflict management. we're saying we're going to keep the gaza strip, you know, we spoke a bit about the tactical issues and the absence of a long-term strategy within israel and the fact that israel had debate internally about whether or not to increase the

installation of the gaza strip and suffering through some of the security measures, but all of those are operating within the context of wanting to have a palestinian authority enter west bank which is committed to security coordination and which maintains israel's security in the west bank while having an authority in the gaza strip that is actually anti-concession, has refused to recognize israel, committed to arms struggle against israel and to suggest that that represents the 2 million palestinians, this way we can manage the palestinian territories without allowing them any form of unity and without addressing their political drivers that animate what hamas as an organization is. so we can think whatever we want to think about hamas, i personally find many of its

policies despicable, but that doesn't mean that hamas doesn't have legitimate political goals that were called for by the plo before hamas and that if hamas were to be defeated now would be called for by some organization after hamas. so rather than fix agt on this idea of how do we -- you know, the zero sum game between fatah and hamas and how do we manage the situation in gaza, ensure security, we need to be thinking about what the underlying political drivers that give rise to organizations like hamas are to begin with. and the fact of the matter is israel is an occupying state and gaza is still under occupation. so when we talk about collective punishment and when you talk about hamas not caring for the people under its rule israel as an occupying force has a responsibility to people under occupation by it. the palestinians in gaza are still occupied by israel.

and so this idea of collective punishment is actually in violation of international law to begin with from the side of the israelis, regardless of what hamas thinks about the people under its rule. the one other thing i want to say is we can talk about -- we can talk about hamas not caring about the people under its rule, we can talk about hamas being a terrorist organization, hamas being illegitimate. the fact of the matter is that many people that i spoke with in gaza despise hamas, they also despise israel which is the biggest architect of this sort of occupying infrastructure and framework around the gaza strip, but when wars flare up people support the resistance and there is a reason for that. it's not because all the people in the gaza strip and all the palestinians are terrorists, they support the resistance because there are legitimate internationally sanctioned rights including the right to

self-determination, the right of return, the core tenets of the palestinian struggle. whether those are couched in hamas or fatah or lone wolf attacks, those are always been there. so instead of talk about this idea of managing gaza, you know, israel is in a difficult position because it has to deal with this internal palestinian struggle, in reality there wouldn't be that situation if israel worked to end its occupation and get in line with international law and with american foreign policy which continues to call for a two-state solution. so if there is any sort of desire to genuinely end this situation in the gaza strip the way isn't to focus on hamas and stop defining it as a terrorist organization and engage with it and all those things, those would be rerequisites in my opinion, but it would be to deal with the palestinian issue as a political problem that still has

international law or demands that are supported by international law that israel continues to sidestep and circumvent in its so-called fight against terror. >> thank you. >> there is a lot to deal with, i won't cover everything. first the question was asked about renegade province. it is a technical terms and it's actually not a question of israel's determination or my determination, it's a question for the pa to decide. so a country, a province that is a renegade province usually would be one that's ruled by rebellious military and that would entail very dramatic if the pa were to declare gaza a renegade province it would entail very dramatic sanctions against gaza and in particular stopping paying for things -- sorry, for ramala for things in gaza strip. the pa has not declared gaza to be a province in rebellion. i think there is a more important sort of undertone to

the whole question. renegade province or any other determination or calling hamas a terror organization, i think we're us missing the point. there are 2 million people in a very difficult terrible situation, there is also -- care or not, but i think there are also people neighboring gaza in israel that are in a much better situation but find themselves every two years running to the shelter. the question who do you hate more, you're saying israel we should hate more than hamas, that's kind of beside the point -- [ inaudible ]. >> i apologize, then. so whether or not someone hates israel more, hates hamas more, that really is beside the point. the request he is what the parties can do and it's important to remember a few things. first is that the stronger party as you mentioned israel is definitely the stronger party as many more believers of power and also has a moral responsibility

for a lot of things that's happened but it's a terrible mistake, it's self-bigotry of low expectations to think that the palestinians have no decisions at all. life in the last decade has been very bad in the west bank, it's been light years better than the gaza strip. the same evil is ra he will is dealing with both of them. evil in quotations. something about the decisions in ram la and gaza has been different and had an effect on the lives of millions of people. we can argue about who is to blame and who is to not, but i think we should focus on the important thing which is a dramatic crisis of people. historic kwibls about who is responsible for what, there is also agencies to the parties. the evidence of that is the question of the terrorist organization. whether it's a definition -- do you define it this way or not. i think maybe relevant is whether it uses terrorism, but that should not be relevant i think to whether one deals with the reality that hamas is there,

has a lot of power, should be dealt with, should be spoken to, not because anyone likes it, i don't, but because it's a reality. we speak to many regimes, many organizations that we hate with good reason but we still deal with them in reality. i would say about the blockade there is a lot of words that are usually thrown around. people sometimes say there is a siege of gaza. that would mean you're trying to starve the population into existence. that doesn't happen. there is clearly a blockade. the israelis define it as a blockade and have legally gained sort of legal recognition that fighting a state -- it's not quite a state, blockade is one of the things that you do in war. the u.s. has done it with cuba, many countries have done it with many others. the problem is that we have this no man's land of ten years of a partial blockade by israel and egypt against the gaza strip

with no clear resolution. israel is not intending to conquer the gaza strip, it's not intending to simply let hamas do whatever it wants and attack israel. even if it's much weaker no country, the u.s., denmark, anyone would allow a neighbor to attack it even if it's much weaker. if tijuana broke from mexico and started shelling san diego the u.s. would do something about it. now, should it do a ten-year blockade? i think not. i think things need to be changed dramatically, but it does not -- because there is no palestinian agency whatsoever, nor is it that israel is not the stronger power. i will try to end quickly. so i hope i've angered people on both sides enough. security corporation i think this is a crucial question in the west bank. i don't know, i don't know the pa very well but i think this is a crucial question and especially when we look at what's happening in the gaza strip and when we think about

what happens we saw can lead to the gaza strip quickly. we are entering a dangerous period not only with gaza but the west bank. the possibility of transitioning of ending a security corporation or what might happen with security apparatuses is crucial. i very much hope the corporation continues, it is normalization, it is cooperating with israel and i think that's a good thing. i think it has allowed the west bank to be vastly better than the gaza trip, although it is certainly not where it should be which should be an independent state alongside israel. >> we have seven minutes left. i will take two questions and then to the floor. gentleman in the fifth row. [ inaudible ]. >> microphone, please. >> roland robinson representing the national council on u.s. arab relations and gulf state analytics. with regard to the qatar crisis what would an elongation of that mean for gaza, are there any

quantifiable impacts we can expect if it lasts for months or years as it is had aen indica d indicated? >> thank you. gentleman in the front here. that gentleman, yes. you. >> welcome -- >> speak into the microphone. >> my name is hassan, i was born in tehran, i represent global bridges for humanity and our logo is use your tongue, not your gun, but the problem of what is going on in palestine did not exist 100 years ago. i am sure 100 years from now it's not going to exist either. >> quick question because we don't have time. >> the question is this, for 60 years of negotiation we have got nothing. when is the more powerful partner, the occupiers of palestinian land going to

realize that this cannot go forever. either they have to live together or they're going to die alone. >> shoe. the gentleman who didn't hold the microphone briefly, required to write. >> thank you for doing this. >> i have a question for mr. saggen and mr. free man. after i talked to a rabbi he said the reason the israeli attacks on palestine is not only because of hamas but also for the holy promises that israel wants to achieve in jerusalem and palestine. and whenever gaza and palestine get attacked by israel israel obviously blames hamas. do you really think that israel will stop its attacks and occupational mindset in hamas -- occupational mind-set if hamas decides to dissolve itself?

is. >> thank you. we have one minute each for our panelists and then you can ambush them in the hallways after this. >> the question of occupation, of israeli occupation of the gaza strip and when will it finally stan to end it. israel as perceived as an occupier of the gaza strip rests on what really? israeli troops are not in the gaza strip, settlements are not in the gaza strip, the border is partly closed but that is perfectly normal between two countries, the border in many countries is closed. the main difference is the -- the question of sea access and inter access. that's where israel has some effective control. that's basically the core of all we're talking about when we're talking business really occupation in the gaza strip. i would be very cautious on using that word because israelis time and time again if you see gaza and israel it's completely obvious to israelis -- [ inaudible ]. >> i understand, but we have

very few minutes. you can discuss later. >> no, i didn't say it's -- i said the occupation boils down to that. that's what i said. [ inaudible ]. >> okay. maybe there are invisible settlers there that i don't know of. it boils down to the effective control of the territory, that's what these organizations talk about, which is the air and the sea. it's not the border with egypt which is -- there are no settlers that i have seen, no military troops inside gaza, it boils down to the effective control which is what, the sea and the air. this is what it boils down to. and it's dangerous to use this -- to use this rhetoric of israel is responsible for absolutely everything because it weakens the possibility of convincing israelis that if occupation ever ended something would change. in israeli minds they pulled out of the gaza strip and what resulted was worse for palestinians and also israelis. therefore we need to be careful about this. when will israelis change their mind? in their thought it's around

august 1993 when they decided to engage the plo, accept the idea that had already been accepted and in 2000 and later accept the two-state solution. has this happened? no. has israel done everything it should, absolutely not. let's not forget there have been two parties to these negotiations that have broke down. i just want to point out what's happening is we're arguing about who is right, who is wrong, is israel evil, is it occupying or not. we need to be asking ourselves how the actual situation of real people is improved. i will stop. >> time is short. >> so since time is short i will be quite quick. i think this is where probably natan and i disagree. it's not just about making the lives of day to day inhabitants better, it's about getting them political rights and full equality. so in the west bank the lives of people could be better but they're also committed to

security coordination, you're also unable to live and maintain a semblance of life that is devoid of occupation and devoid of israeli control into your every day life. including through check points, including through home demolitions, including whether or not you are able to study abroad. this idea if life is better then everything is okay is fundamentally inaccurate. then the fact that, you know, in '87 it was a rupture of this idea that when life is better, you know, people will stop demanding political rights, people will continue to demand political rights. that's not happening in the west bank and it's definitely not happening in the gaza strip. in terms of the idea of occupation, there's a vast body of literature which shows why the gaza strip is occupied, it's not only the sea and air, it's the fact if you have cancer in the gaza strip you're not able to get chemotherapy because israel doesn't allow you to leave.

to my mind that's a form of occupation. people who are born and raised in the gaza strip would have to register within israel to be allowed to get some form of identity at some point so israel is the body that's able to get people registration, it maintains the population registry, that's another way in which gaza is occupied. i think i'm going to end with this final comment here about, you know, when will -- when will the situation change. i think it's -- i'm in no way shying away from criticizing the palestinian leadership, i think half of my talk in the beginning was about doing just that and about the fact that the palestinian struggle has devolved into some factional zero sum game, but ultimately until the average israeli starts seeing the impact of the occupation on their life and are unable to go to their coffee shops in tel aviv or go to jerusalem without seeing that they are fundamentally electing and supporting governments that

are maintaining the occupation, until that shift happens within israel then the occupation is actually quite sustainable and we've been saying, you know, for the past 60 years or 50 years since '67 but also since '48 that the situation is not sustainable. it's actually very sustainable. and until the costs start changing for israel things aren't going to change on the ground. >> thank you. chris and laura, last words. >> i will yield back my minute. >> all right. >> so i want to close by going back to what i said before which is i think gaza has to be woven back into the suggestion of resolving the palestinian as a whole. when also the next war in gaza, but a week ago we were talking about whether or not dwrer use thumb was going to completely explode. we have had a low level sort of quasi mini which has bubbled up for the past three years around

jerusalem. when we walk about lone wolf terrorism that's not from gaza, that's from the west bank and happening in east jerusalem. this comes down -- and i agree with a lot of what both of my colleagues said even where they disagree with each other, the immediate challenge when we look at gaza is clearly humanitarian. you would have to be a sociopath to look at gaza and not feel -- not just terrible but some sense of human responsibility for trying to make things better. but the reality is you can band-aid it all you want. that's absent overwhelmingly. the overwhelming absence is a political horizon. that's absent not just in gaza, it's maybe more obvious that it's absent in gaza because there's really nothing, there's not even a pretense of a political horizon, but it's long been absent in the west bank and east jerusalem as well. i'm old enough to remember the logic after the after hamas took over gaza which is the international community is going

to shut out hamas and people will see how bad life is in gaza while we let life flourish in the west bank. i've watched the past ten years as life in the west bank has basically seen the political horizon for ending occupation disappear, settlements constantly expanding, area c being depopulated. i mean, let's be honest here, that wasn't even a real -- i mean, if that had worked, if we had seen gaza turn -- gaza turn into this difficult place and the west bank turn into hong kong you could have said, all right, this is maybe a winning strategy, people will see turning away from hamas has benefits, but abbas has no credibility in the west bank. spend some time there. talk to people and don't go to rawabi as exciting as it is, it is not an example of what's happening in the west bank. the area in the south hills and in the shilo valley is a better example of what's happening in the west bank where you are

seeing huge areas of what should be a future palestinian state if anyone is serious about a two-state solution being effectively depopulated. in the shiloh valley it's happening essentially -- you don't need very many settlers if you need outposts that are like pins and string and you use the pins and string to take over massive areas and you have the israeli government passing laws which suspend the rule of law to allow this to continue. >> fundamentally you asked what about the religious side even if hamas goes away, even if we have a viable peace plan what about the religious side. some of my best friends that are in israel who are on my left are deeply -- if you talk to -- it doesn't matter, we all know these people who come out of a portion of real love of the land. let's not forget hebron is the cradle of judaism. the idea of giving up control of hebron is very painful if you are religious at all.

even if you are not religious you should understand why there is a connection for the jewish people to hebron. when i talk to my friends and they say i dream of the day that i come back to hebron and be welcomed as a person with a legitimate right and legitimate history here, that's what they're fighting for. i think that strand of religious commitment to the land does not demand perpetual occupation. at the end of the day, though, humanitarian obviously but the political horizon across the board, that is what we always get back to and after every war that's what we're going to be still missing until somebody res reflects it for the israelis and palestinians alike. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> this has been a very excellent and sobering panel, i want to thank you all for coming. before thanking the panel if you could stay seated, please, for a moment before we finish, i wanted to again thank the george and rhonda family foundation for

their support and mei board member mr. george salem for his continued support. please join me in thanking this excellent panel. [ applause ]

president trump says he has a very big announcement to make at his rally in west virginia. c-span will have live coverage starting at 7:00 p.m. eastern. and on c-span 3, american history tv is in prime time all week with our original series, landmark cases. this evening we will look at the slaughter house cases of 1873 which limited the privileges and immunities of u.s. citizens, guaranteed by the newly enacted 14th amendment. american history tv prime time begins at 8:00 p.m. eastern. sunday on in-depth, american educator, tea party activist, author and attorney chris ann hall is our guest. >> and for different reasons everybody has an idea that the federal government is out of control. and then the most asked question i get as we teach, what do you suppose that is? what do we do about it?

but if we had been teaching the constitution properly for the last 150 years we would know what to do. >> she's the author of several books including "essential stories for junior patriots", in defense of lib aert and sovereign duties. during our three hour conversation we will be taking your phone calls, tweets and facebook questions. watch in depth with chris ann hall, sunday, live from noon to 3:00 p.m. eastern on book tv on c-span 2. >> this week college students from across the country are in washington, d.c. for the national conservative student conference. the conference kicked off on monday with senator rand paul speaking to the students. on tuesday they heard from radio host david prager. former virginia governor and senator george allen and former speaker of the house newt gingrich.